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Social Engineering: A Test of
   Your Common Sense
   By Frederick Gallegos, CISA,
          CGFM, CDE
   Computer Info Systems Dept
Social Engineering
• Monday morning, 6am; the electric rooster is
  telling you it's time to start a new work week. A
  shower, some coffee, and you're in the car and
  off. On the way to work you're thinking of all you
  need to accomplished this week.
• Then, on top of that there's the recent merger
  between your company and a competitor. One of
  your associates told you, you better be on your
  toes because rumors of layoff's are floating
  around.
Social Engineering
• You arrive at the office and stop by the restroom
  to make sure you look your best. You straighten
  your tie, and turn to head to your cube when you
  notice, sitting on the back of the sink, is a CD-
  ROM. Someone must have left this behind by
  accident. You pick it up and notice there is a
  label on it. The label reads "2005 Financials &
  Layoff's". You get a sinking feeling in your
  stomach and hurry to your desk. It looks like
  your associate has good reasons for concern,
  and you're about to find out for your self.
And so
•   The Game Is In Play: People Are The Easiest Target
    You make it to your desk and insert the CD-ROM. You
    find several files on the CD, including a spreadsheet
    which you quickly open. The spreadsheet contains a list
    of employee names, start dates, salaries, and a note
    field that says "Release" or "Retain". You quickly search
    for your name but cannot find it. In fact, many of the
    names don't seem familiar. Why would they, this is
    pretty large company, you don't know everyone.
    Since your name is not on the list you feel a bit of relief.
    It's time to turn this over to your boss. Your boss thanks
    you and you head back to your desk.
Let's Take A Step Back In Time
•
  The CD you found in the restroom, it was not left there
  by accident. It was strategically placed there by me, or
  one of Security Consulting employees.
• You see, a firm has been hired to perform a Network
  Security Assessment on your company.
• In reality, they have been contracted to hack into your
  company from the Internet and have been authorized to
  utilize social engineering techniques.
Bingo - Gotcha
• The spreadsheet you opened was not the only thing
  executing on your computer.
• The moment you open that file you caused a script to
  execute which installed a few files on your computer.
• Those files were designed to call home and make a
  connection to one of our servers on the Internet. Once
  the connection was made the software on the Security
  firms servers responded by pushing (or downloading)
  several software tools to your computer.
• Tools designed to give the team complete control of
  your computer. Now they have a platform, inside your
  company's network, where they can continue to hack the
  network. And, they can do it from inside without even
  being there.
This is what we call a 180 degree
                 attack.
•     Meaning, the security consulting team did not have to
    defeat the security measures of your company's firewall
    from the Internet.
•   You took care of that for us.
•   Many organizations give their employees unfettered
    access (or impose limited control) to the Internet.
•   Given this fact, the security firm devised a method for
    attacking the network from within with the explicit
    purpose of gaining control of a computer on the private
    network.
•   All we had to do is get someone inside to do it for us.
Welcome to Social Engineering
• What would you have done if you found a
  CD with this type of information on it?

• Yes it is people who are the weakest link
  in any security system and Social
  Engineering Exploits that ---
Phisher Site Basics
•Thief sends e-mail to customer claiming
to be a legitimate company which has lost
the customer’s personal information
•Customer reads e-mail and goes to fake
website
•Customer enters credit card or other
personal information on website
•Thief steals personal information
Phisher Site E-mail Example (part
               1)
From: EarthLink <billing@earthlink.net>
To: <thecustomer@earthlink.net>
Date: 7/6/2003 11:50:02 AM
Subject: Billing Department

Dear EarthLink User,
We regret to inform you, but due to a recent system
flush, the billing/personal information for your
account is temporally unavailable, and we need to
verify your identity.


<cont.>
Phisher Site E-mail Example (part
               2)
  In order to continue using your EarthLink account
  and keeping it active, you must provide us with
  your full information within 24 hours of receiving
  this message.

