Civis

ISSN 1800-9328

Montenegrin Journal
of Political Science
volume 1 | number 1 | januar 2012

Montenegrin Journal of Political Science
www.fpn.co.me

Editor in Chief | Glavna urednica: Sonja Tomović-Šundić

Editorial board | Redakcija :
Srđan Darmanović, University of Montenegro
Saša Knežević, University of Montenegro
Miloš Bešić, University of Montenegro
Nataša Ružić, University of Montenegro

International Advisory Board | Međunarodni urednički odbor:
Ivo Banac, Yale University
Nenad Dimitrijević, Central European University
Florian Bieber, University of Graz
Danica Fink-Hafner, University of Ljubljana
Anton Grizold, University of Ljubljana
Vlado Miheljak, University of Ljubljana
Ivan Šiber, University of Zagreb
Vladimir Goati, Institute for Social Research, Belgrade
Čedomir Čupić, University of Belgrade
Ratko Božović, University of Belgrade
Ana Čekerevac, University of Belgrade
Ilija Vujačić, University of Belgrade

Assistant editors | Pomoćnici urednika: Ivan Vuković, Olivera Komar

Civis (MJPS) is interdisciplinary, independently peer-reviewed journal that publishes articles,
book reviews and research results in the field of politics and political science.
Journal is published yearly by the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Montenegro.

This issue is now available at www.fpn.co.me

Civis (MPSJ) je interdisciplinarni, nezavisno recenzirani časopis koji objavljuje članke, prikaze
knjiga, kao i rezultate istraživanja koji su najšire vezani za oblast politike.
Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta Crne Gore objavljuje časopis jednom godišnje.

Ovo izdanje je dostupno na www.fpn.co.me

Sadržaj

005 Riječ urednice / Sonja Tomović Šundić

oo7 Occupational Attainment in Montenegro / Miloš Bešić

o31 Novine u politici zaštite ljudskih prava u Evropi: pristupanje Evropske
unije Evropskoj konvenciji o ljudskim pravima / Ivana Jelić

o45 Budžetska sredstva za finansiranje razvoja EU / Dragan Đurić

o65 Kosmopolitizam i lokalizam u zemljama bivše SFRJ / Marina Vasić

o87 Filozofija demokratije Džona Djuija (prikaz knjige Bojana Spaića:
Politička i pravna filozofija Džona Djuija) / Ilija Vujačić

{ 5 } Riječ urednice

Sonja Tomović Šundić

Riječ
urednice

Prvi put se u Crnoj Gori pojavljuje časopis za političku teoriju i društvena
istraživanja „Civis“. Posvećen je temama iz politike u najširem smislu, istraživanjem
njenih složenih procesa sa stanovišta nauke i empirijskih rezultata. Po svojoj
prirodi čovjek je homo-politicos, političko biće pa je život u zajednici i učešće u
javnom životu duboko povezano sa ljudskim načinom postojanja.
Cilj časopisa „Civis“ jeste da unaprijedi naše znanje o političkim
sistemima i političkim ustanovama da bi smo razumjeli smisao politike, kao i da
utiče na stvaranje nove političke kulture. Koncept „Civisa“ utemeljen je na analizi
ključnih pojmova demokratske političke kulture, promovišući njene osnovne
vrijednosti. To je način da se politički fenomeni tumače koristeći se iskustvima
različitih oblasti: sociologije, teorije međunarodnih odnosa, filozofije, istorije,
prava i ekonomije da bi se njihovi različiti aspekti i važnost za društveni život
potpunije analizirali i shvatili. Na temelju interdisciplinarnih uvida moguće
je razvijati vrijednosti građanskog društva čime bi se uticalo na stvaranje
demokratske javnosti i participativne kulture ponašanja.
Zanimanje za politiku prisutno je od početka ljudske civilizacije do
danas. Od kad postoji misao o politici tražen je državni oblik u kome se može
stvoriti pravedno društvo. Ali, nije jednostavno definisati suštinu političkog
života niti objasniti principe demokratije kao i dominantne pojmove politike. U
tom kontekstu posebno su iskustva totalitarnih ideologija XX vijeka, gašenjem
osnovnih ljudskih prava i sloboda ostavila snažan pečat na evropsku istoriju,
ali i na balkanske narode utičiću neposredno na pojavu različitih vidova
nedemokratskih odnosa i institucija.
Očekujemo da će časopis „Civis“ imati važnu ulogu u našem društvenom
životu ali i u regionalnom. Svi tekstovi su pažljivo odabrani uz poštovanje stroge
naučne procedure. Naš cilj je da promovišemo politiku u njenoj povezanosti sa
demokratskim vrijednostima, doprinosimo obnovi prirodne veze između politike
i etike i osnažimo našu svijest o neophodnosti uspostavljanja demokratije i
građanskih sloboda.

{ 7 } Miloš Bešić

Miloš Bešić Autor je profesor na
Fakultetu političkih nauka
Univerziteta Crne Gore

Occupational
(e-mail: besicmilos@yahoo.com)

Attainment in
Montenegro 1 Profesionalno dostignuće u
Crnoj Gori

Abstract
This paper has a specific focus on the social stratification in
Montenegro. It involves the perspective offered in the Market Transition Theory
as a theoretical background for understanding the main shifts in social structure
in post-communist societies. Its key methodological task is to illuminate the
most important social mechanisms that enable mobility towards prestigious
occupations. As a method, it applies Multinomial Regression Analysis. The main
findings of the paper are as follows: with respect to occupational attainment,
while factors of human capital are very important, the factors of political
capital are of a considerable significance as well. Moreover, in interaction with
the human capital factors, the political factors tend to be more important for
acquiring high position in society. Finally, the paper offers a theoretical analysis
of the actual socio-political constellation in order to explain the persistence of
the political factors considering social mobility in Montenegro.

Keywords: social stratification, human capital, social mobility,
transition

Introduction
Simple questions that need to be raised after 15 years of transition
are the following: when does this process end? Are we still in the phase
of radical social transformation? Is this process over so that we should no
longer speak about transition, or should we speak about post-socialist
capitalism instead? If this process is over, then we can start with a new task of
neo-classic sociology, and that is: ‘the sociology of comparative capitalism’
(Stark and Bruszt, 1998; Szelenyi, 1998). The case of Montenegro is a unique
one, although we can say that each post-communist country has its own
specificities. It is unique simply because after political institutional change,

{ 8 } Occupational Attainment in Montenegro

which meant the introduction of political pluralism, the party which came
to power (Democratic Party of Socialists) is the party which that inherited
SKJ (Alliance of Yugoslav Communists), the only party which existed
during socialism. Therefore, in terms of continuity/discontinuity (Nee, 1989,
1992, 1996) we have to take into consideration the fact that there is no
fundamental elite circulation in Montenegro.
Bearing this in mind, if we view transition as a process of radical
transformation at all levels of society, we can question either the concept
of ‘transition’ or the process as such in the case of Montenegro. Since
the ruling party in this country kept all the positions and advantages of
the SKJ, this brought about inevitable social changes, not beacuse of
internal dynamics and needs of the society, but due to the pressure of the
overall post-communist environment. The dynamics of reform, therefore,
is adjusted to interests of political elite, who tries to use the power and
privileges they had during socialism in order to transpose the power and
privileges into their own hands on a new basis: market distribution (Hankiss,
1990; Stanszkis,1991).
One way or another, with political marketization, an introduction of
free market was inevitable. In this process, independently of the will of the
political elite, the stable stratification order of the society begins to change.
The small entrepreneurship based on private property starts to rise, and
this process increases the whole social dynamics and mobility. On the other
hand, the state sector was only partially privatized. By keeping the main
resources of the economic power, the political elite still greatly regulates
the entire economic process. The privatization of the big companies² is 2 The term ‘big’ is certainly
still subject to political debate, and it happens occasionally, just in order to relative by its nature, but one has
buy political peace, or to use this process as part of the overall liberalization to take into consideration the
fact that Montenegro is a ‘small’
discourse. Meanwhile, there is more than enough time to establish all society according to any possible
the mechanisms, which enable transposition of the state property to the criterion.
hands of ‘transitional bourgeoisie’, which consists of the new/old political
elite and their entrepreneurial alliances. Conceptually, on the road of social
transformation, we can qualify the case of Montenegro as managerial
capitalism (Eyal, 1998). The main consequences of this particular form,
which arise in Montenegro, are: economic crises, overall pauperization
of the population, unemployment, and social polarization. Additionally,
social transformation is shaped ‘at the top’, through activities of the political
elite and through pressure of the international environment, and ‘at the
bottom’, through small entrepreneurship which is the result of the market
liberalization.
All in all, if we accept the thesis that social transformation of the
market has three stages of ‘market penetration’ (Szelenyi and Kostello, 1996),
we can assume that in the case of Montenegro we are just approaching the
third phase, namely the privatization of the whole state sector. Therefore,
if the social transformation, in its economic dimension, implies the basic
change of the ownership in terms of the domination of private property,


we can say that this process in Montenegro is not over yet. Eventually, social
structure in terms of stratification is not a stable one, and it is a ‘mirror’ of the
convergent society. By illuminating the redistribution of power, privileges
and material property through stratification perspective, we may be able to
understand better the nature and dynamics of the social change in case of
Montenegro.

