This document provides an acknowledgements and table of contents section for a study on the Royal Militia of the Island of Jersey from 1890-1917. It thanks various archives and historians for their assistance with research. The study seeks to understand the recruitment, training, and social composition of the RMIJ, especially in the context of part-time military service in Britain leading up to and during WWI. It will draw on primary sources from various archives to analyze the officer corps and enlisted ranks of the RMIJ, comparing it to other British militia units and the wider British military tradition.

1. The Royal Militia of the Island of Jersey within
the British Army,
A Study of Recruitment, Training and Social Composition, c. 1890-1917
By Henry Alasdair Roberts
Supervised by Dr. Timothy Bowman
(hr205@kent.ac.uk)
HI757
Word Count : 16,145

2. Acknowledgements
During my research and the process of writing this paper I have consulted a large
number of books and archival documents on the subject of the Militia forces of the British
Army. within the period studied by this paper. The online repositories of numerous archives
were also valuable throughout this study.
I would like to thank the Jersey Archives and the Société Jersaise for their assistance
in both finding new avenues of research, and procuring individual items that would otherwise
have been impossible to find and use for this paper. Without the archivists and historians of
this organisation this study would have been less well researched than it iss. Particularly Ian
Ronayne who kindly went out of his way to assist this study in its infancy.
The services at the National Archives in Jersey, at Kew, Ottawa, Canberra, Sydney,
Paris and Johannesburg also cannot be thanked enough for their assistance, particularly the
archives that involved language barriers, where the archivists were understanding of
limitations and swiftly assisted in any areas when asked.
Finally, my thanks go to Dr. Timothy Bowman, Dr. Mario Draper, and Dr. William
Butler. These three members of the School of History faculty reacted with enthusiastic
support whenever I required aid in the process of writing this paper. Any errors and
interpretations are mine alone; my research has led me to these views, arguments and
opinions set out in the following, supported by both primary and secondary source material
that is listed in the bibliography.

3. For Summersdean Blackbowler.

4. Henry A. Roberts
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Table of Contents
Page
Abbreviations ii
List of Tables iii
Chapter I: Introduction 1
Chapter II: Recruitment 8
Chapter III: Training 21
Chapter IV: Social Composition of Jersey, and its Militia 31
Chapter V: Conclusion 39
Appendix 42
Bibliography 43

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Abbreviations
BEF British Expeditionary Force
CA Canberra Archives
CNA Canadian National Archives
JA Jersey Archives
OTC Officer Training Corps
NASA National Archives of South Africa
BPP British Parliamentary Papers
RGM Royal Guernsey Militia
RGLI Royal Guernsey Light Infantry
RJGB Royal Jersey Garrison Battalion
RMIJ Royal Militia of the Island of Jersey
SJ Société Jersaise
SJPA Société Jersaise Photo Archive
SRM Staffordshire Regimental Museum
TNA The National Archives
WO War Office

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List of Tables and Charts
1.1. Corps joined by Jerseymen, 1914-1919
1.2. Infantry Regiments joined by Jerseymen, 1914-1919
2.1. Number of Men Absent for more than 7 Drill Sessions, July 1904
3.1. Occupations of officers of the Royal Jersey Militia, 1896-1915
3.2. Occupations of Royal Jersey Militia rank and file, 1896-1915
3.3. Sample of occupations of Alumni, Victoria College, and King’s
Canterbury, 1890-1919

7. Henry A. Roberts
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Chapter I
Introduction
This study seeks to create a greater understanding of the Royal Militia of the Island of Jersey,
in particular, its place within the wider context of part-time military service in the prelude to
and during the First World War. This subject has become known as ‘the amateur military
tradition’. The RMIJ was part of the United Kingdom’s defence commitment to Jersey, and,
as such, funding was provided through the Home Office, and then the War Office, from early
1904 (in line with Major General Hugh Gough’s appointment to Lieutenant Governor); any
shortfall of funding not provided by this bursary would be supplemented by the Bailiwick of
Jersey. The RMIJ appeared to be akin to the ‘orphan battalions’ of the Territorial Force, as it
had no strong, long-term links with any mainland regular unit.1 The Royal Guernsey Militia
had the most in common with the RMIJ, and a similar limbo situation regarding its purpose
and where the unit would fit, into the wider Order of Battle of the British Army, in the event
of a war in mainland Europe.2 On this topic there was a great deal of communication,
between the Bailiwicks and Whitehall. Ian Ronayne has produced two amateur histories on
Jersey and the First World War: firstly, the study of the 1st Jersey contingent serving with 7th,
Royal Irish Rifles, moving to 2nd, Royal Hampshire Regiment in 1917, and secondly, the
experience of the island during the First World War. These were of limited use, and the
primary sources available were key in the further understanding of this discourse, alongside
the plethora of secondary sources available on the amateur military tradition throughout the
United Kingdom. The objective of this study was to gain a further understanding of the RMIJ
position within the British Army, particularly during the Haldane reforms; which showed that
the RMIJ and RGM were anomalies following the creation of the Special Reserve, in addition
1
T. Bowman& M. Connelly, TheEdwardian Army:Recruiting,training and Deploying theBritish
Army,1902-1914, (OUP,Oxford,2012), p. 110.
2
JA,A/C3/1, Correspondence relatingtothe army annual acts andtheirregistrationinJersey,1890;
see also,JA A/C2/31/22 LetterfromE. Markham to G.C.Bertram requestingclarityregarding
bringingMilitiaunderArmyAct1881 intime of war, 3 Dec. 1892

8. Henry A. Roberts
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to the British Army in the prelude to the First World War; the Isle of Man Rifle Volunteers
were another example of an anomalous force in 1907.
The aspect of recruitment of auxiliaries was a subject that received a lot of attention,
but the RMIJ itself has not. The study of recruitment within auxiliary units in the United
Kingdom has tended to become bogged down regarding its purpose; that being additional
pools of recruitment to the regular army in the United Kingdom.3 The study of the RMIJ
takes a look firstly at the officer corps and secondly at other ranks, then relating this to the
experience of mainland Militia units. Ronayne’s two books on the matter regarding the First
World War were important, but the textbook-style employed required that extensive primary
sources were needed in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the RMIJ.4 This
section was predominantly based on the A/C2, A/C3, and D/AP/R series from the Jersey
Archives.
The study of the pre-war officer corps within the RMIJ was very similar to the wider
study of the auxiliary forces prior to the First World War. There were shortages of men on
the active lists, with a hopeless approach to maintaining a strong core of officers within each
of the infantry battalions of the Militia, it’s artillery batteries, and ancillary companies.5 To
this end, the A/C2 and A/C3 series were required to understand why the RMIJ officer corps
was in the state that it was in by 1896.6 There was a vast amount of correspondence within
the previously mentioned series at The Jersey Archives. In addition, at The National
Archives; there were a number of cabinet papers regarding shortages of officers throughout
3
I.F.W.Beckett, Riflemen Form:A Study of the Rifle VolunteerMovement,1859-1908, (Pen&Sword,
Barnsley,2007), 199-201.; see also,T. Bowman& M. Connelly, TheEdwardian Army,p.51-52.; see
also,W. Butler,‘The IrishAmateurMilitaryTraditioninthe BritishArmy,c.1854-1945’, (Unpublished
Ph.D.Thesis,Universityof Kent,2013),p. 129.; see also, B.Bond,‘The Effectof the Cardwell Reforms
inArmy Organisation,1874-1904’, The RUSIJournal,105, 620, 1960, p. 518.
4
I. Ronayne, ‘Ours’,TheJersey Palsin the First World War, (The HistoryPress,Stroud,2011); see
also,I. Ronayne, Jersey’sGreatWar,an Island and its People 1914-1918, (JerseyHeritage Trust,St.
Helier,2014)
5
JA D/AP/R/13/57,Annual expensesestimate forthe Islandof JerseyMilitia,17August1912, p. 2.;
see also,Bowman& Connelly, TheEdwardian Army, p.113-114.
6
JA,A/C2/24/5, LetterfromE.L. PembertontoLieutenantGovernorC.Ewart informinghimof
agreementinremoval of LieutenantWestaway’scommission,24April,1890; see also,JA A/C2/29/1,
LetterC.B. Ewart to UnderSecretaryof State,Home Office,removingLt.Westawayfromactive list
of Officersof the Royal JerseyMilitiadue toabsence forthree yearsinAmerica,8 April 1890; see
also, H. Abadie,‘The States’. TheJersey Times, January20th
1903, p. 2.; see also,Beckett.I.F.W,
Britain’sPart-TimeSoldiers, The AmateurMilitary Tradition,1558-1945, (Pen& Sword,Barnsley,
2011), p. 198.

9. Henry A. Roberts
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auxiliary units. This is supported two theses in particular on British auxiliary units: Robert
Stoneman regarding the British Militia and George Hay on the British Yeomanry Cavalry.7
This is also discussed at length by Ian Beckett in ‘Part-Time Soldiers’, suggesting that this
was an issue, that was closely linked to the issue of recruitment of militiamen to the regular
army.
The method of recruitment of rank and file in the RMIJ, was deemed peculiar by
immigrants in 1890. By 1890 the active list of the RMIJ was to be maintained at 1,800 at all
times, in 1904, this reduced to 1,000, with the remainder of the liable native population
serving in the reserve lists. This was maintained by conscription, which we know from Ian
Beckett and Jeffrey Western was deemed politically untenable by the government in the
United Kingdom by 1890; both the 1757 Militia Ballot, 1793, Irish Militia Act and and the
1797 Scottish Ballot received monumental amounts of opposition, effectively a tax on
manpower, which disgruntled rural communities in particular.8 From sixteen, Jerseymen were
employed in a preparatory service for the RMIJ, entering the active Militia at 18; this ensured
that the RMIJ became ‘an institution of the island’ firmly by the 1890’s, there was a similar
militarist trend noted by Beckett in the United Kingdom.9 There have been issues regarding
the explicit numbers recruited by the RMIJ due to storage of archives. However, the expenses
records are available, which has proven to be vital if used alongside the rates of pay outlined
in draft Militia Bills.10 The RMIJ did not become another pool for regular recruitment as it
had in the United Kingdom, although it was never associated with a regiment as most were
following the Cardwell-Childers reforms.11
Recruiting during the First World War in Jersey and from the RMIJ into the British
Army were one and the same, due to conscription to the Militia. An area that has been
attended, but not explored in detail, was the initial call to the colours by Kitchener in August
of 1815 and the response from Jersey. Ronayne has focussed on the 250 men of D Company,
7
R. Stoneman,‘The ReformedBritishMilitia,1852-1908’, (UnpublishedPh.D.Thesis,Universityof
Kent,2013); see also,G. Hay, ‘The BritishYeomanryCavalry’,(UnpublishedPh.D.Thesis,University
of Kent,2011).
8
J. Western, TheEnglish Militia in the Eighteenth Century, (Routledge&KeganPaul,London,1965),
p. 143-145.
9
JA D/AP/R/13/57,Annual expensesestimate forthe Islandof JerseyMilitia,17August1912; see
also,I. Beckett, Britain’sPart-TimeSoldiers,TheAmateurMilitary Tradition,1558-1945, (Pen&
Sword,Barnsley,2011), p. 199-203.; see also,Ronayne, ‘Ours’,p.15.
10
JA,D/AP/R/2,Pay listsforthe Royal JerseyMilitia,1893-1917
11
Bowman& Connelly, TheEdwardian Army,p.116.; see also,D. French, Military Identities,The
regimentalSystem,The British Army & the British People,c. 1870-2000, (OUP, Oxford,2005), p. 206-
207.

