The document discusses the classification of offenses under the Juvenile Justice Act 2015 into petty, serious, and heinous categories and the impact this has on legal processes for children in conflict with the law. It provides definitions of these offense categories from the Act. It also discusses provisions regarding preliminary assessment and trial timelines for children, and restrictions on sentencing like no death penalty. It examines a case where a juvenile was ordered to be tried as an adult for a heinous offense. Overall, the document analyzes the JJ Act provisions around classifying and trying offenses committed by juveniles.

1. HEINOUS OFFENCES
UNDER THE JJ ACT
: : Prepared By : :
H.S. Mulia
1

2. Disclaimer
Views expressed in this
document are for
information and
academic purpose only.
2

3. CLASSIFICATION OF
OFFENCES IN JJ ACT, 2015
AND ITS IMPACT ON LEGAL
PROCESSES RELATING TO
CHILDREN IN CONFLICT
WITH LAW AND ISSUES OF
TRANSFER OF CHILD TO THE
CHILDREN COURT FOR
TRIAL AS AN ADULT.
3

4. Clause (33) of Section 2 of the
JJ Act provides that “heinous
offences” includes the offences
for which the minimum
punishment under the Indian
Penal Code or any other law for
the time being in force is
imprisonment for seven years
or more.
4

5. Following are the
offences which fall
under the
category of
Heinous Offences.
5

6. Indian Penal Code, 1860
Offences punishable u/s
121, 195, 195A, 302,
304B, 311, 326A, 370(2)
to 370(7), 376(1) & (2),
376(A), 376(D), 376(E),
397 and 398.
6

7. The Commission of
Sati (Prevention)
Act, 1987 Offences
punishable u/s 4(1)
and 4(2).
7

8. The Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985
Offences punishable u/s
15(c), 17(c), 18(b), 19,
20C, 21(c), 22(c), 23(c),
24, 25, 27A, 29, 31A.
8

9. The Arms Act,
1959
Offences
punishable u/s
27(2) and 27(3)
9

10. The Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967
Offences punishable u/s 10(b)
(i) and 16(1)(a).
10

11. The Food Safety and
Standards Act, 2006
Offence punishable
u/s 59(iv)
11

12. The Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 Offences
punishable u/s 3(2)(i),
3(2)(iv) and 3(2)(v).
12

13. Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences
Act, 2000 Offences
punishable u/s 4 and 6.
13

14. Gujarat Prohibition
Ordinance Offences
punishable under the
third proviso of Section
65(e), 68(iii).
14

15. Section 2 (45) of the JJ Act
provides that “petty
offences” includes the
offences for which the
maximum punishment
under the IPC or any other
law for the time being in
force is imprisonment up to
three years.
15

16. Section 2(54) of the JJ Act
provides that “serious
offences” includes the
offences for which the
punishment under the IPC
or any other law for the
time being in force, is
imprisonment between
three to seven years.
16

17. Section 14 of the JJ Act provides
that:-
(1) Where a child alleged to be in
conflict with law is produced
before Board, the Board shall hold
an inquiry in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and may
pass such orders in relation to
such child as it deems fit under
sections 17 and 18 of this Act.
17

18. 14(2) The inquiry under this
section shall be completed within
a period of four months from the
date of first production of the child
before the Board, unless the
period is extended, for a
maximum period of two more
months by the Board, having
regard to the circumstances of the
case and after recording the
reasons in writing for such
extension. 18

19. 14(3) A preliminary assessment in
case of heinous offences under section
15 shall be disposed of by the Board
within a period of three months from
the date of first production of the child
before the Board.
14(4) If inquiry by the Board under sub
section (2) for petty offences remains
inconclusive even after the extended
period, the proceedings shall stand
terminated:
Provided... 19

20. Provided that for serious or
heinous offences, in case the
Board requires further extension of
time for completion of inquiry, the
same shall be granted by the Chief
Judicial Magistrate or, as the case
may be, the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, for reasons to be
recorded in writing.
20