1. Stratification in the post-communist society:
Conceptual framework
There are two important aspects that we must take into consideration
when speaking of stratification of the post-communist societies. First, it is
a problem of the process as such. In this perspective, we are interested in
how social groups are redistributed, or in other words, who is the winner
and who is the loser in this process. Second, it is the final outcome of the
process of re-stratification, or what the new stratification is like, regardless
of the mechanisms and process as such. So we can simply separate the final
outcome from the process. It seems that all the considerations and analyses
of the stratification of the post-communist society are based on the first
aspect, the process of redistribution of power in all its dimensions. So, the
final structural shape of the post-communist society is not a problem, since
it will be more or less the same as the stratification of any other capitalist
society, adjusted to the specific cultural background, and to a different
developmental level in a civilization sense.
Although the idea that post-socialism has many destinations (Kitschelt,
1999) is indisputable, the very ‘western’ capitalism as such can hardly be
unified with the same concept, as well, not to mention ‘non-western’ forms
of the capitalism. Therefore, the differences in the final shape of the post-
communist socialism could be understood as a necessity of the impossibility
to produce the same outcome with different presumptions. So, the first
question stays and, as with many others, we have to illuminate the new
stratification order in post-communist society in terms of the analysis of
social mechanisms and processes which allow certain social groups to
maintain, change, or lose their social positions.
Regardless of whether we agree or disagree with Market Transition
Theory (Nee, 1989, 1991, 1996), the conceptual framework that is offered
in this approach is almost an inevitable starting point in the analysis of the
post-communist society. The very idea of this theory is relatively simple. It
implies that market liberalization changes the basic social mobility pattern.
By involving free market, political elite who has all the power of control
in the socialist society loses this privilege and therefore loses the leading
position in society. On the other hand, regarding market liberalization,
entrepreneurs arise as a new social group, and this group obtains power
through accumulation of economic resources. Consequently, the very


idea of this theory is that the political society will be dissolved and that
instead of the domination of the political elite the main actors in the social
space will be new class – the owners of the private property. Therefore,
the problem of ownership becomes a central issue (Nee, 1989, 1991). More
specifically, the control over resources is the natural basis of social positions.
By shifting from planned to market economy the control over resources is
redistributed form communist bureaucracy toward private entrepreneurs.
But, who are the new entrepreneurs? Where do they come from? How do
they obtain the power to appropriate the resources of the communist state?
These are the central issues that have to be illuminated from stratification
perspective.
Of course, there are many theoretical (and empirical) answers to the
questions put above. But first, we must not forget that in this perspective
we are not moving from any society toward capitalist society, but rather
from one specific form of the state market economy lead by the strong
hand of the communist party. So, in the case when a certain social group
has an overall political and economic power, it is not reasonable to predict
that this group will simply leave over the process of social transformation
without ‘embedding’ itself in new stratification order. In order words, a
more reasonable prediction is that they will use their power and privileges
in order to obtain the positions in the society that will come after
transformation (Hankiss, 1990). The initial advantage is based on the fact
that the transformation of economic order depends on socialist institutional
order, which means that stratification order, as the final outcome, will be a
product of institutional-political transaction (Staniszkis, 1991). But to predict
something about the future of the post-socialist society proved to be an
ungrateful task (Szelenyi, 1979, 1988; Burawoy, 1992). Namely, to mark the
current trends as one premise and to put a few theoretical ideas as another
premise, almost inevitably leads to wrong conclusions. The problem is that
in the ‘moving’ society, the idea of ‘causation’ must be supported with the
idea of ‘constellation’. From the epistemological point of view, the best
method, in my opinion, is the method of ‘constellational causality’. This
method implies involvement of empirical findings based on the specific
social environment inside the very idea of causation, by controlling and
questioning theoretical presumptions which derive from unlimited ability
of abstract thinking, and finally, not to go too far.
So, what is the constellation of socialism as it was in former
Yugoslavia, and specifically in Montenegro? The truth is that although
socialism was not a classless society (Đilas, 1957) in its early phases it had lots
of success in terms of social development (Popović, 1977.). Moreover, it was
more than a successful society in terms of ‘upward’ mobility by neutralizing
the effect of social origin and family status (Simkus and Andorka, 1982;
Wong, 1995). As far as we speak about Yugoslav socialism, one must be
aware of the fact that this model is different from other ‘east’ socialisms in


many points of view. The overall economic results of this society (regardless
of the causes) were much better, and all the economic indicators (GDB,
GNP, employment, standard of living etc.) were competitive even in
comparison with many developed ‘west’ societies (Portugal, Spain, Greece,
even Italy). Also, the role of working class was much stronger than in any
other socialist society, although it was limited by the power of the ruling
Communist Party. In terms of social mobility, as long as one respected
the ideological pattern, he/she could reach a high position, regardless
of the social background (Popović, 1997). Moreover, in economic terms,
Yugoslav socialism introduced ‘mixed’ economy (Konrad and Szelenyi,
1979), much earlier then any other socialist society, and therefore in early
70’s it can be qualified as ‘market socialism’ (Przeworski, 1991). On the
other hand, the common feature with other east societies was the overall
domination of politics over economy (Horvat, 1982, Lazić, 1994). Thus, all
the positive effects of the market economy were potentially jeopardized
by redistributive mechanisms of the state (Lazić, 1994). The latent and
permanent conflict between ideology and economy always ended in favor
of ideology and its carriers – class of the collective owners (ibid). Finally,
socialism crashed, not only due to internal contradictions, but also due to
the overall change of the international environment. One way or another,
in the case of Montenegro (and Serbia) the communist party transformed
into socialist party and kept the whole political and economic power,
proclaiming itself as the leader of the process of social transformation. In
these circumstances, the process of transformation was followed by the
strong role of the state, which took nationalism instead of communist
ideology as the basis of social legitimization (Bešić, 2001). Thus, one form of
totalization was substituted with another form of totalization, legitimizing
the main role of the state and political elite. The final outcome was that
the process of privatization was delayed. In terms of social transformation
the total transformation of society as wholeness without basic change of
ownership, is inevitably limited (Walder, 1996).
During socialism, there were two main reasons which prevented
the ‘class of collective owners’ (Lazić, 1990) from transfering state wealth
into their own hands. First, it was the strong pressure of the ideology,
which was the basis of social legitimization, and second, there is no free
market where one can materialize and increase her/his wealth. After
transition had begun, these two obstacles disappeared. It looked like the
communist elite would relatively easily redistribute the resources and stay
onto high social positions on a new basis (Szelenyi, 1979). Additionally,
the institutional anomy and particularly the weakness of judicial system
proved to be inefficient without ideological pattern it had supported for
decades. Therefore, the legal control of the wealth redistribution was not
an obstacle either. But, it seems to be a wrong prediction, according to
further scenarios and empirical analysis (Ibid, 1998). The point is that the


