Class Actions: Insurance Related Claims
by Thomas F. Segalla
Whether prosecuting or opposing a motion for class certification, within the context of insurance related claims, there are certain principles that are critical to determining the allegations that are necessary to successfully assert such claims and the nature of any challenge to a motion to certify the punitive class. As the court noted, in the case of Deborah Mahon v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.:[1]
Arbitration in Insurance Coverage Disputes: Pluses and MinusesNationalUnderwriter
Arbitration in Insurance Coverage Disputes: Pluses and Minuses By Peter A. Halprin
Deciding whether to proceed with arbitration, either after the denial of a claim or when procuring the placement of a policy,requires an understanding of arbitration and its advantages and disadvantages. This article analyzes the perceived advantages and disadvantages of arbitration.
Policyholders may be surprised to find that their insurance policies contain an arbitration provision. Deciding whether to proceed with arbitration, either after the denial of a claim or when procuring the placement of a policy, requires an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration.
Michael Marick - Breaking down barriers in policyholder- insurer disputes ove...Michael Marick
Corporate policyholders/insureds who have been sued share a common interest with their liability insurers—successfully defending those lawsuits. Yet insureds and insurers often disagree on the choice of defense counsel and how much the insurer must pay toward legal bills. These disputes are costly and, in most instances, can be avoided.
In today’s litigation and regulatory climate, class actions alleging statutory violations can pose some of the most persistent and troublesome threats to lenders...
Arbitration in Insurance Coverage Disputes: Pluses and MinusesNationalUnderwriter
Arbitration in Insurance Coverage Disputes: Pluses and Minuses By Peter A. Halprin
Deciding whether to proceed with arbitration, either after the denial of a claim or when procuring the placement of a policy,requires an understanding of arbitration and its advantages and disadvantages. This article analyzes the perceived advantages and disadvantages of arbitration.
Policyholders may be surprised to find that their insurance policies contain an arbitration provision. Deciding whether to proceed with arbitration, either after the denial of a claim or when procuring the placement of a policy, requires an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration.
Michael Marick - Breaking down barriers in policyholder- insurer disputes ove...Michael Marick
Corporate policyholders/insureds who have been sued share a common interest with their liability insurers—successfully defending those lawsuits. Yet insureds and insurers often disagree on the choice of defense counsel and how much the insurer must pay toward legal bills. These disputes are costly and, in most instances, can be avoided.
In today’s litigation and regulatory climate, class actions alleging statutory violations can pose some of the most persistent and troublesome threats to lenders...
Washington Court Holds Stipulated Covenant Judgment Sets Minimum Amount of Da...NationalUnderwriter
Washington Court Holds Stipulated Covenant Judgment Sets Minimum Amount of Damages in Bad Faith Case. (from FC&S Legal: The Insurance Coverage Law Information Center)
Recently, Division One of the Court of Appeals of Washington State affirmed a jury verdict awarding $13 million in damages to a passenger injured in a car accident, finding that the $4.15 million agreed amount of the covenant
judgment in the insurance bad faith case sets a floor, not a ceiling, on the damages a jury can award.
In Miller v. Kenny and Safeco Ins. Co.,[1] the Court of Appeals ruled on several additional issues on appeal including whether evidence of an insurance company’s loss reserves is properly admissible at trial.
Defining Terms in an Insurance Policy Exclusion: What the "Eight Corners" Ru...NationalUnderwriter
Defining Terms in an Insurance Policy Exclusion: What the "Eight Corners" Rule Does Not Require by Kelly M. Lippincott and Katherine C. Ondeck (from FC&S Legal: The Insurance Coverage Law Information Center)
In Carlyle Investment Management, LLC v. Ace American Ins. Co.,[1] the District of Columbia Superior Court held that when an insurance contract’s definitions of relevant terms brings a claim within the scope of an exclusion within the
policies, it does not matter whether those same terms might mean something else in the context of a different case or a different contract. The contract definitions of the terms control.
Powerpoint For Class Cert Hearing(Final)Dommermuth
This presentation was made at a hearing on a motion for class certification. The motion was denied and subsequently the Court granted summary judgment on all claims.
Don¹t Take Any Wooden Nickels: Lawyers as Targets of Lucrative ScamsNationalUnderwriter
It may come as somewhat of a surprise to some to learn that one kind of business that appears to be particularly susceptible to electronically-induced scams is the legal profession. Yes, lawyers. In the fairly typical scam, lawyers are contacted by foreigners who are in need of legal assistance in collecting debts. The law firms eventually receive checks for large sums from the debtors, and are instructed to deposit them for further instructions. What these law firms do, so as not to comingle with the firms’ accounts, is to establish special accounts at the firms’ financial institutions. Before these checks are cleared by the banks on which the funds were drawn, the clients request that the money representing the checks sent to the law firms, be wired to foreign accounts, less the law firms’ retainer. After the money is received by the foreigners, the law firms are notified that the checks, drawn on foreign or domestic banks, originally sent to the law firms, are bogus.
The article discusses a number of court decisions where lawyers were duped by thieves and sought coverage for
their losses under their commercial insurance policies.
Because of Evidence of a "Special Relationship" Between Insureds and Their Br...NationalUnderwriter
Because of Evidence of a "Special Relationship" Between Insureds and Their Broker, Insureds' Suit Against Broker Should Not Have Been Dismissed, NY's Highest Court Holds
New York’s highest court, the New York Court of Appeals, has ruled that sufficient evidence of a “special relationship” existed between insureds and their insurance broker such that a negligence lawsuit brought by the insureds against their broker should not have been dismissed at the summary judgment stage.
CBI Comments on Treasury's TRIP Data Call for CaptivesJasonSchupp1
Every year the Federal Insurance Office (FIO), as administrator of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, requires participating insurers to respond to a detailed data call.
Among other changes, FIO recently announced its intention to improve the data it collects from captive insurers. A captive is an insurance company that is owned by its policyholder. In many cases, a large corporation sets up a captive to manage retained risks, directly access reinsurance, and capture substantial tax advantages.
Many of these corporations also use captives to directly extract billions of dollars in benefits from government programs such as the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program and Federal Home Loan Bank system. In fact, prior data calls revealed that large corporations are expected to receive up to 95% of Terrorism Risk Insurance Program payouts through their captive insurers.
CBI has offered a number of practical suggestions to FIO to improve its data call templates and instructions. These suggestions, if adopted, would make it more likely captives will provide data that leads to useful insights for Congress and other stakeholders.
CBI Comments to FinCEN on Beneficial Ownership of CpativesJasonSchupp1
In response to this ANPR, CBI draws FinCEN’s attention to how U.S. domiciled captive insurance companies may interact with the provisions and intent of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA).
Supreme Court of New Jersey Confirms "Fairly Debatable" Standard for First Pa...NationalUnderwriter
Supreme Court of New Jersey Confirms "Fairly Debatable" Standard for First Party Bad Faith; Acknowledges Relevance of Actual Investigation by Frederic J. Giordano and Robert F. Pawlowski
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently issued an important pair of decisions for policyholders with bad faith claims against their first-party insurance companies in Badiali v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Group[1] and Wadeer v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company.[2] In Badiali and Wadeer, the court reiterated the narrow “fairly debatable” standard as the threshold for bad faith claims in New Jersey. But, the court also opened the door to modify this standard in the Badiali decision by recognizing the relevance of the actual claims handling in a particular case.
Under the Right Circumstances, an Insured Entitled to "Independent Counsel" i...NationalUnderwriter
Under the Right Circumstances, an Insured Entitled to "Independent Counsel" in California Can Retain More Than One Firm
by Carey B. Moorehead
In a case of first impression, a California district court has ruled that California law does not preclude an insured from
retaining multiple law firms as independent or Cumis counsel where the insurer is defending under reservation of
rights. The court’s ruling came in the case of Signal Products v. American Zurich Insurance Company, et al.
