150171832

Word Count: 14,987 (Excluding Bibliography)
Referencing Style: OSCOLA
Assessing the Extent to Which
Harm to Drug Users in the UK is
Reduced Through the Emergence
and Proliferation of Drug
Cryptomarkets and the
Implications That This Has on the
UK’s Current Drug Policy.
Dissertation Supervisor: Ms.
Amber Marks
Student Number: 150171832

1
Table of Contents
Abstract ...........................................................................................................4
Introduction ....................................................................................................6
Structure of the Paper …………………………………………………………11
I. A Definition of Harm and a Look at the UK’s Current Drug Policy ......14
The United Nations’ Drug Mandate.................................................................14
The Current UK Drug Policy...........................................................................17
A Definition of Harm ......................................................................................18
II. Characterising Cryptomarkets ...............................................................20
A Definition of Cryptomarkets ........................................................................20
Anonymisation and Encryption Services..........................................................20
Tor and I2P ……………………………………..……………...……… 20
Bitcoin ……………………………………………...…………….…… 21
The Silk Road: A Case Study …………..…………………………..………... 22
The Feedback and Ratings System ………...………….…….………… 24
Use of Escrow Accounts ……………………….....………………........ 25

2
III. Comparing the Characteristics of Conventional Drug Distribution
Networks with Online Drug Distribution Networks ……………………… 26
Social Network Analysis .................................................................................26
Characteristics of Conventional Drug Distribution Networks ………...……... 27
Characteristics of Online Drug Distribution Networks and Cryptomarkets ..... 30
The Impact of Cryptomarkets on Conventional Global Drug Networks ….…. 34
Analysis of Drugs Purchased on Cryptomarkets ….…………………….…… 35
IV. Comparing the Harmful Effects of Conventional Networks with
Cryptomarkets ……………………………………………………...……..... 38
Ways in Which Cryptomarkets Are Less Harmful Than Conventional Drug
Markets ………………………………………………………..……………... 38
Violence to User and Wider Society in General ………….……..……. 38
Drug Quality – Purity, Receiving the Right Drug and Contamination .. 40
Ways in Which Cryptomarkets are More Harmful…………………………… 45
Loss of Money Due to Financial Scams ………………………………. 46
Anonymity Being Compromised ……………………………...………. 46
V – The Limitations Present in the Potential Capacity of Cryptomarkets to
Reduce Harm ………………………………………………………………... 49
Cryptomarkets Only Available to “Middle Class” Drug Users ...…….……… 49

3
Reduction of Violence Associated with Conventional Drug Networks ……... 50
Widens the Range of People Who Are Able to Buy Drugs off the Dark Web...50
VI – The Implications on the UK’s Current Drug Policy……….………... 52
Conclusion .....................................................................................................55
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………….57

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Abstract
The speed with which the internet is transforming the way people source drugs is of massive
concern to a wide range of parties. This includes governments and policy makers, law
enforcement agencies, organised crime networks that traffic drugs, drug producers and drug
users. For drug users and producers, the rise of cryptomarkets (drug markets on the dark web)
represents a positive development. Producers have the option to sell their products directly to
buyers, cutting out the “middle-men” involved in conventional drug distribution networks
and increasing their profits. Buyers, meanwhile, have a wider choice of drugs of better
quality to choose from whilst reducing harm caused (from a multitude of perspectives). On
the other hand, the rise of cryptomarkets represent a negative development for conventional
drug trafficking networks. This is due to the potential cryptomarkets have to put them out of
business, in the same way online shopping and marketplaces have put a number of high street
retailers out of business. For law enforcement, cryptomarkets represent a negative
development given the plethora of challenges that the anonymisation and encryption
technologies present; this makes it much harder to locate and prosecute users and sellers
alike. However, for governments and policy makers, the emergence and proliferation of drug
cryptomarkets should represent a positive development.
This paper will assess the different harm-reduction methods present on online drug markets
from a drug user’s perspective and will argue that cryptomarkets present a less harmful
alternative to conventional drug networks and markets. As such, given that the rhetoric
behind the UK’s drug policy is one (supposedly) aimed at public health and safety, the
emergence of drug cryptomarkets should be seen as a more beneficial alternative to the
current status quo. However, the approach that the UK has adopted has focused on a blanket

5
prohibition strategy whereby drug use is seen as a criminal activity rather than a public health
issue. Given the rising popularity and resilience to law enforcement takedowns,
cryptomarkets appear to be “here to stay”. This paper will conclude by arguing that the “war
on drugs” has failed miserably; as such, a revised drug policy that decriminalises drug use
and possession and treats it as a health issue rather than a criminal one should be
implemented by the UK government. This should, eventually, lead to the complete
legalisation and regulation of drug markets.

6
Introduction
In the early 1970s, few would have thought that an exchange between a small number of
Stanford and MIT students using their “Arpanet” accounts at the University’s Artificial
Intelligence Laboratory1
would have eventually lead to the (re)emergence and proliferation of
online drug marketplaces in the 21st
century. 40 years ago, before the internet as we know it
today existed, the first ever “online” trade was a drug trade that involved the exchange of a
small quantity of marijuana. Since then, the scope of both the legal and technological
landscape has dramatically changed. As a result of the development of powerful encryption
and anonymisation software, illicit drugs are now readily available on the internet.
The manner in which people acquire drugs has also changed. Historically, it has been done
through face-to-face meetings but the biggest change today, is that an increasing number of
people are sourcing drugs through non face-to-face meetings. Virtually any drug can now be
purchased online and shipped to the buyer, through both the “surface web” and the “deep
web”. There are a number of different levels to the internet and the term “deep web” refers to
all of the information found on the World Wide Web that is not searched or indexed by
normal search engines, such as Google and Yahoo!. Rather, search engines, such as Google,
are only able to search anything that is found on the “surface web”. Therefore, the “deep
web” consists of any content that is not indexed by search engines. This includes, “data that
needs to be accessed by a search interface, results of database queries and password protected
1
Mike Power, 'Online Highs Are Old as the Net: The First E-Commerce Was a Drugs Deal' (The Guardian,
2013) <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/apr/19/online-high-net-drugs-deal> accessed 22 June 2016.

7
data”.2
Indeed, it is estimated that the surface web consists of 0.03% of the internet. Within
the deep web, there is a section that is usually referred to as the “dark web”. The terms “deep
web” and “dark web” are often incorrectly synonymised. The difference between the two is
that the “dark web” is a section that has been intentionally hidden and is inaccessible through
regular internet browsers.3
This paper is focused on drug markets found on the dark web.
Practically, even though drugs can be bought online, there are still a number of elements of
the drug trade that have to occur in the “offline”4
world; these are the production and
distribution stages of a drug. Drugs bought from online drug marketplaces are often
distributed through the postal service.5
It should be noted that there are also a number of
drugs that are sold on the surface web but that these appear to be mainly consisting of non-
controlled substances where their legality differs across different countries and jurisdictions.6
Many online pharmacies have been emerging which have been the main source of the
aforementioned substances. They tend to sell medicines, lifestyle and herbal products, new
psychoactive substances and (what were once) “legal highs”7
. Additionally, the rise and rapid
growth of social media has had a significant impact on how people communicate with each
other. This has, unsurprisingly, affected how drug dealers interact with potential buyers.
2
Tim Howes, 'What is the Deep Web and Why You’re Already Using It' (Kontrolit.net, 2014)
<http://www.kontrolit.net/blog/what-is-the-deep-web-and-why-youre-probably-already-using-it.htm> accessed
22 June 2016.
3
Such as Internet Explorer and Google Chrome.
4
By offline, I mean any activity that is not conducted online, through the internet.
5
James Martin, 'Lost on the Silk Road: Online Drug Distribution and the 'Cryptomarket' (2014) 14 Criminology
and Criminal Justice.
6
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 'The Internet and Drug Markets, EMCDDA
Insights 21' (Publications Office of the European Union 2016).
7
The Psychoactive Substances Act, enacted in May 2016, prohibits the production, supply or importation of
‘psychoactive substances’ which includes previously legal ‘highs’.

8
Assessing the impact social media and online pharmacies have had is outside the remit of this
paper.8
Online drug markets are a very recent development for which they have simultaneously
attracted great interest and fear. The rise of drug cryptomarkets has been accentuated by the
media coverage it has garnered. Ever since an article on “The Silk Road” (TSR) was
published on the New-York based Gawker blog in 20119
, there has been a growing interest
and panic in relation to online drug markets. Very quickly, much of the mainstream media
started picking up on “the most brazen attempt to peddle drugs online”10
. Despite the
increased media attention, the site received, it continued to grow from strength to strength
before it was eventually shut down by the FBI in 2013.11
However, the resilience of
cryptomarkets is illustrated through the fact that just over a month later, a new site titled “Silk
Road 2.0” was launched. Users who accessed the site were greeted with a welcome page that
parodied the FBI’s seizure notice found on the original Silk Road.12
Sites such as TSR have been labelled a number of different names including, “online drug
markets” and “dark net markets”; there is, however, a more suitable label that can be applied
8
For a more in-depth look at the surface web markets and social media, see the EMCDDA paper, ‘The Internet
and Drug Markets’.
9
Adrian Chen, 'The Underground Website Where You Can Buy Any Drug Imaginable' (Gawker.com, 2011)
<http://gawker.com/the-underground-website-where-you-can-buy-any-drug-imag-30818160> accessed 22 June
2016.
10
'Schumer Pushes to Shut Down Online Drug Marketplace' (NBC New York, 2011)
<http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/123187958.html> accessed 22 June 2016.
11
'FBI Shuts Down Silk Road Website' (BBC News, 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-24378137>
accessed 22 June 2016.
12
Andy Greenberg, 'Silk Road 2.0' Launches, Promising A Resurrected Black Market For The Dark Web'
(Forbes.com, 2013) <http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/11/06/silk-road-2-0-launches-
promising-a-resurrected-black-market-for-the-dark-web/#5784d93b61c5> accessed 22 June 2016.

