This memorandum decision addresses cross motions for summary judgment in a case regarding leases on the Osprey Meadows Golf Course and Lodge. Bryant, as the court-appointed fiduciary for RSPT, holds a promissory note, mortgage, and assignment of rents on the property from the defaulting owner, WMG. Tamarack Municipal Association (TMA) leased and operated the golf course and lodge. The court denies Bryant's motions for summary judgment on contract claims and to strike expert testimony. The court partially grants and denies TMA's motion for summary judgment, finding issues of fact remain regarding Bryant's authority to terminate TMA's leases unilaterally upon WMG's default.
The Court of Appeals affirms the lower court's granting of summary judgment to CitiMortgage in a foreclosure action. Maria Potvin argued she was entitled to relief under the Home Affordable Modification Program and that foreclosure was inequitable, but the court found the mediation was non-binding and she did not sign the modification agreement or make payments. The court also found the affidavit from CitiMortgage in support of summary judgment met evidentiary rules for records of regularly conducted business activities. Therefore, the appeals court denied all of Potvin's assignments of error and upheld the foreclosure.
This document discusses a case regarding the jurisdiction of a county court over a subrogation matter related to workers' compensation benefits. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the subrogation issue, as the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act specifies that such matters must be brought in district court. The decision vacates the lower courts' rulings and remands the case with directions to vacate the county court's order determining distribution of settlement proceeds related to the subrogation claim.
The decision by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. EQT had leased land from Alex Cooper, et al with an initial five-year term. The lease provided for a five-year extension. It also required EQT to drill at least one well on/under the property during the first five-year lease. EQT failed to drill a well in the first term but instead elected to extend the lease for an additional five years. The federal judge found that EQT has the right to extend the lease even if they didn't drill a well during the first term.
This case involves a dispute over insurance proceeds from an automobile accident settlement. Plaintiff Glenn Cody received $25,000 from the insurer of the at-fault driver, but had over $29,500 in medical expenses. Defendant MILA paid $17,632.18 of Plaintiff's medical expenses and asserts an equitable lien over the settlement funds. Plaintiff disputes the validity of MILA's lien. Plaintiff was also insured by Defendant Farm Bureau, which provided $25,000 in UM coverage, but disputes its applicability. The Court must determine the validity of MILA's lien to then address potential liability of Farm Bureau.
Attachment Trustee Process & ExecutionMikeProsser
Slideshow from presentation to District Court Clerk-Magistrates and Asst. Clerk-Magistrates intended to promote understanding of the topics from both an "in court" and "out of court" perspective.
Loughman v EQT - Decision Rejecting Landowner Request to Sever Production Lea...Marcellus Drilling News
A case in which a Greene County, PA landowner requested the court sever production rights under a lease from storage right. The landowners say EQT never produced oil/gas from the property, and lack of production cancels that portion of the lease. PA Superior Court said no, the two are together in the same lease and one OR the other is enough to keep the lease enforceable.
When Plaintiff Offers for Defendants to Validate Plaintiff's "Lease" and "Cas...jamesmaredmond
This supplemental declaration was submitted by David Chatfield, an attorney representing Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co. LLC, in opposition to a motion to compel further deposition of Stephen Gaggero. Chatfield states that he previously offered to show opposing counsel a document establishing Sulphur Mountain's right to lease the premises in question, without copying it, but received no response. Chatfield offered again by letter on August 26th and again received no response. The declaration aims to show Chatfield attempted to resolve the issue without further court action.
This document is a stipulation and order modifying a previous judgment in a divorce case between Gary W. XXXXXX and Barbara K. XXXXXX. It stipulates that (1) Barbara will receive $84,659 from Gary's 401(k) plan, ownership of their Florida condo, funds from rental and personal bank accounts, and levies against Gary's accounts; (2) these transfers settle all child and spousal support claims; (3) the 401(k) transfer is non-taxable; (4) Gary's additional child and spousal support obligations are deemed satisfied; and (5) enforcement actions against Gary will be terminated upon execution of this order.
The Court of Appeals affirms the lower court's granting of summary judgment to CitiMortgage in a foreclosure action. Maria Potvin argued she was entitled to relief under the Home Affordable Modification Program and that foreclosure was inequitable, but the court found the mediation was non-binding and she did not sign the modification agreement or make payments. The court also found the affidavit from CitiMortgage in support of summary judgment met evidentiary rules for records of regularly conducted business activities. Therefore, the appeals court denied all of Potvin's assignments of error and upheld the foreclosure.
This document discusses a case regarding the jurisdiction of a county court over a subrogation matter related to workers' compensation benefits. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the subrogation issue, as the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act specifies that such matters must be brought in district court. The decision vacates the lower courts' rulings and remands the case with directions to vacate the county court's order determining distribution of settlement proceeds related to the subrogation claim.
The decision by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. EQT had leased land from Alex Cooper, et al with an initial five-year term. The lease provided for a five-year extension. It also required EQT to drill at least one well on/under the property during the first five-year lease. EQT failed to drill a well in the first term but instead elected to extend the lease for an additional five years. The federal judge found that EQT has the right to extend the lease even if they didn't drill a well during the first term.
This case involves a dispute over insurance proceeds from an automobile accident settlement. Plaintiff Glenn Cody received $25,000 from the insurer of the at-fault driver, but had over $29,500 in medical expenses. Defendant MILA paid $17,632.18 of Plaintiff's medical expenses and asserts an equitable lien over the settlement funds. Plaintiff disputes the validity of MILA's lien. Plaintiff was also insured by Defendant Farm Bureau, which provided $25,000 in UM coverage, but disputes its applicability. The Court must determine the validity of MILA's lien to then address potential liability of Farm Bureau.
Attachment Trustee Process & ExecutionMikeProsser
Slideshow from presentation to District Court Clerk-Magistrates and Asst. Clerk-Magistrates intended to promote understanding of the topics from both an "in court" and "out of court" perspective.
Loughman v EQT - Decision Rejecting Landowner Request to Sever Production Lea...Marcellus Drilling News
A case in which a Greene County, PA landowner requested the court sever production rights under a lease from storage right. The landowners say EQT never produced oil/gas from the property, and lack of production cancels that portion of the lease. PA Superior Court said no, the two are together in the same lease and one OR the other is enough to keep the lease enforceable.
When Plaintiff Offers for Defendants to Validate Plaintiff's "Lease" and "Cas...jamesmaredmond
This supplemental declaration was submitted by David Chatfield, an attorney representing Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co. LLC, in opposition to a motion to compel further deposition of Stephen Gaggero. Chatfield states that he previously offered to show opposing counsel a document establishing Sulphur Mountain's right to lease the premises in question, without copying it, but received no response. Chatfield offered again by letter on August 26th and again received no response. The declaration aims to show Chatfield attempted to resolve the issue without further court action.
