CRIMINAL EQUITY
420 U.S. 103 (1975).
HISTORY & DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL
EQUITY
• Extraordinary jurisdiction of the King-in- Council sitting in the Star Chamber – analogous to equity
jurisdiction of the Chancery Court in civil matters
• It originated primarily owing to the continuous periods of civil strife and threats to public order
which affected the life and property of the citizens
• However, in this Star Chamber Court was abolished and the jurisdiction of criminal equity now
vested with the King –in-Council subject to its discretion
• In England, later on the Parliament widened the powers of the ordinary courts to vest with them the
jurisdiction of criminal equity – Courts of criminal appeal in England and Canada
WHETHER AN EQUITABLE CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION IS APPLICABLE?
• Manifests itself in various forms – several scholars identify the principles of natural justice as one example
• The fundamental rule is the same – this jurisdiction is subordinate to the letter of the law
• Corporation of Calcutta v. Bejoy Kumar Addy, 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 51
• A similar view has been adopted in the Courts of the United States, and relief has been frequently denied on
the ground that the proceedings for enforcement were of a criminal or guasi-criminal nature and that equity
declines to interfere with the administration of the criminal laws. It has been maintained, however, that a
Court of Equity may in a proper case interfere by injunction to restrain an act or proceeding, criminal,
or guasi-criminal in form, which tends to the impairment of property rights and proceedings for the
enforcement of municipal ordinances, such as the one before us, have been treated as guasi-criminal
(Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, section 1777).
MANIFESTATIONS OF CRIMINAL EQUITY
IN INDIA
• 1. Discretion under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
• Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379
• 20. In the case at hand, if considered in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition, we reach an
inescapable conclusion that the High Court did not apply any of the aforesaid parameters, rather dealt with a
very serious matter in a most casual and cavalier manner and showed undeserving and unwarranted sympathy
towards the accused. The High Court erred in not considering the case in the correct perspective and allowed
the said applications on the grounds that in the FIR some old disputes had been referred to and the accused
had fair antecedents.
• …..The court may not exercise its discretion in derogation of established principles of law, rather it has to be in
strict adherence to them. Discretion has to be guided by law, duly governed by rule and cannot be arbitrary,
fanciful or vague. The court must not yield to spasmodic sentiment to unregulated benevolence. The order
dehors the grounds provided in Section 438 CrPC itself suffers from non-application of mind and therefore,
cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.
• 2. Construction of the provisions of criminal statutes
• Bhagirath v. Delhi Admn., (1985) 2 SCC 580
• 15. We have also already answered the last of the reasons given in Kartar Singh [(1982) 3 SCC 1 : 1982
(Cri) 522 : AIR 1982 SC 1439 : (1983) 1 SCR 445 : 1982 Cri LJ 1772] that the question is not whether the
beneficent provision contained in Section 428 should be extended to life convicts on equitable
considerations. We enter a most respectful caveat. Equity sustains law and the twain must meet. They
cannot run in parallel streams. Equitable considerations must have an important place in the
construction of beneficent provisions, particularly in the field of criminal law. To exclude such
considerations is to denude law's benevolence of its true and lasting content. Lastly, the view
by the Joint Committee in its Report does not yield to the inference that the “mischief sought to be
remedied has no relevance where gravity of offence requires the imposition of imprisonment for life”. As
we have indicated earlier, graver the crime, longer the sentence and, longer the sentence, greater the
need for set-offs and remissions. Punishments are no longer retributory. They are reformative
• 3. Condonation of Delays and Latches in Criminal Proceedings
• Keki Hormusji Gharda v. Mehervan Rustom Irani, (2009) 6 SCC 475
• 20. Indisputably, there might have been some delay on the part of the appellants in approaching the High
Court but while adjusting equity the High Court was required to take into consideration the fact that in a case
of this nature the appellants would face harassment although the allegations contained in the complaint
petition even assuming to be correct were trivial in nature. The High Court furthermore has failed to take into
consideration the fact that in the first information report no allegation in regard to acts of common intention
or common object on the part of the appellants was made out. The appellants were not named as accused
therein. It is, therefore, really difficult to appreciate as to on what basis the complaint petition was filed.
• 4, Frivolous Proceedings
Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of U.P., (2021) 5 SCC 435
14. It is also pertinent to note that as on 5-8-2012, Appellant 1 was a 76-year-old man; Appellant 2 was
suffering from epileptic seizures; and Appellant 4 was of unsound mind. There is no equity in allowing them to
be dragged into criminal proceedings pertaining to a petty offence, instituted 6 years after the alleged
incident. The sword of Damocles cannot be allowed to forever hang on their heads, falling unpredictably at
the whims of a litigant seeking to harass and persecute at will. We gain strength in our conclusions from
Article 21 of the Constitution, which encapsulates the right to a speedy trial. This right has been interpreted to
include not only the actual trial before the Court, but also the preceding stages of inquiry and police
investigation as well (Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar [Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355
: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 95] ; Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1
SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] ).
EQUITABLE RELIEFS IN CRIMINAL LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES
• Injunctions against malicious prosecution
• Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908)
• [I]ndividuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the
laws of the State, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal
nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be
enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action.
• After Younger, a federal court can enjoin a state criminal prosecution only if there is no prosecution pending
in state court at the time the federal prosecution is begun, if a “great and immediate” irreparable injury will
result if the federal court does not issue the injunction, and if “the threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected
rights . . . cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.
• Pre-Trial Detention of Criminal Defendants - Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
• Specific performance of plea bargains and plea offers - Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
• Mitigating circumstances -
• Influencing prosecutorial attitude towards witnesses – against intimidation and threat of incarceration
• Challenging conditions of confinement
• Unlawful Parole Conditions
• Legal Financial Obligations
THE END

Application of Equity in Criminal Law.pptx

  • 1.
