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I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11




 Let Me Stuxnet You

 Itzik Kotler
 CTO, Security Art



All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2010   www.security-
                                                            art.com
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                         www.security-
                                                                      art.com




 Goodbye World!
 •
     S t u x n e t a n d C y b e r Wa r f a r e a r e e x p l o i t i n g
     the (it’s complicated) relationship between
     Software and Hardware to cause damage
     and sabotage!
 •
     To d a y i t ’ s a c o u n t r y t h a t s e e k s t o d e s t r o y
     another nation and tomorrow it’s a
     comm erci al comp a n y th at see ks to m ake a
     rival company go out of business. An act of
     I n d u s t r i a l C y b e r Wa r f a r e .



All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Can Software Damage Hardware? Yes!
 •
     Software controls hardware, and it can
     m a ke it p e r f orm d a m ag in g op er a tio n
 •
     Software can damage another software
     that runs or operates an hardware
 •
     Software controls hardware, and it can
     m a ke it p e r f orm op er ati on th a t w ill b e
     damaging to another hardware




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                             www.security-
                                                                          art.com




 Industrial Cyber Warfare Attack?
 •
     C y b e r Wa r f a r e i s n o t l i m i t e d t o , o r d e s i g n e d
     exclusively for nations or critical
     infrastructures
 •
     A successfully delivered Industrial Cyber
     Wa r f a r e a t t a c k c a u s e s f i n a n c i a l l o s s ,
     o p e r a t i o n l o ss , o r b o t h t o t h e at t a c ke d
     company!
 •
     I n d u s t r i a l C y b e r Wa r f a r e i s L o g i c B o m b s ,
     Pe r m a n e n t D e n i a l - o f- S e r v i c e , A P T a n d m o r e



All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                             www.security-
                                                                          art.com




 Meet Permanent Denial-of-Service
 •
     P e r m a n e n t D e n i a l - o f- S e r v i c e i s a n a t t a c k
     that damages hardware so badly that it
     requires replacement or reinstallation of
     hardware.
 •
     The damage potential is on a grand scale,
     almost anything and everything is
     controlled by software that can be
     m o d if ie d or atta c ke d




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Industrial Cyber Warfare: Why & Who?
 •
     Industrial Espionage
         –
               Rival Companies
         –
               Fo re i g n C o u n t r i e s
 •
     Te r r o r i s m
         –
               Pol i ti ca l/ S oci al Ag e nd a
         –
               Re v e n g e
 •
     Blackmailing
         –
               Gree d , Power an d etc .



All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Permanent Denial-of-Service 101
 •
     Phlashing:
      –
        Overwriting the firmware of the
        component and make it useless (i.e.
        “B r i c ke d ” )
 •
     Overclocking:
      –
        Increasing the working frequency of the
        component and make it unstable and
        overheat




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                                   www.security-
                                                                                art.com




 Permanent Denial-of-Service (Cont.)
 •   Overvolting:
      – Increasing the input voltage of the component
        and “zap” it or cause it to overheat
 •   Overusing:
      – Re p et i t i v e l y us i n g a m e c ha n i ca l f e a t u re o f t he
        com ponent and cause it to wea r quicker




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                        www.security-
                                                                     art.com




 Permanent Denial-of-Service (Cont.)
 •
     Power Cycling
      –
        Re p e t i t i v e l y t u rn o n a n d o f f t h e p o w e r
        supply to the component and cause it
        to wear qu icker (due to temperature
        f le c tio n an d s p ike s )




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Local Attacks
 Does anyone smell smoke?




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Computer Fans
 •
     Not a target, per se.
 •
     Disabling or slowing down the fan RPM
     speed can result in increased temperature
 •
     Lengthy exposure to high temperature (due
     to lack of cooling) can lead to
     Electromigration that in turn will cause a
     P e r m a n e n t D e n i a l - o f- S e r v i c e




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                                       www.security-
                                                                                    art.com




 CPU
 •
     Overheating                            due        to   Stressing
 •
     Overheating                            due        to   Overclocking
 •
     Overheating                            due        to   Overvolting
 •
     Overheating                            due        to   (always on) P0 @
     APM/ACAPI
 •
     Bricking due                            to Phlashing (via Microcode
     Flashing)