process of redistribution is not as smooth as it looks like. Even if you have
all the mechanisms in your own hands, you have to solve the problem of
public opinion as well as certain ethical issues (constellational causality).
So what you really need to do is find some appropriate and efficient legal
mechanism of redistribution, which can be culturally accepted and ethically
justified. That means that the very idea of the appropriation by the political
elite is not wrong as such. It’s just a case that it must be done in a specific
manner that can be culturally justified. The extent of success of the political
elite on this trajectory can differ depending on specific circumstances and
constellation, as well as on individual capabilities of the actors. The way it goes
in Montenegro is the establishing of a reliable network among ‘newcomers’
and political elite. Those newcomers differ in terms of their origin. Some of
them are old party comrades, some are reliable friends from the past, and
some are part of the traditional ‘brotherhood’ network. One way or another,
since transition starts, the common feature for all of them is that they are
apparently new and successful entrepreneurs and that all of them have
‘someone’ at a high-level political position. But there is the other side of the
story. In order to justify the new ideology of the incoming society, i.e. ‘equal
chances for all’, there must be some room left for those entrepreneurs who
don’t have any of the advantages described above. They just try to survive
in market economy on the basis of free market logic, following the well-
known pattern (or stereotype) of success. Those attempts were more or less
successful, as in any market economy, but what is common for this group
is the very fact that their overall achievement is limited by the incapability
to play the game without two main resources: political connections and
high financial accumulation. Therefore, they remain in the socio-economic
space as players on the local markets fighting for survival each day.
It is hard to empirically capture and estimate the size of those two
‘newcomers’ groups, which identify themselves as entrepreneurs, but one
doesn’t need to be a sociologist to claim that the size of the ‘transitional
bourgeoisie’ is significantly smaller comparing to ‘petty bourgeoisie’, or
in other words, there are no more than a few really big entrepreneurs in
Montenegro. So, the main theoretical point considering the problem
of wealth distribution in the case of Montenegro is that political elite
distributes the wealth not in their own hands but in the hands of others for
their own benefit. This means that coalition among ‘transitional bourgeoisie’
and political elite will last as long as there are significant resources to
be redistributed. After that, we can expect the new stratification to be
established as a stable structural element of the society.
But the picture we offered above is based on simplification as a
legitimate scientific weapon. Therefore it is just an ‘ideal type’. In reality
everything seems to be more complex, as it has always been. There are
a few main causes of the complexity. First, it is the very nature of political
power, meaning that ideology plays its role in shaping the overall socio-


economic relations. It takes occasionally some victims in order to prove
its basic devotion to justice. Second, since the political market is open
(Parish and Michelson, 1996), there is always some threat that the process
of wealth redistribution will be jeopardized. Therefore, targeting the
political enemies and their nullification is an inevitable and integral part
of this process. Finally, transition is not something that goes on without
international constellation. Therefore, since the financial accumulation of
the ‘newcomers’ is not sufficient in the process of privatization in the cases
of huge enterprises, international corporations are involved. Today, the
biggest enterprises are still owned by the state, which means that political
elite holds the main control over the resources. But, in order to buy political
peace, political elite has to sell this property to those who are financially
capable, and these are foreign enterprises³. All these elements make the 3Until 2005 the only big company
overall picture of the society somewhat vague, which brings about many that had been sold to foreign
investors was The Beer Industry
obstacles toward the empirical analysis of stratification. ‘Trebjesa’. Recently, we witnessed
such acquisitions of the State
2. Toward the research perspective of the Telecommunication Company,
The Podgorica Aluminium
stratification Factory, as well as the state
owned Electricity Company
Based on its premises, one of the basic theoretical presumptions
of the Market Transition Theory is that in the stratification perspective, after
market liberalization we can expect strengthening the factors based on
human capital and weakening the factors based on political capital (Nee,
1989, 2000). There are two main reasons for this claim. First, it is the fact that
comparing to socialism free market brings an advantage to direct producers
who can sell goods in the market directly instead of being involved in the
process of state redistribution. Second, the influence of free market is
directed toward investment into human capital. Third, free market enables
increasing social mobility which is out of the state control, which means
that the role of the state in shaping the stratification is limited (Nee, 1989).
The opposite idea, considering the Market Transition Theory, would be
that market liberalization in the conditions while political elite control the
overall economic resources, it will use the process of social transformation
in order to keep highest positions in society by transforming state resources
into their own hands (Rona-Tas, 1994; Bian and Logan, 1996; Konrad and
Szelenyi 1988). Therefore, market transition is inevitably an object of the
political logic and control (Shirk, 1993).
So, the first question is to illuminate the concepts of ‘human’
and ‘political’ capital, respectively. The idea of significance of the ‘human
capital’ in market economy is not a new one (Becker, 1964). The very
essence of this idea is that ‘education’ is the most profitable investment
in the market-oriented society. Since this is an investment, the education
can be transformed through market into material wealth (Mincer, 1974;
Willis, 1986). Beside education, the integral part of human capital is ‘on-


job-training’. In late 60’s the idea of human capital was operationalized and
used as status measurement (Blau and Duncan, 1967). As far as we speak of
‘political capital’, it is usually understood as acquiring certain elite position
in the state bureaucracy by using the channels of the inter-party mobility
(so call ‘cadre’ positions). This way, as a member of the political oligarchy,
the party ‘cadres’ are able to dispose the overall state property as well as
to redistribute the public wealth according to planned economy projects.
(Nee, 1991; Szelenyi, 1979). So, the simple meaning of the political capital
would be ‘belonging to a certain party and its network’.
In empirical/research perspective the whole theoretical debate can
be explained in terms of continuity/discontinuity (Nee, 1992, 1996). In other
words the issue that has to be resolved is whether market liberalization
increases or decreases the advantage of the political elite (cadre) who holds
the monopoly of the overall economic resources. If the final outcome of
market liberalization leads toward the new stratification structure in which
the former members of the political elite hold the highest positions, we
can confirm continuity. Otherwise, if market liberalization leads toward
the model of stratification where new entrepreneurs substitute the former
members of political elite, we can confirm discontinuity.
Although it seems simple, to verify empirically the thesis described
above is not so easy. This model, although empirically fruitful, can be
questioned theoretically and empirically by the very nature of both the
socialist and capitalist society. Namely, in the socialist society ‘human
capital’ was also very important. Although it was not the main criterion for
gaining the highest social positions, it was a necessary precondition for the
‘upwards’ mobility. To absorb intellectual elite was a very important goal for
the political elite in state socialism (Szelenyi, 1979). The intellectuals were
needed for the three main reasons. First, it is the fact that planned economy
asks for ‘technocrats’ who are able to handle all the problems which
planned economy ‘produces’. Second, intellectuals, especially (humanistic
intelligence) were needed for the efficient ideological control and political
reproduction of the society. Finally, by substituting the intellectuals, ruling
class neutralizes the possible dangerous enemy (Đilas, 1957). So, the final
conclusion is that in the state socialism education as a form of capital was also
important for the social mobility. There is no question about the significance
of the political capital in the state socialism. But to claim that ‘political capital’
is not important in the capitalist society is problematic as well (Rona-Tass,
1994). In a capitalist society, there is a strong bond between politics and
economy, i.e. the main actors in economy (corporations) often have strong
relations with the state on the bases of ‘mutual interest’ (Galbraith, 1982).
Thus Rona-Tas (Ibid) emphasizes that there is no contradiction between
political and human capital. Human capital is important in socialism, just
as political capital is important in capitalism. The main difference appeared
to be at the level of the relative importance of these two types of capital. In
other words, to put it simply, it should be ‘expected’ that human capital is


more important in market economy, while the political capital is supposed
to be more important in planned economy.
There is a number of empirical analyses that challenge Market
Transition Theory (Rona-Tas, 1994; Bian and Logan, 1996). Moreover, the
recent research in China regarding market liberalization that has been
introduced shows that regardless of the process of economic liberalization,
the political elite (cadre) still holds all the power and privileges. Nee (1991,
1996) explained these findings not as the problem of the theory as such,
but as the problem of ‘imperfect transition’. His main argument is that ‘the
earnings of many economic actors in society increase at a faster rate than
that of political actors’ (Nee, 1996: 916). In other words, by introducing the
market, the main point in the perspective of market liberalization is that
as an outcome we can verify increasing ‘upward’ mobility of the lower
social strata, while ‘downward’ mobility of the political elite (cadre) is not
necessary.
Perhaps the best theoretical perspective of stratification in post-communist
societies involves the idea of ‘convergent society’, which arises in ‘hybrid
economy’. Therefore, in the process of social transformation we can identify
the old stratification structure, which still holds and the new one, which
come from liberal market (Rona-Tas, 1994; Walder, 1995; Nee, 1996; Parish
and Michelson, 1996). We thus have to develop an analytical perspective,
which enables insight into different and co-existing stratification patterns.
By using this kind of analytical approach we must refer to specific
mechanisms that reproduce continuity as well as to identify those which
produce discontinuity. Moreover, since the society in its empirical sense is
wholeness, we must be able to identify the specific ways in which the two
stratification structures interact with each other.
It is not necessary to compare the two systems to prove that
capitalism is ‘better’ than socialism. However, considering the problem of
‘inequality’ from comparative perspective there is one more important issue
that must be discussed. Namely, often in overall theoretical discourse about
the stratification of the post-communist societies, the ‘silent’ presumption
is that state socialism is the society based on ‘inequality’ while capitalism
is the society based on ‘equality’. This way, a social transformation of the
state socialism is considered as the process of shifting a society from
inequality toward equality. From the point of critical sociology it must be
clear that this presumption is an ideological one, and that every society
whose economy is based on free market, inevitably produces inequalities,
by dividing the social groups into those which are successful on the market
and those which are not. Thus, market liberalization can even increase social
inequalities that exist in state socialism (Nee 1991; Rona Tass, 1994; Parish
and Michelson, 1996; Walder 1996). Instead of one simple mechanism of
social diversification (political participation) we have an additional one
that is based on market affiliation. This not only changes the patterns of
stratification, but also increases overall social differences.