  • 2.
    HISTORY & DEVELOPMENTOF CRIMINAL EQUITY • Extraordinary jurisdiction of the King-in- Council sitting in the Star Chamber – analogous to equity jurisdiction of the Chancery Court in civil matters • It originated primarily owing to the continuous periods of civil strife and threats to public order which affected the life and property of the citizens • However, in this Star Chamber Court was abolished and the jurisdiction of criminal equity now vested with the King –in-Council subject to its discretion • In England, later on the Parliament widened the powers of the ordinary courts to vest with them the jurisdiction of criminal equity – Courts of criminal appeal in England and Canada
  • 3.
    WHETHER AN EQUITABLECRIMINAL JURISDICTION IS APPLICABLE? • Manifests itself in various forms – several scholars identify the principles of natural justice as one example • The fundamental rule is the same – this jurisdiction is subordinate to the letter of the law • Corporation of Calcutta v. Bejoy Kumar Addy, 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 51 • A similar view has been adopted in the Courts of the United States, and relief has been frequently denied on the ground that the proceedings for enforcement were of a criminal or guasi-criminal nature and that equity declines to interfere with the administration of the criminal laws. It has been maintained, however, that a Court of Equity may in a proper case interfere by injunction to restrain an act or proceeding, criminal, or guasi-criminal in form, which tends to the impairment of property rights and proceedings for the enforcement of municipal ordinances, such as the one before us, have been treated as guasi-criminal (Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, section 1777).
  • 4.
    MANIFESTATIONS OF CRIMINALEQUITY IN INDIA • 1. Discretion under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 • Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379 • 20. In the case at hand, if considered in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition, we reach an inescapable conclusion that the High Court did not apply any of the aforesaid parameters, rather dealt with a very serious matter in a most casual and cavalier manner and showed undeserving and unwarranted sympathy towards the accused. The High Court erred in not considering the case in the correct perspective and allowed the said applications on the grounds that in the FIR some old disputes had been referred to and the accused had fair antecedents. • …..The court may not exercise its discretion in derogation of established principles of law, rather it has to be in strict adherence to them. Discretion has to be guided by law, duly governed by rule and cannot be arbitrary, fanciful or vague. The court must not yield to spasmodic sentiment to unregulated benevolence. The order dehors the grounds provided in Section 438 CrPC itself suffers from non-application of mind and therefore, cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.
  • 5.
    • 2. Constructionof the provisions of criminal statutes • Bhagirath v. Delhi Admn., (1985) 2 SCC 580 • 15. We have also already answered the last of the reasons given in Kartar Singh [(1982) 3 SCC 1 : 1982 (Cri) 522 : AIR 1982 SC 1439 : (1983) 1 SCR 445 : 1982 Cri LJ 1772] that the question is not whether the beneficent provision contained in Section 428 should be extended to life convicts on equitable considerations. We enter a most respectful caveat. Equity sustains law and the twain must meet. They cannot run in parallel streams. Equitable considerations must have an important place in the construction of beneficent provisions, particularly in the field of criminal law. To exclude such considerations is to denude law's benevolence of its true and lasting content. Lastly, the view by the Joint Committee in its Report does not yield to the inference that the “mischief sought to be remedied has no relevance where gravity of offence requires the imposition of imprisonment for life”. As we have indicated earlier, graver the crime, longer the sentence and, longer the sentence, greater the need for set-offs and remissions. Punishments are no longer retributory. They are reformative
  • 6.
    • 3. Condonationof Delays and Latches in Criminal Proceedings • Keki Hormusji Gharda v. Mehervan Rustom Irani, (2009) 6 SCC 475 • 20. Indisputably, there might have been some delay on the part of the appellants in approaching the High Court but while adjusting equity the High Court was required to take into consideration the fact that in a case of this nature the appellants would face harassment although the allegations contained in the complaint petition even assuming to be correct were trivial in nature. The High Court furthermore has failed to take into consideration the fact that in the first information report no allegation in regard to acts of common intention or common object on the part of the appellants was made out. The appellants were not named as accused therein. It is, therefore, really difficult to appreciate as to on what basis the complaint petition was filed.
  • 7.
    • 4, FrivolousProceedings Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of U.P., (2021) 5 SCC 435 14. It is also pertinent to note that as on 5-8-2012, Appellant 1 was a 76-year-old man; Appellant 2 was suffering from epileptic seizures; and Appellant 4 was of unsound mind. There is no equity in allowing them to be dragged into criminal proceedings pertaining to a petty offence, instituted 6 years after the alleged incident. The sword of Damocles cannot be allowed to forever hang on their heads, falling unpredictably at the whims of a litigant seeking to harass and persecute at will. We gain strength in our conclusions from Article 21 of the Constitution, which encapsulates the right to a speedy trial. This right has been interpreted to include not only the actual trial before the Court, but also the preceding stages of inquiry and police investigation as well (Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar [Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 95] ; Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] ).
  • 8.
    EQUITABLE RELIEFS INCRIMINAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES • Injunctions against malicious prosecution • Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) • [I]ndividuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action. • After Younger, a federal court can enjoin a state criminal prosecution only if there is no prosecution pending in state court at the time the federal prosecution is begun, if a “great and immediate” irreparable injury will result if the federal court does not issue the injunction, and if “the threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights . . . cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.
  • 9.
    • Pre-Trial Detentionof Criminal Defendants - Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). • Specific performance of plea bargains and plea offers - Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). • Mitigating circumstances - • Influencing prosecutorial attitude towards witnesses – against intimidation and threat of incarceration • Challenging conditions of confinement • Unlawful Parole Conditions • Legal Financial Obligations
  • 10.