Mikaela Breese Final Capstone

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INTL-I 400 Capstone Thesis Fall 2015
Mikaela Breese
Fire or Smoke? Media Discourse vs. the Reality of Japan’s Role in the South China Sea
Capstone Professor: Dr. Nicole Kousaleos
Capstone Mentor: Professor Adam Liff

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Abstract:
Rising tensions in the South China Sea over maritime disputes are not limited to states
with sovereignty claims. Other countries, including Japan, also find the area to be of national
interest. Japan is gradually expanding its efforts to cooperate with Southeast Asian countries that
have claims in the South China Sea, such as providing military equipment and building
diplomatic ties. Media discourse claims these efforts are proof that Japan attempting to break
from its pacifist roots in order to become a significant military actor in Asia. This paper seeks to
engage the media’s claims to determine if they are an accurate interpretation of Japan’s actions
vis-à-vis the South China Sea, or if disparities exist between the discourse and reality. It will do
so by critically analyzing the actions of Japan in the South China Sea as well as accompanying
official government rhetoric, and then comparing these with the existing media discourse. My
research will draw from news sources and official Japanese government documents using Shinzo
Abe’s re-election as Prime Minister in 2012 as a baseline. This research is important for several
reasons. First, it is critical to determine if there exists a gap between the media discourse and the
reality of Japan’s actions, and if so what the underlying causes are. Second, disparities between
rhetoric and reality regarding Japan’s role could cause misunderstandings by neighboring
countries over the extent of Japan’s actions or intended actions in the disputes. Given the deep
historical tensions that still exist over Japan’s militaristic past, this could potentially be
destabilizing for the region and exacerbate tensions in the South China Sea.

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Table of Contents
I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………4
II. Literature Review……………………………………………………………………...5
A. Japan’s Security Evolution………….…………………………………………….6
B. Trends Driving Security Changes…………………………………………………7
III. Methodology…………………………………………………………………………..9
IV. Case Study…………………………………………………………………………...13
A. History……………………………………………………………………………13
a. Overview of Historic Tensions…………………………………………..13
b. South China Sea’s Significance………………………………………….14
B. International Law………………………………………………………………...15
a. UNCLOS…………………………………………………………...........16
b. “Nine-dash line”………………………………………………………….17
c. Feature building by China………………………………………………..18
C. Discourse vs. Reality…………………………………………………………….18
a. 2012 Discourse vs. Reality………………………………………………19
b. 2013 Discourse vs. Reality………………………………………………20
c. 2014 Discourse vs. Reality………………………………………………23
d. 2015 Discourse vs. Reality………………………………………………26
D. South China Sea Case in the Broader Literature………………………………...29
V. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..........30
VI. References……………………………………………………………………………31

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I. Introduction
The maritime disputes in the South China Sea are the result of competing maritime
territorial claims amongst China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), and various Southeast Asian
countries over what they perceive as a critically strategic area. These recent maritime disputes
are not new to the South China Sea; the area has seen a cyclic rising and falling of tensions since
1945 due to the ambiguity surrounding sovereignty rights of numerous islands. However,
recently China has acted in what other countries view as a provocative manner in the South
China Sea. This includes building reefs into artificial “islands”, building airstrips on these
features, and sending Chinese navy patrols throughout the area. As this conflict develops, it is
clear that it has become more than simply a regional issue. Japan is another major player that has
taken steps to slowly expand its diplomatic and military presence in what it considers a
strategically important area. There has also been a surge in media discourse on the disputes, an
increasing number of which weigh in on Japan’s role. Presently, discourse suggests that Japan is
attempting to expand its role in the South China Sea disputes through significant changes to its
security policies. However, is this an accurate reflection of the reality of Japan’s actions or does
a gap presently exist between what the media says is going on and what is actually happening? If
so, what is the cause of this disparity? How might misunderstanding of the nature and extent of
Japan’s involvement affect the likelihood of successful conflict resolution in the South China
Sea?
My research will first go into the background of the disputes and outline the respective
positions of the relevant countries. Then I will examine the reality of what Japan is doing by
critically analyzing what actions Japan has actually taken and the rhetoric of Japanese
government officials regarding the issue. My sources for this will be official government rhetoric

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(i.e. direct quotations) from both U.S. and Japanese news articles as well as defense white papers
published by the Japanese Ministry of Defense. Taking this information, I will compare it to the
existing media discourse on the issue that I pull from U.S. and Japanese news articles as well. As
this is an ongoing situation, my research will be slightly limited in how up-to-date the
information is.
This research paper will begin by analyzing the broader literature written on Japan’s
evolving security posture, in particular those that evaluate the extent of this shift under Shinzo
Abe. Then the paper will address the types of methodology employed during the research
process, including textual analysis and theoretical evaluations. The case study will present the
historical and legal background of the issue, as well as why the South China Sea is a hotspot for
disputes. Following, I will discuss my critical analysis of the media discourse, official
government rhetoric, and facts about Japan’s role in the South China Sea. From this, I will draw
conclusions about whether or not a gap exists between media discourse and reality, and how that
could affect the potential for resolution of the maritime disputes. I will also show how my
analysis contributes to the broader, ongoing literature concerning Japan’s evolving national
security policy.
II. Literature Review
The recent changes to Japan’s defense policies are a great source of debate for academics
and policy makers. Some argue that recent changes under the Abe administration mark a drastic
turn from Japan’s dedication to pacifism, while others contend that, although significant, these
changes are part of an ongoing evolution of Japanese national security policy that is not limited
solely to Abe’s term. There are also varying opinions surrounding what shapes Japanese policy.
One argument presented is that the anti-militarist sentiment in Japan is responsible for containing

