“Unlike the time when recall value of competition was associated only with examinations or sports, the awareness about competition law has come a long way when almost every other day CCI is in the news for reprimanding the erring
market players. Fines for anti-competitive conduct are huge as seen in cases such as that of DLF and cement companies. Having completed a little over four years of active enforcement and nearly ten years of advocacy, CCI has carved a niche for
itself. The author, Mr. K K Sharma, Chairman, KK Sharma Law Offices and former Director General, CCI, having the rare privilege of both drafting and implementing the law as well as being at the cutting edge by way of sculpting the
very first investigations and heading Merger Control and Anti-trust Divisions looks back and sums up the four years of cartel enforcement in India in this article.“
The Competition Act 2002 provides for prohibition of abuse of dominant position. However, the provisions of unfair trade practices earlier covered by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969,are not covered under the competition law. The apparent effect of the two being quite similar, there is a considerable possibility that a situation very close to unfair trade practices may be held to be an abuse of dominant position. The difference being very close, the article looks at the penalty handed out to DLF Ltd for abuse of dominant position from this perspective.
The Competition Act 2002 provides for prohibition of abuse of dominant position. However, the provisions of unfair trade practices earlier covered by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969,are not covered under the competition law. The apparent effect of the two being quite similar, there is a considerable possibility that a situation very close to unfair trade practices may be held to be an abuse of dominant position. The difference being very close, the article looks at the penalty handed out to DLF Ltd for abuse of dominant position from this perspective.
This document discusses the relationship between competition law and intellectual property rights (IPR). It notes that while IPR provides exclusive rights to encourage innovation, competition law aims to promote market efficiency. There can be tensions between the two. The document outlines the objectives of competition law in India and the nature and intent of IPR. It discusses how the TRIPS agreement and Indian competition law address potential abuses of IPR, such as compulsory licensing. The application of competition laws to restrictive IPR practices like tie-in arrangements and package licensing is also examined.
Legal Aspects PPT for TATA Motors in India Charul Arora
PPT for TATA Motors in Cab Aggregator, TATA MOTORS, Competirors in cab aggregator, Entrance in new business, Investment & Business Expansion in Cab Sector.
This document summarizes key aspects of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the UK Bribery Act (UKBA), and provides guidance on designing an effective compliance program. It outlines that both acts prohibit bribery of foreign officials, but have some differences in scope and defenses. An effective compliance program should have top-level commitment, assess bribery risks, establish clear policies and controls, provide training, conduct due diligence on third parties, and monitor/audit compliance. The document uses examples of Indian companies investigated under the FCPA to illustrate the global reach and enforcement of these anti-bribery laws.
The document provides guidance for answering company law exam questions involving the doctrine of ultra vires. It outlines three scenarios for answering a question about Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co v Riche that has not been seen before: 1) panicking and moving to another question, 2) attempting to answer it based on general knowledge of ultra vires, or 3) fully answering it by explaining the case facts, rule, implications, and how it was later modified. The key points are that ultra vires means beyond a company's capacity, the Ashbury case established a strict interpretation of this in England, and Malaysia has since modified the doctrine through statute.
Which of the following is a distinguishing feature of a common law legal systemGender Core
This document provides the questions from the Law 531 final exam and includes a link to purchase the answers. There are 30 multiple choice questions testing various areas of law including business organizations, contracts, employment law, property law, and Sarbanes-Oxley regulations. Students are encouraged to copy and paste the link provided to obtain the correct answers to the exam questions.
This document contains 51 multiple choice questions that appear to be from a law school final exam. The questions cover a wide range of legal topics including alternative dispute resolution, torts, contracts, business organizations, intellectual property, and employment law. A link is provided to access the full exam questions and answers.
The Competition Act 2002 provides for prohibition of abuse of dominant position. However, the provisions of unfair trade practices earlier covered by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969,are not covered under the competition law. The apparent effect of the two being quite similar, there is a considerable possibility that a situation very close to unfair trade practices may be held to be an abuse of dominant position. The difference being very close, the article looks at the penalty handed out to DLF Ltd for abuse of dominant position from this perspective.
The Competition Act 2002 provides for prohibition of abuse of dominant position. However, the provisions of unfair trade practices earlier covered by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969,are not covered under the competition law. The apparent effect of the two being quite similar, there is a considerable possibility that a situation very close to unfair trade practices may be held to be an abuse of dominant position. The difference being very close, the article looks at the penalty handed out to DLF Ltd for abuse of dominant position from this perspective.
This document discusses the relationship between competition law and intellectual property rights (IPR). It notes that while IPR provides exclusive rights to encourage innovation, competition law aims to promote market efficiency. There can be tensions between the two. The document outlines the objectives of competition law in India and the nature and intent of IPR. It discusses how the TRIPS agreement and Indian competition law address potential abuses of IPR, such as compulsory licensing. The application of competition laws to restrictive IPR practices like tie-in arrangements and package licensing is also examined.
Legal Aspects PPT for TATA Motors in India Charul Arora
PPT for TATA Motors in Cab Aggregator, TATA MOTORS, Competirors in cab aggregator, Entrance in new business, Investment & Business Expansion in Cab Sector.
This document summarizes key aspects of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the UK Bribery Act (UKBA), and provides guidance on designing an effective compliance program. It outlines that both acts prohibit bribery of foreign officials, but have some differences in scope and defenses. An effective compliance program should have top-level commitment, assess bribery risks, establish clear policies and controls, provide training, conduct due diligence on third parties, and monitor/audit compliance. The document uses examples of Indian companies investigated under the FCPA to illustrate the global reach and enforcement of these anti-bribery laws.
The document provides guidance for answering company law exam questions involving the doctrine of ultra vires. It outlines three scenarios for answering a question about Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co v Riche that has not been seen before: 1) panicking and moving to another question, 2) attempting to answer it based on general knowledge of ultra vires, or 3) fully answering it by explaining the case facts, rule, implications, and how it was later modified. The key points are that ultra vires means beyond a company's capacity, the Ashbury case established a strict interpretation of this in England, and Malaysia has since modified the doctrine through statute.
Which of the following is a distinguishing feature of a common law legal systemGender Core
This document provides the questions from the Law 531 final exam and includes a link to purchase the answers. There are 30 multiple choice questions testing various areas of law including business organizations, contracts, employment law, property law, and Sarbanes-Oxley regulations. Students are encouraged to copy and paste the link provided to obtain the correct answers to the exam questions.
This document contains 51 multiple choice questions that appear to be from a law school final exam. The questions cover a wide range of legal topics including alternative dispute resolution, torts, contracts, business organizations, intellectual property, and employment law. A link is provided to access the full exam questions and answers.
Dear Members,
We are pleased to present to you ‘TransPrice Times – July 2018 edition’.
This periodical covers key court rulings on selection of different tested party; FAR analysis and Rule of consistency.
Apart from this, recent news relating to the draft e-commerce policy released by Government of India have been discussed in the periodical. Links to the OECD’s recent activity and our Special Edition article on ‘Changing Colours of Indian Tax Audit (3CD)’ have also been cited.
We trust you will find this update useful and informative.
We would be happy to know your suggestions. You can write to us at akshaykenkre@transprice.in
Thank You and Happy Reading!!
The document summarizes key information for motor vehicle dealers regarding franchise agreements and the current legislative landscape in Australia. It notes that while there is no ideal franchise agreement, recent and proposed changes to laws such as the Franchising Code of Conduct may help improve protections for dealers. It outlines challenges facing the Australian automotive industry and reviews existing legal protections for franchise agreements from unfair contract terms and unjust conduct. The presentation provides an overview of relevant laws and regulations regarding franchise agreements in Australia.
The document summarizes the legal and contractual complexities that arise for video on demand (VoD) platforms operating in India. It notes that India allows foreign investment in VoD platforms and the acquisition of content from abroad, but negotiations over rights, subtitles/translations, digital rights management, and other issues are complicated by the lack of established standards in India. It also outlines India's censorship laws and laws regarding pornography/obscenity/sedition that apply to VoD platforms but are outdated, leading platforms to assume relaxed enforcement will continue. The fragmented Indian VoD market is primed for rapid growth but also consolidation in the future.
The document summarizes recommendations from an investigation report regarding actions against brokers and defaulters related to the payment crisis at the National Spot Exchange Limited (NSEL).
Key points:
1) The investigation found brokers mis-sold NSEL contracts as low-risk investment products without properly explaining risks to clients. Brokers also engaged in unauthorized funding and client code modifications.
2) The report recommends referring broker cases to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) for actions including restricting director access to money markets or declaring them "Not Fit and Proper".
3) For defaulters, the report recommends re-opening tax cases and examining money flows under tax laws, as defaulters
The document summarizes Sesa Goa's response to allegations made by India's Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO). Sesa Goa denies all charges levied by SFIO, including under-invoicing of iron ore exports, excess commissions paid, over-invoicing of coking coal imports, and over-invoicing of iron ore sales to a subsidiary. Sesa Goa argues that SFIO's conclusions contradict its own findings of no funds siphoning or suspicious transactions. The company provides detailed explanations to counter each allegation.