10. Henry A. Roberts
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7th, The Royal Irish Rifles on 3rd January 1915. The wider study of recruitment of the
Territorial Force in the First World War has drawn a lot of attention, but two stand out:
Edward Spiers, and Beckett. These two published numerous books surrounding the subject
area which effectively explained why Kitchener rejected the Territorial Force in late 1914.12
An interesting area to explore with this topic in mind was the relationship between individual
Channel Island Bailiwicks and the United Kingdom. This relates to the issue of conscription,
which comes into force later in Jersey than it did throughout the rest of the Crown
Dependencies, this suspended the RMIJ until 1919, and this was the first time the Bailiwick
of Jersey had a large non-Jersey garrison since the English Civil War.
Training of auxiliary units became a study of the RMIJ in the pre-war period; how it
attempted to enforce a strict regimen among a large group of conscripts and whether this was
successful. The result of training in the First World War was measured through reports of the
only unit within the British Army that could be regarded as a purely Jersey unit, D Company,
7th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles. The Royal Ulster Rifles Museum has a number of reports
from commanding officers that infers that RMIJ training gave ‘the fighting D’ an advantage
when reaching camp at Buttevant.13 There were a number of diaries held by the Jersey
Contingent Association, which appear to have been lost in recent years with the last of the
company dying.
The pre-war period should be treated as an area where the RMIJ, and RGM appear to
be side-lined by the United Kingdom. Communication between senior officials of the
Bailiwicks and Whitehall showed that there was clear confusion about the objective of RMIJ
training. This was both due to Lieutenant Governor Edward Markham’s persistency and
rising European tensions that the following issues were partially addressed by 1903.14 The
RMIJ lacked adequate funding, and as previously mentioned, it was treated as an unimportant
matter. This led to fundraising efforts on the island to procure enough funding for the
12
E. Spiers, Haldane:An Army Reformer,(EUP,Edinburgh,1980),p. 143-146.; see also,E. Spiers, The
Army and Society,1815-1914, (Longman,London,1980); see also,Beckett,I, Britain’sPart-Time
Soldiers,The AmateurMilitary Tradition,1558-1945, (Pen&Sword,Barnsley,2011), p. 174-197.
13
Ronayne, ‘Ours’,p.39.; see also,“Withthe JerseyBoysinIreland”, Morning News, 3June 1915;
see also,RUR, M143, General SirJamesSteele,The Original JerseyOverseasContingent,18January
1915
14
JA A/C2/38/17, Letterto the D A A General fromthe Adjutantrecommendingtothe Defence
Committee thatthe NorthshedOldTownArsenal shouldbe covered,12 Nov1902

11. Henry A. Roberts
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shortfall.15 More importantly, the RMIJ lacked direction during peace time; the annual
training took place across the island. The Royal Militia Artillery was stationed at the
antiquated Mont Orgueil and Fort Regent. The Militia infantry battalions, artillery batteries,
engineer company and medical company trained at these locations, as well as Elizabeth
Castle and in camps to the West of St. Helier.16 The Militia had never trained in a larger
formation by 1914 either, and lacked the tools to mount a strong defence, which was an
initial fear until the Marne. The Militia continued to parade throughout the island and
embodied this idea of ‘an institution of the island’ which the Société Jersaise Photo Archive
and Ronayne highlighted.17 The wider subject has been considered by Beckett and Stoneman,
both of which highlight a trend across the United Kingdom Militia units in the prelude to the
First World War of increased investment highlighted, increasing tension in Europe.18 With
this section there should also be an appreciation for discipline and morale, this was important
on Jersey, particularly regarding who was exempt from service; this was a political issue that
William Butler has addressed regarding the Irish amateur military tradition and was also
touched upon by Timothy Bowman regarding conscripts who joined Irish regiments after the
series of amalgamations in 1916/’17.19
There has not been an in depth analysis of the social fabric of the Royal Jersey
Militia. Academics have been able to look at social composition of the United Kingdom
within certain periods. For instance, the approach taken by Jeffrey Western in his study of the
18th Century Militia in England.20 His in depth research of both the officer corps and the
other ranks allowed him to create an analysis of both within his given period. French also
provided similar monographs, in method, in this he detailed insight into the social
composition and the reasons for these groups to join their given auxiliary unit.21 William
Butler has endeavoured to do this also, between the years 1854 and 1945. In his paper, Butler
15
JA A/C2/31/10-11, VernablesVernontoAttorneyGeneral clarifyingfundingandmartial law if
breakof communicationwithmainlandintime of war,23 April 1892; see also,JA A/C2/31/22, Letter
fromE. Markham to G.C.Bertram requestingclarityregardingbringing MilitiaunderArmyAct1881
intime of war,3 Dec.1892
16
SJ, SJPA/000657, Militiacampinggroundof Royal JerseyMilitiaCamponEastGlacis Field,May
1906
17
Ronayne, ‘Ours’, p.15.
18
R. Stoneman,‘The ReformedBritishMilitia,1852-1908’
19
Butler,‘The IrishAmateurMilitaryTradition’,p.127-132.; see also,T.Bowman, Irish Regiments
and the Great War,Discipline and Morale,(MUP, Manchester,2003), p. 143-146.
20
Western, TheEnglish Militia in the Eighteenth Century
21
French, Military Identities

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has focussed on religion as a factor alongside their occupations, this was required for his
thesis, as it was an integral factor regarding the Irish auxiliary.22 This was not a factor
required in an analysis of the composition of the RMIJ, nonetheless, the methodology of
Butler should be emulated in a study of the officer corps and other ranks of the RMIJ.
Therefore, this chapter should be separated between the officers and other ranks, and should
note any change to the social fabric of the RMIJ, particularly at the turn of the 20th Century,
with the influx of migrant businessmen to St. Helier. Then a comparison with the British and
Irish Militias should be made to effectively contribute to the current academic discourse.
In order to carry out this study effectively, it was important to understand the number
of men who served in the RMIJ, who also served in the First World War. This allowed in
depth analysis of regiments joined, whether there were links to any of these regiments. To
create this database, the National Archives of the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, South Africa and France were used. This revised the number of men who served in
the First World War from Jersey. The number of men from the original roll of service
increased from 5,070, to 9,163, and the total lives lost increased from 2,554 according to the
1921 roll of honour, increased to 2,908. This database allowed a proper appraisal of the social
composition of the RMIJ. The attestation lists indicated previous Militia service in Jersey and
the unit within the RMIJ that was joined. When cross referenced against the 1911 census, for
occupations via ancestry.com a social composition of the officer corps and other ranks could
be made.
Primary material had to be the basis of any study of the amateur military tradition of
Jersey, this was due to little attention by academic historians. Regarding the pre-war RMIJ,
the information held at the Jersey Archives and The National Archives, was extremely
valuable. Together, these two locations had enough resources to provide a clear image of
RMIJ recruitment, training, and an adequate image of social composition. To understand the
relationship between the Bailiwick and Whitehall, local newspapers, such as: The Jersey
Times were telling of local attitude throughout the period, alongside letters between senior
officials of both the Bailiwick and Whitehall. The Militia Archives appear to have been
stored in poor conditions, which the locals assert was during the German occupation, in
addition the occupying troops burned many of the documents also. This made it impossible to
attain specific figures for recruitment into the RMIJ before the First World War, particularly
22
Butler,‘The IrishAmateurMilitaryTradition’

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the active lists between 1890 and 1896. Wartime recruitment was easier to research using the
previously mentioned archives, as well as, the French, Canadian, Australian and New
Zealand national archives. Training was also documented and the guidelines were clearly laid
out by the previously mentioned communications between Jersey and the United Kingdom.
During wartime the RMIJ was embodied to defend the island until 1917, when conscription
was forced upon the Crown Dependency.

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Chapter II
Recruitment
This chapter considers how recruitment of men into the officer corps or rank and file of the
Late-Victorian, Edwardian Militia in Jersey was conducted and how this recruitment
impacted on efforts towards recruitment during the First World War. The rank and file
merited a more in depth study on this subject due to its size. The officer corps was relatively
small in comparison. The study has relied heavily on Edward Spiers and Hugh Cunningham’s
studies of the period which provided a wider history of the subject.23 Timothy Bowman and
Mark Connelly’s co-authored, The Edwardian Army was the first comprehensive study of the
Edwardian Army.24 Prior to this historians had mixed studies of the Victorian and Edwardian
periods together. 25 The study of the rank and file explored the conscription system that
existed, in Jersey. This study also looked at the islands attitude during the First World War
and an appreciation for the key reasons for the island’s opposition to conscription in 1916 and
‘17. Equally, this section discussed the issues of similar systems of recruitment within the
amateur military tradition of the United Kingdom, this looked at the recruitment difficulties
of the Militia that followed the Cardwell-Childers reforms. This showed that the Militia in
Jersey was not attached to any regiment, and had been side-lined by the War Office, until
1902. 26 The focus of the discourse on the officer corps revolved around the lack of willing
men to join it, why this happened and the effect that this had on the rank and file, which was
constantly at full strength, due to conscription. There is also an appraisal of the actions taken
by the military authorities to remedy these issues. This section of the study also focussed on
23
Spiers, Haldane:An Army Reformer;see also,Spiers, TheArmy and Society;see also,Cunningham,
The VolunteerForce
24 Bowman,& Connelly, TheEdwardian Army
25
See example of cobblingtogether,C. Mahaffey,‘The FightingProfession:The Professionalizationof
the BritishLine InfantryOfficerCorps,1870-1902’, (UnpublishedPh.D.Thesis,Universityof Glasgow,
2004)
26
JA A/C2/39/23, LieutenantGovernorHenryAbadie tothe Home Office,regardingexpensesof
mobilization,7November1903; see also,JA,A/C2/39/1, LetterfromUnder Secretaryof State Home
Office toLieutenantGovernorHenryAbadieregardingexpensesof mobilisation,1January1904

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the British Militia thesis of Robert Stoneman, which highlighted similar issues throughout the
Late-Victorian and Edwardian officer corps.
As previously mentioned, the existence of conscription within a Militia unit was an
alien and distasteful concept to contemporaries in the British Empire by 1890. Ian Ronayne
correctly stated that Jersey, Guernsey, Sark, and Alderney were unique in this manner, which
was an unusual arrangement, by 1890. The purpose of the RMIJ as a defence force was
certainly redundant by this point, especially if one considers that at all times, a regular British
Army battalion was present on the island; from 9 September 1914, a battalion of The South
Staffordshire Regiment was placed on the island, with the addition of the RMIJ until
February 1917 and the creation of the Royal Jersey Garrison Battalion.27 Conscription of all
native men from 16 to 60, or those owning property on the island, did not have a comparable
feature in England, Wales, Scotland or Ireland at the time; see following extract of the
Bailiwick of Jersey Militia Act 1881:
“Every man who is a native, or the son of a native, of the island, or who, being a
British subject, is possessed of real property in the island, or who carries on it any profession,
trade, or calling, is liable to serve in the Militia from the age of 16 to that of 60, and this
service is, personal, gratuitous and obligatory.”28
In the United Kingdom, the closest process that would be similar to this was the Militia
Ballot of 1757 in England and Wales, Ireland in 1793 and in Scotland in 1797.29 However, all
instances were taxes on manpower and not conscription of all men into Militia service, be it
in the active or reserve lists. This highlighted a difference in opinion regarding militarisation
of society, which Ian Beckett has highlighted regarding army and society relations in the
United Kingdom.30 The Militia Ballot system had caused a string of riots throughout Great
Britain, particularly in the North East and in Ireland. The latter resulted in 230 deaths in the 8
weeks following the embodiment of the Militia.31 The reason for this violence was objection
to compulsion, with an element of scaremongering, regarding overseas service. All of this
27
“SoldierandSailorsClubatPrince of WalesRooms”, Evening Post, 5 October1916
28
JA,D/AP/AD/6/14,Orderof herMajestyin Council toconfirman act of the Statesentitledthe
MilitiaLaw,2 March 1881
29
I. Beckett, Citizen Soldiers and the British Empire,1837-1902, (Routledge,London,2012),p.4.
30
Ibid, p. 198-199.
31
T. Bartlett, A Military History of Ireland,(CUP,Cambridge,1997), p.254.