9
– “cryptomarkets”. The term is said to have originated on online hacker forums but has also
been given a scholarly definition: “[A] cryptomarket may be defined as an online forum
where goods and services are exchanged between parties who use digital encryption to
conceal their identities”.13
Arguably, the main reason as to why these markets have been so
popular and successful can be attributed to the ability to protect one’s anonymity. This is
achieved through a number of different methods, tools and technologies. Anonymisation
services, such as Tor, are able to hide a computer’s IP address when accessing a
cryptomarket. Relatively untraceable cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, are used to make
payments. Encrypted communication between participants, through the use of PGP,14
allows
users to communicate between each other without the threat of law enforcement “spying" on
them.15
It must be stressed that anonymisation services, encrypted communication services and
cryptocurrencies serve a number of legitimate purposes – especially in the context of
protecting one’s anonymous identity. A good example of this is journalists wanting to protect
their sources. Whilst purchasing drugs off a cryptomarket will amount to a criminal offence16
,
it is important to note that not everyone who uses digital encryption to conceal their identities
and exchange information would be guilty of committing a “cybercrime”. This is because a
person’s intentions could simply be to protect their privacy or because they need to use the
13
Martin, 'Lost on the Silk Road: Online Drug Distribution and the 'Cryptomarket' (n 5).
14
PGP stands for ‘Pretty Good Privacy’.
15
I will expand further on each of these elements in section two of the paper.
16
It is often referred to as a ‘cybercrime’. For a more in-depth look at cybercrime classifications, see James
Martin, Drugs on the Dark Net (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2014).

10
dark web for political motivations, such as whistle-blowing. Indeed, a number of legitimate
sites, such as The Guardian, WikiLeaks and Facebook have dark web addresses.17
Year-on-year, the number of people accessing and buying drugs from cryptomarkets has been
increasing. The most recent Global Drug Survey (GDS) finds that globally, almost 1 in 10
(9.3%) had bought illicit drugs off cryptomarkets whilst the number of people that reported
purchasing in the last 12 months increased from 4.5% in 2015 to 6.7% in 2016.18
As already
mentioned, drug cryptomarkets have evoked great interest but also great consternation and
fear. As Martin puts it:
[Cryptomarkets] constitute a ‘perfect storm’ of potential crime hysteria and moral
panic [as they] combine two emotive and often little understood issues – illicit drugs
and the dark net … evoking fear and suspicion amongst the general public.19
It is, perhaps, no surprise that this is the case given the potential of harm to arise upon
consuming drugs. Many of these fears are well-founded: cryptomarkets do not require a great
deal of technical nous to access, the use of cryptomarkets directly facilitates criminal acts and
their use has led to the death of a small number of drug users (at least according to the US
government)20
. As such, there are a number of harms that can be associated with the use of
cryptomarkets to source illicit drugs. However, stating that consuming drugs may lead to
17
Andy Greenberg, 'A Guide to the Dark Web’s Lighter Side' (WIRED, 2015)
<https://www.wired.com/2015/09/guide-dark-webs-lighter-side/> accessed 30 June 2016.
18
Adam R Winstock and others, Global Drug Survey 2016 (GDS2016) (1st edn, 2016)
<https://www.globaldrugsurvey.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/TASTER-KEY-FINDINGS-FROM-
GDS2016.pdf> accessed 22 June 2016.
19
James Martin, Drugs on the Dark Net (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2014), p.3.
20
'Silk Road Linked to Six Drug Overdose Deaths' (BBC News, 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
32480601> accessed 22 June 2016.

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some manifestation of harm is a somewhat obvious statement to make; it is clear that there
are a number of harms that can manifest themselves when taking drugs. These include harm
to the user (for example, overdosing on a drug), harm to others (committing an act of
violence whilst under the influence) and harm to society in general (street violence
committed by organised criminal groups).
Structure of the Paper
Section one will look at the different types of harm that will be focused on. There will be a
focus on harm from two perspectives – the user’s perspective and the wider society’s
perspective. In particular, the six different types of harm that will be discussed are: drug
quality; receiving the right drug; threat of violence to the user from the drug dealer; loss of
money resulting from financial scams; user’s online anonymity being compromised by law
enforcement and street violence and organised crime. A brief overview of the current UK
drug policy, which is based on the United Nations’ drug mandate, will also be provided in
this section.
In section two, the characteristics of cryptomarkets will be examined by using TSR as a case
study. A brief history of cryptomarkets will be provided along with law enforcement’s
methods of disruption. In addition, the technologies and tools used to ensure anonymity as
well as TSR’s self-regulatory mechanisms, in the form of feedback and ratings systems,
along with the use of escrow accounts will be assessed.
In section three, a comparison will be made between conventional drug distribution networks
and online drug distribution networks. Using social network analysis, an argument will be
made that online drug distribution networks present a less harmful alternative to conventional

12
drug distribution markets due to their ability to remove “intermediary nodes” or “middle-
men” in a drug distribution network. This has the effect of improving upon network
inefficiencies by removing price mark-ups and product adulteration present in conventional
drug distribution networks. An assessment of the potential impact online distribution
networks, in the form of cryptomarkets, has on the conventional global drug trade is made.
The section concludes by looking at the most popular types of drugs purchased, offering an
insight into the “class” of drug user that mainly uses cryptomarkets.
Section four will compare and contrast the potential harms that may manifest themselves
when users purchase drugs through conventional means with those who purchase drugs
through online cryptomarkets. This will be looked at through the six harm criteria chosen.
The ways in which cryptomarkets present a less harmful option than conventional markets
are through the self-regulation mechanisms used on cryptomarkets, the presence of forums
and discussion boards whereby users can discuss drug habits and the opportunities for health
professionals to engage with cryptomarket users. The ways in which cryptomarkets could
present a more harmful alternative to the current status quo are through the prospect of
financial scams and one’s online anonymity being compromised.
The limitations present in the potential capacity of cryptomarkets to reduce harm are assessed
in section five. In particular, three arguments will be evaluated: that cryptomarkets are only
available to a certain class of drug users, that the potential for violence to be reduced is
limited with conventional drug networks that are involved in semi-synthetic drugs and that
cryptomarkets present a more harmful alternative because they widen the range of people
who are able to access and buy drugs.

13
The paper concludes with some final thoughts on the implications on the UK’s current drug
policy. An argument is made that the current policy is not one based on public health and
given the failure of the war on drugs, drug use and possession should be decriminalised and
the drugs mandate should be transferred to the Department of Health. Going even further, this
should represent a stepping stone towards the full legalisation and regulation of drugs as this
is the only way to drive the organised criminal networks that profit most out of the war on
drugs out of business, whilst also reducing the harm suffered by drug users and wider society
alike.

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I – A Definition of Harm and a Look at the UK’s Current Drug Policy
The United Nations’ Drug Mandate
The United Nations’ (UN) drug mandate is one which is aimed at ensuring “security, human
rights and development”.21
One of the main common threads that is supposed to run through
those three stated aims is public health. Indeed, the UN’s drug regime explicitly states that it
is concerned with the “health and welfare of mankind”.22
However, there is plenty of
evidence to highlight how the UN have failed in their objectives which have also resulted in a
number of horrific, unintended consequences. Leading academics and public health bodies
have been calling for a complete re-evaluation of drug policies and for the decriminalisation
of drugs. Recently, a commission set up by Johns Hopkins University and the Lancet Medical
Journal published a detailed report which found that the current drug policies have failed to
control drug use and the crime associated with it. The report also finds that “repressive drug
policing greatly contributes to the risk of HIV linked to injection”.23
Meanwhile, the Royal
Society for Public Health (RSPH) and the Faculty of Public Health in the UK published a
report calling for a change in the current drug policies and for the misuse of drugs to be
treated as a health issue, rather than a criminal issue.24
21
'Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies That Work' (Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2014)
<http://www.gcdpsummary2014.com/#executive-summary> accessed 22 June 2016.
22
United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 'Single Convention
On Narcotic Drugs, 1961' (United Nations 1961).
23
Joanne Csete and others, 'Public Health and International Drug Policy' (2016) 387 The Lancet.
24
Taking A New Line On Drugs (1st edn, Royal Society for Public Health 2016)
<http://www.rsph.org.uk/filemanager/root/site_assets/our_work/areas_of_work/tanlod/RSPH-TANLOD-
Pages.pdf> accessed 22 June 2016.

15
The 1961 UN Convention on Narcotic Drugs25
has been the spine of which most
governments have based their drug policies on. However, the convention has done nothing
but limit governments’ ability to reduce public harm. Rather than being aimed at minimising
and preventing harm, the Convention has led government responses towards criminalisation
and law enforcement enforcing a blanket prohibition strategy. Additionally, there is evidence
to suggest that the UN’s current approach has failed in its attempt to reduce both drug
demand and supply.26
The emergence of cryptomarkets is the latest development that
highlights how the war on drugs has failed. In their report, Buxton and Bingham expressed a
hope that the recent United Nation General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) would
represent “an ideal opportunity to engage in serious discussion about re-visiting aspects of the
treaty framework … particularly within the context of the Dark Net.”27
Unfortunately, rather
than using the conference to advocate for a move away from the archaic and out-dated
policies, the United Nations chose to maintain policies that criminalise drugs used for non-
medical or scientific purposes. Most alarmingly, and perhaps negligently, the “outcome
document” that was released completely avoided using the words “harm reduction” and
instead focused on increasing cooperation between nations.28
It is perhaps no surprise that no
25
United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (n 22).
26
Julia Buxton, The Political Economy of Narcotics: Production, Consumption and Global Markets (Zed Books
Ltd 2006).
27
Julia Buxton and Tim Bingham, The Rise and Challenge of Dark Net Drug Markets (1st edn, Global Drug
Policy Observatory 2015)
<https://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/The%20Rise%20and%20Challenge%20of%20Dark%20Net%20Drug%20
Markets.pdf> accessed 22 June 2016.
28
Jessica Glenza, 'UN Backs Prohibitionist Drug Policies Despite Call for More 'Humane Solution' (The
Guardian, 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/19/un-summit-global-war-drugs-agreement-
approved> accessed 22 June 2016.

