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How to think like a threat actor for Kubernetes.pptx

How to think like a threat actor for Kubernetes.pptx

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Nov. 29, 2023
How (and why) to think like a
threat actor in your
Kubernetes Environments
Abhinav Mishra
Abhinav Mishra Rewanth Tammana
Director of Product
Management, Uptycs
Consultant, Uptycs
2
Abhinav Mishra
Director of Product Management
› Leading Uptycs product team on Containers & Kubernetes
› 10+ years of Security and Engineering Experience
3
Rewanth Tammana
Consultant
› Speaker, Trainer, Open-source contributor, GSoCer & more
› DevSecOps, Cloud & Container security - Red, Blue & Purple teams
By the Numbers - Kubernetes Attacks
Source: 2023 Red Hat State of Kubernetes Security Report
Threat actors are now Kubernetes security experts
4
Which room am I in?
How many floors are
in this house?
What doors can I open?
Where are
the security cameras?
Where are the valuable items?
Which room am I in?
Specific Pod or Namespace
What other rooms can I get
into?
Kubernetes Network Policies/Lateral Movements
What doors can I open?
Access Controls (Role Bindings)
Where are
the security cameras?
Kubernetes Audit Log Data
Where are the valuable items?
Secrets/Sensitive Data

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How to think like a threat actor for Kubernetes.pptx

