The document discusses the resurgence of the debate surrounding the 'fundamental structure' of the Indian Constitution, particularly in light of the National Commission's review and the concerns over extreme constitutional amendments. Key legal cases such as Golaknath and Kesavananda Bharati have shaped the understanding of parliamentary powers versus judicial authority, emphasizing the inviolability of fundamental rights against amendments that could distort the Constitution's essential framework. The ongoing tension reflects the conflict between legislative intentions and judicial interpretations in safeguarding constitutional principles.

1. Doctrine of Basic Structure
The dispute over the Constitution's "fundamental structure," which had been dormant in the
archives of India's constitutional history for the last decade of the twentieth century, has
resurfaced in the public sphere. While establishing the National Commission to Review the
Constitution's Operation (the Commission), the National Democratic Alliance government
(established by a coalition of twenty-four national and regional level parties) stated that the
core framework of the Constitution would not be altered.
The Commission's Chairman, Justice M.N. Venkatachalaiah, has repeatedly stated that an
investigation into the fundamental structure of the Constitution is beyond the scope of the
Commission's job.
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There are several political parties:
Notably, the Congress (I) and the two Communist parties in opposition have made it plain
that the review exercise was the government's attempt to gain legitimacy for its approach of
adopting extreme constitutional revisions, damaging the document's core structure.
Much of the broad public discourse has been hampered by partial cognitive condition, since
even metropolitan Bharat's literate circles are unsure of the implications of this notion, which
was hotly disputed throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The following talk attempts to navigate
the waterways of that amount made turbulent by the capacity conflict between the legislative
and thus judicial arms of the State.
According to the Constitution, Parliament and thus the state legislatures in Bharat have the
authority to pass laws at regular periods in their respective domains. In nature, this power is
not absolute. The judiciary is given the authority by the Constitution to rule on the
constitutionality of all laws. If a statute passed by Parliament or state legislatures violates
any provision of the Constitution, the Supreme Court can declare it invalid or extra vires.
Still, the founding fathers desired the Constitution to be a flexible instrument rather than a
fixed structure for governing.

2. As a result, Parliament was given the authority to modify the Constitution. Article 368 of the
Constitution gives the impression that Parliament's amending powers are unlimited and
cover all aspects of the document. However, since its inception, the Supreme Court has
acted as a check on Parliament's hunger for legislation. To protect the original principles
envisaged by the constitution-makers, the Supreme Court ruled that Parliament could not
distort, harm, or modify the core structure of the Constitution under the guise of altering it.
The phrase "fundamental structure" does not appear in the Constitution. In the landmark
Kesavananda Bharati case in 1973, the Supreme Court recognized this concept for the first
time. Since then, the Supreme Court has served as the interpreter of the Constitution and
hence the adjudicator of all amendments proposed by Parliament.
The Position of Pre-Kesavananda
The ability of Parliament to change the Constitution, particularly the chapter on the basic
rights of voters, was contested as early as 1951. Many laws were enacted inside the states
following independence with the goal of changing land possession and residence patterns.
This was in keeping with the ruling Congress party's electoral promise of implementing the
Constitution's socialistic goals [contained in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Directive Principles
of State Policy], which required equitable distribution of production resources among all
voters and a prohibition on concentration of wealth in the hands of a few.
Property owners, who were harmed by these laws, petitioned the courts. The courts struck
down the land reform measures, claiming that they violated the fundamental right to property
guaranteed by the Constitution. Piqued by the unfavorable decisions, Parliament included
these laws into the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution by the 1st and 4th amendments (1951
and 1952, respectively), essentially removing them from the purview of review.
[The Ninth Schedule was inserted to the Constitution by the 1st Amendment in 1951 as a
mechanism of shielding bound statutes from scrutiny. According to the provisions of Article
31, which were amended many times later, laws placed within the Ninth Schedule relating to
the acquisition of personal property and compensation due for such acquisition cannot be
challenged in a court of law on the grounds that they violated voters' basic rights.

