The document discusses Kierkegaard's view that a radically free choice requires "teleological suspension of the ethical" through faith in God. It summarizes Kierkegaard's concept of ethical, aesthetic, and religious spheres of existence. The document then argues that Beauvoir undermines Kierkegaard's view by claiming that willing oneself free is the same as willing oneself moral, without needing to appeal to God or transcend ethics.

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Nicholas Vaughn
John Kaag
Existence and Anxiety
12/17/13
Dismissing Kierkegaard’s God
With Ethics of Ambiguity
The ideas of freedom, God, and anxiety are in constant contention within the
contemporary existential canon. Soren Kierkegaard is a recognized existentialist who proposed
in ​Is There Such a Thing as a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical?​ that free choice is
contingent upon the suspension of modern society’s norms and values, i.e., ethics. Kierkegaard
continues with the story of Abraham and explains that God is the way to hurdle society’s ethics.
However, Simone de Beauvoir, a later existentialist, makes a claim in a piece called ​The Ethics
of Ambiguity​ that “to will oneself moral and to will oneself free are one and the same decision”
(Beauvoir 293). Therefore, I will argue that Kierkegaard’s claim that making a free choice is
contingent upon hurdling society’s ethics through God is undermined by Beauvoir’s claim of
willing oneself free is equivalent to willing oneself moral.
Kierkegaard makes the claim that there must be a teleological suspension of the ethical
but one must first understand the key terms within his argument to understand why he comes to
this conclusion. He says, “the ethical as such is the universal” (Kierkegaard 15), by which he
means to express that something considered “ethical” is also something that everyone is bound
by, i.e., “universal”. He further explains this point in saying that “it applies every instant”
(Kierkegaard 15). So, one is capable of understanding ethics in a Kierkegaardian sense that

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depicts societal norms and values (ethics) as rules that bind everyone at every instant (universal).
“Telos,” is a term that Kierkegaard uses which means, ​“intentions, goals, and purposes”
(plato.stanford.edu). He claims that “it has nothing outside itself which is its ​telos​, but is itself
telos​ for everything outside it, and when this has been incorporated by the ethical it can go no
further” (Kierkegaard 15). Kierkegaard is furthering his point about ethics being a universal. He
is claiming that there is no intention, goal, or purpose outside of ethics and rather that ethics
dictates the intention, goal, and purpose to everything outside of it. Thus, Kierkegaard is
claiming that the intentions, goals, and purposes (telos) of ethics is not outside itself but rather
that ethics are the intentions, goals, or purposes of society at large and that you cannot go beyond
it insofar as you are within the ethical sphere.
This leads Kierkegaard to outlining “three spheres of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical,
and the religious” (Solomon 2). The aesthetic sphere is defined by its adherence to materialism.
The ethical sphere is defined by its adherence to societal norms and values. The religious sphere
is defined by its adherence to an idea beyond societal norms and values. These expressions of
existence are analogs for Kierkegaard to help the reader understand why one must take a “leap”
to the religious in order to make what he claims to be a radically free decision. This radically free
decision is anxiety­ridden but Kierkegaard’s claim is that “we can overcome anxiety only
through faith” (Solomon 2). This leads into the story of Abraham in the Bible.
The story of Abraham presents the reader with a dilemma that seems uncompromisable.
Abraham is told by God in an unmediated transmission that he must slit Isaac (his son’s) throat.
Kierkegaard when introducing the story says, “let us see whether in this story there is to be found
any higher expression for the ethical such as would ethically explain his conduct” (Kierkegaard

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15). Which, if there is no higher expression for the ethical to explain his conduct, then the logical
conclusion for Kierkegaard is he took a leap of faith into the sphere of the religious.
Kierkegaard argues this point by introducing the concept of a tragic hero which defines as
someone who “lets one expression of the ethical find its ​telos​ in a higher expression of the
ethical… he reduces to a sentiment which has its dialectic in the idea of morality” (Kierkegaard
16). Whereas, Abraham steps entirely outside of the sphere of the ethical in almost slitting
Isaac’s throat. There is no societal norm, value, or relationship between the father and son that
can ethically explain his conduct. He concludes that Abraham had to have “overstepped the
ethical entirely and possessed a higher ​telos​ outside of it, in relation to which he suspended the
former” (Kierkegaard 16). The higher telos that he is alluding to is the religious telos.
The overstepping of the ethical is then prosecuted for a reason as to why Abraham would
do such a thing. So, the question that arises is, “Why then did Abraham do it?” to which he
answers, “For God’s sake and for his own sake… God required this proof of his faith… [and for]
his own sake… that he might furnish the proof” (Kierkegaard 16). The feeling that Abraham gets
when he is trying to furnish this proof is anxiety. The anxiety that Abraham feels when he is
holding a knife to Isaac’s throat is the feeling that he is about to make a choice that is entirely
free. Nobody can understand the message that God sent to Abraham because God did so in an
unmediated way. Even if Abraham were to explain to others that he were sent on a mission from
God to slit Isaac’s throat there would be nobody who could understand why. This is why he
considers it a “purely personal undertaking” (Kierkegaard 16). The purely personal undertaking
of slitting Isaac’s throat is directly equivalent to a radically free choice.
The radically free choice creates a lot of anxiety for Abraham because of how free he is

