NATO, Cuban Missile Crisis enhanced and diminished US security

POL211 – 2014 – S1 – Assignment 2 – 3000 Words – 40% – Rodney Dines – 31510992 – Mon. 4pm
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Assignment 2: (3000 words) - 40% - Approx. 8 Pages
Due date: Friday 23 May 2014 (with 3 week extension).
Choose one (1) only of the following topics:
1. Critically explain how and why the US foreign policy has
evolved since the Cold War ended.
2.Explain critically how the NATO alliance, the
Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and nuclear weapons
had the effect of both enhancing and diminishing
US security.
3. If the relationship between security and identity has
always underpinned US foreign policy, explain critically
how this relationship has revealed itself during the
presidencies of Bill Clinton (1993-2001), George W. Bush
(2001-2009) and Barack Obama (since 2009).
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Explain critically how the NATO alliance, the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962, and nuclear weapons had the effect of both
enhancing and diminishing US security.
Allin and Jones argue that the Mexican-American war (1846-48) can be identified as a demonstration
by the United States of America (USA) of being a “dangerous nation” (citing Kagan 32) that “meant
business” (Allin and Jones 2012, 32). Despite the dubious expansionary slavery motive1
on which the
Mexican-American war was waged,in mentioning Kagan’s comment Allin and Jones are attempting to
illustrate that Mexican-American war was the beginning of the USA as a nation exerting dangerous external
force that ultimately led to it: entering and taking a dominant role in the execution of World War II (WWII)
(Garden 2000, 10); the seminal act of utilising nuclear weapons to successfully cut short the end of WWII in
August 1945 in the Pacific (Herzog and Chase 2012, 13); leading the Western world2
through the Truman
Doctrine and its Marshal Plan out of economic poverty after the end of WWII (Ikenberry and Slaughter
2006, 15, CNN and Coombs 1998a); and taking up the subsequent role as the “world’s policeman” (Allin
and Jones 2012, 32). In the post-cold war unipolar world of today it easier to see the USA’s role as the
“world’s policeman”, but if we look back to the end of WWII both the USA and the United Soviet Socialist
Republic (USSR) where both great powers, potentially as powerful as each other and seemingly equally
capable if not morally certainly in terms of force, and the most likely of the great powers to become either a
global leader or menace. Eventually these two great powers relied on developing two key security alliances
of other identity aligned nation states,the American (USA) led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
and the Soviet (USSR) led Warsaw Pact to form two respectively opposing West and East power blocs that
led to the bipolar world order that in the Western bloc is known as the cold-war (Campbell 1998, 8-13).
In this essay I will critically examine in relation to their effect on enhancing and diminishing US
security: firstly how nuclear weapons3
,their development and the strategic plans for their use scenarios, and
their delivery systems have had an effect; secondly how the formation and actions of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a strategic alliance have had an effect; and finally how the decision making
and actions of the events that constituted the Cuban missile crisis (CMC) have had an effect. I will for the
most part limit the examination of these issues to the period since the end of WWII in the Pacific (September
1 The moral issue of slavery was resolved by the USA civil war less than 20 years later between 1861 and 1865.
2 The Marshal Plan also offered financial support to Eastern countries but the Soviets and the countries they
influenced were suspicious ofthe American’s motives and thus refused to participate. Khrushchev apparently directly
threatened Hungary not to take up the offer. (CNN and Coombs 1998a)
3 In this essay I do not distinguish between Fission and Thermonuclear weapons due to size and scope
limitations. They are collectively referred to as nuclear weapons throughout.

