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SAP BusinessObjects
Attacks
Juan Perez-Etchegoyen
jppereze@onapsis.com
February 2014
IT-Defense Security Conference
Will Vandevanter
wvandevanter@onapsis.com
2SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Disclaimer
This publication is copyright 2014 Onapsis, Inc. – All rights reserved.
This publication contains references to the products of SAP AG. SAP, R/3, xApps, xApp, SAP
NetWeaver, Duet, PartnerEdge, ByDesign, SAP Business ByDesign, and other SAP products and
services mentioned herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of SAP AG in Germany and in
several other countries all over the world.
Business Objects and the Business Objects logo, BusinessObjects, Crystal Reports, Crystal Decisions,
Web Intelligence, Xcelsius and other Business Objects products and services mentioned herein are
trademarks or registered trademarks of Business Objects in the United States and/or other countries.
SAP AG is neither the author nor the publisher of this publication and is not responsible for its content,
and SAP Group shall not be liable for errors or omissions with respect to the materials.
3SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Who is Onapsis, Inc.?
 Company focused in protecting ERP systems from cyber-attacks.
SAP®, Siebel®, Oracle® E-Business SuiteTM, PeopleSoft®, JD Edwards® …
 Trusted by Global Fortune-100 and large governmental organizations.
 What does Onapsis do?
 Innovative ERP security software (Onapsis X1, Onapsis Bizploit, Onapsis IA).
 ERP security consulting services.
 Trainings on business-critical infrastructure security.
Who are we?
 Juan Perez-Etchegoyen, CTO at Onapsis.
 Will Vandevanter, Security Researcher at Onapsis.
4SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Agenda
 SAP BusinessObjects Landscape
 The attacker lifecycle
 Abusing the Business Intelligence Process
 Conclusions
5SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
SAP BusinessObjects
Landscape
6SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
What is SAP?
● Largest provider of business management solutions in the world.
● More than 140.000 implementations around the globe.
● More than 90.000 customers in 120 countries.
● Used by Global Fortune-1000 companies, governmental
organizations and defense agencies to run their every-day business
processes.
● Such as Revenue / Production / Expenditure business cycles.
SALES
PRODUCTION
FINANCIAL PLANNING
INVOICING
PROCUREMENT
TREASURY
LOGISTICS
PAYROLL
BILLING
7SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
SAP BusinessObjects
● Purchased by SAP in 2007
● Business Analysis and Intelligence is the Core
Functionality
● Produces Reports, Dashboards and KPI
consumed by decision makers
● Simplifies analysis of data for users
● Usually pulling information from products such
as ERP or CRM
8SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Impact of a breach to an SAP system
While for traditional SAP systems (ERP,CRM,SCM…) it is easier
to understand the impact of a security breach...
ESPIONAGE: Obtain customers/vendors/human resources
data, financial planning information, balances, profits, sales
information, manufacturing recipes, etc.
SABOTAGE: Paralyze the operation of the organization by
shutting down the SAP system, disrupting interfaces with other
systems and deleting critical information, etc.
FRAUD: Modify financial information, tamper sales and
purchase orders, create new vendors, modify vendor bank
account numbers, etc.
9SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Impact of a breach to a BO System
In a BusinessObjects implementation it is more difficult to
understand the impact of a security breach...
FINANCIAL STATEMENT: Incorrect reporting to
authorities such as SEC. Access the information in advance.
BUDGETING AND STAFFING: Incorrect allocating of
resources for the achievement of targets.
SALES FORECAST: Critical to determine the budget and to
understand how much the company will grow, quantity of
products to be produced, purchasing requirements…
LIQUIDITY PLANNING: Affect the understanding of the
available cash that the company will have during a period of
time.
10SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Business Intelligence
11SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
 BW is an analytical, reporting and data warehousing product
 Structured by layers. ETL (Extract, Transform, Load) is probably the
most important layer
 The process of extracting data from other SAP Systems is usually
performed by RFC Function Calls.
BO/BI/BW
 SAP BusinessObjects are
usually connected to SAP BW
12SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
13SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
14SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
VIP Services
● Central Management Server
● File Repository Server
● Report Templates
● Resulting Reports
● Server Intelligence Agent
● Client Endpoints
● Web Applications: Central Management Console
● Web Services
15SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Communication
● From the Client browser tier to
the Application tier, SOAP and
HTTP are the most common
methods of communication
(REST is also available)
● Most of the Inter “Process” communication is
done using CORBA on the BO Service Bus
16SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Communication – CORBA
● Standard defined by OMG
(“Similar” to JAVA RMI)
● Uses IIOP Network Protocol
● Uses IDL to define
interfaces exposed
● Designed to facilitate the communication of
systems that are deployed on diverse platforms.
