Criminal Law

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2022 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
WITH CASES PENNED BY J. CAQUIOA
BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla.
Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
TERRITORIALITY - For purpose of venue under the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and territoriality principle in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the
place of commission of the criminal act and the place of occurrence of the effect
of such act, which is an element of the offense, shall be considered. If one pulled
the trigger of his gun in Quezon City and hit the victim in City of Manila, who

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died as a consequence, Quezon City and City of Manila, which are the places of
commission of the criminal act and the occurrence of the criminal effect, are
proper venues. If the psychological violence consisting of marital infidelity
punishable under RA No. 9262 is committed in Singapore but the psychological
effect occurred in the Philippines since the wife of the respondent, who suffered
mental anguish, is residing in the Philippines, our court can assume jurisdiction
(see: AAA vs. BBB, G.R. no. 212448, January 11, 2018). However, if the
commission of the criminal act consummates the crime and the effect thereof is
not an element thereof, the place of occurrence of the effect shall not be
considered for purpose of venue and territoriality rule. Bigamy committed in
Singapore is beyond the jurisdiction of our court although the offended spouse
is residing in the Philippines since the psychological effect of bigamy on her is
not an element thereof.
Convention of the law of the sea - Under the Convention on the Law of
the Sea, the flag state of a foreign merchant vessel passing through the 12-mile
territorial sea of another state has jurisdiction over crimes committed therein.
However, a coastal state such as the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction over
any crime committed on board such ship in the following cases: (1) if its
consequences extend to the coastal State; (2) if it disturbs the peace of the
country or the good order of the territorial sea; (3) if the ship master or a
diplomatic or consular officer of the flag State requested assistance from the local
authorities; or (4) if it is for the suppression of traffic in narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances. Murder or serious physical injuries committed in a
foreign vessel anchored in a Philippine port against a passenger thereof is within
the jurisdiction of the Philippine court since this crime disturb the peace of the
country.
Regime of islands - Under the principle of territoriality, the court has also
jurisdiction over a crime committed in Kalayaan Islands or Scarboruogh Shoal
because the Baseline Law (RA No. 9522) declares that the Philippines exercise
sovereignty and jurisdiction over it.
200-mile exclusive economic zone - The Philippines has no sovereignty
over the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Under the convention of the law of
the sea, the Philippines has the sovereign right to fish and exploit the natural
resources in the zone. This sovereign right is not equivalent to sovereignty. Under
the convention, foreign states have the freedom of navigation and overflight over
the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. Freedom of navigation and
overflight cannot be exercised in a place where a State has sovereignty such as
its 12-mile territorial water. Under the convention, the Philippines has limited
jurisdiction over crimes committed within the exclusive economic zone such as
those involving fiscal, custom, immigration, health and safety. A State has
absolute jurisdiction over crimes committed in a territory over which it has
sovereignty subject only to a few exceptions under international laws. The
recognition of freedom of navigation and overflight and the limited jurisdiction
over crimes committed in the exclusive economic zone militates against the
concept of sovereignty.
If a Chinese fishing vessel deliberately bumped a Filipino vessel in the West
Philippines Sea covered by the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, and
as a consequence, several Filipino fishermen died, the Philippines’s jurisdiction
over the crime of murder cannot be based on the theory that the Philippines has
sovereignty over the zone. Other principles must be used to justify its jurisdiction
over a murder committed within the zone such as flag state rule or universality
principle.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY - Under Article 14 of the Civil Code, penal
laws shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory.
This is the generality principle. Hence, a person regardless of his citizenship,

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religion, political position or any other status can be criminally prosecuted and
convicted as long as he is living or sojourning in the territory of the Philippines.
Under the US Constitution, an American citizen has the right to bear
firearms. Even though an American citizen has a US license to carry a firearm,
he can be prosecuted for illegal possession of loose firearm if he failed to obtain
a permit from PNP to carry it. RA No. 105911 on loose firearm is obligatory to
him regardless of his foreign characteristic. (People v. Galacgac, C.A., 54 O.G.
1027) The American constitutional provision on firearm is not operative in the
Philippines.
However, penal laws shall not be obligatory upon a person, who enjoys
criminal immunity from suit. In October 21, 2015, a Chinese diplomat and her
husband killed two Chinese diplomats in Cebu. The Philippines authorities did
not prosecute the killers for murders because of diplomatic immunity protected
by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The case was referred to
China. They will be prosecuted under Chinese Law.
Case law or jurisprudence recognizes presidential immunity. Because of
this immunity, penal laws are not obligatory to the President. The President of
the Philippines is entitled to immunity from suit subject to the following
conditions: (1) the immunity has been asserted; (2) during the period of his
incumbency and tenure; and (3) the act constituting the crime is committed in
the performance of his duties. Presidential immunity will assure the exercise of
presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that the Chief Executive is a job that demands undivided attention.
(Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001)
During the period of his incumbency and tenure, President Aquino cannot
be charged with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicides in
connection with the Mamasapano incident where 44 SAF members were killed
because of his presidential immunity. His decisions concerning the handling of
the police operation leading to the tragic event are official acts. However, after
the tenure of the President, he can be criminally charged since presidential
immunity is not invocable anymore. But, in Nacino v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. Nos. 234789-91, October 16, 2019, the Supreme Court found no probable
cause to charge President Aquino for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicides in connection with the Mamasapano incident. It was held that Aquino
participated in the planning of Oplan Exodus to arrest Marwan and Usman by
approving the suggested alternative date of execution and ordering the increase
in the number of troops and coordination with the AFP. However, these acts
barely qualify Aquino as an active player in the entire scheme of the operations,
more so point to any criminal negligence on his part.
Vice-presidential immunity - It is submitted that a Vice President is not
immune from criminal prosecution. The job of the Vice President, unlike the head
of the executive department, does not demand undivided attention. Hence, the
circumstance, on which the presidential immunity is based, is not obtaining if
the position is vice-presidential.
Some experts are saying that criminally prosecuting a vice-president will
violate Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, which mandates that the Vice
President may be removed from office only through an impeachment proceeding.
It is submitted however that there is no constitutional violation since in case of
conviction, he can function as Vice President while serving sentence in prison.
However, the accessory penalty of disqualification, which involved removal from
office, is not implementable since the enforcement thereof will offend the
impeachment provision.