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resulted in a relatively low percentage of the male population trained as a reserve, as was its
intended purpose in its revival in 1852 and 1854.32 The RMIJ’s purpose was supposedly to
act as a defence force, but it had last seen combat in January 1781, in the Battle of Jersey.
Since then it had seen no action, but was conscripted and trained throughout the 19th Century
without the taint of political issues of the Militia of the United Kingdom, beyond the 1891
mutiny.33 The RMIJ could also claim to be one of the longest standing, active Militia units in
the world by 1890, having never been fully disbanded since the 14th Century.
Conscription provided a constant supply of recruits to the RMIJ, which ensured that
the number of men within the Militia was maintained at its upper limit. This has often
become a focal point of discourse regarding the late 19th Century ‘old constitutional force’,
which experienced major competition for recruits and funding.34 The number of militiamen
was set at 3,000 at the beginning of the period studied within this piece of work, this was
later reduced to 1,000 by 1914.35 The exact date of this change is currently unknown because
of storage of documents in Jersey during the German occupation. This leaves an unanswered
question on this topic, because the German occupation force destroyed most documents from
between 1906 and 1911. It stands to reason that this change was probably among the reforms
brought in by Major General Henry Richard Abadie, and Henry Sutlej Gough, during the
reorganisation of the Militia that had begun formally in 1903, which Gough oversaw from
February 1904. The official reorganisation was finalised in early 1905, this added an
Engineer and Medical Company to the three battalions and four Companies of the Royal
Jersey Artillery.36 David French noted that the main cause for disaffection between the
militiamen, their officers and the War Office, in particular, was the lack of sufficient long-
term recruitment; French, used a mixture of Parliamentary Papers and The National Archives
to highlight that most Militia recruits were underemployed and unfit for regular service from
32
H. Herwig, The Dynamicsof Necessity:German Military Policy During theFirst World War, ineds,
A.R.Millett& W. Murray, Military Effectiveness,Volume1,The First World, (CUP,Cambridge,2010),
p. 83-84.
33
Beckett, Part-TimeSolders,p.231.
34
TNA,WO 33/21A, O.H. Moreshead,Memoon MilitiaRecruiting,10 March 1870
35
JA, D/AP/R/13/57, CorrespondencebetweenLieutenantGovernor’sOffice andthe War Office with
Draft MilitiaBill enclosed,17August1912
36
JA,D/AP/AD/8/18,Memorandumof the LieutenantGovernorsregardingthe Reorganisationof the
Royal JerseyMilitia,6August1901; see also,TNA HO 45 10070/B5960/77, Correspondence between
the Clerkof PrivyCouncil andWar Office re:reorganisationof militia,31December1903; see
example of reductionof battalions,TNA,HO45 10070/B5960/64, Reformof the numberof
battalionsof the Royal JerseyMilitia,23October1904

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1890 to the creation of the special reserve.37 This had been caused by the Cardwell-Childers
Reforms, which had linked the auxiliary battalions with the regular battalions. Ultimately
eroding the long-term numbers employed by the Militia, and increasing the numbers of men
recruited from the Militia to the regulars. Alongside this issue, there was a clear lack of
recognition for protests by commanding officers regarding recruitment, many of which were
disgruntled by the Cardwell-Childers reforms.38 The number of men recruited from the
Militia into the regular army showed that this was certainly the case, Ian Beckett states that
this figure was 327,496 within the period between 1882 and 1904, and this represented 35.4%
of the regular army’s recruits in this period. 39 A similar number of men from the officer
corps transferred from the reserves to the regulars.40 The Militia in the United Kingdom had
also had competition for recruits with the Rifle Volunteers in the period studied by this paper.
Jersey had not been plagued by these issues; there was no alternative to the Militia on
the island and no strong link to any one regular regiment or corps, bar indirect links with the
King’s Royal Rifle Corps and the British Indian Army, through the large ex-pat community.
This was reflected in First World War recruitment, which showed that 41.24% of men went
to the infantry, and 11.2% to the artillery (see chart 1.1.). Within the former group, 45.7%
went to six particular regiments (see chart 1.2.). Three being based on the south coast, one in
Jersey, as the remaining garrison, as Lieutenant Governor, Sir Alexander Rochefort requested
that a garrison of 500 remain. The cadre of men joining, 7th, Royal Irish Rifles appeared to be
sent as a stop gap, to an otherwise failing battalion. The hundred and one men who served in
the King’s Royal Rifle Corps generally served in the 1st and 3rd battalions and were awarded
the 1914-1915 Star. This suggested that the individuals were in regular army service already
during the outbreak of war, given that the regiment had no reserve battalion’s when the First
World War Broke out. On the subject of links to United Kingdom units, there was a peculiar
link to the County Carlow Militia, which had trained on the island, this dated back to 1796,
but since the mid-19th Century, communication had stopped. The other three-hundred and
eighty-one regiments joined by men from Jersey suggest little correlation between units being
37
D. French, Military Identities,p. 205.; see also,TNA,WO 33/37, Reportof the MilitiaLocalisation
Committee,4April 1881; see also,C.Arnold, FromMonsto Messinesand Beyond:TheGreat War
Experienceof SergeantCharlesArnold,(BrewinBooks,Studley,1999),p. 5.
38
BPP,XVL, 5922, Reportof the Committee appointedtoenquire aboutcertainquestionsthathave
arisenwithrespecttothe militia,April 1903: see also,BPP,X,Col.T. Innes, NotesonTrainingthe
Militia,1881
39
Beckett, Part-TimeSoldiers,p. 187.
40
BPP,XLIX, ArmyCommissions,returnastothe numberof commissionsgrantedduringeachof the
years1885 to 1906

18. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
12
12
chosen; if cross-referenced with medal cards, these individuals were drawn from a later cadre
and being forced to join regiments in the final year of the First World War, regardless of any
connections to regiments that Jersey had. This meant that men were not able to take
advantage of any links to British Army Regiments.
1.1 Corps joined by Jerseymen, 1914-191941
41
The numbersof menandtheirdestinationsinthe warwascompiledusingmultiple archives,
however,focusedona numberof specificclassmarks:the WO 95 War Diariesof 48th
Brigade and
medal cards of the BT 351, and WO 372 seriesatthe National Archives,the RG9 seriesatthe
CanadianNational Archives,the B2455 seriesat the CanberraArchives,the URU 1900 seriesof the
National Archivesof SouthAfrica,the VictoriaCollege Bookof Remembrance,extractsfrom The
Jersey Times, and Evening News,the War Graves Commission,andthe 1911 census.
0.68%
11.20%
2.78%
1.17%
4.18%
41.24%
8.16%
1.33%
8.65%
4.78%
9.84%
4.79%
0.10%
0.13% 0.07% 0.15% 0.23%0.52%Anciliary
Artillery
Aviation
Cavalry
Engineers
Infantry
Logistics
Machine Gun Corps
Marine
Medic
Navy
Non Combat Corps
OTC
Provost
Reserve
Staff
Training/Depot
N/A

19. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
13
13
1.2 Infantry Regiments joined by Jerseymen, 1914-191942
If one was to look at the pre-war conscription recruitment in Jersey, it inferred that
there was not the same level of patriotism, as there was with the Militia in England and
Wales which Beckett alluded to.43 It was clear from The Jersey Times that local sentiment
regarding the Militia, was ambivalent, and this was reflected by the numbers of men that
turned out when Lieutenant Governor Rochefort called men to the colours on 4 December
1914.44 The initial call to the colours for the French army saw roughly 2,400 seasonal
labourers from Brittany leave Jersey in the early months of the war. The first boatload left
Jersey on the evening of 1 August 1914, the day the call to arms arrived on the island.45
There was not a similar level of success with the British Army in the initial call up, due to
recruitment being based on volunteering, not conscription. Another major factor for Jersey,
was defence of the island, which was the major fear of Rochefort in the first months of the
42
Ibid
43
Beckett, Part-TimeSoldiersp.,198-199.
44
“The War”, Evening Post, 3 August1914; see also,SJ,SJPA/017283, Copyof extractfrom Jersey
Evening Postwithpicturesof the ‘Mobilisationof the JerseyMilitia’atthe beginningof the Great
War, 4 December1914
45
“How JerseyStands”, Evening Post,5 August1914; see also, SJ,SJPA/049456, “Frenchlabourers
leavingonMondaymorningto jointhe colours”,asreproducedinthe JerseyIllustratedWeekly
edition,8August1914
13.76%
12.09%
9.17%
4.75%
3.32%
2.73%
54.18%
Royal Jersey Garrison Battalion
Hampshire Regiment
Dorsetshire Regiment
Royal Irish Rifles
Devonshire Regiment
King's Royal Rifle Corps
Other

20. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
14
14
war, until victory at the Marne.46 He had believed that the RMIJ, when fully embodied,
would provide an effective defence of the island from the 31 July 1914, when the battalion of
The Devonshire Regiment left Jersey to join the British Expeditionary Force. The islands
defence was left to the embodied regiment of Militia for a short period. The Militia did
admittedly prove itself diligent throughout this period. It was clear that the RMIJ and the
island were isolated from European affairs and felt that the war was not their responsibility.47
However, the population did run a series of charity drives, such as the “Smokes for our
Troops” campaign led by The Morning News, which emulated the “How to be useful in
Wartime” campaign led by The Times.48 Nevertheless 1,255 men native to Jersey had joined
Kitchener’s army, or were currently serving. Their service can be recorded through the medal
cards held at Kew.49 Again, this group showed no affinity for any one regiment, the largest
group going to one regiment was the 2nd, Royal Hampshire Regiment, with just over seventy
recruits from Jersey in the initial call to the colours. The remainder served within the infantry,
artillery, or the Royal Navy. It should also be noted that many men from the RMIJ were
transferred to the 2nd Jersey Overseas Contingent, which was then amalgamated into the 2nd,
Royal Hampshire Regiment. The initial group of men that joined Kitchener’s Army were
mostly ex-regular army and had retired to the island, therefore not drawing many from the
younger cadre that composed the active list of the RMIJ rank and file, this was reinforced by
the “acte organique” proposed by Abadie and Fleetwood Wilson.50 This conclusion was
drawn from the Victoria College Book of Remembrance, which noted that many fathers had
served in the British Indian Army or British Army Regiments who were in service in India
(see also table 3.3.).51
What was clear during the war, was that local sentiment was similar to that of rural
communities in the United Kingdom. However, the population of Jersey was relatively
healthier, compared to the rural populations of England, and the island was more affluent
46
JA,A/C2/49/2, Correspondence betweenthe Bailiff,W.V.Vernonandthe Office of the Lieutenant
GovernorregardingMilitiacosts,11 December1915
47
“Jersey’sChance”, Morning News, 5December1914
48
“How to be useful inWartime”, TheTimes, 3 September1914
49
TNA,BT 351/1, Registryof ShippingandSeamen:Index of FirstWorldWarMercantile Marine
Medals,1914-25; see also,TNA WO 372, War Office:Service Medal andAwardRollsIndex,First
WorldWar, 1914-1920
50
TNA,HO 45/10070B5960/79, Acte Organique de laMilice Royal de Jersey,30 April 1902; see also,
SJ,SJPA/049021, A groupof Englishreservistsatthe quayhavingbeenrecalledtothe colours;image
reproducedin TheMorning News newspaper,6June 1914
51
A.H. Worrell, Victoria College,Bookof Remembrance, (J.T.Bigwood,Jersey1920)

21. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
15
15
prior to the First World War. This was due to high demand for Jersey’s main exports:
potatoes, milk, tomatoes and cucumber; all of which were subject to appellation d’origine
controlee. Which allowed Jersey farmers to set higher rates for what were considered
“luxury” products.52 If one looks at the census of 1901 and 1911, the amount of the
population engaged in the agricultural sector was high, and Rochefort explained this as one of
the reasons why there was not an overseas contingent of volunteers raised of similar size to
that of Guernsey in 1914.53 Furthermore, the agricultural sector had an increased burden from
9 September 1914, with the arrival of 2,000 men of the 4th, South Staffordshire Regiment,
formerly a Militia Battalion itself.54 With this, brought new military contracts for goods and
services, and decreased the amount of burden on the RMIJ for defence of the island.
It appeared that beyond the small cadre of ex-pats there was no unified wish to join up
en masse in the early months of the war. The embodied Militia was to be retained at full
strength for home service, and this was similarly felt by many Special Reserve units during
the war throughout England and Wales, none of which were required to provide men for
overseas service, this, like today was completely voluntary.55
The manpower requirements of the First World War placed a particularly large
burden on those occupations required to feed the country, and supply its industry, namely,
farmers and miners. Both of which were required for the effective maintenance of the war. In
Jersey this was punishing, and by 1916, the fiercest battle faced by Jersey was between the
farmers and the military authorities. The Bailiff had noticed the damaging effect of
conscription particularly on agrarian communities in England, Wales and Scotland, and
wanted to retain a degree of autonomy for the island. This was the main reason for hesitation
regarding conscription to the British Army from Jersey, which was introduced in February
1917; 13 months later than it had been in England, Wales and Scotland. Unlike Guernsey,
Jersey retained some provisions regarding the number of men conscripted.56 Alongside this
52
JA,D/AP/AD/8/89,Annual Reportof the Official Analyst,FWoodlandToms,forthe yearending
25/03/1915, 22 March 1915
53
JA,D/AP/R/13/37, CorrespondencebetweenLieutenantGovernor,SirAlexanderRochefortand
the War Office regardingthe possibilityof aJerseycontingent,forservicewiththe British
Expeditionary Force,26 July1914; see also,SJ,SJPA/033045, Group portraitof Major General
Rochefort,Governor,andofficersof the SouthStaffordshire regimentatSpringfieldStadium, 18
September1914
54
Ronayne, “Ours”,p.26.
55
Ibid,p. 22-24.
56
JA,D/AP/R/13/37 Correspondence betweenLieutenantGovernor,SirAlexanderRochefortandthe
War Office regardingthe possibilityof a second Jerseycontingent,forservice withinthe British
ExpeditionaryForce,26 July1917

22. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
16
16
concession, the RMIJ was suspended, the Royal Jersey Garrison Battalion was raised in its
place. This unit was made up of 510 men, 320 of this number had no recent Militia
experience, but did register as farmers, farm labourers, or ploughmen in the 1911 census.57
This suggested that this Regiment was raised to retain a number of farmers on the island to
meet the high yields demanded by the United Kingdom and this was the intended purpose,
due in part to Rochefort. Jersey was a microcosm of farming communities in the United
Kingdom, in a constant struggle to retain a large number of its population to ensure targets
would be met. This was particularly difficult for Jersey considering the 2400 French
Nationals who left the island at the outbreak of war; this having made up the bulk of cheap
labour for the island.58
There was a shortage of an adequate officer corps for the militia in the United
Kingdom and in the Channel Islands within the period studied in this paper. This was
reflected in the Parliamentary Paper reports of the Militia Committee from the 1880’s to the
beginning of the First World War, as well as the correspondence between the Lieutenant
Governors, Charles Ewart, Sir Edwin Markham, Sir Edward Hopton, Abadie, Gough, and
Rochefort.59 The issue was not addressed by the War Office and there was little progress
throughout the period. There was still a wish for the Militia officer corps to retain its
gentlemanlike stance in the Militia of England and Wales. However, it was not the case in
Jersey, by 1912.60 In Jersey it was clear that there were two clear issues with encouraging
gentlemen to gain commissions within the Militia: firstly, those who could afford the extra
costs of being granted a commission were otherwise employed in the fledgling financial
sector on the island or abroad, and therefore had no wish to dedicate more time beyond their
obligated period of service. Secondly, those who had wished to participate as an officer in the
57
TNA,WO 372, War Office:Service Medal andAwardRollsIndex,FirstWorldWar,1914-1920; see
census,1911 CensusResultsre:Compositionof the RMIJ <http://search.ancestry.co.uk/cgi-
bin/sse.dll?db=1911ChannelIslands&gss=sfs28_ms_db&new=1&rank=1&msT=1&_F000686E=farm&
_83004003-n_xcl=f&MSAV=0&uidh=000> [Accessed16February2016]
58
“The War”, Evening Post, 3 August1914
59
JA,A/C2/32/7, LetterfromLieutenantGovernorE.Markham to UnderSec of State Home Office
regardingpossiblesolutionstothe problemof recruitingofficers,15August1893; see also,JA,
A/C2/40/60, Letter fromLieutenantGovernorH.Goughto Bailiff W.Vernoninforminghimof use of
civiliandoctorsasmedical officersdue toshortage inthe medical company,15June 1906; JA,
A/C2/44/16, H. Goughto W. Vernonrequestingextrafundsforauniformgrantto encourage
recruitsto take commissions,26March 1908
60
TNA,WO 33/408, Organizationof the Special Reserve,InterimReport,14April 1910

23. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
17
17
active lists of the Militia lacked the funds, or status to do so.61 This issue led to issues with
training and discipline.
As previously mentioned this was also an issue in England, Wales, Scotland, and
Ireland and Robert Stoneman noted this trend stemming from 1862, noting the lack of reform
in the Militia revival of 1852.62 With agricultural depression and an enlarged middle class,
the land qualifications were abolished in 1869 the landed gentry core of officers in Militia
units gave way to a firmly middle class base of: businessman, professionals and those using
the ‘Militia backdoor.’ Using Stoneman’s table (appendix 1.1.) it was clear that the years the
decline in recruitment of new officers began from 1873-1874 with a sharp reduction from
941 in the former year to 376 in the latter year, in England and Wales, and a reduction from
132 to 55 in Scotland, representing an overall decrease of 59.83% of those wanting to
complete training.
The RMIJ also witnessed this level of snobbery, which required that an officer be a
gentleman. This requirement was similar to the land qualification in England, Wales,
Scotland, and Ireland, and was resisted by the Lieutenant-Governors. There was a dedicated
attempt by the leading military officials on the island to increase numbers of officers within
the Militia, this included suggestions to introduce special allowances, that the British Militia
had introduced. The Bailiff William Venables Vernon “declined to entertain” this suggestion
by Gough to allow non-commissioned officers to gain commissions with special grants for
extra costs if they had appeared keen.63 Whitehall were aware of such issues and these were
raised by the Bailiwick, the response was as it always had been with Jersey, to leave it be for
the moment as the army had bigger problems, and this was evident from the correspondence
mentioned previously. Edward Erickson has inferred that there was a backlash against
recruiting from the ranks en masse, before the first world war, due to the schism caused in the
Ottoman officer corps, which he inferred had ripple effects in Britain and was in part the
cause for the hesitance on this matter, which could be explained by this theory, if Erickson
had properly backed up this point.64 The impression given by the successive lieutenant-
61
JA,D/AP/R/13/57, CorrespondencebetweenLieutenantGovernor’sOffice andthe War Office with
Draft MilitiaBill enclosed,17August1912
62
R. Stoneman,‘The ReformedBritishMilitia,p.71-73.
63
JA,A/C2/44/22, LetterfromW.V.Vernon,Bailiff tothe LieutenantGovernorreferringtohisletter
of 26 March regardinggrantsor of moneyforofficers,informinghimthe DefenceCommittee
‘decline to entertainthe matter’,2April 1908
64
E. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War, (Praeger,
Westport,2001), p.73-79.

24. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
18
18
governors was that they were at their wits end because of this matter, which in turn led
neglect themselves of the RMIJ. Whilst Militia recruiting in Britain had been poor in both
officers and other ranks, in Jersey, there were ample recruits, due to conscription, but few
officers. This had led Rochefort to write a letter, which pleaded with the Bailiff to support his
petition to allow other ranks to enter the officer corps, en masse: On 17 August 1911 he
wrote:
“Our Militia is still woefully short of officers, and anything that can be done to induce
young Jerseymen to apply for commissions instead of serving their period of service in the
ranks will induce enormously to the efficiency of the force.”65
Rochefort was clearly keen to improve the quality and strength of the officer corps of the
Militia to redistill discipline, in particular, which it had lacked from 1903.66 On 13 October
1912, a number of negligent, or possibly purposeful discharges almost killed the horse of the
officer commanding, of the 3rd battalion. Captain Charles Binet recounted that: “…some
men; whom I could not single out, owing to the darkness, commenced firing charges at the
horse.”67 The outcome was a rowdy march to the arsenal with a number of men charged,
however, due to the Militia Act these men would not be punished appropriately for their
crime. Captain Binet had also noted that he lacked a sufficient compliment of officers, as
such, on the return march his men were shouting “fall out D Company”, a joke among the
enlisted men, regarding the inability of officers to instil discipline among the battalion. The
only battalion that appeared to have an adequate complement of officers was the 1st, this was
focussed on St. Helier alone, which in this period was in its early stages of becoming a
financial hub. This battalion attracted men of a middle class background to gain commissions
within the Militia, but also ensured that other battalions were stripped of possible troops.
If one were to consider the abilities of members of the RMIJ officer corps, the
previous example was worrying. Another worrying issue was the inefficiency of the officer
corps to promote officers to the active Militia, who would fulfil their duties. From 1890 there
were a number of officers who were either no longer residents of Jersey, or were incapable of
65
JA,D/AP/R/13/57, LetterfromD.A.A.Gregardingannual expensesestimateforthe Islandof Jersey
Militia,17 August1912, p.2.
66
JA,A/C2/39/23, LetterfromLieutenantD.W.Le Brocq, Goreyto LieutenantColonelLe Gallais
tenderinghisResignation,29August1903
67
TNA,HO 45/10070B5960/78, CaptainBinetreportonthe 13th
October1912, 22 October1912

25. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
19
19
efficient command. The General Officer Commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Le Gallais sent
letters to the adjutants of each unit within the Militia requiring efficiency reports, and the
response was that each unit was inefficient due to officer shortages.68 This issue was not
assisted by certain Lieutenants who moved to the United States, or Canada without informing
their superiors; this occurred throughout the 1890’s and 1900’s, and was documented at
Victoria College, as a general note. An individual case would be Lieutenant Westaway, who
had lived in the United States for three years by 1890 and yet still retained a commission.69
Stoneman noted that coastal areas were particularly susceptible to “permanent migration”
within the British Militia and it only stands to reason that this was an occurrence on Jersey
also.70 An example of the response to Le Gallais’ requested efficiency report that should be
highlighted was the instance of Lieutenant Le Brocq. Major Chermside noted that Le Brocq
was “...incapable of command.”71 Nine days’ following this report, Le Brocq resigned his
commission within the Royal Jersey Militia Artillery. In this resignation letter he stated that
he was not offered a chance to be sent for further training as Chermside claimed had been
offered.72 Whatever the reason for Le Brocq’s resignation this highlighted an additional
factor that was the cause for the low numbers of active Militia officers.
The study regarding recruitment in Jersey has pointed out some similarities between
the Militia of Jersey and its equivalent, within the same period, in the United Kingdom. A
prevalent issue was the recruitment of an officer corps able to instil discipline to the unit, and
also effectively command during wartime. The Jersey born officers that joined 7th, Royal
Irish Rifles were no longer with D Company within weeks of leaving Aldershot for France,
their numbers were so few. There was little sign of a countryside elite that felt an obligation
to serve within the active Militia as an officer, rather than in the ranks. Most of this cadre
worked in the financial industry, or directly applied to the regular army through RMA
Sandhurst or Woolwich. The aspect of conscription was peculiar considering its purpose was
to create a standing defence force in the event of French invasion, which by 1890 was no
68
TNA,HO 45/10292/113014A/47, Reportsonthe numbersof absenteesfromthe Royal Jersey
Militia,4 August1904
69
JA,A/C2/29/1, LetterfromC.B.Ewart to Under Secretaryof State,Home Office removing
LieutenantJ.Westawayfromthe listof officersof the Royal JerseyMilitia,8April 1890
70
Stoneman,‘The ReformedBritishMilitia’,p.171.
71
JA,A/C2/39/22, LetterformMajor Chermside toLieutenant-Colonel Le Gallaisregarding
LieutenantLe Brocq,20 August1903
72
JA,A/C2/39/23, Resignationof CommissionbyLieutenantLe Brocq,29 August1903

26. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
20
20
longer apparent. This represented an issue the Militia and special reserve had not faced in the
United Kingdom: ample men in the ranks, with a meagre number of officers to control the
regiment effectively. There was an equal level of snobbery and attempts to retain a
gentlemanlike core of the RMIJ officer corps. However, the islands military authorities
echoed the sentiment of many commanding officers of reserve units in their wish to offer
commissions and bursaries to those who were keen, but lacked the funds to afford the extra
costs of becoming an officer within the reserve. Furthermore, during the First World War,
there was significant proof that the United Kingdom was vying against the farmer community
in Jersey for manpower, particularly in the later stages of the war. This raises further
discussion regarding whether manpower was efficiently managed during the First World
War, and whether the United Kingdom imposed itself upon Crown Dependencies, forcing
through legislation.

27. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
21
21
Chapter III
Training
The study of training and discipline considered the difficulties faced by Jersey, in the prelude
to the First World War, and how this affected the men recruited into the British Army, from
1914. This chapter had three focal points: the purpose of the Militia by 1890 and up to 1914,
training of the Militia in Jersey, and the discipline of and how the various difficulties on this
subject were managed. The 1902 reorganisation was a period, which this chapter focused on
and was the turning point of the Militia, on the precipice, facing disbandment and how the
War Office and the Lieutenant-Governors sought to improve the RMIJ to create an efficient
Regiment. There will be some cross-over throughout this chapter and the previous chapter
due to related topics, particularly regarding the officer corps. The purpose, or lack thereof for
the Militia throughout the period studied by this paper should be considered. Looking at both
the Bailiwick and the United Kingdom’s reasons for the Militia in Jersey and similarly, the
different opinions held by Militia units in the UK. This topic drew heavily on the primary
material held on Jersey and various regimental museums to create an image of the condition
of the RMIJ in this period, as well as, the condition of the wider amateur military tradition in
the United Kingdom. The study of discipline suggested a lack of professionalism; in both
rank and file, and the officer corps. This information also alluded to what can only be
described as a feudal host; the leading families of the island bestowed patronage upon
individuals within the Militia and offered land to be used for training. The impact of the
various regular garrisons has also been considered, their relations with the RMIJ and
similarly the relations between the regulars and the Militia in the United Kingdom, this
should show that the relations were amicable, but that there was always a barrier between the
two. Thus, the apt comment made by David French that the relationship between the regulars
and the reserve was “between distant cousins, rather than blood brothers”.73
A question that should be asked regarding the Royal Militia of the Island of Jersey
would be what its purpose was in 1890. The original purpose was to defend the island from
73
D. French, Military Identities,p. 231.

28. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
22
22
French invasion, France had claimed ownership of the island since 1204. However, since
January 1781 there had not been an invasion of the island. Despite the numerous invasion
scares of the 19th Century there was no dedicated focus for training of the Militia regarding
defence of Jersey until its reorganisation in 1902. 74 From 1902 there was a focus to train a
strong reserve on the island by both the War Office and the States. 75 The War Office
correspondence with the civil and military authorities on the island suggested an increased
fear of a war in Europe. However, the War Office never answered the salient question: where
would the RMIJ have fit into the British Army in the instance of such a European war? 76
Would it be folded into the incumbent garrison battalion, or retained to defend the island,
freeing up regular troops for overseas service, or would members of the RMIJ be drafted into
the British Army?77 Within the Militia Act there was provision for those on both active and
reserve lists to be brought under the Army Act in a time of war, but when asked how this
would happen in practice, the response was to sit tight for the moment. Clearly the War
Office had more pressing concerns. These were questions that many Militia units had asked
before the Haldane Reforms. 78 If the purpose of the Militia and Special Reserve was to act as
a reserve for the regular army in a time of war, why then did Kitchener then spurn the
auxiliary forces, when he created the ‘New Armies’? The answer to this was clear, because
Kitchener did not trust the reserve, and this opinion can be understood considering the
betrayal of certain auxiliary units during his experience of the South-African War and the
condition of the reserve in the United Kingdom in 1914.79 However, surely this undid that
which Cardwell-Childers and Haldane had done. The formers had created the linked battalion
system, which had a dual purpose: to provide an ample reserve for the regular army, and
bridged the gap between army and society. 80 Haldane’s key act regarding the auxiliary forces
74
TNA,HO 45/10292/113014B/102, Review of the Royal Militiaof the Islandof JerseyforPrivy
Council,18 July1902
75
TNA,HO 45/10070B5960/78, Acte Organique de la Milice Royal de Jersey,7November1902
76
JA,A/C3/2, Correspondence relatingtothe ArmyAnnual Actsand theirregistrationin Jersey,
1912; see also,TNA,HO 45/10292/113014A/45, Commentsonreceivedbill regardingthe
reorganisationof the Militia,19July1904
77
JA,A/C2/31/26, LetterfromE. Markham to UnderSecretaryof State,Home Office,forwardedto
War Office,informinghimof concernsregardingbringthe JerseyMilitiaunderthe operationof the
ArmyAct 1881, 12 December1892; see also,JA,A/C2/36/7, LetterformH. Gough to Under
Secretaryof State,War Office regardingbringingthe Royal JerseyMilitiaunderthe ArmyAct,23
January1905
78
R. Stoneman,‘The ReformedBritishMilitia’,p.236-237.
79 Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, p. 147.
80
Bond,B, ‘The Effectof the Cardwell ReformsinArmyOrganisation,1874-1904’, The RUSIJournal,
105,620, 1960., p.523.

29. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
23
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was the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907. In this Act Haldane sought to reform the
tripartite structure of: Regular Army, Yeomanry and Volunteers, and the Militia. The result
has been referred to as a two-tier system: The Regular Army, The Territorial Force, and a
Special Reserve. The Special Reserve would act as a reserve for the continental expeditionary
force, a role which the Militia had, in practice, embodied since Cardwell linked regular
battalions and the Militia. 81 When the First World War broke out the auxiliary forces
appeared somewhat redundant. With the formation of the New Armies, those who wished to
serve overseas joined either the British Expeditionary Force, or answered Kitchener’s call to
the colours. 82 Thus, the reserve was again, a hollow shell for regular recruitment that it had
been since 1881, and this can be seen from the WO 372 series at TNA.83
When the Devonshire Regiment left Jersey to join the BEF there was an interim
period before the 4th, South Staffordshire Regiment arrived. During this period there was a
purpose for an embodied Militia on Jersey, to defend the island. Bearing in mind the retreat
from Mons to the River Marne was underway, and the reported sightings of zeppelin
squadrons near Jersey. 84 The War Office recognised that Jersey could become strategically
important to defend the channel shipping lanes if Calais was lost, prior to defeat at Mons,
there was a debate within the War Office on the topic of defence of Jersey, and whether it
was strategically important. This debated concluded that Jersey was not of strategic
importance.85 However, once the the battalion of the South Staffordshire Regiment arrived on
Jersey, and remained there for the duration of the war, and the defeat of German Army at the
1st Battle of the Marne, Calais appeared secure once again after ‘the race to the sea’. The
embodied RMIJ then appeared to be composed of individuals unable to serve within the
regular army due to medical grounds, or were required in the agricultural industry. 86 These
individuals were registered in the 1911 census with occupations relating to farming and were
81
D. French, Military, p. 203.
82
I.F.W.Beckett, Part-TimeSoldiers,The AmateurMilitary Tradition:1558-1945, (Pen& Sword,
Barnsley2011)231-234
83
W. Butler,‘The IrishAmateurMilitaryTraditioninthe BritishArmy’,p.84.
84
“How JerseyStands”, Evening Post,5 August1914
85
JA,A/C3/2/24, LetterfromUnderSecretaryof State,War Office toLieutenantGovernorH.Gough
statingthat the garrisonof regulartroopson Jerseywasnolongeressential,13February1911
86
The numbersof menandtheirdestinationsinthe warwascompiledusingmultiple archives,
however,focusedona numberof specificclassmarks:medal cardsof the WO 372 seriesatthe
National Archives,the VictoriaCollegeBookof Remembrance,extractsfrom TheJersey Times, and
Evening News,the War Graves Commission,andthe 1911 census.

