1. 1900toPresent
Taliban and Al-Qaeda 293
and Tashkent remained under Uzbek control. The
national delimitation policy of the Russian authori-
ties assigned national groups to specific homelands.
However, many Tajiks resided beyond the geopolitical
boundaries of present-day Tajikistan in other newly
formed republics, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
During the 1920s, Soviet authorities encouraged
native peoples to join the Communist Party to bring
about effective management and organization to the
newly formed Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. The
nationalization of natural resources, water and land
distribution programs, emancipation of women, and
free education for all citizens were the first govern-
mental directives of change. The collectivization of
agriculture was not achieved until the 1930s because
of violent Tajik objections. The disagreements led to
the elimination of two Tajik Communist Party leaders,
Abdurakhim Khojibaev and Nasratullah Maksum.
Post–World War II
Since the 1950s, the population of Tajikistan has
increased by 3 percent per year, which is three times
higher than the previous Soviet average and higher
thanotherdevelopingnations.By1980,thepopulation
of Tajikistan had increased by more than 100 percent.
The combination of rapid growth, rural overpopula-
tion, and high unemployment contributed to the rela-
tively unequal distribution and access to education,
healthcare, and other resources. Russian directives
from Moscow were sent to correct the problems of
overpopulation and poverty in the 1980s by the devel-
opment of labor resources in urban centers. Soviet
state investment in Tajikistan ranked among the low-
est per capita for any republic. In 1989, two-thirds of
the inhabitants in Tajikistan lived in small, underde-
veloped villages in rural areas. The ethnic composi-
tion of Tajikistan primarily stems from an Iranian
background. In contrast to other central Asian repub-
lics with Turkic language origins, the Tajik language
is more closely aligned with modern Persian. Several
distinct dialects of Tajik exist. The foundation for the
modern literary Tajik language originated among the
Uzbekistan border towns of Samarqand and Bukhara.
Independence
On September 9, 1991, the formation of the newly
independent and former Soviet Republic of Tajikistan
wasdeclared.ThefirstpresidentofTajikistanwasRah-
mon Nabiyev, but he resigned after a civil war broke
out in Tajikistan in August 1992. The speaker of the
supreme Soviet, Akbarsho Iskandarov, became presi-
dent until November of the same year. On November
6, 1994, Emomalii Rahmon was elected president of
Tajikistan with 97 percent of the total votes.
Matthew James Forss
Independent Scholar
See Also: Russia; Soviet Union in Central Asia;
Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan;
Uzbekistan.
Further Readings
Allworth, Edward. Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian
Dominance, a Historical Overview. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1999.
Bacon, Elizabeth E. Central Asians Under Russian Rule:
A Study in Culture Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1980.
Batalden, Stephen K. and Sandra L. Batalden. The Newly
Independent States of Eurasia: Handbook of Former
Soviet Republics. Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1993.
Bergne, Paul. The Birth of Tajikistan: National Identity and
the Origins of the Republic. London: I. B. Tauris, 2007.
Jonson, Lena. Tajikistan in the New Central Asia:
Geopolitics, Great Power Rivalry, and Radical Islam.
London: I. B. Tauris, 2006.
Taliban and Al-Qaeda
Sociopolitical changes and tensions both at the elite
and masses level may motivate some to form social
movements, which can play a role in changing rules of
governing social order. Studies suggest the formation
and the growth of social movements in the Muslim-
majority societies in west, central, and south Asia
built their success and failure in catching the atten-
tion of masses and the social actors. The stories of
Taliban and al-Qaeda are cases in point.