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Japanese security; another argues that the surrounding security situation is what largely shapes
Japan’s military evolution. These views are all part of the broader literature on Japan’s evolving
security policy.
A. Extent of Japan’s Security Changes
In “Japan’s Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary”, Professor Adam Liff assesses recent
changes in Japan’s security strategy under the administration of Shinzo Abe16. He examines how
transformative security reforms under Abe really are and what has been driving them, while also
looking at what these reforms mean in the context of the U.S.—Japan alliance. Liff contends that
the new transformations under Abe’s administration are in fact continuations of trends already
put in place by previous governments. The driving forces behind these changes are in large part
due to the perceived threats of North Korea and the development of its nuclear capabilities, as
well as China and what Japan views as encroachment on Japanese territory. Japan is reacting to
the developing security situation in which it finds itself. Furthermore, the idea of restraint that
has shaped Japanese security policy since the end of WWII is still present in the most recent
reforms. Liff points out that “political leaders still prohibit the JSDF from using military force
outside a singular, narrow interpretation of self-defense” while “the public remains deeply
skeptical about the employment of military power as a tool of foreign policy”16. Thus, the
domestic situation prevents Japan from developing its military beyond the scope of self-defense.
Liff ultimately concludes that Abe’s reforms are “practically significant, but limited”16. His
analysis of how transformative Japan’s security changes are provides context for looking at the
reality of Japan’s actions in the South China Sea.
Other scholars argue that Abe’s reforms are not quite as restrained as some claim. In his
article “A Blueprint for a Strong Japan? Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Evolving Security System”,

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Sebastian Maslow contends that although Abe is building on the work of previous governments,
he is accelerating Japan’s security strategy to weaken Japan’s postwar pacifism in an effort to
enhance Japan’s military role on the global stage19. He points specifically to Abe’s attempt at
proactive pacifism, the establishment of a National Security Council, and the passage of the State
Secrecy Protection Law as the three basic policies of Abe’s administration. Maslow goes on to
outline what each of these developments mean and why they show an accelerated increase in
Japan’s military involvement in the world. Maslow spends a good deal of his article focusing on
the impacts security developments have had domestically, and how engagement in international
affairs has elicited protest from the Japanese public. He concludes by indicating possible future
involvements of the Japanese SDF in international affairs. Maslow points to MSDF Admiral
Kawano Katsuyoshi’s suggestion that Japanese forces might conduct patrols and surveillance
activities in the South China Sea, which he believes to be proof of Tokyo’s desire to join U.S.
navy patrols in the area19. Overall, he concludes that the acceleration in military involvement that
Abe initiated will be a trend that we can expect to see in the future.
B. Trends Driving Security Changes
The driving forces behind Japan’s security changes are also a point of contention among
scholars. Jennifer Lind is the author of a journal article titled “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?
Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy”17. She questions constructivist claims that the
post-WWII “culture of antimilitarism” in Japan is responsible for the country’s show of restraint
when it comes to security and developing an offensive military. Instead, she offers that there are
other factors besides domestic norms that were the driving force behind Japan’s policies. Her
method for approaching this argument is to test a constructivist theory of antimilitarism and a
realist theory of buck-passing against one another. In order to achieve this, she generated

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predictions of how Japan’s government had determined its security policy by coding the
explanatory variables of the two theories17. Her purpose is to show that Japan is not as militarily
weak as some people claim it is, and that constructivist claims of antimilitaristic sentiments in
Japan do not account for the recent shifts in security policy. Instead, she argues that Japan’s
actions are more consistent with the practice of “buck-passing”, which is a defensive strategy
that occurs when states recognize a threat but do as little as possible to balance against the threat.
Instead, states that engage in buck-passing rely on others to do most of the work in handling the
threat. In the case of Japan, it is buck-passing by relying heavily on the United States to balance
against what it perceives as a Chinese threat. However, if Japan believes that the U.S. might be
withdrawing from Asia and therefore leaving it more vulnerable to regional powers, it will
increase its contributions to the alliance. Her overall conclusions were that the antimilitarist
argument is legitimate until the 1970s, but it cannot explain the transformation of the Japanese
military from the late 1970s. Buck-passing, on the other hand, works to explain Japanese policy
until the end of the Cold War; after that, it is less able to account for shifts in security strategy17.
Buck-passing also works to explain some of the aspects of Japan’s security strategy that have not
changed since World War II. For example, Japan still does not possess nuclear weapons despite
the fact that it has large stockpiles of plutonium it could use to create them17. Instead, Japan
continues to live under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The anti-militarist argument is weak here,
particularly because other states such as South Korea that are not anti-militarist also live under
the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Instead, the idea of buck-passing shows how Japan forgoes nuclear
weapons in exchange for protection from the U.S. Her work provides an analysis of some of the
driving forces behind shifts in policy, and proves that antimilitarist sentiments in Japan are not as
capable of affecting policy as some argue that it is.

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Thomas Berger takes the position that antimilitarist sentiments among the Japanese
population are what will dictate Japan’s approach towards security and national defense5. He
begins by contending that Japan has the economic and technological power to become a military
power if it chose to. Given the evolving security situation in East Asia, he says that there is the
question of whether or not Japan would choose to “unsheathe its sword” and become a military
competitor again if it felt threatened enough5. However, his argument against this thought is that
in the forseeable future at least, Japan is unlikely to want to become a military power. He does
not attribute this to any structural factors; instead, the reason lies in the deeply imbedded culture
of pacifism that is a legacy of Japan’s militaristic past. He traces the evolution of this culture
before evaluating arguments that Japan either will or will not become a military power. His
conclusions are that Japan will not become a competitor, but that it should work on playing a
larger security role in the region. This can be achieved with the help of the United States who
should assist Japan with managing “a slow and orderly evolution of this peculiar culture toward a
more realistic stance with regard to security affairs”5. He argues that although anti-militarism
drives Japanese policy, the government should still work to gradually become more involved in
global, or at least regional, affairs.
It is critical to keep this broader literature in mind when looking at my case study. Since
the maritime disputes are still ongoing, it is unclear what the outcome will be and how/if Japan’s
role in the area will change in the future. The “bigger picture” of what scholars have observed in
regards to trends or shifts in Japan’s overall security policy can be used to analyze Japan’s
currents efforts vis-à-vis the South China Sea.
III. Methodology