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MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA - Criminal law has long divided
crimes into acts wrong in themselves called "acts mala in se," and acts which
would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called
"acts mala prohibita." This distinction is important with reference to the intent
with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala
in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the
law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
(Estrella vs. People, G.R. No. 212942, June 17, 2020)
To classify a crime as malum in se or malum prohibitum, the nature
thereof and the law that punishes it must be considered.
1. Intentional felony — Intentional felony under the Revised Penal Code
is committed by means of dolo. Since dolo or criminal intent is an element of
intentional felonies, they are mala in se. However, there is an exception; technical
malversation is an intentional felony, and yet, the Supreme Court declared it as
malum prohibitum.
In Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012, the mayor, who
applied 10 boxes of food appropriated for feeding program to the beneficiaries of
shelter assistance program, is liable for technical malversation. Mayor’s act, no
matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of
technical malversation. Criminal intent is not an element of technical
malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked
by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose.
The offense is malum prohibitum, meaning that the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids
its commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.
It is the commission of an act as defined by the law and not the character or
violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant. Dura lex sed
lex.
2. Offense under special law – If the offense punishable under special
law is not inherently wrong in nature, it shall be classified as malum prohibitum.
The following offenses under special laws are mala prohibita for not being
inherently evil: violation of BP Blg. 22 (Ongkingco vs. Sugiyama, G.R. No.
217787, September 18, 2019); illegal recruitment (People vs. Espiritu, G.R. No.
226140, February 26, 2020, Justice Caguioa) (People vs. Sison, G.R. No.
187160, August 9, 2017); crimes involving dangerous drugs (Pang vs. People,
G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011); and possession of loose firearms (People vs.
Peralta, G.R. No. 221991, August 30, 2017).
If the offense punishable under special law is inherently evil, there are
two views on the standard in classifying a crime as malum in se or malum
prohibitum.
First view - The first view is that if the offense is punishable under a
special law, it will be treated as malum prohibitum.
Fencing is a concept substantially similar to that of theft or robbery
committed by an accessory. Same as theft or robbery committed by an accessory,
fencing is wrong in character. However, since fencing is punishable under a
special law, the Supreme Court in Cahulugan vs. People, G.R. No. 225695,
March 21, 2018 and Estrella vs. People, G.R. No. 212942, June 17, 2020
declares it as malum prohibitum.
Hazing where the victim died or was raped is for obvious reason evil in
nature. However, the congressional deliberation shows that the legislators
considered hazing as malum prohibitum. Because of the legislative treatment of
hazing as malum prohibitum, the Supreme Court in Villareal v. People, G.R. No.

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151258, February 1, 2012 and Estrella vs. People, G.R. No. 212942, June 17,
2020 declared it as malum prohibitum.
Sexual harassment under RA No. 7877 (Escandor vs. People, G.R. No.
211962, July 06, 2020) and trafficking in person under RA No. 9208 (People vs.
Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 238754, June 16, 2021) are inherently wrong. However, the
Supreme Court declared sexual harassment and trafficking in person as mala
prohibita since they are punishable under special criminal statutes.
Second view - The second view is that although the offense is
punishable under special law, if the same is inherently evil it will be treated as
malum in se.
An election offense e.g., Dagdag-bawas and child pornography under RA
No. 9775 (now online sexual abuse or exploitation of children or OSAEC under
RA No. 11930) are mala in se for being immoral per se although they are
punishable under a special law. (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157171,
March 14, 2006; Cardona vs. People, G.R. No. 244544, July 06, 2020; Cadajas
vs. People, G.R. No. 247348, June 15, 2022)
In Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 224162, November 7, 2017, the
legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 that the crime of plunder under RA No.
7080 is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it
does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in
the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would
be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere
prosecutions for violations of BP Blg. 22 or of an ordinance against jaywalking,
without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts. (Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002)
In XXX vs. Peeople, G.R. No. 221370, June 28, 2021 (Third Division) and
XXX vs. People, G.R. No. 252087, February 10, 2021 (First Division), violence
against women under RA No. 9262 was declared malum prohibitum. However,
in Acharon vs. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021, the Supreme Court
En Banc through Justice Caquioa disregarded the principle in the XXX case
and XXX case and declared violence against women as malum in se although it
is punishable under a special law.
Sexual abuse and child abuse are both punishable under RA No. 7610,
and yet, the Supreme Court classified them differently.
Sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 is considered by the
Supreme Court as malum prohibitum simply because it is punishable under a
special law. In sum, the first view was applied in this case. (Carbonell vs.
People, G.R. No. 246702, April 28, 2021; People vs. Udang, G.R. No. 210161,
January 10, 2018, People vs. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 08, 2017; People
vs. Caballo, G.R. No. 198732, June 10, 2013, Imbo vs. People, G.R. No. 197712,
April 20, 2015, and Malto vs. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007)
Before child abuse under Section 10 of RA No. 7610 is considered by the
Supreme Court as malum prohibium (Lucido vs. People, G.R. No. 217764, August
7, 2017). However, the latest cases treated child abuse as malum in se. (People
vs. Mabunot, G.R. No. 204659, September 19, 2016; Malcampo-Repollo vs.
People, G.R. No. 246017, November 25, 2020) In sum, the second view was
applied in this case.
In Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019, the Supreme
Court considered child abuse as malum in se. Accordingly, when the acts