Source: Wikipedia
17SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Client to Server Communication - CORBA
● Interoperable Object Reference (IOR)
● Reference to a remote object
● Provided by the server, consumed by the client
to communicate using remote object
● Example Components
● “IDL:Hello/HelloWorld”
● “Host: www.remotecorba.com”
● “Port: 4678”
18SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
BO Communication – CORBA
● Each BO server has a number of services
available via CORBA
● A client needs to know the IOR of the remote
service to initiate communication
● They also need to know (or reverse engineer)
the IDL to communicate meaningfully
19SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
BO CORBA Example – Client to CMS
Client “aps” CMS
Client IOR:010000003500……. CMS
Client {object} CMS
Parse IOR to obtain IP/Port, Object Key,…
20SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
BO and the Attacker
Lifecycle
21SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Quick Note on Attackers
● Many Different Types of attackers
● Internal/External
● Advanced/Script kiddies
● Just for fun/Criminal organizations
● Identifying the threat actor is an obvious key to
defense
● Define monitoring processes
● Define configuration and security standards
22SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Default Ports (Reconnaissance)
23SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Reconnaissance
● In default state, 15 other listening ports
● Example Use Case
● One service needs to know the IP:PORT of
another service. How does it get this
information?
● Asks the CMS via CORBA
24SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Demo
25SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Note on Defense
As discussed in the Administrators guide,
limiting network access to every
BusinessObjects component is the best method
to protect against pulling information from
these services.
26SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Account Types
● Enterprise
● SAP
● LDAP
● WindowsAD
27SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Default Accounts (Reconnaissance)
28SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Note on Defense
It is critically important to apply the most up
to date security notes. Furthermore, disabling
unused web applications and services limits
the attack surface.
29SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Major Version Info (Reconnaissance)
● What Web Interfaces are available?
● Web Services also has valuable information
30SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
A Warning About MITM
● Communication is Unencrypted by default
● An Attacker can hijack a Session via HTTP or
CORBA
31SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Poisoning and
Intercepting
Business
Intelligence
32SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
“Post Exploitation”
● We are discussing an attacker that wishes to
access or poison the Business Intelligence Process
● See “Actions on Objectives” in the Intrusion Kill
Chain
● Intercepting vs. Poisoning
● How we discuss “Data” is important
33SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
● Information disclosure
– Any information in the data sources
– Generated Reports
● Information Tampering
– Switching data source system
– Changes on the business data
– Changes on the generated reports
● …
Business-oriented Attack Vectors
34SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
● BO processes and groups information from
many systems (ERP, SCM, CRM, HR, etc).
● By compromising BO/BW/BI the attacker will
have almost all of the company critical
information in a central repository.
● Access to Business Reports
● Access to Financial Statements
BI
ERP
SCM
HR
CRM
Information Disclosure
35SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Information Tampering
● Change data source
– Point to a different SAP system (ERP,BW…)
– Changing Infoproviders (Infoset, SAP
Queries…)
● Modify BO contents
– Reports
– Dashboards
– KPI
36SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Demo
37SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Impacting BO BI – Client Side
● Commonly an attacker will focus on a client with
access
● Obvious ways to access data
● Check the FS
● Browser cookies
● How else?
38SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Impacting BO BI – Client Side
● Network Sniffing
● Active Traffic is best
● But, the Client will auto ping the Server on a
set schedule
●SESSION_ID is given in the ping
39SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Demo
40SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Impacting BO BI – Client Side
●Power Shell
● Made available in the Client or Server
BusinessObjects installation
● SDK Like functionality
● Reporting Access
● InfoQuery
● Session Handling
41SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Impacting BO BI – Server Side
● File Repository Server
● Input
● Output
● What is a report to BO?
● File on the Filesystem
● Entry in the InfoStore
● Not all files will stay overwritten
42SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Demo
43SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Conclusion
● Read the Admin Guide!
● Many of these attacks can be prevented or
detected
● Keep the systems updated!