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This paper is a case study comparing the reality of Japan’s actions versus the media
discourse on the topic. The methods I utilized for my paper were content analysis, both in
qualitative and quantitative manners, as well as compiling data regarding trends of discourse on
the South China Sea in Japan. Since my topic focuses on analyzing shifting discourse and
actions, I believe these methodologies will be the most beneficial for my research.
In order to show the history of the South China Sea disputes in media discourse, I
searched for all articles featured in The Japan Times since WWII that mention both the keywords
“South China Sea” and “dispute”. I chose The Japan Times since it is the largest English-
language newspaper in Japan. From the search, I was able to see the number of articles written
each year and compile the data into a table to clearly show any patterns that emerged. I used
WWII as the baseline for this because the forced withdrawal of Japanese troops from the South
China Sea after WWII left the ownership of the area unclear. This has fueled maritime and
territorial disputes all the way until the present. This method is not entirely accurate for
measuring Japanese media discourse specifically since The Japan Times targets foreign
audiences and Japanese people who want to read English news. However, generally speaking the
graph does a satisfactory job of showing trends of when the South China Sea disputes showed up
in the media.
The sources I chose to use for my case study were the New York Times, Asahi Shinbun
(both English and Japanese version), and the Japanese Ministry of Defense White Papers. The
scope of my paper is somewhat limited since I only chose to analyze content from these three
sources. However, I believe that the quality and popularity of these media and government
outlets help to offset this limitation. I decided to use Shinzo Abe’s re-election as Prime Minister
of Japan on December 26, 2012 as the baseline for my case study. I chose that date because

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people often point to the “Abe factor” as the reason for Japan’s security policy shifts. I wanted to
see if he was also a driving force behind any gaps that existed between media discourse and
reality. Although Abe officially assumed the office of Prime Minister on December 26, 2012, I
use articles dating from September 26, 2012. This was when Abe won his party’s (Liberal
Democratic Party) presidential election, which made him a candidate for the general election in
December. This helps to expand the timeframe in 2012 that I can draw articles from beyond just
the last few days of December.
For my first news source, I selected the New York Times because it is a well-respected
and well-known news source in the United States, so it would be able to give me a somewhat
(though not completely) unbiased overview of the situation. I also wanted a diverse array of
sources which is why I chose to go beyond only using Japanese media. For my Japanese media
sources, I decided to use the Asahi Shinbun because, similar to the New York Times, it is a top
national news sources. Since I am only using a few sources to research the media discourse
aspect of my case study, I consider it important that my sources be fairly popular. I am working
under the assumption that less well-known sources have a smaller reach within the general public
and thus does not impact people’s perceptions of Japan’s role in the South China Sea as greatly.
I used all of these news sources, which totaled twenty-eight, in a variety of ways. First, I
pulled direct quotes from government officials that addressed security situations or changes in
Japan’s domestic policies. This was one way I measured the government rhetoric regarding what
Japan was doing, which was part of how I determined the reality of Japan’s actions. I also
determined reality by assessing what concrete facts were present in the article. For example, if
Japanese officials attended a conference or if Japan supplied Vietnam with patrol boats, those
were actions that were part of the reality of what Japan was doing. If the article simply

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mentioned that Japan was “considering” giving patrol boats to Vietnam, I did not consider that to
be an action and therefore did not include it in my reality section. The third way I used the news
sources was by engaging in content analysis to determine the evolving media discourse on the
topic. I analyzed the substance of the articles in a qualitative manner to draw out the media
discourse for comparison.
The Ministry of Defense White Papers are reports that the ministry writes and publishes
every year regarding the security situation both in Asia and around the world, and any revisions
or changes in Japan’s defense policy. Since a government department authors and publishes the
white papers, they are very reliable sources in regards to concrete actions that Japan has taken
and how government policy has developed since 2012. I analyze the content in each white paper
from 2012-2015 in order to gauge policy shifts and determine the reality of what Japan has done
in the South China Sea maritime disputes. However, since the Ministry of Defense only
publishes white papers once a year, there can be lags in how up-to-date their information is. I
supplement these gaps with official quotes and facts drawn from the media sources I chose.
The news stories and articles that I have critically analyzed to gauge developing
discourse and action in the context of the South China Sea have proven to be useful, but I have to
be very careful not to get caught up in some of the rhetoric that is employed. There is clearly a
great deal of bias against Beijing and what Japan views as its overly assertive stance towards
maritime claims in the South China Sea. Japanese news articles as well as American news
articles tend to use loaded terms such as “encroaching” and “aggressive” when describing
Chinese activity in the South China Sea. There is also bias against Abe in particular among my
news sources. The New York Times and Asahi Shinbun tend to be more liberal and thus anti-Abe.
I had intended to balance this out with a more conservative popular news source, such as

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Yomiuri Shinbun. Unfortunately, I did not have access to the archives of any of the popular,
conservative Japanese newspapers. So although it is possible to gauge general opinions different
governments and peoples hold regarding the South China Sea dispute, it is not possible to accept
everything within these articles as true and impartial. To avoid as much bias as possible I
decided to focus on articles rather than editorials for my research. Even so, it was important for
me to analyze the context of each news source I utilized to identify potential biases that may,
knowingly or unknowingly, be present within the text.
IV. Case Study
A. History
Figure 1 (above)38
a. Overview of Historic Tensions
The South China Sea has been a site of contention since the end of World War II. After
the forced withdrawal of Japanese military forces from the area, there was ambiguity
surrounding the ownership of numerous islands. Since then, there has been a repeating pattern of
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1945
1948
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2014
NumberofArticleswithKeywords
Mentioned
Year
The Japan Times' articles that reference
"South ChinaSea" and "dispute"

