The document discusses the concept of ijtihad in Islamic law, the debate around whether the "gate of ijtihad" was closed, and the relevance of ijtihad today. It explains that ijtihad allowed qualified jurists to give rulings where the Quran and Hadith were silent, but some argue this practice closed in the 10th century. However, others believe ijtihad was still needed or that the gate was never truly closed. The document argues ijtihad remains important today, as some countries have relied on it to reform laws to address modern issues not covered in early Islamic texts.

1. 2017
Discuss the concept of Ijtihād in Islamic law and the juristic debate about the
closure of the gate of Ijtihād, explaining the relevance and application of
Ijtihād in modern times.
2020 / Q1
Discuss the debatesabout the “closingof the gate of Ijtihad” and whetheror not there isa
compellingneedforthe continuedapplicationof Ijtihad incontemporary times.
2019 / Q2
“There is a strong opinion in classical Islamic law, which is contested in modern Islamic legal
scholarship, that by the 10th century all main principles of Islamic law had been completely
settled by the great scholars and therefore ‘the gate of Ijtihad’ had been closed.”
Discuss.
This question requires us to discuss conceptof Ijtihad and juristic debate
regarding concept of closureof gate of Ijtihad and then understanding its
relevance in modern times. To answer this question we will firstunderstand the
concept of Ijtihad and then will to juristic debate and then will try to analyze it. In
the last partof our essay wewill discuss relevanceof Ijtihad in modern era.
Concept of Ijtihad
Within the realm of usulal-fiqh but outside Shafi’i's hierarchy of the main sources
of law, falls another sourceknown as “Ijtihad”. During theearly
period, ijtihad referred to the exercise of one's discretionary opinion (ra'y) on the
basis of the knowledgeof the precedent (‘ilm).[5]
Jurists used ra'y to help reach
legal rulings, in cases wherethe Qur'an and Sunna did not provideclear direction
for certain decisions. Itwas the duty of the educated jurists to come to a ruling
that would be in the best interest of the Muslimcommunity and promotethe
public good.
As religious law continued to develop over time, ra'y became insufficient in
making sure that fair legal rulings werebeing derived in keeping with both
the Qur'an and Sunna. However, during this time, the meaning and process
of ijtihad became more clearly constructed. Ijtihad was “limited to a systematic
method of interpreting the law on the basis of authoritative texts, the Quran and
Sunna,” and the rulings could be “extended to a new problem as long as the
precedent and the new situation shared the sameclause.”

2. As stated above that Ijtihad can be used whenever Quran and Sunnah do not
cover particular issue. However there is some restrictions in application and usage
of the Ijtihad. There is no ijtihad within an explicit rule in the texts (la ijtihaada
ma’ al-nass).Itmeans Ijtihad can not be applied where a text is so clear and can
not be given two meaning. For instance, consider the phrase“cutoff their hands”
(5:38). While“to cut off” has a simple meaning, the term “hand” (yad) is unclear
and incorporates the region fromthe elbow to the fingers, and is it the left hand
or righthand, and so on. There may be additional linked questions to this
command about the thief and about the value of the property stolen. These
questions are firstanswered on the basis of the texts themselves, that is, through
the Quran and Sunnah. If a meaning is given in these texts, it becomes the legal
meaning and is to be followed, irrespectiveof its conformity with the literal
meaning of the word. When no explanation is available, the juristlooks for literal
meanings and uses his own reasoning and judgmentto arriveat the appropriate
answer.
Jurist debate over closure of gate of Ijtihadand relevance of Ijtihadin modern
times
The question whether or not ijtihad can still be performed now is controversial.
There is a strong opinion in classical SunniIslamic law, which is contested in
modern Islamic legal scholarship, thatby the 10th century all main principles of
Islamic law had been completely settled by the great scholars and therefore ‘the
gates of ijtihad’ had been closed allowing for taqlid (the established legal
precedents and traditions) to take priority over ijtihād. This move away fromthe
practice of ijtihād was made by the Hanafī and Malikī law schools, and the
majority of Shafīʿis, but not by Hanbalīs or a number of prominentShafīʿi jurists
who believed that "true consensus ijma apartfromthat of Muhammad's
Companions, did not exist" and that "the constantcontinuous existence
of mujtahids was a theological requirement."[13]
After the 11th century, Sunni
legal theory developed systems for ranking jurists according to their qualifications
for ijtihad. One such ranking placed the founders of maddhabs, who were
credited with being "absolutemujtahids" (mujtahid muṭlaq) capable of
methodological innovation, at the top, and jurists capable only of taqlīd at the
bottom, with mujtahids and those who combined ijtihād and taqlīd given the
middle ranks.[Note 1]
In the11th century, jurists required a mufti (jurisconsult) to be
a mujtahid; by the middle of the 13th century, however, mostscholars considered

