1. LETTERS
Civ-MiI Partnerships
Thank you for highlighting the impor
tance of civilian-military relations in the
Foreign Service in the October Journal.
In Iraq, I would joke to friends that it was
often a chalLenge to be in a
place where people dressed
differently spoke a different
language, were hospitable
but clearly had different
beliefs and customs—and
then you would go outside
the wire with the Marines and
be with the Iraqis.
Based on my experience, I
think the four keys to a strong
partnership between U.S. civilian agen
cies and military units are:
1. An understanding ofand respectfor
each other’s mission, customs, personnel
practices and underlying approaches to
achieving objectives (what the military
calls doctrine”). This holds regardless
of whether a given mission is primar
ily civilian, with some military support
(what we have Inmost embassies), or
whether the mission has a high mili
tary component and yet has significant
diplomatic and other civilian agency ele
ments, as in Iraq and Afghanistan.
2. Being able to “add value” to a given
mission. For the Foreign Service this
means drawing on (and supporting)
its personnel who have deep area and
language expertise; who can understand
and deal effectively with foreign societ
ies’ ambiguities and contradictions,
their outcasts and opposition, as well as
their privileged classes; who have long
experience addressing often contradic
tory policy goals in dealings with foreign
governments, civil society, press and
security services; who understand the
full range of U.S. diplomatic, develop
ment, intelligence, law enforcement and
military tools and interests; and who can
work well with the interagency process,
especially at our overseas missions. The
military respects and appreciates this
talent when we offer it.
3. Being u’illing to show up wizen
needed in difficult and even
dangerous circumstances.
To the extent that the For
eign Service, and State, are
willing to embed officers
with military units or to staff
provincial reconstruction
teams, and more generally
to send Its best to emhassies
in countries at war, they gain
credibility and respect from
their colleagues in the military and in
other agencies.
4. Having the right leaders in the right
places. Embassy Baghdad under Ambas
sador Ryan Cracker and the embassy-
U.S. military relationshIp led by Amb.
Crocker and General David Petraeus are
classic examples of the critical role of
leadership in establishing an effective
U.S. government and coalition civilian-
military partnership.
Stephen McFarland
Ambassador, retired
Bogotd, Colombia
The FS Profession
Lamenting that the Foreign Service is not
yet a profession (Charles Ray, Speaking
Out, Itily-August FSfl is an unfortunate
tradition that has resurfaced from time
to time over more than 50 years.
lames K. Penfield addressed this issue
in the March 1960 edition of The Foreign
Service Journal and urged the Foreign
Service to get over our ‘built-in inferior
ity complex” and emhracc the critical
professional role that we must play in the
life of the nation.
In his classic work, The Soldier and
the State, Samuel Huntington explicitly
identifies diplomatic service as a profes
sion. And, [would argue, in the Foreign
Service Act of 1980, Congress did so as
well.
Of course, there are always steps we
can and should take to further enrich
and advance our profession. But there
is no good substitute for it—experts just
won’t do.
As Penfield said: ‘No one would deny
that a good Merchant Marine skipper
isa professional sailor. It might even
be argued that he’s a better sailor than
the average captain of a Navy ship, who
spends a good deal less of his time at sea.
But who in his right mind would suggest
that the Navy would do its job better if It
hired Merchant Marine officers with
out Navy experience to run some of its
ships?’
Deep experience in diplomacy is criti
cal for good diplomatic dedsion-making.
Former Secretary of State Cohn Powell,
In his leadership book, It Workedfor
Me, observed that the best decisions are
those that draw upon “superb Instinct”
informed and developed through “long
experience.’ Such instincts are the hall
mark of professionals, not experts.
Todd Kushner
FSo
Rockville, Alaryland
Back Story to the
FS Act of 1980
The September articles on the Foreign
Service Act of 1980 were interesting and
factual but neglected the back story:
the two-year battle of the then-AFSA
Governing Board with the department,
on the one hand, and with Congress, on
the other.