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periods of tension over sovereignty claims followed by gradual de-escalation. Figure 1
demonstrates this pattern by showing the number of articles published every year since 1945 by
The Japan Times that reference both “South China Sea” and “dispute”. I read all of the articles to
ensure that they specifically mention the maritime disputes. Although this does not show the
history of Japan’s role vis-à-vis the disputes, it provides a general idea of when tensions in the
region spiked. This paper will not go into the underlying cause of each cycle of disputes; instead,
the purpose of the graph is to demonstrate that tensions in the South China Sea are not a new
phenomenon. Therefore, the present disputes should be viewed from a much larger context than
simply the past five years or so.
b. South China Sea’s Significance
The South China Sea has both historical and strategic significance to many actors in the
region. Some nations in the South China Sea, such as Vietnam and China, claim historic rights to
the area12. They argue that their people have been fishing in those waters for thousands of years.
This is difficult to prove, however, and the legality of these historical claims in the context of
international law will be addressed in the following section. Although Japan does not present
historic claims like China and Vietnam, it does consider the shipping lanes that run through the
South China Sea to be of critical importance. The South China Sea is one of the main areas for
maritime trade and traffic in the world. Around a third of all maritime traffic globally goes
through the South China Sea, along with more than half of all merchant tonnage, including
finished and unfinished products12. If a nation was able to claim the area, they would be able to
control some of the most important international shipping lanes in the world. Therefore, nations
that rely on these trade routes, including Japan, consider it to be of vital importance that
sovereignty claims do not impact these international lanes. Some experts also speculate that there

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are massive reserves of oil and natural gas below the sea floor, which makes the area all the more
tempting and desirable for countries in the region12. Although there are some doubts concerning
the size of these reserves and whether they are really as extensive as some states claim, the fact
remains that this area is highly contested between many nations. Along with historical and
strategic concerns, international law also plays a significant role in the ongoing dispute.
B. International Law
States use a number of legal arguments to justify their claims in the ongoing maritime
disputes. Non-claimants such as Japan also cite international law and a desire for countries in the
disputes to adhere to it. In a U.S.-Japan joint statement released in April 2014, both countries
called for South China Sea claimants “to clarify the basis of their maritime claims in accordance
with international law”31. In order to recognize why international law plays such a key role in the
South China Sea disputes, it is important to understand the background of the legal arguments
states put forth to justify their claims.
Figure 2 (above)35 Figure 3 (above)6

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Figure 4 (above)35
a. UNCLOS
International maritime law, specifically the 1994 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS), is widely cited by nations in the context of this conflict when disputing
sovereignty claims1. One hundred sixty-seven parties have ratified this convention, which
includes all of the claimants in the South China Sea dispute. It states that exclusive economic
zones (EEZ) are zones where a nation has the right to use resources in the zone and control who
is allowed in and out of that area1. These zones extend from the coastline to 200 nautical miles
out; after that it is international waters. Figure 2 shows a breakdown of the different sections
within a nations’ EEZ. For the purpose of this paper, it is unnecessary to note the exact
differences between the sections. The main point to understand is that an exclusive economic
zone awards states maritime sovereignty within that area. Figure 3 shows the EEZs of all
countries in the South China Sea in accordance with UNCLOS, barring the disputed islands.

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Figure 4 shows what the South China Sea looks like when the countries’ claims to the disputed
islands are included. Many of the claims overlap one another, which is one of the sources of
tension presently. Countries find it important to maintain these claims because if they succeeded
in establishing sovereignty over certain islands, under UNCLOS they would have greatly
expanded territorial waters. This would include the right to resources and access to the areas, and
potentially the aforementioned important shipping lanes. Out of all of the various countries’
claims, one that is widely considered controversial by many actors is China’s “Nine-dash line”.
b. “Nine-dash line”
In both Figure 3 and Figure 4, there are dotted red lines that mark what is commonly
referred to as the Nine-dash line. This line first appeared on a 1947 map titled “Map of South
China Sea Islands” that was published by the Nationalist government of the Republic of China30.
There are indications that an even earlier map, labeled “Map of Chinese Islands in the South
China Sea”, predates it. Despite its history, the line itself and what it represents remains unclear
due to China’s refusal to clarify those matters. Since China has not clearly defined the Nine-dash
line, the argument exists that China’s claim is invalid.
It is clear from Figures 3 and 4 that China’s Nine-dash line maritime claims in the South
China Sea not only extend far beyond its own economic zone but also overlap with the EEZs of
other nations, including Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. China cites
historical rights as the reason why it has sovereign control over such a vast piece of territorial
water in the South China Sea, pointing to the existence of the historical maps30. Along with this,
despite having ratified the UN Convention, China argues that UNCLOS does not properly
address states’ historic maritime rights, which is why its claim is still acceptable under
international law. Some scholars, such as Peter Dutton who is a Professor at the U.S. Naval War

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College and retired Navy Judge Advocate, argue that “UNCLOS obviated the need for the
existence of historic rights for resources beyond the territorial sea and it included historic rights
as part of the process for defining territorial sea baselines”7. Thus, different actors have varying
interpretations of international law and how to address the South China Sea disputes by using it.
c. Feature Building by China
In addition to claiming the Nine-dash line, China has also begun employing tactics such
as creating islands by piling dredged up sand from the ocean floor on coral reefs to turn them
into “islands”, also referred to as features39. While “island” or feature building is not illegal
under international law, China goes a step further and claims the territorial waters surrounding
these features. Since these features were once reefs submerged at either high or low tide,
international law does not allow for the claiming of territorial waters surrounding them1. The
purpose of the recent Freedom of Navigation Operation by the U.S. Navy within 12 nautical
miles (considered territorial water by China) of Subi Reef was to reinforce that point32. If,
however, China is successful in its historical arguments to territorial and maritime sovereignty in
the South China Sea, it could have implications for future maritime disputes, which is one of the
reasons why the outcome of this dispute is so important to Japan.
C. Discourse vs. Reality
The following section will present the media discourse that appears for each year starting
in 2012. Following, it will compare the discourse with the reality that has been determined for
that same year. Each section will conclude with an analysis determining whether or not a gap
exists. This case study begins by looking at the latter part of 2012, using Shinzo Abe’s re-
election as Prime Minister of Japan as a baseline.