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1945) and on up until the generally recognised end of the cold war (1991) (Brookings Institution et al. 2010,
2); I will refer to this period from now on as the cold war period which is in the context of nuclear weapons
also known as the first nuclear age (Walton 2010, 209). In addition I will occasionally refer to relevant
events of the post-cold war era in order to make a point. In examining these issues it is important to frame
them in terms of the background of both the bipolar power struggle between the Soviet and Warsaw Pact
Eastern bloc and the American and NATO Western bloc and the underlying ideological and identity driven
battle between communism and capitalism that fuelled these superpowers (Campbell 1998, 8-13, Burrows
2010, 147-149).
At the end of WWII the USA held the technological advantage of having been the first to develop, test
and then use a nuclear weapon in war (Herzog and Chase 2012, 13). Despite the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
nuclear bombings at the end of WWII, since then the use of nuclear weapons has been limited to the realm of
threat (Walton 2010, 210-213). Importantly they also became crucial to the cold war nuclear deterrence
strategy initially conceived in 1964 by the Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara in the United States’
(US) Johnson administration, known as a mutually assured destruction (MAD) (Ikenberry and Slaughter
2006, 43, Brookings Institution et al. 2010, 5, Sokolski 2004, Preface v). Instead of nuclear weapons being
used again in anger – some would argue they were almost used as a result of the Cuban missile crisis (CMC),
which I will examine later – history shows their use has instead been limited to remote and often
underground testing, and since 1996 the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty4
(CTBT) has practically
limited these tests to theoretical simulated modelling, and the occasional conspicuous real and worrying
testing by rogue states presumably in order to sound a warning to would-be protagonists, thus developing
their own nuclear deterrence (Roland 2003, 720;723;729, CTBTO 2013, Henriksen 2012, 153). I have
chosen nuclear weapons as the first and main area to examine in regard to US security during the cold war
period because they run as the primary security threat throughout the entire cold-war period being examined
and also play a significant role in both the NATO alliance and the CMC examined later.
After WWII the Soviets were concerned about the new power of the US nuclear weapons which they
did not have but had seen the results of in Japan. Four years later on 29August 1949 the Soviets successfully
tested their first atomic bomb (Herzog and Chase 2012, 17, Walton 2010, 210). Initially the number of
nuclear weapons available for use in a war on either side was significantly limited and so was their ability to
4 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a multilateral treaty by which participating states have
agreed to ban all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes.Refer http://www.ctbto.org/

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deliver the weapons to a distant target. Ironically as the number of nuclear weapons grew and their delivery
mechanisms developed significantly they began to play a significant and integral role in both decreasing and
simultaneously increasing US security. The doctrine of "massive retaliation" was developed by the
Eisenhower administration Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initially in a speech on January 12, 1954
(Brookings Institution et al. 2010, 4). Realists argue the aim of which was to deter the Russian’s from
utilising an imbalance perceived by the US as the Soviet advantage of a larger conventional force than the
US and its allies had in NATO (Walton 2010, 211). Yet liberalists perceived the aim as indicating the US
wanted to pursue a more economically efficient form of international security (Brookings Institution et al.
2010, 4). In either case the outcome was the same,this doctrine had the effect of the US further utilising
their advantage in nuclear weapons in an attempt to enhance US security, particularly of it and its allied
forces stationed in the divided Germany and Europe and the potential invasion by Soviet forces into Western
Europe (Walton 2010, 211).
US security was also diminished by the increasing availability of these ominous weapons for their
potential use by the Soviet adversary; because had they been launched for whatever reason then many more
Americans would have died in the nuclear holocaust (Litwak 1986, 82). At the same time they enhanced US
security because the rapidly increasing numbers on both sides eventually provided for the development of a
bipolar stalemate in the ominous potential outcome of a mutual assured destruction (MAD) (Ikenberry and
Slaughter 2006, 43, Brookings Institution et al. 2010, 5, Sokolski 2004, Preface v). The idea of MAD
effectively translated into an outright deterrence for the use of nuclear weapons through a mutual lack of will
to utilise them for fear of the devastation bought about from the reprisal (Brookings Institution et al. 2010, 5,
Litwak 1986, 82-83). Deterrence was a centraltenet of US strategic thinking as John Ikenberry explains “the
deterrence concept is straight-forward: persuade a potential adversary that the risks and costs of his proposed
action far outweigh any gains that he might hope to achieve” (Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006, 1). Nuclear
counterstrike capability was assured collectively firstly by the limited strategic use of ABMs (Baylis 2010,
20) and secondly by mounting nuclear weapons in hardened inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM)
bunkers, on difficult to target medium range mobile launch transporters and through the use of easy to hide
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) (Walton 2010, 211-212, Baylis 2010, 19-23). Later the USSR
in a response to the MAD deterrence strategy developed the anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) to provide a shield
to protect their citizens, and then in a counter-move the USA developed multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicle (MIRV) missiles that could carry up to 10 separate war-heads (or dummies) which could be