  To re-enter your account information and keep
  your account active visit:
  www.billingdepartment-el.net


  Sincerely,
  Sean Wright
  EarthLink Billing Department
Phisher Site Example
The Real EarthLink Web Site
How to Spot Phisher Sites
        TRICKS                 TIP-OFFS

• E-mail looks legit     • Claims of “lost”
  (at first)               information
• Prompts you to act     • Unfamiliar URL
  quickly to keep        • Asks for credit card or
  service                  other personal info
• Website, html or fax   • No log in or not
                           secure
  form looks legit
                         • Most companies will
                           not do this
Tips for Avoiding Phisher Sites
• Be suspicious of email asking for credit
  card or other personal info
• URL should be familiar
• Should require log-in
• Should be a SECURE SITE
• Call the company when in doubt
• Always report spam/fraud to your ISP
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Trade Commission
                                            Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse Complaints1

                   250
                             CY-         CY-2000                         CY-2001                              CY-2002                           CY-20032
                             1999                                                                                                         Projected Cumulative
                                                                                                                                       Complaint Count 1999-2003: 490,000

                                                                                                                                             Projected Total:
                   200                                                                                                                            210,000
  (in thousands)




                                                                                                         Total: 161,886
                   150
                                                                                                                                                             n
                                                                                                                                                     je ctio
                                                                                                                                              Pro
                   100
                                                                      Total: 86,197



                    50
                                       Total: 31,117
                             Total:
                              1,380
                     0
                         1
                          Since February 2001, complaint data have also been provided to the Clearinghouse by the Social Security Administration-Office of Inspector General.
                                                                                                                                     2
                                                                                                                                       Projections for calendar year 2003 are based
                         on complaints received from January through June 2003.
Federal Trade Commission
                                                             Consumer Sentinel Complaints1
Federal Trade Commission


                                                                                                                       380,170
                                    400
                                                        - Identity Theft Complaints

                                                        - Fraud Complaints

                                                                                                                                     161,886
                                    300                                                                               43%
                                                                                        220,088
                   (in thousands)




                                    200
                                                                                                     86,197
                                                        139,007                        39%
                                                                      31,117                                                         218,284
                                                        22%
                                    100                                                                               57%
                                                                                                     133,891

                                                        78%
                                                                      107,890          61%

                                     0
                                                    CY-2000                        CY-2001                         CY-2002
                                          1
                                              Percentages are based on the total number of Consumer Sentinel complaints by calendar year.
Federal Trade Commission




                           1-877-FTC-HELP
                           www.consumer.gov/sentinel




                           1-877-IDTHEFT

                           www.consumer.gov/idtheft
And Another
• The easiest way to break into any
  computer system is to use a valid
  username and password and the easiest
  way to get that information is to ask
  someone for it.
The Beginning
• Like many hacking techniques, social
  engineering got its start in attacks against
  the telephone company. The hacker (or
  phone phreaks, as they used to be called)
  would dial-up an operator and by using the
  right jargon, convince him or her to make
  a connection or share some information
  that should not have been shared.
In Reality
• social engineering is probably as old as
  speech, and goes back to the first lie.
• It is still successful today because people
  are generally helpful, especially to
  someone who is nice, knowledgeable, and
  / or insistent.
• No amount of technology can protect you
  against a social engineering attack.
So How Do You Protect Yourself
        from Yourself?
• Recognizing an Attack
  – You can prepare your organization by
    teaching people how to recognize a possible
    social engineering attack. Do we have a
    Cyber Security & Ethics 101 Class?
• Prevent a successful attack
  – You can prepare a defense against this form
    of social engineering by including instructions
    in your security policy for handling it.
So How Do You Protect Yourself
        from Yourself?
• Create a response plan
  – Your response plan should include
    instructions on how to deal with inquiries
    relating to passwords or other classified
    information.
• Implement and Monitor the response plan
  and continue to reinforce with Training
Target And Attack
• The basic goals of social engineering are the same as
  hacking in general: to gain unauthorized access to
  systems or information in order to commit fraud, network
  intrusion, industrial espionage, identity theft, or simply to
  disrupt the system or network.
• Typical targets include telephone companies and
  answering services, big-name corporations and financial
  institutions, military and government agencies, and
  hospitals.
• The Internet boom had its share of industrial engineering
  attacks in start-ups as well, but attacks generally focus
  on larger entities.
And Another
• One morning a few years back, a group of
  strangers walked into a large shipping firm and
  walked out with access to the firm’s entire
  corporate network.
• How did they do it? By obtaining small amounts
  of access, bit by bit, from a number of different
  employees in that firm. First, they did research
  about the company for two days before even
  attempting to set foot on the premises.
And so on…
• For example, they learned key employees’
  names by calling HR. Next, they
  pretended to lose their key to the front
  door, and a man let them in. Then they
  "lost" their identity badges when entering
  the third floor secured area, smiled, and a
  friendly employee opened the door for
  them.
And so on…
• The strangers knew the CFO was out of town, so they
  were able to enter his office and obtain financial data off
  his unlocked computer.
• They dug through the corporate trash, finding all kinds of
  useful documents.
• They asked a janitor for a garbage pail in which to place
  their contents and carried all of this data out of the
  building in their hands.
• The strangers had studied the CFO's voice, so they were
  able to phone, pretending to be the CFO, in a rush,
  desperately in need of his network password. From
  there, they used regular technical hacking tools to gain
  super-user access into the system.
Common Techniques
•   Social Engineering by Phone
•   Dumpster Diving
•   On-line Social Engineering
•   Persuasion
•   Reverse Social Engineering
•   And many more….
Defining The Term "Social
               Engineering"
• In the world of computers and technology, social
  engineering is a technique used to obtain or attempt to
  obtain secure information by tricking an individual into
  revealing the information.
• Social engineering is normally quite successful because
  most targets (or victims) want to trust people and provide
  as much help as possible.
• Victims of social engineering typically have no idea they
  have been conned out of useful information or have
  been tricked into performing a particular task.