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complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if a
special law punishes them. Physical abuse of a child under RA No. 7610 is
inherently wrong; hence, criminal intent on the part of the offender must be
clearly established with the other elements of the crime. In sum, the second view
was applied.
In Demata vs. People, G.R. No. 228583, September 15, 2021, the offense
of creating "conditions prejudicial to the child's development" under Section 10
(a) of RA No. 7610 is not mala prohibita, for there may be instances where the
child finds himself/herself in that situation without the willful intent of the
adults around him or her. For example, failure to send a child to school would
certainly be prejudicial to his/her development, but if it was because the child
lived in a remote area under the care of an unemployed and financially struggling
single parent, the latter may not necessarily be convicted under Section 10(a) of
R.A. 7610. The same may not necessarily be said of parents who are well-off but
intentionally deprives education for their children just so that they could always
have someone to order around the house. This is the same principle that
underpins cases where this Court found the accused guilty of slight physical
injuries instead of child abuse because the circumstances did not show the act
was not intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity
of a child as a human being.
This writer humbly submits that the second view is the correct view. The
first view is not based on the definition of mala in se, which are inherently wrong
crimes. Even without a special law punishing sexual abuse or trafficking in
person, sexually abusing a child or trafficking a person for prostitution is wrong.
Moreover, the significance of the classification of a crime as malum in se or
malum prohibitum is the acceptance or rejection of the defense of good faith or
lack of evil intent. The law penalizes malum in se because it is inherently evil. If
the accused in a case involving malum in se committed the subject act in good
faith or without evil intention, the condition of evilness, which is why the law
penalizes it, does not exist. Hence, he will be acquitted. On the other hand, if the
accused in a case involving malum prohibitum committed the subject act in good
faith or without evil intention, he will still be convicted. Lack of evilness is not
material in the prosecution for malum prohibitum because the law penalizes the
same not based on the evil character of the act but due to the commission of a
prohibited act. If the first view will be observed, then the acceptance or the
rejection of the defense of lack of evil intention will absurdly depend on the
source of the law, and not on the evil or non-evil nature of the crime.
In Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015, it was ruled: A common
misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code,
while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality,
however, there are mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under
R.A. No. 7080. Similarly, there are mala prohibita crimes under the Revised Penal
Code, such as technical malversation. The better approach to distinguish
between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the
inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or
omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime malum in se; on the contrary, if
it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by
public policy reasons, then it is malum prohibitum. In Demata vs. People, G.R.
No. 228583, September 15, 2021, Cardona vs. People, G.R. No. 244544, July 06,
2020, and Cadajas vs. People, G.R. No. 247348, June 15, 2022 the Supreme
Court adopted the Dungo principle.
For purpose of the bar exam, if the crime is sexual abuse under Section 5
of RA No. 7610, fencing, hazing, sexual harassment or trafficking in person the
first view must be followed because the Supreme Court says so. Thus, they are

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mala prohibita since they are punishable under special laws. On the other hand,
if the crime is child abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610, plunder,
carnapping, piracy or highway robbery/brigandage under PD No. 532, or
terrorism, the second view must be observed. Thus, they are mala in se since
they are wrong in nature.
Partakes the nature of malum prohibitum – Section 3 (g) of RA No. 3019
punishes a public officer, who has entered, on behalf of the government, into
a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government. Violation of this provision partakes of the nature of malum
prohibitum. (Luciano vs. Estrella, G.R. No. L-31622, August 31, 1970; Villa vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 87186, April 24, 1992) Lack of benefits from the
contract is not a defense on the part of the public officer.
Private individuals, who benefitted from the contact, which is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government, will be held liable under Section
4(b) of RA No. 3019. In other words, notwithstanding the allegation of conspiracy
with a public officer to violate Section 3(g), the liability of these private
individuals will be based on Section 4 (b), which punishes any person for
knowingly inducing or causing the public officers to commit Section 3(g). In
violation of Section 4 (b), criminal intent must necessarily be proved. This is in
clear recognition that Section 3(g), a malum prohibitum specifically applies to
public officers only. (Go vs. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 172602,
September 3, 2007) In sum, violation of Section 4 (b) is malum in se.
Section 3 (d) of RA No. 3019 punishes a public officer or any member of
his family, who accept employment in a private enterprise with whom such
public officer has a pending official business with during the pendency thereof
or within one year from its termination as it is considered a corrupt practice. In
Villanueva vs. People, G.R. No. 237864, July 8, 2020, the Supreme Court
declared violation of Section 3 (d) as malum prohibitum. It was held that mere
acceptance by wife of a TESDA officer, of employment with RACE, with pending
business with TESTA, renders them liable under the law.
In Luciano case, the Supreme Court declared violation of Section 3 (g) of
RA No. 3019 as crime which partakes of the nature of malum prohibitum. On the
other hand, in Villanueva case, it considered crime under Section 3 (d) as malum
prohibitum.
Settled in the rule that violation of RA No. 3019 partakes of the nature of
malum prohibitum. However, the offense under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may
be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith
or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross
inexcusable negligence. (Plameras v. People, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013)
Since malice, evident bad faith or manifest partiality is an element of violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, this crime also partakes the character of malum in
se.
ABERRATIO ICTUS – If the crimes committed against the target victim
and third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus, were produced by a
single act, the accused is liable for a complex crime. Thus, a single act of
throwing a grenade or firing a gun killing one and injuring another constitutes a
complex crime of murder with attempted murder. (People v. Julio Guillen, G.R.
No. L-1477, January 18, 1950; People vs. Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016, September
08, 2020) However, the accused is liable for separate crimes despite the
application of the aberratio ictus rule, and not a complex crime in the following
cases:
1. If the bullet that killed the target victim is different from the bullet that
killed the third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus (People v. Flora,

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G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000; People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, July 15,
2015; Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 216642, September 8, 2020, Justice Caquioa);
2. If the crime committed against the third person, who was hit by reason
of aberratio ictus, is merely a light felony such as slight physical injuries (People
v. Violin, G.R. Nos. 114003-06, January 14, 1997);
3. If the components of a complex crime are alleged in two different
information. (People v. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014);
4. If the crime committed against the third person, who was hit by reason
of aberratio ictus, is child abuse, which is an offense punishable under special
law (Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019) Components of
complex crime must be felonies.
Accused consciously poured hot cooking oil from a casserole on CCC,
consequently injuring AAA (3 years old) and BBB (2 months old) burning their
skins and faces. Accused is liable for child abuse involving infliction of physical
injury although there is no intent to degrade, debase or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. In fact, the intention of the
accused is merely to inflict injury on CCC but because of aberratio ictus or
mistake of blow, AAA and BBB were also injured. In sum, because of Article 4 of
RPC, accused is liable for the wrongful act done (child abuse against AAA and
BBB) although it differs from the wrongful act intended (physical injuries on
CCC). This is not a complex crime. Accused is convicted of two counts of child
abuse. (See: Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019) He should
also be held liable for physical injuries.
Although the accused did not intend to kill Jonabel, treachery may still be
appreciated in aberratio ictus Just because Jonabel was not the intended victim
does not make accused's sudden attack any less treacherous. (People vs.
Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016, September 08, 2020)
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME – Stabbing a person without knowing that he is
already dead is an impossible crime. (Intod v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119,
October 21, 1992) However, if the accused, who stabbed the dead body of the
victim, conspired with the one who previously hacked and killed the victim, the
former is liable for murder and not an impossible crime because of the collective
responsibility rule. The liability of the accused for murder is not based on his act
of stabbing the dead body of the victim. His liability is based on the act of his co-
conspirator in hacking and killing the victim, which by the fiction of the law shall
be treated as the act of both of them. (People v. Callao, G.R. No. 228945, March
14, 2018, Caguioa)
CONSUMMATION OF THREAT - The crime of grave threat is
consummated as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person
threatened or as soon as the victim heard accused utter his threatening remarks.
(People vs. Bueza, G.R. No. 242513, November 18, 2020)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE - A signboard "no testing no smoking" was
posted in front of the fireworks store. Despite this warning, accused deliberately
lit the mother rocket and directed it towards the other firecrackers on
display. The burning of the merchandise and the building (and the death of a
victim) is a foreseeable result. Judging from his action, conduct and external
acts, there was intent to cause damage to another's property by fire. The accused
is liable for arson with homicide and the claim that he did not intend to commit
so grave a wrong as that perpetrated was rejected. (People vs. Pugal, G.R. No.
229103, March 15, 2021)
SELF-DEFENSE – Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or
material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or