3. a muqallid (practitioner of taqlīd) to be qualified for the role. During that era
some jurists began to ponder whether practitioners of ijtihad continued to exist
and the phrase"closing of the gate of ijtihād" appeared after the 16th century.
Shi’ah jurisprudencedid not accept the concept of the ‘closing of the gates of
ijtihad’. For the Shi’ah, the hidden Imam(the 12th Imamof the Shi’ah, who was
subsumed in the mosqueof Samara near Baghdad) has always been a sourceof
reinterpretation of existing concepts and even of fundamental changes. But, as a
matter of fact, Shi’ah jurisprudence, likethat of the Sunni, entered into a period
of stagnation around the 10th century. Therefore Someauthors are of the opinion
that gates of Ijtihad haveclosed, while others state that they never closed.
Yet there are others who fall in between the spectrum The firstgroup argues that
there was an ijma by which the gates to ijtihad were closed to prevent every
other person fromexercising ijtihad and to follow their own personalized version
of Islam. Ostrorog belongs to this group but mentions how this closure caused the
suppression of the development of Islamic law. The process of closurehas been in
an orderly manner with initially ijtihad being permissiblein minor matters which,
when settled, the gates were sealed (Gibbs). This resulted in the outcome that
what has been established in the four schools i.e. Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and
Hanbali, is the final word and there can be no change or ruling that falls outside
these four schools. As Brown explains, Islambecame fossilized.
However, the second group which includes academics like Hallaq. reject both the
notions of closureor narrowing of the gates of ijtihad. Hallaq argues that ijtihad,
being an integral partof Islamic legal theory was of principal importance in
determining judicial judgments. In fact, he goes on to state that jurists who
opposed exercise of ijtihad were ostracized fromSunnisect. He bases his
argument on the Zahiree schoolof jurisprudence(now extinct) which rejected
qiyas as well as ijtihad. As a result, this schoolwas excluded from the
jurisprudentiallimits defining Sunnism. Hallaq also regards ijtihad as a religious
duty and maintains that it can only end when jurists qualified to performijtihad
either refuseto performit or there do not exist any mujtahids.
The third group which falls within these two extremes havea different outlook on
the matter. Farukiwrites an accountwhereby mufti Mohammad Shafielaborated
when ijtihad can be used in modern times. These, according to him are

4. contemporary issues on which ijma has not yet reached. This seems to be in line
with the Islamic juristShawkaniwho states that there was never an agreement
with the Hanbalis arguing that the gates of ijtihad can never be closed.Scholars
like Allama Iqbalhad argued that the exercise of ijtihad was not only the right, but
also the duty, of present generations if Islamwas to adapt itself successfully to
the modern world (Coulson).
By relying on the belief of modern scholars many countries havecarried out law
reforms to meet modern legal challenges. The firstsuch kind of reliance on Ijtihad
was seen in the Egyptian Law of Testamentary Dispositions of 1946. This
interpreted (Verse180 of Surah 2 of the Quran) which compels a muslim that he
should declare his nearest kinsmen as heir of the property. However Sunnijurists
believes that this versewas abrogated when latter versewas revealed in same
surah which had set certain sharefor certain heirs. However someJurists believe
that abrogation only applies to thoseheirs who are particularly mentioned in the
Quran. The Egyptian reformers adopted this view and then exercised ijtihad to
designate orphaned grandchildren as the only heirs entitled to such an obligatory
bequest.
Another example of application of Ijtihad to reformthe law was given by the
Tunisian reformers when prohibiting polygyny. Thememorandumaccompanying
the Tunisian Law of PersonalStatus of 1956 states that the juristic basis for the
reformwas the Qur’an itself. Surah 4 verse3 of the Qur’an provides thata man
may marry polygynouslyonly wherehe is able to deal equally with severalwives.
Verse129 of the same surah, however, states that however “hard a man tries he
will never be able to treat severalwives equally”. Interpretation of these
apparently contradictory verses in traditional jurisprudencewas that, as long as
the man dealt equally with his wives in practical matters such as maintenance,
housing and spending time equally between them, he had fulfilled all the
obligations imposed upon him. The traditional jurisprudenceinterpretation of this
versewas that as long as the man would deal with his wives equally in practical
matters such as housing or spending equal time with them, he will fulfill his
obligations .The Tunisian lawmakers rejected this interpretation and adopted the
interpretation advanced by the 19th century Egyptian jurist, Muhammad Abduh,
that the two verses read together amounted to a prohibition of polygyny because
practically a man would never be able to give equal treatment to all his wives and
that is why the banned polygyny. Another interesting use of judicial ijtihad was
the judgmentof Mr Justice Rabbani in Md Hefzur Rahman v Shamsun Nahar

5. Begum. In this judgment, the learned judge re-interpreted the Qur’anic verses to
mean that a woman was entitled to receive maintenance as long as she remained
a divorcee (i.e. until she re-married). The traditional interpretation is that
following divorce a woman will receive maintenance only while she is observing
the iddah. In KHURSHID BIBI V MUHAMMED AMIN, theSupremeCourtof
Pakistan gave a new interpretation of the verseon khul’ which effectively gave
the courtthe right to granta judicial khul’.