16
real progress was made given that at the last UNGASS on drugs in 1998, the nations “agreed
to work toward a ‘drug-free world’ by 2008”.29
In spite of this, there has been a notable change in the way a number of countries are
discussing the world drug problem. As already mentioned, there is an increasing number of
leading health professionals and academics publishing research calling for a change in policy.
More tellingly, however, are the number of countries that are ignoring the UN conventions.
In 2001, Portugal decriminalised all drugs, whilst Switzerland was the first country to
introduce “fix rooms” for addicts in 1994 and currently allows heroin prescriptions. The
Netherlands allows licenced coffee shops to sell marijuana whilst also recently introducing
safe heroin injection sites.30
Denmark also has “fix rooms” whereby addicts may inject drugs
under supervision whilst the Czech Republic treats possession of small quantities of certain
drugs only as misdemeanours. Away from Europe, Uruguay will soon be the first country to
legalise all sales of Marijuana whilst Canada’s newly elected prime minister has repeatedly
stated his intentions to legalise recreational marijuana. Perhaps most significantly, however,
the United States, which has often been the war on drugs’ most outspoken and staunch
supporter has legalised marijuana for recreational use in Colorado and Washington and for
medicinal purposes in Alaska and Oregon.31
This has resulted in diluting America’s rhetoric
on the war on drugs.
29
Jessica Glenza, 'UN Backs Prohibitionist Drug Policies Despite Call For More 'Humane Solution' (The
Guardian, 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/19/un-summit-global-war-drugs-agreement-
approved> accessed 22 June 2016.
30
Chris Smyth, 'Make All Drug Use Legal, Say Experts' (The Times, 2016)
<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/make-all-drug-use-legal-say-experts-m89gp9p37> accessed 22 June
2016.
31
ibid.

17
The Current UK Drug Policy
The two leading public health bodies in the UK, the RSPH and the Faculty of Public Health,
have published a timely report calling for a change in the UK’s current approach to drugs. It
is timely in the sense that it provides fresh support to governments and policy makers that
wish to adopt a harm-reduction approach, an opportunity that was missed in the recent
UNGASS conference in April 2016. The report argues that the approach centred on law
enforcement enforcing a strict prohibition strategy has failed because its attempt to curb the
demand and supply of drugs and reduce the harm caused has been futile and unsuccessful.32
The report is most critical of the UK government’s current drug classification system and
calls for a new approach that is set in the context of all drugs (including legal ones such as
alcohol and tobacco) and looking at the different harms they pose. The current legal
framework is both “confusing … and does not correlate with evidence-based assessment of
relative drug harm.”33
The current classification system is based on the Misuse of Drugs Act
1971 where illicit drugs are divided into three classes: A, B and C, with class A being the
most harmful. Each class is determined “according to their accepted dangers and harmfulness
in the light of current knowledge”.34
The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD)
is meant to be advising the government on the classifications but it is clear that these
classifications do not, in fact, reflect the advice given.35
Nutt’s study makes it abundantly
32
Taking A New Line On Drugs (n 24).
33
ibid.
34
'Misuse of Drugs Bill, Second Reading' (Hansard, 1970)
<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1970/mar/25/misuse-of-drugs-
bill#S5CV0798P0_19700325_HOC_247> accessed 30 June 2016.
35

18
clear that there is “almost no correlation between overall associated harm and the class of
drugs … in the UK”.36
A Definition of Harm
The RSPH’s report states that harm cannot be “objectively measured on a single scale – it is
multi-faceted, including physical, psychological and social harm, both to the user and to
others.”37
The majority of people who ever take a drug (including legal drugs) are unlikely to
experience any serious harm to their health, finances or other related harms. However, taking
any sort of drug will always pose risks to the user; those risks, however, differ for different
drugs. In Nutt’s study, two different categories of harm are identified: harm to users and harm
to others around them (which includes a sub-category of harm to wider society).38
These two
categories are then divided into sub-categories of “physical harm”, “psychological harm” and
“social harm”. The ACMD agreed upon 16 harm criteria that were divided into the different
subgroups.39
The harms identified include both direct and indirect health risks.
Given this paper’s focus on the harms associated with cryptomarkets, there will be a
particular focus on harm to users and to wider society in general. Of the 16 harm criteria
identified, six are of relevance here. They are: “drug-specific mortality” which looks at the
lethality of the drug; “drug-related damage” which looks at damage to physical health,
including consequences that arise from cutting agents; “loss of tangibles” which includes loss
of income, housing, criminal record, imprisonment etc.; “crime” which is the extent to which
drug use, directly or indirectly, leads to an increase in acquisitive crime; “international
36
David J Nutt, Leslie A King and Lawrence D Phillips, 'Drug Harms in the UK: A Multicriteria Decision
Analysis' (2010) 376 The Lancet.
37
38
Nutt, King and Phillips, 'Drug Harms in the UK: A Multicriteria Decision Analysis' (n 30).
39
ibid.

19
damage” which assesses the extent to which drug use in the UK contributes to damage
globally (including international crime); and “community” harm which assesses the extent to
which drug use leads to a decline in social cohesion and community reputation.40
The former
three are in relation to harm to users whilst the latter three are in relation to harm to society.
I have identified six types of harm that may be affected through the emergence of
cryptomarkets and can be categorised under one of the 16 harm criteria from Nutt’s study:
drug quality (in terms of purity and levels of contamination); receiving the right drug; threat
of violence to the user from the drug dealer; loss of money resulting from financial scams;
user’s online anonymity being compromised by law enforcement and street violence and
organised crime. Section four will compare the harmful effects of conventional networks with
cryptomarkets.
40
ibid.

20
II – Characterising Cryptomarkets
Cryptomarket Definition
As mentioned in the introduction, the term “cryptomarket” can be defined as an online
marketplace or forum where participants can anonymously buy and sell illicit products and
services.41
Anonymisation and Encryption Services
Tor and I2P
A cryptomarket is able to anonymise its participants’ identities and location through
anonymisation services such as Tor and I2P (the Invisible Internet Project). The Tor project
has developed software that enables people to communicate online whilst maintaining their
privacy and anonymity.42
Tor, which stands for “The Onion Router” allows a user to
communicate with others that is “resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis” by
taking a user’s communications, wrapping them in layers of encryption and re-routing them
all over the world. 43
One alternative to Tor is I2P, which is a decentralised system that
essentially allows users access to an anonymous network within the internet.44
These services
also have the ability of hiding users’ IP addresses, therefore greatly hindering law
enforcement’s ability to catch and prosecute users. However, a number of cryptomarkets have
41
Martin, 'Lost on the Silk Road: Online Drug Distribution and The 'Cryptomarket' (n 5).
42
'Tor Project: Anonymity Online' (The Onion Router, 2016) <http://www.theonionrouter.com/> accessed 23
June 2016.
43
Andrew Lewman, 'Tor and Links with Cryptomarkets' [2016] EMCDDA, the Internet and Drug Markets.
44
Patrick Howell O'Neill, 'As Silk Road 2.0 Struggles, New Black Markets Look Beyond Tor' (The Daily Dot,
2013) <http://www.dailydot.com/crime/deep-web-black-markets-beyond-tor-i2p/> accessed 23 June 2016.

21
started using I2P due to an increasing number of police takedowns45
and “exit scams”46
.47
One of the advantages of I2P is that the software can defend itself against cyberattacks and
potential location leakage.
Bitcoin
To make payments on cryptomarkets, users have to utilise cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin.
These cryptocurrencies are decentralised and incredibly difficult to trace.48
This is because
transactions between parties are facilitated without the involvement of a financial institution,
such as a central bank. 49
Theoretically, law enforcement (or anyone with sufficient technical
proficiency) would be able to track a cryptomarket user’s transactions by examining and re-
tracing their transaction history – this is known as “block chain analysis”.50
However, so far,
law enforcement has not been able to make many inroads into identifying users’ identity
through block chain analysis.
45
'Darknets' (Europol, 2015) <https://www.europol.europa.eu/iocta/2015/darknets.html#fn:two> accessed 23
June 2016.
46
An exit scam is where administrators of cryptomarkets shut down the site after stealing users’ bitcoins.
47
Nicky Woolf, 'Bitcoin 'Exit Scam': Deep-Web Market Operators Disappear With $12M' (The Guardian,
2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/18/bitcoin-deep-web-evolution-exit-scam-12-
million-dollars> accessed 30 June 2016.
48
Joseph Cox, 'Staying in the Shadows: The Use of Bitcoin and Encryption in Cryptomarkets' [2016]
EMCDDA, the Internet and Drug Markets.
49
Martin, Drugs on the Dark Net (n 19).
50
Tom Simonite, 'Mapping the Bitcoin Economy Could Reveal Users’ Identities' (MIT Technology Review,
2013) <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/518816/mapping-the-bitcoin-economy-could-reveal-users-
identities/> accessed 24 June 2016.

22
The Silk Road: A Case Study
The Silk Road is a (now-defunct) cryptomarket that was almost solely devoted to selling
illicit drugs.51
TSR began operating in February 2011 and came to the mainstream media’s
attention after an article was posted on Gawker.52
TSR was by no means the only operating
cryptomarket. The first one to appear on the dark web was “The Drugstore” which was
launched in 2009.53
After the FBI shut down TSR, a number of replacements immediately
sprung in its place. A search on “Deep.Dot.Web”, a website that lists the status of dark web
cryptomarkets, currently lists 51 live markets and vendor shops offering a wide range of
illicit goods.54
Current law enforcement strategies have focused on attempting to disrupt
cryptomarkets and to arrest and prosecute any buyers and sellers caught using these markets.
By closing them down, law enforcement aims to reduce the trust placed in the anonymisation
and encryption services such as the Tor network. This would, in theory, result in
cryptomarkets appearing less attractive for prospective users. Indeed, when the FBI closed
down TSR, arresting and charging Ross Ulbricht (the alleged site administrator) on suspicion
of drug trafficking, amongst other offences, it was hailed as a significant victory for law
enforcement whilst signalling the beginning of the end for cryptomarkets.55
Soon after the
take-down of TSR, law enforcement agencies across Europe, Australia and North America
51
Nicolas Christin, 'Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large Anonymous Online
Marketplace' <http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.7139> accessed 23 June 2016.
52
Chen, 'The Underground Website Where You Can Buy Any Drug Imaginable' (n 9).
53
Buxton and Bingham, The Rise and Challenge of Dark Net Drug Markets (n 27).
54
'Updated: List of Dark Net Markets (Tor & I2P)' (Deep Dot Web, 2016)
<https://www.deepdotweb.com/2013/10/28/updated-llist-of-hidden-marketplaces-tor-i2p/> accessed 23 June
2016.
55
'Manhattan US Attorney Announces the Indictment of Ross Ulbricht, the Creator and Owner Of The Silk
Road Website' (FBI, 2014) <https://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2014/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-
announces-the-indictment-of-ross-ulbricht-the-creator-and-owner-of-the-silk-road-website> accessed 23 June
2016.