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in choosing to or to not slit Isaac’s throat. “As the individual he became higher than the
universal” (Kierkegaard 17), is explaining that he transcends the societal norms and values of the
society in making his radically free decision by entering the sphere of the religious. He concludes
that “the story of Abraham contains therefore a teleological suspension of the ethical”
(Kierkegaard 17). A decision within the sphere of the ethical would only ever be a decision that
is made in relationship to societal norms, values, or to others. Therefore, a decision within the
sphere of ethical could never go beyond the ​telos​ of the ethical and so to make a radically free
decision one must take a leap of faith into the sphere of the religious. Rephrasing this for clarity,
one could say that every time someone makes a choice that is entirely their own, that person is
making a choice between themselves and God.
However, the excerpt from Simone de Beauvoir’s piece ​The Ethics of Ambiguity​ refute
the idea that a radically free decision is contingent upon one transcending to the religious sphere.
Beauvoir opens by claiming that previous theories of ethics, “consider human life as a game that
can be won or lost and to teach man the means of winning” (Beauvoir 292). That is, all ethical
theories create a schematic for the means of conducting yourself in an ethical manner and are
seen as ways to compute your actions in each scenario. She explains that every time someone
attempts to outline plans and ultimately aspire to those plans, the plans fail. The “ends
circumscribed by these plans remain mirages”, so that she concludes that the “original scheme of
man is ambiguous” (Beauvoir 292). Beauvoir makes this claim because the goals of humans are
always indefinite and always elusive. That is, when one goal is achieved, it is considered
complete and then humans erect a new goal and therefore it is perpetually ambiguous what is the
goal of human life.

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Beauvoir is setting the stage to make a larger claim. She says, “but man also wills himself
to be a disclosure of being.” That is, humans desire to understand the secrets of existence. She
says that when a human “coincides with this wish, he wins, for the fact is that the world becomes
present by his presence in it.” So, if a human desires to understand the secrets of existence and is
understanding of his desire then he/she succeeds because the invisible reality of the world
becomes present by a human’s conscious presence in it. Then, she claims that this disclosure of
being, “implies a perceptual tension to keep being at a certain distance, to tear oneself from the
world, and to assert oneself as a freedom.” This means that in an attempt to find out the secrets
of existence, one must detach themselves from existence, and to apply themselves to the world in
a manner that is entirely free. Beauvoir concludes that, “to wish for the disclosure of the world
and to assert oneself as freedom are one and the same movement” (Beauvoir 292). She is saying
that the desire of the secrets of the world and the application of an individual in the pursuit of
freedom are equal.
The point of taking such an analytic approach to a human’s will to discover the secrets of
the world and human’s assertion of freedom is because of the way that Beauvoir defines
freedom​. “​Freedom​ is the source from which all significations and all values spring. It is the
original condition of all justification of existence” (Beauvoir 292). This definition of freedom
appears first as a bold, almost deified version of freedom. However, Beauvoir solidifies her
definition of freedom by arguing that freedom is not something constructed. Freedom is an idea
that is “a cause of itself.” It is a value that is “not on the plane of facility, but on the moral plane”
(Beauvoir 293). This is an important transition that Beauvoir makes because it changes the
notion of freedom from one of exertion to one that is ethically bound. Freedom necessitates itself

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because it cannot do otherwise, i.e., “it can not establish a denial of itself, for in denying itself, it
would deny the possibility of any foundation” (Beauvoir 293). The very idea of freedom negates
the denial of freedom because freedom is the foundation of all decisions. That is, there could be
no decisions made if there wasn’t such a thing as freedom and since there is, it cannot deny itself
because that’s a decision.
Finally, “to will oneself moral and to will oneself free are one and the same
decision” (Beauvoir 293), means that when someone is in pursuit of the disclosure of the world
they are simultaneously asserting their freedom which is the same as willing oneself free which
is to will oneself moral. There are many conclusions that can be drawn from ​The Ethics of
Ambiguity​. First, that a consciously free (or radically free) decision is not contingent upon the
religious sphere of existence (or God). It is made evident that this is not the case due to the fact
that throughout the entire dichotomy of Beauvoir’s claims, she never once appeals to a deity or a
religious sphere of existence. Furthermore, it can be ascertained because of the claim that she
makes about freedom being incapable of denying itself. Freedom is something that exists outside
of the ethical sphere and it is what creates the ethical sphere.
The appeal to God or the religious sphere is a leap that Kierkegaard takes which is
unsubstantiated. The best reconciliation between Beauvoir and Kierkegaard that can be made is
to acknowledge that freedom (for Beauvoir) and God (for Kierkegaard) are both outside of the
sphere of the ethical. Beauvoir, however, does not claim it to transcend the ethical sphere or be
apart of the religious sphere. She simply claims that freedom necessitates itself because it is the
originator of values and significations within human life. This necessitation cannot be
undermined because the idea of freedom denies the denial of freedom on the basis that denying it

