1
John Barry
Professor Harris
POL 100
31 March 2014
How the Shrinking World Led to America’s Aggressive Foreign Policy
The topic of American exceptionalism is highly contentious in the current political
landscape. The belief that the United States possesses some intangible quality that makes it
different from, and better than, other nations conjures up the worst notions of overzealous
patriotism bordering on arrogance amongst those on the left (Liu 31). However, despite the
debate regarding the validity of American exceptionalism on a macro scale, there is little doubt
that American foreign policy is fundamentally different from that of other nations. In order to
parse out the reason for this departure from the global status quo, one needs to simply look at
what is objectively different about the United States when compared to nations like the United
Kingdom and Japan. A cursory glance at a map provides the answer; the United States has
greatly benefited from its geographic isolation. Our only two neighbors, Canada and Mexico,
are not threats to our national security. Any nation who would wish us ill-will is separated from
us by an ocean. It is no coincidence that there has not been a foreign invasion of the United
States since the War of 1812. Our isolation has provided both safety and a buffer which has
allowed our foreign policy to develop in a different way from that of other nations. However,
due to the process of globalization and technological advancements in war, most notably the
development of nuclear weapons, our geographic isolation is becoming much less significant.
While our geographic isolation shaped our isolationist foreign policy prior to World War II, the
2
development of threats which transcend our geographic advantages has led to the recent focus on
homeland security.
In his argument, Paul Miller states that “For more than seventy years, U.S. policy-makers
have equated Europe’s security with that of the United States”. This new line of thought is a
massive departure from the founding principles of the nation. Immediately upon winning
independence, the United States made a concerted effort to seclude itself from world affairs.
Despite the newborn nation’s adversarial relationship with Great Britain and wartime alliance
with France, it established a firm precedent by refusing to aid France in its Napoleonic Wars
against the British. While the geographic isolation of the United States afforded it a large degree
of security, war was still possible if it provoked Britain or France. Thus, America’s foreign
policy evolved out of this defensive mindset. When the United Stated did venture into the arena
of foreign policy, perhaps most famously with the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine, it was to
stress that we would defend our interests and ourselves. It also served to create a further
separation between the Western world and Europe. This choice was a luxury that European
nations could not share due to their geographic proximity to potential rivals. In their case,
provocation was not a prerequisite for invasion, as was most clearly displayed in the two World
Wars. The fundamental differences between American and European foreign policy had begun
to crystalize.
The United States began to move away from its anti-interventionist stance in 1917 with
its entry into World War I. However, this was not a permanent shift. After the conclusion of the
war, the United States again withdrew from European affairs, as evidenced by its refusal to join
the League of Nations. In addition, active-duty military personnel immediately dropped to pre-
war levels upon the end of hostilities (Hudson 312). Clearly, maintaining European security was
3
still far from a major concern for American policy makers. America again displayed its
reluctance to intervene in European affairs during the early stages of World War II. Two years
passed between Hitler’s invasion of neighboring nations and American involvement in the war.
Indeed, it was not until the attack on Pearl Harbor that the United States mobilized troops.
However, the United States experienced a clear shift in its foreign outlook following the
conclusion of the war. I believe that this is mainly due to the successful deployment of an
atomic bomb and the uncertainty it spawned when in the hands of other nations. When viewing
American foreign policy through the lens of geography, this is undoubtedly the most important
event in the shifting dynamics of said policy. Our geographic isolation had always served as a
defensive buffer against attack from a foreign nation. With the development of nuclear weapons
came the possibility of a devastating attack against which even the isolated United States would
not be able to defend itself.
