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The Case for Narrow Banking
                                           By
                                  Kevin R. James




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk       Sao Paulo, May 2007   ©Kevin R. James
The Case for Narrow Banking

                  The views I express in this presentation are my own, and do not
                 necessarily represent those of the Bank of England. The Bank of
                 England does not accept any liability for misleading or inaccurate
                      information or omissions in the information provided.




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk               Sao Paulo, May 2007                     ©Kevin R. James
I. The Problem with Banks




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk         Sao Paulo, May 2007   ©Kevin R. James
What Are We Trying to Do?
         Financial regulators (should) act to ensure that the real
         economy has access to the services that the financial
         sector provides
                       Money as a store of value
                       Raise and sustain investment


         Banks have traditionally been central to providing both
         services

          So we spend a lot of time attempting to keep the banking
         system stable

kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk            Sao Paulo, May 2007   ©Kevin R. James
The Cost of Failure

             If we fail and a banking/financial crisis does occur,
             the costs are huge
               − A country selected at random has an 8% (on average) chance of being
                 in crisis
               − A crisis imposes an average loss of 9% of GDP
               − Poverty increases dramatically (Chen and Ravallion [2001])
               − Women and children suffer most (Atine and Walton [1999])
                     Source: Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria [2001]




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk            Sao Paulo, May 2007                   ©Kevin R. James
The Problem With Banks
             We supervise banks/financial systems because banks
             have strong private incentives to take bigger than
             efficient risks (as they gamble with depositor wealth)

             Regulators must then stop them from acting in their
             own self-interest

             We’re not particularly good at that



kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk      Sao Paulo, May 2007        ©Kevin R. James
Stop!
             Regulators can constrain banks in two ways:

               – Hammer on the financial system

               – Intrusive Supervision


             Neither method is very satisfactory




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk          Sao Paulo, May 2007   ©Kevin R. James
Hammer on the financial system

             If the domestic financial market is very tightly
             controlled, then there is much less chance that
             currency mismatches/lending booms (etc.) will set in
             train events that lead to a crisis

             Regulating in this way will dramatically reduce the
             level of financial development…




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk       Sao Paulo, May 2007      ©Kevin R. James
…Imposing massive costs on the economy
               − Beck, Levine, and Loayza [2000] find that increasing the
                 level of financial intermediary development enhance total
                 factor productivity growth
                                  − “Finance and the Sources of Growth”, JFE


               − Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad [2003] find that equity
                 market liberalization increases GDP growth by 1% over a 5
                 year period
                                  − Columbia University Working Paper




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk                      Sao Paulo, May 2007       ©Kevin R. James
Intrusive Supervision
             Alternatively, one can let banks do what they want
             subject to close monitoring

             The problems are obvious
               – Formal frameworks are highly imperfect (Basle I, Basel I.5,
                 Basle II…)
               – Supervisors find it difficult to fully understand what is
                 going on in a big bank
                  - Deutche Bank is run as a single economic entity, but it
                    consists of almost 2000 legal entities



kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk          Sao Paulo, May 2007           ©Kevin R. James
Powerful regulators tend to screw up the system
              – Who supervises the supervisors?
              – Barth, Caprio, and Levine [2005], Rethinking Banking
                Regulation: ‘Till Angels Govern, Cambridge U Press




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk       Sao Paulo, May 2007              ©Kevin R. James
II. Mu!

                                  Student: Does a dog have a Buddha nature?

                                  Teacher: Mu!




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk                  Sao Paulo, May 2007          ©Kevin R. James
If you can’t get there from here…

             Question: How can we efficiently and effectively
             regulate banks subject to strong moral hazard
             incentives?

             Answer: we can’t.




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk   Sao Paulo, May 2007           ©Kevin R. James
…Let’s start from somewhere else!

             If we can’t be sure of our ability to prevent banks
             from acting upon their natural (given the current
             structure) moral hazard incentives…

             …Let’s transform the incentives themselves




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk    Sao Paulo, May 2007             ©Kevin R. James
Narrow Banking
             The moral hazard problem exists because banks can
             invest in more or less anything with depositor cash

             So, let’s eliminate the problem by requiring a bank to
             depositor wealth in only safe assets

             If depositor wealth can only go into safe assets, then
             there is no moral hazard problem

             A bank that can act in this way is a “Narrow Bank”
kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk       Sao Paulo, May 2007        ©Kevin R. James
Finance Houses
             If banks invest in only safe assets, then other
             institutions—Finance Houses—must arise to invest in
             risky projects

             These institutions will raise their capital on domestic
             and international financial markets