The Signal Products court was called upon to interpret California Civil Code §2860 in the context of cross-motions for summary judgment between American Zurich Insurance Company and its insured Signal Products, Inc., the defendant in a trademark infringement action. Zurich had agreed to defend Signal under reservation of rights and consented to Signal’s retention of independent counsel.
Washington Court Holds Stipulated Covenant Judgment Sets Minimum Amount of Da...NationalUnderwriter
Washington Court Holds Stipulated Covenant Judgment Sets Minimum Amount of Damages in Bad Faith Case. (from FC&S Legal: The Insurance Coverage Law Information Center)
Recently, Division One of the Court of Appeals of Washington State affirmed a jury verdict awarding $13 million in damages to a passenger injured in a car accident, finding that the $4.15 million agreed amount of the covenant
judgment in the insurance bad faith case sets a floor, not a ceiling, on the damages a jury can award.
In Miller v. Kenny and Safeco Ins. Co.,[1] the Court of Appeals ruled on several additional issues on appeal including whether evidence of an insurance company’s loss reserves is properly admissible at trial.
Defining Terms in an Insurance Policy Exclusion: What the "Eight Corners" Ru...NationalUnderwriter
Defining Terms in an Insurance Policy Exclusion: What the "Eight Corners" Rule Does Not Require by Kelly M. Lippincott and Katherine C. Ondeck (from FC&S Legal: The Insurance Coverage Law Information Center)
In Carlyle Investment Management, LLC v. Ace American Ins. Co.,[1] the District of Columbia Superior Court held that when an insurance contract’s definitions of relevant terms brings a claim within the scope of an exclusion within the
policies, it does not matter whether those same terms might mean something else in the context of a different case or a different contract. The contract definitions of the terms control.
Powerpoint For Class Cert Hearing(Final)Dommermuth
This presentation was made at a hearing on a motion for class certification. The motion was denied and subsequently the Court granted summary judgment on all claims.
Don¹t Take Any Wooden Nickels: Lawyers as Targets of Lucrative ScamsNationalUnderwriter
It may come as somewhat of a surprise to some to learn that one kind of business that appears to be particularly susceptible to electronically-induced scams is the legal profession. Yes, lawyers. In the fairly typical scam, lawyers are contacted by foreigners who are in need of legal assistance in collecting debts. The law firms eventually receive checks for large sums from the debtors, and are instructed to deposit them for further instructions. What these law firms do, so as not to comingle with the firms’ accounts, is to establish special accounts at the firms’ financial institutions. Before these checks are cleared by the banks on which the funds were drawn, the clients request that the money representing the checks sent to the law firms, be wired to foreign accounts, less the law firms’ retainer. After the money is received by the foreigners, the law firms are notified that the checks, drawn on foreign or domestic banks, originally sent to the law firms, are bogus.
The article discusses a number of court decisions where lawyers were duped by thieves and sought coverage for
their losses under their commercial insurance policies.
Because of Evidence of a "Special Relationship" Between Insureds and Their Br...NationalUnderwriter
Because of Evidence of a "Special Relationship" Between Insureds and Their Broker, Insureds' Suit Against Broker Should Not Have Been Dismissed, NY's Highest Court Holds
New York’s highest court, the New York Court of Appeals, has ruled that sufficient evidence of a “special relationship” existed between insureds and their insurance broker such that a negligence lawsuit brought by the insureds against their broker should not have been dismissed at the summary judgment stage.
CBI Comments on Treasury's TRIP Data Call for CaptivesJasonSchupp1
Every year the Federal Insurance Office (FIO), as administrator of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, requires participating insurers to respond to a detailed data call.
Among other changes, FIO recently announced its intention to improve the data it collects from captive insurers. A captive is an insurance company that is owned by its policyholder. In many cases, a large corporation sets up a captive to manage retained risks, directly access reinsurance, and capture substantial tax advantages.
Many of these corporations also use captives to directly extract billions of dollars in benefits from government programs such as the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program and Federal Home Loan Bank system. In fact, prior data calls revealed that large corporations are expected to receive up to 95% of Terrorism Risk Insurance Program payouts through their captive insurers.
CBI has offered a number of practical suggestions to FIO to improve its data call templates and instructions. These suggestions, if adopted, would make it more likely captives will provide data that leads to useful insights for Congress and other stakeholders.
CBI Comments to FinCEN on Beneficial Ownership of CpativesJasonSchupp1
In response to this ANPR, CBI draws FinCEN’s attention to how U.S. domiciled captive insurance companies may interact with the provisions and intent of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA).
Supreme Court of New Jersey Confirms "Fairly Debatable" Standard for First Pa...NationalUnderwriter
Supreme Court of New Jersey Confirms "Fairly Debatable" Standard for First Party Bad Faith; Acknowledges Relevance of Actual Investigation by Frederic J. Giordano and Robert F. Pawlowski
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently issued an important pair of decisions for policyholders with bad faith claims against their first-party insurance companies in Badiali v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Group[1] and Wadeer v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company.[2] In Badiali and Wadeer, the court reiterated the narrow “fairly debatable” standard as the threshold for bad faith claims in New Jersey. But, the court also opened the door to modify this standard in the Badiali decision by recognizing the relevance of the actual claims handling in a particular case.
Under the Right Circumstances, an Insured Entitled to "Independent Counsel" i...NationalUnderwriter
Under the Right Circumstances, an Insured Entitled to "Independent Counsel" in California Can Retain More Than One Firm
by Carey B. Moorehead
In a case of first impression, a California district court has ruled that California law does not preclude an insured from
retaining multiple law firms as independent or Cumis counsel where the insurer is defending under reservation of
rights. The court’s ruling came in the case of Signal Products v. American Zurich Insurance Company, et al.
The Signal Products court was called upon to interpret California Civil Code §2860 in the context of cross-motions for summary judgment between American Zurich Insurance Company and its insured Signal Products, Inc., the defendant in a trademark infringement action. Zurich had agreed to defend Signal under reservation of rights and consented to Signal’s retention of independent counsel.
BoyarMiller – Navigating Your Company through Spoliation Claims and Strategie...BoyarMiller
A Penny Saved is a Penny Earned:
Navigating Your Company through Spoliation Claims and Strategies to Maximize Recovering Attorneys’ Fees
presented by:
Chris Hanslik, Craig Dillard & Matt Veech
A penny saved is a penny earned: Navigating your company through spoliation claims and strategies to maximize recovering attorneys' fees. Presented at the Association of Corporate Counsel.
Clarifying Bad Faith Jurisprudence in Virginia, Federal Court Recognizes Bad ...NationalUnderwriter
Clarifying Bad Faith Jurisprudence in Virginia, Federal Court Recognizes Bad Faith Claim Against First-Party Insurer by Michael S. Levine
In Great Am. Ins. Co. v. GRM Mgmt., LLC,[1] a federal district court denied an insurer’s motion to dismiss a bad-faith claim arising out of the insurer’s denial of its policyholder’s claim for property damage and loss of business income following the theft of rooftop air conditioning units from the policyholder’s hotel. The ruling is significant because it illustrates that Virginia law supports first-party bad-faith claims against insurers.
Clarifying Bad Faith Jurisprudence in Virginia, Federal Court Recognizes Bad-...NationalUnderwriter
Clarifying Bad Faith Jurisprudence in Virginia, Federal Court Recognizes Bad-Faith Claim Against First-Party Insurer
In Great Am. Ins. Co. v. GRM Mgmt., LLC,[1] a federal district court denied an insurer’s motion to dismiss a bad-faith claim arising out of the insurer’s denial of its policyholder’s claim for property damage and loss of business income following the theft of rooftop air conditioning units from the policyholder’s hotel. The ruling is significant because it illustrates that Virginia law supports first-party bad-faith claims against insurers.