On the other hand, European nations had existed for years under the constant threat of a
damaging attack from a neighboring state. For Americans, this was an entirely new
phenomenon. This newfound anxiety led to the evolution of American foreign policy into what
it is today. The shift in policy was immediate. For the first time in our nation’s history, the
United States maintained a large standing army in non-war time (Hudson 313). In addition, it
greatly increased its ties with foreign nations both militarily and diplomatically through the
formation of NATO and the United Nations. The September 11 terrorist attacks elevated this
uncertainty to a new level. In response, the United States again raised its military budget to
levels surpassing any period of the Cold War (Hudson 317). In essence, the United States’ new
foreign policy is born out of fear. Constant, low-level threats to national security are inextricably
linked to the histories of most nations. America had historically been spared due to its
4
geographic position. However, for the first time, the United States is experiencing that unease.
That is why the “one percent doctrine” is so appealing to many people (Zenko and Cohen 573).
The possibility of foreign attacks is a relatively new phenomenon which is terrifying to most
Americans. Thus, the United States adopted a more interventionist policy in order to regain
some of the security that it lost after globalization partially erased its geographic advantage.
However, even though the United States is now much more involved in international
affairs, it is still unique in how it enacts its policy. This is mostly due to the sheer size of its
military. The United States defense budget is larger than the next 14 countries’ defense budgets
combined (Zenko and Cohen 573). As such, the United States always has the option of
unilateralism. Even when it does cooperate, it often takes on a leadership role. Its role as an
objective leader of the West is further strengthened by its geographic position, as it has a
metaphorical bird’s eye view of developments in Eurasia. This new dynamic is very evident in
the current crisis in Ukraine. President Obama recently travelled to Europe to speak with NATO
leaders regarding the Russian annexation of Crimea (“US to commit more forces to NATO
efforts”). He pledged to send more American troops to Eastern Europe in response, and
implored the other NATO nations to do the same. The difference between the response of the
United States to Vladimir Putin’s recent actions and its response to the similar early aggression
of Hitler is stark. The United States did not take on a central role in the fight against the Axis
until its homeland was attacked. Now, they are supplying troops and taking on a leadership role
in a conflict which has almost no possibility of touching American soil. When the threats which
emerged from technological advances led the United States to break free from its geographic
bubble, it took its place at the symbolic head of the Western world.
5
While historical evidence seems to support the notion that the United States adopted a
more interventionist foreign policy upon the development of threats which geographic isolation
did not entirely defend from, it is difficult to quantify the underlying mechanisms through which
this occurred. While technically accurate, simply stating that the United States operates under a
different foreign policy than other nations due to its remote location is not very descriptive.
Fortunately, “Distance and Foreign Policy: A Political Geography Approach” by Alan K.
Henrikson is extremely helpful in this area. In the article, Henrikson attempts to establish three
forms of non-physical distance which can coexist with physical distance when analyzing the
relationship between countries. First, he acknowledges the undeniable role of physical distance
in foreign policy. He claims that distance obscures understanding between nations, quoting a
Supreme Court decision which refers to “this vast external realm”. It is this lack of
understanding which leads to different outlooks in foreign and domestic policy. No matter how
far globalization proceeds, the United States will never be able to overcome these shortcomings
born of physical distance, which helps explain the persistent unique quality of American foreign
policy when compared to other nations. However, he then begins to explain his new theoretical
and dynamic “distances”. The first of these new forms of distance is “gravitational distance”.
This relates Isaac Newton’s Theory of Gravitation to international influence. The closer a nation
is to another, the more influence it can exert over that nation. In addition, the larger the nation,
the more influence it yields. Obviously, physical distance remains a static variable. However, as
intuitive as it may seem, the second part of this model provides a firm mechanism to explain the
increased expenditures on national defense since the end of World War II. The principle way to
bolster our national security in the face of new threats was to gain an increased amount of
influence on foreign nations. Since the United States could not control how far it was from other
6
nations, it changed the one variable it could control: its size. This is part of the reason why
expenditures on national defense have skyrocketed. The second new form of distance is the
“topological model”. This states that the amount of nations in between countries is just as
important as the literal distance between them in establishing how “close” they are. This model
explains the existence of buffer states, as friendly neighbor states are very beneficial to national
security. This helps explain the United States’ historically isolationist tendencies, as it is only
bordered by two states which have rarely been openly hostile. The third model is called
“attributional distance”, which states that countries can develop strong relations if they share
cultural values, despite the distance between them. This is the key way in which America’s
geographic position is less important now to its foreign policy than it was in the past. Through
organizations like the United Nations and the general process of globalization, the United States
is becoming more culturally similar to other nations. This allowed for the formation of the strong
alliances which the Unites States craved during the uncertain periods during the Cold War and
post 9/11. Through the application of these three new models of distance, the ways in which
American foreign policy has changed despite its static geographic position can be more easily
understood.