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a. 2012 Discourse vs. Reality
In the latter part of 2012, media discourse rarely mentioned Japan’s limited involvement
in the South China Sea. This was largely due to the fact that most of the attention that year was
on the escalating tensions in the East China Sea between Japan and China. As such, there is very
little media rhetoric on the South China Sea available for this time frame in 2012. However, the
idea that Japan could eventually turn its attention to the South China Sea is evident in media
discourse. In an interview with the British newspaper Financial Times, the Foreign Minister of
the Philippines said that Japan was “strongly welcomed” to build up its military again, saying it
had “the important role of keeping regional balance”2. This is an indication by the Philippines
that it is interested in Japan stepping up efforts to help balance against China, particularly in the
South China Sea.
It is important to note that Shinzo Abe’s 2012 re-election brings with it the topic of
constitutional revisionism in media rhetoric. Abe declared that “I have always wanted to have a
debate about whether or not the Constitution should be amended. I am glad to see the issue
(finally) being discussed in this election”29. This is significant because some media sources point
to this as a sign that Abe is trying to turn Japan away from pacifism29.
The reality of Japan’s efforts vis-à-vis the South China Sea parallel media rhetoric in
2012. There is very little in regards to official government statements made about Japan and the
South China Sea. When President Obama visited Japan on a tour of Asia in November of 2012,
neither he nor the Prime Minister of Japan at the time, Yoshihiko Noda, made any remarks about
the South China Sea dispute in their public comments and even ignored questions from reporters
about it33. This showed that Japan was hesitant to broadcast its presence in the area, even though
it was getting involved slowly but surely.

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The steps that Japan was beginning to take during 2012 in regards to the South China Sea
were limited in their significance. The year 2012 marked the first time since WWII that Japan
had provided military financial aid abroad, “approving a $2 million package for its military
engineers to train troops in Cambodia and East Timor in disaster relief”8. However, given that
this aid is intended for non-offensive military operations, its significance should not be
overstated. A New York Times article pointed out that in 2012 Japan also increased civilian aid
programs to train and equip the coast guards of other nations (i.e. people who would almost
certainly be in the “front lines” of the South China Sea dispute)8. The article goes on to admit
that this shift was “modest” for Japan, given that these civilian aid programs already existed.
In regards to the possibility of constitutional revision to allow for collective self-defense,
the 2012 white paper made it very clear that Japan’s military is strictly for self-defense purposes
only. Any future changes would continue to adhere to this principle of restraint20. Even collective
self-defense, which under international law is a right permissible to any sovereign state, is
deemed to exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and is therefore rejected by
Japan. Although Abe’s rhetoric points towards the possibility of change, the reality in 2012 is
that collective self-defense is not allowable under the current interpretation of Japan’s
constitution.
In the latter part of 2012, there is not an obvious disconnect between rhetoric and reality.
Media rhetoric on the South China Sea is largely absent, while the reality is that Japan is making
very minor steps to increase its efforts in the South China Sea.
b. 2013 Discourse vs. Reality
In 2013, the media focus started to shift somewhat from the East China Sea dispute down
to the South China Sea disputes. The author of an article in the Asahi Shinbun commented on

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Shinzo Abe’s efforts to build better diplomatic relations with countries in the South China Sea.
He called it an attempt to “woo” the countries and create a balanced effort against China’s
actions in the South China Sea41. The rhetoric used shows that the author believes Abe’s actions
are not aggressive, but rather efforts to peacefully build relations.
Other comments in a New York Times article regarding Japan’s increased interaction with
countries in the South China Sea are similarly non-inflammatory. For example, the article
mentioned Japan’s efforts to provide aid to countries in the South China Sea, saying that such
action demonstrates that “long pacifist Japan has restricted its aid to mostly nonmilitary
purposes, like building up coast guards”9. Although the article concedes that changes are being
made to Japan’s security policy, these efforts are labeled as “increasing though still limited
moves”9. It points out that “Japan has long supplied development aid in the region, but [Japan]
has operated carefully to avoid stirring bitter memories of its militarism during World War II”9.
However, Shinzo Abe’s controversial visit to Yasukuni Shrine on December 26, 2013
was an inflection point in media rhetoric. The shrine, which was established in 1869, houses the
souls of millions of Japan’s war dead. Fourteen of these souls belong to convicted Class-A war
criminals from World War II who are responsible for mass atrocities committed by Japanese
troops in China and Korea. For this reason, the shrine is a point of great tension between Japan
and its neighbors.
Following this visit, media discourse becomes far more critical of Japan’s actions
compared to the discourse seen in articles from earlier in 2013. The headline of an article from
the New York Times read, “With Shrine Visit, Leader Asserts Japan’s Track from Pacifism” 37.
The author begins by commenting on Abe’s political focus on reviving Japan’s economy,
criticizing that “in Mr. Abe’s mind, [Japan’s] newfound economic prowess is a means to an end:

Breese 22
to build a more powerful, assertive Japan, complete with a full-fledged military, as well as pride
in its World War II-era past”37. The rest of the article was filled with accusatory and strong
rhetoric aimed at Abe’s other efforts to change Japan’s security policy, proclaiming that “Abe
steamrollered through Parliament a law that would tighten government control over state
secrets”37. It is clear from this language that Abe’s visit provoked a severe backlash against his
policies from certain media outlets. This article also demonstrates how anti-Abe discourse
directed at the Yasukuni Shrine visit negatively affected how the author viewed other changes
under Abe’s administration, such as the passing of the state secrecy law.
The reality is that Shinzo Abe did focus on boosting relations with Southeast Asian
nations, particularly focusing on ones that were engaged in maritime disputes with China. In July
of 2013, Abe took a trip to Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Shinzo Abe said at a
conference during the trip that he “will proceed with strategic diplomacy that contributes not
only to Japan’s national interests, but also to the region’s peace and prosperity”3. He called it a
resumption of a diplomacy with a “bird’s-eye view of the globe”, indicating that Japan was
trying to turn its attention beyond just East Asia3. During his meeting with Philippine President
Benigno Aquino III, Abe also said that Japan would offer ten coast guard cutters to the
Philippines per the Philippines’ request, although there was not yet an established timeline of
when that would happen41. This was a visible example of an attempt at improving relations
between Japan and countries in the South China Sea.
Contrary to the rhetoric from the New York Times article about Abe’s visit to Yasukuni
Shrine, there are very few significant military changes in 2013, especially ones directly related to
the South China Sea. One example is that in 2013 Japan loosened self-imposed restrictions to
allow for exportation of weapons37. Japan’s intention is to build the capabilities of countries in