23
were able to seize 267 “.onion” domains and $1 million in Bitcoin, shut over a dozen
cryptomarkets as well as making 17 arrests.56
This method of disruption has paradoxically both succeeded and failed. It has succeeded in
the sense that, ever since TSR was seized, trust in anonymisation and encryption services has
slightly diminished, whilst no active cryptomarket has reached the size and scale of market
dominance that TSR once had.57
One consequence of the breakdown in trust is that
cryptomarkets’ lifespans tend to be quite short – Christin found that the majority of items
sold on TSR were available for less than three weeks and that the majority of sellers
disappear within three months of joining.58
However, the method of disruption can also be
said to have failed, in that cryptomarkets have learnt to adapt and become even more
decentralised than was the case when TSR was running in 2011. Additionally, taking out the
cryptomarket which had the biggest market share has left a vacuum in cyber-space which a
number of dark web markets have been trying to fill. This has been labelled as the “balloon”
or “hydra” effect whereby when one cryptomarket is taken down, a number of new ones arise
trying to compete for a slice of the market share.59
Law enforcement’s efforts at closing down
cryptomarkets have only served to further enhance and “incentivise technological
innovation.”60
56
Alois Afilipoaie and Patrick Shortis, Operation Onymous: International Law Enforcement Agencies Target
the Dark Net in November 2014 (1st edn, Global Drug Policy Observatory 2015)
<https://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/GDPO%20SA%20Onymous.pdf> accessed 23 June 2016.
57
Martin, Drugs On the Dark Net (n 19).
58
Christin, 'Traveling The Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large Anonymous Online Marketplace' (n
51).
59
EMCDDA, 'The Internet and Drug Markets, EMCDDA Insights 21' (n 6).
60
Buxton and Bingham, The Rise and Challenge of Dark Net Drug Markets (n 27).

24
The fact that there are a number of cryptomarkets competing with each other represents a
positive development from the buyer’s perspective; rather than having the previous
monopoly-like stranglehold that TSR had, there is now greater competition, choice, more
competitive pricing and a concerted effort to increase security by strengthening the
encryption services.
The Feedback and Ratings System
TSR was the biggest and most widely known cryptomarket.61
It is estimated that users on the
market spent $20 million before it was shut down by the FBI.62
In 2014, when Barratt et al.
conducted their investigation into the prevalence of awareness of TSR, 40% of UK
respondents had heard of it and 10% had consumed drugs that were purchased off it.63
It was
regularly labelled as the “eBay for drugs”64
and that is no surprise given the way the market
was presented, structured and had products delivered through the postal service. Much like
legitimate online marketplaces, such as eBay and Amazon, TSR was able to list all of the
available drug vendors and their respective drug listings which allowed buyers to easily
compare listings between vendors, allowing them to shop for the drug of their choice.
Additionally, TSR employed an incredibly useful feedback and ratings system that allowed
customers to rate a seller’s services and products. The feedback system was such a key
element of the success of TSR that virtually all new cryptomarkets introduced it. By
61
Monica J. Barratt, Jason A. Ferris and Adam R. Winstock, 'Use of Silk Road, the Online Drug Marketplace, in
the United Kingdom, Australia and he United States' (2014) 109 Addiction.
62
Emily Flitter, 'US Sharply Reduces Silk Road's Estimated Sales Volume' (Reuters, 2015)
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-bitcoin-trial-silkroad-idUSKBN0KP20N20150116> accessed 23 June
2016.
63
Barratt, Ferris and Winstock, 'Use of Silk Road, the Online Drug Marketplace, in the United Kingdom,
Australia and he United States' (n 61).
64
Monica J Barratt, 'Silk Road: eBay for Drugs' (2012) 107 Addiction.

25
assessing a vendor’s rating, which was based on previous dealings with customers,65
the
feedback system offered buyers a wider range of options allowing them to choose the seller
with the highest rating (out of 5 stars).
Use of Escrow Accounts
TSR also employed an “escrow system” when making payments. An escrow system is an
agreement whereby you deposit an amount of money “in escrow” with a third independent
party, which will hold the funds, and then release them based on what the parties have
agreed. In the case of cryptomarkets, the money is put into an independent wallet and the
money is not released to the seller until the buyer receives their product and is satisfied with
their purchase.66
The escrow system is another tool that has been widely adopted by other
cryptomarkets, highlighting its importance.
65
Marie Claire Van Hout and Tim Bingham, 'Responsible Vendors, Intelligent Consumers: Silk Road, the
Online Revolution in Drug Trading' (2014) 25 International Journal of Drug Policy.
66
Judith Aldridge and David Décary-Hétu, 'Not an 'eBay for Drugs': The Cryptomarket 'Silk Road' as a
Paradigm Shifting Criminal Innovation' [2014] SSRN Electronic Journal.

26
III – Comparing the Characteristics of Conventional Drug Distribution Networks with
Online Drug Distribution Networks
Social Network Analysis
Contemporary research shows that rather than being rigid and hierarchical criminal
organisations and illicit drug distribution networks are carried out by decentralised groups
that are remarkably flexible and able to adapt to constantly changing conditions.67
Social
Network Analysis (SNA) is a popular tool used to examine illicit drug networks; it “is an
analytical method used to describe groups or organisations and the connections between
actors in those groups or organisations”.68
Each participant in a drug distribution network is
seen as an individual node that is a part of a larger network. Within the context of drug
distribution, each network consists of producers/manufacturers and consumers. In between
those beginning and end nodes are, what are described as “intermediary nodes”; these include
drug traffickers, wholesalers and street dealers.69
Network sizes will vary depending on the
drug; for example, a network that consists of an individual who cultivates small quantities of
marijuana and sells it to his friends will only consist of a few nodes. Whereas, a heroin
distribution network can be much larger and more complex and may involve hundreds of
individuals that span across a large number of nodes.70
SNA can be used to assess any
distribution network, ranging from the single link producer-consumer chain to larger, more
decentralised and complex heroin trafficking networks.
67
James Martin, Drugs on the Dark Net (n 19).
68
David A. Bright and Jordan J. Delaney, 'Evolution of a Drug Trafficking Network: Mapping Changes in
Network Structure and Function Across Time' (2013) 14 Global Crime.
69
70
Mangai Natarajan, 'Understanding The Structure of a Large Heroin Distribution Network: A Quantitative
Analysis of Qualitative Data' (2006) 22 Journal of Quantitative Criminology.

27
There is an important and significant limitation present with SNA – a lack of reliable data on
illicit drug distribution networks. Martin offers a number of reasons for this. Firstly,
participants in illicit distribution networks naturally want to keep their activities hidden.
Secondly, a lot of the information on these networks is provided by transnational law
enforcement agencies (such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), whose
mandate is to enforce drug prohibition, and from police reports. The problems found with
relying on information provided by law enforcement are plentiful. For example, much of
undercover information will be confidential and even if it is released to the public, it will
likely have many important details missing. Additionally, from law enforcement’s
perspective, the most important aspect is to gather information to prosecute “key players” in a
drug distribution network rather than analysing the individual nodes in the broader networks.
As such, the incomplete nature of the information available may lead to incomplete analyses
of drug distribution networks.
Characteristics of Conventional Drug Distribution Networks
Drug distribution networks have been described as dynamic and fluid in nature. For example,
Morselli et al. emphasise the importance of flexibility that these criminal networks have.71
Another characteristic they possess is that criminal networks are able to laterally add new
nodes and expand freely.72
Arguably, the most important attribute is that they are able to
respond to environmental changes rapidly by moving and changing the boundaries of their
criminal network. Martin identifies a number of common features of illicit drug distribution
networks: network size and what he describes as “nodal redundancy”, network inefficiencies,
71
Carlo Morselli, Cynthia Giguère and Katia Petit, 'The Efficiency/Security Trade-Off in Criminal Networks'
(2007) 29 Social Networks.
72
Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, 'Assessing The Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why Al-Qaida
May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think' (2008) 33 International Security.

28
in the form of price mark-ups and product adulteration, and systemic violence that is
associated with those networks.73
Beginning with the issue of “nodal redundancy”, conventional drug distribution networks are
typically large and usually consist of a large number of nodes that span across a number of
countries. This is because there are a number of different stages in a drug trafficking network,
which includes producing, transporting and retailing the drug. Drugs will usually pass
through a number of nodes before reaching the customer. The salient point here is that the
large number of nodes present in a conventional drug distribution network is a security
necessity as well as a practical consequence of the business. Due to the constant threat posed
by law enforcement, Martin finds that drug distributions can manage the threat posed by
“introducing additional intermediary nodes”.74
The threat posed by law enforcement is not
equally distributed to the players found in the network – some players, such as the street-
dealers, are naturally more exposed to law enforcement than other players in the distribution
network. This poses problems for the network because a dealer that is arrested could be used
by law enforcement to gather information on other players in the network. Therefore, these
intermediary nodes, effectively act as a buffer by offering protection between the different
levels of the distribution network. For example, a street dealer can act as a buffer between the
producer, who would be of much greater value to law enforcement. As such, these additional
buffer nodes are able to provide significant protection to the distribution network when law
enforcement discovers them. This leads Martin to state that “buffer nodes may therefore be
thought of as providing a reserve of ‘nodal redundancy’” because these intermediary nodes
limit the overall damage that could be caused to the more integral parts of the network.
73
74
ibid, p.53.