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material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a
weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to
cause the injury.
Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at
the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor
must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like
aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making
a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip
where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like
aiming to throw a pot. (Ganal, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 248130, December 2,
2020)
INSANITY - The defense of insanity is in the nature of a confession or
avoidance because an accused invoking it admits to have committed the crime
but claims that he should not be criminally liable therefor because of insanity,
which is an exempting circumstance. An accused invoking the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing
evidence because every person is presumed sane. (People vs. Mirana, G.R. No.
219113, April 25, 2018)
There are two tests (People v. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29,
1950) to determine whether the mental condition of the accused is exempting or
mitigating, to wit: the test of cognition and test of volition.
1. Test of Cognition — Under the test of cognition, the mental
condition of the accused is an exempting circumstance of insanity if there was a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act (People v.
Bulagao, G.R. No. 184757, October 5, 2011; People v. Bacolot, G.R. No. 233193,
October 10, 2018, Caguioa); or mitigating circumstance of mental illness if there
was only a partial deprivation of intelligence. (People v. Puno, G.R. No. L-33211,
June 29, 1981)
After satisfying his lust, the accused threatened the victim. This implies
that the accused knew what he was doing, that it was wrong, and wanted to keep
it a secret. It also indicated that the crime was committed during one of his lucid
intervals. Accused is not exempt from liability for failure to pass the cognition
test. (People v. Alipio, G.R. No. 185285, October 5, 2009)
The accused's voluntary surrender the following day when he killed the
deceased belies his claim of insanity. This act tends to establishthat he was well
aware of what he had just committed. (People v. Bacolot, G.R. No. 233193, October
10, 2018, Caguioa)
2. Test of Volition — Under the test of volition, the mental condition
of the accused is a mitigating circumstance of mental illness if there is
deprivation of freedom. In sum, if a sex maniac or homicidal maniac had merely
passed the volition test but not the cognition test, he will only be given the benefit
of mitigating circumstance of illness. Diminution of freedom is enough to
mitigate the liability of the offender suffering from illness. (see: People v. Rafanan,
Jr., G.R. No. 54135, November 21, 1991) Thus, kleptomania is a mitigating
circumstance of mental illness.
In People v. Bonoan, G.R. No. 45130, February 17, 1937, a schizophrenic
accused, who acted under an irresistible homicidal impulse to kill, was acquitted
due to insanity. In sum, the Supreme Court merely considered the test of volition

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in declaring the accused exempt from criminal liability. This is not a good rule
anymore.
The basis of the exempting circumstance of insanity is lack of intelligence
and not lack of freedom. Thus, even if the mental condition of the accused had
passed the volition test (deprivation of freedom), the plea of insanity will not
prosper unless it also passed the cognition test (deprivation of intelligence). The
controlling rule is the cognition test for purposes of the exempting circumstance
of insanity. (People v. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004)
In several Supreme Court cases, the pleas of insanity of accused who are
suffering from schizophrenia or psychosis were rejected because of failure to
pass the cognition test. In absence of evidence that the schizophrenic or psychotic
accused was deprived completely of intelligence at the time of the commission of
the crime, it is presumed that he is sane when he committed the crime. (People
v. Medina, G.R. No. 113691, February 6, 1998; People v. Pascual, G.R. No. 95029,
March 24, 1993; 1991 Bar Exam) In People v. Marzan, G.R. No. 207397,
September 24, 2018, schizophrenia does not fall within the stringent standard
contemplated by law as an exempting circumstance of insanity.
Time of insanity - In order for the accused to be exempted from criminal
liability under a plea of insanity, he must successfully show that: (1) he
was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of
intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission
of the offense. (People v. Bacolot, G.R. No. 233193, October 10, 2018, Caguioa;
People vs. Mirana, G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018) It is permissible to receive
evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the
time of the act in question. Direct testimony is not required nor are the specific
acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. (People v. Haloc,
G.R. No. 227312, September 5, 2018)
The accused underwent out-patient consultation for his diagnosed
condition of schizophrenia from August 2006 until 13 June 2009. However, there
is no proof of his abnormal psychological behavior immediately before or
simultaneous with the commission of the crime (on November 9, 2009). Thus,
insanity is not exempting. (People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 227997, October 16,
2019)
Proof of the insanity of the accused after the commission of the crime,
especially during trial, is immaterial, unless submitted to prove that the insanity
is continuous or recurring. (People vs. Toledo, G.R. No. 229508, March 24, 2021)
The mental condition of the accused is neither an exempting circumstance nor
a mitigating circumstance if the accused was already treated for a schizophrenic
condition several years before the commission of rape. (People v. Arevalo, Jr.,
G.R. Nos. 150542-87, February 3, 2004, En Banc)
IMBECILITY AND MINORITY – Mental retardation includes (a) idiot,
whose mental age is two-year old; (b) imbecile, whose mental age is seven-year
old; (c) moron or feebleminded, whose mental age is twelve-year old and (d)
borderline intelligence. (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011;
People vs. Bayrante, G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012; People vs. Gilles, G.R. No.
229860, March 21, 2018) For purpose of statutory rape, there is no difference
between actual age and mental age.
Having sexual intercourse with the offended party, who is under 16 years
of age, is statutory rape under Article 266-A (d) of RPC as amended by RA No.
11648. The word “age” in this provision includes chronological age and mental

