1. Environmental NGOs and international climate conferences
A Constructivist approach to organizational strategies, international norms and influence
By
Matthias Huynink
2543018
VU University Amsterdam
Master International Relations and Transnational Governance
Supervisor: Dr. N. de Graaff
Second Assessor: Dr. P. Pattberg
2015

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Abstract
Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) have gained increasing attention
throughout the academic field of Political Studies due to their expanding official recognition at
international organizations and conferences. So far, a lot of this research comprises single case
studies on ENGOs’ potential to influence actors and outcomes at individual conferences, or purely
longitudinalreflectionsof theirevolving participatory roles during multiple conferences. This study
adds tothe debate bypresentinganintegrative Constructivistframeworkincorporating aspectsfrom
both approaches. Specifically, by analyzing norm-setting practices during three individual case
studiesand(environmental)value creationthroughlongitudinal research this study aims to come to
a comprehensiveunderstandingof specific ENGO-activities and ENGO influence exerted over time.
Significantly,besidesthe oftenstudied official participation (so-called insider strategies) of ENGOs,
ENGO-activitiesinthisthesisalsoinclude more non-collaborativeactivities(outsider strategies). The
final conclusion stresses the necessity of incorporating outsider strategies in future studies and
provides a preliminary indication that ENGO-activities do in fact affect the ability of ENGOs to
influence decision-makers.

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Table of Contents
Introduction p.7
State of the Art p.8
Research Question p.13
A Constructivist Framework p.15
Norms, norm-setting and values p.15
Insider and outsider strategies p.18
Norm differentiation and influence p.19
Methods p.21
Longitudinal research to map strategic movement p.21
- Table 1. Insider versus outsider strategies p.22
Case studies – norms and MAs p.22
- Table 2. Major Agreements of the international conferences p.24
Case studies – uncovering influence p.25
Comparing changing ENGO-activities and influences p.27
Part 1 – Mapping change in ENGO-activities p.29
A promising start p.29
The heydays of inclusion p.30
The challenge of consolidation p.32
Part 2 – ENGOs, state actors and norm-setting p.34
ENGOs and norm-setting at the Stockholm Conference p.35
Norm 1: Holding an international conference p.35
Norm 2: Whaling p.37
ENGOs and norm-setting atthe Rio Conference p.39
Norm 3: The Forestry Principles p.39
ENGOs and norm-setting at the Rio+20 Conference p.41
Norm 4: Sustainable Development Goals p.42
Part 3 – Norms, changing ENGO-activities and values over time p.43
Conclusion p.46
Bibliography p.48

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Introduction
International concern over the environment has raised in the last decades, with different
organizations,conferencesandotherdeliberative meeting-placesestablishedtoaddressthe similarly
variedlocal, regional and global ecological challenges. The wide scope of environmental problems
has inducedthe erectionof issue-specificinstitutions that are tasked with the solving or minimizing
of their respective problem at hand. Though financially and otherwise maintained by states, the
organizationshave become actorsonthe internationalstage themselves – and have accommodated
the ascendance of other actors to this stage as well (McGann & Johnstone, 2005). One group of
actors particularly suggested by scholars in the field of International Relations to have gained
influence over the framing of these global debates or even able to shape conference outcomes
comprisesso-called(environmental) non-governmental organizations (ENGOs; Tellam & Chatterjee,
1993).1
Their suggested progressed prominence at such official international negotiations has
sparked academic discussion especially among supporters of rationalist theory on why states have
‘granted’such participation tothese otheractors(see forinstance Böhmelt,Koubi & Bernauer, 2013;
Edwards& Hulme,1992; Gordenker,2010; Princen,Finger& Manno, 1995; Raustiala, 1997a; Steffek,
2013; Tallberg, Sommerer, Squatrito & Jönsson, 2013, 2014).
However, this latter debate somewhat masks a rather more profound question on the
relationship between ENGOs and states, concerning the impact these ENGOs have (had) on state
behavior (also see Joachim, 2007, p.15). Does ENGO participation at these conferences (i.e. formal
participation) and/or protesting or otherwise campaigning outside of them (i.e. activism) actually
influence(inter)state perceptionsof environmental problemsand, ultimately,conferenceoutcomes?
Such a question merits prime consideration, even before inquiries into issues of ENGOs’ political
legitimation or accountability. The influence of ENGO-activities on international environmental
discussionsandduringactual conferencesneedstobe understoodtoassessthe relevance of ENGOs’
partaking and recognize their potential to significantly alter future debates on the contentious
relationshipbetweenhumansand nature preservation – a task at no point more momentous, being
just months away from the talks in Paris on a successor program of the Kyoto Protocol.2
1 Environmental non-governmental organizations in this thesis are conceptualized as ‘independent societal
organizations whose primary aim is to promote common [environmental] goals at the national or the
international level’ (Martens, 2002, p.282). ENGOs in this thesis are not per se identified as formal
(professionalized) actors (unlike Martens, ibid.), as to also incorporate social movements that are non-
bureaucratic from origin.
2 Throughout this thesis the term ‘ENGO-activities’ is used to denote both formal participation and more
activist actions together. Though I realize that a term as broad as ‘activities’ covers an extensive array of
actions, including some that do not specifically relate to environmental policy promotion, here its meaning is
restricted only to those practices that are conducted with the aim of influencing conference agreements.

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State of the Art
(E)NGOs have been subject to increased scholarly attention commencing in the early ’90s of the
previous century. Their relationship with IOs in general, and the United Nations (UN) (and it’s
subdivisions) in specific, became of prime interest especially after the Rio Conference of 1992,
perceived by many in the International Relations’ (IR) field as a watershed event with regard to
(E)NGO participation (e.g., Dany, 2013, p.3; Mathews, 1997, p.55; van Rooy, 1997; Tellam &
Chatterjee, 1993). An impressive amount of research has been done on these actors, of which I
present four different subdivisions.
A first group of scholars, writing especially up to about the year 2000, conducted studies that were
primarily centered on the changing official accreditations to (E)NGOs at international conferences
(for instance Charnovitz, 1996; Clark, Friedman & Hochstetler, 1998; Raustiala, 1997b; Tellam &
Chatterjee, 1993). These contributions almost unanimously claimed an unprecedented upsurge in
(E)NGO participation opportunities based on their levels of access granted to the conventions and
the changesthereof overtime.Studiesof this period consequently provide detailed illustrations of
the changingattitude of internationalorganizations(andtheir member-states) towards increasingly
seeing(E)NGOsasofficial collaborativepartners(see especially Charnovitz, 1996), even though they
still lacked structured insights into the actual influence these (E)NGOs gained.
More importantly,despite mostremainingsilentonthe topicof activiststrategiesperformed
by NGOs (e.g. protesting and public campaigning), an implicit notion developed throughout these
articles as to the relationship between rising official accreditation levels and such more unofficial
strategies(Gulbrandsen&Andresen,2004).3
Many authorsat the time appear to have assumed that
such activist elements diminished proportionately to the rising official recognition by states at
international (climate) conferences. Indeed, the contributions even hint at a causal relationship
betweenthe two,withgrantedseatsatthe conference tablesdirectlyreplacingprotestbanners(see
for instance Raustiala, 1997b). Such a proposition seems to follow the straightforward line of
reasoning that earlier days saw less ENGOs in general (both in number and in size of activities
3 The terms used here to denote this distinction are borrowed from Gulbransen and Andresen (2004), who, as
will later be elaborated upon, refer to so-called insider and outsider strategies pursued by ENGOs. Insider
strategies are those particular forms of participation where the ENGO directly communicates and collaborates
with the more ‘common’ participants of international environmental negotiations, including state delegates
and the host organization, on the official conference premises (p.56-57). Outsider strategies, alternatively,
entail the framing of a particular debate or negotiation through public manifestations, ranging from
campaigning to outright protests – sometimes even including civil disobedience (ibid.)

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employed) thatwere accredited fewerrightsduringinternationalenvironmentalnegotiations, while
negotiationsnowadaysincreasinglyembrace official ENGO participation as a result of ENGO growth
in size, number and, following this, (perceived) importance.
In my view this nonetheless represents a problematic predisposition towards material
resources and opportunity structures. Though the argument that spending resources on official
participation strategies automatically means fewer resources available for protests and
demonstrations may seem elementary in the case of a single ENGO, it does not hold when
consideringthe entiregroupof ENGOsthat promote the value of environmental protection.It is very
well possible that while one group of ENGOs remains primarily aimed at outsider strategies, at the
same time a new(growing) groupof ENGOscenterson more official participation activities – or vice
versa.More fundamentally,however,Iobjecttothe underlyingacademic acceptance of a restrictive
Realist conceptualization of power and influence; one where material resources and opportunity
structuressolelydetermine the level of capacityforinternational actorstoimpose theirwill at global
negotiations.Perhapsinthiscase notconcerningthe more classical resources of military strength or
financial capability,itisstill Realistinitsfocusonpowerstructuressuchas ENGO accreditationlevels
allowed for by states and legal power granted to ENGOs by letting them draft proposals or directly
participate at the negotiations (sometimes even at the expense of state budgets). Such a Realist
perceptionof influencesitsuncomfortable with the more general tendency of Realism to disregard
any influence exerted by actors other than states.
Despite thisemphasison insiderstrategies overmore (unofficial)activistpressuresbyENGOs
(as a resultof the Realistconceptualizations)rarelybeingmade explicit, it would nevertheless go on
to have a lasting effect on a second group of academics that aimed to establish (E)NGOs’ influence
more positively. This latter group bypassed the longitudinal element of their predecessors and
focusedeffortstofindENGOinfluence onanindividualconference-level (seefor instance Betsill and
Corell, 2008; Charnovitz, 2011; Dombrowski, 2010; Gordenker, 2010). In part, they succeeded. The
cross-case analysis done by Betsill and Corell (2008) concludes that ENGOs can have influence over
conference outcomes, depending on a range of conditions (such as ENGO coordination or the
saliency of the topic), whereas Dombrowski (2010) stresses ENGOs ability to overcome democratic
deficits inherent to international state conferences. Across the board, however, these authors
adhere to the aforementioned academic consensus that perceives formal participation in modern
times as more relevant than the other, more traditional outsider (E)NGO-activities (see Betsill and
Corell, 2008; Charnovitz, 2011; Clark, Friedman & Hochstetler, 1998; Dunér, 1997; Gordenker, 2010;
Gulbrandsen & Andresen, 2004; Princen & Finger, 1994; Princen, Finger & Manno, 1995; Raustiala,
1997a, 1997b; Willets, 1996, 2000;).