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targeted individually upon re-entry which made ABM’s at least five time more expensive, and thus
economically ineffective (Baylis 2010, 28, Walton 2010, 213).
Through the pursuit of national security utilising nuclear deterrence, the US in fear of the other have
also spurred many technological changes by diverting limited public capital resources into important
technological research and development (R&D), particularly through the technological space race
administered through the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) (Burrows 2010, 286).
While the public facing inspiration from president Kennedy’s “we choose to go to the moon” speech, was
one of human aspiration and potential achievement, the space race had really been driven by a national
security agenda, to dominate the newly arrived theatres of nuclear and space warfare, to develop improved
nuclear weapons, to develop better warhead delivery mechanisms, and for the support of satellite based
intelligence gathering (Burrows 2010, 333, Kennedy 1961, IX. Space). In the end these grand visions and
the sacrifices the US peoples made to achieve them have been revolutionary to the development of many
follow-on technologies that have flowed into both the US and eventually the global community. By the end
of the cold war many technologies with both military and domestic benefits had been developed, examples
include improved aircraft,spacecraft, semiconductors, computers, communications technologies, satellites,
the internet, and the global positioning system (GPS) (Garden 2000, 15). Both realists and liberalists alike
agree these technologies and many others had the benefit of significantly enhancing US security through
both their dominance in military applications and probably more importantly the economic power to allow it
to continue dominance in the world economy (Burrows 2010).
In contrast the nuclear arms race and subsequent presence of vastly more useable nuclear weapons
implies at least some diminished level of US security simply because they exist and can possible be fired,
thus greatly reducing the security of those people in the vicinity of any explosion and specific to nuclear
weapons the radioactive fallout that under the right conditions could affect many more victims (Herzog and
Chase 2012, 74-77). The command and control chain of such deadly weapons is a concern particularly when
no imminent threat exists, mainly because people become complacent and haphazard in their approach to the
teams of people who manufacture, guard, maintain and ultimately launch these dauntingly powerful weapons
(Herzog and Chase 2012, 28, 45, 139). Other dangers of nuclear weapons include accidental detonation for
which to date we know of none, but there has been one close call; then there is the radioactive impact of lost
or destroyed warheads for which there are many examples; all of these incidents are referred to as broken
arrows (Herzog and Chase 2012, 139). In 1966 over the coast of Spain a B52 was attempting a refuelling

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when two B52 hit each other and exploded and fell to the ground and there are more than 25 other examples
(Shepard 2013). While idealists like Herzog and Chase argue these are unacceptable consequences (Herzog
and Chase 2012, 139), liberalists and realists argue they are acceptable utilitarian consequences of the
enhanced security of the entire US nation .
In the late 60’s increased communication between Washington and Moscow which was originally
initiated in the heat of the CMC later led to a period of easing in tension, referred to as détente between the
NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances (Caldwell 1985, Mastny 2004). It is believed that Nixon’s desire to find a
way to withdraw from the Vietnam conflict (Litwak 1986, 82) and unrest in the middle-east led the US and
the USSR to come to an agreement about reducing the USA response to the USSR’s ABMs with their
MIRVs (Baylis 2010, 29). At this point $50M per day was being spent on nuclear weapons globally and this
was a burden on both countries (CNN and Coombs 1998b). One of the main outcomes of détente was the
Helsinki Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT5
) starting in November 1969 and finalised in May 1971
where undertaken in order to reduce the numbers of ABM systems to two each and limited the number of
strategic launch vehicles ( to 2400) and later MIRV’s ( to 1320) (Baylis 2010, 14-16). Despite the good will
of these talks, during the next decade the US and USSR collectively added another 12,000 nuclear war heads
to their arsenals (CNN and Coombs 1998b), which can be seen as discussed earlier as both an enhancement
in US security through the doctrine of the MAD deterrence for their use and also a significant diminishing of
US security should they actually be utilised in a war leading to a nuclear holocaust. While further arms
control talks continued (in 1972 SALT II) and strategic arms reduction treaties (START I & II) followed,
arguably the most important outcome of these initial talks was that the USSR and the USA began to
seriously talk with each other about the idea of limitations which is an example of enhanced US and
international security. I will now briefly examine some ways in which the NATO alliance both enhanced
and diminished US security.
The prospect of increasing Communist expansion in 1949 led the USA and eleven other Western
nations, including the great powers of Great Britain (UK) and France to form the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) alliance on April 4 (NATO 1949). Within six months on August 29 the Soviets
successfully tested their first atomic weapon which served to galvanise NATO (Herzog and Chase 2012, 17,
Walton 2010, 210). The threat of NATO to the USSR in1955 led to the Soviet Union and its affiliated
Communist nations in Eastern Europe founding a rival alliance called the Warsaw Pact. This alignment of
5 Later known as the SALT I talks (Baylis 2010, 14-16)