Zenko and Cohen present an excellent argument for why America is safer now than it
has been in decades. However, until we become as accustomed to the notion of a constant low
level threat as foreign nations are, American leaders will never adopt the 99% doctrine.
America’s geographic isolation largely sheltered it from many of the dangers of the world. Now
that technology has torn that defense down, the United States has a foreign policy more dictated
by fear than other nations. This difference between the 99% doctrine and 1% doctrine is now
7
primarily what differentiates the foreign policy of the United States from other nations, and it is
born of its geographic position and history.
On my honor, I have neither given nor received any unacknowledged aid on this paper.
Works Cited
Canon, David T., John J. Coleman, and Kenneth R. Mayer. The Enduring Debate: Classic and
Contemporary Readings in American Politics. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2014. Print.
Henrikson, A. K. "Distance and Foreign Policy: A Political Geography Approach." International
Political Science Review 23.4 (2002): 437-66. JSTOR. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.
Hudson, William E. American Democracy in Peril: Eight Challenges to America's Future. Los
Angeles: CQ, 2013. Print.
Press, Associated. "US to Commit More Forces to NATO Efforts." Washington Post. The
Washington Post, 26 Mar. 2014. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/obama-right-to-self-determination-
being-tested/2014/03/26/47a08f22-b50d-11e3-bab2-b9602293021d_story.html>.

foreign policy

  • 1.
    1 John Barry Professor Harris POL100 31 March 2014 How the Shrinking World Led to America’s Aggressive Foreign Policy The topic of American exceptionalism is highly contentious in the current political landscape. The belief that the United States possesses some intangible quality that makes it different from, and better than, other nations conjures up the worst notions of overzealous patriotism bordering on arrogance amongst those on the left (Liu 31). However, despite the debate regarding the validity of American exceptionalism on a macro scale, there is little doubt that American foreign policy is fundamentally different from that of other nations. In order to parse out the reason for this departure from the global status quo, one needs to simply look at what is objectively different about the United States when compared to nations like the United Kingdom and Japan. A cursory glance at a map provides the answer; the United States has greatly benefited from its geographic isolation. Our only two neighbors, Canada and Mexico, are not threats to our national security. Any nation who would wish us ill-will is separated from us by an ocean. It is no coincidence that there has not been a foreign invasion of the United States since the War of 1812. Our isolation has provided both safety and a buffer which has allowed our foreign policy to develop in a different way from that of other nations. However, due to the process of globalization and technological advancements in war, most notably the development of nuclear weapons, our geographic isolation is becoming much less significant. While our geographic isolation shaped our isolationist foreign policy prior to World War II, the
  • 2.