Going back to the empirical level, without trying to get involved in
huge theoretical debates, we will analyze the relative importance of ‘human’
and ‘political’ capital, respectively, in the case of Montenegro. The starting
point would be the presumption that, with respect to market transition,
human capital plays an important role in the process of social stratification.
The opposite argument would simply be the presumption that political
capital is important from the stratification perspective. Additionally we
will try to illuminate the relative importance of some socio-demographic
predictors of the social status. Considering all the theoretical arguments
discussed above, we may assume that both, political and human capital are
important, and that their specific weight depends on the analytical level
which is the final destination in the abstract way of thinking. But, sooner
or later, the ‘two societies’, which exist in convergent social space, must
interact with each other. We will try to estimate the nature and the final
outcome of this interaction.

3. Data, method and measurement
a) Data

The data used for the analysis were collected in the fall of 2003.
The research in Montenegro made an integral part of the so- called SEESP
project. In other words, the questionnaire was the same as for other
Western Balkan Countries. The questionnaire itself was a result of internal
analysis and agreement among researches that were involved in the
research. There were in fact two instruments. Both have the same number
of questions, but each has separate sets of questions. The first questionnaire
is mostly focused on stratification issues and the other one on religious and
ethnical issues. However, the ‘main’ questions regarding the social status
were in both instruments. Since there were two questionnaires, we had two
independent, but representative samples (2 x 750). The samples, as such,
are the combination of the stratified and random sampling procedure.
The stratified procedures of the sampling were based on two main criteria:
regional division and the residence size. After choosing the basic units4, 4‘Mesna zajednica’ – the smallest
random sampling procedure was applied. Each census circle consists of 7-8 municipal unit in Montenegro.
households chosen on step-end-go basis. Besides the two representative
samples, there was an additional sample of 350 respondents for ethnic
minorities. The idea of this additional sample was to provide enough cases
for the comparative examination of the ethnical issues. So, we eventually
had 1850 respondents in our data files. In this particular analysis, by merging
two samples (2 x 750) as well as by adding 16 cases from the additional
sample (randomly chosen among the target group) in order to correct
some deficient categories, we had 1516 respondents for the analysis.
Post-stratification weights procedure was carried out on the basis of age,
gender and ethnicity. Since our research perspective for this purpose was


occupational attainment as an aspect of social stratification, the analysis
covered only those respondents who reported that they receive any kind
of income. Therefore, all in all, 1021 respondents were left for the analysis5. 5 While estimating the size of
samples, one should keep in
mind that total population in
b) Dependent variable Montenegro older then 18 is
455,731
The immediate object of our research is ‘occupational attainment’,
so our dependent variable was ‘respondent occupation’. Unwilling to get
involved into class analysis debate, we do not aim at solving the problem
of the class mapping at either the theoretical or empirical level. We
merely used classical schemes of the social strata based on occupation.
Additionally, we adjusted those schemas with our empirical material, since
it was more than necessary to merge some categories in order to provide a
sufficient number of cases for the analysis. The occupation as a variable was
constructed regarding a few element variables: respondent occupational
self-identification, the title of the occupation, the description of the job
(duties) and respondent estimation of the training or qualifications, which
are required for his/her job. Finally, we identified six occupational groups
and these are: managers, professionals, entrepreneurs, technicians and
clerks, skilled and service workers, and unskilled workers (Table 1). Among
1021 respondents that we involved into the analysis, we could identify
occupation for 1003 respondents. Thus, our analysis is based on this number
of cases.

Table 1. Frequency distribution of the dependent variable

Occupational Status N %
Managers 42 4.2
Professionals 119 11.8
Entrepreneurs 46 4.6
Technicians & Clerks 295 29.4
Skilled & Service workers 344 34.3
Unskilled workers 158 15.7
Total 1003 100.0

Among managers all the levels are included, which means that in
this category we have higher level, middle level and lower level managers.
This was necessary since the total number of manager is relatively small.
We use the term professionals in conventional sense to refer to a person
with a university degree, who does a job that requires a university degree.
As for entrepreneurs it was inevitable to merge all the respondents who
are owners or co-owners of a private business, regardless of a relative


difference in their status (size of the enterprise, number of employees etc.).
Technicians and clerks are practically ‘white collar workers’. We merged
them since it was hard to distinguish among them according to their job
description6. Skilled and service workers are practically ‘qualified workers’ 6 ‘The attempt to involve ISCO-
both in industrial sector and in services7. Finally, unskilled workers are those 88 coding scheme appears
to be dead end especially in
who have no qualification or have some very low level of job training. This
light of this distinction. For
category includes mainly ‘blue collar workers’, but also workers from other example, according to ISCO
sectors who do ‘low’ unskilled jobs. coding schema, technicians
are supposed to be at the
We want to emphasize that this occupational map is not any third skill level. However, in
former Yugoslavia, most of the
kind of class or strata analysis of the post-communist society, but only a technicians were on the second
methodologically produced classification of the occupation for the purpose skill level (medical nurses for
of the occupational attainment analysis8. instance).

c) Comparison of the socioeconomic status of 7 We were in dilemma whether
to merge service and skilled
occupational categories workers. Namely, the main
difference among them is that
The main idea of the occupational attainment is the difference service workers work in service
among occupations in terms of social status. So, since each occupation sector, while skilled workers are
qualified ‘blue collar workers’ in
holds particular social status, the occupational categories are not equally industry. On the other hand, they
desirable destinations. By trying to reach as high social status as possible, are very close according to the
an individual following certain social trajectories enters into some of the level of qualification, education
occupational categories. Thus in order to see which categories are most and social status. We decided
to merge them given that our
prestigious, we have to compare them. In stratification theory different
analysis of the occupational
criteria have been used for the purpose of defining the socioeconomic attainment is primarily focused
status (Duncan, 1961; Goldthorpe, 1972; Treiman, 1977; Wright, 1988). But, on ‘higher’ occupations. Such
since this is a somewhat different issue considering our research goals, we decision, in any case, does not
present just the differences among occupation categories in two aspects: affect the overall analysis.
education and income (Table 2).
8 Of course that we tried to
make analysis based on different
Table 2. Median Income and Educational differences among occupations 9 classification of the occupation,
but the classification that we
chose proved to be the most
Occupation Education Income in EUR
appropriate form the statistical
Manager 16.00 200 – 249 and interpretational point of
view.
Professionals 16.00 250 – 299
Entrepreneurs 12.00 250 – 299 9 According to the official data
Technicians & Clerks 12.00 150 – 199 provided by the Republic Office
for Development, the average
Skilled & Service workers 11.00 100 - 149 income for 2003 was 173.9 EUR.
Unskilled workers 8.00 Less than 100 This information corresponds
with the median income we
Total found in this research.
(Average for the entire population)
12.00 150 – 199