Taliban
Taliban literally means “students from madrassas,” and
is predominantly a Pashtun Muslim group in Afghani-

2. 1900toPresent
294 Taliban and Al-Qaeda
stan. However, the Taliban comprises more than just
students. Its top leadership and high command are
drawn from former mujahideen who fought against
the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. The movement
also accommodated former communist followers from
the Pashtun community, the majority ethnic group in
Afghanistan. It emerged as a viable politico-military
force in late 1994 made of madrassa students in Paki-
stan who were refugees. Sociopolitical instability, eth-
nicandideologicalcivilwars,andthepresenceofSoviet
troops to support the Soviet-inspired government run
contributed to the rise of the Taliban. The Taliban is
led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, who is believed to
have been hiding in Pakistan since the collapse of the
Taliban regime in 2001. The Taliban captured state
power in Afghanistan in 1996. Despite the fact that the
Taliban government failed to win diplomatic recogni-
tion from many countries, including the United States,
it did manage to secure diplomatic recognition from
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan.
These countries, particularly Pakistan and Saudi Ara-
bia, aggressively contributed to the Taliban’s financial
and human resources. However, since the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States,
these countries officially barred all forms of support to
the Taliban. The group is known for having provided
safe haven to Osama bin Laden who allegedly master-
minded the September 11 terrorist attacks.
The top Taliban leaders practice Wahhabism, an
orthodox form of Sunni Islam similar to that prac-
ticed in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism aims to embrace
Islam in all state affairs with no separation between
state and religion. The Taliban believes that social
evils are the by-product of rejecting religion from
everyday life. Therefore, Islamic societies should form
a state that respects and practices Islam in all affairs,
including laws and wars. The Taliban’s aspirations to
form a state basically endorsed the messages of Seyyid
Qutb, who called Muslim societies to challenge the
non-Islamic political system and ideas and build an
Islamic state through the channels of (militant) jihad.
TheTalibaninvestedimmenseenergyandresources
to form a state and society influenced by basic Islamic
principles. Therefore, it is safe to note that the ide-
ology of the Taliban, with respect to forming a state
and social norms, is primarily Islamic, with sharia
becoming one of the major sources of law. However,
it is not very clear whether sharia was the only major
source of law that the Taliban implemented until it
was ousted by U.S.-led forces in 2001.
Islamic understanding of women contradicts the
teaching of modernity, which liberates women from
the traditional male-dominated clutches. The status
of women was pathetic under the Taliban. In addition
to sharia, it is very likely that some laws of the Tal-
iban pertaining to women and family could have been
inspired by local customs and traditions. The Taliban
regime (1996–2001) implemented harsh forms of
social and religious norms. For example, women were
barred from going outside their residences except for
those working in the medical sector. Girls were not
allowed to attend schools, and schools that catered
to girls were violently closed. The Taliban also imple-
mented a strict dress code for women, including a veil
enshrined in Koran. Since these measures go beyond
Sharia, it is safe to assume that the laws of the Taliban
regime were a combination of Sharia and local cus-
toms of Afghanistan.
Although this group has been out of power for sev-
eral years, it remains a socially and politically power-
ful force in the region, running shadow government
structures in isolated areas of southern Afghanistan
where the elected government fails to deliver com-
mon good to the people. The 2007 report compiled
by the London-based Senlis Council suggests that the
Taliban maintains a permanent presence in 54 per-
cent of Afghanistan. This explains the trend, and it is
very likely that the Taliban will be a force to fear in
building a future political system.
Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda is a politico-military transnational organi-
zation led by Osama bin Laden, who met his death
on May 2, 2011, at the hands of the U.S. Navy’s SEAL
Team 6 in Abbottabad, a city located some 35 miles
north of Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. The word al-
qaeda can mean a base, as in a camp or a home. By
the mid-1980s, Muslim radicals who fought the Sovi-
ets alongside the local militants were also identified
as al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda was established around 1988 by bin
Laden to defeat the foreign occupation and to estab-
lish an Islamic political regime in the Muslim-major-
ity societies in the Middle East and beyond. In other
words, bin Laden wanted to establish a Pan-Islamic
caliphate throughout the world by actively associat-

3. 1900toPresent
Taliban and Al-Qaeda 295
ing with single-mind Islamic groups to bring down
regimes it considered “non-Islamic.” The group also
aims at expelling westerners and non-Muslims from
Muslim countries. It is impossible to estimate mem-
bership. However, some estimates suggest a few thou-
sand members.