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GulbrandsenandAndresen(2004),intheirresearch on ENGO influence during gatherings of
the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), notably address the problematic
features of such a consensus, and their subsequent proposal to distinguish insider from outsider
strategies(alsousedinthisresearch),andthe relatedtherewith advisory from more activist ENGOs,
isinsightful.Nevertheless,astheyconcur,the distinctionbetweenactivistandadvisory ENGOs is not
without its challenges (as different strategies can be pursued at the same time). Similarly, their
sticking to the method of measuring influence through a combination of formal access levels and
goal attainment ‘measured as the correspondence between NGOs’ positions and proposals and
actual negotiation outcomes’ (ibid, p.59) does not appear to counter the general tendency to put
primary emphasis on official participation. Instead, the study remains predisposed towards more
insiderstrategiesandis unable to clearly assess which kind of strategy chosen by (and available to)
the ENGO ultimately leads to influence. In other words, though the work done by this group grants
further insights into the direct influence exerted by ENGOs at international negotiations, the
recurring conceptualization of ENGO-activities to only entail formal participation through official
accreditation levels foregoes the possibility of ENGOs influencing state actors through outsider
strategies.
The indisputable importance of such outsider strategies is shown by a third set of
researchers. Though I present them here as unitary group for the sake of clarity, arguably the only
thing these authors have in common is their focus on outsider strategies as pursued by NGOs to
influencestate andbusinessactors.Infact,thisgroupcomprisesstudiesof wide diversity,with some
focused on NGO influence specifically targeting business (De Bakker & De Hond, 2007; Spar & La
Mure, 2003; Vasi & King, 2012) while others concern NGOs influencing domestic politics (Ho &
Edmonds,2007; McAdam, 1983) or global decisions(Marsh,2006; Nelson&Dorsey,2013); and some
discussingNGOinfluencesonspecificissues(Carpenter,2007; Einwohner,1999; Moffa,2012), where
others direct attention to different tactics within outsider strategies (Seo, Kim & Yang, 2009; Earl &
Kimport, 2009; Taylor & van Dyke, 2004; Wapner, 1995). Nevertheless these studies all stress the
potential of outsiderstrategiestoinfluence (inter)national actors and decision-making procedures.
Vasi and King,forinstance,with regard to NGO influence on business ‘via street protests, boycotts,
and other forms of public demonstration’ (2012, p.576) NGOs might directly affect corporate plans
through public mobilization. Unfortunately, unlike the earlier two groups, so far none of these
studies specifically concern themselves with the influence of environmental NGOs, thus doing
nothing to overcome the prominent reliance on insider strategies within the academic field of
international ENGO influence.
Finally, a smaller, fourth group of authors investigating influence from both state and non-
state actors too deviatesfromthe firsttwogroupsin its more constructivist perception of influence

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as dependentonnorms.Normsstate whatkindof behaviorisexpectedof international actors; what
type of choices and actions are deemed ‘appropriate’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1997, p. 891). Without
immediatelydenyingthe influence of otherfactorson state behavior, according to the norm-setting
theory of Finnemore and Sikkink, state actors (as well as other types of actors) will base their
interests and identities on these norms – their behavior and choices are restricted by normative
boundaries(ibid, p. 914).4
The ‘life cycle’ they introduce has three steps: norm emergence through
so-called norm-entrepreneurs (which could theoretically be any type of political actor); norm
cascading through the socialization of the norms, with states adhering to the norm just to avoid
international condemnation;andnorm internalization, a longer process following the international
acceptance of the norm after which the norm becomes so integrated in everyday practice that few
(international) actors will even be aware it exists (ibid, p. 895). This final phase is not one without
controversy,asthe wideracademicdebate oninternalizationshows(foran overview of this debate,
see Arievitch & van der Veer, 1995), but the theory of internalization here suffers a more
fundamental issue.Inmyopinion norminternalizationwillonlyoccurwhenitcoincideswithaperiod
of value creation – where the actors not only agree to perceive certain behavior and choices as
appropriate, but also begin to see this behavior (and the wider value in which it is embedded) as
desirable.Cananormreallybecome partof the everydayrepertoire of aninternational actorif there
are principal objections to the value it represents?
Such questions notwithstanding,manyauthorshave gone ontoinvestigate thisnorm-setting
process through empirical research. Though the initial focus of many of these studies is on state
actors (Benwell, 2011; Cass, 2005; Cock, 2011; Eckersly, 2007; Moore, 2012; Van Schaik & Schunz,
2012; Zwolski & Kaunert, 2011), some work has been done on environmental NGOs as well (see
Schroeder, 2007, 2008; Tallberg et al., 2014). Unfortunately, these latter contributions are either
nationally oriented (in the case of Schroeder 2007, 2008) or comprise quantitative longitudinal
studies that measure influence of ENGOs on ENGO-participation itself (Tallberg et al., 2014).
Nonetheless, they remain important on a more theoretical level in their challenging of the
assumption thatonly material resourcesorrationalism canguide state behavior.State actorshave to
adhere to international normative boundaries and the theory presumes for all international actors
(explicitlyincluding (E)NGOs) tocontribute tothe foundingandpromotionof these norms (as will be
explained in more detail later in this thesis).
4 Though this will be touched upon later, I think it is important to reiterate here that by no means are
Constructivists in general,or shall I later in this thesis, proposing norms to be the only principle through which
states reach decisions or choose how to behave. As Finnemore and Sikkink put it in their reflection of the
critique on the deterministic character of norms, ‘[t]he argument has never been that other logics of action do
not ever drive behavior; the argument has been that appropriateness is a powerful and important motor of
political behavior worthy of investigation’ (p.914).

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In sum,then, eachof these academicsub-fieldspresentsaunique lookat(E)NGOs,influence and the
relationshipbetweenthese twothroughoutsiderandinsiderstrategies. Bycombining the promising
elements of each of these groups an integrative framework of analysis can be theorized that
incorporates a longitudinal element (group 1 and 4); in-depth case studies (group 2); includes
outsideractivities(group3);andappliesamore encompassingconceptualizationof influence (group
4). As a result, I aim to come to a comprehensive understanding of ENGO-activities and ENGO
influence over time.

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Research Question
In an effort to contribute to the literature this thesis presents such an integrative framework.
Through the Constructivist lens of norm-setting, this thesis adds to the academic debate by
combining a longitudinal scope with three single case studies. The three stages of norm-setting
induce the studyto lookat outsideraswell asinsiderstrategiespursued by ENGOs in their efforts to
change and create new norms. By not readily presuming ENGOs for the last couple of decades to
have onlyfocusedon(orhad successwith) insiderstrategies,I look at norm-emergence as a process
that can happen both in the conference rooms (of the actual conference itself, or at its earlier
preparationcommittees) andoutsideof these inthe widerenvironmental debates that precede and
induce the erection of an international conference. 5
At the second step of norm cascading, I do
neverthelessconcurwiththe academic trend that proclaims international conferences are of prime
importance astheypresenta possibilityforthe norm to be institutionalized. These steps combined
can happen over a rather short time-span of a few years, with their processes best illustrated
throughcase studies.Finally,Ipropose to broaden the perceptionof norminternalizationasthe third
step,and suggestfocusshouldbe on the processof ‘value creation’ –where the individual norms no
longeronlystate whatisdeemed appropriate, but combined shape what actors find to be desirable
(towhichI will return indetail later).Thisinduces the research to also investigate how these norms
over time have altered the way state actors, and the global public, look at environmental issues in
general.
The main questionin this research therefore concerns itself with the relationship between
changed ENGOs’ activities over time and their ensuing influence on the norm-setting process:
HowhaveENGO-activities concerning internationalenvironmental debates changed over the
last fifty years and what has been the effect thereof for their influence on the norms and
values that guide state behavior?
In essence then, the aim of the study is to discern the impact of ENGO-activities on the norms and
values that both curtail as well as propel state interests, through a Constructivist framework that
5 To elaborate on these international debates, this study does not treat environmental concerns and debates
on environmental issues as a sole prerogative to attendees of the respective international conferences. Rather,
it is assumed the discussions will already be well underway among the international public, through media
outings and local debates,even before the state delegates are tasked with findinga global solution to the issue
during international conferences. In this wider debate, just as much as at the conference table, norms are
introduced, shaped and accepted, and ENGOs will also try to frame this wider debate to influence state
representatives.

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emphasizes the changes of this influence and both types of ENGO-activities (for example, but not
necessarily,ashiftfrommore activistmethodstoformal participation) over a longer period of time.
To fulfill thisgoal the thesisfirstelaboratesonthe theoretical frameworkof Constructivism,touching
upon the concepts of norms, values, norm-setting and influence. After this the thesis turns to the
methodological structure of the researchitself,whichinvolvesbothalongitudinalinquiryintoENGO-
activitiesas well as a case comparison among three environmentally oriented conferences ranging
from 1972 up to 2012. The analysis that follows will engage the major part of this work,
encompassing a literature review of ENGO-activities over the last fifty years, followed by in-depth
analysesof ENGO norm-setting prior to and during the three conventions. A third part of the actual
analysis then compares these three cases and puts the outcomes thereof alongside the found
changesinENGO-activitiestohighlightpossible congruences or discrepancies between them. Some
final remarksonthe meritsand weaknessesof this study’s approach and the necessity of additional
research on the influence of (E)NGOs on norms and values conclude the thesis.