This document is a stipulation and order modifying a previous judgment in a divorce case between Gary W. XXXXXX and Barbara K. XXXXXX. It stipulates that (1) Barbara will receive $84,659 from Gary's 401(k) plan, ownership of their Florida condo, funds from rental and personal bank accounts, and levies against Gary's accounts; (2) these transfers settle all child and spousal support claims; (3) the 401(k) transfer is non-taxable; (4) Gary's additional child and spousal support obligations are deemed satisfied; and (5) enforcement actions against Gary will be terminated upon execution of this order.
The court granted a motion to add additional judgment debtors to a $1.8 million judgment against plaintiff Stephen Gaggero. The additional judgment debtors included six entities (four limited partnerships and two LLCs) that were formerly owned by Gaggero, totaling $35-40 million in assets in 1998. It also included the trustee, Joseph Praske, of three trusts that now owned the entities, after Gaggero transferred ownership of the entities to the trusts in 1998 as part of an "estate plan". The court found all were alter egos of Gaggero based on evidence that Gaggero controlled the entities and trusts, and used them to avoid creditors like the defendants in this case. The additional judgment
The document summarizes New Jersey statutes and court rules related to landlord-tenant law and eviction proceedings. It discusses when a landlord can file to transfer an eviction case from a Special Civil Part court to a Law Division court, rebuttable presumptions against landlord retaliation, and grounds for a tenant to obtain a judgment if an eviction is filed for retaliatory reasons. It also covers stays of eviction warrants and when a court must issue a warrant for possession. The document provides an overview of New Jersey laws governing landlord-tenant disputes and eviction cases.
This summary order vacates the sentences of defendants Mariluz Zavala and Jose Ibanez and remands their case for de novo sentencing. The district court erred in applying simultaneous role-in-offense sentencing enhancements under different subsections of the guidelines for the same offense. It also failed to undertake a sufficient factual analysis to support a finding that the criminal activity was "otherwise extensive" to justify an enhancement. Additionally, the district court made errors in its grouping analysis of the counts. The case is remanded for the district court to remedy these errors by reassessing which enhancements apply and correctly grouping the counts.
The court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the special employer doctrine applied. Under the special employer doctrine, an employee can be considered simultaneously employed by both their primary employer and any other employer to whom their services were loaned, if three conditions are met: (1) an express or implied contract with the special employer; (2) the work being done is essentially for the special employer; and (3) the special employer has the right to control the work details. The court determined all three conditions were met, making the defendant the plaintiff's special employer and entitling the defendant to workers' compensation immunity.
This document is an appellant's opening brief for a case in the California Court of Appeal regarding a trust. Robert Quick (the appellant) alleges that Andrea Pearson (the respondent), as trustee, breached the trust by concealing its existence from him and failing to provide him distributions as a beneficiary. The brief argues that Quick sufficiently alleged facts to state a cause of action and overcome defenses of statute of limitations and laches. It maintains the trial court erred in sustaining Pearson's demurrer without leave to amend.
Sample petition for final distribution for probate in CaliforniaLegalDocsPro
This sample petition for final distribution in a probate case in California is filed to request that the Court make an order of final distribution and approve the statutory compensation for the personal representative and their attorney. The sample petition on which this preview is based is 18 pages and includes brief instructions, a sample summary of account, sample exhibits to support the summary of account and a sample verification. The author is an entrepreneur and freelance paralegal that has worked in California and Federal litigation since 1995 and has created over 300 sample legal documents for sale.
The document provides a historical overview and summary of fraudulent transfer law in Vermont. It begins with the origins of fraudulent transfer law in 16th century England and discusses how various states, including Vermont, adopted versions of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. It then summarizes Vermont's adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in 1996 and how the Act modernized fraudulent transfer standards. The summary concludes by outlining the key elements, parties, remedies, standards of proof, and statute of limitations in fraudulent transfer cases under Vermont law.
The court appoints a receiver to enforce a judgment against several judgment debtors. The receiver is given broad powers to investigate and take control of the debtors' assets and records. This includes investigating properties, business interests, bank accounts, transfers of assets, and employment of agents. The debtors are ordered to turn over financial documents and records to the receiver and are prohibited from interfering with the receiver or disposing of assets.
Sample motion for consolidation of cases in CaliforniaLegalDocsPro
This sample motion for consolidation of multiple cases in California is filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1048(a) to request consolidation of two or more cases. The motion is used by a party who is requesting that a Court consolidate two or more cases on the grounds that consolidation of the cases is warranted in that all of the cases arise out of the same set of operative facts and contain common issues and further that consolidation of all of the cases will avoid unnecessary duplication of evidence and procedures in all of the actions; avoid the risk of inconsistent adjudications and avoid many of the same witnesses testifying on common issues in all actions as well as promote judicial economy and convenience. The sample on which this preview is based can be easily modified for use in cases where complete consolidation is requested or where consolidation is requested only for purposes of trial and is 19 pages including brief instructions, a memorandum of points and authorities with citations to case law and statutory authority, sample declaration, proof of service by mail and proposed order. The author is an entrepreneur and freelance paralegal who has worked in California and Federal litigation since 1995 and has created over 250 sample legal documents for sale.
Sample motion for consolidation in unlawful detainer (eviction) in California LegalDocsPro
This sample motion for consolidation in an unlawful detainer (eviction) in California is filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1048(a) and 1177 and is used by a defendant in an eviction proceeding who wants to request consolidation of the eviction case with another case involving title to the real property such as a fraud or quiet title action on the grounds that the two cases are related and that determination of complex title issues should not be decided in a summary proceeding as that would unfairly prejudice the defendant. The sample is designed to be used by a defendant in an eviction after a foreclosure but can also be easily modified for use in situations such as where the defendant in the eviction case is asserting an interest in the real property. The sample on which this preview is based is 27 pages and includes brief instructions, a table of contents and table of authorities, memorandum of points and authorities with citations to case law and statutory authority, sample declaration, proof of service and proposed order granting motion for consolidation. The author is a freelance paralegal who has worked in California and Federal litigation since 1995 and has created over 250 sample legal documents for sale.
Court Order Granting Certification of Demchak Royalty Class Action Lawsuit Se...Marcellus Drilling News
The court order that certifies the class action status of the "Demchak" royalty case in Pennsylvania against Chesapeake Energy. PA landowners sued Chesapeake Energy for shorting them on royalty payments using a technique of inflating post-production prices. This order allows the settlement to proceed.
This order grants a motion for assignment of rights and restrains judgment debtors from certain financial activities. It assigns the judgment debtors' rights to payments (now and in the future) from various accounts, properties, lawsuits, trusts, individuals and entities to the judgment creditors until an outstanding judgment is paid in full. It also requires the judgment debtors to post an undertaking to stay enforcement of the order.
The document discusses the rules regarding the inventory and appraisal, allowances for the family, and a related case on these issues.