• The prey is not just you but your children and elders as
  well
A Challenge to the CSU
• This is the 21st Century The Time of
  CyberSpace
• Why is their No Formal GE Requirement
  for CyberSecurity and Ethics which can
  not only be taught at the CSU level but the
  CC level as well?
• Why don’t we extend this education to K-
  12 and Senior Centers as well?
Mt. SAC and Cal Poly Efforts
• NSF Grant Project – Establishment of a
  Regional Information Systems Security Center
  (RISSC see
  http://rissc.mtsac.edu/RISSC_NEW/default.asp )
• Cal Poly’s Participation in the Title V Grant and
  development of Network Security curriculum
• Cal Poly Pomona’s Establishment of a Center
  for Information Assurance (see
  http://www.bus.csupomona.edu/cfia.asp )
Please join US for
•
    Information Assurance Symposium
    Building Information Assurance Capacity
    and Improving Infrastructure at Minority
    Serving Institutions

    December 8 - 10, 2005
    Cal Poly Pomona
    8:30 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.
Contribute to:
• Information Sharing
• Curriculum Development
• Awareness, Knowledge and Development
  of initiatives to help others around us be
  better at practicing good security
  techniques
• Our thanks to Educause, ISACA, ISSA, IIA
  and HTCIA for their support

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077 socialengineering

  • 1. Social Engineering: A Test of Your Common Sense By Frederick Gallegos, CISA, CGFM, CDE Computer Info Systems Dept
  • 2. Social Engineering • Monday morning, 6am; the electric rooster is telling you it's time to start a new work week. A shower, some coffee, and you're in the car and off. On the way to work you're thinking of all you need to accomplished this week. • Then, on top of that there's the recent merger between your company and a competitor. One of your associates told you, you better be on your toes because rumors of layoff's are floating around.
  • 3. Social Engineering • You arrive at the office and stop by the restroom to make sure you look your best. You straighten your tie, and turn to head to your cube when you notice, sitting on the back of the sink, is a CD- ROM. Someone must have left this behind by accident. You pick it up and notice there is a label on it. The label reads "2005 Financials & Layoff's". You get a sinking feeling in your stomach and hurry to your desk. It looks like your associate has good reasons for concern, and you're about to find out for your self.
  • 4. And so • The Game Is In Play: People Are The Easiest Target You make it to your desk and insert the CD-ROM. You find several files on the CD, including a spreadsheet which you quickly open. The spreadsheet contains a list of employee names, start dates, salaries, and a note field that says "Release" or "Retain". You quickly search for your name but cannot find it. In fact, many of the names don't seem familiar. Why would they, this is pretty large company, you don't know everyone. Since your name is not on the list you feel a bit of relief. It's time to turn this over to your boss. Your boss thanks you and you head back to your desk.
  • 5. Let's Take A Step Back In Time • The CD you found in the restroom, it was not left there by accident. It was strategically placed there by me, or one of Security Consulting employees. • You see, a firm has been hired to perform a Network Security Assessment on your company. • In reality, they have been contracted to hack into your company from the Internet and have been authorized to utilize social engineering techniques.
  • 6. Bingo - Gotcha • The spreadsheet you opened was not the only thing executing on your computer. • The moment you open that file you caused a script to execute which installed a few files on your computer. • Those files were designed to call home and make a connection to one of our servers on the Internet. Once the connection was made the software on the Security firms servers responded by pushing (or downloading) several software tools to your computer. • Tools designed to give the team complete control of your computer. Now they have a platform, inside your company's network, where they can continue to hack the network. And, they can do it from inside without even being there.