30. Henry A. Roberts
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24
24
drawn from the rural parishes.87 Twenty-Six members of the RMIJ joined the South
Staffordshire Regiment, and this was because the 4th battalion were trained on the island
throughout the war; this number included the previously branded, “…incapable of efficient
command”, Lieutenant Le Brocq. 88 By 1916 there was little purpose for the RMIJ, as the
German Prisoners of War, acted amicably. This was felt on Guernsey also, and this sentiment
led to the creation of, the Royal Guernsey Light Infantry, and the Royal Jersey Garrison
Battalion. The latter being referred to as “the Invalids” by the 4th, South Staffordshire’s
Commanding Officer, this regarded, the RMIJ’s ability to efficiently carry out duties in 1916.
89 In the First World War, the RMIJ became a training unit for the regulars, similar to most
Militia units following the Cardwell-Childers reforms. Thus, it lacked a defensive purpose in
January 1915. The RMIJ became a pawn in the ongoing battle between the military
authorities and the farming community. The Militia was used to protect the manpower of
essential farm labourers on the island until December 1916. It also appeared that many used
the Militia as a conduit, to join the new armies, 236 men took this opportunity throughout the
war.
The officer corps was one of the key reasons for disturbances in the RMIJ between
1890 and 1917. Numerous studies have suggested that it was hard to maintain order within
the regular British Army in this period. 90 To keep 1,000 embodied militiamen in line, when
conscripted, with an officer corps that was both inept and relatively small was catastrophic.
The 1903 review of the Militia revealed that in Jersey there were 46 officers to 1,800 rank
and file. 91 Considering these numbers, it was a surprise that there weren’t more incidents,
considering the unruliness of the British Militia. Despite this, the incidents were not
damaging to civil-military relations as they had been with certain units within the British
Militia in the late 19th Century.92 Certain individuals from the Société Jersaise have
87
1911 CensusResultsre:Compositionof the RMIJ1914 1917<http://search.ancestry.co.uk/cgi-
bin/sse.dll?db=1911ChannelIslands&gss=sfs28_ms_db&new=1&rank=1&msT=1&_F000686E=farm&
_83004003-n_xcl=f&MSAV=0&uidh=000> [Accessed16February2016]
88
JA,A/C2/39/22, LetterfromMajor Chermside toLieutenant-Colonel Le Gallaisregarding
LieutenantLe Brocq,20 August1903
89
SRM, BV/49/84, Digestof 4th
SouthStaffordshire Regiment,1916 correspondence,31March 1916
90
Beckett,Part-TimeSoldiers;see also,W. Butler,‘The IrishAmateurMilitaryTraditioninthe British
Army’;see also,Stoneman,‘The ReformedBritishMilitia’
91
TNA,HO 45/10292/113014A/3, Estimate forpay allowancesandgeneral expensesfor1903,
November1904
92
I.F.W.Beckett, Citizen Soldiers, and theBritish Empire,p. 37. & p. 50.

31. Henry A. Roberts
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25
25
embellished the significance of the 1891 mutiny; Ian Ronayne inferred that it was more
violent than it was in reality, he does this in his use of emotive language that revealed a
slipshod style of writing. 93 In August 1891, men of the St. Oeun Company, West (1st)
Battalion disregarded their officer’s orders on the parade ground. They stood their ground,
and shouted “N’bouogi Pas!”, “Don’t move”; this was their response to an apparent slight on
the company position during the parade with a garrison battalion of The Lancashire
Regiment. 94 The ringleaders were then surrounded by the regular battalion and forced to drop
their equipment and submitted to arrest. The ringleaders were imprisoned for an evening and
following this, greeted by peers on their release and treated to a meal. The second relatively
‘major’ incident would be the previously mentioned discharging of rifles during a training
exercise on the evening of 13 October 1912 by the South Battalion (3rd). These two incidents
highlight a disregard for commands given by officers; in both instances, the officer
commanding was ignored and this issue of discipline can be further explored regarding the
numbers of men that attended training between 1890 and 1914.
2.1. Number of Men Absent for more than 7 Drill Sessions, July 190495
Number of MenAbsent
1st Battalion RJLI 148
2nd Battalion RJLI 64
3rd Battalion RJLI 310
Medical Company 21
Total 543
*Note that numbers for the RJA and Engineer Company were not available
In 1904 the number of men recruited was far more than the established figure during
the reorganisation of the Militia, starting between 1902 and 1903. The RMIJ had 1,800 men
93
Ronayne, Jersey’sGreatWar, p.43-49
94
A. Stewart, A Mutinyin Jerrais, “The Royal JerseyMilitiain the Years1890 to 1892”, EveningPost,
27 January1956
95
TNA,HO 45/10292/113014A/47, Reportsonthe numbersof absenteesfromthe Royal Jersey
Militia,4th
August1904; see also,JA,D/AP/R/13/27,Numbersof menabsentandcorrespondenceon
thissubject, 1904

32. Henry A. Roberts
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on its active list in 1904, rather than 1,000 men, which the War Office amendment to the
Militia Act had set as the upper limit for Militia recruiting. The reason for this confusion was
similar to the British Militia’s issues regarding desertion and was entirely the responsibility
of the parish constables.96 The constables prepared and delivered the lists of those obligated
for service in each of the twelve parishes. The issue with discipline regarding training nights
was the attendance, and this suggested a backlash against conscription by 1904. In July 1904
the newly appointed Lieutenant-Governor Henry Gough carried out an inspection of the three
Infantry Battalions and the Medical Company. In his report to the War Office on 4 August he
stated that 39% of men failed to attend numerous training events. This was particularly a
problem with the 3rd Battalion, missing 310 individuals, during his review. The recruits of 3rd
battalion were drawn from St. Helier alone; the Bailiwick’s capital, these men tended to be
more likely in occupations related to the financial hub (see tables 3.1. & 3.2.). The London
City and Midland Bank had opened a large branch on the island which attracted large
numbers of men from both the mainland and the rural communities on Jersey to St. Helier. 97
Gough found his powers insufficient to properly enforce attendance to Militia training in this
report Gough stated that: “…I have not the powers or means to arrest those who have failed
to attend.”98 This suggested a serious issue with the RMIJ, particularly the 3rd battalion
regarding its ability to train. Gough was of the mind that the Militia was no longer tenable, or
effective, as a defence force, as it stood in 1904. He was an important catalyst in the
reorganisation of the Militia, and sought to acquire more funding from the War Office
throughout his time as Lieutenant-Governor on Jersey, and this was reflected in the yearly
requested budget until 1911. In the years previous to Gough, there was not an effective
review of each unit carried out by the Lieutenant-Governor personally, among Gough’s
predecessors. The approach taken by previous Lieutenant-Governors had done little to benefit
the Militia, ushering in a period of neglect that existed until Gough’s appointment in 1904. It
was Gough who had also pushed for further incentives regarding commissions in the RMIJ,
in an attempt to create a strong officer corp.99 Despite the issue of absenteeism within the
Militia, there has not been any note in any of the archives used during the research of this
96 JA, A/C2/42/1, Letter from W.W. Maitland to Parish Constables regarding notices of
Enrolment, 3 January 1904
97
JA,D/AU/R1/11, Documentsregardingthe purchasingof landforthe LondonCityand Midland
Bank,6 August1901
98 JA,D/AP/R/13/27,Numbers of menabsentandcorrespondence onthissubject,1904
99 JA, D/AP/R/13/57,Correspondence betweenLieutenant-Governor,H.GoughandWar Office
regardingimprovementstothe RMIJ,1904-1910

33. Henry A. Roberts
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27
paper to suggest that any considerable amount of Jerseymen deserted en masse, or were the
source of disturbance within any unit that was joined in the First World War. This was noted
as a redeeming feature of men trained by the RMIJ, by Sir James Steele when the 1st Jersey
Contingent joined the otherwise unruly 7th, Royal Irish Rifles. 100
Robert Stoneman’s thesis provided further context for the RMIJ
absenteeism/desertion issue faced by 1904 through to 1914. 101 He has reported that in the
British Militia the main issue that regarded discipline, was desertion. In coastal Militia units
in particular there was a trend of men “absent at sea”, and this was a similar situation to that
of Jersey. 102 The farming and land-owning families of the island created a method to avoid
Militia service, that when studying the case of Lieutenant Westaway highlighted a more
troubling trend within his family. The will of Susan Westaway noted that the family owned a
number of investments on the island. However, this was all held through the Westaway Trust,
and technically not owned by any one individual of the family. 103 Thus, the children were
American by birth; despite being a long-standing Jersey ruling family, its members legally
owned no land on the island, nor were they professionals, thus had no obligation to join the
Militia. This was a tactic used by the Bertram family also, the Bertram and Westaway
families were the largest land-owners on the island. The numbers of men who avoided
service between these two families was forty-seven, the wealthy land-owners, it appeared,
used the Bailiwick’s Militia Act’s specific wording regarding conscription to their advantage.
Whilst there was little purpose for the RMIJ by 1890, there was a focus for the
Militia’s training. The RMIJ focused on musketry, and this was taught by the ex-King’s
Royal Rifle Corps, Captain Tempest. This took place near the East (2nd) Battalions Arsenal in
Grouville in the 1890’s, and was received gladly, however, this range was rather hastily
made, and was not able to meet the demand of training the RMIJ and the garrison battalion.
104 In 1902 a Captain Connolly was seconded to the RMIJ, initially as a Permanent Staff
Administrative Officer. Connolly quickly proved his worth to the unit, and showed his
100
RURM, M143, General SirJamesSteele,The JerseyOverseasContingent,18January 1915; see
also,T. Bowman, Irish Regimentsin theGreat War, (MUP, Manchester,2006), p.80.
101
Stoneman,‘The ReformedBritishMilitia’,p.152-156.
102
Ibid, p. 163.
103
JA,D/AU/R1/11, Documentsregardingthe trusteesof the WestawayEstate,18January 1903; see
also,JA,D/AU/R1/9, Ledgerdetailingpaymentsmade bythe WestawayTrust,March 1901-Marcn
1928
104
JA,A/C2/28/3, LetterfromCaptainTempesttoSouthRegimentAdjutantregardingpoor
conditionsof musketrycourse,30May 1889

34. Henry A. Roberts
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proficiency for shooting at the annual competitions. He was placed in charge of rifle drill for
the RMIJ, in 1908, and alongside the Adjutant of the Hampshire Regiment, a Captain Blakey,
a joint effort created a purpose built rifle range for those few who attended training. 105 This
was in the North-West of Jersey, near both St. Brelade and St. John. The new range was
successful in training a number of ‘crack shots’, 23 of the individuals who joined the 1st
Jersey Overseas Contingent to join 7th, Royal Irish Rifles in the outset of the war were
recorded among the best shots at this shooting range. 106 The boards with the best scores for
annual shooting competitions held by the RMIJ were held at the ‘Jersey Pistol and Rifle
Shooting Club’. The range was built on land owned by the Westaway family, and the favour
of this family was given to the island’s Militia repeatedly. Whether this was an exchange to
keep the men of this family out of obligatory service was unclear, but for certain the
Westaway, Bertram and Hilgrove families allowed the Militia to train on their land, in a
similar manner to the Lord-Lieutenants of the British and Irish Militia in the 18th and 19th
Century.
One should also consider training alongside other regular or auxiliary units. Large
formation training was not the focus of the Militia. As previously mentioned the majority of
the meagre training able to occur between the garrison battalion and RMIJ, was to the extent
of some assistance with the jointly ran range. The RMIJ would only act alongside the
regulars on the parade ground on a regular basis. In the First World War, the RMIJ carried
out patrols and had various lookout positions. However, the responsibility of furnishing the
island for defence was carried out by the Devonshire Regiment. 107 The entirety of the British
Army in the early 1900’s did not have an adequate staff for manoeuvre of large formations
operationally. Field Marshal John French had attempted to command two corps in a training
exercise in 1913, during this exercise he caused a number of blue-on-blue incidents, and
proved that the staff of the British Army were not capable of effective command of a corps in
practice before the First World War. Liddell Hart has criticised the Staff College at
Camberley for being devoid of any forward thinking thought, the opposite of the
Prussian/German Kriegsakademie. 108 The RMIJ had never trained in the field, with a large
formation, even in simulation with more than 300 regular army troops. The amount of
105
JA,A/C2/44/4, Proposeddatesandlocationof musketrytraining,signedbyCaptainConnolly,11
February1908
106
JA,L/D/11/F/7, Scoringbook of Pte HedlyBoutillierforthe General MusketryCourse,6January
1913
107
“The Mobilisation”, Evening Post,31 July 1914
108
B.H. Liddell Hart, A History of the First World War, (PanMacmillan,London,2014), p. 137.