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almost every European nation into one or the other of the two opposing alliances formalised the political
division of Europe that had taken place since WWII (Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006, 7). The alignment with
these two alliances provided the framework for the bipolar military standoff that continued throughout the
Cold War (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009). Neo-realists like Waltz argue that “Realism
reveals what liberal institutionalist 'theory' obscures: namely, that international institutions serve primarily
national rather than international interests” (Waltz 2000, 29). An alternative view by liberalists is that the
alliance members have a common set of interests and a common set of values that determine the collective
identity and seek to benefit mutually from the power of the alliance (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth
2009).
While the US was potentially able to utilise its own technological and economic power to deter a
nuclear threat from the Soviets on its own, this was fundamentally a short term position and the NATO
alliance was formed with Americas intent of containment of the potential expansion of the Communist
ideology and the subsequent prevention of a potential eastern bloc growth in resources and a potentially
diminishing market for their own products and thus their own prosperity (Campbell 1998, 25-26, Walt 1985,
9,40). For example the West feared what was called the domino theory and saw a genuine merit for national
security in their belief that they could not afford to lose Vietnam to communism. “Its (the domino theory’s)
central tenets that security was indivisible and that weakness in one place would only invite aggression in
other places held sway over U.S. strategic thinking for twenty years” (Gelb and Betts 1979, 197). Therefore
we can see that from the US participation in NATO this provides for an enhanced longer term position of
security. In contrast there was a potential of a short term diminishing of US security in that it might have to
undertake military engagements in conflicts to support other alliance members and in order to stem the tide
of Communism through distant engagements for example in the Korean and later the Vietnam wars. Realists
argue these engagements also enhanced US security through the use and testing of weapons and development
of new conventional weapons through experience and the support it provides to the US defence economy
(Baylis 2010, 17-20).
After the Soviet’s launched the Sputnik satellite in 1957 displaying Soviet superiority US and NATO
membership morale waned and in order to strengthen NATO members both the militarily and
psychologically the US decided in conjunction with NATO to deploy Jupiter missiles in NATO states;
however in 1959 only Great Britain (UK),Italy and Turkey where willing recipients of the Jupiter missiles,