  • 7. This is what we call a 180 degree attack. • Meaning, the security consulting team did not have to defeat the security measures of your company's firewall from the Internet. • You took care of that for us. • Many organizations give their employees unfettered access (or impose limited control) to the Internet. • Given this fact, the security firm devised a method for attacking the network from within with the explicit purpose of gaining control of a computer on the private network. • All we had to do is get someone inside to do it for us.
  • 8. Welcome to Social Engineering • What would you have done if you found a CD with this type of information on it? • Yes it is people who are the weakest link in any security system and Social Engineering Exploits that ---
  • 9.
  • 10. Phisher Site Basics •Thief sends e-mail to customer claiming to be a legitimate company which has lost the customer’s personal information •Customer reads e-mail and goes to fake website •Customer enters credit card or other personal information on website •Thief steals personal information
  • 11. Phisher Site E-mail Example (part 1) From: EarthLink <billing@earthlink.net> To: <thecustomer@earthlink.net> Date: 7/6/2003 11:50:02 AM Subject: Billing Department Dear EarthLink User, We regret to inform you, but due to a recent system flush, the billing/personal information for your account is temporally unavailable, and we need to verify your identity. <cont.>
  • 12. Phisher Site E-mail Example (part 2) In order to continue using your EarthLink account and keeping it active, you must provide us with your full information within 24 hours of receiving this message. To re-enter your account information and keep your account active visit: www.billingdepartment-el.net Sincerely, Sean Wright EarthLink Billing Department
  • 14. The Real EarthLink Web Site
  • 15. How to Spot Phisher Sites TRICKS TIP-OFFS • E-mail looks legit • Claims of “lost” (at first) information • Prompts you to act • Unfamiliar URL quickly to keep • Asks for credit card or service other personal info • Website, html or fax • No log in or not secure form looks legit • Most companies will not do this
  • 16. Tips for Avoiding Phisher Sites • Be suspicious of email asking for credit card or other personal info • URL should be familiar • Should require log-in • Should be a SECURE SITE • Call the company when in doubt • Always report spam/fraud to your ISP
  • 17. Federal Trade Commission Federal Trade Commission Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse Complaints1 250 CY- CY-2000 CY-2001 CY-2002 CY-20032 1999 Projected Cumulative Complaint Count 1999-2003: 490,000 Projected Total: 200 210,000 (in thousands) Total: 161,886 150 n je ctio Pro 100 Total: 86,197 50 Total: 31,117 Total: 1,380 0 1 Since February 2001, complaint data have also been provided to the Clearinghouse by the Social Security Administration-Office of Inspector General. 2 Projections for calendar year 2003 are based on complaints received from January through June 2003.
  • 18. Federal Trade Commission Consumer Sentinel Complaints1 Federal Trade Commission 380,170 400 - Identity Theft Complaints - Fraud Complaints 161,886 300 43% 220,088 (in thousands) 200 86,197 139,007 39% 31,117 218,284 22% 100 57% 133,891 78% 107,890 61% 0 CY-2000 CY-2001 CY-2002 1 Percentages are based on the total number of Consumer Sentinel complaints by calendar year.
  • 19. Federal Trade Commission 1-877-FTC-HELP www.consumer.gov/sentinel 1-877-IDTHEFT www.consumer.gov/idtheft
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  • 22. And Another • The easiest way to break into any computer system is to use a valid username and password and the easiest way to get that information is to ask someone for it.
  • 23. The Beginning • Like many hacking techniques, social engineering got its start in attacks against the telephone company. The hacker (or phone phreaks, as they used to be called) would dial-up an operator and by using the right jargon, convince him or her to make a connection or share some information that should not have been shared.
  • 24. In Reality • social engineering is probably as old as speech, and goes back to the first lie. • It is still successful today because people are generally helpful, especially to someone who is nice, knowledgeable, and / or insistent. • No amount of technology can protect you against a social engineering attack.