Since we used ordinal scale for the income in the questionnaire, we present
the median income of each occupational category. In other words, this is
the corresponding income category for each occupation. Also, we present
the median education in order to reduce the standard error based on mean.
According to these data, we can clearly see that managers, professionals
and entrepreneurs are much more prestigious then other categories. Also,
we can see that managers reported a lower income than professionals and
entrepreneurs. This is partly because in our sample we had somehow less
high-level managers comparing to middle-level and lower-level managers,
and partly because the managers always try to ‘obscure’ their material
status. Also, it is obvious that the managerial elite is well educated, while
entrepreneurs fall behind managers and professionals in this sense. As far as
we speak about the income of the entrepreneurs, it must be clear that most
of the them in the sample (as well as most of them in overall population)
are ‘small’ by any possible criterion.
Comparing the other occupastional groups we can see hierarchical
order among groups both, in terms of education and in terms of income
as well. The ‘lowest’ category of unskilled workers is significantly depressed
when compared to all other occupational groups.
This estimation of the social status of the occupations does not
include ‘supervisor variables’10 since that approach, in this particular case, 10
These variables provide
would not be very informative. All in all, if we take for granted the thesis that the information about the
income and education are the main benefits (without considerations how supervision of others at work. If
we take into consideration the
they interact each other), we might say that first three categories must be nature of Montenegrin society,
in focus from the social stratification perspective, or to put it simply, they this aspect must be included
represent desirable destinations of individual endeavor. in measurement of the social
status.
d) Method, measurement and Independent variables

Our dependent variable is categorical by its nature. Therefore we
used multinomial logistic regression in order to illuminate occupational
attainment. The reference category for the Multinomial Regression Analysis
is ‘unskilled workers’. Therefore, the regression coefficients, estimates the
effects of the independent variables on the log-odds of entering a certain
occupational category, as opposed to becoming unskilled worker11. This should be kept in mind
11

The methodological focus of the analysis was on the significance while analyzing data.
of factors of the human and political capital, respectively, in the perspective
of occupational attainment. Therefore, we put forward two main predictors
(independent variables). As an indicator for human capital we used
respondent total number of education and as an indicator for political
capital we used two variables separately. The first one is the membership
in SKJ (The Alliance of the Communists of Yugoslavia), and the second is
membership in any party in the present political space. The second variable
includes the party members regardless of which party he/she specifically
belongs. There are two reasons for this choice. The main reason is the


very fact that all Parliament Parties shared the power with the ruling DPS
(Democratic Party of Socialists), either in the past or today. Moreover, the
main opposition party in Montenegro (SNP – Socialist People’s Party) was
an integral part of the DPS until 1997, legitimately sharing the full power
with the current ruling political elite. The second reason is the fact that
at the local level all the ‘main’ parties hold power, and notwithstanding
their ideological differences they are sharing the authority. Usually, the
leaders of different parties at the local level are involved when a ‘deal’ is
supposed to be made for ‘mutual benefit’. Thus, to take for the analysis only
the members of the ruling party (and its present coalition partners) would
be inappropriate from the perspective of estimation of the importance of
political capital. So, we used two types of political membership (SKJ and
current party engagement) because we wanted comparatively to estimate
the relative importance of SKJ membership as accumulated political
capital in socialism with the importance of the political capital based on
current political conditions. Additionally, the following socio-demographic
predictors are included in the model: gender, age and residence. The choice
of the independent variable is based on - 2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square
significance for each predictor. This means that the socio-demographic
predictors that are not included proved to be statistically insignificant.
All the variables in the model are included as a continuous variable
(Table 3). Therefore, the membership in SKJ is transformed into dummy
variable (1 = SKJ member; 0 = SKJ non-member). Accordingly, party
members variable is recoded into 1 for party member and 0 party-non-
member. Among the social-predictors variables, gender is recoded into 1
for male and 0 for female. Residence variable is recoded into 1 for urban; 0
for suburban and rural. Education and Age are used as continuous variable.

Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of the Independent Variables

Variable Mean S.D.
Male .5378 .49881
Age 46.06 14.956
Urban .3520 .47782
Education 11.89 2.910
SKJ .3012 .45900
Party member .2301 .42107

Considering statistical analysis we developed two models in order
to estimate the relative importance of the independent variables. The first
one is ‘base model’ which does not include interaction among variables.
The other one is ‘extended model’ and it includes interaction between


education and the two variables that represents political capital. The main
reason for this was to estimate how political capital interacts with human
capital in the final estimation of the dependent variable. Additionally, the
model is based on deviance scaling by using the deviance function of the
likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic.

e) Hypotheses

Market Transitional Theory suggests that by introducing liberal
market, the old patterns of social mobility based on political capital are
substituted by the factors of ‘human capital’ (Nee, 1991, 1996). According to
this argument we can predict:

Hypothesis 1: In the period of social transformation, ‘human capital’ is a
significant factor for the overall occupational attainment.

On the other hand, the main functional characteristic of socialist
societies was the domination of politics over and above the economy
(Szelenyi, 1979; Horvat, 1982; Lazić, 1994). Therefore, the main economic
actor is ‘state’ supported by strong bureaucracy. Eventually, the social group
that holds the overall power is political elite, or the highest ranked party
members. The reasonable presumption is that, by using their political capital
during the period of social transformation, members of the party provided
initial advantage for themselves through accumulation of the wealth they
controlled during socialism (Staniszkis, 1991; Hankiss, 1990; Szelenyi, 1988).
Therefore the second hypothesis would be:

Hypothesis 2: After 15 years of transition in Montenegro, SKJ membership
plays a significant role for entrance into each occupational category

At this level of analysis it must be noticed that those two
hypotheses don’t necessarily oppose each other. Namely, it is possible that
both the human capital based on education and political capital based
on membership in SKJ could be important factors for the occupational
attainment.
The main feature of Montenegro is the fact that the ruling party
originates from former SKJ, as we mentioned previously. Regarding the
fact that privatization, as an element of transition in terms of ownership
transformation, has been delayed, we might assume that members of this
political party also have an advantage. Therefore, we might assume that this
factor is also significant for the occupational attainment. However, since all
the ‘biggest’ parties in Montenegro participate in power, just as they still
hold the power at a local level, we will consider membership of any party
as the possible factor of ‘political capital’ as significant for the occupational
attainment. Therefore we involve the new prediction:


Hypothesis 3: In post-communist Montenegro, membership in any party is
a significant factor for the occupational attainment.

Finally, we wanted to find out how political and human capital
interact with each other. Therefore, we introduced in the analysis the
interaction term between education and the variables which present the
political capital. The main goal of this was to see if political factor jeopardizes
the role that education has for the occupational attainment. So, our final
two hypotheses would be:

Hypothesis 4: SKJ membership has a negative impact on education for
entering into any occupation but unskilled worker

Hypothesis 5: Party membership has a negative impact on education for
entering into any occupation but unskilled worker.

Each of the five hypotheses could be put in their opposite form
since, from the logical point of view, to confirm thesis or to disapprove anti-
thesis leads to the same conclusion. One way or another, the results of the
tests of hypotheses are presented in the text that follows.

f) Analysis and results

Considering the base model (Table 4) first we can see the relative
importance of the socio-demographic predictors. As far as gender differences
are concerned, it looks like males have an advantage over females only
for the entrance into managerial occupations. To enter into professional
occupations as well as into technicians and clerks, as opposed to unskilled
workers, is more likely for females. Eventually, gender differences for the
entering into entrepreneurs and skilled and service workers are statistically
insignificant. Older population is more likely to enter in any occupational
group than the younger population with exception of entering into
entrepreneurs. This speaks about the fact that in the society of transition
the youngest population, without inherited capital has less chance than
the older population. But, speaking about entrepreneurs it looks like they
are coming from different age compositions. However the coefficients,
which estimate odds of ratio, are not very high. Finally, residence proved
to be important for all the occupation except for the service and unskilled
workers. So, with exception of service and skilled workers, living in town
increase the odds of entering all but unskilled workers for the urban
residents by at least 88%12. 12
The smallest coefficient for
By analyzing predictors that are in our main methodological technicians and clerks is 0.63.
Therefore, the estimated odds is:
focus we can see that education as well as SKJ membership is significant Exp (0.63) = 1.88
for the occupational attainment. To obtain higher education and to be a
member of the SKJ (in the past) was an advantage for entering into each


occupation as opposed to becoming an unskilled worker. Therefore, our
first hypothesis is confirmed, but also the second one. It looks like socialism
left an advantage to their members regarding their social status. But human
capital is important as well. It should be noticed that education is more
important for entering into managerial and professional groups comparing
to others. Also, SKJ membership is significantly more important for entering
into managerial group than into other groups.
Apparently, as far as we speak about party membership, it seems
that this factor is insignificant by any statistical criterion for entering into any
occupational group. So, at this level of analysis the third hypothesis should
be rejected. It is even easier to confirm this finding by estimating the Chi-
Square Likelihood Ratio Tests, since we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that contribution of this variable for the model is equal to zero (p> 0.10).
Our extended model of the Polytomous Regression is presented in
Table 5. It includes an interaction between SKJ membership and education
as well as between party membership and education. The main idea
of adding the interaction terms has been to see whether the SKJ and
party membership undermines the relative importance of the education
detected in the base model. Moreover, since the regression model as such
is sensitive to involvement of new variables and interactions, this simulation
will show significance of each variable.