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 CPU: Infinite Loop
 x86 Assembly Code:

 jm
 p
 Description:

 Infinite loop that jump to self




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 CPU: Microcode Flashing
 •
     Not your typical firmware update
 •
     Microcode goes into the processor,
     providing a slightly higher level or more
     complex commands based on the
     processor's basic ("hard-wired") commands
 •
     Microprogramming can be used to abuse or
     to damage the microprogram within the
     processor




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 RAM
 •
     Overheating due to Overclocking
 •
     Overheating due to Overvolting
 •
     Burnout due to Overvolting




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                                    www.security-
                                                                                 art.com




 GPU (Graphics Processing Unit)
 •
     Overheating due to Overclocking
 •
     Overheating due to Overvolting
 •
     Bricking due to Phlashing
      –
         U t i l i t i e s ( e . g . n v f l a s h , N i B i To r , e t c . )




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                        www.security-
                                                                     art.com




 Hard disk drive
 •
     Tr a d i t i o n a l ( i . e . M e c h a n i c a l )
       –
          O v e rh e a t i n g d u e t o E xc e s s i v e Wr i t e &
          Re a d
       –
          We a r i n g o u t d u e t o E x c e s s i v e H e a d
          Pa r k i n g
       –
          Bricking due to Phlashing
 •
     Solid-state drive
       –
          We a r i n g o u t d u e t o E x c e s s i v e W r i t e



All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Hard Drive: Pseudo Format Attack
 Comma
 nd:
 while true; do

 Description:

 Infinite loop of read and write requests to disk




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Hard Drive: Spindown Attack
 Commands:

 hdparm

 Description:

 Sets disk




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 BIOS: Bricking/Firmware Flashing
 •
     Bricking due to Phlashing




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                            www.security-
                                                                         art.com




 Rouge BIOS Firmware as Platform
 •
     Allow s au tom ation of:
       –
          O v e rc l o c k i n g o f C P U , RA M a n d e t c .
       –
          O v e r v o l t i n g o f C P U , RA M a n d e t c .
       –
          Pow er C yc lin g (o f th e w h ole Sy ste m )
 •
     C a n i n c l u d e a “ S e l f- d e s t r u c t ” f u n c t i o n




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                         www.security-
                                                                      art.com




 CD-ROM/DVD-ROM
 •
     We a r i n g o u t d u e t o O v e r u s i n g t h e d r i v e
     tray
 •
     Bricking due to Phlashing




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 CD-ROM: Mechanical Part Attack
 Co
 de:
 while true; do eject; eject –t; done

 Description
 :
 Infinite loop that opens and closes the CD-ROM tray




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                             www.security-
                                                                          art.com




 Memory Wear
 •   Flash memory has a finite number of program-
     erase cycles (aka. P/E cycles).
 •   Most commercially available Flash products are
     guaranteed to withstand around 100,000 P/E
     cycles, before the wear begins to deteriorate
     the integrity of the storage
 •   Popular products that are based on, or using
     F l a s h m e m o r y: U S B D i s k O n K e y s , S o l i d - s t a t e
     D r i v e s , T h i n C l i e n t s a n d Ro u t e r s a n d m o re .




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                 www.security-
                                                              art.com




 Flash: Memory Wear Attack
 Co
 de
 :
 d
 d

 Descripti
 on:

 Infinite loop that excessively writes pseudo-random to a flash
 memory



All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 NIC (Network Interface Card)
 •
     Bricking due to Phlashing




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                                www.security-
                                                                             art.com




 NIC: TCP Offload Engine
 •   TC P O f f l o a d E n g i n e o r T O E i s a t e c h n o l o g y u s e d
     in network interface cards (NIC) to offload
     p r o c e s s i n g o f t h e e n t i r e TC P / I P s t a c k t o t h e
     n e t w o r k c o n t r o l l e r.
 •   TOE is primarily used with high-speed network
     interfaces, such as gigabit Ethernet and 10
     Gigabit Ethernet
 •   TOE is implemented in hardware so patches
     must be applied to the TOE firmware




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 CRT Monitor:
 •
     There are problems at scan rates which
     exceed the monitor's specifications (low or
     high). Some monitors can blow if given a
     too low scan rate or an absent or
     corrupted signal input.