  • 1. Nov. 29, 2023 How (and why) to think like a threat actor in your Kubernetes Environments Abhinav Mishra Abhinav Mishra Rewanth Tammana Director of Product Management, Uptycs Consultant, Uptycs
  • 2. 2 Abhinav Mishra Director of Product Management › Leading Uptycs product team on Containers & Kubernetes › 10+ years of Security and Engineering Experience
  • 3. 3 Rewanth Tammana Consultant › Speaker, Trainer, Open-source contributor, GSoCer & more › DevSecOps, Cloud & Container security - Red, Blue & Purple teams
  • 4. By the Numbers - Kubernetes Attacks Source: 2023 Red Hat State of Kubernetes Security Report Threat actors are now Kubernetes security experts 4
  • 5. Which room am I in? How many floors are in this house? What doors can I open? Where are the security cameras? Where are the valuable items?
  • 6. Which room am I in? Specific Pod or Namespace What other rooms can I get into? Kubernetes Network Policies/Lateral Movements What doors can I open? Access Controls (Role Bindings) Where are the security cameras? Kubernetes Audit Log Data Where are the valuable items? Secrets/Sensitive Data
  • 8. Pillar 1 - Visibility Across Your Supply Chain
  • 9. Pillar 1 - Visibility Across Your Supply Chain 9 Developer Laptop Development Container Images Control Plane Data Plane Code Development Git Repository Code Pull Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Registry Container Runtime Container Orchestration Registry Scanning Confidential. All rights reserved. CI / CD Tool CI Scanning
  • 10. Pillar 1 - Visibility Across Your Supply Chain
  • 11. Example - Malicious & Vulnerable Packages 11 Container Image - Image is Signed - Registry and CI where image is built and stored is scanned for vulnerabilities - Image Layer vulnerabilities are scanned - What were the ingredients used to make the cookie? Are they safe? - What are the contents of the cookie on the inside? - What was the state of the factory when the cookie was built?
  • 12. Example - Malicious & Vulnerable Packages Need to inspect: - the contents of the image when it is built - the traceability of the image - where did it come from, who built it? - the provenance of the image - what was the security of the supply chain components?
  • 13. Example - Malicious Admission Controllers 13 Admission Controls: - enforce sensible & secure defaults (such as namespace quotas) - only allow trusted repositories - don’t allow insecure resources (ex. wildcard ingress controllers or over privileged service accounts) to be deployed The Challenge: How do I know my admission controller is secure at any given point in time?
  • 14. Example - Malicious Admission Controllers 14 Source: https://blog.rewanthtammana.com/creating-malicious-admission-controllers
  • 15. Let’s take a look at a crypto mining example to see what information we need 1. Attacker created malicious mutating webhook to gain persistence to the system 2. Injects crypto mining init container/side car to each deployment. 3. As an attacker, you want to make everything still seem normal - the application will still work normal but in the backend, it’s eating your compute resources 4. This cannot be identified with static checks like CIS benchmarking, misconfiguration checks using kubescape, etc. 15
  • 17. Pillar 1 Takeaways - Visibility Across Your Supply Chain - always have point in time snapshot of your security posture - rely on a combination of the following: - image scanning: across layers of malicious/vulnerable packages - image provenance: what was the security posture of my supply chain components at the time of an image build? need snapshot information - image traceability: where did the image come from? who committed it? did it go through the right set of security pipelines? - Image signing and verification: is the image signed by a trusted author? 17
  • 18. Pillar 2 - Start with RBAC and Dive Deeper
  • 19. Pillar 2 - Start with RBAC and Dive Deeper 19 Source: MITRE ATT&CK Framework - Containers Matrix
  • 20. Example - Masqueraded Cluster Role Bindings 20 Threat Actors will try to hide behind benign names or components that seem important but are actually harmful Source: https://blog.aquasec.com/leveraging-kubernetes-rbac-to-backdoor-clusters NOTE: Misconfigurations can also be introduced via human error or using defaults
  • 21. Example - Lateral Movements via Default Service Accounts Team Alpha Namespace alpha-1 Namespace alpha-2 SHARED EKS CLUSTER Team Beta Namespace alpha-3 The lock/key is now used to access namespaces including ones belonging to the other tenant if malware is present in one namespace or vulnerabilities, it can laterally move across the entire cluster! You need a platform that can tell you where these misconfigurations are present! Use Security Tools That Map Real- Time Threats To Misconfigurations In Your Cluster
  • 22. Leverage Principles of Zero Trust and IAM in the Cloud Source: https://blog.rewanthtammana.com/securing-aws-eks-implementing-least-privilege-access-with-irsa
  • 23. Pillar 2 Takeaways - Start with RBAC and Dive Deeper - always monitor your identities in and across your clusters - leverage concepts such as IRSAs and Pod Identity to map Kubernetes service accounts to core IAM roles that are properly managed and audited - use security platforms that enable you to answer key questions about your RBAC posture 23
  • 24. DEMO
  • 25. Pillar 3 - Correlating Data Plane and Control Plane Telemetry for Incident Response
  • 26. Pillar 3 - Build and Collect Telemetry Across Control and Data Plane 26 Runtime Security relies on observability - you don’t know what you don’t know Example: User Space vs Kernel Space
  • 27. Collect and Correlate Across A Security Data Lake 27 SHARED EKS CLUSTER Audit Logs eBPF Telemetry - API Calls - Policy Creations - User/Service Account Activity - Process Events - Network Events - File Changes
  • 28. Pillar 3 Takeaways - Correlate Telemetry Across Data Plane and Control Plane - Security starts with observability - you need to collect telemetry from the processes running in a container all the way to your Kubernetes and Cloud control plane - Attackers can hide behind seemingly benign processes - leverage eBPF Telemetry and forensic techniques such as YARA rule scanning to catch these nasty attacks 28
  • 29. Malware Developer laptop Threat Actor Identity Provider Code Repository Cloud service provider 1 2 3 4 5 Uptycs Sensor How Uptycs Can Help - Pillar 1: Visibility Across the Supply Chain Cloud Security Early Warning System EKS Cluster
  • 30. How Uptycs Can Help - Pillar 2: Start with RBAC and Go Deeper
  • 31. How Uptycs Can Help - Pillar 3: Correlating Data Plane and Control Plane Telemetry for Incident Response
  • 32. Q&A Shift up your cybersecurity with Uptycs! › Learn more at uptycs.com
  • 33. Thank You Shift up your cybersecurity with Uptycs! › Learn more at uptycs.com