My response to HM Treasury consultation on Implementing PSD2Simon Deane-Johns
The document responds to a UK government consultation on implementing the revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2). It raises several concerns about the proposed regulatory approach:
1. PSD2 leaves many aspects open to interpretation by member states, risking uneven enforcement and "regulatory creep" as businesses struggle with uncertainty.
2. Differences in how the UK and other states interpret scope, exemptions, and compliance standards could lead to inconsistent treatment of payment service providers operating across Europe.
3. Post-Brexit, UK and EU firms may want to continue cross-border business but uncertainty over "passporting" rights could force them to set up new authorized entities in the EU.
4. Some
Reliance Communications plans to raise $500 million through bonds to meet debt obligations. Dabur India acquired US hair care company Namaste Laboratories for $100 million to enter the ethnic hair care market in Africa and the US. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India report found irregularities in the 2008 2G spectrum allocation by former telecom minister A. Raja, estimating losses of Rs. 1.76 lakh crore to the exchequer. Axis Bank acquired Enam Securities' key businesses such as investment banking and broking for Rs. 2,067 crore. The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India cancelled licenses of 62 companies that failed to meet rollout deadlines.
The document provides a summary of top business news headlines from India. Some of the key stories included Eredene Capital making a partial exit from Sattva CFS, Gati seeking debt restructuring of over Rs. 300 crore, various retailers like Future Group and Lifestyle reporting high sales during Republic Day discounts, Facebook hiring Morgan Stanley to work on its upcoming IPO, Sai Security Printers receiving $7 million in funding from Aureos Capital, and the Supreme Court cancelling 122 telecom licenses issued after January 2008.
The article summarizes a recent order by the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) that quashed a record penalty imposed by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) on cement manufacturing companies for cartelization. While the CCI found the companies guilty, the penalty was set aside by the COMPAT on procedural grounds rather than the merits of the case. Specifically, the COMPAT argued the penalty order was invalid because the CCI chairman who authored the order did not attend all oral hearings, despite other members being present. The article argues this technicality has diluted the deterrent effect of the penalty, and questions whether this was an appropriate application of procedural principles given the circumstances.
The relationship between intellectual property rights and competition lawDiganth Raj Sehgal
This document discusses the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and competition law. It provides definitions of competition law and IPRs. It describes how the European Commission established a committee to create a single market for IPRs in Europe. It discusses the inherent tension between IPRs and competition laws, as IPRs provide monopoly protections while competition laws aim to eliminate monopolies. It analyzes various articles of European Union law regarding licenses of IPRs and technology transfer agreements. Finally, it examines case law related to IPRs and competition laws.
The document discusses securities law and regulations related to fraud and unfair trade practices. It provides definitions of fraud under common law, the Indian Penal Code, and securities laws. It examines key concepts such as dealing in securities and outlines specific prohibited practices under securities regulations like front running, self-trades, circular trades, and illegal fund mobilization. Exceptions to the definition of fraud are also noted. Comparisons are made between definitions of fraud under contract law versus securities laws.
Reliance Communications plans to raise $500 million through bonds to meet debt obligations. Dabur India acquired US hair care company Namaste Laboratories for $100 million to enter the ethnic hair care market in Africa and the US. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India report found flaws in former telecom minister A. Raja's allocation of 2G licenses in 2008, potentially causing losses of over 1 lakh crore for the exchequer. Axis Bank acquired Enam Securities' key businesses such as investment banking and broking for Rs 2,067 crore. The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India cancelled 62 licenses issued in 2008 due to the licensees' failure to meet rollout deadlines.
Reviewing the beneficial ownership in nominee arrangementRemidian Law Firm
This document summarizes the risks and implications of nominee arrangements in Indonesia according to anti-money laundering acts. It discusses how nominee agreements are now prohibited under investment laws, but foreign investors still use other forms of nominee arrangements to ensure ownership over their investments. However, these arrangements now carry greater legal risks under Presidential Regulation No. 13/2018, which broadly defines beneficial ownership and imposes sanctions on corporations that do not disclose this information. These sanctions can include criminal charges and penalties under the Money Laundering and Terrorism Funding Laws as well as the Indonesian Criminal Code. The document advises that legal compliance is essential for all companies operating in Indonesia.
The Small Business Administration (SBA) determined that the Department of State failed to properly refer the matter of Latvian Connection's exclusion from bidding to the SBA for a Certificate of Competency determination, as required by law. Specifically, Latvian was excluded from bidding by FedBid due to alleged integrity issues, which relates to responsibility rather than responsiveness. This should have been referred to SBA but was not. As a result, the SBA sustained Latvian's protest.
The complaint alleges economic offenses by several companies and individuals. It summarizes that public limited companies in India can raise public deposits with approval from the central government. The complaint alleges that several borrowing companies (Plethico Pharmaceuticals, Omnitech Infosolutions, Elder Pharmaceuticals, and Premier) have defaulted on paying back both interest and principal to depositors. It also alleges that the financial intermediary Bajaj Capital used unethical advertising tactics and made false claims to mislead depositors into investing with these companies. The complaint requests an investigation into Bajaj Capital, the borrowing companies, the registrar Linktime India, and the role of actor Anupam Kher in advertisements and government
- Rana Kapoor's promoter firm Yes Capital offloaded shares in Yes Bank, leaving Kapoor with ownership of only 900 shares compared to his previous stake.
- Sebi issued directions on margins collection in the cash segment, requiring trading and clearing members to compulsorily collect certain margins from clients upfront.
- Anil Ambani's Reliance Capital said its shareholding in subsidiary Reliance General Insurance was transferred to IDBI Trustee Services upon invocation of pledge.
This document analyzes insider dealing laws in Sri Lanka by comparing them to laws in the US and UK. It defines insider dealing and explains why it should be prohibited to maintain fairness in share markets. The key Sri Lankan law that prohibits insider dealing is the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1987, though its definitions of "insider" and "price sensitive information" lack clarity. The document recommends amendments to strengthen prohibitions, expand liability, improve definitions, and increase enforcement of insider dealing laws in Sri Lanka.
The document discusses several financial scams perpetrated by chit funds and Ponzi schemes in India that have duped millions of small investors. It describes how these schemes promise high returns but operate illegally without proper registrations and vanish after collecting large sums of money. Regulatory agencies like SEBI, RBI and MCA are unable to effectively prevent such scams due to loopholes in laws, weak enforcement powers, and the political influence wielded by some scamsters. Several high-profile chit fund scams in recent years have caused massive losses to investors in West Bengal, Assam, and other states.
The document provides a summary of recent developments related to competition law and policy in India. It discusses five key cases:
1) The CCI closed an investigation against Tata Motors, finding a lack of adverse effects on competition from the alleged restrictions on dealers.
2) The CCI did not impose penalties on the Chandigarh Housing Board and two Chemists Associations after they took corrective action to address CCI's concerns.
3) The NCLAT upheld the CCI's dismissal of allegations against the PVR-INOX merger, agreeing the merger was a combination subject to Section 4, not Section 3.
4) The Madras HC upheld the CCI's power to
A detailed perspective of the background, the present functioning and the future possibilities of the merger control regime in India as it unfolds with the passage of time by the architect of merger control in India.
Calibrating the Pulse of Competition Law in Indiaelithomas202
The document discusses emerging trends in India's competition law, based on a survey conducted by EY. Some key points:
- There is a low awareness of competition law among Indian enterprises, with over 80% unaware of the law and its implications. Multi-national corporations are generally more aware and compliant.
- Dawn raids by the investigating authority are expected to increase in the coming year, increasing the need for e-discovery capabilities to examine electronic records.
- Data available for economic analyses in antitrust cases is often unstructured and widespread, hindering effective market analyses.
- Guidelines are needed for determining appropriate penalties, as penalties levied so far have varied without clear reasons. Over 90% of
Dear Members,
We are pleased to present to you ‘TransPrice Times – July 2018 edition’.
This periodical covers key court rulings on selection of different tested party; FAR analysis and Rule of consistency.
Apart from this, recent news relating to the draft e-commerce policy released by Government of India have been discussed in the periodical. Links to the OECD’s recent activity and our Special Edition article on ‘Changing Colours of Indian Tax Audit (3CD)’ have also been cited.
We trust you will find this update useful and informative.
We would be happy to know your suggestions. You can write to us at akshaykenkre@transprice.in
Thank You and Happy Reading!!
The document summarizes key information for motor vehicle dealers regarding franchise agreements and the current legislative landscape in Australia. It notes that while there is no ideal franchise agreement, recent and proposed changes to laws such as the Franchising Code of Conduct may help improve protections for dealers. It outlines challenges facing the Australian automotive industry and reviews existing legal protections for franchise agreements from unfair contract terms and unjust conduct. The presentation provides an overview of relevant laws and regulations regarding franchise agreements in Australia.
The document summarizes the legal and contractual complexities that arise for video on demand (VoD) platforms operating in India. It notes that India allows foreign investment in VoD platforms and the acquisition of content from abroad, but negotiations over rights, subtitles/translations, digital rights management, and other issues are complicated by the lack of established standards in India. It also outlines India's censorship laws and laws regarding pornography/obscenity/sedition that apply to VoD platforms but are outdated, leading platforms to assume relaxed enforcement will continue. The fragmented Indian VoD market is primed for rapid growth but also consolidation in the future.