The organization’s major agenda has roots in the
message of Muhammad, who aggressively challenged
the Jahiliya (the pre-Islamic Arabian age of ignorance)
sociopolitical system and norms. The organization
was also inspired by the messages of Hasan al-Banna,
who ideologically defended embracing Islam for poli-
tics and promoted militant Islam for the formation of
Islamic states in the Muslim-majority societies.
The organization is inherently against Jews and
Christians. In February 1998, it urged all Muslims of
the world to kill U.S. citizens—civilian or military—
and their allies everywhere. It was listed as a terror-
ist organization after its direct involvement in engi-
neering the September 11 terrorist attacks against
the United States. The United States led the war in
Afghanistan to destroy the organization’s base and
structure. The campaign seriously weakened the
organization, but it continues to watch the West with
deep interest, along with its political moves. Despite
its organizational decay post-September 11, it was
able to successfully challenge and test the West’s
antiterrorist policies and attract sympathies among
certain sections of Muslims in Muslim-majority and
non-Muslim-majority societies.
Al-Qaeda does not have a central structure, unlike
nationalist guerrilla groups such as Sri Lanka’s Lib-
eration Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Kurdish Kurd-
istan Workers’ Party (PKK), Lebanon’s Hizbollah, or
Palestine’s Hamas. But its activities confirm that it
has a rich multinational network possessing a global
reach, and has been supported through financing,
training, and providing logistics to Islamic militants
in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Eritrea,
Kosovo, the Philippines, Somalia, Tajikistan, Yemen,
and Kosovo. Additionally, al-Qaeda has been linked
to conflicts and attacks in Africa, Asia, Europe, the
former Soviet Republics, the Middle East, and North
and South America. In fact, no other insurgency
group in history was successful as al-Qaeda at widely
and globally recruiting foot soldiers. However, al-
Qaeda’s core leadership is largely concentrated in two
countries, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This fact poses
serious question about the organization’s true nature
of transnationalism.
Looking Forward After the Death of bin Laden
It is unlikely that al-Qaeda will collapse after the death
of Osama bin Laden. The organization is active, and
its leaders are still capable of recruiting foot soldiers
globally and convincing them to embrace death for
the caliphate cause of al-Qaeda.
It is unclear what changes are in store for al-Qaeda
after the killing of Osama bin Laden. Some express
optimism, while some cautiously suggest otherwise.
The same goes for the Taliban, which sheltered Osama
bin Laden and his top associates when it was in power
in Afghanistan. The West demands that the Taliban
disown ties with al-Qaeda in order to be considered
as a viable partner in peace talks for power sharing.
The West may increase pressure on the Taliban to
renounce violence. It is also likely that the Taliban
might be gripped by the Pakistani political and mili-
tary establishment in order to build Pakistani influence
to perturb Western interests in Afghanistan, particu-
larly if the American administration intimidates the
Pakistani political and military establishment for their
noticeable failure to identify bin Laden’s safe house in
Abbottabad, a garrison town north of Islamabad, and
go against the interests of Pakistan in the region.
Both the Taliban and al-Qaeda have been employ-
ing Islamic symbols to garner Muslim sympathies in
the region, and they may continue to seek shelter in
these symbols to reach their eventual political aim.
Fundamentally, social movements that employ popu-
lism and primordial symbols are capable of manipu-
lating social tensions and grievances to promote their
causes.
The events of the first decade of the 2000s, includ-
ing the Arab Spring in Muslim majority societies,
suggest that the grievances of Muslim masses can
be channeled through nonviolent mechanisms, and
the very methods (brand of violent extremism) rec-
ommended both by the Taliban and al-Qaeda can be
neutralized if civil and social forces, including com-
munication networks, guide mass agitation and pro-
tests for sociopolitical changes. What is equally true
is that the Taliban and al-Qaeda, as organizations,
are active. Both movements largely ridicule the West,
particularly America’s commitments to democracy
and freedom, and claim that America’s only goal is

4. 1900toPresent
296 Taliban Regime
to exploit the resources of Muslim land. These slo-
gans still have an audience in the region, and thus it
is likely that Islamic social organizations such as the
Taliban and al-Qaeda, run by Islamic extremists, will
stick to populist slogans and religious symbols to win
Muslim sympathies. Some claim that efforts from the
United States such as nation building in the region
may help weaken such rhetoric and, therefore, Islamic
extremists.