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A Constructivist Framework
Constructivism,inoppositiontoneo-realistandneo-liberalistprinciples,emphasizes the significance
of social determinants for different international actors’ actions, based on identities and norms,
rather thanrational or sole materialisticinterests (Reus-Smit,2013).The strategies andinterests (and
the restrictionsthereof) forstatesandotherinternational players(including ENGOs) are formed – in
additiontomaterial structures –through collectiveinterpretationsof such normative and ideational
structuresof how to behave ‘properly’,orwhichdecisionsare collectively believed to be ‘befitting’.6
These interpretations are made possible by the continued social interactions among the range of
actors involved(ibid,p.225).Actorson the international stage are (oftenunwittingly)participantsina
constant collective reflection on what kind of behavior is deemed ‘appropriate’, or which actions
justified.The resultingnormative ramificationsprovide the principal boundaries within which states
define their interests (ibid, p.226; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1997, p.914).
Norms, norm-setting and values
One explanation of how non-state actors influence norms and consequently state interests is
provided for by Martin Finnemore and Sikkink (1997) in their contribution on ‘norm
entrepreneurship’. Norms, they claim, are generally conceptualized as ‘a standard of appropriate
behaviorforactors witha givenidentity’(Finnemore& Sikkink, 1997, p.891). This conceptualization,
‘distinctfromthe state or non-state behavioritisdesignatedtoexplain’( Finnemore& Sikkink, 1997,
p.892), in effect defines (state-)actors’ interests and guides (but not definitively foretells) their
actions.All international actorsconstantlychecktheirbehaviorfor‘appropriateness’ – whether how
they act corresponds to what is socially approved. Concerning the following question of who then
exactlyestablisheswhichcourse of actioncanbe accordedas appropriate the authors suggest this is
the result of an interplay between national (or regional) and international perceptions, with the
‘domestic influences lessen[ed] significantly once a norm has become institutionalized in the
international system’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1997, p.893). In addition, not every domestic
interpretationof the norminfluences the final international outcome equally (and individual cases
may continue to deviate from the international mean).
To clarifythis processof norm-settingFinnemore andSikkinkintroduce the norm ‘life cycle’,
subsequently applied to the cases of women’s suffrage and laws of war. The norm-setting process
6 Constructivists, then, do not completely exclude any such factors as material capabilities in determining an
actor’s influence,yet argue that collectively construed norms,principles, cultures and identities are at least as
important – even if it were only because ‘material resources only acquire meaning for human action through
the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded’ (Wendt, 1995, p.73).

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entailsathree-stage development,if successful,where the norm escalates from local conception to
international institutionalization and internalization.7
‘[T]he first stage, norm-emergence, [entails]
persuasion by norm entrepreneurs [which] attempt to convince a critical mass of states […] to
embrace newnorms’(Finnemore &Sikkink,1997, p.895). These norm entrepreneurs acton the basis
of different incentives, among which significantly are such non-rationalistic motives as altruism or
empathy (1997, p.898). By way of ‘framing’ the debate, described as ‘using language that names,
interprets,anddramatizes[issues]’(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1997, p.897), the entrepreneurs try to put
newideasontothe international agendasandshape the particular understanding of these issues by
the wider public. They attack existing norms that are not in line with their ideas, either through
political lobbyingorthrough other, more unconventional (or even unlawful) actions and try to rally
states to endorse their norms and too become active promoters of the proposed normative
framework. Once enoughstate actorshave assumedthisrole (the critical mass), the theory suggests
a tipping point is reached that enables a new, second-stage, dynamic (1997, p.901-902).8
More and
more actors quickly adopt the new norm, as public and entrepreneur pressures now combine with
diplomaticinfluencesfromthe already‘converted’state actors. The wish to conform to the majority
– socialization – plays a role with state actors striving to prevent being left out of the norm-setting
process(ibid, p.903).It isduringthis normcascading phase that the norms become institutionalized
throughinternational conferences,essentially deemed worthy enough to serve as codified guiding
principlestowhichstates and other international should be held accountable.9
Overall, this means
both the norm emergence and norm cascading phases of the norm-life cycle could be assumed to
occur overa relativelyshortperiod,asthe momentumgainedbynormentrepreneursandsupporting
states will not go on forever and thus the opportunity for socialization and international debate
ultimately diminishes. Finally, as the authors explain, only after a wide majority of actors has
incorporatedthe norm (primarilythroughinstitutionalization) alongerperiodof norminternalization
occurs (i.e. the third step), ultimately resulting in a “taken-for-granted’ quality that makes
conformance with the norm almost automatic’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1997, p.904). Though the
authors argue the verynature of internalizationinherentlyprovides problems for social research, as
7 Norms arguably only become norms after they have passed the different phases outlined in the norm ‘life
cycle’. Indeed, the norm-setting process in fact involves an idea about what should be normal behavior, which
ultimately culminates into a full-grown norm internationally prescribing appropriate behavi or. Nevertheless,
for the sake of clarity, throughout the thesis I will use the term ‘norms’ in both instances.
8 This critical mass does not necessarily have to be an absolute majority, but due to the assertion that at
differingissues differentstate-actors assumea more or less significantrolein the international political debate
the critical mass particularly hinges upon convincing the principal states that (can) guide the debate
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1997, p.901).
9 It is important to note that these norms and their institutionalizations cover both more procedural questions
on what should be done internationally, as well as more substantive directives for how to deal with specific
environmental issues.

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the norms are no longerovertly contested but made an intrinsic part of the world as it is perceived,
they also argue norms at this stage present the strongest motivators for particular actions and
choices over other options and should therefore should not easily be put aside (1997, p.894).
However, asmentionedbefore, I find the idea of norm internalization troubling if the norm
itself isnotalso embracedassomethingthat is found as desirable. A norm which by some is merely
accepted through socialization and peer-pressure begs the question as to why these actors would
not activelyresistthe normfrombecominganinherentpart of their day-to-day repertoire. Rather, I
argue norm internalization can only occur when it coincides with the actors’ rising appreciation of
the value that underlies the norm. Indeed, no actor will succumb to norm internalization if there is
no simultaneous process of value creation. In my view – and an idea that has gathered support
among academics of Psychology (see for instance Liere & Dunlap, 1978; Schwarz, 1970; 1977;
Joireman, Lasane, Bennet, Richards & Solaimani, 2001; Schultz & Zelezny, 1998) – norms and norm-
setting debates alter actors’ ideas on what kind of conduct (and way of thinking about specific
challenges) is perceived as desirable. Value then, can be described as what kind of behavior is
thought of as desirable by one or several actors. Clearly distinct from the norms that state what is
deemedappropriate,valuecreationisactuallyaffectedby such agreed upon codes of conduct – just
as these values in turn could influence the (success of) norm-setting processes.
At firstsight,sucha linkbetweennormsand valuesdoesnotseemovertlysignificantor even
original,butthe implicationforthe importance of norm-settingisprofound. Womenvoting rights, to
use the example providedforbyFinnemoreandSikkink, didnotappearoutof thin air, but rather are
the process of questioning old norms (i.e. only men should be allowed to vote). Given the added
perspective on norm-setting and value creation, I argue such contemplation of these old norms is
done by early norm-entrepreneurs whose perception of the importance of the value of gender
equality has changed. Their subsequent promotion of new norms that are more in line with their
value of genderequality culminatedinanormon women’ssuffrage inthe early20th
century,but also
for instance on the norm of women enrolling at universities. In turn, these norms (and their
internalization) became stimulants for the appreciation of the value that is gender equality.
Nowadayswomen’ssuffrage iswidelyacceptedasappropriate,internalizeduptosuchan extent that
the majorityof votersacross the globe take the normfor granted. However,Iassert that this process
of internalizationwouldnothave occurredwithout manyof these voters findingthese womenvoting
rights as desirable. Indeed, gender equality in general is now widely supported within the
international community. In sum then, short term norm-setting procedures on women’s suffrage,
women enrolment at universities and many other feminist norms (and their consequent
internalizations) have resulted in long-term changes of how people across the globe value gender
equality.

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Hence, coming back to the environmental debate, it is important to understand both the
long-termvalue changeswithregardtothe acknowledgementof the environment being something
which requires governmental protection, as well as recognize the short(er)-term norm-setting
developments that, for instance, resulted in a codification of the norm on how forests should be
managed and protected through the Forestry Principles in 1992. In doing this, one can trace how
ENGO-activities have created or advanced these individual norms, and see over time how these
norms collectively have (or have not) led to a raised appreciation (among international, and
especially state, actors) of the value of environmental conservation.10
Insider and outsider strategies
According to the theory so far, ENGOs influence environmental policy (agreed upon on an
international level during environmental conferences) by successfully amending and creating new
norms that restrain and promote particular state behavior. So far, the literature has primarily
focused on insider strategies as the chief factor to explain ENGO influence. However, as already
mentioned,asecondgroupof scholarshascontinuedtohighlightthe importance of unconventional
outsider strategies – even though no explicit enquiries into environmental NGOs have been
conducted.Nevertheless,theirworkgivesfurthercredence tothe argument that outsider strategies
matteras alreadyimplicitinthe Constructivist theory on norm-setting. This latter process usually is
not solely confined to the official negotiations and its participants, but concerns a longer
development in the wider international community where norms are discussed in national
parliaments and town halls, as well as in the media and personal spheres. ENGOs operate across
these paradigms,withnon-politicalinstitutionsasthe media more often than not the explicit target
of theiractivities.Thismeansall the effortsof ENGOstoinfluence the widerinternational discussion
shouldbe includedinastudyon ENGOinfluence.Inaddition,the work done by the scholars on NGO
influence proves that not only should it be incorporated, it might even turn out to be decisive.
A commonly applied way to map the trajectory of both types of strategies is by measuring
the level of intensity (i.e.the size andnumber) of eitherkindof activitiesovertime. Touched upon in
my review on the ranking of activity ‘importance’ to deduct influence as done by Gulbrandsen and
Andresen(2004; albeitonlyforinsider strategies), this approach effectively surmounts the ensuing
challengesof sucha method – mostnotablythe problematicaspectof differentiatingamongoutsider
strategies.ThoughIconcur withthe aforementionedauthorsthatsuchan ordering providesrelevant
10 Admittedly, there are more ways than one to frame the value that is supposedly promoted by the group of
ENGOs as outlined here. Some groups would for instance prefer the use of preservation over conservation, and
vice versa. Nevertheless, for the sake of coherence it is not beyond reason to suggest a ll organizations covered
by the earlier given conceptualization of ENGOs sharea same goal in their promotion of environmental policies
for the benefit of nature itself – and thus for this thesis to speak of one shared value.