The document summarizes recommendations from an investigation report regarding actions against brokers and defaulters related to the payment crisis at the National Spot Exchange Limited (NSEL).
Key points:
1) The investigation found brokers mis-sold NSEL contracts as low-risk investment products without properly explaining risks to clients. Brokers also engaged in unauthorized funding and client code modifications.
2) The report recommends referring broker cases to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) for actions including restricting director access to money markets or declaring them "Not Fit and Proper".
3) For defaulters, the report recommends re-opening tax cases and examining money flows under tax laws, as defaulters
The document summarizes Sesa Goa's response to allegations made by India's Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO). Sesa Goa denies all charges levied by SFIO, including under-invoicing of iron ore exports, excess commissions paid, over-invoicing of coking coal imports, and over-invoicing of iron ore sales to a subsidiary. Sesa Goa argues that SFIO's conclusions contradict its own findings of no funds siphoning or suspicious transactions. The company provides detailed explanations to counter each allegation.
My response to HM Treasury consultation on Implementing PSD2Simon Deane-Johns
The document responds to a UK government consultation on implementing the revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2). It raises several concerns about the proposed regulatory approach:
1. PSD2 leaves many aspects open to interpretation by member states, risking uneven enforcement and "regulatory creep" as businesses struggle with uncertainty.
2. Differences in how the UK and other states interpret scope, exemptions, and compliance standards could lead to inconsistent treatment of payment service providers operating across Europe.
3. Post-Brexit, UK and EU firms may want to continue cross-border business but uncertainty over "passporting" rights could force them to set up new authorized entities in the EU.
4. Some
Reliance Communications plans to raise $500 million through bonds to meet debt obligations. Dabur India acquired US hair care company Namaste Laboratories for $100 million to enter the ethnic hair care market in Africa and the US. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India report found irregularities in the 2008 2G spectrum allocation by former telecom minister A. Raja, estimating losses of Rs. 1.76 lakh crore to the exchequer. Axis Bank acquired Enam Securities' key businesses such as investment banking and broking for Rs. 2,067 crore. The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India cancelled licenses of 62 companies that failed to meet rollout deadlines.
The document provides a summary of top business news headlines from India. Some of the key stories included Eredene Capital making a partial exit from Sattva CFS, Gati seeking debt restructuring of over Rs. 300 crore, various retailers like Future Group and Lifestyle reporting high sales during Republic Day discounts, Facebook hiring Morgan Stanley to work on its upcoming IPO, Sai Security Printers receiving $7 million in funding from Aureos Capital, and the Supreme Court cancelling 122 telecom licenses issued after January 2008.
The article summarizes a recent order by the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) that quashed a record penalty imposed by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) on cement manufacturing companies for cartelization. While the CCI found the companies guilty, the penalty was set aside by the COMPAT on procedural grounds rather than the merits of the case. Specifically, the COMPAT argued the penalty order was invalid because the CCI chairman who authored the order did not attend all oral hearings, despite other members being present. The article argues this technicality has diluted the deterrent effect of the penalty, and questions whether this was an appropriate application of procedural principles given the circumstances.
The relationship between intellectual property rights and competition lawDiganth Raj Sehgal
This document discusses the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and competition law. It provides definitions of competition law and IPRs. It describes how the European Commission established a committee to create a single market for IPRs in Europe. It discusses the inherent tension between IPRs and competition laws, as IPRs provide monopoly protections while competition laws aim to eliminate monopolies. It analyzes various articles of European Union law regarding licenses of IPRs and technology transfer agreements. Finally, it examines case law related to IPRs and competition laws.
The document discusses securities law and regulations related to fraud and unfair trade practices. It provides definitions of fraud under common law, the Indian Penal Code, and securities laws. It examines key concepts such as dealing in securities and outlines specific prohibited practices under securities regulations like front running, self-trades, circular trades, and illegal fund mobilization. Exceptions to the definition of fraud are also noted. Comparisons are made between definitions of fraud under contract law versus securities laws.
Reliance Communications plans to raise $500 million through bonds to meet debt obligations. Dabur India acquired US hair care company Namaste Laboratories for $100 million to enter the ethnic hair care market in Africa and the US. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India report found flaws in former telecom minister A. Raja's allocation of 2G licenses in 2008, potentially causing losses of over 1 lakh crore for the exchequer. Axis Bank acquired Enam Securities' key businesses such as investment banking and broking for Rs 2,067 crore. The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India cancelled 62 licenses issued in 2008 due to the licensees' failure to meet rollout deadlines.
Reviewing the beneficial ownership in nominee arrangementRemidian Law Firm
This document summarizes the risks and implications of nominee arrangements in Indonesia according to anti-money laundering acts. It discusses how nominee agreements are now prohibited under investment laws, but foreign investors still use other forms of nominee arrangements to ensure ownership over their investments. However, these arrangements now carry greater legal risks under Presidential Regulation No. 13/2018, which broadly defines beneficial ownership and imposes sanctions on corporations that do not disclose this information. These sanctions can include criminal charges and penalties under the Money Laundering and Terrorism Funding Laws as well as the Indonesian Criminal Code. The document advises that legal compliance is essential for all companies operating in Indonesia.
The Small Business Administration (SBA) determined that the Department of State failed to properly refer the matter of Latvian Connection's exclusion from bidding to the SBA for a Certificate of Competency determination, as required by law. Specifically, Latvian was excluded from bidding by FedBid due to alleged integrity issues, which relates to responsibility rather than responsiveness. This should have been referred to SBA but was not. As a result, the SBA sustained Latvian's protest.
The complaint alleges economic offenses by several companies and individuals. It summarizes that public limited companies in India can raise public deposits with approval from the central government. The complaint alleges that several borrowing companies (Plethico Pharmaceuticals, Omnitech Infosolutions, Elder Pharmaceuticals, and Premier) have defaulted on paying back both interest and principal to depositors. It also alleges that the financial intermediary Bajaj Capital used unethical advertising tactics and made false claims to mislead depositors into investing with these companies. The complaint requests an investigation into Bajaj Capital, the borrowing companies, the registrar Linktime India, and the role of actor Anupam Kher in advertisements and government
- Rana Kapoor's promoter firm Yes Capital offloaded shares in Yes Bank, leaving Kapoor with ownership of only 900 shares compared to his previous stake.
- Sebi issued directions on margins collection in the cash segment, requiring trading and clearing members to compulsorily collect certain margins from clients upfront.
- Anil Ambani's Reliance Capital said its shareholding in subsidiary Reliance General Insurance was transferred to IDBI Trustee Services upon invocation of pledge.
This document analyzes insider dealing laws in Sri Lanka by comparing them to laws in the US and UK. It defines insider dealing and explains why it should be prohibited to maintain fairness in share markets. The key Sri Lankan law that prohibits insider dealing is the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1987, though its definitions of "insider" and "price sensitive information" lack clarity. The document recommends amendments to strengthen prohibitions, expand liability, improve definitions, and increase enforcement of insider dealing laws in Sri Lanka.
The document discusses several financial scams perpetrated by chit funds and Ponzi schemes in India that have duped millions of small investors. It describes how these schemes promise high returns but operate illegally without proper registrations and vanish after collecting large sums of money. Regulatory agencies like SEBI, RBI and MCA are unable to effectively prevent such scams due to loopholes in laws, weak enforcement powers, and the political influence wielded by some scamsters. Several high-profile chit fund scams in recent years have caused massive losses to investors in West Bengal, Assam, and other states.
The document provides a summary of recent developments related to competition law and policy in India. It discusses five key cases:
1) The CCI closed an investigation against Tata Motors, finding a lack of adverse effects on competition from the alleged restrictions on dealers.
2) The CCI did not impose penalties on the Chandigarh Housing Board and two Chemists Associations after they took corrective action to address CCI's concerns.
3) The NCLAT upheld the CCI's dismissal of allegations against the PVR-INOX merger, agreeing the merger was a combination subject to Section 4, not Section 3.
4) The Madras HC upheld the CCI's power to
A detailed perspective of the background, the present functioning and the future possibilities of the merger control regime in India as it unfolds with the passage of time by the architect of merger control in India.
Calibrating the Pulse of Competition Law in Indiaelithomas202
The document discusses emerging trends in India's competition law, based on a survey conducted by EY. Some key points:
- There is a low awareness of competition law among Indian enterprises, with over 80% unaware of the law and its implications. Multi-national corporations are generally more aware and compliant.
- Dawn raids by the investigating authority are expected to increase in the coming year, increasing the need for e-discovery capabilities to examine electronic records.
- Data available for economic analyses in antitrust cases is often unstructured and widespread, hindering effective market analyses.
- Guidelines are needed for determining appropriate penalties, as penalties levied so far have varied without clear reasons. Over 90% of
This case involves an antitrust complaint filed with the Competition Commission of India (CCI) against Honda, Volkswagen, and Fiat alleging anticompetitive practices in restricting the availability of spare parts. The CCI investigation found that the car manufacturers were abusing their dominant position by restricting dealers from selling spare parts in the open market. The CCI imposed a penalty of 2% of total turnover on the car manufacturers for violating competition laws. The car manufacturers appealed the decision. The High Court upheld most of the CCI's findings and order, but declared one section of the Competition Act relating to CCI membership to be unconstitutional.