             Shareholders will then have the right incentives to
             monitor them, so there will be no need for intrusive
             supervision

kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk       Sao Paulo, May 2007        ©Kevin R. James
The Advantages
             Narrow Banks
               – Provide liquidity services (as banks do now)
               – No moral hazard problem
               – Reduced chance that a financial crisis wipes out people’s
                 savings


             Finance Houses
               – Provide investment services
               – No temptation/ability to gamble with depositor wealth
               – Suppliers of capital (with the right incentives) monitor the
                 institutions
               – So, no need for (ineffective and inefficient) government
                 supervision, reduced chance of a financial crisis
kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk         Sao Paulo, May 2007               ©Kevin R. James
The Classic Narrow Bank
                                           Papers
             The case for narrow banks has been put forth by
                       - Litan [1987]
                       - Pierce [1991]
                       - Bryan [1991]

             Here I am interested in the idea of narrow banking
             rather than the nature of the optimal narrow bank

                       - See Kobayakawa and Nakamura [2000] for a
                         comparative analysis of the proposals


kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk           Sao Paulo, May 2007       ©Kevin R. James
Narrow Banks: The Critiques




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk         Sao Paulo, May 2007   ©Kevin R. James
The Triple Threat

             Narrow banks are not practical
               – The pool of safe assets is too small to back narrow banks
               – The world pool of liquid savings is too small to support
                 finance houses (or: investment must be financed from local
                 deposits)


             Narrow banks are not efficient
               – Narrow banking destroys a key liquidity provision
                 externality



kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk        Sao Paulo, May 2007             ©Kevin R. James
Narrow banks have nowhere to invest
                             deposits




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk   Sao Paulo, May 2007   ©Kevin R. James
Can Narrow Banks provide liquidity
                          services?
             What will narrow-banks invest in?
                       - A leading candidate is Money Market Mutual Funds
                                  – Assets: commercial paper, government securities


                       - Miles (2001) investigated the properties of MMMF’s,
                         and found that they stable liquidity provision both to
                         depositors and to the commercial paper market
                                  – “Can Money Market Mutual Funds Provide Sufficient
                                    Liquidity to Replace Deposit Insurance?”, J. of Economics and
                                    Finance 25, Fall 2001


             Thus, narrow banking will work on the narrow bank
             side
kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk                       Sao Paulo, May 2007                   ©Kevin R. James
The world pool of liquid savings is too
                   small to sustain finance houses




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk   Sao Paulo, May 2007   ©Kevin R. James
The Savings Glut
               Far from facing a shortage of liquid savings to invest,
               the world is suffering from a lack of good investment
               opportunities
                 – Rajan, “Is There a Global Shortage of Fixed Assets?”, IMF
                   Speech, 1 December 2006


               Thus, intermediaries with access to good projects in
               sound economies should have no trouble attracting
               the funds they need to finance the projects

               In other words, investment need not be financed from
               domestic savings
kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk         Sao Paulo, May 2007             ©Kevin R. James
If you build it, they will come




                                   Source: Patrick Honohan, “Small Countries Coping with EMU: The Case of Ireland”


kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk                Sao Paulo, May 2007                                      ©Kevin R. James
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein:
                         Scarce Liquidity and Wide Banks




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk      Sao Paulo, May 2007   ©Kevin R. James
Economies of Scope
                                  in Liquidity Provision
             Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein argue that the two sides of
             a wide bank are really in the same business, viz., that
             of supplying liquidity

                           Depositors: Draw down demand deposits to meet
                           liquidity needs

                           Borrowers: Draw down lines of credit to meet liquidity
                           needs



kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk              Sao Paulo, May 2007              ©Kevin R. James
In order to meet this (stochastic) demand, banks must
            keep a supply of liquid assets on hand

            If the depositor and borrower demands for liquidity
            are not perfectly correlated, then a single bank
            offering liquidity services to both types of customers
            can meet both demands with a smaller pool of
            (costly) liquid assets

            Hence, wide banks enjoy a natural economy of scope
              – Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, “Banks as Liquidity Providers:
                An Explanation for the Coexistance of Lending and
                Deposit Taking”, JF, 2002
kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk       Sao Paulo, May 2007             ©Kevin R. James
Do banks in fact behave
                                  as if liquidity is costly?