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age. Hence, having sexual intercourse with idiot, imbecile, or feebleminded is
statutory rape under Article 266-A (d) (People vs. Daniega, G.R. No. 212201,
June 28, 2017; People vs. Labordo, G.R. No. 239033, February 13, 2019; People
vs. XXX, G.R. No. 243988, August 27, 2020). Having sexual intercourse with a
person with borderline intelligence with a mental age of under 16 is also
statutory rape.
The word “age” in the phrase “person below 18 years of age” in Section 3
of RA No. 7610 is either chronological or mental. A person who has a cognitive
disability would be considered a child under RA No. 7610 based on his or her
mental age, not chronological age. For purpose of Section 3 of RA No. 7610, there
is no difference between actual age and mental age. Thus, a mentally-retarded
adult (24 years of age), who had a mental age of an 8-year-old, is a child protected
by RA No. 7610. (Versoza vs. People, G.R. No. 184535, September 03, 2019)
Since the concept of a child in RA No. 7610 is adopted by RA No. 9208, a
mentally-retarded adult is a child within the context of qualified trafficking in
person. (People vs. Ybanez, G.R. No. 220461, August 24, 2016)
Under Section 5 (b) of RA No 7610 as amended by RA No. 10648, when
the child subjected to sexual abuse is under 16 years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted for rape and acts of lasciviousness under RPC. The word
“age” in the phrase “when the victim is under sixteen (16) years of age” in Section
5 (b) of RA No. 7610 is either chronological or mental. For purpose of Section 5
(b) of RA No. 7610, there is no difference between actual age and mental age.
Hence, the victim whose actual age is 16 years old but her mental age is 9 years
old, is considered as a victim under 16 years of age within the contemplation of
Section 5 (b). (People vs. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016)
In exempting circumstance, there is a difference between actual age and
mental age. In exempting circumstance of imbecility, what is important is the
mental age of the accused. An idiot, whose mental age is 2 years, and an imbecile,
whose mental age is 7 years old (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October
19, 2011, Bersamin) are exempt from criminal liability. A feebleminded, whose
mental age is 12 years old, is not exempt from criminal liability since he is not
an imbecile (People vs. Nunez, G.R. No. 112429-30, July 23, 1997) but he is
entitled to mitigating circumstance of mental illness (People vs. Formigones, G.R.
No. L-3246, November 29, 1950). In exempting circumstance of minority under
Section 6 of RA No. 9344, what is important is the chronological or actual age of
the accused.
If the actual age of the accused is 18 years old and mental age is 9 years
old, the exempting circumstance of minority and imbecility shall not be
appreciated because he is neither a minor nor an imbecile (People vs. Roxas,
G.R. No. 200793, June 04, 2014).
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES - There are new guidelines on how to
allege aggravating or qualifying circumstance in the Information. In cases where
law uses a broad term to embrace various situations in which may exist, such
as but are not limited to (1) treachery; (2) abuse of superior strength; (3) evident
premeditation; (4) cruelty, alleging in the information the name of the modifying
circumstance e.g. treachery is not enough. The information must state the
ultimate facts relative to such circumstance e.g. alleging that the accused
surreptitiously stabbed the victim at his back to ensure that he cannot defend
himself. In case of failure to comply with the rule on allegation of ultimate facts,
the Information may be subject to a motion to quash or a motion for a bill of
particulars. Failure of the accused to avail any of the said remedies constitutes
a waiver of his right to question the defective statement of the aggravating or
qualifying circumstance in the Information, and consequently, the same may be
appreciated against him if proven during trial. Alternatively, prosecutors may
sufficiently aver the ultimate facts relative to a qualifying or aggravating
circumstance by referencing the pertinent portions of the resolution finding

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probable cause against the accused, which resolution should be attached to the
Information. (People vs. Solar, G.R. No. 225595, August 6, 2019)
The Information for murder alleged that the killing of the victim is qualified
by the circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength. This
information is defective since the prosecution failed to allege facts on which
treachery and abuse of super strength are based. (The prosecution to comply
with Solar principle may allege that accused to render the victim defenseless
surreptitiously stabbed in at his back) It was held that: Accused did not question
the supposed insufficiency of the Information filed against him through either a
motion to quash or motion for bill of particulars. He voluntarily entered his plea
during the arraignment and proceeded with the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have
waived any of the waivable defects in the Information, including the supposed
lack of particularity in the description of the attendant circumstances. (People
vs. Solar, supra)
PARTIAL RESTITUTION - The payment, indemnification, or
reimbursement of, or compromise on the amounts or funds malversed or
misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the
accused's criminal liability or relieve the accused from the penalty prescribed by
the law. At best, such acts of reimbursement may only affect the offender's civil
liability, and may be credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous
to voluntary surrender. Accused enjoys the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, due to his partial restitution of the amount malversed (Valenzuela vs.
People, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018; See also: People vs. Dapitan, G.R.
No. 253975, September 27, 2021)
CONSPIRACY – Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even
knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to
constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose. (People vs. De Gusman, G.R. No. 241248, June 23, 2021)
The fact that the accused prevented preventing Oliva from reporting the
shooting incident to the police is not an indication that he conspired with co-
accused in killing the victim. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the
act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute
one a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose. The shooting incident transpired during a heated argument on a
drinking spree. There was no showing that the accused actively participated in
the furtherance of the common design or purpose since the shooting transpired
and was consummated even without his cooperation or assistance. (De Los
Santos vs. People, G.R. No. 231765, August 24, 2020). However, he could be
held liable for obstruction of justice.
If there is a conspiracy, the act of the public officer in violating RA No.
3019 is imputable to the private individual although they are not similarly
situated in relation to the object of the crime. Moreover, Section 9 of RA No. 3019
provides penalty for public officer or private person for crime under Section 3.
Hence, a private individual can be prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019 (Go
vs. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007). Even
if the public officer, with whom the private individual allegedly conspired, died,
the latter can still be prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019. Death extinguishes
the criminal liability but not the crime. Hence, if there is proof of the crime and
conspiracy between the dead public officer and private individual, the latter can
still be convicted of violation of RA No. 3019 (People vs. Go, GR No. 168539,
March 25, 2014; Canlas vs. People, G.R. Nos. 236308-09, February 17, 2020).
However, if the public officer with whom the private individual allegedly