Table 4. Multinomial Logistic Regression - Base Model of the
Occupational Attainment in Montenegro

Technicians Service &
Manager Professional Entrepreneur & skilled
Clerks workers

Intercept -34.83*** -35.27*** -17.07*** -13.72*** -6.35***
Male 0.61* -0.51* 0.23 -0.68*** -0.03
Age 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.02**
Urban 1.49*** 0.71** 0.99*** 0.63*** 0.29
Education 2.29*** 2.60*** 1.37*** 1.21*** 0.64***
SKJ 1.66*** 0.78** 1.06*** 0.98*** 0.53**
Party member 0.36 -0.16 0.03 -0.11 -0.21

*, p < 0.10; **, p < 0.05; ***, p < 0.01 (2-tailed tests); Reference category is
‘unskilled worker’


Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regression - Extended Model of the
Occupational Attainment in Montenegro

Technicians Service &
Manager Professional Entrepreneur & skilled
Clerks workers

Intercept -37.97*** -42.71*** -16.24*** -16.69*** -8.32***
Male 0.61* -0.52* 0.19 -0.68*** -0.03
Age 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.02***
Urban 1.49*** 0.67** 0.89*** 0.57*** 0.23
Education 2.58*** 3.15*** 1.31*** 1.48*** 0.82***
SKJ 4.93* 6.90** -7.44*** 5.67*** 3.55***
Party member 5.02* 9.85*** 8.09*** 2.35 2.42***
Education*SKJ -0.34 -0.52** 0.57*** -0.46*** -0.33***
Education*
-0.44** -0.77*** -0.70*** -0.25* -0.26***
Party member

*, p < 0.10; **, p < 0.05; ***, p < 0.01 (2-tailed tests); Reference category is
‘unskilled worker’

Both interaction terms that were involved into analysis significantly
changed the whole model. While socio-demographic predictors mostly
correspond to their significance in the base model, the relative significance
of education as well as both variables that represent political capital are
very different. First, all the coefficients for the interaction between party
membership and education are statistically significant at the level of 1%
and they are negative. This means that party membership significantly
jeopardizes the importance of education for entering all the occupation
categories, as opposed to becoming an unskilled worker. Thus, our fifth
hypothesis has been confirmed.
On the other hand, the interaction between SKJ membership and
education somehow showed similar results, but it is not significant in the
case of managers. This means that SKJ membership does not have negative
influence on education when it comes to entrance into managerial groups.
Moreover, we have positive influence of the SKJ membership on education
in the case of entering into entrepreneurs. Therefore we can partly confirm
our fourth hypothesis as far as we speak of a negative influence of SKJ
membership on education for entering into professionals, technicians and
clerks and service & skilled workers.
Regarding the influences of interaction terms, the coefficients for
the three main predicting variables that represent human vs. political capital
are very different in comparison to the base model. First, party membership,


not only became a statistically significant factor for all occupation groups,
except for the technicians and clerks, but it became a more important
predictor than SKJ membership for the three (prestigious) occupational
categories (i.e. managers13, professionals and entrepreneurs). Therefore, 13
It should be noticed that,
we can go back to the third hypothesis and claim that at the level of the although the regression
whole population party membership is not significant for the occupational coefficient for the managers
relating to the party membership
attainment. But, in a certain constellation it can simply diminish the is higher than the coefficients
importance of the other predictors, becoming one of the main predictors for the SKJ membership, it is
for entering into highest occupations. This is not so hard to understand as it significant at 10%, comparing to
seems. Namely, the party membership is more or less normally distributed 1% significance for the education
and SKJ membership.
in the population. Therefore, at the level of overall estimation, it seems
that party members have no better chances than others. But, in the cases
where party members ‘come close’ to highest categories, this factor plays
an important role by increasing the likelihood for entering into these
occupations. The only occupation category where party membership, as
a variable, has no statistically significant influence is the category, which
consists of technicians and clerks.
Since ‘party membership’ and ‘SKJ membership’ are the variables with the
same metric characteristics (both are dummy variables), we can compare
their relative importance for the occupational attainment. According to
the model we presented in Table 5, it seems that membership in any party
that exists in the actual political space brings more advantage for entering
into prestigious occupations than the membership of SKJ. In this context,
there is one more thing worth mentioning and this is the impact of the SKJ
membership on the chances of becoming an entrepreneur. Namely, in the
base model we confirmed that SKJ membership is significant for becoming
an entrepreneur. But, after introducing interaction terms, SKJ membership,
not only became insignificant, but it has significantly negative impact for
entering the same occupation group. It seems that whenever members
of some present party enter into entrepreneurship, they completely nullify
all the advantages that SKJ members initially had. In other words, in the
political society, there is a hierarchy considering the type of political capital
that exists in the overall society. The present political structure forms the
social life in such a way as to diminish the inheritance of the political society
that existed during socialism.

Concluding discussion

There is always an epistemological gap between theory and
reality. Reality is often too complex for the limited human capabilities of
abstract thinking. This is especially the case when we analyze the process
of social change where the reality is filled with contradictions regarding the
differences among the elements that come from different social spaces and
times. A transition society is, undoubtedly, a convergent society. It consists


of the past and the future at the same time. Therefore, structural confusion
and substantial incompatibility are its inevitable characteristics. One of the
possible theoretical solutions would be not to speak in terms of structure
at all, but to speak in terms of conjuncture, and just stick to descriptive and
partial level of analysis. The other solution would be to go beyond the one-
dimensional interpretation by developing additional analytical weapons
that enables ‘clear and distinct view’ into complex and convergent reality.
This is the idea we are ready to support.
With regard to the problem of stratification of the post-communist
society, all the theoretical obstacles we mentioned above are more than
indicative. Regardless of any possible causal or functional explanation, it
was reasonable to expect that the inheritance of the socialist period will
be somehow involved in the process of structural shaping of the ‘new’
society. Therefore the new structure (if it is a structure at all) shapes new
stratification, and it is hybrid in nature (Nee 1989, 1992, 1996). In the case
of Montenegro, the idea that we are willing to support is that the best
insight in stratification is to presume that in this society we can identify
two stratification mechanisms, which produces two stratification structures
(Rona-Tas, 1994; Walder, 1995; Nee, 1996; Parish and Michelson, 1996). The
problem is that in reality in its empirical sense these two structures must
relate with each other. Therefore, without involving necessary analytical
insight, this inevitably leads toward either contradictive or wrong theoretical
conclusions.
Consequently, since in the transitional society we have two
stratification mechanisms, let us presume that this society consists of two
societies in theoretical sense. Therefore, those two societies have their own
ontological foundations and their own internal logic. The first one is the
political society based on the power of political elite, which controls the
resources owned by the state. The other one is the society based on liberal
market. Each of them produces different stratification. The political society
enables high social status based on political criterion, and the market
society provides their actors with a higher status based on market success.
This way, it seems easy to identify the main social groups and to understand
the basis of their status. But, the problem is the very fact that these two
societies co-exist in the same empirical space, which imply that individuals
independently of their will have to be involved in ‘both’ of them. At this
point the overall theoretical confusion arises. The possible combination of
the elements, including different social strata, different types of interaction
and different levels of involvement into these ‘two’ societies, is the equation
that can hardly be solved. This, however, does not mean that the analytical
perspective, as such, is not heuristically fruitful. It simply means that we
should stick to the specific constellation defined by time, in trying to
account for all the mechanisms of interaction between the ‘two’ societies.
Back to our data and analysis we can stress a few important
conclusions. Education is certainly an important factor for the social