35. Henry A. Roberts
hr205@kent.ac.uk
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29
training in the United Kingdom appeared non-existent, the only record of a large group
travelling to the mainland was for King Edward VII’s coronation, in 1901. 109 Ultimate
command of the RMIJ was held by the Lieutenant-Governor, this was clarified in 1903. The
Lieutenant-Governor was trained at Staff College Camberley, prior to appointment in Jersey.
However, the previous comments from Liddell Hart and correspondence regarding Henry
Abadie suggested that Lieutenant-Governors of Jersey were not officers of the highest
calibre.
In the research for this paper the ancillary and artillery companies did not have
anywhere near as much documentation due to the relative size of the Royal Jersey Artillery,
Engineer and Medical Companies. There was increased funding by the War Office of these
battalions.110 However, the brand new equipment provided, was lost almost entirely in a fire
at the La Collette Arsenal in April 1903.111 This limited the training of all the RMIJ apart
from the infantry battalions, which meant that the engineer and artillery units became de facto
infantry companies, until 1912, when more equipment arrived on the island and training
could resume.112 However, this left a long period where the RJA and Engineer Company
were redundant units. Any information pertaining these companies was at the beginning of
the training year, usually the Company Officer Commanding stating that he lacked sufficient
equipment to train, his communique would be passed on to the War Office, but nothing
would come of it. The response from the War Office after 1903 was that the equipment sent
previously was adequate, and the States would have to furnish the RJA and RJE.113
This chapter has put forward the argument that the RMIJ, within the period 1890-
1919 lacked purpose, a proper training regimen across all of those on the active lists and
discipline. The late 19th Century was a time of change for Jersey, it had embraced the
sponsorship of the City of London, to expand its offshore financial hub, this had a
109
JA,A/C2/38/13, LetterfromWar Office regardingarrangementsforthe Royal JerseyMilitia
attendingthe Coronationon9 August,18 July1902
110
JA,A/C2/42, Correspondence regardingfundsforthe Royal JerseyMilitia,1904-1914
111
JA,A/C2/39/20, LetterfromW. VernablesVernontoH.Abadie regardingthe storesatLa Collette,
21 April 1903
112
JA,D/AP/R/13/35, Correspondenceregardingthe deliveryof equipmenttothe Royal Jersey
ArtilleryandEngineerCompany,19April 1912
113
JA,D/AP/R/13/27, CorrespondencebetweenRJA CommandingOfficer,CaptainH.G.Benestand
War Office regardingequipmentforthe RMIJ,18 March 1904; see also,JA,D/AP/R/13/31,
Correspondence betweenRJA CommandingOfficer,MajorH.T. Amyand War Office regarding
equipmentforRJA andRJE,26 March 1908

36. Henry A. Roberts
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30
30
considerable effect on the demographic of the island. At the same time the demand for Jersey
sourced goods was increased, and this burden was further increased from 1914. The increased
workload and influx of businessmen was the reason for the high levels of absenteeism noted
thanks to Lieutenant-Governor Gough from 1904 onwards. These reviews showed that the 3rd
Battalion suffered the worst from absenteeism, despite the influx of migrants to its recruiting
district, St. Helier. Thus, it was clear that the migrant middle class business population were
less willing to accept compulsory service, due to both being alien to the island, and the
schedules of these types. The other infantry battalions, and ancillary companies did not
exhibit similar levels of absenteeism, the recruiting districts for the 1st and 2nd infantry
battalions were in the predominantly farming parishes to the North-West and North East. The
Engineer and Medical Companies recruited across the island and benefitted from the influx of
migrants. Discipline was poor in the years before the First World War. However, there was
no record of ill-discipline by the 1st and 2nd Jersey Overseas Contingent during the Great
War. There was an incidence of a Court Martial in 1920, but this was outside the period
covered in this paper. The commanding officer of 7th, Royal Irish Rifles was keen to note that
the 1st Jersey Overseas Contingent were superior to the other recruits of the battalion, though
the quality of other recruits set the bar low as Timothy Bowman has explained. The island
had become less concerned by invasion and the RMIJ. Similar to today’s Territorial Army,
the population became ambivalent regarding the prospect of serving within the RMIJ due to
its gross mismanagement and support from both the Bailiwick and Whitehall.

37. Henry A. Roberts
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Chapter IV
Social Composition of Jersey, and its Militia
In 1890, Jersey appeared to retain a Manorialist social structure, which this paper has alluded
to previously. This structure ensured that a number of dominant landowning families
controlled most of the land on Jersey, and retained, what appeared to be a feudal host. This
was reflected by the RMIJ officer corps in the 1890’s. This chapter considered three key
areas: the social composition of the officer corps, the other ranks and the occupations of the
social elite, using Victoria College as a case study. The study of the officer corps looked at
the effect of migration from 1896 on Jersey, and explained why this changed the composition
of the RMIJ. In particular, this looked at the changes within the Militia due to the migration
of middle class businessmen, coming to the island at the turn of the 20th Century. This section
also explored the links between Jersey and the British Indian Army. The social composition
of the rank and file, primarily considered the question of whether this reflected the social
composition of the island, with an in depth study of the social composition of each parish and
how this was reflected in its infantry battalion. There should be comparison between the two
previous sections, how these reflected the demographics of Jersey between 1896 and 1915,
with further comparison with the United Kingdom. Using Victoria College and a public
school, in terms of size and status, King’s Canterbury, this created an image of where the
social elite of Jersey worked, and the reasons why the number of officers of upper class birth,
in the RMIJ dwindled throughout the period that this paper has studied.
To gain an appreciation of the social fabric of the RMIJ officer corps between 1890
and 1915, for this study, it was required that the previously mentioned attestation papers be
used. Those who noted previous service as officers within the Militia, would then be cross-
referenced against the 1901 and 1911 census’. This process ensured that individuals, were
firstly, residents of the island, and secondly, confirmed their occupation. The style of this
table was similar to William Butler’s, his table, 2.2 regarding the occupations of men joining
the Militia between 1881 and 1908.114 An exact template cannot be used, as the sample group
114
W. Butler,‘The IrishAmateurMilitaryTraditioninthe BritishArmy’,p.132.

38. Henry A. Roberts
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32
was not as broad, only looking at the officer corps in this instance, and not the entirety of the
Jersey Militia. The inclusion of ‘private means’ was due to a considerable number of
individuals registered in the 1901 and 1911 census’ as this, or stated that they were landlords,
which was particularly noticeable among individuals who were in the 1st and 2nd Battalions.
These were the rural recruiting districts of the island, and given that these individuals were
regularly relatives of the Hilgrove, and Bertram families, and among the social elite of Jersey
in this period. This was similarly represented in Guernsey with the Saumarez family.115 The
time period of the following table was chosen based on the archive records available, this
also took the quality of the 1891 census into account also. Information regarding names of
those who gained commissions within the RMIJ was not present in the Jersey Archives, nor
at Kew, though many documents alluded to names, and figures of officers, the originally
attached documents, were lost, or severely damaged.116 The 1891 census was carried out
poorly by the parish administrative officers, the result was a census that recorded individuals
who were no longer residents of the island, or were taking advantage of the financial benefits
of residency, on the island.117 Therefore, it was not possible to make any cast iron record of
the occupations of the RMIJ officer corps prior to 1896.
3.1. Occupations of officers of the Royal Jersey Militia, 1896-1915118
Labourers Artisans Clerks Professionals Ex-
Regulars
Private
means
1st
Battalion
RJLI
4% 19% 4% 27% 15% 31%
2nd
Battalion
RJLI
8% 16% 23% 15% 19% 19%
115
JA,US/73, Photographof memorial containingthe namesof the Channel IslandsMilitia,La
Collette memorial,1923; see Saumarezinfluence,E.Parks, Diex Aix: God Help Us, (SuttonPublishing,
Stroud,1992), p. 109-134.
116
JA,L/D/21/A, Almanacsalludingto numberof MilitiaOfficersandnames,1874-1898
117
SJ, MS PEO/F/BAL,FamilyHistoryof G.R.Balleine,1873-1966
118
Informationbasedona sample groupof 100 menfromthe followingsources:the WO95 War
Diariesof 48th
Brigade and medal cardsof the BT 351, andWO 372 seriesatthe National Archives,
the RG 9 seriesatthe CanadianNational Archives,the B2455 seriesat the CanberraArchives,the
URU 1900 seriesof the National Archivesof SouthAfrica,the VictoriaCollege Bookof
Remembrance,extractsfromTheJersey Times,and Evening News,the War GravesCommission,and
the 1911 census.

39. Henry A. Roberts
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33
3rd
Battalion
RJLI
- 23% 13% 31% 13% 20%
Royal
Jersey
Artillery
- 33% 11% 22% 6% 28%
Engineer
Company
- - - 100% - -
Medical
Company
- 36% - 64% - -
Average 2.00% 21.17% 8.50% 43.17% 8.83% 16.33%
Throughout the research for this table, it was evident that there was a large ex-patriate
community on Jersey, and this grew exponentially between 1901 and 1911, shown by the two
census’ on these years. The ex-regular British Army and British Indian Army element
naturally grew within this period also, with many sons of men who served in both, returning
to the island. British Indian Army officers, tended to be on the ragged end of the socially elite
group that attended Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Yet this cadre were often the highest
achieving in each intake. An example of this would be Captain Robert Colvill-Jones, whose
father served in the 65th Carnatic Infantry Regiment, he joined its successor, the 80th Carnatic
Infantry Regiment.119 This was, in part, due to inheritance tax concerns also, the Finance Acts
of 1894 and 1909 encouraged many of those set to lose from this tax to liquidise their United
Kingdom assets and move these offshore. This was something that Terence Dooley has
recognized in his study of the Irish social elite at during the turn of the 20th Century.120 This
was also reflected in David Cannadine’s monograph regarding the fall of the British
Aristocracy.121 Both of which suggested a trend in this regard, that began from the early
1890’s. British Indian Army officers tended to have less private income than their British
Army counterparts, the Indian service tended to be more financially appealing; with lower
costs of upkeep and more appropriate rates of pay.122 Another ex-patriate community
appeared in this period also, the middle class businessman appeared en masse in Jersey. This
was due to the incentives given to employees of City of London Banks. Angus Cameron and
Roman Palan have recorded this, in a thesis regarding the expansion of indirect economic
119
A.H. Worrell, Victoria College,Bookof Remembrance, p.48-49.
120
T. Dooley, TheDecline of the Big House in Ireland,(WolfhoundPress,Dublin,2001),p. 69-76.
121
D. Cannadine, TheDecline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, (Penguin,London,2005),p. 203-236.
122
French, Military Identities,p. 107.