    2 development of threatswhich transcend our geographic advantages has led to the recent focus on homeland security. In his argument, Paul Miller states that “For more than seventy years, U.S. policy-makers have equated Europe’s security with that of the United States”. This new line of thought is a massive departure from the founding principles of the nation. Immediately upon winning independence, the United States made a concerted effort to seclude itself from world affairs. Despite the newborn nation’s adversarial relationship with Great Britain and wartime alliance with France, it established a firm precedent by refusing to aid France in its Napoleonic Wars against the British. While the geographic isolation of the United States afforded it a large degree of security, war was still possible if it provoked Britain or France. Thus, America’s foreign policy evolved out of this defensive mindset. When the United Stated did venture into the arena of foreign policy, perhaps most famously with the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine, it was to stress that we would defend our interests and ourselves. It also served to create a further separation between the Western world and Europe. This choice was a luxury that European nations could not share due to their geographic proximity to potential rivals. In their case, provocation was not a prerequisite for invasion, as was most clearly displayed in the two World Wars. The fundamental differences between American and European foreign policy had begun to crystalize. The United States began to move away from its anti-interventionist stance in 1917 with its entry into World War I. However, this was not a permanent shift. After the conclusion of the war, the United States again withdrew from European affairs, as evidenced by its refusal to join the League of Nations. In addition, active-duty military personnel immediately dropped to pre- war levels upon the end of hostilities (Hudson 312). Clearly, maintaining European security was
  • 3.
    3 still far froma major concern for American policy makers. America again displayed its reluctance to intervene in European affairs during the early stages of World War II. Two years passed between Hitler’s invasion of neighboring nations and American involvement in the war. Indeed, it was not until the attack on Pearl Harbor that the United States mobilized troops. However, the United States experienced a clear shift in its foreign outlook following the conclusion of the war. I believe that this is mainly due to the successful deployment of an atomic bomb and the uncertainty it spawned when in the hands of other nations. When viewing American foreign policy through the lens of geography, this is undoubtedly the most important event in the shifting dynamics of said policy. Our geographic isolation had always served as a defensive buffer against attack from a foreign nation. With the development of nuclear weapons came the possibility of a devastating attack against which even the isolated United States would not be able to defend itself. On the other hand, European nations had existed for years under the constant threat of a damaging attack from a neighboring state. For Americans, this was an entirely new phenomenon. This newfound anxiety led to the evolution of American foreign policy into what it is today. The shift in policy was immediate. For the first time in our nation’s history, the United States maintained a large standing army in non-war time (Hudson 313). In addition, it greatly increased its ties with foreign nations both militarily and diplomatically through the formation of NATO and the United Nations. The September 11 terrorist attacks elevated this uncertainty to a new level. In response, the United States again raised its military budget to levels surpassing any period of the Cold War (Hudson 317). In essence, the United States’ new foreign policy is born out of fear. Constant, low-level threats to national security are inextricably linked to the histories of most nations. America had historically been spared due to its
  • 4.
    4 geographic position. However,for the first time, the United States is experiencing that unease. That is why the “one percent doctrine” is so appealing to many people (Zenko and Cohen 573). The possibility of foreign attacks is a relatively new phenomenon which is terrifying to most Americans. Thus, the United States adopted a more interventionist policy in order to regain some of the security that it lost after globalization partially erased its geographic advantage. However, even though the United States is now much more involved in international affairs, it is still unique in how it enacts its policy. This is mostly due to the sheer size of its military. The United States defense budget is larger than the next 14 countries’ defense budgets combined (Zenko and Cohen 573). As such, the United States always has the option of unilateralism. Even when it does cooperate, it often takes on a leadership role. Its role as an objective leader of the West is further strengthened by its geographic position, as it has a metaphorical bird’s eye view of developments in Eurasia. This new dynamic is very evident in the current crisis in Ukraine. President Obama recently travelled to Europe to speak with NATO leaders regarding the Russian annexation of Crimea (“US to commit more forces to NATO efforts”). He pledged to send more American troops to Eastern Europe in response, and implored the other NATO nations to do the same. The difference between the response of the United States to Vladimir Putin’s recent actions and its response to the similar early aggression of Hitler is stark. The United States did not take on a central role in the fight against the Axis until its homeland was attacked. Now, they are supplying troops and taking on a leadership role in a conflict which has almost no possibility of touching American soil. When the threats which emerged from technological advances led the United States to break free from its geographic bubble, it took its place at the symbolic head of the Western world.