Three insurance claims scenarios every agent should share with their insured AMT Warranty
Insurance companies come across all kinds of claim scenarios. In this article, we will discuss three different scenarios and the coverages that apply (or may not apply) to them:
Slip and fall incident
FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Commission) investigation
EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) charge
Using Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes to Challenge Reinsurer...NationalUnderwriter
Although the viability of a claim for violation of an unfair and deceptive acts and practices statute in the reinsurance
context is still in its infancy, the possibility of those claims must be considered by cedents and reinsurers alike in their claims activities, at least in jurisdictions where such claims are viable.
Trial Strategy: The Struggle over Perpetuating Testimony Before Litigation B...NationalUnderwriter
Can an insurance company seek a court order to protect evidence before it is sued by a policyholder? A carrier may want to do this to protect its interests in any coverage case that ultimately is filed. Several decisions by federal district courts in Louisiana have explored this topic – and have reached different conclusions.
Choose one of the options below for discussion. Be sure to elabora.docxrusselldayna
Choose one of the options below for discussion. Be sure to elaborate and explain. I choose p>81
Waffles and Workers’ Rights (EEOC v. Waffle House, p. 81)
Read about arbitration law in Chapter 4 and Case 4-3 in your textbook, and do some online research on the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Then discuss the following:
What is the EEOC’s role in regard to business? Does the court say that the EEOC trumps the arbitration contract between the employee and the employer? If so, why? What are the pros and cons of arbitration agreements? Do you think arbitration agreements between big companies and low wage earners who are uninformed about the law are truly fair? If you have any experiences at work with discrimination policies or EEOC trainings, share those experiences.
Dogs and Dream Therapists (Hagen v. Field, pp. 65 (question 7), and Jones v. Williams, p. 43 (question 9)
P65
The plaintiff, a Texas resident, and the defendants, Colorado residents, were cat breeders who met at a cat show in Colorado. Subsequently, the plaintiff sent two cats to the defendants in Colorado for breeding and sent a third cat to them to be sold. A dispute over the return of the two breeding cats arose, and the plaintiff filed suit against the defendants in Texas. The defendants alleged that the Texas court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they did not have minimum contacts within the state of Texas.
Read both cases and discuss legal issues for the court, focusing on in each. Summarize what factors the court looks at in determining where a case can be brought. What was the decision in each case, and do you think the decision was correct? Why or why not?
ASE
4-3 p81
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. WAFFLE HOUSE, INC.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 534 U.S. 279 (2002)
All employees of Waffle House had to sign an agreement requiring employment disputes to be settled by binding arbitration. After Eric Baker suffered a seizure and was fired by Waffle House, he filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that his discharge violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) under Title VII. The EEOC subsequently filed an enforcement suit, to which Baker was not a party, alleging that Waffle House's employment practices, including Baker's discharge “because of his disability,” violated the ADA. The EEOC sought the following: an injunction to “eradicate the effects of [Waffle House's] past and present unlawful employment practices”; specific relief designed to make Baker whole, including back pay, reinstatement, and compensatory damages; and punitive damages.
Waffle House sought to dismiss the EEOC's suit and compel arbitration because of the binding arbitration clause signed by Baker. The District Court denied Waffle House's motion to dismiss. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the District Court that the arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House did not foreclose ...
Similar to Class Actions: Insurance Related Claims (20)
Excess and Surplus Lines Law: A 3-State Sample of a Complete State-by-State C...NationalUnderwriter
Welcome to the 2015 Excess and Surplus Lines Law: A State-by-State Compendium!
This is a 3-state sample of the FREE complete, 186-page state-by-state compendium.
This state-by-state compendium, culled from FC&S Legal’s Eye on the Experts column, is taken from the 2015 Excess and Surplus Lines Laws in the United States Manual, contributed by John P. Dearie, Jr., John N. Emmanuel, Robert A. Romano, and Paige D. Waters, attorneys at Locke Lord LLP, which reflects all of the pertinent changes in the surplus lines laws and regulations of the 50 states and U.S. territories including a special section on the Non-Admitted and Reinsurance Reform Act (“NRRA”) and the steps surplus lines carriers and brokers should be
taking now to ensure compliance with this groundbreaking legislation.
Easy to use and highly informative, this State-by-State Compendium will be your go-to resource for Excess and Surplus Lines Law around the nation.
Get your complete--and complimentary--compendium today: https://fs8.formsite.com/sbmedia/form1661/index.html
How to Successfully Navigate the Latest Changes to the Affordable Care ActNationalUnderwriter
From ALM's National Underwriter comes a timely and necessary ACA presentation covering:
Employer Mandate Penalties
• Reporting Requirements
• Small Business Health Options (SHOP) Changes
• Cadillac Tax Delay
• Delay of Menu Labeling Rule
• Other Affordable Care Act Changes
• Changes to IRS Forms
• Statistics
Finding in Favor of Insurer, Jury Rejects Homeowners¹ Bid for $600,000 for Wa...NationalUnderwriter
From the NEW Verdicts & Settlements section of FC&S Legal: The Insurance Coverage Law Information Center: Finding in Favor of Insurer, Jury Rejects Homeowners¹ Bid for $600,000 for Water Damage to Their Home
A Florida jury has rejected a couple’s claim that they were entitled to $600,000 from their homeowner’s insurance company for water damage to their residence, finding that the damage claimed by the couple had not been caused by water flowing from a water spout that had been left on overnight.
Facts & Allegations
Andres and Doris Cabo alleged that on January 11, 2011, their residence in Miami-Dade County sustained property damage as a result of their daughter leaving the kitchen faucet’s filtered water spout on overnight. The couple filed a claim with their insurance carrier, Security First Insurance, for water damage to their home.
The EU Solvency II Regime for Insurers: An Update on ImplementationNationalUnderwriter
The EU Solvency II Regime for Insurers: An Update on Implementation by Jeremy G. Hill, James C. Scoville, Edite Ligere, and Benjamin Lyon
The Prudential Regulation Authority’s Policy Statement 2/15: A New Regime for Insurers
On March 20, 2015, the Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”) published Policy Statement 2/15 on Solvency II: A new regime for insurers (“PS2/15”),[1] which runs to 330 pages, sets out the rules and accompanying supervisory statements[2] required for the PRA’s implementation of Solvency II.
CFTC Grants No Action Relief to Commodity Pool Operators with Respect to Cert...NationalUnderwriter
CFTC Grants No Action Relief to Commodity Pool Operators with Respect to Certain Insurance-Linked Securitization Vehicles by Daphne G. Frydman, Brian Barrett, and Raymond A. Ramirez
Toward the end of 2014, the staff of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (“CFTC”) Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight (“DSIO”) issued two letters affecting insurance-linked securitization vehicles: CFTC Letter No. 14-145[1] and CFTC Letter No. 14-152.[2]
Both CFTC Letters 14-152 and 14-145, which are summarized below, afford relief from certain Commodity Pool Operator (“CPO”) compliance obligations. Although Letter 14-145 preceded Letter 14-152, the summary begins with Letter 14-152 because Letter 14-145 is a no-action letter that was issued to a specific (and anonymous) market participant and cannot be relied on by other market participants. In contrast, Letter 14-152 was addressed to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”) and affords industry-wide relief from CPO registration to certain entities that engage in insurance-linked securities transactions.