Breese 23
the South China Sea who are engaged in sovereignty disputes with China. However, since these
weapons are not for use by Japan, it is unclear how this would make Japan a more “powerful”
and “assertive” military actor like the article claims37.
According to the 2013 white paper released by the Japanese government, the decision to
become more active militarily in Asia came because of what the ministry of defense described as
a “severe” security environment around Japan21. It cited North Korea’s nuclear program and
China’s actions in the East and South China Sea as reasons for this shift. From this perspective,
Japan’s military actions could be interpreted as a reaction to its surrounding environment rather
than what some of the media suggests are Abe’s “militaristic” intentions (although admittedly
Abe’s intentions cannot be fully understood).
Media discourse and reality of the situation continue to be fairly similar to one another in
2013 until Shinzo Abe’s visit to Yasukuni shrine. Following that event, the rhetoric turns more
towards themes of militarism and Abe’s “hawkish” nature. There is a small gap between media
rhetoric and reality due to discourse that slightly overestimates Japan’s actions vis-à-vis the
South China Sea.
c. 2014 Discourse vs. Reality
In 2014, following the inflection point that was Shinzo Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine in
December of the previous year, there was a clear focus on what the media considered
nationalistic rhetoric and militaristic efforts from Japan. This was seen in a New York Times
article from April 2014 when Japan decided to completely end its ban on exporting weapons.
The article claimed that the Japanese government “discarded a nearly half-century ban” as the
result of Abe “taking his nation another step away from its postwar pacifism” to make it a “more
proactive player in regional security”10. The rhetoric here is again stronger than in previous

Breese 24
years, showing that some veins of the media are beginning to predict an increasingly militaristic
role from Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.
In July, an article from Asahi Shinbun titled “Major Security Shift: Japan must not
become a military power” contains vastly different language compared to media discourse in the
past two years24. The first line from the article reads, “July 1 will be remembered as the darkest
day in the history of Japan’s constitutionalism because of the Abe cabinet’s approval to change
the government interpretation of the supreme law to allow for the exercise of the right to
collective self-defense”24. The article goes on to lambast Abe and his party, criticizing him for
his “backward looking nationalism” and his complete lack of respect for the constitution.
A New York Times article from May 2014 points to Japan’s increasing engagement with
countries in the South China Sea as proof of accelerated efforts by Japan to play a larger security
role in Asia11. The rhetoric focuses mainly on how quickly Abe is attempting to change Japan’s
security policy. The author argues that Abe has been speeding up efforts to make Japan a more
“normal” nation, one that can defend both itself and its allies. He notes that there is a larger trend
of Japan “stepping up efforts to serve as at least a partial counterbalance to China’s rising
economic and military power in the region”11. Overall, media rhetoric in 2014 appears to argue
that Japan is rapidly making significant shifts to its security policy, and that the driving force
behind these shifts is Shinzo Abe.
One point where the reality appears to line up with rhetoric in 2014 is in regards to
Japan’s increased efforts in the South China Sea to cooperate with countries such as Vietnam and
the Philippines. The New York Times article mentioned in the previous paragraph argued that
Abe in particular has accelerated these efforts11. Statements made by Abe at an International
Security Meeting in Singapore in 2014 support this claim. Abe said in a speech that “Japan will

Breese 25
offer its utmost support for efforts by ASEAN member countries to ensure the security of the
seas and skies and rigorously maintain freedom of navigation and overflight”11. He declared that
the Japanese government would support Vietnam and other nations embroiled in territorial
disputes with China “by providing patrol ships, training and military surveillance equipment”, as
well as helping to train the coast guards of those countries 11. This is proof that Japan is taking
concrete steps to assist countries in the region. However, the goal of providing such assistance is
to build the capacity of other countries (specifically in the South China Sea), not Japan’s military
capacity.
Although enabling the use of collective self-defense is a significant shift from former
policy, the media fails to acknowledge the practical limitations that restrain the use of collective
self-defense by Japan. First, collective self-defense does not allow Japan to launch any sort of
offensive attack against another actor. Japan can only come to the aid of an ally if that ally is
directly attacked. In addition to that, there are three stipulations regarding the use of collective
self-defense that Abe’s cabinet had to agree in the face of domestic resistance to the
constitutional revision. They are the following: “Japan’s survival (kuni no sonritsu14) is
threatened; no alternative means of addressing the threat exist; and whatever force Japan uses
will be limited to the minimum necessary”16. Additionally, Shinzo Abe stated that “Japanese use
of military force even in UN Security Council-sanctioned collective security operations…will
never happen”16. It is important to make that distinction because the media discourse on this
move inflates collective self-defense to make it seem as if Japan will engage in all sorts of
overseas military conflicts in the future. The reality is that these stipulations significantly limit
the Japanese Self-Defense Force’s ability to respond, even with the reinterpretation.