           From James and Willison, “Collateral Posting Decisions in CHAPS Sterling”,
           Financial Stability Review, December 2004

kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk                       Sao Paulo, May 2007               ©Kevin R. James
From James and Willison, “Collateral Posting Decisions in CHAPS Sterling”,
             Financial Stability Review, December 2004

kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk                        Sao Paulo, May 2007                ©Kevin R. James
Why don’t banks economize
                              on liquid asset holdings?
             Banks (at least in the UK) use an average of only
             about 60% of the liquidity they post in the payment
             system

             Holding liquid assets is cheap
               – The gap between the secured lending (Repo) and unsecured
                 lending (LIBOR) rates averages only about 7 basis points


             So, banks are willing to hold liquid assets on their
             balance sheets on the off chance they may need them

kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk        Sao Paulo, May 2007           ©Kevin R. James
The provision of liquidity
                                   as an economy of scope
             Since banks do not behave as if providing liquidity is
             costly, the empirical magnitude of the liquidity
             economy of scope can not be very big

             Hence, this economy of scope probably does not
             explain why banks look the way the do…

             …Nor does it constitute an argument against narrow
             banks

kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk             Sao Paulo, May 2007   ©Kevin R. James
III. Conclusion




kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk       Sao Paulo, May 2007   ©Kevin R. James
Keep your eye on the ball!

             Banks that lend out depositor wealth (especially
             insured depositor wealth) are inevitably subject to
             strong moral hazard incentives

             Since banks can resist everything but temptation…

             …We supervise them (ineffectively) to prevent them
             from acting upon those incentives



kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk             Sao Paulo, May 2007    ©Kevin R. James
Let’s just exploit the marvelous developments that
             modern finance has created to simply eliminate those
             incentives!

             Narrow banks provide the crucial “store of value” and
             payment services aspects of a financial system

             Finance houses have the right incentives to allocate
             and monitor capital…

             And all of this can be done without requiring either
             intrusive supervision or crippling restrictions on
             financial system development
kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk    Sao Paulo, May 2007          ©Kevin R. James

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Creating stability in the financial system -- Narrow Banks