19. - 19 -
insightsforassessingwhichstrategyleavesENGOswithrelatively the most influence, this is not the
aim of the current research. Rather, it endeavors to resolve the more rudimental question of
whetheremphasisput(measuredbynumberandsize) on either ENGO-activity over time in general
influencesstates’behavior(byinfluencingthe normsandvalues upon which these latter actors base
their interests and motivate their choices).
Secondly, and closely related to this, by observing trends in emphasis of both outsider and
insiderstrategiesseparately,thisresearchdeviatesfrommainstreamstudiesonthe topic of (E)NGO-
activities and influence by not presuming insider and outsider activities to be mutually exclusive.
Have ENGOs over time become more reliant on insider strategies at the expense of outsider
strategies?A suggestion of suchanegative relationship seemstobe implicitinthe currentliterature.
However,asmentionedearlier, this premise suffers from both practical and theoretical issues, as a
realist perception of power and influence (and the consequent selective focus on official
accreditation opportunities and insider strategies) has resulted in failure to appreciate outsider
strategies as a potential source of influence for ENGOs. In this thesis I therefore dissent from this
wide-spread (but mostly implicit) consensus on such an assumption and apply a Constructivist
perception of influence that seems less at odds with a focus on such unconventional activities
employed by ENGOs.
Norm differentiation and influence
A valid question posed by Finnemore and Sikkink in their article concerns which norms ultimately
tend to matter in international politics (1997, p.905-906). Though the structure of the current
research is not so much purposed at identifying the potential of future norms, as it can assess the
currentnorms alreadyinstitutionalized, its obvious restrictions in both time and space do not allow
for the scrutiny of all environmental norms institutionalized during the conferences investigated.
Withthe interestof the researchspecificallydirectedat ENGO influence on state behavior, it seems
warranted to at least incorporate those norms that appear to produce the highest probability of
findingsuchinfluence.However, suchaselectionultimatelyhingesonthe particularwayinfluence is
understood.
From the ontology of Constructivism, with its particular emphasis on shaped identities and
constructed norms, a conceptualization of influence can be deducted that focuses on how much
influenceonnormsand state behaviorisattributedtoanENGO by itself andbythe other actors with
which it interacts. Influence, as all other things, for constructivists is a social construct, a product
stemming from a consensus among social actors – probably best conceivable through surveys or
interviews with those other actors and/or ENGOs themselves. Yet, in addition to the severe
methodological issues(forinstancetointerview those attending a conference some fifty years ago),

20. - 20 -
such an approach deviates from the research question posited in this thesis in its results merely
stipulating what others perceive(d) to be the influence of ENGOs on state behavior, rather than
actuallydeterminingthis influence factually.More theoretically,thisconceptualization also neglects
a fundamental assumption of Constructivist theory on the function of norms as explained earlier.
Norms do not so much foretell the choices and behavior of state actors, but they preclude certain
actionsor promote otherones.A Constructivistconceptionof influence of ENGOs on state behavior
at the international level thus needs to acknowledge both norms and their inherent limitations on
how much of the state actors’ behavior they can explain.
According to Mokken and Stokman (1975), influence involves the ability of actors to
(partially) alterthe behaviororchoicesof otheractorswithin a delimited set of behavior- or choice-
alternatives available to these latter actors (p.59). However, as (most) norms cannot definitively
indicate which alternative the state actor will choose, the influence of ENGOs is better grasped by
maintaining influence to involve an actor that (partially) alters the normatively delimited set of
behavior or choice-alternatives available to other actors (most notably states).11
In other words,
influential ENGOs do not influence specifically which type of behavior or choice states choose, yet
throughnorm-settingcan(partially) alterthe range of possibilities (bounded by norms) from which
the state-actor can choose. The result is an essentially Constructivist conceptualization, with an
emphasis on normative principles that guide state behavior, choice and interests in general by
denyingsome optionsand highlightingothers. Evidently,this alsoimplies that those new norms that
mostrestrictstates’behavior(or inferradical changesintheirpossibilitiesascomparedtobefore the
norm) can be regardedasprovidingthe highestprobabilitythatthe ENGOdoesultimatelydetermine
states’ choices and conference outcomes. The method of this study consequently should reflect
these conclusions by looking specifically for these norms.
11 This conceptualization, admittedly, resembles more Mokken and Stokman’s perception of power.
Nevertheless, I find power to connote to the capability of non-state actors to do something, rather than
actually (purposefully or not) doing it. This is also the reason why I did not include ‘having the ability to’ in my
final conceptualization of influence. Van der Eijk (2001), in his assessment of both conceptualizations by
Mokken and Stokman, consequently states that influence and power are substantially different, with some
actors having influence and some have power (or a combination between the two; p. 78). However, if one
would accept the premise by Mokken and Stokman that influence means determining the specific choice made
by the influenced actors, as opposed to power merely determini ng the range of choices from which the
influenced actor can choose himself, I would argue that influence becomes nothing more than a form of power,
as it restricts the range of choices to one. Instead, I view power as the ability to do something, while influence
is the actual (deliberate or not) application of such power to affect the range of possibilities to choose from
(broader definition), or even determine the choiceor behavior of state actors affirmatively (narrow definition).

21. - 21 -
Methods
Thisthesispresentsathree-stepinvestigationintothe particularwaythrough which ENGO-activities
have changedovertime;the effectof these activitiesinindividualcasesonthe of influence of ENGOs
on the normsand valuesthatguide state behavior; and the final effect over time of changing ENGO
strategies on ENGO influence. In other words, by analyzing current literature about ENGO
participation(includingoutsiderandinsiderstrategies) the studycanfirstmapthe (possible) trend in
ENGO-activities over the last fifty years. Next, it zooms in on single cases to determine how these
ENGO-activities,includingoutsiderstrategies,indiffering circumstances have led the ENGO to exert
influence over the norm-setting process. Finally, the picture is broadened once more as these
individualcasesare comparedlongitudinallytoidentify any pattern of changing influence and value
creation, possibly congruent with the already found trends of evolving ENGO-activities.
Longitudinal research to map strategic movement
The firstquestionof thisthesisonchangingENGO-activitiesacrossa fiftyyearperiodwillbe basedon
an extensive literature study of what has been produced on insider and outsider strategies. This
suffices to map a trend over time within the intensity dimension marked upon earlier.12
Sketching
any particularpathsof bothkindsof ENGO-activities does not require an exhaustive list of possible
in- or outsiderstrategies,asthisisalreadyimpliedinthe definitionof insider strategies and outsider
strategies.DescribedbyGulbrandsenandAndresen(2004),andmentionedearlier,insider strategies
isthe headingunderwhichfall all suchactivitiesthatare officiallyascribedtoENGOs at international
conventions, take place on the official conference grounds and involve direct interactions with
official delegates from other participating parties. The aim of this strategy is to affect negotiation
outcomes by directly influencing state behavior and making them comply with the (new) norm.
Outsiderstrategiesthenare the remainingactivitiesperformedbyENGOsthatdo have the intention
of influencing the negotiation process and/or outcome, but are aimed at changing state behavior
indirectly by using public opinion to force states to adhere to the norm. Table 1 thus shows an
overviewof the mostcommonlyemployedactivitiesaffiliatedwitheithertype of strategy,andinfact
doesrepresentall the employedactivitiesbyENGOsasencounteredinthe current research, but it is
by no means exhaustive for all the activities ENGOs (can) employ.
12 A lotof this literature concerns itself with why these levels have changed over time. The thesis will not touch
upon this debate, as the number of influencing factors proposed is enormous and requires a study on its own
to address comprehensively.

22. - 22 -
Table 1. Insider versus outsider strategies
Insider Strategies Outsider Strategies
- Observant status to the conference
- Consultative status at the conference
- Membership of state delegations
- Participating in Advisory Committees
- Lobbying at the conference
- Providing written statements at the
conference
- Speaking time at the conference
- Rallying protests
- Holding parallel conferences
- Issuing press releases
- Boycotting
- Delivering petitions
- Disrupting negotiations
- Conducting (non-)violent direct actions
- (Online) campaigning
- Lobbying outside of the conference
- Circulating daily ‘newsletters’
Similarly,the longitudinal comparison does not benefit from having statistical data on the absolute
levels of intensity for ENGOs regarding both kinds of strategies. The aim of the study is to explain
ENGO influenceovertime and the research thus requires insight into how (the intensity of) insider
and outsider strategies evolved from roughly 1970 up to the present time, rather than demanding
absolute levelsof the numbersandsize of the activitiesinanyspecificyear.Suchprecise pinpointing
is neither straightforward nor relevant, as it would require detailed numbers from all ENGOs over
time on both their insider and outsider activities and still would barely add to the relative changes
across the investigatedperiod.Thoughthere are some indicative numbers that can be incorporated,
the emphasis remains on the overall trends over time – perceived as such by the many scholars
addressingthese patterns of insider and outsider activities. Longitudinal research on both types of
strategies best serves to illuminate these trends as its constant focus is on demonstrating the
position of ENGO-activities in comparison to other moments in time (Bryman, 2008, p.56). In
addition, by not assuming a zero-sum relationship between the two strategies, the analysis
incorporates all types of activities employed by ENGOs, thus laying the groundwork for a later
comparison with ENGO influence to not overlook outsider strategies as an important factor.
Case studies – norms and MAs
KnowinghowENGO-activitiesduringandpriortointernational conferences have changed over time
isone part of the analysis;the otherconcerns the link between these changing ENGO-activities and
ENGOs’abilitytoinfluencethe normsinstitutionalizedat suchconferences –especiallythe restrictive
ones which I have claimed before to grant the highest possibility for the ENGO to influence state
behavior. To reveal such a causal relationship, the research subsequently directs its attention

23. - 23 -
towardsindividualcase studiesof three international conferences taking place in 1972 (Stockholm),
1992 (Rio de Janeiro), and 2012 (again Rio de Janeiro).
Though these conferences have primarily offered new visions at how best to deal with
environmental concerns,rather thanactuallyprovidinggenuinedirectivesonspecific environmental
challenges,the case studiesprovideafairrepresentationof international environmental conferences
within the UN system. Not by definition the largest in number of participants, nor always the most
important with regard to direct policy outcomes, their broad focus on sustainable development
culminates in interest from a similarly broad range of ENGOs and they have often served as the
benchmarkforother,more issue-specificconferences onenvironmental policy (Van Alstine, Afionis
& Doran, 2013, p.333-336). As such, I view them as typical case studies, representative up to a
certain degree for their climate conference counterparts over time and across the arena of
environmental policy (see Bryman, 2008, p.56).
As argued earlier during the conceptualization of influence, the norms that imply severe
restrictions for state behavior, or indicate a new, rather profound way of thinking about (specific)
environmental concerns,are of prime interesttothisstudy,astheyentail the highestprobabilitythat
states indeed have to opt for choices or behavior they would not have done without the norm in
place.Therefore,foreachconferenceone ortwomajor agreements(MA) are listed in Table 2 which
have been the particular institutionalizations of more abstract norms (dealing with the
environment).13
TheseMAsare specificallyselected on the amount of contestation and controversy
that surroundedtheirformalization,asthese disputessignify decisions that moved away from what
was upuntil thennormal practice (the oldnorms),andintroducednew codesof conductand ways to
think about environmental problems.14
For instance, the agreement made to look into so-called
Sustainable Development Goals at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development
(UNCSD) in 2012 indicated the institutionalization of a norm that maintained that international
governance of environmental issues required measurable targets rather than general guidelines.
13 To elaborate, other norms too were institutionalized at the different conferences, for instance on the
particular way to deal with the political conflicts of Northern versus Southern countries. However, despite
possible ENGO influences exerted here as well, those norms will not be incorporated in this study as they do
not explicitly (though sometimes might do indirectly) promote or preclude state behavior and choices
regarding environmental policy.
14 Notably, as can be seen in Table 1, this does not per se mean that the most important outcomes of a
conference will be examined. For many scholars and non-state actors alike, Agenda 21 was the main outcome
of the Rio Conference. Nevertheless, the Forestry principles are examined here due to their highly contested
nature and their initial potential to become a true, binding, forestry convention. In 1972 the international
debate primarily centered on whether there even should be a conference or not. Though the occurrence of the
convention almostsolely about environmental issues thus could be seen as the institutionalization of the idea
that environmental issues require international coordination en cooperation, insider and outsider strategies
obviously no longer took place after the final decision for holding the conference was made. Therefore another
disputed topic at the conference (on whaling) is also incorporated in the study.