29
The increased number of nodes found in a drug distribution network has a significant effect
on the drug being distributed. Every node involved in the network will want to be
compensated for its participation in the network. There are two ways in which it can achieve
this. One way is through price increases whereby each node is able to “mark-up” the drug by
incrementally adding to the price before it passes onto the next node. Given that this network
is of an illicit nature, the higher risks that are associated with these networks (such as
violence and arrests) ensures that the premium added at each stage is even higher. The second
way in which a node is compensated for its involvement in the network is through product
adulteration. To “adulterate” a product is to “render (something) poorer in quality by adding
another substance”.75
This is often referred to as “cutting” and in the context of drugs, this
involves diluting drugs with similar and cheaper alternatives. This has the effect of artificially
increasing the overall product volume which results in each intermediary node receiving
greater profit. Price mark-ups and product adulteration are the two reasons which explain
why drugs obtained through conventional means often cost much higher than their “farm
gate” value76
and accounts for the lower levels of purity found when the customer receives
the drug.77
The final point that Martin makes in relation to conventional drug distribution networks is
that they have always been associated with systemic violence. The reason for that is mainly
due to the illegal nature of producing and supplying drugs. For drug producers to be able to
distribute their products, they need to establish partnerships with organised crime groups.
75
'Adulterate' (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016) <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/adulterate>
accessed 27 June 2016.
76
Jonathan P. Caulkins and Peter Reuter, 'How Drug Enforcement Affects Drug Prices' (2010) 39 Crime and
Justice.
77
National Drug Law Enforcement Research Fund, 'Evaluating Drug Law Enforcement Interventions Directed
Towards Methamphetamine in Australia' (2012).

30
These groups have traditionally used violence to establish their territories and settle disputes
– this is what is often referred to as “turf wars”. Violence is applied at all stages of the
distribution network – from drug manufacturers and producers who may use it to protect their
production assets to wholesalers and street dealers who may use it for dispute resolutions.
Characteristics of Online Drug Distribution Networks
Online distribution networks differ from conventional networks in a number of ways. The
main reason for this is by virtue of the fact that they operate in virtual space rather than
through conventional face-to-face meetings. The characterisations of conventional drug
distribution networks are mainly based on their decentralisation, large number of nodes
(including the presence of buffer nodes) and the tendency for systemic violence to be
associated with them. As discussed, these characteristics arise out of necessity to counter the
threat posed by law enforcement and by rival drug distributing networks. Online distribution
networks, on the other hand, are characterised by having more direct nodal connection
(between producer and consumer for example), having less nodes in the network with a lack
of intermediary buffer nodes and have higher network efficiency.78
As discussed earlier,
cryptomarkets are able to operate due to the anonymisation and encryption services provided
by Tor and cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. The biggest difference between conventional
networks and online distribution networks is the number of nodes found.
With online drug distribution networks, there are three potential network formations to be
pursued.79
They are: a direct link between a producer and a consumer, a link between a
wholesaler and a consumer and a link between two wholesalers. For the purposes of this
paper, the first network formation is the key one because it eliminates the intermediary nodes
78
79
ibid.

31
between a drug producer and the customer. Consequently, this link has the potential to be the
most efficient and transformative in the drug trade. Because they bypass the intermediary
nodes, in theory, one also bypasses the product adulteration and price mark-ups. As such,
there are two harm reduction methods in place here. Additionally, because one is linking the
producer with the customer directly, cutting out the intermediary nodes in the process, the
potential for systemic violence is being limited. Instead of selling through street dealers and
associating oneself with organised crime groups, drugs can be posted directly to the
customer. Moreover, disputes are resolved online through the various mechanisms of self-
regulation found on cryptomarkets. Consequently, the biggest “winners” here are customers,
producers and wider society in general. In contrast, this represents a negative development
for organised crime groups and criminal networks that profit most from the illegal drugs
trade.80
There are, however, limitations present in that this network formation appears to only
be able to form with regards to organic drugs, such as marijuana, as well as synthetically
produced drugs such as MDMA. Therefore, the effects on drugs such as heroin and cocaine
are likely to be very limited.
The second network formation that could occur in an online drug distribution network is
between a wholesaler and a consumer. The effects of this relationship would be to render the
intermediary nodes found in the trafficking, supplying and retailing stages redundant and
supplying the drug directly to the consumer. The drugs most likely to be supplied in this type
of distribution are semi-synthetic drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, which have longer
distribution networks. The obvious benefit of this relationship would be the reduction of
systemic violence associated with drug distribution in source countries. However, a serious
limitation is present in that the farmers of the opium poppy in Afghanistan or the coca
80
Francesco Calderoni, 'The Structure of Drug Trafficking Mafias: The ‘Ndrangheta and Cocaine' (2012) 58
Crime Law Soc Change.

32
farmers in South America are unlikely to have access to computers, the internet and the
technology required to access cryptomarkets in order to be able to directly sell their goods.81
Therefore, a large proportion of this distribution network will still rely on conventional
methods to obtain the drug from the producer to the wholesaler who would then be able to
access cryptomarkets and sell them. Having said that, customers are still able to buy directly
from wholesalers which still has the effect of bypassing intermediary nodes and reduces the
systemic violence associated with those nodes.
The final network formation present is one between two wholesalers or two businesses. This
is when drug sellers use online distribution networks to source stock to sell offline on the
streets to customers. Aldridge and Decary-Hetu’s study of The Silk Road found that between
31-45% of revenue generated on the cryptomarket was a result of large volume sales (sales
greater than $1000).82
This analysis is derived from nearly 12,000 listings on the
cryptomarket. Furthermore, terminology used by some drug vendors made it abundantly clear
that the illicit drugs were for resale. Additionally, the fact that a number of vendors offered
discounts for buyers that bought in bulk seemed to suggest that there were a number of
buyers buying from cryptomarkets to then sell on in the conventional market for a profit. Of
course, these large quantities could have been made by someone who wanted to offer a
“social supply” to their friends.83
But, the fact that a large number of listings had high prices
and entailed significant amounts leads the researchers to conclude that a number of customers
on TSR were drug dealers wanting to source stock to sell online.
81
82
Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 'Not an 'Ebay for Drugs': The Cryptomarket 'Silk Road' as a Paradigm Shifting
Criminal Innovation' (n 66).
83
Ross Coomber and Leah Moyle, 'Beyond Drug Dealing: Developing and Extending the Concept of ‘Social
Supply’ of Illicit Drugs to ‘Minimally Commercial Supply’' (2013) 21 Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy.

33
The reason this is important is because buyers who are buying in wholesale to sell offline
“may increase the capacity of cryptomarkets to diffuse drugs across locales – therefore
reaching even drug users who are not themselves cryptomarket customers.”84
This form of
network formation is the most similar to conventional drug distribution networks because it
eliminates intermediary nodes and the importance of traffickers is reduced. This type of
relationship is most relevant to customers who have no access to online cryptomarkets.
Further empirical research is required into the prevalence of the business-to-business
relationship on cryptomarkets. If this relationship was found to be the most prevalent on
cryptomarkets then that would limit the effects dark net markets have on reducing harm to
drug users, given that users would still need to source the drugs through more conventional
methods.
84
Judith Aldridge and David Décary-Hétu, 'Hidden Wholesale: The Drug Diffusing Capacity of Online Drug
Cryptomarkets' [2016] International Journal of Drug Policy.

34
The Impact of Cryptomarkets on Conventional Global Drug Networks
Currently, cryptomarkets represent a very small fraction of the global drugs trade. A number
of estimates have been made with regards to the revenue generated by TSR; this was done by
multiplying the number of transactions received by a vendor with the price listed. Christin
estimated that the total revenue made by the sellers amounted to slightly over $1.2 million per
month.85
Aldridge and Decary-Hetu however, estimate that TSR’s revenues increased from
an estimate of $14.4 million to $89.7 million from mid-2012 to September 2013.86
In
contrast, it is especially difficult to estimate the value of the global trade in illicit drugs. The
United Nations Drug Control Programme is the official source of estimates of the world trade
in illicit drugs, but Reuter and Greenfield argue that:
[T]he underlying data that give rise to estimates of global drug markets are riddled
with discrepancies and inconsistencies … the most widely cited figure for the
international drug trade is in fact an estimate of something very different, namely total
revenues at the retail level; the true trade figure is much smaller.87
The figures that are usually quoted are from the UNODC with an estimate that the global
drug trade is valued somewhere between $300 billion and $1.3 trillion annually. According to
the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), “a conservative
estimate values the retail market for illicit drugs in the European Union at 24.3 billion Euros”
85
Christin, 'Traveling The Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large Anonymous Online Marketplace' (n
51).
86
Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 'Not an 'eBay for Drugs': The Cryptomarket 'Silk Road' as a Paradigm Shifting
87
Peter Reuter and Victoria Greenfield, 'Measuring Global Drug Markets: How Good Are the Numbers and
Why Should We Care About Them?' (2001) 2 World Economics.

35
with the likely range being between 21 and 31 billion Euros.88
Of course there is an obvious
limitation here in that these figures are only estimates as it is difficult to obtain a more
accurate figure. However, even if we are not able to obtain a more realistic estimate of the
global drug trade, it is quite clear that currently, sales revenue from cryptomarkets only
represent a small fraction of the global drug trade.
From the discussion above, there are two salient points to extract. Firstly, online drug
distribution networks, facilitated through cryptomarkets, are more simple and therefore more
efficient than conventional networks. This is due to their ability to cut out a number of
“middle men” which results in more direct links between the seller/producer and the
customer. A lack of intermediary nodes means there are fewer opportunities for the products
to be adulterated and for price mark-ups to be added. Consequently, this results in a greater
range of higher quality and cheaper drugs for consumers. The elimination of these
intermediary nodes also has the potential to significantly reduce systemic drug violence
associated with conventional drug distribution networks, by virtue of cryptomarkets’ virtual
location.8990
Analysis of Drugs Purchased on Cryptomarkets
The incredible growth in popularity of cryptomarkets is evidently clear. Barratt et al.’s
study91
was the first published description of a relatively large sample of respondents who
had described their drug purchasing habits, including whether they had purchased drugs
88
89
Monica J. Barratt, Simon Lenton and Matthew Allen, 'Internet Content Regulation, Public Drug Websites and
the Growth in Hidden Internet Services' (2012) 20 Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy.
90
Van Hout and Bingham, 'Responsible Vendors, Intelligent Consumers: Silk Road, the Online Revolution in
Drug Trading' (n 65).
91
Australia and he United States' (n 61).