A little history may be in order: Con
gress had already passed a major Civil
Service Reform Act and was then intent
on writing a Foreign Service Act congru
VeW roa’Iwu1
10 I ThEFOIEIGNSERVICEJOURKAL
2. shOW)’ I’EIIIOO of close association with an operating
unit of one of the armed services highlights a situa
tion of weakness in the Foreign Service which,
i8èr increasingly intense bureaucratic buffeLting, scans to
‘eL1ing worse rather titan better. One word -—profession
alism- -defines tins situation.
No one would den) that a good Merchant Marine skipper
is a profesionaI sailor. It might even be argued that lie’s
a hater sailor than the average Captain of a Navy ship, who
sds a good deal less of his time at sea. But who in his
ngiu mind would suggest that the Navy would cia its job
.kUer if it hired Merchant Marine officers without Nay3
aeEience to run spine of its 5111115? Tn fact, even when
-, the military services get into the political field they trail)
.prdfessional militar3 offlcers to do tile job, rather tItan take
:juulifled political officers and try to instill in them the nec
Mfl• miluar) competence, Granted, there are now FSO
litical advisers iii most of the major military commands,
hut the use which is made of these officers varies greatly,
nding largely on tile personalities involved, and only
ysareiy does a political adviser have an “line responsi
But what Ilalipens in the Foreign Sen ice? The general
ta and atmosphere are set by the traditional assumption
• that the size of a party contribution is the determining
•.krion of a man’s ability to represent the United Stales
at an important capital. As Senator Fuibright has so co
dy explained, this is by no means to assert that a politi
i appointee cannot make a good Ambassador. Quite the
.:atrary is true in many professions. We have never fought
-a War in which a tremendous contribution was not made by
avilians in bc-starred uniforms. Even painting has its
Omadma Moses. But the burden of any professional activ
ity must be carried by the professionals.
When we get below- the Ambassadorial level the same
type of thinking leads to the assertion that, for instance:
Mr. X is a good trade unionist, therefore he must ipso facto
Sea good Lahor Attaché. This reasoning is carried even
:ter by those who insist that in order to serve as a Cul
nil Attaché, a person must basically be a professor or
*lhr cultural practitioner, that only an aviation specialist
-lefties K. Petifleld, new Chairman of the Journnr. Editorial
nut appointed go than Foreign Service in 1930, and lint
in I lie Far East, in Europe, in Mexico and in the Near
I
can make a Civil Air Attaché, and us en, that tin one hut a
geographer can intelligentl3 l’uy maps abroad.
This kind of thinking is putting the cart before tile horse.
The basic skill required in the conduct of foreign relations
is ability to deal dffeetivel3 with foreigners iii their own
atiilieu. This skill is not acquired in running a trade union
in Memphis or summarizing reports in Washington. These
activities arc, of course, most helpful in acquiring certain
of the ingredients necessary to the des elolnnent 0f the pro
fessiona I in the field of foreign relations, and to nlaliltain
that the trade unionist or tile researcher could not be an
expert in the conduct 0f foreign relations, is just as fal
lacious as to assert the opposite. ilie point is, the3 are
secondary qualifications.
One may cite three reasons ts by tlut’ conduct of foreign
relations has nes er been and is not tocla) generalk re
garded in the United States, at least, as a genuine profes
sion. The first is that throughout the greater part of our
history foreign relations has, in contrast to the experience
of most nations in the world, heen essentially of secondary
importance to the national interest. With a continent to
develop, our national cnerg) was naturally not focused on
mnneu’ ering for a place on the international stage. Thus,
the conduct of our foreign relations could be, and until
relatively recentl) as, left largely to amateurs.
SECONDLY, OUR professional Foreign Service, developing
under the shadow of this strong traditional attitude, has
had to struggle against a built-in inferiority complex. We
have instinctively felt, despite protestations to the contrary,
that we were trying to corner the market on something that
any Tom, Dick or Harry could do. We are too easily per
suaded that such bromides as “liuanan nature is tIme same
the world over” are really relevant to the question.
This apologetic attitude has been aggravated by the third
factor: the difficulty of describing clearly the professional
nature of the profession. The conduct of foreign relations
cannot he reduced to algebraic formulae or scientifically
classifiable 5) mptoms and remedies. It does not lend itself
easily to classroom instruction and everyone has his own
list of its essentials. My own includes such items as:
I. Language (although we are currently making a great
fuss about this skill, it has, of course, always been impor
tant and, contrary to the assertions of some enthusiastic
21
the Foreign Service a Profession?