24. - 24 -
Table 2. Major Agreements of the international conferences15
Year Conferences Major Agreements (MAs)
1972 UnitedNationsConference on the Human
Environment, Stockholm
- The conference itself
- Moratorium on whaling
1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro
- Forestry Principles
2012 UnitedNationsConference onSustainable
Development, Rio de Janeiro
- Sustainable Development Goals
Naturally, this also implies that there are different levels of institutionalization. For some (if not
most) ENGOs havingForestryPrinciples alone is not enough. They also, for instance, should include
binding requirements or propose a specific conference on Forestry (as was the case with regard to
desertificationandclimate change).The extent to which such (more or less rigid) interpretations of
the norm are reflectedinthe final codificationas presented at the conference thus alters the actual
restraintsof these institutionalized norms on state behavior – and consequently is an indication of
the level of influence exerted by ENGOs.
ThisprimaryattentionforMAs spursthe compositionof ameaningfulanswertothe question
whether ENGOs matter in international relations by looking at the latter’s contribution to the
transforming of politically and socially significant norms into actual policy during international
negotiations, rather than at minor norms which in some form would have been accepted anyway,
regardless of any ENGO-activity. It also allows for the research to look at all ENGOs that appear to
have beeninvolvedinthe settingof one ormore of those norms,rather thannecessitatingafocuson
justone.16
Finally,the longitudinal typical case studiesnow alsogain a critical element, in that it will
be hardestfor ENGOsto influence those normsthatare mostcontesteddue to their unprecedented
15 The reason not to look at the highly disputed agreements on a Climate and a Biodiversity Convention is due
to their negotiations happening outside of the preparatory committee of the Rio Conference. Their
presentation as an outcome of the Rio Conference itself has been suggested by some as a way of compensating
for the rather absence of binding agreements in the remaining documents (Palmer, 1992, p.1016).
16 Significantly, the possibility of variation among the ENGOs is not taken into account. Thus, it might very well
occur that the results show similar ENGO influence over time, though a specific ENGO in practice might have
had changing levels of influence over the same time-period. The definition of ENGO used in this thesis is too
broad to differentiate among the several types of ENGOs and such a distinction in this study does not add to
the aim of finding any influence exerted by ENGOs over time. Nonetheless , the differences of which kind of
ENGO influences norms and state behavior when could be insightful and further study into such discrepancies
is obviously encouraged.

25. - 25 -
approach or restrictive nature (Bryman, 2008, p.55). Accordingly, finding influence here makes the
potential for finding influence elsewhere higher.
Case studies – detecting influence
Withthese MAs established,bymeansof process-tracingthe two phases of the norm ‘life cycle’ are
addressed: norm emergence and norm institutionalization.17
‘Process-tracing’, as Collier (2011)
definesit,‘isananalytical tool fordrawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces
of evidence–often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena’ (Collier,
2011, p. 824). Unhappy with current interpretations of the framework, Collier reiterates the
necessityforthoroughdescriptionsof whichindependentvariable is suggested to lead to what kind
of outcome forthe dependentvariable (2011,p. 823). In thisthesisthe independentvariable (ENGO-
activities) has already been widely discussed above. It subsequently becomes the ‘lens’ through
which to look at the data and present the evidence in favor or against ENGOs’ influence on norms
(the dependent variable).18
The dependent variable, remember, was conceptualized as to mean
ENGOs (partially)alteringthe normativelydelimitedset of behavior or choice-alternatives available
to otheractors (mostnotablystates).Thus,toaccord influence to an ENGO means to proof the non-
state actor to have ‘altered’the normsthatboundstate-actors,bywayof promotionand/orcreation
of new norms.
The particular utilization of process-tracing in this research has been described as a ‘hoop
test’ (Mahoney, 2012, p. 6). Speaking of such tests in relation to a particular hypothesis (which in
these three cases would mean the proposition that ENGO-activities influence norms), Mahoney
maintains that ‘[p]assing a hoop test is necessary but not sufficient for the validity of a given
hypothesis’ (Mahoney, 2012, p.5). Nevertheless, the likelihood of ENGOs in general being able to
influence norm-setting processes further substantiates claims of ENGO-activities (especially those
relatedtooutsiderstrategies) influencingenvironmental norms,as‘[t]he relativedifficultyof passing
a hoop test is directly related to the frequency with which the condition […] is present more
generally’(Mahoney,2012, p.7).‘While failing a hoop test will eliminate a hypothesis regardless of
17 The third, added, phase of norm internalization and value creation is better understood through a more
longitudinal lens that combines the different norm-setting processes over time and therefore will be addressed
in the final part of the analysis.
18 Naturally, there are other lenses that might provide further explanation. Collier even emphasizes the
necessity of being able to reject such alternative hypothesis, though he also (correctly) recognizes that in the
end few studies actually can completely debunk such other factors (2011, p.825). Moreover, and perhaps more
important for this thesis,this problem does not arise in this research, as the independent variable here (ENGO-
activities) is not exclusive to other factors – nor does it need to be (see earlier comment). Rather, it explains a
significant part of the puzzle, by being able to show how ENGO-activities (alongside ENGO coordination,
institutional overlap and many of the other factors determining influence found during other studies) affect the
possibility of influence to be exerted by the ENGO.

26. - 26 -
whether the test is easy or hard, passing a hoop test will lend positive support for a hypothesis in
proportion to the degree that it is a difficult test’ (Mahoney, 2012, p.7). For ENGOs to influence
norm-settingprocessesbyframingand inducing international debates and official negotiations can
hardly be said to be a simple task, and any instance of an ENGO nonetheless accomplishing this
strengthens arguments in favor of (outsider and/or insider) ENGO-activities influencing individual
norms.The case studiesconsequentlycenteraroundENGO-activitieswhichatleasthave inducedthe
(public and official) debates preceding and during the conference, or have significantly altered an
alreadyexistingdebate.Inthe lattercase,a shiftinthinkingandspeaking(i.e.framing) in the debate
has to be made evident,againdue (inlarge part) to ENGO-activities. Indeed, the MAs should be the
resultof deliberationsanddiscussionstowhichthe ENGOscontributed and helped shape its course.
The particular activities of ENGOs to affect these discussions on which kind of action,
behavior, choice or decision is (or should be) appropriate can be found through conference
summaries(fromISSD),ENGOreports(e.g. ECO Magazine), specific literature on these conferences
(includingtheiranecdotes,observations,etc.) andmediapublications. Taken together, these pieces
of evidence should provide for a strong case on how the specific ENGO strategy during and prior to
the respective conference has(orhasnot) ledto momentsof influence onthe normative boundaries
that ultimately shaped state behavior.19
A problem of data-gathering for the older conferences
remains a concern for this research, as the amount of material written on the more recent
negotiations simply outnumbers data on the conferences in the former millennium.20
This then, is
also why secondary sources for all the conferences remain prominently present in this study,
somewhat minimizing the unequal division of primary data available.
Such qualitativeresearch, with these case studies not excluded, faces its challenges. A first
issue concernsthe external validity,orgeneralizability, of the results to other circumstances – often
perceived of as the biggest shortcoming of qualitative research (Bryman, 2008, p.33). Though in
general case studies are therefore not meant for this purpose, the broader question of whether
ENGOs matterininternational relationsobviouslytranscendsthe few casesinvestigatedinthisstudy,
and it is therefore that the cases under scrutiny here have been identified as typical cases,
‘exemplif[ying] a broader category of which [they are] a member’ (Bryman, 2008, p.56). To mitigate
critiquesof subjectivitythatare inherent to qualitative research, the thesis has clearly outlined the
choicesmade,especiallyinthissectionon the methods chosen for this research. This will boost the
19 Indeed, the amount of data that requires investigation is rather extensive. However, by only looking at
specific promising ENGOs (as assumed by the literature) and MAs the number of relevant sources is somewhat
limited and consequently aids the data-selection process by directing the search towards specific accounts of
events or ENGO-activities.
20 Online media articles accessed through the online platform LexisNexis, for example, only stretch back to the
start of 1980.