1) An executor or administrator must return an inventory and appraisal of the deceased's real and personal property within three months, excluding certain personal items for the surviving family.
2) During estate settlement, the widow and minor or incapacitated children shall receive allowances under the court's direction as provided by law.
3) In a related case, the court ruled that the guardianship court did not have authority to enforce payment of widow's allowance, as that power belongs to the court overseeing estate settlement.
Mark swhwartz gets_40k_for_client_vs_peter_mallonihatehassard
This order approves the settlement of a personal injury claim brought on behalf of a minor, Joseph Michael Hernandez. It approves attorney fees of $10,096, reimbursement of medical expenses of $11,279, and a total settlement of $41,667. The remaining $30,291 will be deposited in a blocked account for the minor until he turns 18. The guardian is authorized to sign settlement documents and a full release of claims.
This document is a memorandum submitted by the defendant's counsel in a civil case regarding ejectment. The plaintiff filed a complaint to eject the defendant from an apartment the defendant had been leasing. The defendant argues that the plaintiff has no cause of action because the lease contract presented by the plaintiff is fictitious. Additionally, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff's action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations for unlawful detainer cases. Finally, the defendant claims the complaint should be dismissed for lack of a proper certification against forum shopping. The defendant requests that the court dismiss the plaintiff's complaint.
If you rent out individual rooms to 4 or more unrelated occupants in Massachusetts without first obtaining a license, you may be violating Massachusetts law. These slides provide a brief introduction of what a rooming house is and how to obtain a license.
This newsletter provides summaries of recent reinsurance case law and regulatory developments from March 2014. It includes summaries of cases from New York, Tennessee, and California federal courts related to arbitration awards, protected cell reinsurance agreements, preclusion of subsequent arbitrations, and common interest privilege with reinsurers. It also summarizes cases related to tax treatment of retrocessional agreements, dismissal of defenses in a facultative reinsurance dispute, denial of stay in a mortgage reinsurance case, and assumption versus reinsurance.
121815 - OBJECTION TO 120815 ORDER ON OBJECTION (Townsend Matter)VogelDenise
POWER WITH "WE THE PEOPLE" - KNOW YOUR LEGAL/LAWFUL RIGHTS TO OVERTHROW THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S DESPOTISM GOVERNMENT and have a GOVERNMENT that WORKS for "WE THE PEOPLE!"
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE - Overthrowing Despotism, Political Corruption, Judicial Corruption/Injustices. . . .HEALING and RESTORING a NATION!
A fictitious legal brief to remit the final judgment of bail forfeiture. Capt. Bryant issued a bond for the release of Rutger Batty who later failed to appear in court. Mr. Batty was in a Texas jail because of a prior illegal gun possession charge. Though Mr. Batty was not incarcerated in a North Carolina jail or a federal prison within the United States, Captain Bryant wants Weft and Wright, P.L.L.C. to try and get the forfeited bail money remitted.
This document is a report and recommendation from a magistrate judge regarding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by the defendant, Info Directions, Inc. The plaintiff, Transverse LLC, alleges that Info Directions interfered with its contract and misappropriated its trade secrets related to billing software. The magistrate judge provides background on the parties and claims, summarizes the legal standards for personal jurisdiction, and will make a recommendation to the district court judge on the motion to dismiss.
This document is a court order denying a motion from defendants Alec and Mike Sou for attorneys' fees and expenses under the Hyde Amendment. It provides background on the criminal case against the Sous, including that they initially pled guilty but later withdrew their pleas after the court rejected their plea agreements. It then describes how the government dismissed all charges against the Sous after a witness testified inaccurately during trial about the legality of recruiting fees. The court applies the legal standard under the Hyde Amendment and denies the Sous' motion, finding that their arguments do not establish that the government's position was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith.
The court granted a motion to add additional judgment debtors to a $1.8 million judgment against plaintiff Stephen Gaggero. The additional judgment debtors included six entities (four limited partnerships and two LLCs) that were formerly owned by Gaggero, totaling $35-40 million in assets in 1998. It also included the trustee, Joseph Praske, of three trusts that now owned the entities, after Gaggero transferred ownership of the entities to the trusts in 1998 as part of an "estate plan". The court found all were alter egos of Gaggero based on evidence that Gaggero controlled the entities and trusts, and used them to avoid creditors like the defendants in this case. The additional judgment
The document summarizes New Jersey statutes and court rules related to landlord-tenant law and eviction proceedings. It discusses when a landlord can file to transfer an eviction case from a Special Civil Part court to a Law Division court, rebuttable presumptions against landlord retaliation, and grounds for a tenant to obtain a judgment if an eviction is filed for retaliatory reasons. It also covers stays of eviction warrants and when a court must issue a warrant for possession. The document provides an overview of New Jersey laws governing landlord-tenant disputes and eviction cases.
This summary order vacates the sentences of defendants Mariluz Zavala and Jose Ibanez and remands their case for de novo sentencing. The district court erred in applying simultaneous role-in-offense sentencing enhancements under different subsections of the guidelines for the same offense. It also failed to undertake a sufficient factual analysis to support a finding that the criminal activity was "otherwise extensive" to justify an enhancement. Additionally, the district court made errors in its grouping analysis of the counts. The case is remanded for the district court to remedy these errors by reassessing which enhancements apply and correctly grouping the counts.
The court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the special employer doctrine applied. Under the special employer doctrine, an employee can be considered simultaneously employed by both their primary employer and any other employer to whom their services were loaned, if three conditions are met: (1) an express or implied contract with the special employer; (2) the work being done is essentially for the special employer; and (3) the special employer has the right to control the work details. The court determined all three conditions were met, making the defendant the plaintiff's special employer and entitling the defendant to workers' compensation immunity.
This document is an appellant's opening brief for a case in the California Court of Appeal regarding a trust. Robert Quick (the appellant) alleges that Andrea Pearson (the respondent), as trustee, breached the trust by concealing its existence from him and failing to provide him distributions as a beneficiary. The brief argues that Quick sufficiently alleged facts to state a cause of action and overcome defenses of statute of limitations and laches. It maintains the trial court erred in sustaining Pearson's demurrer without leave to amend.
Sample petition for final distribution for probate in CaliforniaLegalDocsPro
This sample petition for final distribution in a probate case in California is filed to request that the Court make an order of final distribution and approve the statutory compensation for the personal representative and their attorney. The sample petition on which this preview is based is 18 pages and includes brief instructions, a sample summary of account, sample exhibits to support the summary of account and a sample verification. The author is an entrepreneur and freelance paralegal that has worked in California and Federal litigation since 1995 and has created over 300 sample legal documents for sale.