Competition is the best means of ensuring that the ‘Common Man’ or ‘Aam Aadmi’ has access to the broadest range of goods and services at the most competitive prices. With increased competition, producers will have maximum incentive to innovate and specialize. This would result in reduced costs and wider choice to consumers. A fair competition in market is essential to achieve this objective. Our goal is to create and sustain fair competition in the economy that will provide a ‘level playing field’ to the producers and make the markets work for the welfare of the consumers
The document provides an index for MCQ questions from case studies issued by ICAI on various topics related to economic law, including competition law. It includes the following:
- An introduction and instructions on how to use the index, which directs the user to first find repeated case studies in a descriptive question index before referring to this MCQ index.
- A table with columns for the topic, question, and answer. Questions are sorted alphabetically and grouped by relevant law or chapter to help the user quickly find the answer to an MCQ.
- A caution that the answers are not updated for amendments to laws and the user should verify answers from source materials if unsure.
The Competition Act of 2002 established the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to prevent anti-competitive practices and promote competition. The CCI is tasked with investigating anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant market positions, and mergers and acquisitions. Parties to a combination are not required to notify the CCI, but the CCI can investigate combinations on its own. The CCI faces challenges due to overlapping jurisdictions, unrealistic timelines, lack of cooperation from foreign counterparts, and limited resources and infrastructure.
The document summarizes key aspects of India's competition law framework. It outlines that competition law in India was triggered by the constitution and the first law was the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969. This was replaced by the Competition Act of 2002 to promote competition and private enterprise.
The Competition Act established the Competition Commission of India and has four main parts - regulating anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, combination regulation, and competition advocacy. It aims to facilitate competition, establish the CCI to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote market competition, protect consumer interests, and ensure trade freedom. The CCI has powers like imposing penalties, modifying or blocking combinations, and separating dominant enterprises.
The document discusses the importance of competition and the need for competition laws when global trade is taking place on a single platform. It notes that India enacted the Competition Act 2002 to establish a new competition regime and foster competition in markets after economic reforms in 1991 made the previous MRTP Act inadequate. The Act aims to eliminate anti-competitive practices and promote competition for the benefit of consumers.
Article on teleInter- Regulatory Space : A case for healthy cooperation --- K...KK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
The Competition Commission of India (CCI) seeks to develop a formal consultation mechanism with sector regulators like the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) regarding merger and acquisition rules. The CCI's mandate under the Competition Act is to examine combinations (mergers and acquisitions) across all sectors that may have adverse competitive effects. Developing coordination between regulators could help avoid potential jurisdictional conflicts and regulatory uncertainty for businesses. The CCI aims to establish healthy cooperation with sector regulators based on their respective expertise to best promote competition while providing certainty to markets.
Presentation on The competition act(2002)satya pal
The document summarizes the key aspects of the Competition Act of 2002 in India. It discusses the objectives of eliminating anti-competitive practices and promoting fair competition. The main features covered are the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements such as cartels, abuse of dominant market positions, and regulations governing mergers and acquisitions. Enforcement is carried out by the Competition Commission of India through investigations and imposition of penalties. The act aims to protect consumer welfare and ensure fair competition in the market.
The document summarizes the development and implementation of merger control regulations in India by the Competition Commission of India (CCI). It discusses how there was initial opposition to bringing merger control provisions into force, but that the CCI was finally able to notify final merger regulations in May 2011. It describes some initial amendments made by the CCI in 2012 and 2013 to refine the merger review process based on experience. It also notes that after over two years of implementation, it is an appropriate time to review the CCI's performance in regulating combinations and mergers under Indian competition law.
“ India recently completed a little over two years of regulation of combinations.
In contrast to the exaggerated fears associated with the likely bringing into force
of the provisions relating to regulation of combinations before the provisions
were actually notified w.e.f. June 1, 2011, the two years have passed rather
peacefully. The author , Mr. K K Sharma, former Head of Merger Control and
Director General, CCI, who laid the foundations of regulation of combinations
in India by way of devising the Merger Review Format as well as making it
successfully functional , reviews the performance of Competition Commission of
India in regulation of combinations and discusses the associated issues. He also
throws light on merger filing Form 1 which is almost the simplest in the world
for a jurisdiction having almost the highest thresholds in the world. He places on
record the deft handling of the regulation of combinations by CCI.”
A comparative study of the provisions of the Indian Competition Act, US Anti ...Pritam Pandey
This document provides an overview of competition law in India, the United States, and the United Kingdom. It discusses key provisions and comparisons. The main points are:
1) Competition law deals with restrictive business practices and market failures. The US Sherman Act of 1890 was one of the earliest such laws. India, UK, and over 100 other countries now have competition laws.
2) The Indian Competition Act covers anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and combinations. It established the Competition Commission of India to enforce the act.
3) US and UK competition laws are more rigorously applied and enforced through criminal sanctions. Violations in India are larger in number but attract less regulatory attention.
Compared to the other enforcement provisions of the Act, the merger control
provisions, or regulation of combinations as these are called in India, are of more
recent origin. The regulations drafted by the Competition Commission of India
(the Commission) for regulation of the combinations, in an attempt to make the
combination regulations more business friendly, have given a window of not filing
the merger filings before the Commission in some cases of combinations where the
possibilities of the Appreciable Adverse Effect on Combination (AAEC) are lesser.
The question arises as to how to deal with the instances where the parties do not file
the details of any combination and the Commission is of the opinion that the
combination either causes or is likely to cause an AAEC in the relevant market.
The author, who was the architect of the introduction of schedule 1 for the
exempt type categories while drafting the combination regulations for India as
the first Head of Merger Control in India and thus making regulation of
combinations a reality in India, delves deep into the issue and looks at the possible
solutions. In his view, the Commission still has freedom to act against any
combination causing AAEC – whether above or below thresholds.
The Competition Act, 2002 aims to promote fair competition in India and protect consumer interests. It replaced the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969. The key objectives of the Competition Act are to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote competition, protect consumer interests, and ensure freedom of trade. The Act prohibits anti-competitive agreements between companies, abuse of dominant market position, and regulates combinations/mergers above certain financial thresholds. It established the Competition Commission of India to enforce the competition laws and regulations in the country.
Reality Bites: A Review of Penal Provisions under the Competition LawKK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
Despite being a new law in its own right, the Competition Act, 2002 (the Act)
is still perceived as a successor to the Monopolies and Restrictive practices Act,
1969 (MRTPC Act). There is a need for a better appreciation that, unlike MRTPC,
the CCI has adequate powers to deal with the delinquent enterprises, to ensure
that it is in a position to effectively fulfill the mandate given to it. Through a
discussion of the penal provisions of the Act, the author, who played a pioneering
role in establishing the CCI, sets the record straight about the adequate penal
powers given to the CCI to be in a position to be an effective regulator by making
a comparison between the earlier MRTPC regime and, after its repeal, the present
competition regime under CCI. On comparison, the author feels that the CCI
has adequate powers to deal with the responsibility entrusted to it.
A 360 Degree Review of Penal Provisions’ Application under Competition Law ...KK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
Perhaps not many laws have been subject to so much public scrutiny as competition law either before its enactment or afterwards. Almost immediately after its enactment, just after a duly appointed Member had assumed office and before a duly appointed Chairman could enter office, the Competition Act, 2002(Act) was challenged on various counts. This resulted in a very strange situation. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) could not be called a Commission in terms of the Act which needed a minimum quorum of a Chairman and, at least, two Members for being a legally recognized Commission. So, the CCI remained a one Member body (not a full Commission) till as late as March 1, 2009 when, for the first time, a Chairman and two Members were in office and the CCI, in the eyes of law, was a full Commission. The enforcement powers to CCI came in stages. In first phase only advocacy functions were allowed. This was followed by antitrust enforcement powers being given to the Commission from May 20, 2009. Thereafter, regulations of combinations (popularly known as Merger Review) came into force with effect from June 1, 2011. There were always fears that the CCI may turn out to be as effective (or ineffective depending upon one’s perspective) as MRTPC. Now, that five years have passed since the time the CCI began to get its enforcement powers, it is high time to look back if the fears about the efficacy of the powers given to the CCI were justified or misplaced. The author, the only official in senior echelons of the CCI who not only saw the transition from a CCI doing only competition advocacy to a fully functional Commission but also played a very crucial role in this transition by way of being the very first Director General of the functional CCI, laying down the investigative framework of investigation, and later as the first head of Merger Control who gave the country its very efficient Merger Review Format, takes a look at this issue.
This document discusses some areas for potential improvement in the functioning of the Competition Commission of India (CCI). It notes that over 7 years, the CCI has not grown as effectively as expected given the size of India's economy and prevalence of anticompetitive practices. The document discusses three key areas - institutionalizing institutional memory to avoid repeating work, improving how information from informants is dealt with to protect identities and encourage more cases, and making greater use of sua sponte investigations instead of just reacting to cases. Maintaining proper records and knowledge management could help the CCI function more effectively.
The document discusses competition and competition policy in India. It defines competition as situations in markets where sellers strive for buyers to achieve business goals. Competition policy aims to promote efficiency and maximize welfare. The Competition Act of 2002 established a commission to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote competition, protect consumers, and ensure freedom of trade. The Act prohibits anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant positions. It regulates combinations and promotes competition advocacy. The Commission has powers like issuing cease/desist orders and imposing penalties.
