1. BuiRegCol_005
Female 1:…To us now,thankyou.
Male 1: Thankyou Marina andthanks toeveryone forstill beinghere thislate inthe day. I thoughtI
wouldtake a slightlydifferentapproachandit’sa slightlynegativeapproachtothe ideaof cooperation
and collaboration. Ithinkwe needtorecognize thatthere are limitationstocooperation. Now I’mnot
suggestingthatcooperationmaritimesecuritydoesn’toccur,thatit hasn’t increasedanddeepened,
thickenedoverthe yearsandthatit can’t improve further. Infact,I’ve beenengagedformany years
throughEncores,throughthe DCP and underthe International PolicyDivisionof Defenseandwithother
strainof governmentagenciestoactuallydeliversome of thatcooperationandcapacitybuildingaround
the regionsoI’m well aware thatit occurs butthere are some limitationsthatwe needtounderstand.
I’mgoingto lookat thisin twobasic ways. The firstis that there are inherentstructural problemsthat
limitthe typesanddepthof cooperationthatcan occur. One of the problemsisthat we’re simplythe
inheritorsof averydifficultcomplex geography,particularlyinEastAsiawithall those outlyingislands
and archipelagosseeminginclosedseas. Once youputa political anda legal overlayuponthat
geographyyouhave some inherentproblemsthatare reallydifficulttoovercome. The territorial
disputesthatwe hearso muchabout alsoI thinkneedtobe viewedasintractable problems. It’snot
that statesshouldn’ttryandwhiparoundthose problemsandtalk,youknow Churchill wasgettingit
rightthat haw jawis betterthanmore war, butsometimestalkingdoesn’tnecessarilygetyouanywhere
and I thinkit’simportantintermsof practical cooperationthatcan occur to buttoff small chunksthat
are doable. Andrelatedtothatgeographyandthose territorial disputesisthe problemof jurisdiction,
whetherit’sdisputedorsimplyunderlimited. Andsothere are many areasof maritime jurisdictionthat
remainunclearandso if jurisdictionisunclearthanenforcementagainstcriminal activityforexample
becomesextremelydifficultandcontroversial. Soit’sbadnewsif you’re afishbecause thisisno wayto
potentiallyprotectthose fishstocksinthese areas. The secondstructural effectare a bunchof strategic
factors some of those are relatedtothe disputesbutIthinkthe underlyingstrategicfactorsnot
necessarilydrivenbythose disputes. Andthere are manygeopolitical areasof geopolitical competition
or oftenbinarysetsof dispute orhistorical mistrustthatoccurred oftenbetweensome of the smaller
statesinthisbroaderEndo-Pacificregion. Justlookatforexample TongaandFiji. Extremelydifficultto
overcome alot of those things. Andthe thirdpart of that structural equationrelatestothisideaof this
international rulesbasedorderthatwe’ve discussedquite abittodayandI take Marina’spointearlier
on that internationallawdoesevolve butaspectsof internationallaw are set. It’sverydifficultto
change certainthingsand a particularconvention that’scentral toourdiscussionsisthe law of the sea
convention. Youcannotcherry-pickpartof the law of the seaconvention. It’satotality. Ittook literally
decadestonegotiate. Itwasa compromise. Noone goteverythingtheywanted. Coastal statesgotthe
regime of the [INAUDIABLE5:10]. Maritime powerwasaccepted;the ideaof the archipelagicstate was
pushedbyIndonesia. The regimesof navigationhowever,itwasveryclearfromthe conference of the
lawof the seathat these issueswere,forwarshipsinparticular,were controversial. Butthe actual
conventionthatwasagreedwasquite clear. ThisideaaboutdifferentinterpretationorambiguityI
simplydonotaccept. Some stateswillfullymisinterpretthose provisionsinthe law of the seaand I
thinkit’sreallyimportantforusall to standup for those provisions