The document provides a historical overview and summary of fraudulent transfer law in Vermont. It begins with the origins of fraudulent transfer law in 16th century England and discusses how various states, including Vermont, adopted versions of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. It then summarizes Vermont's adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in 1996 and how the Act modernized fraudulent transfer standards. The summary concludes by outlining the key elements, parties, remedies, standards of proof, and statute of limitations in fraudulent transfer cases under Vermont law.
The court appoints a receiver to enforce a judgment against several judgment debtors. The receiver is given broad powers to investigate and take control of the debtors' assets and records. This includes investigating properties, business interests, bank accounts, transfers of assets, and employment of agents. The debtors are ordered to turn over financial documents and records to the receiver and are prohibited from interfering with the receiver or disposing of assets.
Sample motion for consolidation of cases in CaliforniaLegalDocsPro
This sample motion for consolidation of multiple cases in California is filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1048(a) to request consolidation of two or more cases. The motion is used by a party who is requesting that a Court consolidate two or more cases on the grounds that consolidation of the cases is warranted in that all of the cases arise out of the same set of operative facts and contain common issues and further that consolidation of all of the cases will avoid unnecessary duplication of evidence and procedures in all of the actions; avoid the risk of inconsistent adjudications and avoid many of the same witnesses testifying on common issues in all actions as well as promote judicial economy and convenience. The sample on which this preview is based can be easily modified for use in cases where complete consolidation is requested or where consolidation is requested only for purposes of trial and is 19 pages including brief instructions, a memorandum of points and authorities with citations to case law and statutory authority, sample declaration, proof of service by mail and proposed order. The author is an entrepreneur and freelance paralegal who has worked in California and Federal litigation since 1995 and has created over 250 sample legal documents for sale.
Sample motion for consolidation in unlawful detainer (eviction) in California LegalDocsPro
This sample motion for consolidation in an unlawful detainer (eviction) in California is filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1048(a) and 1177 and is used by a defendant in an eviction proceeding who wants to request consolidation of the eviction case with another case involving title to the real property such as a fraud or quiet title action on the grounds that the two cases are related and that determination of complex title issues should not be decided in a summary proceeding as that would unfairly prejudice the defendant. The sample is designed to be used by a defendant in an eviction after a foreclosure but can also be easily modified for use in situations such as where the defendant in the eviction case is asserting an interest in the real property. The sample on which this preview is based is 27 pages and includes brief instructions, a table of contents and table of authorities, memorandum of points and authorities with citations to case law and statutory authority, sample declaration, proof of service and proposed order granting motion for consolidation. The author is a freelance paralegal who has worked in California and Federal litigation since 1995 and has created over 250 sample legal documents for sale.
Court Order Granting Certification of Demchak Royalty Class Action Lawsuit Se...Marcellus Drilling News
The court order that certifies the class action status of the "Demchak" royalty case in Pennsylvania against Chesapeake Energy. PA landowners sued Chesapeake Energy for shorting them on royalty payments using a technique of inflating post-production prices. This order allows the settlement to proceed.
This order grants a motion for assignment of rights and restrains judgment debtors from certain financial activities. It assigns the judgment debtors' rights to payments (now and in the future) from various accounts, properties, lawsuits, trusts, individuals and entities to the judgment creditors until an outstanding judgment is paid in full. It also requires the judgment debtors to post an undertaking to stay enforcement of the order.
The document discusses the rules regarding the inventory and appraisal, allowances for the family, and a related case on these issues.
1) An executor or administrator must return an inventory and appraisal of the deceased's real and personal property within three months, excluding certain personal items for the surviving family.
2) During estate settlement, the widow and minor or incapacitated children shall receive allowances under the court's direction as provided by law.
3) In a related case, the court ruled that the guardianship court did not have authority to enforce payment of widow's allowance, as that power belongs to the court overseeing estate settlement.
Mark swhwartz gets_40k_for_client_vs_peter_mallonihatehassard
This order approves the settlement of a personal injury claim brought on behalf of a minor, Joseph Michael Hernandez. It approves attorney fees of $10,096, reimbursement of medical expenses of $11,279, and a total settlement of $41,667. The remaining $30,291 will be deposited in a blocked account for the minor until he turns 18. The guardian is authorized to sign settlement documents and a full release of claims.
This document is a memorandum submitted by the defendant's counsel in a civil case regarding ejectment. The plaintiff filed a complaint to eject the defendant from an apartment the defendant had been leasing. The defendant argues that the plaintiff has no cause of action because the lease contract presented by the plaintiff is fictitious. Additionally, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff's action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations for unlawful detainer cases. Finally, the defendant claims the complaint should be dismissed for lack of a proper certification against forum shopping. The defendant requests that the court dismiss the plaintiff's complaint.
If you rent out individual rooms to 4 or more unrelated occupants in Massachusetts without first obtaining a license, you may be violating Massachusetts law. These slides provide a brief introduction of what a rooming house is and how to obtain a license.
This newsletter provides summaries of recent reinsurance case law and regulatory developments from March 2014. It includes summaries of cases from New York, Tennessee, and California federal courts related to arbitration awards, protected cell reinsurance agreements, preclusion of subsequent arbitrations, and common interest privilege with reinsurers. It also summarizes cases related to tax treatment of retrocessional agreements, dismissal of defenses in a facultative reinsurance dispute, denial of stay in a mortgage reinsurance case, and assumption versus reinsurance.
121815 - OBJECTION TO 120815 ORDER ON OBJECTION (Townsend Matter)VogelDenise
POWER WITH "WE THE PEOPLE" - KNOW YOUR LEGAL/LAWFUL RIGHTS TO OVERTHROW THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S DESPOTISM GOVERNMENT and have a GOVERNMENT that WORKS for "WE THE PEOPLE!"
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE - Overthrowing Despotism, Political Corruption, Judicial Corruption/Injustices. . . .HEALING and RESTORING a NATION!
A fictitious legal brief to remit the final judgment of bail forfeiture. Capt. Bryant issued a bond for the release of Rutger Batty who later failed to appear in court. Mr. Batty was in a Texas jail because of a prior illegal gun possession charge. Though Mr. Batty was not incarcerated in a North Carolina jail or a federal prison within the United States, Captain Bryant wants Weft and Wright, P.L.L.C. to try and get the forfeited bail money remitted.
This document is a report and recommendation from a magistrate judge regarding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by the defendant, Info Directions, Inc. The plaintiff, Transverse LLC, alleges that Info Directions interfered with its contract and misappropriated its trade secrets related to billing software. The magistrate judge provides background on the parties and claims, summarizes the legal standards for personal jurisdiction, and will make a recommendation to the district court judge on the motion to dismiss.
This document is a court order denying a motion from defendants Alec and Mike Sou for attorneys' fees and expenses under the Hyde Amendment. It provides background on the criminal case against the Sous, including that they initially pled guilty but later withdrew their pleas after the court rejected their plea agreements. It then describes how the government dismissed all charges against the Sous after a witness testified inaccurately during trial about the legality of recruiting fees. The court applies the legal standard under the Hyde Amendment and denies the Sous' motion, finding that their arguments do not establish that the government's position was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith.
