CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason.
2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya.
3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters, potentially disrupting shipping routes and routine maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandab Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance fired a missile at an Emirati vessel off the coast of Mokha port city in western Yemen on October 1. A video shows the destruction of the vessel. The UAE foreign ministry described the attack as an “act of terror.” Separately, al Houthi-Saleh forces are probably using American citizen Peter Willems as a human shield against Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh forces detained Willems on September 20 after an airstrike hit an intelligence headquarters in the capital.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the imminent loss of its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces. ISIS militants who fled Sirte as the U.S.-backed offensive began have conducted multiple attacks behind the Sirte frontline since mid-September, including an ambush that caused dozens of casualties on October 2. The U.S. air campaign is entering its third month.
3. Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments in the contested Kashmir region. Tensions rose when India blamed a Pakistan-based militant group for attacks on Indian security forces. The Indian and Pakistani militaries have since exchanged fire across the Line of Control. India is preparing fortifications for a possible military escalation.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.]
2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.]
3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason.
2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya.
3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters, potentially disrupting shipping routes and routine maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandab Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance fired a missile at an Emirati vessel off the coast of Mokha port city in western Yemen on October 1. A video shows the destruction of the vessel. The UAE foreign ministry described the attack as an “act of terror.” Separately, al Houthi-Saleh forces are probably using American citizen Peter Willems as a human shield against Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh forces detained Willems on September 20 after an airstrike hit an intelligence headquarters in the capital.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the imminent loss of its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces. ISIS militants who fled Sirte as the U.S.-backed offensive began have conducted multiple attacks behind the Sirte frontline since mid-September, including an ambush that caused dozens of casualties on October 2. The U.S. air campaign is entering its third month.
3. Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments in the contested Kashmir region. Tensions rose when India blamed a Pakistan-based militant group for attacks on Indian security forces. The Indian and Pakistani militaries have since exchanged fire across the Line of Control. India is preparing fortifications for a possible military escalation.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.]
2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.]
3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.