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conspired is acquitted, the latter should also be acquitted (Marcos vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998).
While the primary offender in violation of RA No. 3019 and plunder are
public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they
are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This
proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all. In this case, Janet Napoles engaged in the illegal
hemorrhaging of Senator Enrile's PDAF. Thus, they are rightfully charged as a
co-conspirator for corruption and plunder. (Napoles vs. Carpio-Morales, G.R. Nos.
213542-43, March 15, 2016)
Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted
and if found guilty, be held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019. (Granada vs. People, G.R. No. 184092, February 22,
2017) When a contract that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government is entered into, the persons involved—whether public officers or
private persons—may be charged for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and suffer the same penalty if found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. (Garcia-Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 193236, September 17, 2018)
If a contract with the government involved an overprice products or
services, the public officers are liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019
for causing undue injury to the government or giving undue advantage to the
overpaid private individual through manifest partiality and evident bad faith; or
violation of Section 3 (g) for entering into a contract, which is manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government. The overpaid private individual is
also liable for violation of Section 3 (e) or (g) of RA No. 3019 on the basis of
conspiracy and Go vs. Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan. (Santillano vs.
People, G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March 03, 2010; Uyboco vs. People, G.R. No.
211703, December 10, 2014; Granada vs. People, supra) If the overpaid private
individual is a corporation, the responsible officers are liable for violation of RA
No. 3019. When the separate juridical personality of a corporation is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law
will regard the corporation as an association of persons. There is sufficient basis
to pierce the corporate veil, and responsible corporate officers e.g. president
should be held equally liable as her co-conspirators. (Granada vs. People, supra)
A municipal mayor allegedly obstructed and stopped the execution of the
Municipal Trial Court's valid writs of execution and demolition of the structure
illegally constructed on the lot owned by the wife of the complainant. The
Sandiganbayan convicted the mayor of violation of Section 3 (g) of RA No. 3019
by giving unwarranted benefit to the defendant in that civil case. However, his
criminal liability was extinguished by reason of his death. The two accused,
municipal administrator and private secretary of the mayor, were present when
the mayor intervened in the demolition site. But there is no evidence showing
their participation in the intervention committed by the mayor. Passive presence,
knowledge or approval of the crime, or companionship is not evidence of
conspiracy. (Dela Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 197153, October 9, 2019, (Justice
Caquioa)
FENCING – Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD No. 1612 creates
a prima facie presumption of Fencing from evidence of possession by the accused
of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject
of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the
property. (Cahulugan vs. People, G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018)
Section 5 of PD 1612 states that mere possession of any object which has
been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
However, this presumption was overcome by the accused upon presentation of
the notarized affidavits of the President and Chief Mechanic of Bicycle Works

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that indeed, he bought the bicycle subject of the case from their store. Without
proof that the bicycle stolen from the complainant is the same bicycle in the
possession of the accused, the presumption under Section 5 of PD 1612 would
not operate. (Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 249196, April 28, 2021)
Actual knowledge that the property is stolen is not required. Fencing is
committed if the accused should have known that the property is stolen taken
into consideration the attending circumstances such as (1) the price of the
property is so cheap; (2) expensive jewelry is being offered for sale at midnight in
a street; (3) accused knew that the car he bought was not properly documented
(Dimat vs. People, supra); or (4) new tires are being peddled in the streets by an
unknown seller (Ong vs. People, supra). Furthermore, mere possession of stolen
property shall be prima facie evidence of fencing (Section 6 of PD No. 1612).
The accused should have been forewarned that the soft drinks came from
an illegal source, as his transaction with the thief did not have any accompanying
delivery and official receipts, and that the latter did not demand that such items
be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common practice among dealers of
soft drinks. He should have known that the goods are stolen. He was convicted
of fencing. (Cahulugan vs. People, G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018)
If the information alleged that the accused “knows” that the property is
stolen, he cannot be convicted of fencing on the ground that he “should have
known” that the same was derived from the proceeds of theft because of his
constitutional right to be informed (Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 211977, October 12,
2016).
In Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 211977, October 12, 2016, the clearance stated
in Section 6 of PD No. 1612 is only required if several conditions, are met: first,
that the person, store, establishment or entity is in the business of buying and
selling of any good, articles item object, or anything of value; second, that such
thing of value was obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof;
and third, that such thing of value is to be offered for sale to the public. In the
present case, the first and third requisites were not met. Nowhere was it
established that accused was engaged in the business of buy and sell. Neither
was the prosecution able to establish that accused intended to sell or was
actually selling the subject grader to the public.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE - In robbery with homicide, all other felonies
such as rape, intentional mutilation, usurpation of authority, or direct assault
with attempted homicide are integrated into this special complex crime. This
special complex crime is committed as long as death results by reason or on
occasion or robbery without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime (People
vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No.
202124, April 05, 2016).
There is no special complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated
homicide. The offense should have been designated as robbery with homicide
alone, regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed. (People vs.
Labuguen, G.R. No. 223103, February 24, 2020)

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The accused and his companion, intended to rob only the eatery. In the
process, they likewise took the personal belongings of its employees, the victim,
and Teresita. Taking properties from the employees is only a consequence of their
original and single impulse and therefore cannot be taken as separate and
distinct offenses. This taking form part of the special complex crime of robbery
with rape, as they are borne from one criminal resolution, that is, to rob. The
crime of robbery with rape is a continuing crime, thus, although there is a series
of acts, there is but one crime committed. (People vs. Coritana, G.R. No. 209584,
March 03, 2021)
Homicide component – A special complex crime of robbery with homicide
takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion,
of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution
must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging
to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime
of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires
certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob
must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on
occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery
or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the
loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate
witnesses in the commission of the crime (People vs. Balute, G.R. No. 212932,
January 21, 2015)
If the original design is to kill the victim (e.g., there is motive to kill), and
accused killed him, and took his property as an afterthought, the crimes
committed are homicide or murder and theft (People v. Atanacio, No. L-11844,
November 29, 1960) or robbery. (People vs. Natindim, G.R. No. 201867,
November 4, 2020)
The victim was shot while the accused was robbing the passengers of a
jeepney. Even if victim's bag was not taken, accused are liable for special complex
crime of robbery with homicide. In this special complex crime, it is immaterial
that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, as long as
homicide occurs by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof. (People vs.
Madrelejos, G.R. No. 225328, March 21, 2018)
In robbery with homicide, the victim of the robbery did not need to be the
victim of the homicide. (People vs. Daguman, G.R. No. 219116, August 26, 2020)
In robbery with homicide, it is immaterial that the victim of homicide is a
bystander (People vs. Barut, G.R. No. L-42666 March 13, 1979), a responding
policeman (People vs. Pelagio, G.R. No. L-16177, May 24, 1967) or one of the
robbers. (People vs. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020)
However, in robbery with homicide there must be an intimate connection
between the robbery and the killing of one of the robbers. This intimate
connection must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt such as
establishing that one of the robbers was killed during the shootout between the
policemen and robbers. (People vs. Daguman, G.R. No. 219116, August 26,
2020) If the policemen extrajudicially killed one of the robbers, the policemen are
liable for murder while the surviving robbers are only liable for robbery, and not
a special complex crime of robbery for homicide. The criminal liability of the
surviving robbers will not be increased due to the unlawful acts of the policemen.
Collective responsibility – Case law establishes that whenever
homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as