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would be a free choice and thus it reinvents itself. The term “morality” that Beauvoir is using
within her ​The Ethics of Ambiguity​ should not be misinterpreted as “ethical” — or societal norms
and values. She is certainly adhering to an idea that is outside of societal norms and values.
However, what she does not do is postulate a deity or claim that freedom is above or
below the ethical sphere. Freedom, to Beauvoir, is simply something that is outside of the ethical
sphere, necessitates itself, and necessitates morality. The decision that Abraham is contending
with could have been made without an unmediated message from God within ​The Ethics of
Ambiguity​. Instead, Abraham would be viewed as someone who is contending with a decision,
entirely free, thus entirely moral, but still outside of the ethical sphere. God is unnecessary in the
picture of morality and instead is merely a proposition that is produced when people are met with
uncertainty and want security in the most anxiety­ridden times of our lives.
One thing that remains consistent through ​The Ethics of Ambiguity​ and ​Is There Such a
Thing as a Teleological Suspension of the Ethical?​ is the anxiety that is produced from an
entirely free decision. Anxiety is something that arises when someone is making a choice that is
entirely free. The two different interpretations of the anxiety, as one can see, are biases that are
generated from each author individually. However, the interpretation that Beauvoir presents
seems to be more correct because it does not postulate anything to imbue the particular
individual with their free choices and rather claims that freedom is a necessity intrinsically.
The significance of the arguments presented in both Simone de Beauvoir, Soren
Kierkegaard, and this paper are many. The discussion of freedom, God, and anxiety are
constantly debated amongst some of the greatest philosophers of all time and especially within
the existential criteria. However, the relationship of freedom and anxiety to morality is

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something that has been rarely explored previously and only as of recently has really begun to
see analysis with existential philosophers such as Beauvoir. It is also important and intriguing to
notice how Beauvoir is capable of taking a concept as simple as freedom and exploring it in such
depth as making it a requisite of morality. She casts a light on freedom that is entirely not
understood before her work.
Although, even while Beauvoir claims that it is impossible to willingly choose to
not be free which does seem to be a logical inconsistency or catch­22, people choose to not be
free all the time. Coincidentally, it is the people who choose to not be free that do appear in our
society to be the most morally repulsive people. So, to amend the claim that Beauvoir makes, it
should be acknowledged that those who choose to condemn their freedom are morally abhorrent
while those who choose to assert their freedom are simultaneously asserting their morality. In
either light, the requirement of God or the religious sphere that is proposed by Kierkegaard has
been shown throughout this paper and with the help of Beauvoir’s ​The Ethics of Ambiguity​ to be
merely a proposition. “Every man is originally free” (Beauvoir 293), is a claim that she makes to
continue ​The Ethics of Ambiguity​ and is implicatively a claim that has been made and disputed
previously; that humans are inherently moral. If this is true, then the entire notion of
Kierkegaard’s sense of freedom and God are entirely unnecessary ideas of freedom and God.
The very act of being, is the act of freedom, and that is the act of morality.
The only way to reconcile Kierkegaard’s claim is to say that in some cases a radically
free decision may be conjured with the postulation of a deity that instills anxiety into a human to
be aware of their decisions. The problem with this reconciliation and the way that Beauvoir
would reply to this would be along the lines of saying that the postulation of a deity (or religious

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sphere) is a superficial and unnecessary catalyst to anxiety and freedom. Furthermore, that in
postulating a deity or taking the leap into the religious sphere, one does so in a way that is not
free. The dictation of a deity to do something would impede on a human’s will to be free and
thus their will to be moral. There is no room for a deity in the picture of morality if we are to
view morality from Beauvoir’s stance as something that is directly equivalent to a human’s will
to be free.
Works Cited
1. Allen, Colin, Allen,. "Teleological Notions in Biology." ​Stanford University​. Stanford
University, 20 Mar. 1996. Web.
2. Solomon, Robert C. ​Existentialism,​. New York: Modern Library, 1974. Print.