Similar to India: Prohibition of Anti-Competitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Position (20)
Economies (Efficiencies) – An Essential Consideration in Merger AnalysisKK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
The document discusses the evolving consideration of efficiencies (economies) in merger analysis under competition law. It notes that while competition law aims to preserve competition, the essential objective is efficient market outcomes. Most jurisdictions now accept efficiencies as a justification for approving mergers. However, quantifying and weighing efficiencies can be complex. The document examines how the US, Canada, and Australia incorporate efficiencies in their merger analysis, representing three approaches: as part of substantive assessment, as a defense, and through authorization. It concludes there is need for transitional economies like India to recognize efficiencies in competition law and policy.
Some Thoughts for CCI-II: Participatory Competition Law EnforcementKK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
Carrying forward, the theme of an earlier article, the author looks at the authorised
representation before the Competition Commission of India (‘Commission’) and
whether it continues the way it was envisaged in the Act or tilting in favour of
any particular profession. He also examines the newly started practice of the
Commission calling the opposite parties during the preliminary hearings with
the informant to fully understand the matter. There were certain amendments
introduced to the Competition Act, 2002(‘Act’) in September, 2007. The issue
being examined in this article also includes the point if this practice is compatible
with the amendments of 2007 to the Act.
The author who not only was closely involved in amendments of 2007, drafting
regulations for the functioning of the Commission and headed the Antitrust
Division of CCI but was also the first Director General of the functional
Commission discusses the compatibility of this new practice with the probability
of success of investigation process in this article.
Counter Point - V: First Economic Study in DG Report to examine two models of...KK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
Ever since the time when the powers of enforcement were conferred on the
Competition Commission of India (CCI) in May, 2009, there has been a
continuous evolution of the competition law in the country in the form of decisions
of the CCI in various informations brought before it. Amongst various cases
before it, the case No. 3 of 2009, one of the very first cases before the CCI was
interesting from many angles. First of all, this was the first instance where the
help of economic anlysis was taken by Director General (DG), in his report to
arrive a t his findings. Secondly, it was a case where, three associations of travel
agents were actively involved in boycott of an airlines wheres the other three
associations were not actively involved in the boycott but their names were used
by the remaining three associations in the agitation. The ‘not active’ associations
had also not hauled by the three ‘active’ associations for use of their name in their
hoardings but had also not contributed towards the funding of the agitations
without any visible resistance from the ‘not active’ associations.
The author who supervised the preparation of the report of the DG for the Commission
also introduced economic analysis in this case for the first time as the very first
Director General of the functional Competition Commission of India looks back at
the case and the dissenting orders passed by two Members of the CCI
Counter Point - III: Anti-competitive Practices in Pharmaceutical Sector- Cas...KK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
As done in some of the previous issues of Competition Law Reporter (CLR),
continuing with the series on dissenting and separate orders of different members
of the Competition Commission of India (Commission) in some of the cases, in
this write up the focus is on an old case filed before erstwhile MRTPC and
transferred to the Commission under the scheme, provided under the Competition
Act, 2002 (the Act ), to deal with such cases on repeal of MRTPC Act, 1969 and
commencement of enforcement of the Act w.e.f. May 20,2009. This was followed
by similar informations filed before the Commission alleging anticompetitive
practices in pharmaceutical distribution and retail sector. Various studies have
documented the prevalence of a number of anticompetitive practices in the
pharmaceutical sector which are so deeply entrenched that even pharmaceutical
giants have to succumb to them. The reason of successful perpetuation of these
anticompetitive practices is that the players responsible for initiation of these
practices and their continuation have not only have a wide reach across the
country but are extremely well organised. Interestingly, most of these informations
landed before the Commission because of the infighting amongst members of the
associations responsible for these practices or when one or some of the office bearers
of these associations became too domineering with other ordinary members. The
author, who as the first Director General of the Commission put the competition
law investigation framework in place and supervised the very first investigations,
looks at the different orders passed by the Commission and its members and the
way similar issues were handled in other jurisdictions worldwide.
Way back in September, 2007, the Competition Act, 2002 (the Act) was amended
by the Competition (Amendment ) Act, 2007 ( the Amendment Act). This had
become necessary on account of numerous legal challenges to the implementation
the competition law in India despite the enactment of the Act in January, 2003.
These amendments added an altogether new chapter creating a new appellate
structure in between the decisions of the Competition Commission of India (the
Commission) and the Supreme Court which was not existing in the original Act
as enacted in January, 2003. Thus came into existence a new body known as the
Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT). In addition to this amendment,
the Amendment Act also made many significant amendments to the Act. One
such amendment was replacement of the word ‘complaint’ with ‘ information’ in
section 19 of the Act. This write up limits itself to looking only at this amendment
to section 19 of the Act.
The author who assisted the Commission in drafting the regulations for various
aspects of the functioning of the Commission and headed the Antitrust Division
of CCI to actually implement these regulations in real practice and also was the
first Director General of the functional Competition Commission of India
examines the implication of this amenmdment in this article.
The Competition (Amendment ) Bill, 2012, Bill No. 136 of 2012 ( the Amendment
Bill 2012) lapsed before it could become a law because of the dissolution of the then
lower house of Parliament just before the general elections leading to the present
Government, at the centre, came to power. One of the amendments, proposed in
this Amendment Bill 2012, sought to make changes in Section 26 of the Act to
allow some clear lee way to the Competition Commission of India (Commission) to
differ from the report of the Director General(DG) and close the matter despite the
DG having come to the conclusion that there is a violation of competition law
after he has investigated into the allegations of violations of competition law. Such
clarity, sought to be introduced by the Amendment Bill, 2012, is missing in the
relevant provisions of the Act as they stand today. In the appropriate provisions, as
they exist today, there is enough room for inquiry by the Commission in addition
to the investigation by the Director General(DG) after investigation by DG is
done. The natural corrollary is that a poorly investigated report by DG can not be
either a basis or excuse for not upholding violations of competition law if found in
a prima facie opinion of the Commission. However, it is a moot point if this part of
the mandate is being fully exercised at present or not.
It is this part of inquiry by the Commission after the report has been submitted by
the DG which the author, who headed the Antitrust Division of CCI to actually
see the implementation of functional regulations in real practice and also assisted
the Commission in drafting these regulations, discusses in this article.
The Competition Commission of India(CCI) had imposed a penalty of Rs. 672 Crores, cumulatively, on four public sector general insurance companies. All the four companies preferred an appeal before the Competition Appellate Tribunal
(COMPAT). In its appellate order, the COMPAT did not disagree with CCI as far as the applicability of penalty was concerned but reduced the quantum by Rs. 670 Crores.
The write up discusses ONLY the factual aspects of the case, strictly for academic purposes, WITHOUT airing any personal opinions on the issue. This is being done on account of the fact of the author being professionally involved in the matter.
Baby Steps of Competition Law Jurisprudence in Pharmaceutical Sector - K.K. S...KK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
The document summarizes an order by the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) regarding appeals in the pharmaceutical sector. The order disposed of multiple appeals related to alleged anti-competitive practices by chemists' associations.
The key issues addressed were requirements for pharmaceutical companies to obtain no-objection certificates or product information service approvals from chemists' associations, as well as fixed trade margins. The appellants argued the investigation conducted by the Director General was flawed and violated principles of natural justice. COMPAT analyzed the relevant sections of the Competition Act and regulations at length before determining the Commission is bound by principles of natural justice in its adjudicatory functions.
Counter Point - III: Anti-competitive Practices in Pharmaceutical Sector -Cas...KK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
As done in some of the previous issues of Competition Law Reporter (CLR), continuing with the series on dissenting and separate orders of different members of the Competition Commission of India (Commission) in some of the cases, in
this write up the focus is on an old case filed before erstwhile MRTPC and transferred to the Commission under the scheme, provided under the Competition Act, 2002 (the Act ), to deal with such cases on repeal ofMRTPC Act, 1969 and
commencement of enforcement of the Act w.e.f.May 20,2009. This was followed by similar informations filed before the Commission alleging anticompetitive practices in pharmaceutical distribution and retail sector. Various studies have documented the prevalence of a number of anticompetitive practices in the pharmaceutical sector which are so deeply entrenched that even pharmaceutical
giants have to succumb to them. The reason of successful perpetuation of these anticompetitive practices is that the players responsible for initiation of these practices and their continuation have not only have a wide reach across the
country but are extremely well organised. Interestingly,most of these informations landed before the Commission because of the infighting amongst members of the associations responsible for these practices orwhen one or some of the office bearers of these associations became too domineering with other ordinary members. The author, who as the first Director General of the Commission put the competition
law investigation framework in place and supervised the very first investigations, looks at the different orders passed by the Commission and its members and the way similar issues were handled in other jurisdictions worldwide.
Some Thoughts for CCI-II : Participatory Competition Law Enforcement - K K Sh...KK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
Carrying forward , the theme of an earlier article, the author looks at the authorised representation before the Competition Commission of India (‘Commission’) and whether it continues the way it was envisaged in the Act or tilting in favour of any particular profession. He also examines the newly started practice of the Commission calling the opposite parties during the preliminary hearings with the informant to fully understand thae matter. There were certain amendments introduced to the Competition Act, 2002(‘Act’) in September, 2007. The issue being examined in this article also includes the point if this practice is compatible with the amendments of 2007 to the Act.