27. - 27 -
study’sreliabilityandreplicability,increasingthe likelihoodof similarresearchconductedtoyieldthe
same results(Bryman,2008, p.31-32). Lastly,the specificmethodof hoop-tests,andthe arduoustask
of changingconference deliberationsand international debates, substantially supports the internal
validityof the research(asdefinedbyBryman,2008, p.32). The possibilityof ENGO-activitiesactually
influencing the normative boundaries within which states operate is greatly enlarged by this
approach.Nevertheless,cautionremainsrequiredwith regard to the final conclusions on the causal
relationshipbetweeninsiderandoutsiderstrategiesandthe ensuinginfluence for each of the cases.
These three case studies will not produce definitive results concerning such a connection. Rather,
they will indicate the likelihood for such a proposition, substantiated by the evidence obtained
through process-tracing – and possibly even further supported by a longitudinal argument.
Comparing changing ENGO-activities and influences
A final part of the analysis then compares the three case studies to grasp the changing influence of
ENGOs (andtheirparticularofficial ormore activistactivities)overtime.Thiscase comparisonallows
for an, albeit limited, understanding of how ENGOs over the last fifty years have affected norm-
setting procedures during international conferences. Especially with regard to value creation,
comparingthe three case studies over time provides arguments in favor or against ENGO influence
on the wayinternational actors(andthe international community in general) thinks and acts on the
basis of environmental norms and values. This section thus puts specific emphasis on the way the
normspromotedbyENGOs and institutionalizedduringthe three investigated conferences (and the
many similar norms that have been during other conferences) indeed positively added to the
appreciation of the environmental value.
In turn,thiscase comparisonand(potentially) derived value creation is contrasted with the
earlierfoundtrendsinENGO-activities over the same period. Are the patterns found on the side of
ENGO influence compatible with the trends and events of the ENGO-activities? Touching upon the
researchquestion, this section looks into the relation between changes in ENGO-activities and the
way ENGOs have been able to influence the norms and values upon which states (and state
delegations) base their interests, actions and decisions. It specifies how converging or diverging
results from the two investigations provide additional grounds for the assumption that ENGO
influence is affected by ENGO-activities.
Overall then, more than common realist approaches of influence; this research has the
advantage of clearlydiscerning which activity employed by the ENGO ultimately led to the exerted
influence on the final negotiation outcomes. Even outsider strategies such as a parallel organized
ENGO conference cannowbe describedto have influenced the norms institutionalized at the ‘real’
conference,asthe norms of the ENGO conducting such informal practices could show to have been

28. - 28 -
adheredto because of the ENGO by illuminating the process through which the norm – through for
instance lobbyingof prime state-membersorframingof the publicopinion –ultimatelymade its way
into the conference room. Despite being more indicative than definitive due to a limited scope of
three cases and data limitations, such results do provide for an alternative perception of ENGO
influence and could – by having longitudinal research substantiated with individual case studies –
resultinan additional argumentinfavororagainstsuchinfluence beingfound for the past fifty-year
period, still remaining today, and perhaps even shaping international politics well into the future.

29. - 29 -
Part 1 – Mapping change in ENGO-activities
In 1996, Steve Charnovitz,writing on ‘Two Centuries of Participation’ noted the exponential rise of
NGOs participating on the international stage during the final quarter of the 20th
century. Though
before this period (E)NGOs too up to some extend participated in international politics, from 1972
onwardsa periodof intensificationof (formal)participationhadcommenced,smoothlyfollowedbya
periodof empowerment from1992 still goingstrongathispointof writing. What Charnovitz termed
empowerment and intensification, Gough and Shackley dubbed the ‘participation-mode’ (2001,
p.331), Raustiala‘establishedparticipation’ (2001, p.96), and Willets a ‘significant long-term change
in the legal status of NGOs’ (2000, p.192) – in essence, they all meant the same. All authors
investigated observe a trend wherein (E)NGOs increasingly gain formal participation rights to the
international political arenas concerning a multitude of issues, yet especially with regard to
environmental discussions(e.g. Andonova, Betsill&Bulkeley,2009; Boli & Thomas, 1997; Charnovitz,
1996; Chartier & Deléage, 1998; Gough & Shackley, 2001; Mathews, 1997; Mol, 2000; Princen &
Finger, 1994a, 1994b; Raustiala, 1997a, 1997b, 2001; Reimann, 2005, 2006; Ringius, 1997; Rootes,
2004; Simmons,1998; Tallberg2008; Willets,2000).Informal participation(i.e.outsiderstrategies) in
these describedpatternsare generally explained todecline inalinearfashion,though some nuances
on this view will be presented further on in this section.
The official numbers endorse this depicted image of increasing levels of access during
international (environmental) conferences. Whereas the Stockholm conference saw 250 NGOs
accredited to observe, the 1992 conference in Rio already saw a rise towards 1400 registered NGOs
and this has become 3200 in Johannesburg in 2002 (UN Website; Betsill & Corell, 2008; Clark et al.,
1998, p.9). Similar (environmental) conferences show similar results (see for instance Princen &
Finger, 1994). Though no separate numbers exist for environmental NGOs, the mere figures
strengthensentimentstowardsageneral increase informal participationnumbers.However,though
these quantificationsexpose atenortowardsexpandedinsiderstrategies(andpossibilities), they fail
to shedlightonnuancesbetweendifferentperiodsof formal participationlevels, let alone explicate
any trend of outsider strategies as conducted by ENGOs over time.
A promising start
NGO activityalreadytookplace before the time-periodunderinvestigation in this thesis. During the
1932 conference on world disarmament peace movements already tried to influence the
negotiations(Spiro,1995).Thisactivism (i.e. outsider strategy) was only further enhanced after the
endof the SecondWorldWar, thougha truly environmental branch still had to wait for the 1970s to

30. - 30 -
really kick off (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Tarlock, 1992). So much so, even, that the United Nations in
1968 felt it necessary to emphasize their position that (E)NGOs would never gain the same (formal
access) rights as accredited to states (Willets, 1982, p.14). Ironically, the timing of the statement
somewhatcoincidedwith what has generally been perceived as the true starting point for a steady
increase in insider strategies executed by (especially environmental) NGOs.
Followingseveral smallerinternational conventions,the Paris Biosphere Conference of 1968
was the first major environmental conference where ENGOs where involved in (primarily in its
establishment and through scientific contributions; Morphet, 1996, p.120-122). Nevertheless, the
limited scope of the conference towards a highly technical topic meant that for most ENGOs not
specificallyfocusedonthissubjectparticipatingproved difficult. The United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment, as the name already implies, had a much broader scope and effectively
became the conference to which most scholars on the matter point to indicate the start of a new
periodwithregardto ENGO formal participation levels (Tarlock, 1992, p.65; Charnovitz, 1996, p.261;
Betsill &Corell, 2008; Boli & Thomas, 1997). Not only were ENGOs formally accredited access to the
conference (primarily meaning access to policy documents and statements), but they also helped
shape the directionof the negotiationsthroughtheircontribution to the earlier devised (unofficial)
Founex Report on Environment and Development in 1971 (Dodds, 2008, p. vii). Though their
numberswere still relativelylow(seeabove),(E)NGOaccessnow hadprecedentandthis culminated
in a similar status achieved at conferences and such unofficial deliberations in the following years
(Raustiala, 1997b, p.549).
Nevertheless,the 60swere barelyoverandthe environmental movementwasstill struggling
to gainrespectas a serious,professionaland individual movement, branching away from the peace
and anti-nuclear movements of a decade earlier (Mol, 2000, 48; also see Simmons, 1998). Raustiala
describes ENGOs’ legal recognition during international negotiations to stay minimal up until the
mid-80s,as a lot of conferencesrefrainfrommentioningENGOs(andtheirrights) completelyin their
statutes (1997a, p.723). In short then, agenda-setting through campaigning and other outsider
strategiesstill flourished, though ENGOs increasingly recognized the potential formal participation
provided them to influence international negotiation outcomes on environmental topics.
The heydays of inclusion
The processof decliningactivismversusincreasing formalization very slowly continued up until the
endof the 80s. Similartotwo decadesbefore,more issue-specific conferences followed by a major
convention on the climate (and economy) in general then heralded the beginning of new period,
markedby an exponentialrise inENGOformal participationopportunities(Mathews,1997; Reimann,
2006; Raustiala, 2001; Charnovitz, 1996; Gulbrandsen & Andresen, 2004; Willets, 2000). Especially

31. - 31 -
after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) of 1992 in Rio de
Janeiro,thisperiodof upuntil the millennium truly represented the heyday of formal participation
opportunities – and insider strategies as a result of that.
In 1982 the WorldCommissiononEnvironmentandDevelopment (WCDED) wasestablished,
whichin1987 presented‘OurCommonFuture’,more commonly known as the Brundtland Report.21
As mentioned earlier, this report explicitly devoted a section to argue in favor of enhanced formal
inclusionof NGOsandthe scientificcommunity(WCED,Section4.1).UNCED to some extent lived up
to this expectation, with its high number of ENGOs accredited to the formal negotiations. Though
frustrations remained (see Chatterjee & Finger, 1994, p.63), overall the conference has been
regarded to realize these ambitions (Mathews, 1997; Lindblom, 2013; Charnovitz, 1996; Raustiala
1997b, p.552). Following conventions, on for instance climate change (Gulbrandsen & Andresen,
2004) or desertification(Charnovitz,1996,p.266), too includedformal participation,withthese rights
oftenexpandingwitheveryconference.Now notonlydocumentscouldbe accessed, but sometimes
statements could be made; ENGOs could be consulted upon formally; or even drafts could be
proposed (Willets, 1996, p.70-76). Eventually, especially after the changes made in 1996 to the
provisions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resulting in fewer restrictions for
accreditationto UN agencies and conferences for ENGOs (see specifically Willets, 2000, p.192-193),
formal ENGO participationduringenvironmental negotiations was widely recognized and accepted.
Still, the unprecedented increase in insider strategies as a result of these formal
opportunitiesmade some scholarsturntothe downsides of such practices. Arthur Mol (2000), in his
contribution on ecological modernization, describes the move towards insider strategies as an
implicit move away from outsider strategies. Radical and unconventional tactics, according to him,
are supplemented for cooperation and co-optation with and by government (and business) actors
(2000, p.48; for a similar argument, see Gough & Shackley, 2001). This argument gains credence
whenthoughtof the fundingforENGOsthat doubledduringthe 80s, andagain tripledadecade later
(Reiman, 2005, p. 38). Chartier and Deléage (1998) observe comparable patterns when they claim
that out of all the tactics employed (including outsider strategies), ‘lobbying is the one that has
progressedthe most’(Chartier& Deléage, 1998, p.34). As a result, environmental movements have
become ‘mired in business mentality, turning the environment into merchandise’ (Chartier &
Deléage, 1998, p.36). Though less pronounced, Rootes (2004) portrays a similar picture in his
reflection onnational ENGOstrategies.Again,ashappenedduringthe periodpriortothe Brundtland
Report, it appears insider strategies have come at the expense of outsider strategies.
21 After the chair of the Commission, the Norwegian prime-minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.