21. Section 18 of the JJ Act provides that
(1) Where a Board is satisfied on inquiry that
a child irrespective of age has committed a
petty offence, or a serious offence, or a child
below the age of sixteen years has
committed a heinous offence, then,
notwithstanding anything contrary contained
in any other law for the time being in force,
and based on the nature of offence, specific
need for supervision or intervention,
circumstances as brought out in the social
investigation report and past conduct of the
child, the Board may, if it so thinks fit —
(a) to (g)... 21

22. Section 18 (3) of the JJ Act
provides that:-
(3) Where the Board after
preliminary assessment under
section 15 pass an order that there
is a need for trial of the said child
as an adult, then the Board may
order transfer of the trial of the
case to the Children’s Court having
jurisdiction to try such offences.
22

23. Section 21 of the JJ Act provides
that:-
21. No child in conflict with law
shall be sentenced to death or for
life imprisonment without the
possibility of release, for any such
offence, either under the
provisions of this Act or under the
provisions of the Indian Penal Code
or any other law for the time being
in force. 23

24. Case Law:- In probably the first
case of its kind, the Juvenile
Justice Board (JJB), Delhi has
concluded that a teenager who
allegedly ran over a 32-year-old
marketing executive in the city of
Delhi while driving his father's
Mercedes is to be tried as an adult
by the Children's Court as
provided u/s18(3) of the JJ Act.
24

25. The JJB gave this decision on 4th
June, 2016, ruling that the offence
allegedly committed by the
Juvenile was "heinous offence".
Transferring the case of the
Juvenile to the Children's Court,
the JJB held that the circumstances
show the teenager was mature
enough to understand the
consequences of his act and to
think of ways to escape from
lawful punishment for the offence.25

26. The JJB did not accept the defence's
claim that the alleged offence of 304
IPC (culpable homicide not
amounting to murder), which entails
a maximum punishment of 10 years'
imprisonment, is not made out
against the Juvenile. The JJB also
relied on the report of a Clinical
Psychologist. The report said the
juvenile was in no manner lacking
the mental and physical capacity to
commit the alleged offence.
26

27. This is significant because
according to section 2(33) of
the JJ Act, "heinous offences"
include the offences for which
minimum punishment under
IPC or any other law for the
time being in force is
imprisonment for seven years
or more.
27

28. However, the Juvenile could
still get some relief from the
Children's Court, as the JJ
Act has a provision [u/s
19(1)(ii)] for the Children
Court to take a relook and
decide whether the
teenager is to be tried as an
adult or not.
28

29. Question:- In the afrosaid
premise, what do you
reckon, whether the order
passed by the JJB, Delhi
would stand or not?
29

30. Before the JJ Act, 2015 came into force,
under Section 9 of the Central Reserve
Police Force Act, categories of 'More
Heinous Offence' and 'Less Heinous
Offence'. Over and above this the First
Schedule of Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 provides for the jurisdiction of
the Courts to try the offence, and all
serious offences are being tried by the
Court of Sessions. Otherwise than this,
nowhere definitions of Serious Offence
and Heinous Offence has been
provided. 30

31. While giving simple meaning of
the 'Heinous Offences' and
'Serious Offences' the Larger
bench of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Manoj
Narula v. Union of India, AIR
2014 SCW 5287 has observed
in para no.114, as under:-
31

32. “… if the offence is heinous
punishable under Section
307 of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC) or kidnapping
punishable under Section
363 of the IPC or any other
serious offence not
attracting a minimum
punishment”.
32

33. Above observations of the
Hon'ble Apex Court leaves
no matter of doubt that
offences like 307 and 363
are heinous offences and
those offences which do not
entail minimum punishment
would fall under the
category of serious offence.
33

34. Para 4 of the Statement of Object and
Reasons of JJ Act, 2015 reads as under:-
“Further, increasing cases of crimes
committed by the children in the age
group of 16-18 years in recent years
makes it evident that the current
provisions and system under the JJ Act,
2000, are ill equipped to tackle child
offenders in this age group. The data
collected by the National Crime Records
Bureau establishes that crimes by
children in the age group of 16-18 years
have increased especially in certain
categories of heinous offences”. 34

35. Bare reading of the Para 4 of the
Statement of Object and Reasons
leads to the conclusion that the
Parliament did not wish to equip
the new JJ Act, 2015 to tackle child
offender in the age group 16-18
years, who has alleged to have
committed an offence which
entails graver punishment but
alleged to have committed only
certain categories of heinous
offences. 35