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                                      www.security-
                                                                                   art.com




 XFree86 Screen Configuration:
 HorizSync   2 8 . 0 - 7 8 . 0 # Wa r n i n g : T h i s m ay f r y
 very old Monitors
 HorizSync   2 8 . 0 - 9 6 . 0 # Wa r n i n g : T h i s m ay f r y o l d
 Monitors

 ( t a k e n f r o m a r e a l l i f e , X Fr e e 8 6 C o n f i g f i l e )




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Floppy Drive:
 •
     We a r i n g o u t d u e t o E x c e s s i v e H e a d
     Ro t a t i o n
      –
          On some floppy drives there are no
          validity checking on sector/track
          values, and so the floppy head might
          get hit repetitively against the stopper
          (See: NYB Virus)




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Legacy: Motorola 6800 & 6809
 •   Motorola 6800 was a 8-bit microprocessor and
     was part of M6800 Microcomputer System
 •   The Motorola 6800 and 6809 can damage the
     computer's bus lines by the instruction 'HCF'
     ( H a l t , t h e n C a t c h Fi r e ) .
 •   HCF successively toggles each of the bus lines,
     but it does it so fast that it can damage them.
     It was intended for manufacturer testing.




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Summary
 •   C o m p u t e r Fa n s
 •   CPU
 •   GPU
 •   RAM
 •   Hard Drives
 •   BIOS
 •   CD-ROM/DVD-ROM
 •   External Storage (e.g. Disk On Key)
 •   Network Cards
 •   CRT Mo ni to r ( Lega c y)
 •   Floppy Disk (Legacy)
 •   Non-x86 Chip




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Remote Attacks
 The long arm of the Permanent Denial-of-Service




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                     www.security-
                                                                  art.com




 Firmware Updates via Web
 •
     Network-attached Storage (NAS) Appliances
 •
     N e t w o r k A p p l i a n c e s ( e . g . W i - Fi A c c e s s
     Poin t s)
 •
     DSL/ADSL Cable Modems
 •
     C om pu ter Per ip h e r als (e . g. K VM )
 •
     Vo i c e O v e r I P ( Vo I P ) P h o n e s
 •
     And more …




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Open Questions
 •
     How this affects Cloud and Virtualized
     System?




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11                            www.security-
                                                                         art.com




 Countermeasures?
 •
     Hardware:
      –
        O v e r- c l o c k i n g P r o t e c t i o n
      –
        O v e r- v o l t a g e P r o t e c t i o n
      –
        O v e r- t e m p e r a t u r e P r o t e c t i o n
 •
     Software:
      –
        D i g i t a l l y s i g n e d Fi r m w a r e B i n a r i e s &
        Updates




All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11               www.security-
                                                            art.com




 Thanks!

 Questions are guaranteed in life; Answers
 mailto: itzik.kotler@security-art.com
 aren't.


All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011

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HES2011 - Itzik Kolter - Let me Stuxnet You