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The challenge of consolidation
The general tendency of recent literature on these participation levels has been to regard the last
fifteen years as an extension of these ‘golden times’ for formal participation levels. And indeed,
insider strategies have still been found to dictate ENGO-activities (Andonova, Betsill & Bulkeley,
2009; Fitzduff &Church,2004; Rootes,2008; Tallberg,2008). Insome instancesthe opportunities for
such practiceshave actuallyincreased.AsTobiasBöhmelt(2013) finds,duringrecentconventions up
to 70% of the state delegations included at least one person affiliated to an ENGO. Consequently,
ENGOs gainthe abilitytoparticipate directlyinnegotiations,includingthe ‘off-the-record-talks’some
conference chairmenhadoriginally implemented to keep ENGOs away from the table (ibid, p.699).
However, several authors too point towards a new trend in outsider strategies as executed
by ENGOsduringmajor conferences.Arguablystartingwiththe 1999 protestsinSeattle aimed at the
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) taking place there (though claims of
earlier events can be found, see Taylor, 2000; and Mohai, Pellow & Roberts, 2009), more
confrontational tacticstowardsglobal institutionshave beenpredictedandalreadyobserved(Smith,
2001; alsosee Fisher,2004). Thisresurgence of activismforJulie Doyle (2009) isinextricablylinkedto
the oppositionfromsmallergrassrootsmovementstothe co-optationsupposedly undergone by the
larger ones (p. 115). As she describes, these smaller (more domestically-oriented) grassroots
movementstarget‘industryandgovernment,[…] conductedinanoppositional ratherthan reformist
matter’ (Doyle, 2009, 113). Like their larger international counterparts such as Greenpeace and
Friends of the Earth, ‘[t]heir form of direct action is similar – creative, visible and non-violent – yet
their organizational structure is entirely different’ (Doyle, 2009, p.113). For these smaller ENGOs
action can only mean direct action, with more conservative activities as petitioning and lobbying
rejected (ibid, p.115).
Other authors observe similar trends, ascribing the sudden rise of smaller grassroots
movementstoanewframingof the debate thatistermedenvironmental justice (Taylor,2000, Fisher
2010, Mohai, Pellow & Roberts, 2009, Hofrichter, 1993; Szarka, 2013). This new paradigm entails an
understanding of environmental problems and social injustice as inseparable, with the former
primarily the result of the latter (Taylor, 2000, p.566). Taylor further differentiates between
environmental justice activists and mainstream environmental activists through their social
backgrounds and their consequent tactics used (2000, p.509-510). According to her, different social
backgrounds provide different access to resources, which in turn leads to other strategies. Thus,
‘mainstream environmentalists [i.e. the large international ENGOs] who might count lawmakers
amongtheirpersonal,political,orprofessionalnetworksare more likelytouse lobbyingasanactivist
strategy,whereasenvironmentaljustice activists [i.e. the smallergrassrootsmovements], with much
less access to Congress and other powerful political bodies in the country, are more likely to use

33. - 33 -
direct-actionstrategies such as protests and rallies as part of their campaigns’ (Taylor, 2000, p.510).
Some of these smaller movements have even been called to constitute ‘militant environmental
activists’ (Button, John & Brearley, 2002, p.18), characterized as organizations with a non-
bureaucratic structure that try to influence environmental policy through direct actions – including
those of illegal nature (ibid, p.23).
Both Szarka(2013) and Fisher(2010) write aboutthe real-world consequences of such more
confrontational tacticswhentheyaddress the events happening in 2009 in Copenhagen, during the
fifteenth Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC. The small protests there that ultimately
culminatedintomassive demonstrations on the 12th
of December were in part due to a ‘merging of
movements’,where ‘[j]ustice groups courted those who had traveled to Copenhagen to participate
as peaceful NGO observers inside the negotiations’ (Fisher, 2010, p.14). More generally, it thus
seems as though the formalization of ENGO participation, though initially meaning its demise,
recently has actually led to a rise in outsider strategies (albeit in a different shape) conducted by
ENGOs in their strive to influence international policy negotiations.

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Part 2 – ENGOs, state actors and norm-setting
In 1972 the UNCHE was the first international conference on the environment, held in Stockholm
after the initial idea for such a conference was suggested by the Swedish. The conference is
renownedforrelatingenvironmental degradation and poverty alleviation (primarily instigated by a
speechonthe topic givenbythe prime-minister of India, Indhira Gandhi) and its first steps towards
bridgingthe gapsexistingbetweendeveloped and developing countries on the specific governance
needed to cope with environmental issues (Egelston, 2006, p.64). Indeed, the very existence of a
conference primarilyconcerning environmental topics was perhaps more significant than the more
directresultsof the conventionconcerning the establishment of the United Nations Environmental
Program (UNEP) and proposing a moratorium on whaling. Twenty years later, in light of the
recommendations done by the Brundtland Report of 1987, the General Assembly of the United
NationsconvenedUNCED,orthe Rio Earth Summitas it isoftencalled,to‘come to an understanding
of “development”, that would support socio-economic development and prevent the continued
deterioration of the environment’ (UN Website). Besides its popularizing of the term ‘sustainable
development’, UNCED resulted in a rather comprehensive program called Agenda 21 (outlying
general and more detailed proposals for combating a range of environmental issues), a concluding
RioDeclaration,twoframeworkConventions regarding Climate Change and Desertification and the
ForestPrinciples.The following established Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) which
oversaw the adherence of states to Agenda 21 led to a review in 2002 at the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD) inJohannesburg. Thoughthe summithasbeenpraisedforits initial
attemptto come to actual targets and timetables, the convention was effectively boycotted by the
UnitedStatesandhas beencriticizedforits ultimate lackof ambition regarding environmental goals
(Dembach, 2002). At the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) in 2012
an agreementwasmade to start a process of negotiating so-called Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) that are to replace mere environmental pledgeswithactual,measurableresponsibilities. The
following section will turn to each of these conferences and assess how ENGOs have influenced
specificnormsinstitutionalizedatthe conference,oreventhe establishmentof the conference itself.
ENGOs and norm-setting at the Stockholm Conference
The 1972 Stockholm conference has been regarded by many scholars as the starting point for the
modern way of thinking about the environment (see earlier comment in the previous section).
Despite the overcomingof initial differencesduringthe several PreparationCommittees (PrepComs)
inthe yearsleadinguptothe conference, the negotiations themselves too were subject to intense

35. - 35 -
disputes and only eleventh-hour compromises (Strong, 2001). Though the convention has been
described as marking the beginning of an international environmental movement, as mentioned
earlier the activities of ENGOs remained confined to ‘input to reports, joining government
delegations,holdingaforum and producing a newspaper’ (Willets, 1996, p.67). It is these activities,
underthe particularcircumstancesprecedingandduringthe conference,whichwill be assessedhere
in their success of promoting new norms on the international stage.
Norm 1: Holding an international conference
The firstideafor a firstinternational climate conference came fromthe Swedish government in 1968
(UN, Letter from Swedish Representative to Secretary General E/4466/Add.1). Though the initial
remarksfromboth the General Assembly and ECOSOC were positive, the idea to hold a conference
onlydealingwithenvironmental matters soon suffered heavy criticism from developing nations, as
they didnot perceive environmental problems to belong among the top priorities dealt with at the
global level (Morphet,1996, p.122). Moreover,andmore importantly,many of these nations feared
the consequences of measures taken internationally and by developed states as to interfere with
theireconomicdevelopment.AsJohnsonwrites,‘theirproblemwastoofew factories,not too many’
(2012, p.12). Maurice Strong, secretary-general to the secretariat tasked with the preparations for
the conference,wouldlatercommentonthe difficultiesof overcomingthe problems,statingthatthe
conference wasclose tobeingboycottedbyprettymuchthe entire developing world (Strong, 2001).
After the initial proposal, many ENGOs became entrepreneurs of the norm that held that
environmental problemsmerited international attention and policies. Consequently, they became
avidsupportersof holdinga conference,cooperating with Strong’s team to overcome the problems
between the North and South in a number of ways. First, ENGOs as the International Council of
ScientificUnions(ICSU) erectedspecificCommitteeswhichprovided scientific advice to delegations
perrequest, including a Committee on Science and Technology in Developing Countries (Morphet,
1996, 122). ‘Such developments were helpful in persuading certain developing countries to take a
more positive attitude to NGOs’ (ibid).
Secondly, Strong and the ENGOs recognized that no conference could take place unless a
provisional step was taken to bridge the gap between Northern environmental convictions and
Southern developmental concerns. With developing nations skeptical of any conference on the
environment that would not also address developmental issues, Strong decided to convene a
separate (unofficial) gatheringof 27 leadingscientistsfromall overthe world(includingthe South) in

36. - 36 -
Founex, Switzerland, in June of 1971 (UN, Founex Report).22
Leading (E)NGOs were allowed to
participate inthe draftingof the final Founex Report,alongside individual experts and small political
delegations (Dodds, 2008, p.vii). The report indeed attracted the attention of state actors from
developingcountries throughitsacknowledgementof aninherentlinkbetween underdevelopment
and environmental concerns (Johnson, 2012, p.13). Rather than promoting a new way of thinking
about economic growth (as done, for instance, by the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth), the report
emphasizedadifferenceinenvironmental challengesfacedbythe developedand developing world,
withthe latterhavingenvironmental problems ‘of a different kind […], reflect[ing] the poverty and
very lack of development of their societies’ (UN, Founex Report).
A third and rather similar way through which ENGOs as norm-entrepreneurs tried to make
the conference possible was through their help with another report, Only One Earth (1971), which
accordingto Strong providedthe ‘conceptual framework for participants’ attending the conference
(Strong in Johnson, 2012, p.13). The International Institute for Environmental Affairs (IIEA, later
becoming the IIED) oversaw this project, and again the different expertise Committees erected by
ENGOs became a major source for expertise information (Egelston, 2013, p.66-67; Morphet, 1996,
p.123). For example, the Special Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) ‘produced
reportson pollutantmonitoring,internationalregistry for chemical compounds, and implications of
“man-made”ecosystems’ (Egelston, 2013, p.67; also see Bazell, 1972). In large parts Only One Earth
echoed the findings of the Founex Report, stating that the environmental problems faced by the
underdevelopedworldhaddifferentcausesand required other solutions than the challenges of the
developed North.
Obviously,contrastingthese insiderstrategiespursued,more unofficial activist campaigning
alsotook place.However,apartfromactivitiesduringthe conference itself,few activities werefound
to be aimed at framing (or even starting) an international debate (in the media or other public
participation) on the necessity of holding a two-week conference on the environment. Though
unofficial meetingswere organizedtodeliberate about the activities to take place during the actual
conference,the subsequentcampaigns,demonstrations and other activist activities appeared to be
more about linkingenvironmental degradation with the war in Vietnam than the actual conference
itself (see especially Björk, n.d.).
Overall, the combinedeffortsbythe secretariat and the different ENGOs finally proved effective as
the conference did take place with the support of the majority of Southern nations. Even hesitant
22 More officially known as ‘Development and Environment: Report and Working Papers by a Panel of Experts
Convened by the Secretary-General of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment at Founex, Switzerland,
June 4-12, 1971, UN document, A/Conf. 48/10’.