Supreme Court of Texas Marries Contractual Limitations to Insurance PoliciesNationalUnderwriter
Supreme Court of Texas Marries Contractual Limitations to Insurance Policies by Tom Stilwell, John English, Justin T. Scott, and J. Sean Jain
In a case that has been closely watched by the oil and gas industry and its insurers, the Supreme Court of Texas recently issued its opinion in In re Deepwater Horizon, and settled the debate concerning whether a company’s insurance policies stood alone or were married to and dependent upon an insured’s limited obligation in a separate contract to insure and indemnify a third party. Specifically, the court found that Transocean’s $750 million primary and excess insurance policies did not offer unrestricted coverage to BP as an additional insured, but instead incorporated and were bound by the
limitations placed on Transocean’s liability under the parties’ drilling contract (the “Drilling Contract”).
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Policyholders May Assign Their Statutory Rig...NationalUnderwriter
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Policyholders May Assign Their Statutory Right to Recover Punitive Damages Arising from Insurer¹s Bad Faith by Sara N. Brown and Roberta D. Anderson
In an issue of first impression, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held in Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe[1] that a policyholder may assign statutory bad faith claims under Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute, Section 8371,[2] to a third party claimant.
Importantly, Wolfe resolves the conflict among Pennsylvania and federal decisions regarding the assignability of the right to recover statutory bad faith damages, and allows assignees to seek punitive damages under the statute against an insurer who acts in bad faith.
New York State Department of Financial Services Expands Its Cyber Focus to In...NationalUnderwriter
New York State Department of Financial Services Expands Its Cyber Focus to Insurers by Eric R. Dinallo, Jeremy Feigelson, David A. O’Neil, Jim Pastore, and Jordan R. Friedland
The New York State Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) recently announced a major expansion of its cybersecurity efforts: DFS will require insurers to respond to a special “comprehensive risk assessment” on cybersecurity, with those assessments to be followed by an enhanced focus on cybersecurity as part of DFS’s regular examinations of insurers. DFS’s announcement expands to insurance the increasingly rigorous approach it has recently applied to banks in the area of cyber security. More importantly, it offers critical guidance to all industries about what regulators will consider adequate precautions and preparation in this area.
Migrating Sand Triggers Separate Policy Limits for CGL Policy¹s Personal Inju...NationalUnderwriter
Migrating Sand Triggers Separate Policy Limits for CGL Policy¹s Personal Injury and Property Damage Coverages by Michael S. Levine and Matthew T. McLellan
Cyber Security and Insurance Coverage Protection: The Perfect Time for an AuditNationalUnderwriter
Cyber Security and Insurance Coverage Protection: The Perfect Time for an Audit by Lynda Bennett
2014 ended almost the same way that it began for most companies – having concerns about cyber security and hackers. At the beginning of the year, the news cycle was focused on breaches that took place in the consumer product space as Target, Michael’s, Neiman Marcus, and Home Depot worked fast and furious to address breaches that led to concerns about a massive amount of credit card information possibly being “in the open.” Later in the year, we learned that corporate giants like JPMorgan Chase and Apple were not immune from cyber security breaches as still more personally identifiable information and very personal photographs were released into the public domain. Finally, as 2014 drew to a close, the entertainment industry was further rocked by the cyber-attack on Sony Corp., which led to even broader concerns about national security and terrorist threats.
CFTC Grants No-Action Relief to Commodity Pool Operators with Respect to Cert...NationalUnderwriter
CFTC Grants No-Action Relief to Commodity Pool Operators with Respect to Certain Insurance-Linked Securitization Vehicles
Toward the end of 2014, the staff of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (“CFTC”) Division of Swap Dealer
and Intermediary Oversight (“DSIO”) issued two letters affecting insurance-linked securitization vehicles: CFTC Letter No. 14-145[1] and CFTC Letter No. 14-152.[2]
Both CFTC Letters 14-152 and 14-145, which are summarized below, afford relief from certain Commodity Pool Operator (“CPO”) compliance obligations. Although Letter 14-145 preceded Letter 14-152, the summary begins with Letter 14-152 because Letter 14-145 is a no-action letter that was issued to a specific (and anonymous) market participant and cannot be relied on by other market participants. In contrast, Letter 14-152 was addressed to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”) and affords industry-wide relief from CPO registration to certain entities that engage in insurance-linked securities transactions.
N.J. Trial Court Applies "Named Storm" Deductible in Superstorm Sandy Case
A New Jersey trial court has ruled that the “Named Storm” deductible applied to an insured’s claim in a Superstorm Sandy case.
The Case:
Wakefern Food Corporation, a buying cooperative of owners/operators of Shoprite and PriceRite supermarkets that purchased commercial property insurance from Lexington Insurance Company, claimed over $50 million in losses from Superstorm Sandy. Lexington paid about $22 million, and Wakefern sued the insurer.
Wakefern asserted that Superstorm Sandy was not a “Named Storm” by definition when it hit New Jersey and its losses had occurred. It asserted that when the storm hit New Jersey at approximately 8:00 p.m. EDT on October 29, 2012, the storm was not declared by the National Weather Service to be a hurricane, typhoon, tropical cyclone, or tropical depression, as its policy defined Named Storm. Wakefern pointed out that as of 5:00 p.m. EDT on October 29, 2012,
the storm already was “expected to transition into a frontal or wintertime low pressure system shortly.” Wakefern
contended that by 7:00 p.m. EDT, the National Weather Service’s National Hurricane Center (“NHC”) had declared the storm a “Post-Tropical Cyclone.” Wakefern argued that a “Post-Tropical Cyclone” was defined in the glossary of NHC terms as its own weather event and that a Post-Tropical Cyclone was a “former tropical cyclone” not a “Hurricane, Typhoon, Tropical Cyclone, Tropical Storm or Tropical Depression.”
Wisconsin Supreme Court: Pollution Exclusion Bars Coverage for Well Contamin...NationalUnderwriter
Wisconsin Supreme Court: Pollution Exclusion Bars Coverage for Well Contamination Resulting from the Application of Manure and Septage as Fertilizer
In Wilson Mutual Ins. Co. v. Robert Falk and Jane Falk,[1] and Preisler v. Kuettel’s Septic Serv.,[2] the Wisconsin Supreme Court sought to resolve conflicting court of appeals’ decisions on whether excrement (manure and septic waste, respectively) are “pollutants” under standard insurance policy exclusions when they contaminate groundwater after
being applied as fertilizer. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected categorically defining manure and septage as
“pollutants.” Instead, the court determined that such fertilizing excrement unambiguously falls within the applicable policy’s definition of “pollutants” once the manure and/or septage has contaminated a water supply.
New York High Court Finds Lead Exposure Injuries to Children of Different Fam...NationalUnderwriter
New York High Court Finds Lead Exposure Injuries to Children of Different Families a Single Loss for Coverage Purposes
In its recent decision in Nesmith v. Allstate Ins. Co.,[1] the New York Court of Appeals ruled that lead paint exposure
injuries suffered by the children of two different families occupying the same apartment in successive periods constitute a single “accidental loss” subject to a single per-occurrence limit pursuant to the non-cumulation clause in two successive policies issued by a landlord’s insurer.
February14 IRS Valentine’s Day Words of Wisdom by Jay KatzNationalUnderwriter
Who Says the IRS is Heartless? I retort, you decide. Here are the February 14 IRS Valentine’s Day Words of Wisdom, by Jay Katz, author of the Tools & Techniques of IncomeTax Planning, 4th Edition
Discharge of Debt Income (from The Tools & Techniques of Income Tax Planning)NationalUnderwriter
Discharge of Debt Income is culled from the NEW 4th Edition of The Tool & Techniques of Income Tax Planning. It covers: When Can a Discharge of Debt Be Excluded from Gross Income?; Types of Indebtedness; Recourse v. Nonrecourse; Which Types of Debt Can Be Excluded from a Taxpayer’s Gross Income?; Which Types of Debt Can Be Excluded from a Taxpayer’s Gross Income?; and MORE.
Jay Katz, author of The Tools & Techniques of Income Tax Planning, addresses the IRS Halloween Bag of Tricks in a recent posting to his blog, Tool & Techniques World of Financial & Tax Planning.