36. Simple interpretation of Clause (33) of
Section 2 of the JJ Act (heinous offence)
and Clause (54) of Section 2 of the JJ Act
(serious offence) leaves no matter of
doubt that one category viz the category
between the 'Serious Offence' and
'Heinous Offence' is missing i.e. the
offences for which the punishment under
any Statute is imprisonment for more
than seven years but no minimum
punishment of imprisonment for seven
years or more has been prescribed. For
example Second Part of Section 304,
Sections 306 of IPC etc. 36

37. In the JJ Act, 2015, it has been made
clear that all offences where after the
conviction, accused can be ordered to
undergo sentence of imprisonment for
more than seven years (like 307 and
363 of IPC) would not fall under the
category of heinous offence and only
those offences for which statue has
prescribed the minimum imprisonment
for seven years or more would fall
under the category of heinous offences.
Which is in consonance with Para 4 of
the Statement of Object and Reasons of
JJ Act. 37

38. The JJ Act is the beneficial
legislation and, therefore, it
cannot be interpreted in a way
which may be less or non-
beneficial for the Juvenile who
has alleged to have committed
an offence falling between the
categories of serious offences
and heinous offences.
38

39. Reference may be made to
the ratio laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Utkal
Contractors and Joinery Pvt.
Ltd. V/s State of Orissa,
reported in (1987) 3 SCC
279 : AIR 1987 SC 1454,
wherein it is held that :-
39

40. "No provision in the statute and no word of
the statute may be construed in isolation.
Every provision and every word must be
looked at generally before any provision or
word is attempted to be construed. The
setting and the pattern are important. It is
again important to remember that
Parliament does not waste its breath
unnecessarily. Just as the Parliament is not
expected to use unnecessary expressions,
Parliament is also not expected to express
itself unnecessarily.
Continue... 40

41. Continue..
Even as Parliament does not use any word
without meaning something, Parliament
does not legislate where no legislation is
called for. Parliament cannot be assumed to
legislate for the sake of legislation; nor can it
be assumed to make pointless legislation.
Parliament does not indulge in legislation
merely to state what it is unnecessary to
state or to do what is already validly done.
Parliament may not be assumed to legislate
unnecessarily. Again, while the words of an
enactment are important, the context is no
less important." 41

42. Reference is also required to made
to the test laid down by Blackburn J.
in R. v. Cleworth, (1864) 4 B and S.
927 at p. 934 to determine what the
correct presumption arising from an
omission in a statute should be, was
whether what was omitted but
sought to be brought within the
legislative intention was "known" to
the law makers, and could,
therefore, be "supposed to have
been omitted intentionally". 42

43. The issue as to whether
the stand for motor
vehicles also includes the
Bus Shelters as provided
under Section 285 of the
Chennai City Municipal
Corporation Act, 1919?
43

44. Section 285 of the
Chennai City
Municipal
Corporation Act,
1919 reads as
under:-
44

45. Provisions of landing places, cart-
stands, etc. - The Commissioner may
construct or provide public landing
places, halting places, cart-stand,
cattle-shed and cow-house and may
charge and levy such fees for the use
of the same as the standing committee
may fix.
Explanation - A cart stand shall, for the
purpose of this Act, include a stand for
carriages including motor vehicles
within the meaning of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 and animals. 45

46. While interpreting
Section 285 of the
Chennai City Municipal
Corporation Act, 1919,
Hon'ble the Apex Court
has held as under:-
46

47. “… when we scan the anatomy of the
provisions, we are impelled to arrive at a
singular conclusion that the Corporation
has the authority to deal with cart-stand
which includes the motor vehicles and
the 'stand' as used in proviso to Section
285 of the Act only refers to the stand for
motor vehicles and cannot include bus
shelters”.
Please refer to the ratio laid down by
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s.
Nova Ads. vs. Metropolitan Transport
Corporation, reported in AIR 2015 SC
1468. 47