● Enable Auditing
● Periodically scan/monitor the systems
● Secure the system and the critical data
44SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Questions?
jppereze@onapsis.com
wvandevanter@onapsis.com
45SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
Thank you!
www.onapsis.com
Follow us! @onapsis

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SAP Business Objects Attacks

  • 1. SAP BusinessObjects Attacks Juan Perez-Etchegoyen jppereze@onapsis.com February 2014 IT-Defense Security Conference Will Vandevanter wvandevanter@onapsis.com
  • 2. 2SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Disclaimer This publication is copyright 2014 Onapsis, Inc. – All rights reserved. This publication contains references to the products of SAP AG. SAP, R/3, xApps, xApp, SAP NetWeaver, Duet, PartnerEdge, ByDesign, SAP Business ByDesign, and other SAP products and services mentioned herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of SAP AG in Germany and in several other countries all over the world. Business Objects and the Business Objects logo, BusinessObjects, Crystal Reports, Crystal Decisions, Web Intelligence, Xcelsius and other Business Objects products and services mentioned herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of Business Objects in the United States and/or other countries. SAP AG is neither the author nor the publisher of this publication and is not responsible for its content, and SAP Group shall not be liable for errors or omissions with respect to the materials.
  • 3. 3SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Who is Onapsis, Inc.?  Company focused in protecting ERP systems from cyber-attacks. SAP®, Siebel®, Oracle® E-Business SuiteTM, PeopleSoft®, JD Edwards® …  Trusted by Global Fortune-100 and large governmental organizations.  What does Onapsis do?  Innovative ERP security software (Onapsis X1, Onapsis Bizploit, Onapsis IA).  ERP security consulting services.  Trainings on business-critical infrastructure security. Who are we?  Juan Perez-Etchegoyen, CTO at Onapsis.  Will Vandevanter, Security Researcher at Onapsis.
  • 4. 4SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Agenda  SAP BusinessObjects Landscape  The attacker lifecycle  Abusing the Business Intelligence Process  Conclusions
  • 5. 5SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved SAP BusinessObjects Landscape
  • 6. 6SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved What is SAP? ● Largest provider of business management solutions in the world. ● More than 140.000 implementations around the globe. ● More than 90.000 customers in 120 countries. ● Used by Global Fortune-1000 companies, governmental organizations and defense agencies to run their every-day business processes. ● Such as Revenue / Production / Expenditure business cycles. SALES PRODUCTION FINANCIAL PLANNING INVOICING PROCUREMENT TREASURY LOGISTICS PAYROLL BILLING
  • 7. 7SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved SAP BusinessObjects ● Purchased by SAP in 2007 ● Business Analysis and Intelligence is the Core Functionality ● Produces Reports, Dashboards and KPI consumed by decision makers ● Simplifies analysis of data for users ● Usually pulling information from products such as ERP or CRM
  • 8. 8SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Impact of a breach to an SAP system While for traditional SAP systems (ERP,CRM,SCM…) it is easier to understand the impact of a security breach... ESPIONAGE: Obtain customers/vendors/human resources data, financial planning information, balances, profits, sales information, manufacturing recipes, etc. SABOTAGE: Paralyze the operation of the organization by shutting down the SAP system, disrupting interfaces with other systems and deleting critical information, etc. FRAUD: Modify financial information, tamper sales and purchase orders, create new vendors, modify vendor bank account numbers, etc.
  • 9. 9SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Impact of a breach to a BO System In a BusinessObjects implementation it is more difficult to understand the impact of a security breach... FINANCIAL STATEMENT: Incorrect reporting to authorities such as SEC. Access the information in advance. BUDGETING AND STAFFING: Incorrect allocating of resources for the achievement of targets. SALES FORECAST: Critical to determine the budget and to understand how much the company will grow, quantity of products to be produced, purchasing requirements… LIQUIDITY PLANNING: Affect the understanding of the available cash that the company will have during a period of time.