Making Sense of California's "Accident" Requirement in Liability Insurance Po...NationalUnderwriter
Making Sense of California's "Accident" Requirement in Liability Insurance Policies, Part 1 by David B.Ezra (from FC&S Legal: The Insurance Coverage Law Information Center)
Experience, Expertise, and Preparation: Keys to a Successful Workers' Compen...NationalUnderwriter
Experience, Expertise, and Preparation: Keys to a Successful Workers' Compensation Fraud Investigation by Stacey Golden (from FC&S Legal: The Insurance Coverage Law Information Center)
Unfortunately, workers’ compensation fraud has been on the rise. The poor state of the U.S. economy is certainly a
factor with the associated mortgage meltdown and government cutbacks. Even rising student debt in this environment is placing pressure on young people. Equally unfortunate for those who see fraud as a solution to their challenges, many consider it easy money and are simply clueless to the potential consequences. There are also plenty of examples of sophisticated cases that require careful and persistent digging.
Statements Made by Insurance Company¹s Employees Can Be Used as Evidence That...NationalUnderwriter
Statements Made by Insurance Company¹s Employees Can Be Used as Evidence That It Must Provide a Defense.
by Graham C. Mills
The Court of Appeal of California, in North Counties Engineering, Inc. v. State Farm General Insurance Co., recently issued a significant opinion finding that statements and notes made by an insurance company’s employee can be used as evidence that an insurance company has a duty to defend its policyholder in a lawsuit. This opinion is important because insurance companies often will argue that such statements and notes cannot be used to establish a duty to defend because such duty only exists when the insurance policy provides coverage against a complaint’s allegations, regardless of what insurance company employees say or write.
ALL EYES ON RAFAH BUT WHY Explain more.pdf46adnanshahzad
All eyes on Rafah: But why?. The Rafah border crossing, a crucial point between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, often finds itself at the center of global attention. As we explore the significance of Rafah, we’ll uncover why all eyes are on Rafah and the complexities surrounding this pivotal region.
INTRODUCTION
What makes Rafah so significant that it captures global attention? The phrase ‘All eyes are on Rafah’ resonates not just with those in the region but with people worldwide who recognize its strategic, humanitarian, and political importance. In this guide, we will delve into the factors that make Rafah a focal point for international interest, examining its historical context, humanitarian challenges, and political dimensions.
In 2020, the Ministry of Home Affairs established a committee led by Prof. (Dr.) Ranbir Singh, former Vice Chancellor of National Law University (NLU), Delhi. This committee was tasked with reviewing the three codes of criminal law. The primary objective of the committee was to propose comprehensive reforms to the country’s criminal laws in a manner that is both principled and effective.
The committee’s focus was on ensuring the safety and security of individuals, communities, and the nation as a whole. Throughout its deliberations, the committee aimed to uphold constitutional values such as justice, dignity, and the intrinsic value of each individual. Their goal was to recommend amendments to the criminal laws that align with these values and priorities.
Subsequently, in February, the committee successfully submitted its recommendations regarding amendments to the criminal law. These recommendations are intended to serve as a foundation for enhancing the current legal framework, promoting safety and security, and upholding the constitutional principles of justice, dignity, and the inherent worth of every individual.
NATURE, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.pptxanvithaav
These slides helps the student of international law to understand what is the nature of international law? and how international law was originated and developed?.
The slides was well structured along with the highlighted points for better understanding .
Car Accident Injury Do I Have a Case....Knowyourright
Every year, thousands of Minnesotans are injured in car accidents. These injuries can be severe – even life-changing. Under Minnesota law, you can pursue compensation through a personal injury lawsuit.
Responsibilities of the office bearers while registering multi-state cooperat...Finlaw Consultancy Pvt Ltd
Introduction-
The process of register multi-state cooperative society in India is governed by the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002. This process requires the office bearers to undertake several crucial responsibilities to ensure compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks. The key office bearers typically include the President, Secretary, and Treasurer, along with other elected members of the managing committee. Their responsibilities encompass administrative, legal, and financial duties essential for the successful registration and operation of the society.
WINDING UP of COMPANY, Modes of DissolutionKHURRAMWALI
Winding up, also known as liquidation, refers to the legal and financial process of dissolving a company. It involves ceasing operations, selling assets, settling debts, and ultimately removing the company from the official business registry.
Here's a breakdown of the key aspects of winding up:
Reasons for Winding Up:
Insolvency: This is the most common reason, where the company cannot pay its debts. Creditors may initiate a compulsory winding up to recover their dues.
Voluntary Closure: The owners may decide to close the company due to reasons like reaching business goals, facing losses, or merging with another company.
Deadlock: If shareholders or directors cannot agree on how to run the company, a court may order a winding up.
Types of Winding Up:
Voluntary Winding Up: This is initiated by the company's shareholders through a resolution passed by a majority vote. There are two main types:
Members' Voluntary Winding Up: The company is solvent (has enough assets to pay off its debts) and shareholders will receive any remaining assets after debts are settled.
Creditors' Voluntary Winding Up: The company is insolvent and creditors will be prioritized in receiving payment from the sale of assets.
Compulsory Winding Up: This is initiated by a court order, typically at the request of creditors, government agencies, or even by the company itself if it's insolvent.
Process of Winding Up:
Appointment of Liquidator: A qualified professional is appointed to oversee the winding-up process. They are responsible for selling assets, paying off debts, and distributing any remaining funds.
Cease Trading: The company stops its regular business operations.
Notification of Creditors: Creditors are informed about the winding up and invited to submit their claims.
Sale of Assets: The company's assets are sold to generate cash to pay off creditors.
Payment of Debts: Creditors are paid according to a set order of priority, with secured creditors receiving payment before unsecured creditors.
Distribution to Shareholders: If there are any remaining funds after all debts are settled, they are distributed to shareholders according to their ownership stake.
Dissolution: Once all claims are settled and distributions made, the company is officially dissolved and removed from the business register.
Impact of Winding Up:
Employees: Employees will likely lose their jobs during the winding-up process.
Creditors: Creditors may not recover their debts in full, especially if the company is insolvent.
Shareholders: Shareholders may not receive any payout if the company's debts exceed its assets.
Winding up is a complex legal and financial process that can have significant consequences for all parties involved. It's important to seek professional legal and financial advice when considering winding up a company.
The Main Procedures for Obtaining Cypriot Citizenship
Class Actions: Insurance Related Claims
1. The Insurance Coverage Law Information Center
The following article is from National Underwriter’s latest online resource,
FC&S Legal: The Insurance Coverage Law Information Center.
CLASS ACTIONS – INSURANCE RELATED CLAIMS
Thomas F. Segalla
February 24, 2015
Whether prosecuting or opposing a motion for class certification, within the context of insurance related claims, there
are certain principles that are critical to determining the allegations that are necessary to successfully assert such claims
and the nature of any challenge to a motion to certify the punitive class. As the court noted, in the case of Deborah
Mahon v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.:[1]
In Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.E.2d 374 (2011), the court stated:
The class action is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual
named parties only.” In order to justify a departure from that rule, “a class representative must be part of the class
and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.” Rule 23(a) ensures that the named
plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to litigate. The Rule’s four requirements
–numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation – “effectively limit the class claims to those fairly
encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims.”[2]
The Mahon court further indicated that courts must determine through a “rigorous analysis” whether all four Federal
Rule 23 requirements have been met. In addition, the courts have clearly indicated that the party seeking class
certification bears the burden of establishing by a predonderance of the evidence that each of the federal class action
rule’s requirements has been satisfied.[3] It is only where all the class requirements have been proven through both
“objective” and “reliable and administratively feasible” evidence that a class will be certified.[4] At that juncture, the
class device saves resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting issues potentially affecting every class
member to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23 or the relevant state regulatory rule.[5] As an aside,
under various state regulatory schemes, the interpretation of the Federal Rules, in assessing the viability of a class action,
are considered.
