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Daily Sabah > Opinion
AHMAD EL NASHAR
Published
May 16, 2014
I
July 3 in Egypt was the culmination of attempts by Egyptian
elites and external forces to return to the status quo and
retake control of the country
s the military coup about to end? I often hear members of the
coalition in person and on TV saying, "The coup is almost over, it is
wavering, it is on its death bed." My usual reaction to this is a mix of
sorrow, frustration and, naturally, laughter. The coalition leaders are
unable to comprehend the nature of the revolution despite having rich
literature on the nature of change required to revive social systems, and
despite having a tremendously painful experience of oppression and
injustice with the Egyptian state and I mean the state not the military
leadership. As long as they keep repeating those statements and insisting
on this limited view of what took place between Feb. 11, 2011 and July 3,
2013, I believe that every passing day will bring them closer to their own
demise.
To me, defining what happened on July 3 as a military coup is essentially
wrong and therefore the question becomes null and void. What took
place that day was the climax of efforts by key powers of the current
Egyptian social system, along with some external help, to regain control
over the country and maintain the status quo. It is also what some people
call the counterrevolution. Therefore, the question becomes whether the
counterrevolution is about to end? Still, my answer is no. Let me first
explain where the counterrevolution view comes from.
Who has interest in supporting what is happening now in Egypt? In
answering the question it becomes easier to explain the thought of
Egypt: It is not a coup, it is a counterrevolution
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counterrevolution. Obviously the military has an interest, as it has been
in power since 1952. There are also the social elites (government officials,
religious preachers, academics, artists, sportsmen, policemen, traders et
cetera) who may have had different reach or influence throughout the
decades since 1952 but still existed happily within the current social
system. There are the poor Egyptian people who are overwhelmed with
their daily living burdens and wish for stability to return to their dayto
day lives despite the enormous injustices they have become accustomed
to.
Needless to say there are the external powers who are interested in Egypt
as far as their interests in Egypt and in their own homelands are
maintained. If we were to give some thought to those stakeholders and
the number of people that make up each group and the resources they
possess, we can easily conclude that what took place on July 3 was not
simply a military coup but the climax of the combined effort of millions
of people who do not accept what happened on Jan. 25 in short, a
counterrevolution.
To support my argument further, let us consider what I describe above as
the practices of the current regime and certain factions of society. Those
practices are not limited to oppressive state practices but also social
practices, committed in some cases by members of our own family. Those
are not the actions of a military coup, but rather a society aka a
counterrevolution. Now in the context of this piece it doesn't matter who
was the grand designer behind the counterrevolution or what roles the
different stakeholders played, the important point to grasp is that it is a
whole system at work. Therefore, defining it as a military coup and
insisting on slogans such as "supporting legitimacy" truly undermines
what is currently taking place and limits the options of what can be done
to restore the revolution.
When did the counterrevolution effort start? It started on the day
Mubarak was deposed. The trap for the revolution started with the
constitutional decree announced by the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces (SCAF) laying out the political roadmap the country would follow.
When a revolution takes place it designs and follows its own roadmap.
The only problem is we did not have a roadmap we all agreed on. What
happened after that was a mixture of SCAF's plan, the contribution of
counterrevolutionary factions, the choices of the Muslim Brotherhood as
the major opposition power and the choices of the revolutionaries all
leading to the old regime's power structure regaining what it once lost.
When I refer to choices, I do not mean the choices made at the ballots
only, I also mean the fundamental choices of whether we should have
accepted SCAF's roadmap, or whether we should go to the elections
(parliamentary and presidential), how we should design the committee
writing the constitution, how to deal with Morsi's incompetence, how to
deal with the corrupt judicial and media institutions. To clarify with an
example, I believe that just as the Brotherhood was mistaken to scurry to
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take power within a SCAFdesigned roadmap that was clearly managed by
SCAF, the revolutionaries were mistaken to have taken to the streets on
June 30, 2013 in an occasion that was clearly designed by SCAF.
We all contributed in one way or another to where we find ourselves
today. It is a sad reality but it has given us experience to comprehend that
what took place on July 3 was a counterrevolution that was able to
leverage our blunders and its willingness to restore the old system once
more. The funny thought is that we saw it happening, recognized it and
made loads of fun about it with our inherent sense of humor. I remember
all the jokes shared over the last three years about how Mubarak and his
gang would eventually be released and the revolutionaries would end up
in jail instead. Subconsciously we knew what was going on and yet
consciously we did a wonderful job in allowing it to happen.
This leads me to the crucial: By viewing what took place on July 3 within
the context of a counterrevolution we can leverage the huge opportunity
of taking the revolution back to square one. We can go back to the point
of Feb. 11, 2011. We can design and follow a new political roadmap that
would ensure we would not allow the military and other key powers in
the current ailing system the ability to influence or intervene in the
building of a new Egypt.
All factions opposing the current system need to come together and
realize that we all have a role to play in revamping the revolution.
Predominantly, the Brotherhood and their allies in the coalition must
reconsider their current stand and view the results that took place in the
ballots as part of a faulty decision that referred us to a corrupt political
system and should therefore let go of the notion of restoring the results of
a distorted democratic process. In simple words, let go of Morsi, the 2012
constitution and the parliament. In doing so, they will be able to offer a
much more inclusive option for others to join in and demonstrate that
this is not about a power struggle but a revolution that seeks to establish
a new social system.
The Brotherhood and their allies in the coalition need to admit that they
have so far been unable to be inclusive and do not have the competence
to lead Egypt alone. In parallel, the revolutionary groups and individuals
must admit to their short comings of being divided, unable to harness
sufficient street support and lacking clear visibility about what sort of
social system they want instead. Both groups need to work on all of their
shortcomings together. They are on the same boat and both of them are
rocking it hard enough to make it topple.
What happens if they both topple? Not much really, maybe a little time
delay but in the end the revolution will find others who will capture it,
believe in it and lead it to victory.
The counterrevolution is not on its deathbed. The Egyptian army's
reputation and credibility have been negatively influenced but much of
their power is still intact. The corruption of the current social system