40. Henry A. Roberts
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dominance from the City of London, in the 1890’s, through offshore markets, i.e. Jersey.123 A
significant number of men flowed into Jersey from the mid-1890’s, in particular, St. Helier
and this is shown with the 3rd Battalion, which recruited from St. Helier alone.124 The RMIJ
officer corps was increasingly staffed by the middle class professionals, rather than the
landed class, and this was the trend across the British and Irish Militia from 1869. The
numbers listed by this sample group suggested that the social fabric of the RMIJ officer corps
was similar to the Militia of the United Kingdom in its social composition. This was recorded
by Stoneman, whose only major difference was the number of land owners/title holders in the
Militia officer corps within each unit of the RMIJ.125 However, the numbers of men with
‘private means’ as their listed occupation made up 16.33% of the entire Militia in Jersey
within the same period. The Militia officer corps was exclusive in the given period, if one
compared it to the occupations of the rank and file, which roughly matched the social
composition of the island, the officer corps was not, considering the largest occupation group
in Jersey would be categorised as labourers. This group only made up 2% of the RMIJ officer
corps, as opposed to 31.2% in the other ranks
3.2. Occupations of Royal Jersey Militia rank and file, 1896-1915126
Labourers Artisans Clerks Professionals Ex-
Regulars
Private
means
1st
Battalion
RJLI
53% 31% 13% 3% - -
2nd
Battalion
RJLI
56% 29% 3% 10% - -
123
A. Cameron& R. Palan, The Imagined Economiesof Globalisation,(SAGE,London,2003)
124
JA, A/D1/L10, Papersrelatingto the LicensingAssembly,consistingof the Lieutenant-Governor,
the Bailiff andJurats,6 January 1902 – 18 November1915
125
R. Stoneman,‘The ReformedBritishMilitia’,p.87.
126
Informationbasedona sample groupof 200 menfromthe followingsources:the WO95 War
Diariesof 48th
Brigade and medal cardsof the BT 351, andWO 372 seriesatthe National Archives,
the RG 9 seriesatthe CanadianNational Archives,the B2455 seriesat the CanberraArchives,the
URU 1900 seriesof the National Archivesof South Africa,the VictoriaCollege Bookof
Remembrance,extractsfrom TheJersey Times,and Evening News,the War GravesCommission,and
the 1911 census.

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3rd
Battalion
RJLI
15% 18% 18% 24% 15% 9%
Royal
Jersey
Artillery
26% 35% 24% 8% - 7%
Engineer
Company
15% 35% 10% 4% 16% 20%
Medical
Company
21% 57% 3% 7% 6% 4%
Average 31.20% 34.35% 12.35% 9.14% 6.07% 6.89%
In the rural areas of Jersey, the 1st and 2nd infantry battalions resembled the social
composition of rural Militia units of the United Kingdom within a similar period. Using the
census’ it was possible to look at the social composition of the eleven parishes that the 1st and
2nd battalions recruited from. The result was that the social composition of each parish can be
collated and compared to the battalion’s social composition, and the results were similar for
most, two parishes were considerably different in social composition to its infantry battalion:
Grouville and St. Brelade. The composition of these two parishes was due to proximity to St.
Helier, as such, each had larger professional demographics than the rest of the parishes in the
recruitment district. The average number of artisans was also inflated from roughly 1900
onwards. There were two major factors affecting this: the 7th Earl of Jersey, Victor Villiers
rebuilt Radier Manor, with an addition of two new wings, and built numerous properties
across the West Coast of Jersey.127 At the same time, on the seafront in St. Helier was
experiencing a drastic change, from relatively quiet town, on the coast, to financial hub.128
This inspired an expansion along the seafront of offices, the scale of of this required labour
from the United Kingdom and France. In St. Helier, there were a number of work licences
requested for those in trades required by the financial industry, i.e. tailors, cobblers, and
haberdashers.129 The ancillary companies, and artillery batteries did not recruit from one, or a
selection of parishes, but island-wide, the more technical units were allowed to pick from the
127
JA,B/A/W31, Correspondence regardingConstructionof Villiersproperties,1900-1913; see also,
SJ,SJPA/008444, RaiderManor underConstruction,6 June 1908
128
SJ, SJPA/001657, ViewacrossRoyal Square towardsSt. HelierParishChurchinthe Snow,2 March
1903; example of buildingworks,SJ,SJPA/000082, The Esplanade lookingtowardsFortRegent,27
May 1911
129
JA,A/D1/L10, Papersrelatingtothe LicensingAssembly,consistingof the Lieutenant-Governor,
the Bailiff andJurats,6 January 1902 – 18 November1915; see also,JA,A/C2/41/37, Letterfrom
W.V.VernontoDeputyGovernorre:holdinga sessionof the LicensingAssembly,8June 1905

42. Henry A. Roberts
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annual cadre, who were conscripted for active Militia service. These units also picked those
with further education or technical experience, leaving ‘the chaff’ for the infantry battalions.
It was also interesting that the men who served in these units, then served almost entirely, in
either the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, or Royal Army Medical Corps in the First World
War. In the UK contemporaries and revisionists have both stated that the social background
of the United Kingdom’s Militia was either underemployed, or in training in the Militia prior
to joining the regular army. However, in Jersey, the youth population was reflected in the in
the rank and file of the three infantry battalions. This was due to the system of conscription to
the Militia present on Jersey until the RMIJ suspension in 1917, this conscripted by both
seniority and years of residence on the island. This latter was an addition from 1904 to
dissuade the large migration of professionals to Jersey, which didn’t work.
3.3. Sample of occupations of Alumni, Victoria College, and King’s Canterbury,
1890-1919130
Occupations Victoria College King’s Canterbury
British Indian Army 15 6
British Regular Army 47 23
RNAS 2 4
RFC 1 5
Royal Navy 4 11
Militia 5 -
Professional 14 63
Academia 2 3
Finance Industry 36 11
This chapter should also consider the social elite of Jersey within the given period for
this paper, in particular this groups hesitance to gain commissions in the Royal Jersey Militia.
Victoria College was the premier school on Jersey, and the RMIJ had strong links to this
school. The Lieutenant-Governor’s children were allowed scholarships to Victoria College,
and he was often a patron of the Victoria College Officer Training Corps, present at
130
Worrell, Victoria College,Bookof Remembrance;see also,Occupationsof Alumni andstaff,<
http://www.hambo.org/kingscanterbury/view_men.php?war=WW1>[Accessed29 February2016]

43. Henry A. Roberts
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numerous reviews of the OTC from its creation in 1903.131 Furthermore, the 1911 census
confirmed that many of those that were engaged in service throughout the period covered by
the table, in the British and British Indian Army were sons of officers who had served in both
armies. The King’s Canterbury Roll of Service, suggested that there was still a trend in public
schools, that a considerable number of the faculty would have served in the Regular Army,
and this added nothing new to the current academic discourse, which Otley has studied in
depth and provided a similar conclusion on.132 This table confirmed that occupations of
alumni of Victoria College were often in regiments they had family links to, as was shown
with Colvill-Jones, or occupied as professionals and in the growing financial sector. This
suggested that there was ready access to professional jobs, and this was due to the rapid
expansion of Jersey’s financial sector. Thus, these groups would have been less available, or
willing to serve beyond their obligatory term in the rank and file. This was a widely held
feeling among the professionals of Jersey in the early 1900’s according to Clarence Ahier.
Who wrote in his diary of an occasion in which a Subaltern of the RMIJ attempted to rouse
young men to the Militia in February of 1907, at the United Club, overlooking the Royal
Square. The officer was not disrespected, but neither was his wish respected, he was
summarily blackballed from the private member’s club for badgering.133 Ahier noted his own
thoughts on the matter, he stated that he saw no positive of gaining a commission in the
Militia in its current state and this can be taken as the opinion of many professionals in this
period given the correspondence between the Bailiwick military authorities with the Home
and War Office.
The social composition of the RMIJ explored the changes of the population of Jersey
and how this effected the officer corps and other ranks of the Militia. The combination of
rising inheritance tax, returning sons, and the attraction of the offshore financial industry
were the key reasons for any change of the demographic of Jersey between 1890 and 1917.
This changed the officer corps in particular, and despite its retention of a strong core of those
related to, but not direct heirs to the dominant families: the Hillgrove’s, Bertram’s and
Westaway’s. By 1905, professionals of middle class origin composed the bulk of the officer
131
SJ, SJPA/032839, CommandingOfficer,the Royal JerseyMilitiareviewingthe VictoriaCollege
OfficerTrainingCorps, 19 May 1914
132
C.B. Otley,‘The educationalbackgroundof Britisharmyofficers’, Sociology,Vol.9,1973; see also,
C.B. Otley,‘The social originsof Britisharmyofficers’, SociologicalReview,Vol.18, 1970
133
SJ, 920 AHI, Diaryof Clarence Ahier,United Clubincident,24February1907

44. Henry A. Roberts
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corps, this was, 43.17% of the officers between 1896 and 1915. The social fabric of the
officer corps confirmed conclusions of previous chapters also. In particular, the influence of
the dominant families in Jersey on the Militia. The change throughout the period concerned
in this paper echoed the change with the United Kingdom Militia’s officer corps, which
occurred due to removal of land qualifications for Militia officers relatively soon after the
1852 revival. In the United Kingdom, the landed gentry element dominance was replaced by
middle class businessmen. The reason for this change at a later date in Jersey was due to the
lack of a proportionally similar middle class, until the late 1890’s and the creation of the
financial hub. The composition of the rank and file was similar to the composition of the rank
and file of the younger population of each parish, bar the parishes of Grouville, and St.
Brelade due to their proximity to St. Helier. Due to the census’ available and the licensing
committees it was clear that migrants tended to settle in these two parishes and St. Helier,
primarily because of their occupations. Conscription ensured that the composition of the rank
and file emulated the demographic of the younger population of Jersey, this group were
conscripted at the beginning of each year once reaching the age of eighteen, moving from
preparatory service to active service. In the First World War, the rank and file was formed of
those required by the island to meet the procurement quotas, the RMIJ was torn between
defence and production of goods for both the war effort and Jersey itself. The social elite of
Jersey were not interested in service within the RMIJ officer corps. There was no evidence to
suggest that there was a spate of men using the ‘Militia backdoor’ either. The Victoria
College alumni records showed that there was firstly, a tradition for this group to join either
the British, or British Indian Armies, or to seek a profession, usually in the financial sector.
Thus, as was proposed in previous chapters, there was a respect for the RMIJ, however, there
was not a unified wish to join for long term service, or to gain a commission, particularly for
the youth of Jersey.