48. In the nine States of India, including Madras,
there are two Houses: the Legislative Assembly
and the Legislative Council. One
Narayanaswami's election, held on 11-4-1970,
to the Madras Legislative Council from the
Madras District Graduates' Constituency. The
argument was, Narayanaswami, who had only
passed the High School Leaving Examination
and was not a Graduate, could not be elected at
all to the Legislative Council from the
Graduates' Constituency. The main limb of
argument was, the educational qualification of
the electors should be read into the system of
representation set up by the Constitution for
Legislative Councils as a necessary qualification
of candidates in such constituencies. 48

49. Hon'ble Madras High Court
held that the candidates
from Graduates'
Constituencies of Legislative
Councils must also possess
the qualification to having
graduated and allowed the
Election Petition preferred
against Narayanaswami.
49

50. Section 6 of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 reads as under:-
6. Qualifications for membership of a
Legislative Council:-
(1) A person shall not be qualified to be
chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative
Council of a State to be filled by election
unless he is an elector for any Assembly
constituency in that State.
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be
chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative
Council of a State to be filled by
nomination by the Governor unless he is
ordinarily resident in the State. 50

51. While interpreting Section
6 of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951,
Hon'ble the Apex Court
has held as under:-
51

52. The omission by the Parliament to
prescribe graduation as a
qualification of the candidate for
the Graduates' Constituency is
deliberate and the Court cannot
infer such a qualification as
necessary by resorting to a
presumed legislative intent, as it
would amount to adding it to
those expressly laid down, which
is not generally permissible.
52

53. Please refer to the ratio
laid down by Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of
S. Narayanaswami v/s. G.
Panneerselvam, reported
in AIR 1972 SC 2284 (Five
Judges).
53

54. From the ratios referred to
hereinabove, it becomes crystal clear
that, it could not possibly be said that
the question to be dealt with was not
'known' to the legislators. It could not
even be said that one category viz the
category between the 'Serious
Offence' and 'Heinous Offence' was not
the matter to which the attention of
the law makers in the Parliament was
not specially drawn at all or that the
omission must be by mere oversight.
54

55. Therefore, the crux is, the omission by the
Parliament to prescribe the category of offences
falling between the categories of Serious
Offences and Heinous Offences in the JJ Act,
2015 is deliberate and no Court can add
another category of Heinous Offences, which
otherwise fall under a category of offences
falling between the categories of Serious
Offences and Heinous Offences in the JJ Act,
2015, by resorting to a presumed legislative
intent that such category of offences would also
fall under the category of Heinous Offences. If it
is done it would amount to adding to those
expressly excluded categories of offences,
which is not permissible.
55

56. Conclusion:- When JJB decides to
conduct the Preliminary Assessment
[u/s 15(1)] and passes an order to try
such child as an adult and transfers
the case to the Children's Court, the
Children's Court can try such child as
an adult as per the provided under
CrPC and Section 21 of the Act [u/s
19(1)(i)] or pass an order that there is
no need for trial of such child as an
adult and may conduct an inquiry as a
JJB and pass an order as provided u/s
18 of the Act [u/s 19(1)(ii)]. 56

57. Meaning thereby, when the
Children's Court tries such child as
an adult, as per the provisions
contained under CrPC and Section
21 of the Act [please refer Section
19(1)(i)] such child can be ordered
to undergo sentence of
imprisonment for even 10 years or
beyond but not imprisonment of
life or sentence to death.
57

58. And when JJB passes an order
u/s 15(2) of the Act and
decides to dispose of the case
itself or when the Children's
Court passes an order u/s 19(1)
(ii) of the Act, JJB or the
Children's Court shall follow
the procedure, as far as may
be, for trial in summons case
under the CrPC.
58

59. Final Words:- The JJB may not pass
an order of Preliminary
Assessment u/s 14(3) of the Act, if
the alleged offence does not fall
within the definition of Heinous
Offence.
If it is done, child will have to
undergo sentence of imprisonment
after he attains the age of 21
years [as provided u/s 19(3)] of the
Act. 59

60. And if, the JJB decides to pass an
order of Inquiry u/s 14(2) of the
Act, if the alleged offence falls
within the definition of Petty
Offence, Serious Offence and
Offences falling in between the
categories of Serious Offences and
Heinous Offences, JJB will have to
pass an order as provided u/s 18
of the Act.
60

61. THANK YOU
61