Breese 26
In 2014, there continue to be gaps between media discourse and reality on the issue of
Japan’s involvement. Although the media is accurate in pointing out that Japan is taking steps to
increase cooperation with countries in the South China Sea, the extent and speed of these steps is
exaggerated. The media discourse in particular surrounding the July 1 constitutional revision
greatly over estimates the change because it fails to acknowledge the strict limitations that also
exist.
d. 2015 Discourse vs. Reality
The year 2015 has seen a rapid increase in coverage of Japanese military efforts in the
South China Sea. It has become a larger issue in the government’s view as well as the media’s,
although the difference in discourse versus the reality of Japan’s role continues to be significant.
The article titles alone suggest that the general consensus is that Japan’s role in the South China
Sea is expanding and will continue to grow in the future: “U.S. and Japan Agree to Broaden
Military Alliance”, “Testing Beijing, Japan Eyes Growing Role in South China Sea Security”,
“Japan, Vietnam to Bolster Cooperation in Defense Field”, “Japan, Philippines Huddle Amid
Increasing China Concerns” 13,26,36,40. A more in-depth analysis of these articles also reveals
rhetoric that suggests the media is no longer convinced that Japan’s government is being
cautious. Japan is described as proactive and showing its “willingness to take on a more robust
international role”25. According to this discourse, the questions seems to no longer be whether or
not Japan will become involved in the South China Sea, but how far will it get involved in the
South China Sea and whether or not this is a stepping stone for Japan’s military to expand its
involvement globally.
There also appears to be an increase in the number of times articles refer to Japan’s
militaristic past when analyzing the situation in the South China Sea. In previous years, it

Breese 27
typically came up when explaining tense relations between Japan and its neighbors. In one
article, however, the first line reads: “Seventy years after its imperial forces were kicked out of
the South China Sea, Japan is quietly moving back into the region, forging security ties with the
Philippines and Vietnam as both Southeast Asian nations try to cope with China’s territorial
ambitions”13. Whether or not this is a reaction to the rising amount of nationalistic rhetoric that
people claim Japan uses is unclear, but the fact remains that there are comparisons made between
WWII Japan and contemporary Japan.
Although it is made to seem as if Japan is expanding its role in the South China Sea at an
exceedingly fast pace, a more critical look shows that this expansion is far more gradual than
rhetoric suggests. For example, in an article addressing the possibility of U.S.—Japan tactical
cooperation in the South China Sea, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani declared, “We do not have a
plan for conducting a specific response”27. This is just one example of many where Japanese
officials gave quotes saying that they do not have any plans or intentions to take certain steps in
the disputes. It shows their restraint from getting too involved too quickly, at least from their
viewpoint.
Instead, Japan’s role in 2015 continued to be an extension of its efforts in previous years
to build better relations with countries in the region. In September 2015, members of the Self-
Defense Force visited Myanmar to teach their corps diving medicine, such as treating cases of
bends in diving fishermen4. This was an example of Japan engaging in capacity building of
foreign forces, which is a tactic they have used in previous years (ex. Exporting military
equipment to Vietnam and the Philippines in previous years). The intended goal is to increase the
capabilities of other nations to balance against China. Another example of improving relations
was when Gen Nakatani, the Japanese Defense Minister, visited Vietnam to meet with his

Breese 28
Vietnamese counterpart and discuss defense concerns. Both sides agreed to engage in future
maritime joint training to strengthen defense cooperation. After the meeting, Nakatani told
reporters that “defense was able to be widely discussed for the further development of
cooperation”4, highlighting the fact that the main goal was improved relations through increased
engagement with one another.
Following the recent Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) that the U.S.
conducted, there was similarly a lot of speculation about whether or not Japan would either
conduct one of its own or join the U.S. in its next FONOP. However, it is unlikely that Japan
would do so given that it is not a party to the ongoing territory disputes and it has been careful
not to be more active than regional members in the South China Sea. A high-ranking Defense
Ministry official stated: “We can hardly deploy our resources as far as to the South China Sea”34.
This demonstrates that Japan realizes the practical limits to its physical involvement. It is more
probable that Japan will continue to approach the situation with the same cautiousness that has
characterized its approach to security and military involvement.
In 2015 the gap between media discourse and reality was again present, with much of the
discourse overreacting to actions Japan has been taking. The discourse is correct that Japan is
stepping up its efforts to engage with other countries in order to balance against China. However,
it exaggerates the extent and purpose of these efforts. The discourse seems to suggest that Japan
is trying to actively engage in the disputes to stand up to China; the reality shows that Japan is
still limiting its role to joint and cooperative efforts rather than acting unilaterally.
D. South China Sea Case in the Larger Literature

Breese 29
In regards to the broader literature on Japan’s security policy, the reality of what Japan is
doing in the South China Sea currently lines up with the argument that recent shifts in policy are
part of a larger evolution. The case study shows examples of how even just within Abe’s
administration policies are evolving. For example, the constitutional revision that Abe’s
government passed in 2014 was shown to have been previously brought up by Abe in a 2012
statement. Also, the decision to eliminate the ban on exporting weapons that took place in 2014
was part of an ongoing process to gradually loosen those restrictions, as was seen in the 2013
section of the case study. Liff’s argument that restraint is still visible in the most recent changes
under Abe’s administration also stays true in this case study. The constitutional revision was a
significant shift, but the stipulations put down for invoking collective self-defense were
restrictive. Maslow’s argument, although it does agree that Japan’s security shifts are
evolutionary, seems to overestimate the extent of the acceleration that he claims is happening.
When framing the South China Sea disputes within the larger literature, it is not entirely
clear what is driving recent security shifts under Abe’s administration. According to Berger, anti-
militarist sentiments in Japan would restrain its policy choices. However, Lind would argue that
anti-militarism doesn’t not account for recent shifts, and that buck-passing does a better (but not
great) job of accounting for changes. In the case of Japan’s role in the South China Sea, I don’t
believe that either of them can accurately account for what is happening. Although domestic
politics are putting limitations on the changes Abe’s administration is making, there have still
been a number of significant shifts that do not line up with the idea of anti-militarism. At the
same time, these shifts also do not appear to be a push for militarism or nationalism in Japan.
The U.S. also does not appear to be pulling out of the region either, which means that Japan
should not feel the need to increase its military capabilities and role in the region if we were to