37. - 37 -
nationsinEurope feltthe pressure tosocialize,despite collective fears for a crackdown on economic
activitiesinfavorof the environment.Thisisbestillustratedthrougha paper written by an official in
the BritishDepartmentof the Environmenton the necessity of having an international organization
(which would become UNEP) dealing with the environment internationally, writing a ‘new and
expensive international organisation must be avoided, but a small effective central coordinating
mechanism ... would not be welcome but is probably inevitable’ (Johnson, 2012, p.19). In essence,
thoughthe perceptionof developmentalconcernsnow tooviedfor attention at the conference, the
contributionof ‘objective’ENGOsandtheiraffiliated scientists through insider strategies had made
the conference possible. Outsiderstrategiesremainedsignificantlyabsent,thoughthiswould change
as the actual conference got underway.
Norm 2: Whaling
Besidesthe establishmentof UNEPas a new organizationtodeal withglobal environmental matters,
a lesshighlightedoutcome of the UNCHEwas the recommendation of the Declaration for a ten year
moratoriumoncommercial whaling(UNCHE Declaration, A/CONF.48/14, Recommendation 33). The
recommendation,regardlessof itsnarrow focusona single environmentalproblem, heralded a new
phase in the continuing debate between proponents and adversaries of commercial whaling –
despite anactual banningonlybeingimplementedbythe International WhalingCommission(IWC) in
1982 (Oberthür, 1998, p.29). Still, as one commentator would later have it, ‘[t]his was probably the
most significant event in the history of the protection of whales’ (Stein, 1994, p.167). Indeed, the
institutionalization concerned an amendment to an already existing norm which up to that point
depicted whaling as controversial, but not necessarily in need of complete legal prohibition –
essentially comprising an international taboo (Bailey, 2006). The opposition then came from those
supporters of the old norm, such as traditional whaling countries Japan and Norway.
ENGOs hadalreadybeenlobbyingfor more humane ways of whaling since the beginning of
the 19th
century. However, according to Bailey, it was the combination of depleting whale stocks,
inhumane waysof whaling,andalossof credibilitythatwhalingindustriescouldchange this that led
ENGOs to take the fierce stance of being in favor of a complete ban on commercial whaling (2006,
p.294-296). As she states,the firstchanges occurred in the United States, where ‘American activists
drew upon or developed an array of frames […] and provided multiple avenues for reasoning by
which adherents of the diverse standpoints could unify around single, consolidated position. They
argued that the history of all whaling enterprises demonstrated clearly that commercial whaling
simplycouldnotbe done ina sustainable fashion’(p.297).Ultimately,the UnitedStates’government
passed the Endangered Species Act in 1966, listing and protecting endangered species’ habitat (US
Fish and Wildlife Service).

38. - 38 -
Internationally, the norm-setting process entered the norm cascading phase, with ENGOs
such as Friends of the Earth together with the US now promoting an international moratorium
(Bailey,2006, p.298; Andresen&Skodvin,2008, 136). Phraseslike ‘how canyousave the earth if you
cannot save the whales?’(Morishita,2006, p.806) alteredthe debate froma purelyscientific context
to a more passionate environmental one, where whales became the ‘icon of the environmental
movement’ (ibid). These outsider strategies continued during the conference itself, with whaling
gaining prime media attention for the alternative conferences organized by ENGOs in Stockholm.
Multiple participants(includingStrong) recall the whale-shapedcarthat drove passedstate delegates
in the streets of Stockholm one evening during the conference (Strong, 2001; Johnson, 2012, p.23;
Egelston, 2013, p.76; Feraru, 1974, p.48). These activities put focus on the groups of ENGOs that
were behindthem,the alternativeforumstheyattended,andthe proposal declarationstheywrote –
for example The HamiltonDocumentsbythe alternative youthconference whichexplicitly proposed
to ‘preventextinctionof suchspeciesasthe whale’(The HamiltonDocuments).Inturn,this attention
inducedthe US to officially proposearesolution on a moratorium (Egelston, 2006, p.72). It has been
suggestedthatthe inclinationof the United States and other Western nations to promote the norm
was primarily due to their professed hope that the topic would distract from other, more painful
measures(Morishita,2006, 806). Regardlessof whetherthisistrue,the very fact that ENGOs put the
topicon the agendaof the international conference inducedbothpublic and political thinking about
whaling-practices as comprising inappropriate activities. Though the conference did not have the
mandate to actuallyenforce suchamoratorium(andit would take ten years before the moratorium
was finally approved by a majority in the IWC), the norm was effectively institutionalized as it had
been codified by the ‘critical mass’ of state actors.

39. - 39 -
ENGOs and norm-setting at the Rio Conference
As remarked upon earlier, a large group of scholars attests to the Rio Conference constituting the
most inclusive UN gathering as far as (E)NGOs are concerned, and often on the basis of this, make
profoundclaimsaboutthe extenttowhichthese (E)NGOswere able to affect the state delegations.
At leastthe figuresproof NGOsattendedboththe official andparallelconferencesin unprecedented
numbers (UN Website – Rio Conference). Some 1400 NGOs were officially accredited observant
statusand the several forumsorganizedoutside of the conference have been suggested to host the
astounding amount of over 17.000 NGOs (ibid). Moreover, the possibilities for ENGOs to influence
state delegations had similarly increased since 1972, both regarding insider activities (for instance
due to more nations incorporating ENGOs on their delegations) and outsider tactics (for instance
through growing media coverage). Nevertheless, despite the conference taking place in close
proximity to the greatest rainforest of the world, influencing state delegations on a new norm for
forestry proved far from straightforward.
Norm 3: The Forestry Principles
The international context in which the ENGOs pondered their tactics still resembled many of the
characteristicsof twodecadesbefore.Inthe wake of fadingEast-Westcontradictionsafterthe fall of
the iron curtain in 1989 and the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, North-South disputes
appearedreadytotake overinternationalpolitics.Atandprior to the conference discussions on the
particular links between (economic) development and environmental concerns resurfaced
(Holmgren, 2008, p.57). For this reason, the conference (and the secretariat tasked with organizing
it) got the ambitious goal of ‘achieving environmentally sound and sustainable development in all
countries’(UN Resolution,A/RES/44/228).Evencombiningeconomic and environmental arguments
in one ‘sustainable development’ term could not prevent debates on the specific focus the term
shouldimply.Again,ENGOsfacedpromotingenvironmentalnormsina worldsocietythatstill hadn’t
reached consensus on the priority that should be given to environmental issues.
Even so, up until the agreement the promotion of new forest principles seemed to escape
the impasse that undermined other decisions. In the 80’s forests had surfaced as one of the main
themes of ENGOs (Holmgren, 2008, p.62). A decade earlier, despite the WWF already in 1975
initiating a campaign to prevent deforestation by making rainforests part of national parks or
reserves(WWF,2006), the international emphasis ‘was on the development of forests, rather than
theirconservation or sustainable use’ (Humphreys, 2004, p.54). However, new research on tropical
forests and, particularly, deforestation and its effect on soil erosion made environmental activists
aware of the forestry problems (Smout, 2003). As a result, in the 80’s, as one commentator put it,
‘[e]veryone was discussing deforestation’ (Schwartzmann et al., 2010, p.284). In 1990 a joint

40. - 40 -
declaration drafted by delegations from UNEP, IUCN and WWF called ‘Caring for the Earth’
proclaimedanewinternationalstrategywasneededto deal withdeforestationproblems (Caring for
the Earth, 1991). Touching upon the development schism that seemed to prevent many more
effective measures taken to combat environmental degradation, the declaration urged the
international (political) community to ‘provide lower-income countries with favourable terms of
trade for sustainably produced forest products; provide lower-income countries with assistance in
maintaining their forests and using them sustainably; [and] increase international cooperation on
forestconservation’(ibid,p.134). OtherENGOs,such as Friendsof the Earth, prior to the conference
or its PrepComs undertook media campaigns to name and shame European timber-trading
companies which practices were thought to stand in direct relation to tropical deforestation
elsewhere (Dudley, Jeanrenaud and Sullivan, 1995). Through such (primarily outsider) activities
ENGOs as norm-entrepreneurs were able to put the problem of deforestation, and forestry more
general, on the international agenda. Consequently, the discussion by the turn of the decade had
gone ‘froma fairlyrestricteddebate inscientific and conservation journals to coverage in the large-
circulation media’ (Williams, 2003, p.430).
The ENGOs soon convinced other groups (such as local indigenous groups) to support their
claims (Holmgren, 2008, p.84). ENGOs, such as the newly formed World Rainforest Movement
incorporatedthe causesof the indigenousgroupsintheirownprograms,arguingindigenousrightsto
be a central theme with regard to forest management (ibid, p.85-86). State actors as the United
States and Canada (both having virtually no rainforest) too joined the environmental campaign for
sustainable forest management (ibid, p.26, 65). With their approval the G-7 summit in 1990 already
remarked upon the issue and suggested being ready to ‘begin negotiations on a global forest
convention or agreement’ (G7, 1990, par.77). However, though Brazil is part of this group of seven
countries,together with Malaysia and India it stressed such a convention on forestry to infringe on
their ‘sovereign discretion’ (Porter et al., 2000; Palmer, 1992, 1020). ENGO framing of the forest
concerns thus actually gained support from the wrong states (Yamin, 2001, p.158). The general
debate nowcenteredonthe ideaof deforestation(despite forest management entailing more than
this) andas a result,ENGOsperhaps(unwittingly)shapedadebate that was fundamentally opposed
by those countriesthatprofitedfromtimber exports. This lead the preparatory committee (in spite
of the many ENGOs attending it) to already during its second gathering take ‘note of the extensive
discussionsonforests’andtoadvice ‘anon-legallybinding authoritative statement of principles […]
on the management, conservation and development of all types of forests’ (UN, Report of
Preparatory Committee A/46/48).
Duringthe actual conference the ENGOsthusseemedtobe confrontedwitha fait accompli –
there wouldnotbe a bindingagreementorconventiononforestry. ‘[W]iththe negotiations mired in