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principals of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the
homicide, unless it appears that they sought to prevent the killing. (People v.
Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173, December 24, 2008; People v. Castro, G.R. No.
187073, March 14, 2012; People vs. Labagala, G.R. No. 221427, July 30, 2018;
People vs. Bongos, G.R. No. 227698, January 31, 2018; People vs. Casabuena,
G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020)
Once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission
of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally liable for the rape committed
by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves
that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape. (People v. Suyu,
G.R. No. 170191, August 16, 2006; People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, June 26,
2009; People vs. Madrelejos, G.R. No. 225328, March 21, 2018; People vs.
Sanota, G.R. No. 233659, December 10, 2019; People vs. Coritana, G.R. No.
209584, March 03, 2021)
However, in fine, the long line of jurisprudence on the special complex
crime of robbery with rape requires that the accused be aware of the sexual act
in order for him to have the opportunity to attempt to prevent the same, without
which he cannot be faulted for his inaction. (People vs. Agaton, G.R. No. 251631,
August 27, 2020) If there is no evidence that the accused is aware of the
commission of rape, he could not have prevented the rape. Hence, the accused
is only liable for robbery and not robbery with rape. (People v. Canturia, G.R. No.
108490, June 22, 1995)
Canturia principle where lack of awareness is a defense is applicable to
kidnapping with rape (People v. Anticamaray, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011),
kidnapping with homicide, robbery with homicide (People v. Corbes, G.R. No.
113470, March 26, 1997) and robbery with arson.
Canturia principle is not applicable to robbery with homicide. Even though
the accused was not aware of the killing by his co-robber and had no the
opportunity to attempt to prevent the same, he is still liable for special complex
crime of robbery with homicide since the killing of the victim is an inherent
consequence of the violence which is an element of robbery.
ROBBERY AND SEXUAL ASSAULT – R.A. No. 7659 on December 13,
1993 amended Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) by prescribing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the special complex crime of robbery
with rape.
On October 22, 1997, RA No. 8353 amended RPC by reclassifying rape
from crime against chastity to crime against persons, transposing the provision
on rape from Article 335 of RPC to Article 266-A, and making sexual assault in
addition to sexual intercourse as a mode of committing rape. Act of sexual
assault includes inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Rape through sexual intercourse is simply called “rape” while rape through
sexual assault is now called “sexual assault.” (People vs. Tulugan, G.R. No.
227363, March 12, 2019) The penalty for rape is graver than that for sexual
assault. In the exercise of its discretion and wisdom, the legislature resolved that
a more severe penalty should be imposed when rape is committed through sexual
intercourse because it may lead to unwanted procreation, an outcome not
possible nor present in sexual assault. (People vs. Barrera, G.R. No. 230549,
December 01, 2020)
At the time Congress was crafting the provision on robbery with rape, its
members were thinking of rape under Article 335 of RPC, which is committed
through sexual intercourse. There is no crime of sexual assault in 1993 when its
members were making the special complex crime of robbery with rape a heinous

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crime. At that time sexual assault was punished as acts of lasciviousness. Hence,
there is no special complex crime of robbery with sexual assault. The crime of
sexual assault in Article 266-A of RPC is not within the contemplation of the
word “rape” as a component special complex crime of robbery with rape under
Article 294. If by reason or on occasion of robbery, sexual assault is committed,
the offender is liable for separate crimes of robbery and sexual assault. (See:
People vs. Barrera, G.R. No. 230549, December 01, 2020)
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE - The phrase “by reason of the rape” obviously
conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape, which is the crime the
offender originally designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim
of the killing. In contrast, the phrase “on the occasion of the rape” as shown by
Senate deliberations refers to a killing that occurs immediately before or after,
or during the commission itself of the rape, where the victim of the homicide may
be a person other than the rape victim. (People vs. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926,
April 11, 2012; People vs. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011)
For the crime of robbery with rape, the law does not distinguish whether
the rape was committed before, during, or after the robbery, but only that it
punishes robbery that was accompanied by rape. (People vs. Salen, G.R. No.
231013, January 29, 2020)
ARBITRARY DETENTION AND MURDER - If the victim dies or is killed
as a consequence of detention, the offender is liable for special complex crime of
kidnapping with homicide. If the victim dies or is killed in the course of arbitrary
detention, the offender is not liable for special complex crime. Neither is he liable
for complex crime. These two crimes were not produced by a single act. Arbitrary
detention was not used as a necessary means to commit murder. Hence, the
offenders are liable for separate crimes of murder and arbitrary detention even if
they were indicted of a complex crime in the Information. It was improper for the
prosecutor to have charged them of a complex crime as the offenses were
separate and distinct from each other and cannot be complexed. (People vs.
Dongail, G.R. No. 217972, February 17, 2020)
INCIDENTAL DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY – Accused committed robbery
inside a factory. Before they could leave the premises after the commission of the
robbery, the police authorities were already at the scene of the crime. Since they
cannot escape, they detained 21 victims. After 22 hours of captivity, the hostages
were rescued. Since the principal intention of the accused is to rob the victims,
and the deprivation of their liberty is just incidental to the prevention of the
responding police officers from arresting them, the crime committed is robbery,
which absorbed incidental kidnapping and serious illegal detention. (People v.
Astor, G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, April 29, 1987)
AAA lived rent-free in a house owned by accused. Accused intercepted AAA
at the garage area and held a knife to her back and dragged her to his room and
raped her. Shortly after, police authorities arrived; but accused refused to release
her and detained her for a period of time. Although the initial (forcible) abduction
of AAA may have been absorbed by the crime of rape, the continued detention of
AAA after the rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it. Likewise, since the detention
continued after the rape had been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary
means for the crime of rape. Hence, the accused is convicted of rape and slight
illegal detention (People vs. Concepcion, G.R. No. 214886, April 04, 2018) or
serious illegal detention with the qualifying circumstance that the victim is a
female.
The Astor case is not compatible with Concepcion case. However, for
purpose of the bar exam, Astor case should be applied to robbery and detention
while Concepcion case should be applied to rape and detention. In sum, if the
robbers held hostages the victims to prevent the policemen form arresting them,
the crime committed is robbery, which absorbs illegal detention. On the other