UNITED STATES' ABUSE OF THE 'SERIAL LITIGATOR' DEFENSEVogelDenise
17 USC § 107 Limitations on Exclusive Rights – FAIR USE
This document has been prepared in support of DEPRIVATION OF JURY TRIAL(S) - i.e. as “For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury” – as set forth in the United States of America’s DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. Furthermore, provides a copy of a Court Order FALSELY accusing Newsome of RACIAL and ANTI-SEMITIC SLURS for addressing for what are KNOWN to be Terrorist Acts, War Crimes, Apartheid Practices/Crimes Against Humanity, and other Criminal Acts launched against her by the United States of America’s NAZI’S and/or WHITE Jews/Zionists/Supremacists!
IMPORTANT TO NOTE: Are those WHO played ROLES in the FOUNDING of Israel as the Nazis and/or WHITE Jewish/Zionists/Supremacists Law Firms as Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz: https://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/baker-donelson-founder-of-state-of-israel
The DENIAL of JURY TRIAL is also a defense that may be used in seeking INTERNATIONAL Judicial Review, INVESTIGATIONS and PROSECUTIONS, etc. – i.e. in taking matter(s) before INTERNATIONAL Tribunals!
Doc962 freeman group motion compromise & settlement_ a walk-awaymalp2009
The Trustee filed a motion seeking court approval of a compromise and settlement agreement between the Trustee and the Freeman Parties. The agreement provides that Robert Freeman and David Ward will withdraw their respective $92,500 proof of claims against the estate with prejudice, and the Trustee will dismiss the Freeman Parties from an adversary proceeding. The agreement achieves a walk-away settlement and full mutual release of claims between the parties. The Trustee believes the settlement is in the best interest of creditors and the estate by avoiding substantial time and costs of litigation, despite believing there are good objections to the proof of claims.
The document summarizes recent developments in Texas law from decisions by the Supreme Court of Texas covering several areas:
1) The Court held that a landlord cannot use the Declaratory Judgment Act to collect attorneys' fees in a trespass to try title suit against a tenant holding over.
2) The Court extended its previous ruling requiring trial courts to specify reasons for granting a new trial, and authorized appellate review of those reasons.
3) The Court confirmed its prior ruling that statutes suspending limitations periods do not suspend statutes of repose.
4) The Court held that a home builder's costs to remove and replace defective siding from homes was covered by its insurance policy.
This document is an order from a United States District Court regarding cross-motions for summary judgment in a case involving a plaintiff who was imprisoned at a halfway house operated by the defendant. The court provides background on the case, including that the plaintiff sued over alleged unlawful seizure of his property and constitutional violations. The court evaluates the motions using the standard for summary judgment, granting the defendant's motion and denying the plaintiff's motion.
This appeal concerns discovery disputes in an adversary proceeding brought by Sulphur Mountain Land & Livestock, LP against John and Maureen Redmond regarding their bankruptcy filing. Sulphur Mountain had previously sued the Redmonds over a commercial lease guaranteed by their daughter. The bankruptcy court granted Sulphur Mountain's motion to compel discovery from the Redmonds and later issued terminating sanctions against them for alleged noncompliance, even though the Redmonds had produced documents and been deposed. The Redmonds are appealing these rulings.
Decision by U.S. District Judge David N. Hurd on Force Majeure Case in New Yo...Marcellus Drilling News
A decision issued by Judge David Hurd in a case of landowners from Broome and Tioga Counties in New York State against Chesapeake Energy and Statoilhydro. Chesapeake is attempting to extend leases on property for gas drilling claiming that the moratorium in New York has stopped them from drilling. Landowners claim the leases were signed long before horizontal hydraulic fracturing of shale was done and that Chesapeake could have drilled, conventionally, any time they chose to.
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Similar to 54 - Memorandum Decision and Order (20)
1. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
JEANNE B. BRYANT, solely in her
capacity as court-appointed independent
fiduciary for RETIREMENT SECURITY
PLAN AND TRUST,
Plaintiff,
v.
TAMARACK MUNICIPAL
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:14-cv-00339-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Plaintiff Bryant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
counts I and II of Bryant’s Complaint (Dkt. 24), Bryant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on Tamarack Municipal Association’s (TMA) counterclaims (Dkt. 45), TMA’s Motion
for Summary Judgment on all three of Bryant’s claims (Dkt. 44), and Bryant’s Motion to
Strike Expert Testimony (Dkt. 28). The Court has reviewed the briefs submitted by the
parties and after a hearing conducted on August 4, 2015 enters the following Order
denying Bryant’s motions for summary judgment, partially granting and partially denying
TMA’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and denying Bryant’s Motion to Strike Expert
Testimony.
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 1 of 17
2. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
BACKGROUND
Bryant is the court-appointed independent fiduciary for Retirement Security Plan
and Trust (“RSPT”). Compl. ¶ 1, Dkt. 1. RSPT is the current holder of notes and a
mortgage related to the Osprey Meadows Golf Course and portions of the Lodge at
Osprey Meadows at the Tamarack Resort (together the “Osprey Meadows Property”). Id.
¶¶ 6-52. West Mountain Golf (WMG), who is not a party to this case, is the title holder to
the Osprey Meadows Property, as well as the debtor under the notes and mortgage held
by RSPT. Id.
WMG was unable to maintain or operate the Osprey Meadows Property and
consequently leased the property to TMA – the homeowners association of the Tamarack
Resort. Id. ¶ 20. The initial lease related to portions of the lodge and was signed on July
3, 2009. Compl. Ex. E, Dkt. 1-7. The lease was set to renew every 30 days and obligated
TMA to pay $100 a week in rent in the form of a credit against past due municipal
assessments owed by WMG. Id.
On May 1, 2012, WMG and TMA entered into a new lease agreement, in which
WMG leased to TMA the golf course and remainder of WMG’s lodge parcels. Compl.
Ex. F at 2-3, Dkt. 1-8. The terms of this lease called for TMA to operate the golf course
at its expense but did not require the payment of any rent. Id. at ¶ 3.2. In February 2013,
the golf course lease was extended until October 31, 2013. Aff. of Christensen, Ex. F,
Dkt. 24-3. According to the terms of the extension agreement, however, the lease was set
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 2 of 17
3. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
to renew automatically on October 31 of each year unless either party gave a notice of
non-extension no later than the first day of October. Id.
It is undisputed that WMG failed to make its payments to RSPT and is now in
default under the note and mortgage. RSPT took the view that, under the assignment of
rents provision in the mortgage, WMG’s breach gave it authority to unilaterally terminate
and/or modify all lease agreements to the property. Compl. ¶¶ 41, 83-86, Dkt. 1.