36
online. It was based on the responses from the 2013 GDS. Of the 422 people that had bought
drugs online, the most popular drugs were MDMA (all forms) (56%), cannabis (51%) and
LSD (29%).92
By way of comparison, Barratt et al.’s 2016 study, which is based on the
responses from the 2015 GDS, finds that the drugs most commonly bought by 3794 people
on cryptomarkets were MDMA/Ecstasy (55%), cannabis (43%) and LSD (35%).93
The most
recent (2016) GDS found that MDMA, cannabis, new psychoactive substances and LSD were
the drugs most commonly bought.94
The 2016 survey obtained a record sample of
cryptomarket users with 8058 respondents stating that they have bought drugs off a
cryptomarket. Furthermore, it found that almost 1 in 10, or 9.3% of respondents, reported
ever buying drugs off the dark web. Additionally, there was an increase in those reporting
purchasing off cryptomarkets, rising from 4.5% to 6.7%.95
Of course there are limitations present with the analyses – the 2014 study was based on a
small sample size of 422. But, the 2016 study was based on a much larger sample size of
3794 whilst the most recent GDS had an increase of 53% (4264 respondents) of those who
reported buying drugs off cryptomarkets. Another limitation present is the fact that the
sample sizes are a non-representative sampling method so, it cannot be said that the sample
reflects or represents the wider population. From this data, it is clear that the most popular
drug purchases on TSR and other cryptomarkets have been “soft” or “party” drugs. This is
relevant because “recreational” drugs such as cannabis, LSD and Ecstasy are, according to
Nutt’s study, much less harmful (both to users and to others) than “harder” drugs such as
92
ibid.
93
Monica J. Barratt, Jason A. Ferris and Adam R. Winstock, 'Safer Scoring? Cryptomarkets, Social Supply and
Drug Market Violence' [2016] International Journal of Drug Policy.
94
Winstock and others, GDS 2016 (n 18).
95
ibid.

37
heroin and crack and even legal drugs such as alcohol.96
Of the 20 drugs that the study
ranked, alcohol was found to be the most harmful to society whilst crack and heroin were the
most harmful to users. In contrast, cannabis was ranked eighth whilst Ecstasy was 17th
and
LSD 18th
in terms of combined harm to users and others. Given this, an argument can be
made that efforts needed to police cryptomarkets should instead be focused on the more
conventional drug distribution networks, which producers of the most harmful drugs such as
heroin and crack cocaine, will continue to rely on to supply their products.
96
Nutt, King and Phillips, 'Drug Harms in the UK: A Multicriteria Decision Analysis' (n 30).

38
IV – Comparing the Harmful Effects of Conventional Networks with Cryptomarkets
US Senator Chuck Schumer described TSR as “the most brazen attempt to peddle drugs
online”97
. Cryptomarkets, however, appear to play an incredibly important role in harm
reduction. As per the harm reduction coalition website, harm reduction practice “accepts, for
better and or worse, that licit and illicit drug use is part of our world and chooses to work to
minimise its harmful effects rather than simply ignore or condemn them.”98
As mentioned in
section one of the essay, there are a number of different ways to using and taking drugs and
some ways produce less them harm than others.
There are six harms that will be looked at that may be affected through the emergence of
cryptomarkets: drug quality (in terms of purity and levels of contamination); receiving the
right drug; threat of violence to the user from the drug dealer; loss of money resulting from
financial scams; user’s online anonymity being compromised by law enforcement and street
violence and organised crime.
Ways in Which Cryptomarkets Are Less Harmful Than Conventional Drug Markets
Violence to User and Wider Society in General
The fact that cryptomarkets have regulatory mechanisms (such as escrow systems,
marketplace adjudication system for disputes, ratings and feedback systems) greatly helps in
removing a number of the unstable factors found in conventional drug markets.
Cryptomarkets can present a less harmful alternative to the conventional drug trade through
97
'Schumer Pushes to Shut Down Online Drug Marketplace' (NBC New York, 2011)
<http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/123187958.html> accessed 22 June 2016.
98
'Principles of Harm Reduction' (Harm Reduction Coalition, 2016) <http://harmreduction.org/about-
us/principles-of-harm-reduction/> accessed 27 June 2016.

39
the mere fact that they have a virtual location and the anonymity that they provide both
buyers and sellers.99
As such, it “reduces or eliminates the need – or even the ability – to
resort to violence”.100
However, it could be argued that, from the user’s perspective, the harm that is manifested
through systemic violence is overstated. Barratt et al. highlight how apart from
cryptomarkets, the additional sources from which respondents to the 2015 GDS most
commonly reported sourcing drugs were in-person friendships (73.8%) and in-person known
dealers (57.1%). Moreover, when asked which of the alternate sources cryptomarket users
would turn to if cryptomarkets were no longer available, most answered in-person friendships
(49.3%) whilst 34% answered with in-person known dealers.101
The conclusion reached in
this study was that:
[C]ryptomarkets are associated with substantially less threats and violence than
alternative market types used by cryptomarket customers, even though a large
majority of these alternatives were closed networks where violence should be
relatively less common.102
This is further supported by interviews conducted by Ormsby with cryptomarket users. She
highlighted that despite a large number of users often stating that the fear of violence is one
of the key reasons for purchasing off of cryptomarkets, the majority of respondents admitted
99
Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 'Not an 'eBay for Drugs': The Cryptomarket 'Silk Road' as a Paradigm Shifting
100
ibid.
101
Barratt, Ferris and Winstock, 'Safer Scoring? Cryptomarkets, Social Supply and Drug Market Violence' (n
93).
102
ibid.

40
that they had never previously faced violent threats when purchasing off the street.103
The
important point here, however, is that users are “acutely aware of the potential for a deal to
go sour, and the fear itself created high levels of anxiety.”104
Drug Quality – Purity, Receiving the Right Drug and Contamination
A second very important harm reduction benefit present with cryptomarkets that is not found
in conventional drug markets is the self-regulation that is implemented via the ratings and
feedback mechanisms – something that was first pioneered by TSR. In theory, given that both
cryptomarket buyers and sellers are completely anonymous, a drug vendor could easily sell
products that are of sub-standard and not be held to account with no way of recourse for the
buyer. The way this has been resolved is through the self-regulation systems in place on
cryptomarkets. These take place in the form of ratings, feedback and reviews of both the
products and the vendor’s quality of service. These mechanisms allow buyers to make
informed decisions as to what type of drug they want to buy by assessing the quality and the
purity of the drug. This is evidenced through the fact that a large number of vendors on TSR
express a commitment to selling the “finest, highest-purity, ‘lab-tested’ products
available.”105
These claims are often supported with evidence in the form of photographs of
drug testing kit reports and detailed chemical reports.106
This represents an important harm
reduction mechanism as it allows the user to understand what the correct and safe dosage is
as well as being confident in the fact that there are no harmful adulterants in the drug. Of
course, there is an issue of proving the veracity of the claims made, however, what is certain
103
Eileen Ormsby, 'Silk Road: Insights from Interviews with Users and Vendors' [2016] EMCDDA, The
Internet and Drug Markets.
104
ibid.
105
106
ibid.

41
is that they provide cryptomarket users with greater information about the contents and
potency of drugs – something that is most definitely absent in conventional drug markets.
Data collected by the Spanish non-governmental organisation, Energy Control, supports the
claim that purity of illicit substances purchased from the dark web is higher than drugs
purchased by conventional means. In April 2014, the organisation, launched a pilot service
called “the International Drug Testing Service” which was aimed at testing the purity of
drugs bought by users off cryptomarkets.107
After obtaining the samples, users would receive
detailed feedback and a report on the test results and other harm reduction information.
According to the EMCDDA, there were a total of 129 samples submitted between April and
December 2014.108
In 120 of the 129, or 93%, of the samples analysed, the main result of the
drug analysis was consistent with the type of substance users thought they had purchased.109
Additionally, purity levels of drugs tested (including cocaine, MDMA crystals and MDMA
pills) were very high. With MDMA (both types), no other adulterants or active ingredients
were detected.110
The main limitation with this research is the fact that there are
methodological biases with the sample selections sent in by cryptomarket users; as such, it
cannot be said that these results represent the market as a whole. Another important point to
note is that higher drug purity does not always lead to harm reduction. Whilst drugs with high
purity and more careful dosing preparations can lead to safer methods in drug taking, it is
also very easy to mistakenly take too much which can lead to even greater harm.111
107
Fernando Caudevilla, 'The Emergence of Deep Web Marketplaces: A Health Perspective' [2016] EMCDDA,
The Internet and Drug Markets.
108
ibid.
109
ibid.
110
ibid.
111

42
The self-regulating feedback mechanisms also reduces the risk of contamination of the drug,
that may arise due to product adulteration; this may increase the risk of overdosing or
fatalities. These mechanisms are successful because if a drug vendor wishes to be successful,
he will want to receive the best possible feedback and highest ratings. The importance of a
vendor’s reputation on a cryptomarket, as determined by these feedback mechanisms, is
supported by ethnographic research conducted with participants of cryptomarkets.112
The feedback systems are important harm-reduction mechanisms because they ensure that
buyers are instilled with most of the bargaining power. They also provide the consumer with
greater confidence. In Barratt et al.’s study, 60-65% of respondents stated that the ratings
system on cryptomarkets was one of the main reasons that attracted them to using them to
buy drugs. They also highlighted how a vendor’s higher rating instilled them with greater
confidence.113
Through these ratings systems, cryptomarkets have developed a very clever
way in ensuring there is a degree of accountability. They are also important in helping users
warn others of any sellers who are selling dangerous batches of drugs or those who sell a
drug that is disguised as something else.114
This has implications for users’ health; in
comparison, a customer purchasing drugs off the street has very little way of knowing how
strong or adulterated the drug is. This makes managing dosage incredibly difficult.
A third harm reduction benefit is found in the chat rooms, forums and discussion boards that
allows drug users to share and discuss harm reduction methods. On most cryptomarkets, there
112
Marie Claire Van Hout and Tim Bingham, '‘Silk Road’, the Virtual Drug Marketplace: A Single Case Study
of User Experiences' (2013) 24 International Journal of Drug Policy.
113
Australia and the United States' (n 61).
114
Cox, 'Reputation Is Everything: The Role of Ratings, Feedback and Reviews in Cryptomarkets' (n 48).