Breese 30
apply the theory of buck-passing. My conclusion is that Abe’s more conservative (but not
militaristic) goal of boosting Japan’s military capabilities, coupled with the security situation
surrounding Japan (most notably the growing military strength of China and North Korea’s
nuclear program) are what is causing the current trends in Japan’s security policies. However, it
is likely that restraint will continue to characterize Japan’s future changes.
V. Conclusions
Throughout 2012 and most of 2013, public discourse and reality were fairly consistent
with one another. Although there were some hints that people were concerned about Abe’s
security goals, the discourse tended not to over exaggerate what Japan was doing in the South
China Sea. However, following Shinzo Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine on December 26, 2013
there is a clear shift in the media discourse. The media labels Japan’s actions as evidence of its
desire to be “powerful” and “assertive” in East Asia. This causes a gap to arise because the
reality is that most of Japan’s efforts are limited. This gap widens even further after the passing
of the collective self-defense cabinet resolution on July 1, 2014. Media discourse again greatly
exaggerates the ability of Japan to engage in collective self-defense. The reality is that there are
many stipulations that restrain the Self Defense Force from engaging in collective self-defense.
By 2015, a gap is clearly present as demonstrated by the large amount of media discourse over
estimating the extent of Japan’s role in the South China Sea. The reality of the situation in 2015
so far is more subdued; although Japan has been increasing its actions in the South China Sea, it
has done so in a restrained manner, usually through joint efforts.
Proving that this gap exists and that it has continued to widen since late 2013 has
implications for the future of relations in Asia. Over exaggerated rhetoric risks misinterpretation

Breese 31
by Japan’s neighbors, which could worsen the situation not only in the South China Sea but in
other areas of tension. Although the media discourse of Japan and the U.S. is by no means an
official source of government or public opinion, the fact is that the media has a much more
visible platform through which opinions, information, etc. can be spread. This is not to suggest
that the media is wholly unreliable; my argument is that in the case of Japan’s ongoing efforts in
the South China Sea, the media discourse has been exaggerating the extent of Japan’s role in the
disputes since 2013. In order to try and mitigate this, Japan needs to be candid with other
countries about its true intentions to prevent overreactions from them, which could quickly spiral
out of control. At the same time, Abe and his administration should be careful not to inflame
greater criticism against him and his administration on the domestic front. Further discourse
about Japan’s supposed remilitarization would only serve to breed greater mistrust. It is critical
that the current gap between discourse and reality not be heightened any further than it already is
if conflict resolution in the South China Sea disputes is to be possible one day.
VI. References
11833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261 (1982)
2Asahi Shinbun. "日本の再軍備「強く歓迎」フィリピン外相、中国を意識 " [Remilitarization of
Japan "Strongly Welcomed" by Philippines’ Foreign Minister, China Aware]. December
11, 2012. http://database.asahi.com/library2e/main/start.php.
3Asahi Shinbun. "海洋進出の中国意識安倍首相、東南アジア３カ国訪問" [Conscious of China's
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http://database.asahi.com/library2e/main/start.php.
4Asahi Shinbun. "（変わる安全保障）自衛隊、広がる外国軍支援
潜水医学・国際航空法…二国間協力強化"[(Change security) Self-Defense Forces, foreign

Breese 32
forces support diving medicine and international aviation law ... bilateral cooperation
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10Fackler, Martin. "Japan Ends Decades-Long Ban on Export of Weapons." The New York Times
(New York, NY), April 2, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/world/asia/
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11Fackler, Martin. "Japan Offers Support to Nations in Disputes With China." The New York
Times, May 30, 2014, Asia Pacific. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/world/asia/japan-

Breese 33
china-abe.html.
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Sea Security." Reuters. Last modified March 10, 2015.
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14Kuni no sonritsu o mattou shi, kokumin o mamoru tameno kireme no nai anzen hosho hosei no
seibi ni tsuite [Regarding Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s
Survival and Protect Its People], National Security Committee & Cabinet Decision, July 1,
2014, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/ anpohosei.pdf
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16Liff, Adam. "Japan's Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary." The Washington Quarterly
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18Map showing claims of countries in the South China Sea maritime disputes. Photograph. The
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19Maslow, Sebastian. "A Blueprint for a Strong Japan? Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Evolving

Breese 34
Security System." Asian Survey 55, no. 4 (July/August 2015): 739-65.
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25Mohammed, Arshad. "U.S., Japan Unveil New Defense Guidelines for Global Japanese Role."
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26Nikaido, Isamu. "Japan, Vietnam to bolster cooperation in defense field." The Asahi Shinbun
(Japan), November 7, 2015.
27Nikaido, Isamu, and Go Kobayashi. "Japan vows cooperation with U.S. in South China Sea but
faces limits." The Asahi Shinbun (Japan), October 28, 2015.
28Nikaido, Isamu. "日越、防衛協力の強化で一致中国を牽制する狙い" [Japan-
Vietnam, aim to check China by the strengthening of defense cooperation]. Asahi Shinbun,
November 6, 2015. http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASHC64RKDHC6UTFK005.html.
29Nogami, Yu. "LDP, Japan Restoration Party leading momentum for constitutional revision."
The Asahi Shinbun (Japan), December 6, 2012.

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30Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, Doc. No.
143, (2014).
31Office of the Press Secretary. "U.S.-Japan Joint Statement: The United States and Japan:
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33Perlez, Jane. "China Stalls Move to Quell Asia Disputes Over Territory." The New York Times
(New York, NY), November 19, 2012, A10.
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disputes-in-southeast-asia.html.
34Sasaki, Manabu. "Joint exercise in South China Sea reflects Japan's 'strong concern' about
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35Sea Areas in International Rights. Image. Wikipedia. April 22, 2006.
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alliance.html.
37Tabuchi, Hiroko. "With Shrine Visit, Leader Asserts Japan's Track From Pacifism." The New
York Times New York, NY), December 27, 2013.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/27/world/asia/japanese-premier-visits-contentious-war-
shrine.html.
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