  • 25. So How Do You Protect Yourself from Yourself? • Recognizing an Attack – You can prepare your organization by teaching people how to recognize a possible social engineering attack. Do we have a Cyber Security & Ethics 101 Class? • Prevent a successful attack – You can prepare a defense against this form of social engineering by including instructions in your security policy for handling it.
  • 26. So How Do You Protect Yourself from Yourself? • Create a response plan – Your response plan should include instructions on how to deal with inquiries relating to passwords or other classified information. • Implement and Monitor the response plan and continue to reinforce with Training
  • 27. Target And Attack • The basic goals of social engineering are the same as hacking in general: to gain unauthorized access to systems or information in order to commit fraud, network intrusion, industrial espionage, identity theft, or simply to disrupt the system or network. • Typical targets include telephone companies and answering services, big-name corporations and financial institutions, military and government agencies, and hospitals. • The Internet boom had its share of industrial engineering attacks in start-ups as well, but attacks generally focus on larger entities.
  • 28. And Another • One morning a few years back, a group of strangers walked into a large shipping firm and walked out with access to the firm’s entire corporate network. • How did they do it? By obtaining small amounts of access, bit by bit, from a number of different employees in that firm. First, they did research about the company for two days before even attempting to set foot on the premises.
  • 29. And so on… • For example, they learned key employees’ names by calling HR. Next, they pretended to lose their key to the front door, and a man let them in. Then they "lost" their identity badges when entering the third floor secured area, smiled, and a friendly employee opened the door for them.
  • 30. And so on… • The strangers knew the CFO was out of town, so they were able to enter his office and obtain financial data off his unlocked computer. • They dug through the corporate trash, finding all kinds of useful documents. • They asked a janitor for a garbage pail in which to place their contents and carried all of this data out of the building in their hands. • The strangers had studied the CFO's voice, so they were able to phone, pretending to be the CFO, in a rush, desperately in need of his network password. From there, they used regular technical hacking tools to gain super-user access into the system.
  • 31. Common Techniques • Social Engineering by Phone • Dumpster Diving • On-line Social Engineering • Persuasion • Reverse Social Engineering • And many more….
  • 32. Defining The Term "Social Engineering" • In the world of computers and technology, social engineering is a technique used to obtain or attempt to obtain secure information by tricking an individual into revealing the information. • Social engineering is normally quite successful because most targets (or victims) want to trust people and provide as much help as possible. • Victims of social engineering typically have no idea they have been conned out of useful information or have been tricked into performing a particular task. • The prey is not just you but your children and elders as well
  • 33. A Challenge to the CSU • This is the 21st Century The Time of CyberSpace • Why is their No Formal GE Requirement for CyberSecurity and Ethics which can not only be taught at the CSU level but the CC level as well? • Why don’t we extend this education to K- 12 and Senior Centers as well?
  • 34. Mt. SAC and Cal Poly Efforts • NSF Grant Project – Establishment of a Regional Information Systems Security Center (RISSC see http://rissc.mtsac.edu/RISSC_NEW/default.asp ) • Cal Poly’s Participation in the Title V Grant and development of Network Security curriculum • Cal Poly Pomona’s Establishment of a Center for Information Assurance (see http://www.bus.csupomona.edu/cfia.asp )
  • 35. Please join US for • Information Assurance Symposium Building Information Assurance Capacity and Improving Infrastructure at Minority Serving Institutions December 8 - 10, 2005 Cal Poly Pomona 8:30 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.
  • 36. Contribute to: • Information Sharing • Curriculum Development • Awareness, Knowledge and Development of initiatives to help others around us be better at practicing good security techniques • Our thanks to Educause, ISACA, ISSA, IIA and HTCIA for their support