The author who not only was closely involved in amendments of 2007, drafting regulations for the functioning of the Commission and headed the Antitrust Division of CCI but was also the first Director General of the functional Commissiondiscusses the compatibility of this new practice with the probability of success of investigation process in this article.
Economies (Efficiencies) – An Essential Consideration in Merger Analysis - KK...KK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
While the purport of competition law is to preserve and promote competition, the
essential object of competition is to ensure optimal allocation of available resources,
produce more while using less resources and thus, achieve efficient market
outcomes. Generally, the efficiency is accepted as a defence in competition law.
Ignorance of economies (efficient use of resources) by competition law and
competition enforcement agencies would prejudice the very object of preserving
competition. However, one should also acknowledge that scientific quantification and weighing of efficiencies are complex tasks.
Combination Review in India: Lessons So Far - Part II - KK SharmaKK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
In the immediately preceding issue, the performance of the CCI in the task of
regulations of combinations, as compared to international standards, was discussed
and found to be really impressive for any new competition agency. However, this
experience in regulation of combinations has thrown up interesting lessons in
merger control. In this concluding part, the author, who laid down the basic
analytical and procedural framework for combination review, as the first Head of
Merger Control CCI, in India, takes a look at the lessons from the journey in
merger control so far in India. The comparisons with other jurisdictions throw
up extremely interesting results as seen here in this concluding part.
Combination Review in India: A Mid-year Review (Part I) - K.K. SharmaKK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
In this two-part article, the first part of which appears here, the author, the chief
architect behind the review format of Merger Review in India, takes a look at the
performance of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) in handling the
regulations of combinations (merger review) in India and how does it compare
with international standards. The stark contrast between the anxious reactions
before the regulations of combinations came into force and the deafening silence,
even after 19 approvals have been given by the CCI, has also been briefly touched
upon. The next part, to follow, shall deal with the lessons arising from the
journey of merger control in India so far.
Automobile Manufacturers Fined for Restricting Access to Replacement Parts - ...KK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), since ages, have had a difficult marriage. As is popularly believed that a happy, successful and enduring marriage, between spouses, is good for the growth, stability and future development of the children, nearly in a similar way, it is necessary for this marriage between competition law and IPRs for the overall and long-term benefit of the society. IPRs are statutorily given monopolies and these are given for good reasons to induce inventions and other creative outcomes from some gifted members of the society to be revealed to the society at large so that , in exchange for granting of short term monopoly to the contributor of the IPRs, the society is revealed the new inventions and creations which become publicly available after the lapse of statutorily granted monopoly time period. During the period during the grant of these statutorily allowed monopolies, the holder of IPRs is permitted reasonable protection under competition law as well. The order in automobiles spare parts’ case passed by CCI on the question of reasonableness is an important landmark in this area of jurisprudence of IPRs and competition law. The author, who as the first Director General of functional Competition Commission of India, established the competition law investigation framework in India, looks back at this order of CCI in this piece.
Importance of Being a Member of CCI : Order in Jypee Case --K K Sharma KK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
Recently, the Competition Commission of India(Commission or CCI) came up with, perhaps, its first very closly contested order wherein a majority of 3 members held that the Jaypee Group was not in a dominant position in the relevant market of ‘residential units’ in Noida and Greater Noida and , therefore, was not to be imposed any penalty upon for abuse of dominant position. On the other hand, a minority of 2 Members imposed a penalty of Rs. 666 crores on the group for abusing its dominant position in the relevant market of ‘integrated townships’ in Noida and Greater Noida.This was a case wherein the DG was asked to submit a supplementary report after carrying out further investigations. The DG submitted his supplementary report which substantially differed from the earlier finding by the DG as far as the dominant position was considered. It was this aspect of the matter which dramatically changed the contours of the case. After the new recommendations of the DG pointed to considerably changed position and held Jaypee group to be dominant in the newly defined relevant market as suggested by the Commission, the majority opinion differed from this new finding and went back to the earlier finding of DG and thus not imposing penalty on the group but the minority went ahead and imposed a penalty. The author who headed the Antitrust Division of CCI , when now well known case of DLF was being examined within CCI, and was the first Director General of the functional Competition Commission of India and made the architecture for the competition law investigation in the country looks at this interesting order in this write up.
Ex-Parte Prima Facie order by the Competition Commission of India – A CritiqueKK SHARMA LAW OFFICES
Prima facie view or opinion as to existence or absence of a case by the Competition
Commission of India is an extremely crucial decision. Affirmative decision as to
existence of an anti competitive/abusive practice triggers a full fledged Inquiry.
Likewise, a prima facie view that there is no case of infringement of provisions of
Competition Act results in dropping of further proceedings. It is significant for
parties involved.
Portion for the box
The Competition Act, 2002 (the Act), which on June 1, 2011, became fully functional, has been hailed as ‘close to state-of-art’ and ‘embodying an economics based approach’ by OECD and WTO respectively. It is an interesting mix of the best components of law and judicial precedents from the jurisdictions which have been practicing this law for decades and even longer. It contains many concepts which took long years of judicial evolutionary journey in different jurisdictions and are considered nearly integral part of the law today. One such concept is the concept of ‘effects’ doctrine’ or ‘the principle of extraterritoriality’ contained in section 32 of the Act. The author discusses the background of this concept and its future in Indian context.
Lifting the Corporate Veil. Power Point Presentationseri bangash
"Lifting the Corporate Veil" is a legal concept that refers to the judicial act of disregarding the separate legal personality of a corporation or limited liability company (LLC). Normally, a corporation is considered a legal entity separate from its shareholders or members, meaning that the personal assets of shareholders or members are protected from the liabilities of the corporation. However, there are certain situations where courts may decide to "pierce" or "lift" the corporate veil, holding shareholders or members personally liable for the debts or actions of the corporation.
Here are some common scenarios in which courts might lift the corporate veil:
Fraud or Illegality: If shareholders or members use the corporate structure to perpetrate fraud, evade legal obligations, or engage in illegal activities, courts may disregard the corporate entity and hold those individuals personally liable.
Undercapitalization: If a corporation is formed with insufficient capital to conduct its intended business and meet its foreseeable liabilities, and this lack of capitalization results in harm to creditors or other parties, courts may lift the corporate veil to hold shareholders or members liable.
Failure to Observe Corporate Formalities: Corporations and LLCs are required to observe certain formalities, such as holding regular meetings, maintaining separate financial records, and avoiding commingling of personal and corporate assets. If these formalities are not observed and the corporate structure is used as a mere façade, courts may disregard the corporate entity.
Alter Ego: If there is such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its shareholders or members that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individuals no longer exist, courts may treat the corporation as the alter ego of its owners and hold them personally liable.
Group Enterprises: In some cases, where multiple corporations are closely related or form part of a single economic unit, courts may pierce the corporate veil to achieve equity, particularly if one corporation's actions harm creditors or other stakeholders and the corporate structure is being used to shield culpable parties from liability.
Business law for the students of undergraduate level. The presentation contains the summary of all the chapters under the syllabus of State University, Contract Act, Sale of Goods Act, Negotiable Instrument Act, Partnership Act, Limited Liability Act, Consumer Protection Act.
Matthew Professional CV experienced Government LiaisonMattGardner52
As an experienced Government Liaison, I have demonstrated expertise in Corporate Governance. My skill set includes senior-level management in Contract Management, Legal Support, and Diplomatic Relations. I have also gained proficiency as a Corporate Liaison, utilizing my strong background in accounting, finance, and legal, with a Bachelor's degree (B.A.) from California State University. My Administrative Skills further strengthen my ability to contribute to the growth and success of any organization.
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This document briefly explains the June compliance calendar 2024 with income tax returns, PF, ESI, and important due dates, forms to be filled out, periods, and who should file them?.
The Future of Criminal Defense Lawyer in India.pdfveteranlegal
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Discover how Mississauga criminal defence lawyers defend clients facing weapon offence charges with expert legal guidance and courtroom representation.
To know more visit: https://www.saini-law.com/
Sangyun Lee, 'Why Korea's Merger Control Occasionally Fails: A Public Choice ...Sangyun Lee
Presentation slides for a session held on June 4, 2024, at Kyoto University. This presentation is based on the presenter’s recent paper, coauthored with Hwang Lee, Professor, Korea University, with the same title, published in the Journal of Business Administration & Law, Volume 34, No. 2 (April 2024). The paper, written in Korean, is available at <https://shorturl.at/GCWcI>.
Sangyun Lee, 'Why Korea's Merger Control Occasionally Fails: A Public Choice ...