  • 10. 10SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Business Intelligence
  • 11. 11SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved  BW is an analytical, reporting and data warehousing product  Structured by layers. ETL (Extract, Transform, Load) is probably the most important layer  The process of extracting data from other SAP Systems is usually performed by RFC Function Calls. BO/BI/BW  SAP BusinessObjects are usually connected to SAP BW
  • 12. 12SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
  • 13. 13SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved
  • 14. 14SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved VIP Services ● Central Management Server ● File Repository Server ● Report Templates ● Resulting Reports ● Server Intelligence Agent ● Client Endpoints ● Web Applications: Central Management Console ● Web Services
  • 15. 15SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Communication ● From the Client browser tier to the Application tier, SOAP and HTTP are the most common methods of communication (REST is also available) ● Most of the Inter “Process” communication is done using CORBA on the BO Service Bus
  • 16. 16SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Communication – CORBA ● Standard defined by OMG (“Similar” to JAVA RMI) ● Uses IIOP Network Protocol ● Uses IDL to define interfaces exposed ● Designed to facilitate the communication of systems that are deployed on diverse platforms. Source: Wikipedia
  • 17. 17SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Client to Server Communication - CORBA ● Interoperable Object Reference (IOR) ● Reference to a remote object ● Provided by the server, consumed by the client to communicate using remote object ● Example Components ● “IDL:Hello/HelloWorld” ● “Host: www.remotecorba.com” ● “Port: 4678”
  • 18. 18SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved BO Communication – CORBA ● Each BO server has a number of services available via CORBA ● A client needs to know the IOR of the remote service to initiate communication ● They also need to know (or reverse engineer) the IDL to communicate meaningfully
  • 19. 19SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved BO CORBA Example – Client to CMS Client “aps” CMS Client IOR:010000003500……. CMS Client {object} CMS Parse IOR to obtain IP/Port, Object Key,…
  • 20. 20SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved BO and the Attacker Lifecycle
  • 21. 21SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Quick Note on Attackers ● Many Different Types of attackers ● Internal/External ● Advanced/Script kiddies ● Just for fun/Criminal organizations ● Identifying the threat actor is an obvious key to defense ● Define monitoring processes ● Define configuration and security standards
  • 22. 22SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Default Ports (Reconnaissance)
  • 23. 23SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Reconnaissance ● In default state, 15 other listening ports ● Example Use Case ● One service needs to know the IP:PORT of another service. How does it get this information? ● Asks the CMS via CORBA
  • 24. 24SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Demo
  • 25. 25SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Note on Defense As discussed in the Administrators guide, limiting network access to every BusinessObjects component is the best method to protect against pulling information from these services.
  • 26. 26SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Account Types ● Enterprise ● SAP ● LDAP ● WindowsAD
  • 27. 27SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Default Accounts (Reconnaissance)
  • 28. 28SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Note on Defense It is critically important to apply the most up to date security notes. Furthermore, disabling unused web applications and services limits the attack surface.
  • 29. 29SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Major Version Info (Reconnaissance) ● What Web Interfaces are available? ● Web Services also has valuable information
  • 30. 30SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved A Warning About MITM ● Communication is Unencrypted by default ● An Attacker can hijack a Session via HTTP or CORBA
  • 31. 31SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Poisoning and Intercepting Business Intelligence
  • 32. 32SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved “Post Exploitation” ● We are discussing an attacker that wishes to access or poison the Business Intelligence Process ● See “Actions on Objectives” in the Intrusion Kill Chain ● Intercepting vs. Poisoning ● How we discuss “Data” is important
  • 33. 33SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved ● Information disclosure – Any information in the data sources – Generated Reports ● Information Tampering – Switching data source system – Changes on the business data – Changes on the generated reports ● … Business-oriented Attack Vectors
  • 34. 34SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved ● BO processes and groups information from many systems (ERP, SCM, CRM, HR, etc). ● By compromising BO/BW/BI the attacker will have almost all of the company critical information in a central repository. ● Access to Business Reports ● Access to Financial Statements BI ERP SCM HR CRM Information Disclosure
  • 35. 35SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Information Tampering ● Change data source – Point to a different SAP system (ERP,BW…) – Changing Infoproviders (Infoset, SAP Queries…) ● Modify BO contents – Reports – Dashboards – KPI
  • 36. 36SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Demo
  • 37. 37SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Impacting BO BI – Client Side ● Commonly an attacker will focus on a client with access ● Obvious ways to access data ● Check the FS ● Browser cookies ● How else?
  • 38. 38SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Impacting BO BI – Client Side ● Network Sniffing ● Active Traffic is best ● But, the Client will auto ping the Server on a set schedule ●SESSION_ID is given in the ping
  • 39. 39SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Demo
  • 40. 40SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Impacting BO BI – Client Side ●Power Shell ● Made available in the Client or Server BusinessObjects installation ● SDK Like functionality ● Reporting Access ● InfoQuery ● Session Handling
  • 41. 41SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Impacting BO BI – Server Side ● File Repository Server ● Input ● Output ● What is a report to BO? ● File on the Filesystem ● Entry in the InfoStore ● Not all files will stay overwritten
  • 42. 42SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Demo
  • 43. 43SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Conclusion ● Read the Admin Guide! ● Many of these attacks can be prevented or detected ● Keep the systems updated! ● Enable Auditing ● Periodically scan/monitor the systems ● Secure the system and the critical data
  • 44. 44SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Questions? jppereze@onapsis.com wvandevanter@onapsis.com
  • 45. 45SAP BusinessObjects Attacks www.onapsis.com – © 2014 Onapsis , Inc. – All rights reserved Thank you! www.onapsis.com Follow us! @onapsis