  • 1. The Case for Narrow Banking By Kevin R. James kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 2. The Case for Narrow Banking The views I express in this presentation are my own, and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of England. The Bank of England does not accept any liability for misleading or inaccurate information or omissions in the information provided. kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 3. I. The Problem with Banks kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 4. What Are We Trying to Do? Financial regulators (should) act to ensure that the real economy has access to the services that the financial sector provides Money as a store of value Raise and sustain investment Banks have traditionally been central to providing both services So we spend a lot of time attempting to keep the banking system stable kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 5. The Cost of Failure If we fail and a banking/financial crisis does occur, the costs are huge − A country selected at random has an 8% (on average) chance of being in crisis − A crisis imposes an average loss of 9% of GDP − Poverty increases dramatically (Chen and Ravallion [2001]) − Women and children suffer most (Atine and Walton [1999]) Source: Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria [2001] kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 6. The Problem With Banks We supervise banks/financial systems because banks have strong private incentives to take bigger than efficient risks (as they gamble with depositor wealth) Regulators must then stop them from acting in their own self-interest We’re not particularly good at that kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 7. Stop! Regulators can constrain banks in two ways: – Hammer on the financial system – Intrusive Supervision Neither method is very satisfactory kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 8. Hammer on the financial system If the domestic financial market is very tightly controlled, then there is much less chance that currency mismatches/lending booms (etc.) will set in train events that lead to a crisis Regulating in this way will dramatically reduce the level of financial development… kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 9. …Imposing massive costs on the economy − Beck, Levine, and Loayza [2000] find that increasing the level of financial intermediary development enhance total factor productivity growth − “Finance and the Sources of Growth”, JFE − Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad [2003] find that equity market liberalization increases GDP growth by 1% over a 5 year period − Columbia University Working Paper kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 10. Intrusive Supervision Alternatively, one can let banks do what they want subject to close monitoring The problems are obvious – Formal frameworks are highly imperfect (Basle I, Basel I.5, Basle II…) – Supervisors find it difficult to fully understand what is going on in a big bank - Deutche Bank is run as a single economic entity, but it consists of almost 2000 legal entities kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 11. Powerful regulators tend to screw up the system – Who supervises the supervisors? – Barth, Caprio, and Levine [2005], Rethinking Banking Regulation: ‘Till Angels Govern, Cambridge U Press kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 12. II. Mu! Student: Does a dog have a Buddha nature? Teacher: Mu! kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 13. If you can’t get there from here… Question: How can we efficiently and effectively regulate banks subject to strong moral hazard incentives? Answer: we can’t. kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 14. …Let’s start from somewhere else! If we can’t be sure of our ability to prevent banks from acting upon their natural (given the current structure) moral hazard incentives… …Let’s transform the incentives themselves kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 15. Narrow Banking The moral hazard problem exists because banks can invest in more or less anything with depositor cash So, let’s eliminate the problem by requiring a bank to depositor wealth in only safe assets If depositor wealth can only go into safe assets, then there is no moral hazard problem A bank that can act in this way is a “Narrow Bank” kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 16. Finance Houses If banks invest in only safe assets, then other institutions—Finance Houses—must arise to invest in risky projects These institutions will raise their capital on domestic and international financial markets Shareholders will then have the right incentives to monitor them, so there will be no need for intrusive supervision kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 17. The Advantages Narrow Banks – Provide liquidity services (as banks do now) – No moral hazard problem – Reduced chance that a financial crisis wipes out people’s savings Finance Houses – Provide investment services – No temptation/ability to gamble with depositor wealth – Suppliers of capital (with the right incentives) monitor the institutions – So, no need for (ineffective and inefficient) government supervision, reduced chance of a financial crisis kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 18. The Classic Narrow Bank Papers The case for narrow banks has been put forth by - Litan [1987] - Pierce [1991] - Bryan [1991] Here I am interested in the idea of narrow banking rather than the nature of the optimal narrow bank - See Kobayakawa and Nakamura [2000] for a comparative analysis of the proposals kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 19. Narrow Banks: The Critiques kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 20. The Triple Threat Narrow banks are not practical – The pool of safe assets is too small to back narrow banks – The world pool of liquid savings is too small to support finance houses (or: investment must be financed from local deposits) Narrow banks are not efficient – Narrow banking destroys a key liquidity provision externality kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 21. Narrow banks have nowhere to invest deposits kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 22. Can Narrow Banks provide liquidity services? What will narrow-banks invest in? - A leading candidate is Money Market Mutual Funds – Assets: commercial paper, government securities - Miles (2001) investigated the properties of MMMF’s, and found that they stable liquidity provision both to depositors and to the commercial paper market – “Can Money Market Mutual Funds Provide Sufficient Liquidity to Replace Deposit Insurance?”, J. of Economics and Finance 25, Fall 2001 Thus, narrow banking will work on the narrow bank side kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 23. The world pool of liquid savings is too small to sustain finance houses kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 24. The Savings Glut Far from facing a shortage of liquid savings to invest, the world is suffering from a lack of good investment opportunities – Rajan, “Is There a Global Shortage of Fixed Assets?”, IMF Speech, 1 December 2006 Thus, intermediaries with access to good projects in sound economies should have no trouble attracting the funds they need to finance the projects In other words, investment need not be financed from domestic savings kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 25. If you build it, they will come Source: Patrick Honohan, “Small Countries Coping with EMU: The Case of Ireland” kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 26. Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein: Scarce Liquidity and Wide Banks kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 27. Economies of Scope in Liquidity Provision Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein argue that the two sides of a wide bank are really in the same business, viz., that of supplying liquidity Depositors: Draw down demand deposits to meet liquidity needs Borrowers: Draw down lines of credit to meet liquidity needs kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 28. In order to meet this (stochastic) demand, banks must keep a supply of liquid assets on hand If the depositor and borrower demands for liquidity are not perfectly correlated, then a single bank offering liquidity services to both types of customers can meet both demands with a smaller pool of (costly) liquid assets Hence, wide banks enjoy a natural economy of scope – Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, “Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistance of Lending and Deposit Taking”, JF, 2002 kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 29. Do banks in fact behave as if liquidity is costly? From James and Willison, “Collateral Posting Decisions in CHAPS Sterling”, Financial Stability Review, December 2004 kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 30. From James and Willison, “Collateral Posting Decisions in CHAPS Sterling”, Financial Stability Review, December 2004 kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 31. Why don’t banks economize on liquid asset holdings? Banks (at least in the UK) use an average of only about 60% of the liquidity they post in the payment system Holding liquid assets is cheap – The gap between the secured lending (Repo) and unsecured lending (LIBOR) rates averages only about 7 basis points So, banks are willing to hold liquid assets on their balance sheets on the off chance they may need them kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 32. The provision of liquidity as an economy of scope Since banks do not behave as if providing liquidity is costly, the empirical magnitude of the liquidity economy of scope can not be very big Hence, this economy of scope probably does not explain why banks look the way the do… …Nor does it constitute an argument against narrow banks kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 33. III. Conclusion kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 34. Keep your eye on the ball! Banks that lend out depositor wealth (especially insured depositor wealth) are inevitably subject to strong moral hazard incentives Since banks can resist everything but temptation… …We supervise them (ineffectively) to prevent them from acting upon those incentives kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James
  • 35. Let’s just exploit the marvelous developments that modern finance has created to simply eliminate those incentives! Narrow banks provide the crucial “store of value” and payment services aspects of a financial system Finance houses have the right incentives to allocate and monitor capital… And all of this can be done without requiring either intrusive supervision or crippling restrictions on financial system development kevin.james@bankofengland.co.uk Sao Paulo, May 2007 ©Kevin R. James