This article provides case notes relative to decisions of courts throughout the United States that have grappled with
the arguments forged by the litigants seeking to certify or opposing certification of a class action in the context of
insurance related matters. These case notes are meant to issue spot and not resolve the various contentions. Further,
they are intended to provide the reader with a keen understanding of how courts, in the context of insurance claims, have
analyzed and applied the requirements of Rule 23 (a)(1)(2)(3) and 4 (i.e., numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate
representation) and answered the question of whether the class is “maintainable” under one of the three categories
found in Rule 23(b)(1)-(3). Of the Rule 23(b) categories, the reader will see that the litigants often fence over whether the
“predominance” requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) has been met. Specifically, the party seeking class certification “must
establish that the issues in the class actions that are subject to generalized proof, and thus applicable to the class as a
whole, . . . predominate over those that are subject only to individualized proof.”[6] The decision of each of the courts
should be referenced for the factual and legal details considered by the particular court in the granting or denying
certification.
CALIFORNIA
1. Force-Placement of Insurance – Certification granted.
Stephen Ellsworth v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 2734953 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014).[7]
Plaintiffs challenge U.S. Bank’s practice of force-placing backdated flood insurance on their real property that was
underwritten by ASIC. The practice of purchasing insurance by the lender/mortgagee when a borrower/mortgagor
does not obtain insurance coverage in an amount the lender/mortgagor requires is known as “force placement” of
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2. insurance. Six causes of action were alleged – breach of mortgage contract; breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; unjust enrichment and violation of Business and Professions Code. Plaintiff moved to certify three
multi-state classes with each multi-state class having two subclasses. The court certified the plaintiffs’ classes noting
that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B) “an order that certifies a class must define the class and the class claims, issues and
defenses.” The classes were sufficiently defined and clearly ascertainable by objective standards and therefore, are
administratively feasible in determining class membership and whether the member is bound by the judgment.
Further, the court noted that, “A party seeking class certification then must show the following prerequisites of Rule 23(a):
numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation.” The court must perform a “rigorous analysis” of
these prerequisites to determine if they have been satisfied. The court found that each of these prerequisites were met.
The defendants did not challenge the numerosity and commonality prerequisites. With respect to the other prerequisites,
the court made the following comments:
Typicality – Borrowers had identical form contracts; the policies were applied uniformly; harms are identical and
classes and subclasses address different theories of liability:
Predominance – Common questions predominate when they evolve from contracts and standardized policies and
practices applied on a routine basis to all customers by the bank. The court rejected the Defendants’ claims that in six
ways individual issues predominate over common issues.
Adequacy of Representation – The court concluded that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interest of the class (i.e., experience, knowledge, and resources).
Practice Note: A reading of various case notes indicates that force-placed insurance is being challenged in multiple
jurisdictions.
2. Car Repair Parts – Certification denied.
Sarah Perez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 291 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2013).
The insured filed a putative class action alleging that automobile insurers engaged in an anticompetitive conspiracy to
provide low quality car repair in California to increase profits. The trial court denied class certification. On this appeal,
the court rejected the insured’s motion to vacate the denial and concluded that the insureds has not produced a
methodology for determining which categories of parts should qualify as inferior. Therefore, the insureds had not met
their burden of establishing “commonality or predominance.” The court also noted that it did not find “clear error,
mistake or manifest injustice” to warrant reconsidering or vacating the prior order.
Practice Note: Auto repair has become an area of the insurance world that is subject to many challenges in the
class action arena.
3. Automobile Repair Facilities – Certification granted and denied.
Eric E. Ortega v. Topa Insurance Company, 206 Cal. App. 4th 463, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 771 (May 24, 2012).
At issue in this case was a claim made by an insured under an automobile policy that the insurer’s practice of providing
two tiers of physical damage coverage, paying all of the reasonable costs incurred at a preferred repair facility (“PRF”),
but only 80 percent of the reasonable costs incurred at an unapproved repair facility selected by the insured. The plaintiff
sought to represent three putative classes. The trial court dismissed two of the three putative classes. With respect to
the two dismissed classes, the trial court held that the complaint failed to allege common questions of the fact and law
and therefore, these classes were not ascertainable. As to the remaining class the trial court found that the classes meet
the requirements of class certification for “purposes of overcoming a pleading challenge.” The appellate court, however,
struck the class because the plaintiff’s claim illustrates the individual inquiries that would have to be made by the court.
Specifically, the court noted that plaintiff “. . . alleges the ‘door locks’ and ‘headlamp’ were replaced with unacceptable
non-OEM parts.” In reaching its decision, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims alleged a breach of the insurance
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Practice Note: There is an interesting discussing of the issuance of a “restricted” insurance policy and the duties
and obligations of the insured and insurer.
4. Life Insurance Policy – Class claims not precluded.
Freeman Investments, L.P. v. Pacific Life Insurance Co., 704 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2013).
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3. Plaintiffs were the purchasers of variable life insurance policies from the defendant and in this litigation plaintiffs
contended that their insurer promised one thing and delivered another. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the insurer was
levying excessive cost of insurance charges and instituted a class action alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing and unfair competition under California Business and Professions Code §17200. The court held
that the class claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing were not precluded by
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”) which precluded private plaintiffs from bringing
certain class actions. In this case, the court noted that the plaintiff’s claim was a “straight contract claim” (i.e., insurer
charged them too much which reduced the value of their investments) that did not rest on a misrepresentation or
fraudulent omission. Therefore, the breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant were not dismissed.
Practice Note: The court did dismiss the claim based on unfair competition violation of California law claim.
CONNECTICUT
1. Title Insurance – Overcharge class certified.
Deborah Mahon v. Chicago Title Co., 296 F.R.D. 63 (D. Conn., Sept. 30, 2013).[8]
Class certification was granted to a putative class alleging that their title insurer overcharged for title insurance in
connection with refinance transactions. The court in reaching its decision noted that: “The class action is ‘an exception to
the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only. In order to justify a depar-
ture from that rule ‘a class representative must be part of a class and possess the same interest and suffer the
same injury as the class members.’” With respect to the Rule 23(a) prerequisites the court noted:
Numerosity – There are more than 40 members and the class is ascertainable. The court rejected the insurer’s
argument that the class selection process was speculative.
Commonality – The court held that there was commonality (i.e., common questions of law and fact) and rejected the
defendant’s argument that there is no class-wide evidence to produce a common answer to the question of which
borrowers were overcharged.
Typicality – Because the claims arise out of the same course of events (i.e., the purchase of title insurance policies in
residential mortgage transactions and they were overcharged) the typicality requirement was met. The court rejected
the defendant’s argument that the class should be defeated due to the differences in agents and transactions.
Adequate representation – The court held that plaintiff’s counsel was qualified to conduct the litigation and the
plaintiff’s interests were aligned with the class.
Predominance – In noting that the predominance requirement involved more demanding criterion than commonality
and that to satisfy this requirement issues applicable to the class as a whole predominate over those issues that are
subject only to individualized proof. The court held as unpersuasive the defendants arguments that a “file-by-file
review” would be necessary while such a review might be necessary, a file-by-file trial would not be.
Superiority – The court held that class certification is superior because the trial of common issues will reduce litigation
costs and promote judicial efficiency.
Finally the court concluded that, “Class certification is appropriate given the standardized notice of the title transactions
at issue and the claims being brought.”
Practice Note: Class actions should be the exception to the rule which is highlighted by this decision.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
1. Real Property/Mortgagee Insurance – Class recognized.
Andrea Cannon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 952 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. July 1, 2013).