43
are entire threads or sub-sections devoted to “drug safety”. 115
These include suggestions on
optimal doses and poly-drug use. One important consequence of this is that it allows the users
to create a community whereby drug users are able to confidently share and discuss ideas in a
non-judgemental environment – something they would perhaps not feel comfortable doing in
“real life”. Indeed, Maddox et al, found that a cryptomarket’s discussion forums allowed an
active online community to openly discuss the stigmatised topic of illicit drug use.116
This is
especially important for solitary drug users who don’t share with other people in their real life
that they are drug users. It is the engagement and participation in these online communities
that has the potential to reduce harms. When one of the moderators of the Reddit Silk Road
page was interviewed, he stated that cryptomarket “users and sellers alike can have the
freedom to be open and express themselves in ways that are impossible in real life.”117
This is
a measure that will result in increased safety if they are able to understand the safe dosages
etc. Intriguingly, it is apparent that cryptomarkets and their forums have the potential effect
of moderating a user’s drug use.118
Whilst it is easy to understand why a user that is
committing a criminal act would share advice on how to avoid getting caught by law
enforcement, it is perhaps unexpected for users to share advice on curbing dependence and
addictions to drugs.
Another interesting harm-reduction development on cryptomarkets is the opportunity for
health professionals to engage with cryptomarket users. Fernando Caudevilla, a qualified
Spanish physician, had been running a number of discussions on cryptomarket forums
115
Caudevilla, 'The Emergence of Deep Web Marketplaces: A Health Perspective' (n 107).
116
Alexia Maddox and others, 'Constructive Activism in the Dark Web: Cryptomarkets and Illicit Drugs in the
Digital ‘Demimonde’' (2015) 19 Information, Communication & Society.
117
Jamie Bartlett, The Dark Net (Windmill Books 2015), p.138.
118
Van Hout and Bingham, '‘Silk Road’, The Virtual Drug Marketplace: A Single Case Study of User
Experiences' (n 112).

44
whereby he invited users to ask him any health-related questions.119
He provided a free
service where he would give advice from a harm and risk-reduction perspective. According to
data collected by the EMCDDA, a thread entitled “Ask a Drug Expert Physician about Drugs
and Health” attracted 136,407 visits and 1,146 questions, with 931 questions being
answered.120
Given the susceptibility of cryptomarkets to interventions from law
enforcement, the popular thread ended up being transferred across the three most prevalent
cryptomarkets: TSR, Silk Road 2.0 and Evolution. The topics that were covered on the thread
included: drug effects and dosages, adverse effects of drugs, medical contraindications,
pharmacological interactions with prescription drugs and other illicit drugs, and the long-term
effects of drugs.121
There are limitations and disadvantages present with a service like the one offered by Dr
Caudevilla in that messages and advice given over forums will never be as useful or
beneficial as a face-to-face meeting with a physician who can also physically assess the
individual. However, as already mentioned, many drug users would not admit or ask their
physicians about any drug-related problems for fear of being judged or singled out. This is
something that the RSPH highlights in its report:
The criminal status of drug use may deter people from coming forward for treatment.
An RSPH survey found one in five young people would be put off seeking help due to
the stigma of having illegal drugs on their record … only one in 20 felt confident they
119
'Doctor Fernando Caudevilla' (Doctorcaudevilla.com, 2016) <http://doctorcaudevilla.com/> accessed 27 June
2016.
120
Caudevilla, 'The Emergence of Deep Web Marketplaces: A Health Perspective' (n 107).
121
ibid.

45
would receive the help they would need for illegal drug use without judgement or
stigma.122
Additionally, in many parts of the world, a harm reduction service aimed at drug users is
simply not present. This highlights the need to reduce societal stigma attached to illicit drug
use; this is an important development that policy makers should implement to enable drug
users to be able to discuss their habits with other people, especially health professionals,
without judgement.
Ways in Which Cryptomarkets are More Harmful
In addition to loss of tangibles, there are two further harms that can be identified in relation to
cryptomarkets being more harmful than conventional markets. The first is related to the fact
that cryptomarkets operate on the internet, in virtual space. There are a number of obstacles
found with online shopping, such as the inability to enter a physical shop and physically
inspect a product; these are factors which leaves some customers slightly hesitant when
purchasing items online. These problems are only exacerbated with online drug shopping
given the relative lack of trust found between the buyer and the seller.123
The second way in
which cryptomarkets can be seen to be more harmful is due to the mistrust present as a result
of the absence of external regulation. In the legitimate economy, this external regulation takes
place in the form of “government-mandated testing, quality control, safety standardisation …
assurances of quality [for products]”.124
Were drugs to be completely legalised and regulated,
these harms would be minimised.125
122
123
124
ibid.
125
An argument for the regulation of drugs in a legitimate economy is made in section six.

46
Loss of Money Due to Financial Scams
Cryptomarket users are incredibly vulnerable to scammers; this can be in the form of sellers
demanding payment for the order but never posting the drugs or can take the form of
administrators making way with all of the cryptomarket users’ money and shutting down the
market without notice.126
The solution that markets have found to this problem is through the
use of an escrow system, which is discussed earlier in the paper. This is a resolution that
cannot be applied to conventional drug markets so in that sense, cryptomarkets present a less
harmful alternative to conventional drug markets. However, a related problem arises – the
larger a cryptomarket is, the more money an administrator is likely to hold in escrow (as a
result of the transaction fees that the administrator pockets). The large amounts of
cryptocurrencies (which are very difficult to trace) ensures that it is vulnerable both to the
aforementioned “exit scams” by administrators but also to hackers. However, as a result of a
number of high-profile “exit scams”, a more advanced “multi-signature escrow system” has
been introduced to many dark web markets.127
Rather than just needing the buyer to confirm
that an order has been successful for the money to be released to the seller, the multi-
signature system requires two out of three signatures from the buyer, the seller and the
marketplace administrator. This makes “exit scams” much harder to accomplish and is just
another example that highlights how adaptive and resilient cryptomarkets are to disruptions.
Anonymity Being Compromised
Arguably, the greatest obstacle to cryptomarket users is their anonymity being compromised
and identities being revealed to law enforcement. Given the illicit nature of drug markets, law
enforcement’s main aim is to attempt to infiltrate the markets and to prosecute anyone caught
buying or selling on them. This threat poses a significant obstacle to market administrators
126
This is known as an ‘exit scam’, discussed earlier on in the paper.
127

47
who want to attract consumers to their sites. Law enforcement have made it very clear that if
they are able to identify the identity and location of users caught using cryptomarkets, then
they face the prospect of arrest and long prison sentences. But therein lies the problem – it is
very hard for law enforcement to determine the identity and location of users. One of the
ways in which a person’s anonymity can be compromised is during the product delivery stage
where a package posted may appear to be suspicious or can fall foul to a random customs or
postal inspection.128
Another way is through law enforcement infiltrating cryptomarkets by
going undercover and posing as drug vendors. The other, and probably most concerning way
to cryptomarket users, is through law enforcement decrypting messages found on a
cryptomarket’s server or hard drive. In fact, that was the reason behind a number of arrests in
the United States, Britain and Australia that took place after the seizure and closure of TSR;
the FBI were able to incriminate buyers who had used the cryptomarket by tracing their
“digital footprint” from the seized servers and hard drives.129
As a result of this and given the grave consequences of being caught by law enforcement, it is
somewhat surprising that cryptomarkets continue to proliferate and the number of users using
them continues to rise. This can be explained by two facts: firstly, the demand for illicit drugs
is not subsiding and secondly, cryptomarkets are continually adapting and getting stronger in
response to the growing number of threats against them. One example of this is the
development of OpenBazaar which represents the potential next generation of cryptomarkets.
The way OpenBazaar works is by “distributing the transactions of the e-commerce software
128
129
Dara Kerr, 'Silk Road Drug Busts Multiply, Eight New People Arrested' (CNET, 2013)
<http://www.cnet.com/uk/news/silk-road-drug-busts-multiply-eight-new-people-arrested/> accessed 28 June
2016.

48
among all participants of the market”.130
Therefore, when a user downloads and runs
OpenBazaar, instead of having one computer or server that deals with all of the traffic, each
individual computer forms part of the marketplace. This has the effect of distributing the
marketplace over all of the computers that are involved, making it even harder to identify the
users and protecting anonymity and privacy further. Indeed, it can be said that the biggest
weakness cryptomarkets currently face is the single server problem, found with Tor and I2P.
Those services are essentially located and run from a single computer so, in the event of law
enforcement seizing and accessing that computer, they would be able to trace all previous
logs. Moreover, having a marketplace located on a single computer is much more susceptible
to cyber-attacks. This is an issue that has been picked up on by law enforcement with Europol
labelling cryptomarkets’ resilience and move towards more decentralised marketplaces as
“concerning”.131
Of course, an argument can be made that a consumer also runs the risk of buying drugs off an
undercover police officer. However, given that law enforcement’s efforts have generally been
aimed at stopping larger organised crime groups, the chances of a consumer being caught can
be said to be lower. Additionally, the relative lack of arrests made of cryptomarket users and
the increasing popularity of these marketplaces highlights the difficulties that law
enforcement faces. As such, one can conclude that in relation to being caught by law
enforcement, despite the challenges present, drug cryptomarkets can be seen as representing a
less harmful alternative to conventional drug markets.
130
Lewman, 'Tor and Links with Cryptomarkets' (n 43).
131
'Darknets' (n 45).