Accordingly, on April 28, 2014, RSPT sent a letter to TMA stating that it was terminating
the leases. Compl. Ex. Q at 1-6, Dkt. 1-11.The letter proposed new lease terms including
increasing the yearly rent to $693,500. Id. RSPT’s letter advised TMA, that if it remained
on the Osprey Meadows Property beyond June 1, 2014, that would constitute acceptance
of the new terms, including the yearly rent of almost $700,000. Id.
In addition to arguing that the Assignment of Rents provision of the mortgage
gave it the unilateral right, upon WMG’s breach, to terminate all leases to the property,
the April 28 letter also contended that it could terminate the lease because TMA had
failed to pay the property taxes owed on the Osprey Meadows Property. Id. TMA
responded on May 9, 2014, contending that RSPT did not have the right to unilaterally
terminate the lease, and that the lease did not obligate TMA to pay property taxes and
TMA was therefore not in default under the lease. Compl. Ex. R at 1-5, Dkt. 1-11.
In an apparent attempt to hedge its bet, RSPT replied by letter dated May 29,
2014, indicating that if its prior efforts to terminate the lease proved ineffective, it was
thereby giving notice of its intent not to renew the lease. Specifically, the letter stated:
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 3 of 17
4. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
Lastly, to the extent necessary (and only to the extent a court of competent
jurisdiction deems the TMA/WMG lease still operable as of the date of this letter,
this letter constitutes notice of non-renewal of the current TMA/WMG lease, as
required by paragraph 1 of the Lease and Sublease Extension Agreement between
TMA and WMG dated February 28, 2013.
Compl. Ex. S at p.1, Dkt. 1-11. Without any agreement as to whether the lease was or
was not terminated, TMA continued to occupy the Osprey Meadows Property until at
least April 2, 2015 without paying any rent to RSPT. Aff. of Lord, Ex. 4, Dkt. 48-4.
Subsequently, Bryant filed this lawsuit against Tamarack for breach of contract for
failing to pay the rent and property taxes as well as for unjust enrichment. Tamarack
responded with counterclaims against Bryant for unpaid municipal assessments and for
unjust enrichment as a result of Tamarack’s expenditures to maintain and operate the
Osprey Meadows Property. Bryant has now filed a motion for summary judgment on her
breach of contract claims, a motion for summary judgment on TMA’s counterclaims, and
a motion to strike TMA’s expert witnesses. TMA has filed a motion for summary
judgment on all three of Bryant’s claims.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or
defense, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). One of the principal purposes of the
summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims . . . .”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). It is “not a disfavored procedural
shortcut,” but is instead the “principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 4 of 17
5. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant
unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.” Id. at 327. “[T]he mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). There must be a genuine dispute as to any material fact – a fact
“that may affect the outcome of the case.” Id. at 248.
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
and the Court must not make credibility findings. Id. at 255. Direct testimony of the
non-movant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d
1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). On the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt
unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d
1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988).
When cross-motions for summary judgment are filed, the Court must
independently search the record for factual disputes. Fair Housing Council of Riverside
County, Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). The filing of cross-
motions for summary judgment – where both parties essentially assert that there are no
material factual disputes – does not vitiate the court’s responsibility to determine whether
disputes as to material fact are present. Id.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a
genuine dispute as to material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.
2001) (en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 5 of 17
6. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply point out
the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Fairbank v. Wunderman
Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir.2000).
This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to
support a jury verdict in her favor. Deveraux, 263 F.3d at 1076. The non-moving party
must go beyond the pleadings and show “by her [ ] affidavits, or by the depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file” that a genuine dispute of material fact
exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
ANALYSIS
In 2010, Matthew Hutcheson defrauded the members of RSPT of $3,276,000.00
and used the proceeds of his crime to further his plan to purchase Tamarack resort near
Donnelly, Idaho. Hutcheson acquired a mortgage and an assignment of rents
encumbering Osprey Meadows Golf Course and a portion of the Lodge at Tamarack.
Osprey Meadows was owned by West Mountain Golf, LLC (“WMG”).
In unrelated proceedings, Bryant (as trustee for RSPT) later acquired as restitution
for Hutcheson’s embezzlement of RSPT funds, all of Hutcheson’s interest in the
promissory note, the mortgage and assignment of rents, so she now holds the position of
“Lender” as defined in those documents. Bryant thus has the rights of the Lender, and
nothing more. This is not just a question of what the parties to the mortgage agreed upon.
It is also a question of what notice was given to an innocent third party entering into a
lease on the property. A party entering into a lease on the property would not have
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 6 of 17
7. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
understood the language of the mortgage and assignment giving the mortgagee (Bryant)
an unfettered right to terminate the lease without complying with the limitations
contained in the lease – i.e., giving at least a 30-day notice of non-renewal before the end
of the lease. Dkt. 1, Ex. A.
Additionally, the modification to the lease also gives Bryant, as the Landlord, the
right to “terminate this Agreement in the event that . . . [TMA] breaches any material
term of this Agreement and fails to cure such breach within fifteen (15) days after
receiving written notice from Landlord of the breach.” Dkt. 1, Ex. F at 10.
Bryant argues that she had the right to terminate the lease, on behalf of RSTP, on
three alternative theories: (1) The April 28 letter constituted an exercise of her absolute
right to terminate the lease pursuant to the assignment of rents provisions in the
mortgage; (2) TMA was in default for failing to pay real estate taxes on the property; and
(3) The May 29 letter satisfied the thirty day notice requirement for not renewing the
lease. As explained below, Bryant is only correct with regard to the 30-day notice of
non-renewal.
1. Unilateral Termination Breach of Contract Claim (Holdover Lease) Count I.
First, Bryant claims she unilaterally terminated the lease and imposed new lease
terms on TMA as a holdover lessee. But Bryant had no right to unilaterally terminate the
lease because no such right existed in the original lease assigned to her. TMA obtained
rights under its lease from WMG. Those rights were not affected by an independent
agreement that WMG may have reached with Bryant’s predecessors-in-interest who
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 7 of 17
8. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8
negotiated the terms of the note, mortgage and assignment of rents. Those documents do
provide that upon WMG’s default, Bryant, as lender, may,
assume all rights of the landlord under the Leases, may operate and manage
the property, enter into and enforce the Leases, terminate the Leases and
take any or all actions Lender deems prudent to preserve its rights to the
Rents and Leases and collect amounts owing to it.
Compl., Ex. B at p.2, Dkt. 1-4. However, the only reasonable construction of this
language is that Bryant, upon WMG’s default, would have only those rights which WMG
possessed to terminate any leases of the mortgaged property. Nothing in this clause
suggests that Bryant received the right to unilaterally terminate all existing leases,
regardless of the rights of the tenants. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary
judgment for TMA on Count I.