India: Prohibition of Anti-Competitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Position
1. B-1672013]
COMPETITION LAW REPORTS SEPTEMBER, 2013
Section B
Articles
India: Prohibition of Anti-Competitive Agreements
and Abuse of Dominant Position*
K K Sharma**
“Unlike the time when recall value of competition was associated only with
examinations or sports, the awareness about competition law has come a long way
when almost every other day CCI is in the news for reprimanding the erring
market players. Fines for anti-competitive conduct are huge as seen in cases such
as that of DLF and cement companies. Having completed a little over four years of
active enforcement and nearly ten years of advocacy, CCI has carved a niche for
itself. The author, Mr. K K Sharma, Chairman, KK Sharma Law Offices and
former Director General, CCI, having the rare privilege of both drafting and
implementing the law as well as being at the cutting edge by way of sculpting the
very first investigations and heading Merger Control and Anti-trust Divisions
looks back and sums up the four years of cartel enforcement in India in this article.“
49
After a long wait of nearly six years,
during which it was exclusively engaged
in competition advocacy duties under
Section 49 of the Competition Act, 2002
(the Act), the Competition Commission
of India (CCI) got enforcement powers
for prohibition of anti-competitive
agreements, cartels and abuse of
dominant cases on 20th
May, 2009.
Perhaps, as can be understood for any
new competition agency, it took some
time for the CCI to put the entire
investigating and secretarial machinery
in place for it to be in a position to carry
out its enforcement mandate effectively.
Although the flow of information (as the
complaints are called under the Act)
started coming in right in the first few
weeks of the enforcement powers being
* This article was first published in Competition Policy International, Inc. For more details
please visit Competition Policy International.com
** K K Sharma Law Offices & Ex-Director General, CCI. The author can be reached at
kksharma@kkslawoffices.com or kksharmairs@gmail.com.
2. Competition Law ReportsB-168 [Vol. 2
COMPETITION LAW REPORTS SEPTEMBER, 201350
expeditiously, and not much after the
cartelization was proved by DG, it would
have had the potential to be an admitted
cartel case with, maybe, a still higher fine
and a much stronger advocacy value.
When compared with Singapore,
wherein the first few cartel cases were
used to showcase the determination of
the authority, this may have been an
opportunity missed here by CCI.
In its very first case, after the enactment
of the Competition Act of 2004, the
Competition Commission of Singapore
(CCS) imposed a penalty totalling S
$262,759.66 on six pest control
companies.2
Interestingly, in this case,
none of the six parties objected to the
findings of CCS3
, nor did they appeal the
CCS’s order. In the same press release4
,
in which this infringement order was
announced, the CCS also showcased its
leniency program and induced the
members of the public as well as any
cartels to come forward with instances
of cartelization. During the course of
investigation, CCS ensured that this case
becomes that of an admitted cartel and
the parties investigated do not file
appeals against the order of CCS.
Similarly, if the very first case of
cartelization before the CCI was used to
gain visibility (the case had great
potential coming from the high visibility
entertainment sector) and credibility, by
making it an admitted cartel and
announcing the decision quickly, the
journey of the CCI towards being seen as
an effective and mature competition
agency could have been much quicker
as such actions give credibility and
confidence to any new competition
agency.
given to the CCI, and although the first
investigation reports from the Director
General began flowing in from
September, 2009 onwards, it took a while
for the CCI to start delivering its orders
restraining erring market players or
imposing penalties on them or their
associations. The reasons for this were
not far to seek. The CCI had to give an
opportunity of being heard to the
different parties involved. The Indian
lawyers, used to the judicial system in
India, had their own ways of asking for
inspections, copies of various documents
or adjournments on one excuse or
another which, effectively, meant a delay
in the proceedings. “Justice delayed is
justice denied” is not just a saying but a
vibrant reality in Indian sub-continent,
not just India. This is almost an article of
faith amongst some lawyers who,
perhaps, believe that howsoever weak
their defense may be, tomorrow may
develop some escape route.
On 25th
May, 2011, disposing off the very
first information before the CCI (Case No.
1 of 2009), the CCI agreed1
with the
findings of the Director General (DG) that
the United Producers and Distributors
Forum (UPDF) had indulged in
cartelizing conduct by way of not
supplying prints of the motion pictures
to multiplex theatres, but imposed a
token penalty of Indian rupees 100,000
(only about USD $1,667) each on the
cartelizing members. Some of the parties
still went in appeal before COMPAT. In
absence of any strong defence, agreeing
clearly with the categorical finding of DG
and still imposing a token fine-after
keeping the matter pending for nearly two
years-it is not very easy to understand. If
finalization of this matter had been done
1 http://www.cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/FICCIOrder260511.pdf
2 http://www.ccs.gov.sg/content/ccs/en/Public-Register-and-Consultation/Public-
Register/Anticompetitive-Agreements.detail.collusive_tenderingbid-
riggingfortermitetreatmentcontrolservices.html
3 Para 359 Ibid 3
4 http://www.ccs.gov.sg/content/ccs/en/Media-and-Publications/Media-Releases/
CCS-Fines-Pest-Control-Operators-for-Bid-Rigging.html
3. B-1692013]
COMPETITION LAW REPORTS SEPTEMBER, 2013 51
currency derivative segment from the
receipts being collected by an NSE from
its operations in the share market
segment. A further allegation of MCX-
SX against NSE was that NSE was merely
waiting for MCX-SX to fail before being
in a position to capture and exploit the
market. This tactic of predatory pricing
was used by NSE to ensure that the new
entrant into the market, MCX-SX, was
wiped out. It was a matter where the CCI
had a ready case of predatory pricing. It
may be mentioned that, across the
competition world, cases of predatory
pricing are extremely difficult to prove.
This is true for the reason that predatory
pricing requires intense economic
analysis which may not be easy for a new
competition agency in a developing
economy, as was the case with the CCI.
However, things were made easier by the
fact that the predatory price, in this case,
was not a finite price but a zero price.
Naturally, it made the task for the CCI
easier. The second factor that went in
favor of MCX-SX was that its net worth
was continually eroding and it was
public knowledge as to how long it could
survive. The complainant could bring out
forcefully before the CCI that it is,
financially, on a death bed and it is only
a matter of time before it is totally wiped
out from the market, and that the
predator exploits the market to its
advantage. Another factor that went
against the NSE was that although
originally treated as a promotional price,
zero pricing continued nearly
indefinitely on one pretext or the other
that were not fully explainable.
The order against the NSE set the pace of
the future course of action of the CCI to
come heavily against all anti-competitive
practices. This order, imposing a penalty
of INR 55.5 crores (about USD $9.25
million.), was followed by another
India: Prohibition of Anti-Competitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Position
The next order coming from the CCI
related to a trade association was Paper
Merchants Association of Delhi (PMAD)
in Vijay Paper Merchant5
case (Case No.
7 of 2010). Although no penalty was
levied on the PMAD, cognisance of the
anti-competitive clauses in the
constitution of the association was taken
and the PMAD was directed to modify
the constitution and report back to the
CCI. Even without imposing a penalty,
this was the first case taking cognisance
of anti-competitive clauses in the
constitution of a trade association. It is
important to note that, despite a lapse of
nearly four years of enforcement, the trade
association activities remain a big
headache for the CCI even today. Case
after case, the dubious role of the trade
associations keeps on surfacing in the
matters before the CCI. This also
indicates in India how rampant the old
business practices are, many times under
the guise of trade associations, which are
either instances of plain cartelization or
border on cartelization.
Thereafter, the next true first affirmative
order of the CCI imposing penalty on a
market participant was in the case of
National Stock Exchange (NSE) (Case
No. 13 of 2009). This was a complaint
from MCX Stock Exchange (MCX-SX)
against the NSE for not charging any
transaction fee for two long years despite
recurring costs for providing its services.
The allegation of MCX-SX was that the
NSE was cross subsidising its
operations in providing services for
Case after case, the dubious
role of the trade associations
keeps on surfacing in the
matters before the CCI
5 http://www.cci.gov.in/menu/OrderVijay150411.pdf
4. Competition Law ReportsB-170 [Vol. 2
COMPETITION LAW REPORTS SEPTEMBER, 2013
landmark order against realty major in
India, DLF Ltd.6
A massive penalty of
Indian Rs. 630 crores (about USD $105
million) was imposed on DLF for
abusing its dominant position. People
may keep debating as to whether it was
a consumer matter or a competition issue,
however it certainly marked the
beginning of an upbeat CCI confident of
passing similar orders in other cases of
infringements in a way to signal that it
would not take violations of competition
law lightly.
Another important case was that of LPG
Cylinder Manufacturers.7
It may be
interesting to note that the case was
brought against Public Sector Oil (PSU)
major, Indian Oil Corporation by a
manufacturer of LPG cylinder, Pakaj Gas
Cylinders, who was a member of LPG
Cylinder Manufacturers Association.
During the course of investigation by DG,
it was found that not only were the
allegations untrue, but the complainant
was a part of a cartel of LPG Cylinder
Manufacturers Association that was
consistently rigging bids of the tenders
floated by the oil processing companies.
The case against the Indian PSU
company was predictably turned down.
However, the CCI simultaneously took
cognizance, on its own, of the cartel of
LPG Cylinder Manufacturers
Association members who were
consistently submitting bids after the
pre-bid meetings amongst all the
members of the association. This
investigation resulted into very
interesting results. It was found that the
association was a hotbed of anti-
competitive conduct. Not only were they
indulging in anti-competitive practices
but they also had the gumption to
approach the CCI.