49
V – The Limitations Present in the Potential Capacity of Cryptomarkets to Reduce
Harm
Cryptomarkets Only Available to “Middle Class” Drug Users
One of the biggest limitations present with cryptomarkets is the fact that they only represent a
small portion of the global drug market. As discussed in section three of the paper, online
drug distribution networks allow for relationships to be built between the producer and the
consumer, the wholesaler and the consumer and between two businesses or wholesalers. In
order for a consumer to be able to buy drugs directly from a producer online, there are a
number of circumstances that have to be met. The consumer must have access to a computer,
an internet connection, a bank account, a delivery address and some technical proficiency to
be able to access the dark web. Martin states that the current cryptomarket users are
determined by “self-selection bias”.132
That, in effect, rules out a large number of people,
including the poor and the homeless, from being able to gain from the potential capacity of
cryptomarkets to reduce harm. It is those social classes who are most at risk of harm from
drugs and developing an addiction. Additionally, Van Hout and Bingham found that the fact
that cryptomarket users have to wait for drugs to be shipped or posted appears to exclude
more vulnerable drug users such as the homeless and opiate dependents.133
Moreover, it is
these marginalised social classes that are most badly affected by the “war on drugs” and its
rhetoric. Having said that, the next decade presents a serious opportunity for these
cryptomarkets to carry on growing and attracting more users. The number of people with
access to computers and smartphones is increasing and the markets are constantly improving
132
Alice Speri, 'Cryptomarkets Are Gentrifying the Drug Trade, And That’s Probably a Good Thing' (VICE
News, 2014) <https://news.vice.com/article/cryptomarkets-are-gentrifying-the-drug-trade-and-thats-probably-a-
good-thing> accessed 28 June 2016.
133
Marie Claire Van Hout and Tim Bingham, '‘Surfing The Silk Road’: A Study of Users’ Experiences' (2013)
24 International Journal of Drug Policy.

50
to become more user-friendly and resilient to potential threats from scammers, hackers and
law enforcement.134
Reduction of Violence Associated with Conventional Drug Networks
Another important point to note is that the prevalence of semi-synthetic drugs such as cocaine
and heroin will still likely have to rely on conventional drug distribution networks; the opium
farmers in Afghanistan and coca farmers in South America are unlikely to have the resources
and ability to access cryptomarkets to sell their products directly to consumers. As such, the
ability of cryptomarkets to reduce violence associated with traditional and conventional drug
networks can be said to be limited to Europe, North America and Australia. Semi-synthetic
drug networks will still have to rely on large networks, with a large number of nodes to
produce, traffic and sell the drugs. Moreover, Morris states that the emergence and
proliferation of cryptomarkets will have very little impact on its ability to reduce the worst
forms of systemic drug crime which includes violence and political corruption.135
Cryptomarkets Widens the Range of People Who Are Able to Buy Drugs off the Dark Web
There is an argument to be made that with the greater prevalence of cryptomarkets, more
people will be exposed to drugs, in particular those who were not previously drug users and
that this represents a more harmful effect than conventional drug markets. 5% of respondents
to the 2016 GDS stated that before accessing and purchasing drugs off cryptomarkets, they
had not previously consumed any drugs.136
However, it is submitted that this argument is
134
Andrew Braun, 'The Dark Net: Will the Black Market Continue to Rise?' (IDG Connect, 2014)
<http://www.idgconnect.com/abstract/8985/the-dark-net-will-black-market-continue-rise> accessed 28 June
2016.
135
Stephen D. Morris, 'The Impact of Drug-Related Violence on Corruption in Mexico' (2013) 57 The Latin
Americanist.
136

51
limited. Firstly, simply stating that someone who consumes drugs will definitely suffer some
form of harm is untrue. As mentioned in the RSPH report, the majority of people who take
any form of drug are unlikely to experience any serious harm.137
Moreover, whilst accessing
and using cryptomarkets is not incredibly difficult – anyone with limited technological
proficiency would be able to follow guides on how to access the dark web – someone
wouldn’t just “stumble across” a drug cryptomarket. Rather, one would have to actively
search for it. Furthermore, the process of buying drugs requires the creation of a bitcoin
account, a bank account to be linked to that bitcoin account, in order to be able to buy the
cryptocurrency etc. These barriers are by no means insuperable, however it does suggest that
anyone who is willing to go to these lengths to try and source some drugs would also be able
to do so through more conventional means.138
137
138
Speri, 'Cryptomarkets Are Gentrifying the Drug Trade, and That’s Probably a Good Thing' (n 132).

52
VI – The Implications on the UK’s Current Drug Policy
It is widely acknowledged and accepted today that the “war on drugs” has failed, in that it has
produced more harms than benefits. Not only that, but it is also responsible for a number of
devastating and unintended consequences. It has failed to curb both supply and demand, has
helped spread health pandemics, such as HIV, and has fuelled a violence-ridden black
market. Even the United Nations Office on Drug Control, which is the “global leader in the
fight against illicit drugs and international crime”,139
has acknowledged the “dramatic
unintended consequence [of the war on drugs]: a criminal black market of staggering
proportions”.140
The prohibitionist regime adopted by the United Nations has undermined the
three pillars of its mandate: security, human rights and development. The emergence and
proliferation of cryptomarkets is further evidence of the failure of the war on drugs.
The number of ways in which harm to users and wider society is reduced has been explored
in this paper. If the rhetoric behind the UK’s drug policy is one that is aimed at public health
and safety, then the emergence of cryptomarkets should be seen as a more beneficial
alternative to the current status quo. However, the UK’s current approach is not looked at
from a public health standpoint and has instead focused on a blanket prohibition strategy
where all drug use is seen as a criminal act.
139
'About UNODC' (UNODC.org, 2016) <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-
unodc/index.html?ref=menutop> accessed 29 June 2016.
140
'The War On Drugs Undermines Core UN Goals of Health, Security, Development and Human Rights,
Admits UNODC' (Tdpf.org.uk, 2016) <http://www.tdpf.org.uk/blog/war-drugs-undermines-core-un-goals-
health-security-development-and-human-rights-admits-un> accessed 29 June 2016.

53
The recent report by the RSPH highlights how the war on drugs has failed to minimise the
harms caused by drugs.141
It criticises the current UK drug policy that is based on a pointless
classification of drugs rather than by looking at the potential harm caused by each drug.
Instead, drugs should be classified against the different types of harm they cause. The report,
rightly, calls for a change in policy so that drug use becomes a public health issue rather than
a criminal one. In the same manner that alcoholism, obesity and nicotine addictions are
treated as health problems, those with a drug problem should not be criminalised and instead
sent for treatment.
The RSPH report calls for the decriminalisation of personal drug use and possession but not
for the complete decriminalisation of drugs, however an argument can be made for one. The
only way to drive the black market of drugs out of business is not only to eventually
decriminalise drugs but also to legalise and regulate drugs in the same way it has regulated
and created a legal market for alcohol and tobacco. A policy that decriminalises possession of
a controlled substance but still allows organised criminal groups and drug traffickers to profit
from the black-market is a flawed one. One only needs to look at the Netherlands, which has
decriminalised marijuana and other drugs but still “spends more per capita than other EU
countries enforcing drug laws,”142
to witness the faults with that approach. As such, the
Netherlands remains the top European hub in organised crime and drug trafficking.143
By
leaving the drug trade unregulated, drug producers – especially those of semi-synthetic drugs
such as cocaine and heroin – will ultimately continue to rely on organised crime networks to
transport and traffic their products. The argument that critics of decriminalisation often put
141
142
Smyth, 'Make All Drug Use Legal, Say Experts' (n 30).
143
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol, 'EU Drug Markets Report: In-
Depth Analysis' (EMCDDA-Europol Joint Publications, Publications Office of the EU 2016).

54
forward – that it leads to a significant increase in illicit drug use – has proven to be untrue.144
Since decriminalisation, drug deaths in Portugal have fallen by 80%.145
Additionally, drug
use amongst 15-24 has declined146
- in fact, overall levels of drug use are now below the
European average.147
Moreover, in 2014, the number of drug-induced deaths per one million
citizens for those aged 15-64 in Portugal was 4.5. By comparison, the Netherlands’ was 10.8
and the UK’s was 55.9.148
Finally, there are a number of benefits to regulating and licensing
drug markets. These include but are not limited to: the ability to impose restrictions on
purchasing age, drug volume rationing, prescription models for dependent users, taxation
revenue, the introduction of safer products and environments for drug users, reduced social
stigma and the development of new social norms and values educating users on responsible
use.149
144
Peter Beaumont, 'What Britain Could Learn from Portugal's Drugs Policy' (The Guardian, 2010)
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/05/portugal-drugs-debate> accessed 29 June 2016.
145
146
George Murkin, Drug Decriminalisation in Portugal: Setting The Record Straight (1st edn, 2014)
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/Contributions/Civil/Transform-Drug-Policy-Foundation/Drug-
decriminalisation-in-Portugal.pdf> accessed 30 June 2016.
147
148
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 'European Drug Report 2016: Trends and
Developments' (Publications Office of the European Union 2016).
149
Stephen Rolles, A Comparison of the Cost-Effectiveness of Prohibition And Regulation Of Drugs (1st edn,
2009) <http://www.tdpf.org.uk/sites/default/files/Cost-Effectiveness.pdf> accessed 29 June 2016.

55
Conclusion
Cryptomarkets present a whole host of challenges that are different from those found with
conventional drug trafficking networks. By virtue of their virtual location and the encryption
and anonymisation services used, cryptomarkets are able to quickly adapt to external
pressures, including those from law enforcement. As has been seen, even when law
enforcement is successful in shutting down one of these dark web marketplaces, a number of
new ones proliferate very quickly. Furthermore, even if law enforcement were able to seize
and shut all cryptomarkets, that would surely result in a return to the previous status quo
which would not represent a positive development given that conventional drug markets can
be seen to be a more harmful alternative.
This paper has argued that cryptomarkets reduce a number of different harms both to users
and to wider society in general. This is due to the fact that online drug distribution networks
cut out a number of intermediary nodes which removes the ability of “middle men” in a
distribution chain to impose price mark-ups and adulterate the product. Furthermore, the self-
regulatory mechanisms, in the form of ratings and feedback provided by users, the
encouragement of discussion on cryptomarket forums and virtual location of cryptomarkets
present a number of harm-reduction methods for drug users. Cryptomarkets’ ability to reduce
harm is limited to a certain class of drug users who have the necessary resources and
technical nous to access those markets. The inability of poorer producers, such as opium
farmers in Afghanistan, to access cryptomarkets means that semi-synthetic drugs will
continue to rely on conventional drug networks.

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