1. The court held that those with §7100 rights and close family/friends aware of funeral services could sue. 2. The mortuary owed a duty of care to handle remains with dignity to these plaintiffs. 3. The media exposure of the mishandling was the actual and proximate cause of emotional distress.

1. David Aicholtz
Full Case Brief
Legal Research and Writing
04/17/2013
R. Biering, Instructor
CASE NAME AND CITATION
Christensen v. Superior Court 54 Cal. 3d 868
APPELLANT
Donald Paul Christensen also original Plaintiff
APPELLEE
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Pasadena Crematorium of Altadena Also original
Defendant.
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
The mortuaries and crematoria removed gold from decedent’s teeth and sold body parts
to companies for commercial distribution after which the remains were cremated and placed in
55 gallon drums and then distributed to families who had entrusted the crematoria with the
cremation of their family members. The conduct of the mortuaries and crematoria was
discovered and made public through media reports. Several thousand family members brought

2. suit alleging emotional distress resulting from the mistreatment of their decedent’s remains.
Before the matter could proceed to trial, however, the court had to resolve the question of which,
if not all, plaintiffs could sue.
TRIAL COURT DECISION
The Superior Court ruled that only Cal. H&S §7100 rights holders and those under
contract with the mortuaries and crematoria could assert claims.
LOWER APPELLATE COURT DECISION
Through a confused decision that the mishandling of human remains and intentional
infliction of emotional distress were the same thing, the court amended the lower courts findings
to include all family members and close friends of the decedents and bereaved families.
FINAL DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
The Supreme Court modified and remanded to the trial court, to include §7100 rights
holders and those close family members and close friends who were aware of the
funeral/cremation services being performed and on whose behalf or benefit those services were
being rendered.
ISSUES OF LAW
1. Whether or not close friends, family members and §7100 rights holders all have
standing to bring suit.
2. Whether or not the defendants owed a duty to plaintiffs.

3. 3. Whether or not the investigation and public exposure by the media was the actual and
proximate cause in the action.
4. Which causes of action may be pursued against defendants.
HOLDINGS OF THE CASE
1. The court held that §7100 rights holders and those close family members not included
in §7100 that were aware of the services to be performed and were owed a duty by the defendant
were able to assert claims.
2. (a)The mortuary and crematorium owed a duty of care to the decedents families and
§7100 rights holders to handle the remains with dignity, respect and confidentiality, as
established in Cal. H&S §8115
(b) a foreseeable injury due to the negligence per se in (a) due to the intentional
mishandling of decedents remains should be evidently known to cause emotional distress to
those who had a duty owed them by a violation of Cal. Evidence code §669 and Cal.C.C.§1714
3. The actual and proximate cause of the initial cause of action upon which this case is
based is the media exposure (proximate cause) of an independent media investigation which was
made public and to which alerted the families of decedents whose remains had been handled by
defendants of the crimes committed by defendants against those remains and the negligence of
defendants in the handling of said remains against the wishes of the families (actual cause.)
4. The causes of action which may be pursued by the classes of plaintiffs allowed by the
Supreme Court’s ruling would be negligent infliction of emotional distress based upon the

4. intentional mishandling of the remains under Ev. §669 and H&S §7100 as well as breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, deceit, negligent misrepresentation and unfair
business practices. IIED was not allowed due to the negligence by defendants not being in the
presence of any of said plaintiffs nor was defendants conduct aimed directly at any of said
plaintiffs.
LIST OF KEY LEGAL AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE COURT IN ITS DECISION
Cal. Evid. §669, Cal. H&S §§7100, 7051, 7052, 7054.7, 7055, 7150, 7150.5.
Cal. Rules of Court §1541(a)(4) Cal. Civ. Proc. §§404.1, 1086.
Cal. B&PC §§7615, 7616 Cal. Civ. Code §§1427, 1428, 1714
Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644
Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728
Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112
SUMMARY OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
1. Class of plaintiffs allowed is those §7100 rights holders and those close family
members and close friends who were aware of the funeral/cremation services being performed
and on whose behalf or benefit those services were being rendered.
2. Duty owed by Mortuary and crematorium is to those §7100 rights holders and those
close family members and close friends who were aware of the funeral/cremation services being
performed and on whose behalf or benefit those services were being rendered.

5. 2.1. Using the Rowland Factors as listed below;
a. foreseeability of harm to injured party
b. degree of certainty party suffered injury
c. closeness of connection between defendant’s conduct and the injuries suffered
d. moral blame attached to defendants conduct
f. policy of preventing future harm
2.2. the duty owed by Bio supply firm is only to §7100 rights holders and if, under the
circumstances Bio had foreseen the unlawful conduct of defendant crematorium then its conduct
might be held to be negligence per se.
3. breach of duty based on the duty owed under §§ 1714, 8115
4.(a) the defendants had foreseeability of injury through their intentional mishandling of
decedents remains placed in their care for proper disposal under §8115
(b) foreseeability was established upon public media exposure of defendants mishandling
of decedents remains as without any media exposure the violations committed by defendants
may have never come to light.
5. causes of action plaintiffs may pursue
a. negligence based on §1714 and failure to exercise reasonable care as established under
§8115.

6. b. breach of duty as defined by §8115
5.1 causes of action not supported
a. negligence on behalf of Bio company as it did not assume any duty related to the
delivery of funeral related services.
b. negligent infliction of emotional distress against Bio company to anyone but §7100
rights holders.
c. negligence per se against Bio company due to lack of foreseeability of the
wrongdoings of other defendants.
d. intentional infliction of emotional distress (discussed in detail below)
5.2 IIED not established
The court declined the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
stating that though the actions of the defendants was extreme and outrageous that in itself was
insufficient to establish the claim as the conduct was not specifically aimed at the plaintiffs and
no plaintiffs actually witnessed any of the defendants alleged wrongdoings.
SUMMARY OF CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CONCURRING OPINIONS
MOSK: agrees that those close family members who were aware of both
decedents death and the nature of the funeral services to be performed and §7100 rights holders,

7. also agrees that the basis which plaintiffs have asserted for negligent intention of emotional
distress is valid.
KENNARD: agrees with majority that complaint at issue does not support a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that §7100 rights holders have
established a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
DISSENTING OPINIONS
MOSK: disagrees with majority in that the claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress was denied because the admittedly outrageous conduct was not aimed at
plaintiffs nor did they witness it but asserts that the conduct being as reprehensible as it was
should render the perpetrators accountable to a greater rather than lesser extent. Mosk believes
that if IIED has been established then the scope of claimants should be expanded to include
anyone who could show a close relationship with decedent.
KENNARD: disagrees with the court asserting that the proximate cause rules
applied by the court are too strict and should be more openly interpreted as meaning that only a
“reasonable” foreseeability is needed to establish negligence. Holds that only §7100 rights
holders and those immediate family members who observed the mishandling or the direct
consequences thereof.