2. Bryant’s Property Tax Claim (Count II).
Bryant next claims that TMA breached its lease agreement with WMG by failing
to pay the property taxes on the golf course. Thus, Bryant claims that she had the right to
terminate the lease pursuant to the modification to the lease stating that the “Landlord has
the right to terminate this Agreement in the event that . . . [TMA] breaches any material
term of this Agreement and fails to cure such breach within fifteen (15) days after
receiving written notice from Landlord of the breach.” Dkt. 1, Ex. F at 10. TMA counters
that the terms of the lease do not require it to pay any property taxes and that, even if the
language is ambiguous, the only evidence in the record is that the lease did not require
TMA to pay the property taxes. The Court agrees that the language is ambiguous, but
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 8 of 17
9. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9
concludes that TMA’s extrinsic evidence is so persuasive that no reasonable jury could
disagree with TMA’s interpretation.
The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law that is
ascertained through the court’s analysis of whether the contract is reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretations. Williams v. Computer Resources, Inc., 851 P.2d 967, 969
(Idaho 1993). Only if the contract is found to be ambiguous may extrinsic evidence be
considered in order to discern the true intent of the parties. Bilow v. Preco, Inc., 966 P.2d
23, 27 (Idaho 1998).
TMA was “solely responsible for all costs associated with its operation of the Golf
Course and Lodge and any other activities in which [TMA] engage[d] on the Property.”
Compl. Ex. F at Art. 4.4. Bryant argues that, in a commercial setting, the term “operating
expenses” often includes the payment of property taxes. However, the contract language
could also mean that TMA was only responsible for costs that arose as a direct result of
the operation of the property. Property taxes would have been assessed even if TMA did
not operate the golf course or engage in any activities on the property. Thus, this
interpretation would not require TMA to pay the property taxes. Therefore, the language
is ambiguous because it is subject to two reasonable interpretations that directly conflict.
TMA has presented uncontradicted and persuasive extrinsic evidence showing that
WMG and TMA did not intend for TMA to pay the property taxes. Specifically, TMA
offers the affidavit of WMG’s managing member, Randy Hopkins. Hopkins attests that
WMG never intended for TMA to pay the property taxes on the Osprey Meadows
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 9 of 17
10. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10
Property. Hopkins Aff., ¶¶ 10, 19, Dkt. 30-3. Presented with Hopkins’ affidavit and no
other evidence of intent, it would be impossible for a reasonable jury to conclude that
WMG and TMA intended the term “operating expenses” to include the payment of
property taxes.
Bryant also contends that TMA was obligated to pay the property taxes since
TMA was required to “discharge at its expense any lien…resulting from [TMA’s] use of
or activities on the Property.” Compl. Ex. F, Art. 10, Dkt. 1-8. Bryant alleges that failure
to pay taxes on the Osprey Meadows Property resulted in a tax lien. Compl. ¶ 65.
However, the lease unambiguously did not require TMA to discharge the lien because the
property taxes did not result from TMA’s use of or activities on the property. Rather,
taxes would have been assessed and the lien imposed even if the property was dormant.
Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment on this claim as well. Accordingly, the
Court will grant summary judgment for TMA on Count II.
3. Bryant’s Unjust Enrichment Claim (Count III).
Finally, Bryant contends that it terminated the lease by giving at least 30 days’
notice that the lease would not renew. Bryant is correct. In a May 29, 2014 letter, Bryant
indicated that “this letter constitutes notice of non-renewal of the current TMA/WMG
lease, as required by paragraph 1 of the Lease and Sublease Extension Agreement
between TMA and WMG . . . .” Comp. Ex. S, Dkt. 1-11. Thus, the lease was terminated
as of October 31, 2014, and Bryant may pursue a claim for unjust enrichment for any
damages from TMA after that date.
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 10 of 17
11. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11
“The essence of the quasi-contractual theory of unjust enrichment is that the
defendant has received a benefit which [it] would be inequitable to retain at least without
compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust.” Beco Const. Co. v.
Bannock Paving Co., 797 P.2d 863, 866 (Idaho 1990) (Quoting Hertz v. Fiscus, 567 P.2d
1 (Idaho 1977)). Bryant claims that TMA has been unjustly enriched both before and
after she allegedly terminated the leases. Since the leases were contained in express
contracts, Bryant cannot now claim that the leases unjustly enriched TMA. “We will not
rescue a contracting party from the consequences of what later appears to be a bad
bargain.” Christensen Motor Sales, Inc. v. Am. Motor Sales, Inc., 697 P.2d 442, 445
(Idaho 1985). However, Bryant may have a valid claim of unjust enrichment if TMA
received a benefit by holding over after the leases were terminated.
There is a genuine dispute regarding the amount of benefit conferred to TMA.
TMA presents evidence that the rental value of the Osprey Meadows Property is $0 and,
therefore, that TMA did not receive any benefit. In response, Bryant contends that TMA
enjoys benefits beyond mere profits from the golf course because of the course’s
association with the Tamarack Resort. There appears to be adequate evidence on both
sides of this argument to persuade a reasonable jury and, therefore, there is a genuine
dispute of material fact regarding Bryant’s unjust enrichment claim. Accordingly, the
Court will deny both Bryant’s and TMA’s motions for summary judgment on Bryant’s
unjust enrichment claim. That claim will need to be resolved by a jury.
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 11 of 17
12. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12
4. TMA’s Unjust Enrichment Claim.
TMA filed a counterclaim for unjust enrichment against RSPT. In order to prove
that RSPT was unjustly enriched, TMA must show that 1) a benefit was conferred on
RSPT by TMA, 2) RSPT appreciated the benefit, and 3) it would be inequitable for RSPT
to accept the benefit without paying for the value of the benefit. Gibson v. Ada County,
133 P.3d 1211, 1224 (Idaho 2006). The party receiving the benefit must actually
appreciate the benefit. As a result, unjust enrichment will not apply in the case of a mere
volunteer who, without request, confers a benefit upon another. Teton Peaks Inv. Co.,
LLC v. Ohme, 195 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Idaho 2008). “This rule exists to protect persons who
have had unsolicited ‘benefits' thrust upon them.” Id.
There is sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to conclude that RSPT
received a benefit from TMA. TMA claims that it conferred a benefit on RSPT by
partially paying RSPT’s assessments levied by the Lodge at Osprey Meadows (LOMA)
and by maintaining and improving the Osprey Meadows Property beyond the
requirements of the leases. RSPT has the right to lease the property but any lessee would
be liable for the LOMA assessments. See Aff. of Christensen, Ex. A, Article 7.5, Dkt. 45-
4. As a result, paying the LOMA assessments will allow RSPT to possibly obtain a
higher rental price for the property. In addition, the assessments are used to benefit the
lodge and, therefore, presumably benefit those who own or have an interest in property
within the lodge. See Aff. of Christensen, Ex. A, Art. 7.2, Dkt. 45-4. Thus, there is
sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that TMA conferred a benefit on RSPT.