status from the occupation point of view. But it is important in both the
political and market society (Konrad and Szelenyi, 1998; Walder 1995). The
only difference is that as a resource in these two societies it is used in a
different manner and for different purposes. Therefore the significance of
the education for the occupational attainment is quite ‘normal’.
The SKJ membership proved to be a significant factor as well for
the entrance into all the occupation categories. At the same time, being
a party member (of a present political party) does not imply inevitably an
advantage in terms of stratification. But, as far as the highest positions in the
society are concerned, this factor is very important. In this regard, it is more
important than membership of SKJ.
Party membership has a negative impact on education for each
occupation category. However, it does not diminish the significance of
education, and this factor is persistent regardless of all the negative impacts.
Moreover, if we compare the regression coefficients for the education
(between the Tables 4 and 5) we can see that the coefficients are even
higher for the first four categories regardless of the negative impact of the
political variables.
Persistence of education does not necessarily mean that ‘human’
capital is more important than political capital in the process of post-
communist transformation. It could simply mean that education was and
still is a significant factor for occupational attainment, or that this is an
important factor in any modern (and postmodern) society. Thus, to identify
education as a significant factor from the perspective of occupational
attainment might be a truism.
So, in my point of view, findings about significance of the political
variables are more important. Montenegro is still a political society.
Anyone doing some business in Montenegro knows very well that it is
much more useful to ‘know someone’ who holds a certain ‘position’ than
to develop an entrepreneur idea. The involvement of the party members
into liberal market is hard to detect for two main reasons. First, there are
many party members who are just ordinary people lead by ideology, and
second, for party members it is much easier to ‘share’ the final outcome
with the ‘entrepreneurs’ without being involved in market transactions. Put
simply, they do not want to be entrepreneurs; they just want to be rich.
The involvement as such brings not only economic, but also high political
risk. Since the high party members know ‘the name of the game’ they are
getting involved in liberal market only in certain constellation when there is
no chance to lose. This is why party membership as such is not a significant
factor for the occupational attainment generally (Table 4) but it is more than
significant when we introduced interaction terms (Table 5).
Going back to the beginning, when can we say that transition is
over? Is there a ‘moment’ when we can simply confirm that the process of
transformation ended and that now we can start to deal with ‘sociology
of the comparative capitalism’ (Stark and Bruszt, 1998; Szelenyi, 1998)? It


looks like the issue of ownership is crucial (Nee, 1989, 1991). Namely, as long
as the main economic resources are the property of the state, power and
privileges of the political elite remains. Once the private property becomes
dominant, the whole game changes. So, what is the case of Montenegro? 14
Official Reports: Vlada RCG
According to official statistics14 private property accounts for 24% of GDP. (2003) Strategija razvoja i
redukcija siromaštva Crne
Additionally, the ‘mixed’ sector15 accounts for 58%, and the share of the Gore. Podgorica: Republički
state property is 18%. The private sector has 28.000 employees which makes sekretarijat za razvoj; Vlada RCG
25% of all the employees but just 11.8% of the overall active population16. (2000) Regionalni razvoj Crne
On the other hand, more than 30.000 people work only in public or state Gore. Podgorica: Republički
organizations. But the most important issue from this perspective is the sekretarijat za razvoj; Bjeletić
V. (2000) Društveni proizvod i
fact that the main economic resources (including the biggest enterprises) njegovo ostvarivanje u Crnoj Gori.
are still the property of the state. Eventually, the role of the state and Podgorica: Republički sekretarijat
hence the significance of political groups incorporated in its bureaucratic za razvoj.
mechanisms, is still important. 15
The property consists of both
However, the privatization continues, and we can assume that private and state capital.
sooner or later the private property will dominate. So, it can be said that
the problem of social transformation in the perspective of Market Transition 16
The entire active population
Theory is not an ‘imperfect transition’ (Nee, 1996), but rather a ‘temporal is 237.280 and, among them,
extension’ of the transformation. In other words, to introduce the liberal 112.000 are employed. Official
statistics, when estimating the
market economy as such is necessary but not sufficient condition for unemployment, thus accounts
radical shifts of the whole social structure. To come close to an end of the just for those who seek for job.
post-communist transformation, an issue of ownership must be resolved.
Additionally, the whole emerging society needs ‘some time’ in order to
build a new structure and a new network of social relations. Thus ‘temporal
extension’ must be accounted for as an inevitable dimension of the overall
process of the social transformation of the post-communist society.


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{ 31 } Ivana Jelić

Ivana Jelić Autorka je profesorica
na Pravnom fakultetu
Univerziteta Crne Gore
(e-mail: ijelic@yahoo.com)

Novine u politici zaštite
ljudskih prava u Evropi:
pristupanje Evropske
unije Evropskoj
konvenciji o ljudskim
pravima 1 Novelty in the Politics of Human
Rights Protection: Accession
of the European Union to the
European Convention on Human
Abstract Rights
In order to improve human rights protection in Europe, several legal and
political steps have been taken during the last two years. They followed Lisbon
Treaty’s entry into force, which paved trail for linking the human rights protection
within the Council of Europe and the EU. The most important legal novelty
is Protocol no. 14 entering into force, which implies change of the procedure
before the European Court for Human Rights. The novelty in the politics of
human rights protection was marked by the EU accession to the Convention,
which is a step towards the concentration of human rights protection at the
Court in Strasbourg. This process requires an analysis of several legal issues,
such as introduction of so-called co-respondent mechanism. Although it
represent a genuine progress in international human rights protection, the fate
of the Accession Agreement of EU still remains uncertain having in mind the
present distribution of political powers and non-EU states’ fear from imposing
supremacy of the EU over other High Contracting Parties.

Keywords: human rights, EU accession, European Convention,
Protocol 14

Uvod
Zaštita ljudskih prava u okviru Savjeta Evrope važi za najcjelovitiji,
najefektivniji i najefikasniji sistem zaštite ljudskih prava na međunarodnom
planu, i pored mana koje mu se mogu pripisati i koje su, uglavnom, vezane
za efikasnost procesuiranja tužbi. Odlike sistema mu obezbjeđuje legislativni
okvir, tj. pravni instrumenti, a u prvom redu Evropska konvencija o ljudskim

{ 32 } Novine u politici zaštite ljudskih prava u Evropi: pristupanje Evropske unije Evropskoj konvenciji o ljudskim pravima

pravima (u daljem tekstu: Konvencija) i četrnaest protokola uz nju, zatim
institucionalni okvir, odnosno organi koji primjenjuju odnosnu legislaciju, u
prvom redu Evropski sud za ljudska prava (u daljem tekstu: Sud), te, konačno,
kontrola i nadzor nad primjenom prava, oličenog prije svega u Komitetu
ministara Savjeta Evrope. U literaturi i praksi često ga nazivaju Evropskim
sistemom zaštite ljudskih prava (u daljem tekstu: Evropski sistem).
Ipak, imajući u vidu činjenicu da se Sud upušta u odlučivanje samo
u vezi sa pravima zaštićenim u Konvenciji i Protokolima uz nju, ostaje cijeli
katalog ekonomskih, socijalnih i kulturnih prava koja ne uživaju zaštitu niti
pomenutih instrumenata, niti Suda. Takođe, onakav kakav je sada, Evropski
sistem ne obezbjeđuje ni pravnu zaštitu osnovnih ljudskih prava koja su
ugrožena postupcima institucija ili država članica Evropske unije. Da bi se
poboljšala zaštita ljudskih prava u Evropi, nekoliko bitnih pravnih i političkih
koraka preduzeto je u posljednje dvije godine. Oni su uslijedili nakon
stupanja na snagu Ugovora iz Lisabona, kojim je popločan put povezivanju
evropskog sistema zaštite ljudskih prava u okviru Savjeta Evrope i zaštite
ljudskih prava u okviru Evropske unije. Od pravnih novina bez sumnje
najznačajnija je procesno-pravna reforma Suda, u skladu sa Protokolom
br. 14, koji dopunjava Konvenciju u dijelu sistema kontrole i koja implicira
izmjene postupka.
S druge strane, novina u politici zaštite ljudskih prava u Evropi
obilježena je pristupanjem Evropske unije Konvenciji, što predstavlja korak
ka koncentraciji zaštite ljudskih prava pred sudom u Strazburu. Osim toga,
Unija se tako uključuje u Evropski sistem kao četrdeset i osma Visoka
strana ugovornica Konvencije, ali i prva međunarodna organizacija u ovom
svojstvu. EU ovaj kapacitet crpi iz svoje kvazidržavne prirode, kao i činjenice
da su svih dvadeset i sedam država članica Unije ujedno i članice Savjeta
Evrope.
Pristupanje Unije Konvenciji, kao sui generis pravni i politički proces,
zahtijeva analizu nekoliko pravnih aspekata, koji se kreću od uvođenja
mehanizma kotužene ili sutužene strane (correspondent mechanism),
izbora sudije iz EU, pa do adaptiranja sistema u donošenju odluka od
strane Komitete ministara, s obzirom na to da će Unija dobiti pravo glasa
u ovom tijelu. Takođe, nakon dugog perioda, dopunjava se i mijenja tekst
Konvencije, a Evropa se ujedinjuje, ne samo u pogledu funkcionalnog,
ekonomskog i političkog aspekta već i u smislu zaštite ljudskih prava.
I pored opredijeljenosti svih država članica i Savjeta Evrope i
Evropske unije za njegovu primjenu, sudbina Sporazuma o pristupanju
Unije Konvenciji još uvijek je neizvjesna. Ta neizvjesnost se odnosi na datum
njegovog stupanja na snagu, te na to da li će se tekst sporazuma dalje
prilagođavati Konvenciji ili će proces postati obrnut, što bi podrazumijevalo
suštinske promjene u sisitemu zaštite ljudskih prava u okviru Savjeta Evrope
pod uticajem Evropske unije. Situaciju bi učinili izvjesnijom odgovori
na pitanja da li je moguće u sadašnjoj političkoj raspodjeli moći da se
obezbijedi ratifikovanje od strane svih država Visokih strana ugovornica