- --
by Janies K. Penflehi
3. professionals in tile linguistics field, acceptable competence
is not acquired tnercl I,) taking a three-month quickie at
the FSI.)
2. Abilit3 to put one’s thoughts in writing clearly, sue
cinctl and graninmtically. This “good drafting,” in the
broadest seiisc’, is of lirinte iniportance in the conduct of
foreign relations, and is all too often taken for granted or
underestirnaLed in evaluating Foreign Service skills.
3. Ability effecticly to organize data and to speak on it
persuasit clv.
4. Ability quickly to determine and exploit the sources
of povcr and information in a strange society.
3. Ability proniptly and effecthely to adiust oneself to
customs, mechanics a1 life and outlook which differ coni
pleteb’ from one’s own.
6. Ability to put oneself in another’s shoes - and very
unfamiliar shoes they usually are.—--but to keep them walk
ing ill the direction indicated by one’s own, rallier than
their owner’s interests.
This list can be greatl ;aried and added to, particularly
in terms of technical qualifications, hut basic skills such
as those listed above must primarily be acquired through
experience, preferabLy under skilled guidance. At any rate,
they can’t be, or at least normally are not, taught as tech
nical courses in schools. So. runs the argument, they can.
not be the skills o1 a true vrofession.
What can be done about this situation? Here, as a
starter. are bra suggestions.
First, let’s revise our thinking about education and train.
ing. Tn.service training for the Foreign Sen’ice Officer
should have two main purposes, both equally important:
studies calculated to assist in the development of profes
sional Foreign Service Officers, and the much more easily
planned technical training,
how to issue a visa, how to
labor statistics, how to speak
içonese etc. This latter cat
seenis to be receiving effectiv
purhaps excessive atteation in
rent training programs. I
Aside front a half dozen
FSI seminars, the first catego
now largel hunted to the va
war colleges and the mid
and senior officers courses, th&
ter now only in its second y C
existence. For the more
grades many would consider!
training adequate or more
adequate in quantity but it cqj
undoubtedl1 he improved in
ity. Those directing the seniot
cers’ course are making adm
efforts iii this direction. An:
move in the right direction w
be to appoint a civilian Co
dnnl of the National War Cnll’
step the British have taken fat
first time this year.
It is in the professional trait
of junior officers that much
needs to be done. By the time.
officer reaches Class 3 his prof
siunal competence is established, and if lie has had
lroper training when an 0-5, 0-6 and 0.7, tltis co4
tence should be much greater, oil the average, than i
toda3. It will not be easy to develop effective prb
sional training of junior officers. Time, patience, ima
tion and unorthodox thinking will be necessary.
“course” wlieh might prove effective would be to
a trainee, and if married, his wife separately, to spend
months or so in “grass roots” travel abrood on an aust
budget in areas not conditioned to large-scale tourisri.
addition to the educational value, required reports on
travel shnuld, particularly after some experience with
had been accumulated, be most useful in revealing an q
cer’s potential for a Foreign Service career.
In considering academic training, prior to entry intol
Service, interesting conclusions for the Foreign Sen’ica’
revealed in the results of two recent Foundation.fln
studies nf education for business. An attempt was 1111*
determine whether the business schools justify their exisIiD
.-whether the system gives the best possible preparation
business careers. The evidence, taken from the mout)d
top businessmen themselves, seems to be that it
Both surveys were in substantial agreement that wh
needed at the undergraduate level is work which will d
op general capacities and understandings, and that an *
posure to the major fields of learning is the best way for
to be achieved. A similar survey of pre-service undergxa
ate and graduate training for the Foreign Sen-ice sli
prove interesting, it might not only be helpful in k --
recruitment and examination procedures effectively
date but should be useful in planning junior in-sex-vice
ing. Despite the difficulty of coming to grips with
LIFE AND LOVE IN ThE FOREIGN SERViCE
by Robe,t IF. Rffi.fp,,
...“tWo, U’s not Parls—lt’s Kookantonga. They want you to
set np the files iii the new
1’
itit