3. This umbrella term encompasses around 250 legislation enacted by state legislatures with
the goal of controlling the size of land holdings and abolishing various residency
arrangements. The Ninth Schedule was drafted with the primary goal of preventing the
judiciary, which has repeatedly maintained citizens' right to property, from derailing the
Congress party's aim for a social revolution.
Property owners petitioned the Supreme Court once more, claiming that the constitutional
modifications that placed land reform regulations in the Ninth Schedule violated Article 13 (2)
of the Constitution.
Article 13 (2) guarantees the protection of the subject's fundamental rights. The creation of
laws by Parliament and state legislatures that remove or diminish the subject's basic rights is
expressly prohibited. They contended that any amendment to the Constitution has the legal
force of law, as defined by Article 13. (2). In 1952 (Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union Of
Bharat) and 1955 (Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan), the Supreme Court rejected each
argument and affirmed Parliament's freedom to change any provision of the Constitution,
including those affecting voters' basic rights. Despite this, two dissenting judges in the case
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1955) highlighted concerns that the basic rights of voters
could become a toy of the majority party in Parliament.
The Golaknath Scandal
The Supreme Court's associate degree eleven-judge bench reversed its position in 1967. In
its 6:5 majority decision in the Golaknath v. State of Punjab case, Justice Subba Rao took
the unusual opinion that Article 368, which provided provisions for modifying the
Constitution, merely ordered down the amending procedure. Article 368 did not grant
Parliament the authority to modify the Constitution.
Parliament's modifying power (constituent power) evolved from alternative provisions in the
Constitution (Articles 245, 246, 248) that granted it the right to create legislation (plenary
legislative power).

4. As a result, the Supreme Court ruled that Parliament's modifying and legislative powers were
essentially similar. As a result, any amendment to the Constitution should be considered law,
as defined in Article 13. (2).
The majority decision referred to implicit constraints on Parliament's capacity to modify the
Constitution. This interpretation states that the Constitution guarantees the subject's
fundamental freedoms in perpetuity. The people have reserved the fundamental rights for
themselves by creating the Constitution.
Article 13, in accordance with the bulk read, expressed this limitation on Parliament's
powers. Because of the content of the Constitution and thus the nature of the freedoms
guaranteed thereunder, Parliament could not change, ban, or limit fundamental liberties.
The justices declared that the fundamental rights were thus inviolable and transcendental in
importance, and that they could not be limited even if such a measure received unanimous
consent from each house of Parliament. They agreed that Parliament might call a
Constituent Assembly to modify the fundamental rights if necessary.
In other words, the Supreme Court ruled that several elements of the Constitution were
fundamental and required considerably more than usual procedures to change.
Manjeri Narayanan Nambiar and different counsels represented the petitioners in the
Golaknath case, but it wasn't until 1973 that the phrase "fundamental structure" appeared
within the language of the Supreme Court's verdict.
Bank nationalization and the abolition of privy purses
Within a few weeks of Golaknath's discovery, the Congress party suffered significant defeats
in parliamentary elections and lost control in many states. Although a private member's bill -
presented by lawyer Nath Pai - attempting to restore Parliament's power to modify the
Constitution was introduced and debated on the floor of the house and inside the committee,
it may not be passed due to political compulsions of the time.

5. However, another opportunity to check parliamentary ascendency arose when Parliament
passed legislation to increase agricultural sector access to bank financing and ensure equal
distribution of output resources by:
Bank Nationalization
Derecognizing Former Princes in an attempt to take away their Privy Purses, which were
secure in perpetuity - as a bribe to join the Union - at the time of India's independence.
Parliament reasoned that it was carrying out the Directive Principles of State Policy, but the
Supreme Court overruled each move. By this point, it was evident that the Supreme Court
and Parliament were at odds over the relative standing of fundamental rights in relation to
the Directive Principles of State Policy. At one level, the conflict was about Parliament's
ascendance vs the courts' power to interpret and uphold the Constitution.
At another level, the conflict was over the value of property as a fundamental right, which
was jealously defended by an affluent category vastly smaller than that of the large destitute
plenty, for whose benefit the Congress government claimed to conduct its socialist
development agenda.
Less than two weeks later, the Supreme Court overturned the President's decision
de-recognizing the princes, in a quick move to secure the people's mandate and boost her
own prestige. Prime Minister Gandhi called a snap election after dissolving the Lok Sabha.
For the first time, the Constitution of India became an electoral issue. Eight of the ten
manifestos in the 1971 elections called for constitutional amendments to restore Parliament's
dominance. A.K. Gopalan of the Bharat (Marxist) political party went so far as to demand
that the Constitution be repealed and replaced with one that recognized the importance of
people's sovereignty.
With a common fraction majority, the Congress party reclaimed control. Citizens had backed
the Congress party's socialist agenda, which included calling for fundamental reforms to the
Constitution in order to restore Parliament's dominance.

6. Between July 1971 and June 1972, Parliament attempted to reclaim lost ground with a flurry
of amendments. It granted itself absolute authority to change any provision of the
Constitution, including Part III, which deals with fundamental rights. Even the President was
given the absolute duty of providing his consent to any amendment measure that passed
both houses of Parliament. Many restrictions on rightful property have been enacted into
legislation.
The right to equality before the law and equal protection under the law (Article 14), as well as
the essential liberties guaranteed by Article 19, were made subject to Article 39 (b) and (c) of
the Directive Principles of State Policy. Privy purses of former princes were abolished, and a
comprehensive class of laws dealing with land reforms was placed beyond the jurisdiction of
review in the 9th Schedule.