2. The Need for Administrative Inquiry:
Many administrative and quasi judicial authorities exercise statutory powers
Therefore some preliminary inquiry as a condition precedent to the exercise of such
power. [eg hearing objections at a local inquiry before making an order of compulsory
acquisition of land, under the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act, 1946
in England or under sec 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) in India
See Nandeswar Prasad v. U.P Government., A. 1964 SC. 1217 (1220) & sec 9 of the
Factories Act, 1948, sec13 of the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952
3. contd..
Broadly speaking : to collect the views of the parties to be affected by the exercise of
the statutory power, together with the relevant facts and
To be placed them before the government or other authority for its consideration in
exercising the power
Statutory authority is not bound to act according to the inquiry report
The procedure to be followed at these inquiries is laid down in the statute itself or in
statutory rules.
The Party affected by the resulting statutory order must be given notice of the
inquiry
4. The Frank Committee:
The Frank Committee was appointed by the British lord Chancellor to study administrative tribunals and
such procedures as the holding of a public inquiry. The committee declared that the work of
administrative tribunals and of public inquiries should be characterized by openness, fairness and
impartiality and their report applied these aims in great detail. The recommendations of the committee
were largely accepted and resulted in the Tribunals and Enquiries Act of 1958.
5. Tribunals And Inquiries Bill
How the Bill was introduced in the House of Lords where it received the second reading on April
1, 1958 and received its third reading on May 20.
How the Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on July 3, 1958 where it received the
second reading and received its third reading with amendments which were agreed by the House
of Lords on July 28, 1958.
The Bill finally received the Royal Assent on August 1, 1958.
Many other recommendations of the Frank Committee were in principle adopted by the
Government and put into effect by administrative devices such as circulars and by changes of
practice.
6. The Problems/solutions attempted by Frank
Committee
To seek a new balance between private right and public advantage[ the balance between the public
interest which Administration promotes and the private interest which it disturbs]
Between fair play for the individual and efficiency of administration.
The Procedures by which the rights of individual citizens can be harmonized with wider public interests.
Finding a right relationship between authority and the individual.
Government rests fundamentally upon the consent of the governed.
[tilting of the scales in favour of the state, of restoring the balance, of the arbitrary exercise of the
growing powers of the state, of striking a just balance and of restoring to the individual citizen the
protection to which he has always been and must always be entitled.]
7. Special procedures considered by the Committee:
The characteristics of openness, fairness and impartiality should mark the procedures, according to
the Frank Committee.
If procedures were wholly secret, the basis of confidence and acceptability would be lacking, there
would be nothing to stop oppression.
How can the citizen be satisfied if he feels that those who decide his case come to their decision with
open minds? P.127 If the objector were not allowed to state his case, there would be nothing to stop
oppression.
But the Committee could have argued that since there is a right to a hearing before a man can be
compelled to part with his property, so there ought to be a right to a hearing before an alien could be
compelled to leave country. Then only their arguments for openness, fairness and impartiality would
have had much force.
8. Tribunals- Real Purpose of Establishment of
Tribunals:
One view: Tribunals should properly be regarded as part of the machinery of administration for which
the government must retain a close and continuing responsibility.
Second view: Tribunals should properly be regarded as machinery provided by Parliament for
adjudication rather than as part of the machinery of administration. [advances the real issue no
further]
[Although the relevant statutes do not in all cases expressly enact that tribunals are to consist entirely of
persons outside the government service, the use of the term, ‘tribunal’ in legislation undoubtedly bears this
connotation, and the intention of Parliament to provide for the independence of tribunals is clear and
unmistakable.] This is full of confusion
It is like saying: Legislature is an expression of the joint will of commons and Lords instead of the expression
of the will of the Queen in Parliament. That is to say, Tribunals are not ‘machinery provided by Parliament.”
Parliament has not deliberately provided for a decision outside and independent of the Department
concerned. It is not true that the use of the term ‘tribunal’ indicates that Parliament meant to provide for the
independence of decision. It is the Government, the Department, which made all these rules.
9. Contd…
If we are trying to discover the real purpose for the establishment of tribunals and how far they
were meant to be separate from the Departments, then it is the ’official’ view of the Joint
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury which is more likely to be historically accurate.
It would have been clearer to say that tribunals should be more independent than to argue of
parliamentary intention.
The real advantages of tribunals and the usual reasons for their establishment are well known
to be their cheapness, their informality, their expertness and the speed with which decisions
can be obtained. Eg: Rent Tribunals; Industrial Injury Disputes were in the hands of the courts.
10. Tribunals should properly be regarded as machinery provided by Parliament for adjudication rather
than as part of the machinery of administration. [advances the real issue no further
This dichotomy is false. The truth is that Departments did not mind what the decisions were.
Whether Rs 12 or Rs 15 is a reasonable rent for two rooms in a place?
Whether Mrs Smith is entitled to a widow’s pension?
Whether Mr Smith was injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment:
these decisions did not matter to the department. They were not like decisions on compulsory
purchase orders or planning appeals or clearance orders, where the individual decisions shaped and
reflected the policy.
In most cases, the Departments made the regulations or put them in the Acts, the scope of individual
decisions was strictly limited.
11. Contd..
The inevitability of decentralization, the inappropriateness of employing local authorities were
overwhelming reasons for keeping the administration out of the Departments.
When policy questions arise then the decision was kept in the Department.
All this is very far from the assertion that Parliament in “clear and unmistakable” terms provided for
tribunals in order to ensure that their decisions should be independent of the departments.
The assumption still persists that departments are avid for power, that they wish to have everything
in their hands, principle and detail, policy and administration alike.
But in practice departments are not so shortsighted. Departments may want the substance of
power, the making of vital decisions but they are frequently anxious to avoid responsibility for the
application of principle and policy and happily use local authorities/administrative tribunals for this
purpose.