  • 5.
    5 While historical evidenceseems to support the notion that the United States adopted a more interventionist foreign policy upon the development of threats which geographic isolation did not entirely defend from, it is difficult to quantify the underlying mechanisms through which this occurred. While technically accurate, simply stating that the United States operates under a different foreign policy than other nations due to its remote location is not very descriptive. Fortunately, “Distance and Foreign Policy: A Political Geography Approach” by Alan K. Henrikson is extremely helpful in this area. In the article, Henrikson attempts to establish three forms of non-physical distance which can coexist with physical distance when analyzing the relationship between countries. First, he acknowledges the undeniable role of physical distance in foreign policy. He claims that distance obscures understanding between nations, quoting a Supreme Court decision which refers to “this vast external realm”. It is this lack of understanding which leads to different outlooks in foreign and domestic policy. No matter how far globalization proceeds, the United States will never be able to overcome these shortcomings born of physical distance, which helps explain the persistent unique quality of American foreign policy when compared to other nations. However, he then begins to explain his new theoretical and dynamic “distances”. The first of these new forms of distance is “gravitational distance”. This relates Isaac Newton’s Theory of Gravitation to international influence. The closer a nation is to another, the more influence it can exert over that nation. In addition, the larger the nation, the more influence it yields. Obviously, physical distance remains a static variable. However, as intuitive as it may seem, the second part of this model provides a firm mechanism to explain the increased expenditures on national defense since the end of World War II. The principle way to bolster our national security in the face of new threats was to gain an increased amount of influence on foreign nations. Since the United States could not control how far it was from other
  • 6.
    6 nations, it changedthe one variable it could control: its size. This is part of the reason why expenditures on national defense have skyrocketed. The second new form of distance is the “topological model”. This states that the amount of nations in between countries is just as important as the literal distance between them in establishing how “close” they are. This model explains the existence of buffer states, as friendly neighbor states are very beneficial to national security. This helps explain the United States’ historically isolationist tendencies, as it is only bordered by two states which have rarely been openly hostile. The third model is called “attributional distance”, which states that countries can develop strong relations if they share cultural values, despite the distance between them. This is the key way in which America’s geographic position is less important now to its foreign policy than it was in the past. Through organizations like the United Nations and the general process of globalization, the United States is becoming more culturally similar to other nations. This allowed for the formation of the strong alliances which the Unites States craved during the uncertain periods during the Cold War and post 9/11. Through the application of these three new models of distance, the ways in which American foreign policy has changed despite its static geographic position can be more easily understood. Zenko and Cohen present an excellent argument for why America is safer now than it has been in decades. However, until we become as accustomed to the notion of a constant low level threat as foreign nations are, American leaders will never adopt the 99% doctrine. America’s geographic isolation largely sheltered it from many of the dangers of the world. Now that technology has torn that defense down, the United States has a foreign policy more dictated by fear than other nations. This difference between the 99% doctrine and 1% doctrine is now
  • 7.
    7 primarily what differentiatesthe foreign policy of the United States from other nations, and it is born of its geographic position and history. On my honor, I have neither given nor received any unacknowledged aid on this paper. Works Cited Canon, David T., John J. Coleman, and Kenneth R. Mayer. The Enduring Debate: Classic and Contemporary Readings in American Politics. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2014. Print. Henrikson, A. K. "Distance and Foreign Policy: A Political Geography Approach." International Political Science Review 23.4 (2002): 437-66. JSTOR. Web. 30 Mar. 2014. Hudson, William E. American Democracy in Peril: Eight Challenges to America's Future. Los Angeles: CQ, 2013. Print. Press, Associated. "US to Commit More Forces to NATO Efforts." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 26 Mar. 2014. Web. 30 Mar. 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/obama-right-to-self-determination- being-tested/2014/03/26/47a08f22-b50d-11e3-bab2-b9602293021d_story.html>.