At issue in this case was the application of a provision in the Deed of Trust relative to a mortgage obtained by the plaintiff
which indicated:
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4. . . . that if the borrower fails to maintain sufficient insurance coverage on the mortgage property, the lender “may
obtain insurance coverage, at Lender’s option and Borrower’s expense” and “the cost of the insurance coverage
might significantly exceed the cost of insurance that the borrower might have obtained.”
Plaintiff instituted the action on behalf of herself and a class of “other similarly situated” District of Columbia residents
and homeowners which contained claim against the mortgagor and the insurance carrier alleging claims based on unjust
enrichment, negligence, and fraud claims. While the court held that these claims would not survive a motion to dismiss,
the court allowed the plaintiff the right to amend her complaint as it relates to a breach of contract claim.
Practice Note: There is an excellent analysis of the rights and duties of the parties involved in real estate transactions
as they relate to insurance issues.
GEORGIA
1. Diminished Value/Automobile – Class not certified.
Annette Tiller v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15726 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013).
The court granted the defendant/insurer’s motion to dismiss the putative class action concerning third-party property
damage class for diminished value arising out of automobile accidents. Specifically, the putative class alleged that the
insured did not fully recover the diminished value of automobiles damaged in accidents because the methodology used
to determine the diminished value resulted in substantially less than the actual lost value of the repaired vehicle. The com-
plaint alleged that the methodology was contrary to Georgia law and causes of action based on fraud, unjust
enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees and
expenses. The court, in reviewing the applicable standards of each cause of action dismissed the putative class
complaints, held that plaintiffs failed to meet the relevant standards.
Practice Note: With respect to the cause of action based on an alleged breach of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing, the court dismissed the claim because plaintiffs did not allege a breach of the first-party insurance policy.
INDIANA
1. Bad Faith – Class assertion premature.
William Klepper v. ACE American Insurance Co., 999 N.E.2d 86 (C.A. Dec. 5, 2013).
At issue with respect to the bad faith claims asserted against the insurer was the insured’s claim that regardless of
coverage, an insurer may breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in other ways than the wrongful denial of
coverage. For example, a bad faith claim can be based on the “manner of handling a claim.” The court held that at the
stage of the litigation the assertion by the class that they were entitled to judgment on this bad faith claim was premature.
In reaching its decision, the court noted that there were two distinct theories available to an insured -- one in contract
and one in tort.
Practice Note: The resolution of the contract/coverage dispute does not necessarily dispose of the tort based bad
faith claim.
LOUISIANA
1. Class Member – insured failed to alleged membership in the class.
Lionel Williams v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company, 115 So. 3d 27 (La. Ct.App. 5th Cir. Apr. 10, 2013).[9]
Plaintiff in this action asserted a claim against its insurer for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing for failure to pay their claims under a homeowners’ policy for damages sustained as a result of Hurricane
Katrina. The insurer filed exceptions of prescription in each of the cases. The insureds contended that prescription has
been suspended because they were putative class members in the actions against the insurer. The court dismissed the
insured’s petition noting that the insured failed to allege in the petition that they were members of a timely-filed class
action. The insureds were allowed to amend their petitions.
Practice Note: Statutes involving prescriptions are strictly construed and the party asserting has the initial burden
of proof.
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5. NEW JERSEY
1. Homeowners’ Insurance – Class not ascertainable.
Miriam Haskins v. First American Title Insurance Co., 2014 WL 294654 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2014).
The court denied the putative class plaintiff/homeowner insureds’ motion for class certification in a case where the
homeowners alleged that the defendant/insurer systematically cheated New Jersey homeowners by misrepresenting the
amount of money due and owning for title insurance. The court concluded, relying on expert testimony, that the putative
class was not ascertainable and that individualized fact finding will overwhelm issues common to the proposed class.
Specifically, the plaintiff could not meet the predominance requirement. Also, the court, without resolving the issue,
stated that a plaintiff seeking class certification must present a reliable method of calculating damages on a class-wide
basis. There, however, is a disagreement among the courts within the Third Circuit on this issue.
Practice Note: The predominance prerequisite is the most difficult to meet and often an insured’s Achilles heel.
2. UM/UIM – Class certification granted (Bad Faith).
Shannon L. Ensey v. Governmental Employers Insurance Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159373 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2013).
At issue in this case was the contention that the insurer failed to provide its insured with a coverage selection form at
the inception of coverage and failed to apprise its insureds, at that time and throughout the course of coverage, of the
opportunity to raise UM and UIM limits. The action was brought by the plaintiff in her individual capacity and as a
representative of a putative class. It appears that class certification was not challenged. Plaintiff alleged in the Complaint
cause of action based on breach of a statutory duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach
of contract, violation of Consumer Fraud Act and a violation of the N.J. Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and
Notice Act. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cause of
action because the plaintiff had fully received the benefit of the contract.
Practice Note: The court dismissed all causes of action, except the one pertaining to a statutory violation of the
statutes relative to UM/UIM obligations.
NEW YORK
1. Force-Placed Insurance – Certification recognized.
James Hoover v. HSBC Mortgage Corp. (USA), 9 F. Supp. 3d 223 (N.D.N.Y. March 27, 2014).
This case is one of many similar cases brought in courts around the country challenging the practices of mortgage
lender and insurers who “force place” or “lender place” insurance. There were three specific allegations made against the
defendants.
- The bank required the borrowers to purchase and maintain flood insurance in the amounts greater than
permitted under the mortgage (excessive coverage).
- The bank and insurer engaged in an improper scheme of kickbacks, commissions and other compensation.
- The bank and insurer improperly backdated force-placed flood insurance policies to cover periods for which there
was no risk of loss.
As part of its claims, the plaintiff alleged a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and violation of
the New York Deceptive Practices Act §349. The court refused to dismiss the implied covenant cause of action because
the mortgage contract was ambiguous as to the bank’s authority to require flood insurance in an amount greater than
the federal minimums. The court did not dismiss the §349 claim because at this juncture of the litigation it could not be
determined that the alleged deceptive actions were “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under
the circumstances.”
Practice Note: Force-placed insurance, as noted in several other cases in this article, is under scrutiny by courts in
various jurisdictions.
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6. NORTH DAKOTA
1. PIP Claims – Certification denied.
Gale Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 718 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. July 3, 2013).
Plaintiffs instituted this class action for breach of and bad faith in both North Dakota and Minnesota. The action was
based on the contention that the policy owners received less than the submitted amount for mid party and “pip”
following the insurer’s percentile-based review of the claim. The district court denied certification in Minnesota, but
granted certification in North Dakota. This court reversed the certification determination relative to North Dakota and
held that the predominance required of Rule 23(b)(3) was not met. In reaching its decision, the court considered the
following factors:
- Individual interests to control prosecution or defense of separate actions.
- Nature of any litigation already begun.
- Desirability or undesirability to be in a particular forum.
- Difficulty in managing the class.
The court concluded that the class action will not be a superior method of adjudicating the reasonableness of any claim
payment because it will have to be analyzed on an individual basis.
Practice Note: Individual fact inquiries were necessary to resolve the breach of contract and bad faith claims.
OKLAHOMA
1. Property Claim – Class allowed to proceed.
Justin and Brandy Porter v. Mutual Insurance Co., 330 P.3d 511 (2014).
Sewage backed up into and damaged the plaintiffs’ home. The insurer denied coverage. The plaintiffs instituted
this action and other class wide claims contending that the policy was ambiguous and that they were entitled to
coverage because it contained conflicting provisions for loss caused by water damage. The court refused to find such
an ambiguity in the policy and noted that the distinct court must determine where the sewage came from. With
respect to the bad faith claim, the court held that the insurer had a good faith belief at the time of performance and a
justifiable reason for withholding payment under the policy. Even though there was the insurer in its analysis did not
follow an unreported case that had persuasive precedential effect, but no conclusion precedential effect that did not
constitute bad faith.