A look at the orders handed down by the
CCI in cases of anticompetitive
agreements, including cartels, or cases
of abuse of dominant position, shows a
trend that the CCI is not shying away
from the imposition of heavy fines just
because it happens to be a new
competition authority. In the case of DLF,
being held guilty of abuse of dominant
position within the relevant market of
Gurgaon, a suburb of Delhi in the
adjoining state of Haryana, the CCI
imposed a penalty of 7 percent of its
average turnover for the last three years.
This was a bold move if we compare the
evolution of competition law either in the
United States of America or the European
Union. Similarly, the CCI did not think
twice before imposing a fine of 10 percent
of turnover in the case of Cement
Manufacturers Association in the
cartelization by cement companies,
which is the maximum allowable fine
under Section 27 of the Act.
The CCI has also shown maturity in not
imposing multiple fines if a cause of
action has been addressed by its earlier
orders passed, in the case of same parties
against which information has been
received in the past. It happened in the
case of DLF Ltd. Around the same time,
when information against DLF was
received from Belair Owners Association
(which finally resulted in fine). A number
of additional information against DLF
Ltd. were received by the CCI against
various completed projects of DLF.
Several of this information was
forwarded to the DG for investigation.
The investigation reports from the DG
came at various stages but not spaced
too much apart from each other. It so
happened that multiple cases against
DLF were being heard before the CCI at
6 http://www.cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/DLFMainOrder110811.pdf
7 http://www.cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/LPGMainfeb2.pdf
52
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around the same time. The first of these
cases to be decided by the CCI was that
of Belair Owners Association. In this
case, as is widely known and mentioned
earlier in this writing, a penalty of
7 percent of the average turnover of last
three years, totalling to Rs 630 crores
(about USD $105 million) was imposed
on DLF Ltd. Thereafter, in the other
multiple cases against the DLF, the CCI
did pass “Cease and Desist” but
declined to impose any monetary
penalty. It was a very sagacious
approach signalling fairness.
Interestingly, when DLF filed an appeal
before COMPAT, the CCI was directed
by COMPAT to not just find fault with
the buyer builder agreement, which was
found to have lacunae in the case of DLF,
but also give an alternative model of a
similar agreement which would not
violate the provisions of the competition
law and, by implication, act as a model
agreement between a buyer and a
builder. Undoubtedly it was a positive
step forward. In response to the direction
of COMPAT, the CCI did draft a model
agreement which would be appropriate
for the builder and the buyer to enter into.
This agreement, available on the website
of the CCI, was passed in the form of a
supplementary order8
to the order of
DLF, a modification to the original order.
It is a very positive development.
Interestingly, it is around this time that
on account of various pressures, the
Government of India is also seriously
considering bringing about a regulator
for the housing and building sector.
When that becomes a reality may not be
known, but the order of the CCI has done
an excellent job of focussing the spotlight
on the unequal relationship between a
buyer and seller of residential
accommodation.
One of the cases decided by the CCI
stands out for understanding its
approach while dealing with different
types of business segments. This is Case
5 of 2011.9
A blatant case of collusive
bidding was referred to the CCI by South
Eastern Railways in which all the
bidders tendered identical price down
to the second decimal digit. DG
confirmed the prima facie opinion of
collusive bidding of the CCI. The CCI
passed a cease and desist order but did
not impose any penalty, stating that all
the parties being micro and small scale
industries having low awareness of
competition law. For a comparison, in
its second case of cartelisation by 16
coach operators and their association10
,
the Competition Commission of
Singapore noted “ignorance or a mistake
of the law is no bar to a finding of intentional
infringement under the [Competition] Act.”
This is an important indication of the
approach of the CCI keeping in mind that
since 2003 the CCI has been doing high
decibel competition law advocacy in
India.
When we look at the landscape of the
cases decided by the CCI, one thing is
certain: in a short span of about three
years, the CCI has been able to touch
nearly all sectors of the economy-be it
pharmaceuticals, really, entertainment,
software, advertisement, finance
8 h t t p : / / w w w . c c i . g o v . i n / M a y 2 0 1 1 / O r d e r O f C o m m i s s i o n / 1 9 2 0 1 0 S . p d f ;
http://www.cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/DLFMainOrder110811.pdf
9 http://www.cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/REF-052011.pdf
10 http://www.ccs.gov.sg/content/ccs/en/Public-Register-and-Consultation/Public-
Register/Anti-competitive-Agreements.detail.price_fixing_of_coachbusservicesfortravelling
betweensingaporeand.html
India: Prohibition of Anti-Competitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Position
53
6. Competition Law ReportsB-172 [Vol. 2
COMPETITION LAW REPORTS SEPTEMBER, 2013
companies, stock exchanges, and basic
commodities such as onions, sugar, et
cetera. Luckily, the orders of the
COMPAT have been of help in
establishing the rule of enforcement of
competition law in India. In a good
number of cases, the orders of the CCI
have been confirmed by COMPAT, such
as the case of cartelization brought by
Coal India Ltd. before the CCI, in which
penalty imposed by the CCI has been
confirmed by COMPAT11
with some
modifications. In a number of cases,
although the quantum of penalty has
been reduced the basic allegation has
been upheld. The confirmed cases
include a good number of cartel cases
including those relating to the travel
agents association, and many others.
As already mentioned in this article, in
the case of cement companies, COMPAT
has insisted on payment of at least 10
percent of the penalty amount imposed
by CCI on the cement companies
involved. Despite having travelled up to
the Supreme Court, the finding of the
COMPAT has been upheld. This is a big
victory for the competition law and a big
setback for cartelization tendencies.
Unfortunately, the Courts of the sub-
continent are notoriously slow and it is
jocularly remarked, though based on
stark facts,that the pending workload
before the judiciary, in any Court in the
sub-continent, is so much that it cannot
be completed in this lifetime of the
concerned judge. With the situation
being so serious, it is indeed heartening
to note that the resolution of appeals filed
before the Supreme Court by cement
companies against the order of COMPAT
was quickly disposed of. This has given
a very clear signal to all and sundry
across the country that no violations of
competition law would be taken lightly.
Thus, on the basis of the performance of
the CCI, COMPAT and Supreme Court,
it can be said that, irrespective of
differing opinions on matters of detail,
what is clear is that competition law is
here to stay. Other than cement
companies, there are pending cases
before COMPAT where COMPAT is
insisting on payment of not just 10
percent of the total penalty imposed by
the CCI but, in some cases, as high as 25
percent of the penalty imposed by CCI,
before taking up appeals. All this augurs
well for the establishment of competition
law in India.
This is a far cry from the time when cases
of cartelization used to come before
MRTPC Act but could not be resolved on
account of lack of proper provisions in
the then applicable law, MRTPC Act,
1969 and an absence of a clear definition
of the word “cartel.” In some cases,
because of this, unfortunately, despite
having held that cartel conduct was
there, no penalties could be imposed. In
the present dispensation, not only are the
cases being disposed of quickly by
11 http://compat.nic.in/upload/PDFs/aprilordersApp2013/18_04_13.pdf
In a good number of cases,
the orders of the CCI have
been confirmed by
COMPAT, such as the case
of cartelization brought by
Coal India Ltd. before the
CCI, in which penalty
imposed by the CCI has been
confirmed by COMPAT
with some modifications
54
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COMPETITION LAW REPORTS SEPTEMBER, 2013
COMPAT, but the parties are required to
pay at least part of the fines imposed by
the CCI before their appeals can be heard.
This is not a part of law anywhere.
However, these are the practices being
developed by COMPAT.
well drafted or not, and the effectiveness
of the competition agency in pinning
down the anti-competitive conduct. In
view of this, not a single application of
leniency coming to the CCI indicates
some gaps in the leniency program, or
the fact that a full fear of enforcement has
not yet percolated down to the persons
indulging in anti-competitive conduct.
Some attribute it to the lack of certainly,
for the person coming forward to avail
the leniency, of waiver from fines
because of the use of the word “may”
and not a more definitive “shall” in the
operative part of the Regulations12
(clause 4(a) of the Regulations), which
detail as to how much waiver can be
expected by the leniency seeker. There is
a view that the fear among cartel
members in exercise of the CCI’s
discretion is keeping them away from the
CCI. It may or may not be true. However,
if a more definitive and less discretionary
language is used in the leniency
regulations, it certainly would inspire
more confidence in the cartel members
coming forward to the CCI to spill the
beans about cartelization activities. It
may improve the effectiveness of the
agency if leniency Regulations are
amended suitably. However, the agency
has acquitted itself quite well in its
functioning against anti-trust
enforcement. There is always a hope that
tomorrow would be a better day.
As is generally believed, the
success of any leniency
program depends on the
quality of leniency programs,
as to whether it is well
drafted or not, and the
effectiveness of the
competition agency in
pinning down the anti-
competitive conduct
When discussing the enforcement of
prohibition of anti-competitive
agreements and abuse of dominant
position by the CCI, we cannot be
oblivious to the fact that despite leniency
Regulations of the CCI being in place for
nearly three years, not a single serious
application has been filed before the CCI
for leniency. This is slightly unusual. As
is generally believed, the success of any
leniency program depends on the quality
of leniency programs, as to whether it is
India: Prohibition of Anti-Competitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Position
55
12 http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/Regulations/regu_lesser.pdf?phpMyAdmin=
NMPFRahGKYeum5F74Ppstn7Rf00