A. R. M. Imtiyaz
Temple University
See Also: Afghanistan; bin Laden, Osama; Pakistan;
Taliban Regime; Terrorism.
Further Readings
Council on Foreign Relations. “Al-Qaeda.” http://www.cfr
.org/publication/9126/alqaeda_aka_alqaida_alqaida.
html (Accessed October 2010).
Dobbins, James. After the Taliban: Nation-Building in
Afghanistan. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008.
Gerges, Fawaz. The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Global Security. “Al-Qaida /Al-Qaeda.” http://www.global
security.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm
(Accessed November 2010).
International Council on Security and Development
(ICOS). “Stumbling Into Chaos: Afghanistan on the
Brink.” http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/Afghan
istan_on_the_brink.pdf (Accessed November 2010).
Nojumi, Neamatollah. After the Taliban: Life and Security
in Rural Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2009.
Rashid, Ahmed. “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism.”
Foreign Affairs, v.78/6 (1999).
Wedgwood, Ruth. “Al-Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military
Commissions.” The American Journal of International
Law, v.96/2 (2002).
Taliban Regime
Afghanistan after the departure of the Soviets disin-
tegrated into internecine conflict. Competing war-
lords employed brutal tactics to gain control over
key cities and meager resources. Even after their
exit, the Soviets supported Mohammad Najibullah’s
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) by pro-
viding aid to the tune of $300 million in 1989 alone,
whereas American aid had slipped to less than $50
million. America’s waning interest in the Afghan the-
ater was further hastened by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
on August 2, 1990. Meanwhile, the Gorbachev regime
buckled under internal pressure, and with it the Soviet
Union collapsed in December 1991. Najibullah’s DRA
was on its own in its attempt to prevent the march of
Uzbek warlord General Rashid Dostum toward Kabul
from the west, Tajik forces led by Ahmed Shah Mas-
soud from the northeast, and the Pashtun forces of
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar from the south. International
mediation aimed at a peaceful transfer of power from
Najibullah to the warring mujahideen groups failed,
and Najibullah went into hiding. By April 15, 1992,
the mujahideen had taken Kabul, and by end of April
the combined forces of Dostum and Massoud had
evicted Hekmatayer from Kabul.
Afghanistan in the early 1990s was ethnically
divided among Tajik forces of Rabbani and Massoud,
which controlled Kabul and parts of the east and
northeast; forces of Ismael Khan controlled Herat and
regions west; the central provinces were controlled
by the Shiite Hazaras; and in the south, various Pash-
tun groups held sway under the combined leader-
ship of a shura (council) of ex-mujahideen based in
Jalalabad. Gulbuddin Hekmatayer, sensing that the
Pashtuns might lose power in post-Soviet Afghani-
stan, began shelling Kabul. Hekmatayer was pro-
vided arms, logistics, training, and men by Pakistan’s
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency, and General
Dostum switched his alliance from the Tajik forces of
Rabbani to the Pashtun groups of Hekmatayer. Paki-
stan preferred to have a pro-Pashtun group dominate
the politics in Kabul and resented the Massoud-led
Northern Alliance, which was primarily composed of
Tajiks and Uzbeks.
Roots of the Taliban
There are two distant and proximate causes for the
birth of the Taliban. The distant causes are (1) the
religious oppression by the occupying Soviet forces
and the supporting role played by the puppet Afghan
government of Najibullah and (2) the destruction
and death caused by foreign armies; the proximate
causes were (1) disillusionment with the chaos, mur-