  • 1. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 Let Me Stuxnet You Itzik Kotler CTO, Security Art All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2010 www.security- art.com
  • 2. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Goodbye World! • S t u x n e t a n d C y b e r Wa r f a r e a r e e x p l o i t i n g the (it’s complicated) relationship between Software and Hardware to cause damage and sabotage! • To d a y i t ’ s a c o u n t r y t h a t s e e k s t o d e s t r o y another nation and tomorrow it’s a comm erci al comp a n y th at see ks to m ake a rival company go out of business. An act of I n d u s t r i a l C y b e r Wa r f a r e . All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 3. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Can Software Damage Hardware? Yes! • Software controls hardware, and it can m a ke it p e r f orm d a m ag in g op er a tio n • Software can damage another software that runs or operates an hardware • Software controls hardware, and it can m a ke it p e r f orm op er ati on th a t w ill b e damaging to another hardware All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 4. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Industrial Cyber Warfare Attack? • C y b e r Wa r f a r e i s n o t l i m i t e d t o , o r d e s i g n e d exclusively for nations or critical infrastructures • A successfully delivered Industrial Cyber Wa r f a r e a t t a c k c a u s e s f i n a n c i a l l o s s , o p e r a t i o n l o ss , o r b o t h t o t h e at t a c ke d company! • I n d u s t r i a l C y b e r Wa r f a r e i s L o g i c B o m b s , Pe r m a n e n t D e n i a l - o f- S e r v i c e , A P T a n d m o r e All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 5. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Meet Permanent Denial-of-Service • P e r m a n e n t D e n i a l - o f- S e r v i c e i s a n a t t a c k that damages hardware so badly that it requires replacement or reinstallation of hardware. • The damage potential is on a grand scale, almost anything and everything is controlled by software that can be m o d if ie d or atta c ke d All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 6. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Industrial Cyber Warfare: Why & Who? • Industrial Espionage – Rival Companies – Fo re i g n C o u n t r i e s • Te r r o r i s m – Pol i ti ca l/ S oci al Ag e nd a – Re v e n g e • Blackmailing – Gree d , Power an d etc . All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 7. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Permanent Denial-of-Service 101 • Phlashing: – Overwriting the firmware of the component and make it useless (i.e. “B r i c ke d ” ) • Overclocking: – Increasing the working frequency of the component and make it unstable and overheat All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 8. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Permanent Denial-of-Service (Cont.) • Overvolting: – Increasing the input voltage of the component and “zap” it or cause it to overheat • Overusing: – Re p et i t i v e l y us i n g a m e c ha n i ca l f e a t u re o f t he com ponent and cause it to wea r quicker All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 9. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Permanent Denial-of-Service (Cont.) • Power Cycling – Re p e t i t i v e l y t u rn o n a n d o f f t h e p o w e r supply to the component and cause it to wear qu icker (due to temperature f le c tio n an d s p ike s ) All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 10. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Local Attacks Does anyone smell smoke? All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 11. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Computer Fans • Not a target, per se. • Disabling or slowing down the fan RPM speed can result in increased temperature • Lengthy exposure to high temperature (due to lack of cooling) can lead to Electromigration that in turn will cause a P e r m a n e n t D e n i a l - o f- S e r v i c e All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 12. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com CPU • Overheating due to Stressing • Overheating due to Overclocking • Overheating due to Overvolting • Overheating due to (always on) P0 @ APM/ACAPI • Bricking due to Phlashing (via Microcode Flashing) All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 13. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com CPU: Infinite Loop x86 Assembly Code: jm p Description: Infinite loop that jump to self All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 14. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com CPU: Microcode Flashing • Not your typical firmware update • Microcode goes into the processor, providing a slightly higher level or more complex commands based on the processor's basic ("hard-wired") commands • Microprogramming can be used to abuse or to damage the microprogram within the processor All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 15. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com RAM • Overheating due to Overclocking • Overheating due to Overvolting • Burnout due to Overvolting All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 16. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com GPU (Graphics Processing Unit) • Overheating due to Overclocking • Overheating due to Overvolting • Bricking due to Phlashing – U t i l i t i e s ( e . g . n v f l a s h , N i B i To r , e t c . ) All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 17. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Hard disk drive • Tr a d i t i o n a l ( i . e . M e c h a n i c a l ) – O v e rh e a t i n g d u e t o E xc e s s i v e Wr i t e & Re a d – We a r i n g o u t d u e t o E x c e s s i v e H e a d Pa r k i n g – Bricking due to Phlashing • Solid-state drive – We a r i n g o u t d u e t o E x c e s s i v e W r i t e All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 18. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Hard Drive: Pseudo Format Attack Comma nd: while true; do Description: Infinite loop of read and write requests to disk All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 19. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Hard Drive: Spindown Attack Commands: hdparm Description: Sets disk All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 20. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com BIOS: Bricking/Firmware Flashing • Bricking due to Phlashing All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 21. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Rouge BIOS Firmware as Platform • Allow s au tom ation of: – O v e rc l o c k i n g o f C P U , RA M a n d e t c . – O v e r v o l t i n g o f C P U , RA M a n d e t c . – Pow er C yc lin g (o f th e w h ole Sy ste m ) • C a n i n c l u d e a “ S e l f- d e s t r u c t ” f u n c t i o n All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 22. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com CD-ROM/DVD-ROM • We a r i n g o u t d u e t o O v e r u s i n g t h e d r i v e tray • Bricking due to Phlashing All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 23. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com CD-ROM: Mechanical Part Attack Co de: while true; do eject; eject –t; done Description : Infinite loop that opens and closes the CD-ROM tray All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 24. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Memory Wear • Flash memory has a finite number of program- erase cycles (aka. P/E cycles). • Most commercially available Flash products are guaranteed to withstand around 100,000 P/E cycles, before the wear begins to deteriorate the integrity of the storage • Popular products that are based on, or using F l a s h m e m o r y: U S B D i s k O n K e y s , S o l i d - s t a t e D r i v e s , T h i n C l i e n t s a n d Ro u t e r s a n d m o re . All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 25. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Flash: Memory Wear Attack Co de : d d Descripti on: Infinite loop that excessively writes pseudo-random to a flash memory All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 26. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com NIC (Network Interface Card) • Bricking due to Phlashing All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 27. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com NIC: TCP Offload Engine • TC P O f f l o a d E n g i n e o r T O E i s a t e c h n o l o g y u s e d in network interface cards (NIC) to offload p r o c e s s i n g o f t h e e n t i r e TC P / I P s t a c k t o t h e n e t w o r k c o n t r o l l e r. • TOE is primarily used with high-speed network interfaces, such as gigabit Ethernet and 10 Gigabit Ethernet • TOE is implemented in hardware so patches must be applied to the TOE firmware All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 28. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com CRT Monitor: • There are problems at scan rates which exceed the monitor's specifications (low or high). Some monitors can blow if given a too low scan rate or an absent or corrupted signal input. All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 29. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com XFree86 Screen Configuration: HorizSync 2 8 . 0 - 7 8 . 0 # Wa r n i n g : T h i s m ay f r y very old Monitors HorizSync 2 8 . 0 - 9 6 . 0 # Wa r n i n g : T h i s m ay f r y o l d Monitors ( t a k e n f r o m a r e a l l i f e , X Fr e e 8 6 C o n f i g f i l e ) All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 30. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Floppy Drive: • We a r i n g o u t d u e t o E x c e s s i v e H e a d Ro t a t i o n – On some floppy drives there are no validity checking on sector/track values, and so the floppy head might get hit repetitively against the stopper (See: NYB Virus) All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 31. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Legacy: Motorola 6800 & 6809 • Motorola 6800 was a 8-bit microprocessor and was part of M6800 Microcomputer System • The Motorola 6800 and 6809 can damage the computer's bus lines by the instruction 'HCF' ( H a l t , t h e n C a t c h Fi r e ) . • HCF successively toggles each of the bus lines, but it does it so fast that it can damage them. It was intended for manufacturer testing. All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 32. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Summary • C o m p u t e r Fa n s • CPU • GPU • RAM • Hard Drives • BIOS • CD-ROM/DVD-ROM • External Storage (e.g. Disk On Key) • Network Cards • CRT Mo ni to r ( Lega c y) • Floppy Disk (Legacy) • Non-x86 Chip All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 33. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Remote Attacks The long arm of the Permanent Denial-of-Service All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 34. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Firmware Updates via Web • Network-attached Storage (NAS) Appliances • N e t w o r k A p p l i a n c e s ( e . g . W i - Fi A c c e s s Poin t s) • DSL/ADSL Cable Modems • C om pu ter Per ip h e r als (e . g. K VM ) • Vo i c e O v e r I P ( Vo I P ) P h o n e s • And more … All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 35. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Open Questions • How this affects Cloud and Virtualized System? All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 36. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Countermeasures? • Hardware: – O v e r- c l o c k i n g P r o t e c t i o n – O v e r- v o l t a g e P r o t e c t i o n – O v e r- t e m p e r a t u r e P r o t e c t i o n • Software: – D i g i t a l l y s i g n e d Fi r m w a r e B i n a r i e s & Updates All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011
  • 37. I t z i k K o t l e r | A p r i l 2 0 11 www.security- art.com Thanks! Questions are guaranteed in life; Answers mailto: itzik.kotler@security-art.com aren't. All rights reserved to Security Art Ltd. 2002 - 2011