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 12 of 17
13. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13
There is significant evidence that RSPT appreciated the benefit conferred by
TMA. As discussed previously, the intent of the parties is irrelevant in determining
whether or not a quasi-contract exists. See Cont'l Forest Products, Inc., 518 P.2d at 1205.
Therefore, no intent to receive the benefit is necessary. Rather, a receiving party
appreciates the benefit if it understood that it was receiving the benefit from the
conferring party for free. See Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (Defining
“appreciate” as “to understand the significance or meaning of”). In 2013, TMA notified
RSPT that it was expending significant sums of money to protect WMG’s assets and it
does not appear that RSPT objected. Compl. Ex. H, Dkt. 1-10. This alone is sufficient
evidence to persuade a reasonable jury that RSPT knew it was receiving a benefit for
free.
Whether or not it would be inequitable for RSPT to accept the benefit without
payment is a question for a jury to answer. Deciding questions of equity intrinsically
requires the exercise of moral judgment and often requires considering the facts of a case
in the aggregate. In other words, nearly all facts are material facts when deciding
questions of equity. Absent exceedingly clear evidence that the balance of equities tips in
one party’s favor, it would be improper for the Court to replace its judgment for that of
the jury. At a minimum, there are genuine disputes about the value of the benefit
conferred and about whether or not the benefit was a mere byproduct of TMA acting in
its own self-interest. These disputes are sufficient to deny summary judgment because
their resolution will likely affect whether or not a jury finds RSPT’s non-payment
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 13 of 17
14. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14
inequitable. Accordingly, the Court will deny summary judgment on TMA’s unjust
enrichment counterclaim.
5. Unpaid Municipal Assessments Claim.
TMA’s second counterclaim argues that RSPT is liable to it for unpaid Municipal
Assessments. RSPT asks for summary judgment on that claim. Given the facts in the
record, a reasonable jury could conclude that RSPT is liable to TMA for municipal
assessments.
Under the Tamarack Resort Association bylaws, mortgagees are not liable for
municipal assessments but assigns are liable. Aff. of Lord, Ex. 1, ¶ 4.5, Dkt. 25-2. RSPT
is certainly a mortgagee, however, RSPT has been assigned certain property interests
beyond those of a traditional mortgagee as a result of the assignment of rents. Compl. Ex.
B at 1-5, Dkt. 1-4. The bylaws do not appear to indicate whether or not a mortgagee may
also be an assign. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude
that RSPT is an assign and, consequently, liable for any assessments owed on the Osprey
Meadows Property.
TMA has the authority to levy municipal assessments on “units” as the term is
defined in the General Declaration for Tamarack Resort. Aff. of Lord, Ex. 1, ¶ 4.1, Dkt.
25-2. “Units” do not include “the Club Facilities and the Mountain Facilities, exclusive of
any parcel which would otherwise be associated with a Class A Residential Membership
or a Class B Village Membership; [or] Association Facilities.” Id. ¶ 2.42. The portion of
the Osprey Meadows Property within the lodge appears to be part of the Club Facilities.
Case 1:14-cv-00339-BLW Document 54 Filed 09/30/15 Page 14 of 17
15. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15
See Id. ¶¶ 2.4 and 12.1. In addition, any parcels leased by TMA are classified as
Association Facilities during the duration of the lease. Id. ¶ 2.9. Therefore, in order for
TMA to levy assessments on WMG’s lodge parcels, the parcels must be 1) associated
with a Class A or Class B Membership and 2) not under lease to TMA.
TMA has presented evidence that WMG’s lodge parcels are associated with a
Class B Village Membership. All owners of units within the Village are Class B Village
Members. Aff. of Lord, Ex. 2 ¶ 3.1(a)(ii)(1), Dkt. 25-3. The Village is “[t]hat portion of
Tamarack Resort which is delineated in a Final Plat for the PUD, or in any Supplemental
Declaration, as ‘the Village.’” Aff. of Lord, Ex. 1 at ¶ 2.43, Dkt. 25-2. The Condominium
Plat for Tamarack Resort Members Lodge identifies WMG’s parcels as being units
within the Village. Aff. Of Lord, Ex. 1, pp. 6-10, Dkt. 48-4. Therefore, a reasonable jury
could conclude that WMG’s parcels are units associated with a Class B Village
Membership.
WMG’s parcels have not always been under lease to TMA. The record indicates
that TMA leased four of WMG’s 11 lodge parcels in the 2009 lodge lease, Aff. of
Christensen, Ex. E at 1-7, Dkt. 24-3, and the remaining seven parcels in the 2012 golf
lease, Aff. of Christensen, Ex. F at 2-3, Dkt. 24-3. Since TMA was precluded from
levying assessments on WMG’s parcels while they were under lease to TMA, there
remains a genuine dispute regarding the amount of assessments owed by WMG to TMA.
Accordingly, the Court will deny summary judgment on TMA’s Municipal Assessments
counterclaim.
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6. Motion to Strike.
The well-known standard for admitting expert testimony is set forth in Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. One requirement is that the evidence offered by the expert
must assist the trier of fact either to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue. Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 563 (9th cir.2010); Fed.R.Evid. 702. “The
requirement that the opinion testimony assist the trier of fact goes primarily to
relevance.” Id. at 564.
Bryant argues that expert testimony regarding the market rental value of the
Osprey Meadows Property is irrelevant. The Court disagrees. As discussed above,
Bryant is entitled to pursue a claim of unjust enrichment for the time TMA occupied the
Osprey Meadows Property after November 1, 2014. In order to prove unjust enrichment,
Bryant must prove that a benefit was conferred on TMA. Gibson v. Ada County, 133 P.3d
1211, 1224 (Idaho 2006). Presumably TMA has obtained their expert in order to provide
evidence that there was no benefit or that the benefit was very small. Such evidence is not
only relevant but almost necessary to determine any award of damages. Therefore,
Bryant’s Motion to Strike must be denied.
In the alternative, Bryant requests additional time to retain a rebuttal expert.
Bryant’s deadline for disclosing rebuttal experts was March 20, 2015 and she filed her
Motion to Strike on March 19, 2015. The Court is not in the habit of allowing parties to
circumvent established disclosure deadlines by filing motions to extend. In addition,
Bryant should have been well aware that the value of the Osprey Meadows Property
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17. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 17
would be in dispute since she herself made a claim of unjust enrichment. Therefore, the
Court will deny Bryant’s alternative motion to extend the disclosure deadline.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Bryant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24) is DENIED.
2. Bryant’s Motion to Strike Expert Testimony (Dkt. 28) is DENIED.
3. TMA’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 44) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part as explained above. The claim for unjust enrichment remains.
4. Bryant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 45) is DENIED.
DATED: September 30, 2015
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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