{ 33 } Ivana Jelić

Konvencije, što je preduslov za stupanje na snagu ovog međunarodnog
ugovora, kao i da li nova pravna rješenja ili, barem, ona koja Evropska unija
predlaže, predstavljaju politički kopromis kojim se narušavaju ustanovljeni
principi po Konvenciji.
Ovaj rad nema ambiciju da odgovori na sva pitanja i dileme, ali će
se pozabaviti analizom stanja zaštite ljudskih prava u okviru obje evropske
organizacije, obrazložiti pravni osnov, te predočiti prednosti i nedostatke
pristupanja Unije Konvenciji, i time pokušati da odgovori na ključno pitanje
– da li novine mogu garantovati napredak u zaštiti ljudskih prava u cijeloj i
jedinstvenoj Evropi.

1. Zajedničke vrijednosti Savjeta Evrope i
Evropske unije
Tri stuba djelovanja Savjeta Evrope jesu ljudska prava, demokratija i
vladavina prava. To su i pravni i politički principi na kojima počiva Evropska
unija. Oni predstavljaju, takođe, osnov za reformu zakonodavne, izvršne
i sudske vlasti, kao i državne uprave država koje su u pretpristupnoj ili
pristupnoj fazi prema Evropskoj uniji. Ujedno, oni su, kao prepoznati principi
savremene evropske zajednice, preduslovi integracije u Uniju.
Obezbjeđivanje zaštite ljudskih prava, u prvom redu građanskih
i političkih, garantovanih Konvencijom i Protokolima, primarni je kvalitet
sistema zaštite ljudskih prava u Savjetu Evrope. Osnovni principi djelovanja
ove organizacije u zaštiti ljudskih prava jesu jednakost i raznolikost svih
ljudi. Pri tome, posebna pažnja se posvećuje ugroženim grupama, kao što
su osobe sa invaliditetom, Romi, nacionalne, etničke i jezičke manjine, kao i
žene i djeca.
Evropskom socijalnom poveljom štite se, ali ne i garantuju, i
ekonomska i socijalna prava. Ona su propisana i zavise od uslova i životnog
standarda, tako da njihovo ispunjenje, u krajnjem, zavisi od pojedinačnih
država dužne da obezbijede za to potrebne uslove.
Parlamentarna demokratija je princip koji Savjet Evrope promoviše
i u skladu sa kojim funkcionišu njegovi organi, u prvom redu Parlamentarna
skupština. Uz to, lokalna demokratija se razvija i promoviše u okviru Kongresa
lokalnih i regionalnih vlasti, a ne manje važan zadatak koji Savjet Evrope
ima jeste promocija demokratskog vladanja i stabilnosti, kao i izgradnja
demokratske kulture.
Da bi se obezbijedilo postizanje pravde, neophodno je jačati
vladavinu prava, kao i razvijati zajedničke standarde i vrijednosti, čemu
veoma pomaže Evropska komisija za demokratiju kroz pravo, tj. Venecijanska
komisija. Savjet Evrope je aktivan u obezbjeđivanju pravnih standarda
u postizanju transnacionalnog suzbijanja kriminaliteta, transnacionalne
pravde, pravne saradnje, i zaštite podataka. Uz to, ova organizacija se
suočava i bori sa prijetnjama vladavini prava, kao što su korupcija, pranje
novca, terorizam i sajber kriminal.

{ 34 } Novine u politici zaštite ljudskih prava u Evropi: pristupanje Evropske unije Evropskoj konvenciji o ljudskim pravima

Ove zajedničke vrijednosti, makar indirektno, doprinijele su
sagledavanju potrebe da se učvrsti i upotpuni sistem zaštite ljudskih prava
u Evropi, kroz pristupanje Unije Konvenciji. Uz to, bez obzira na konflikte,
nekonzistentnosti i komplementarnosti u praksi suda u Strazburu i suda
u Luksemburgu, s pravom se može konstatovati da je ovaj posljednji dao
doprinosa u razvoju zaštite ljudskih prava u Evropi (Spielmann, 1999: 775).

2. Vladavina prava u EU i njeno pristupanje
Konvenciji
Poštovanje principa vladavine prava neodvojivo je od poštovanja
ljudskih prava, odnosno predstavlja preduslov njihove pune realizacije. U
kontekstu pristupanja Unije Konvenciji, ono je važno kao osnov za dalje
integrisanje zaštite ljudskih prava i pojačanu zaštitu svakog pojedinca u
situaciji kada njihova prava prekrši organ ili članica Unije.
Vladavini prava, kao primarno političkom principu, ali i
opštedruštvenoj vrijednosti, u Evropskoj uniji podređene su sve ostale
vrijednosti, kao i ukupnost njene političke aktivnosti. Vladavina prava
predstavlja vrijednost koja zahtijeva beskompromisno podvrgavanje
ustavu i zakonu, te međunarodnom pravu, prevashodno međunarodnim
ugovorima, običajima i opštim pravnim načelima priznatim od prosvećenih
naroda, kako to kaže pomalo anahrona međunarodnopravna terminologija.
U duhu zahtjeva Evropske unije, ona podrazumijeva pronalaženje načina da
se ustavna tradicija država prilagodi ovom konceptu. S razlogom se može
pretpostaviti da zahtjev Unije za vladavinu prava uključuje, takođe, zahtjev
za poštovanje međunarodnog običajnog prava i u okviru komunitarnog
prava, što potvrđuje praksa Suda pravde Evropske unije (Etinski, 2009: 684).
Uz to, sprovođenje vladavine prava u djelo zahtijeva angažovanje pravnih
mehanizama kako bi se kroz sankcionisanje obezbijedilo njeno poštovanje.
Evropska unija ne daje definiciju vladavine prava (Wennerström, 2007:
15), niti u ugovorima, niti kroz sudsku praksu Suda pravde Evropske unije,
koji podržava i potvrđuje vladavinu evropskog prava, obezbjeđujući
njegovu uniformnu primjenu u svim članicama. Takođe, ni u okviru sistema
Ujedinjenih nacija ne postoji opšteprihvaćena obavezujuća definicija
ovog principa. Ipak, generalni sekretar Ujedinjenih nacija Ban Ki Moon
dao je Smjernice o pristupu UN vladavini prava, imajući u vidu da su UN u
posljednjoj deceniji bile naročito angažovane u pružanju podrške za jačanje
vladavine prava. Prema njemu, vladavina prava je princip vladavine u kojoj
su svi pojedinci, institucije i entiteti, javni ili privatni, uključujući i samu
državu, odgovorni prema zakonima koji su javno proglašeni, podjednako
primijenjeni i po kojima se nezavisno sudi, i koji su u skladu sa normama
i standardima međunarodnog prava ljudskih prava. Ovaj princip zahtijeva
mjere koje obezbjeđuju privrženost principu suprematije prava, jednakosti
pred zakonom, odgovornosti za kršenje prava, pravičnost u primjeni prava,

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