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the other members feared becoming Soviet targets6
,and the internal political issues this raised7
(Uslu 2003,
135-136). It is argued by Uslu and to a lesser degree by Allyn, Blight and Welch that it was the close
proximity to the USSR of the Jupiter missiles installed in Turkey that unbalanced the time required to deliver
a first strike capability into the USSR heartland that led the Soviets to take the risky move to deploy similar
nuclear weapons into Cuba in 1962 in order to rebalance the threat (Uslu 2003, 138-141, Allyn, Blight, and
Welch 1989, 138). This is how the US and ultimately NATO potentially provoked the events of the Cuban
Missile Crisis. If these assumptions are correct then this decision had the effect of enhancing US security by
boosting the NATO alliance but also simultaneously disturbing a delicate power balance and initiating a
nuclear crisis and thus greatly diminishing US security, at least in the short term.
The Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) is a label that the USA and later the Western world would utilise for
the events of October 1962 in the Caribbean; however the other parties involved in the conflict refer to the
events differently and this is due mainly to their individual identities and their differing relationship to the
events that took place. The USSR called these series of events the “Caribbean Crisis” (Garthoff 1987, 5) and
the Cuban’s called them the “October Crisis” (Garthoff 1987, 4). While illustrating the differences in
national identities involved and their differing perspectives, this episode of events also serve to illustrate the
potential and significant impact of minor peripheral state actors in the conflicts of great powers (Barkawiand
Laffey 2006), which cannot always be controlled by either side nor their part in a conflict predicted, this was
also illustrated by the Soviet backing of North Korea and later involvement of China during the earlier
Korean war (Gelb and Betts 1979, 182-190, CNN and Coombs 1998b, Episode 4).
Graham T Allison attempts in his book the Essence of Decision to break down and explain what
happened during the CMC (Allison 1971). Allison examines three models, the Rational Action Model (I),
the Organizational Process Model (II), and the Governmental Politics Model (III) and concludes that these
models are incompatible with one another (Allison 1971). Allison’s intention was not to find a model that fit
exactly the events of the CMC but to provide a basis on which to examine and attempt to understand them.
The main concerns of the study being that issues can escalate rapidly and often can escalate beyond the
control of key decision makers despite their attempts to manage the situation. The implication is that
engagement in a crisis can be difficult to avoid and desired outcomes can be very difficult to secure. All of
these imply that without effective intelligence and communications between all the interested parties that
6 While not a direct diminishing of US security this is nevertheless a diminishing of the power of the NATO
alliance and thus had the effect of diminishing US security somewhat.
7 These kind of issues remain ever-present in the European Union today (Waltz 2000, 26).

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national security can be rapidly destabilised. In hind sight Liberalists argue that the implication for US
security was that better intelligence (Zegart 2012) by the US and better consideration for the consequences of
NATO actions prior to the CMC could have potentially avoided the conflict and thus enhanced short term
US security. While Realists argue that the CMC was the result of power balancing and while they had a
short term diminishing of US security they ultimately led to an enhanced level of US security, at least in the
medium term (Baylis 2010).
Post the CMC the USSR built up their nuclear forces by adding hundreds of nuclear missiles to their
arsenal(Baylis 2010). This eventually led to the realisation that neither side of the bipolar conflict could
assure the destruction of all the nuclear weapons launched at each other. They also realised total nuclear
disarmament was not realistically achievable and that the probable outcome of total nuclear war was
unthinkable. As a result of the CMC both the USSR and USA found that one of the few things they had in
common was a desire to survive a nuclear war and this led to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT),the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and them establishing the communications hot-line between Washington DC and
Moscow and the later SALT treaties as discussed earlier (Baylis 2010, 23); the results of which led to
enhanced US security.
The events of the CMC show us that; even smaller nations in alliances can have a significant impact
on the ability for events to rapidly destabilise the status-quo and thus rapidly diminish the perceived level of
national security; that decision making in a crisis is fraught with potentially unpredictable issues that make it
very difficult for core decision makers to make fully informed decisions that will not escalate out of their
control and this can have unexpected consequences for other parties to a strategic alliance. While the US
benefited from NATO members through the ability to contain the Soviet hard power and also the soft power
of the Communist ideology, the CMC was an illustration of how the far away actions of an alliance could
rapidly come home to directly threaten domestic US security.
Nuclear weapons and their associated technological advancements have generally provided for an
unprecedented period of international peace but they also provided the possibility through the cold war
period to rapidly destabilise international and US security potentially leading to a globally devastating
outcome that could have left and potentially could still leave the fate of human race hanging in the balance.
Now that the cold war is over the possibility of nuclear holocaust has potentially been diminished, however
nuclear weapons have also become an enhanced cause for concern as they are still of grave concern if not to

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many of the world’s people certainly to those charged with the challenges and issues of national security
(Obama 2009). The expanding nuclear proliferation in the second nuclear age (post-cold war) has led to
diminished US security since there are now more avenues for rogue states and terrorist non-state actors to
acquire a nuclear weapon or related nuclear materials that could be used in a dirty bomb (Henriksen 2012,
Ikenberry 2004, Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006). This has led the US president Obama to take measures and
to declare that the source state – which can supposedly be determined through forensic analysis of the
remaining materials – be held at least equally responsible for any attack (Obama 2009). “What gives these
contemporary rogue nations their deadly salience today is their reach for nuclear weapons” (Henriksen 2012,
2).
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