Practice Note: It is critically important that insureds and insurers have an understanding of relative case law in
assessing their actions or inactions in an insurance dispute.
OREGON
1. Automobile Accident – Class standing required.
Sabrina Carranza v. GEICO General Insurance Co., 2014 WL 6998088 (D. Or., 10/12/12). Plaintiff instituted this action as
a class action on behalf of all other current and former holders of automobile insurance policies from various defendant
insurers that issued policies with similar language. At issue was this policy language:
. . . losses arising out of a single occurrence shall be subject to no more than one deductible.
When the plaintiff made a claim under her auto policy, after two vehicles owned by the plaintiff and insured by the same
insurer collided, she was charged with a deductible for each vehicle. Plaintiff sued the insurer in this action.
Two of the defendants GEICO entities moved to dismiss the Complaint as to them because the plaintiff had no privity of
contract. The court dismissed the Complaint against these defendants holding that plaintiff did not have standing noting
that the plaintiff did not allege that neither the defendants is an “affiliate,” “parent company,” “wholly owned subsidiary,”
or that there was a “special relationship” as the claim relates to the determination of policy language on the decision to
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7. charge more than one deductible. Specifically, the court noted that at least one named plaintiff in a class action must have
standing in his or her own right to assert a claim against each named defendant.
Practice Note: Not only must an insured have standing to institute a class action, but insurer must have “some
definable relationship” to make it liable.
PENNSYLVANIA (THIRD CIRCUIT)
1. Life Insurance Policy – Mistaken Value.
Joel Burstein v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada U.S., 573 Fed. Appx. 219 (3d. Cir. 2014).
After the insured’s death, the life insurance company advised the insured’s beneficiaries that inaccurate values of the
Guaranteed Death Benefit and loan values had been reported to the insured. Both the death benefit and the loan
balance stated in the reports were erroneously high due to the software error. The insurer refused to pay the higher
value. The beneficiaries instituted their putative class action alleging breach of contract and a violation of Massachusetts
Consumer Protection Act. The court granted summary judgment to the life insurance defendant noting that:
- A party may recover money paid by mistake.
- A party is not required to pay a mistaken amount if the mistake is discovered before payment is made.
- An insured or his or her beneficiary is not entitled to a windfall based on the mistake.
In reaching its decision, the court rejected the insured beneficiaries’ arguments that the insurer was aware of the mistake
and there were available means to avoid it; the mistake was a mistake of law; the insurer ratified the mistake; and that the
insurer assumed the rest.
Practice Note: Mistaken payments made globally can be ripe for class action certification.
TENNESSEE
1. Dismissal of Complaint – Certification denied.
John and Mary Stiers v. State Farm Insurance, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87591 (E.D.Tn., June 25, 2012).
In this putative class action, the plaintiffs seek to represent “thousands” of State Farm homeowners insured under their
replacement cost insurance policies of storm damage to their homes. The court held that because the plaintiff’s failed to
allege a plausible claim that they received insufficient funds from the insurer to repair their property, the complaint was
dismissed including the claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud,
unjust enrichment and injunctive and declaratory relief.
Practice Note: Where a complaint is dismissed on its merits because the plaintiffs failed to state an individual claim,
the plaintiffs cannot maintain those claims on behalf of the putative class.
TEXAS
1. Title Insurance – Charged premium is excess certification denied.
Stewart Title Guaranty Company v. John Mims, 405 S.W.3d 319 (C.A. of Tex., Dallas June 29, 2013).
The plaintiff insureds instituted this class against the title insurer alleging claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment
and many had and received based on allegations that the insurer charged premiums for policies that exceeded rates set
by the Texas Department of Insurance (“TDI”). The district court had granted the insured’s motion for certification. This
court reversed and remanded the case. In reaching its decision, the court noted that the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
42 governs certification of class actions in Texas and held that:
Actual conformance with Rule 42 is indispensable, and compliance with the rule must be demonstrated, not
presumed.
As with the Federal Rules,[10] under this statute there are four prerequisites:
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8. - Numerosity;
- Commonality;
- Typicality; and
- Adequacy of representation.
The court specifically addressed the prerequisite that requires that questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. In doing so, the court noted that “predominance”
is one of the most stringent prerequisites to class certification. The court denied class certification because the plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the predominance requirement under Rule 42(b)(3).
Practice Note: Where the insurance field is highly regulated, the premium charged could be subject to challenge.
2. Life Settlements Under Life Insurance Policy – Certification granted.
Life Partners v. Helen J. McDermott, 2014 WL 2810472 (C.A. of Tex., Dallas June 23, 2014).
The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and individuals similarly situated, filed this action against Life Partners one of the oldest
and most active companies in the United States engaged in secondary market for life insurance known generally as
“life settlements” – sale of an existing life insurance policy by the policyholder who is ill and/or elderly to another.
Plaintiff asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.
Under the mechanics of these policies, the plaintiff placed a sum of money in escrow with Life Partners which was for a
factional interest in a life policy on another. This sum of money, with other escrow payments, was to be used to pay the
premium of the life policy. It appears that Life Partners overpaid the premium because the individual insured under the
policy died earlier than expected. The life insurance company did not refund the overpayment of the premium. The plain-
tiff in this action is seeking a return of her pro-rata share of the overpaid premium.
At issue was whether the class should be certified. Life Partners challenged this class certification on the “numerosity”
and adequacy of representation prerequisites and not on commonality or typicality. The court granted certification and
rejected the Life Partners’ argument that the trial court failed to conduct a rigorous analysis to determine whether all
prerequisites to certification were met.
Practice Note: Where state certification rules are based on the Federal Rules, Federal precedents can be used to
analyze various prerequisites.
WISCONSIN
1. Insurance Infomercial Advertisement – Certification denied.
Harry R. Wiedenbeck v. Cinergy Health, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134672 (D. WI., Sept. 20, 2013).
The insurer engaged in marketing in the State of Wisconsin through various internet and television “infomercials.”
It is the plaintiffs’ contention that the infomercials were intentionally misleading and misrepresented the limited
benefits health insurance policies. In rejecting class certification, the court reviewed the numerosity, typicality/
commonality, adequacy of representation and predominance and superiority prerequisite. The court held that none
of the prerequisites were met and therefore, denied certification.
Practice Note: Of interest, the court noted for various reasons the adequacy of representation was “dubious.”
Endnotes
[1] 296 F.R.D. 63 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2013).
[2] Mahon, 296 F.R.D., at 71 (internal citations omitted).
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9. [3] Id.
[4] Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349 LEXIS 15959 (3d Cir. Aug. 12, 2013).
[5] Mahon at 72 citing, Gen. Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155, 102 S.Ct. 2634, 72 L.Ed. 740 (1982).
[6] See, Mahon at 75 citing, In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2001).
[7] See, also, Lane v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 269133 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
[8] See, also, Bleich v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., 117 So.3d 1163 (D.Ct. of App. 3d Dist., June 21, 2013).
[9] See, also, Rufus McKnight v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8582 (E.D. La. Jan. 25, 2012)(concerning
prescription applicable).
[10] Because Rule 42 is patterned under Federal Rule 23, federal decisions and authorities were considered instructive.
About The Author
Thomas F. Segalla, a member of the FCS Legal Editorial Advisory Board, is a founding partner of Goldberg Segalla and
a member of the firm’s Global Insurance Services Group. Mr. Segalla is a nationally recognized authority on bad faith,
reinsurance, and insurance, and an ARIAS Board-Certified Arbitrator and mediator. Resident in the firm’s New York City
office, Mr. Segalla can be reached at tsegalla@goldbergsegalla.com.
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