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hand, if the rapist held hostage the victim to prevent the policemen from
arresting him, the crimes committed are rape and serious illegal detention.
SPECIAL MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE – Under Article 64 (5), when
there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law. This is called as special mitigating circumstance. The title of
Article 64 is rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.
Penalties containing three periods are called divisible penalties.
Under Article 63, par. 2 (3), when there are some mitigating circumstances
and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty (of reclusion
perpetua) shall be applied. The title of Article 63 is rules for the application of
indivisible penalties. Death and reclusion perpetua are indivisible penalties.
Article 63, par. 2 (3) is only applicable cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties. There is only one penalty composed to two
individual penalties, and that is, reclusion perpetua to death.
If the accused is convicted of parricide where the law prescribes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and there are two mitigating
circumstances (e.g. voluntary surrender and confession), there are two views on
which provision is applicable.
First view is case of People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15,
2004. The Supreme Court appreciated special mitigating circumstance under
Article 64. Hence, reclusion perpetua to death was graduated to reclusion
temporal.
Second view is the case of People v. Takbobo, G.R. No. 102984, June 30,
1993. Article 64 (5) on special mitigating circumstance that requires the
graduation of penalty is only applicable if the penalty contains three periods.
Reclusion perpetua to death prescribed for parricide is not a penalty containing
three periods. The applicable provision is Article 63 par. 2 (3) on the rule
involving a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. Hence, the lesser
penalty shall be applied. Reclusion perpetua is lesser than death. Hence, the
accused shall be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua.
It is submitted that the correct view is the Takbobo case. In People vs.
Brusola, G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017, the court convicted the accused of
parricide, and found the mitigating circumstances of passion and surrender.
Accused citing Genosa case argued that reclusion perpetua to death should be
reduced to reclusion temporal by reason of the special mitigating circumstance.
However, the Supreme Court refused to apply the Genosa principle. It was held
that considering that the penalty for parricide consists of two indivisible penalties
(reclusion perpetua to death), Article 63, and not Article 64, is applicable. Thus,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. (See also: People vs.
Padilla, G.R. No. 247603, May 05, 2021)
PENALTIES UNDER SPECIAL LAWS - When a special law adopts the
technical nomenclature of the penalties (e.g. prison mayor) in RPC, the intention
of the law is to adopt the provisions under this Code on imposition of penalty
(People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994). Special aggravating
circumstance of organized/syndicated crime group (People v. Esparas, G.R. No.
120034, July 10, 1998); The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
(People v. Montalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011; People v. Musa, G.R. No.
199735, October 24, 2012); and special aggravating circumstance of quasi-
recidivism (People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 98060, January 27, 1997) were
appreciated in malum prohibitum crime where the law punishing it adopts the
technical nomenclature of the penalty of RPC. The penalty for illegal possession
of loose firearm shall be applied in its minimum period because of the mitigating
circumstance of confession (Jacaban v. People, G.R. No. 184355, March 23,

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2015), and the penalty for sexual abuse (Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733,
September 21, 2007), that for fencing (Cahulugan vs. People, G.R. No. 225695,
March 21, 2018) and that for violence against woman (Melgar vs. People, G.R.
No. 223477, February 14, 2018) shall be applied in its medium period in the
absence of modifying circumstance.
If the special law has not adopted the technical nomenclature of
penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the intention of the law is not to adopt the
provisions of this Code on imposition of penalties. Moreover, modifying
circumstances cannot be appreciated since the penalty not borrowed from the
Code has no periods. The crime has no attempted or frustrated stage since this
penalty cannot be graduated one or two degrees lower.
For example, the accused confessed to an offense where the special law
prescribes the penalty of not more than 10 years of imprisonment but not less
than 5 years (American penalty). Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty shall be applied in its minimum period if there is a mitigating
circumstance such as confession. However, confession cannot be appreciated
since the penalty prescribed by law, which is not borrowed from the Code, has
no minimum period.
Penalty under RA No. 9165 - The Simon principle is not applicable if the
crime committed involved dangerous drugs because R.A. No. 9165 has a special
rule on the application of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Under Section
98 of R.A. No. 9165, notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary,
the provisions of RPC shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the
case of minor offenders.
R.A. No. 9165 has not adopted the technical nomenclature of the penalties
of RPC (e.g. the penalty for possession of dangerous drugs involving shabu of
less than 5 grams is imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years). If the
accused is a minor, the penal system of RPC shall apply because Section 98 of
R.A. No. 9165 say so. To apply the penal provisions of the Code, the penalty for
R.A. No. 9165 must be converted into a Spanish penalty. For example, the
penalty for sale of dangerous drugs or importation of dangerous drugs is life
imprisonment to death. If the accused is a minor, this penalty shall be converted
into reclusion perpetua to death. Taking into consideration the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, reclusion perpetua to death shall be reduced
to reclusion temporal. (People v. Montalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011;
People v. Musa, G.R. No. 199735, October 24, 2012).
However, even though Section 98 of RA No. 9165 mandates the application
of the provisions of RPC in a case where the offender is a minor, if the penalty
for a crime involving dangerous drugs cannot be converted into a Spanish
penalty, the penal provisions of RPC shall not apply. For example, the penalty
for use of dangerous drugs committed by a first-time offender is rehabilitation.
Even if the offender is a minor, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
shall not be considered because this penalty of rehabilitation cannot be
converted into Spanish penalty, and thus, it cannot be reduced one degree lower.
American penalty – Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for offense
punishable under special law the imposed minimum penalty shall not be less
than the minimum penalty prescribed by law while the imposed maximum
penalty shall not be more than the maximum penalty prescribed by law.
Possession of shabu involving less than 5 grams, or marijuana involving
less than 300 grams is punishable by imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20
years. Applying the ISLAW, the minimum penalty shall not be less than 12 years
and 1 day while the maximum penalty shall not be more than 20 years. Thus,
the court can sentence the accused to suffer 12 years and one day of

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imprisonment as minimum to 14 years as maximum. (Felomino vs. People, G.R.
No. 245332, October 16, 2019)
Possession of shabu involving 5 grams or more but less than 10 grams, or
marijuana involving 300 grams or more, but less than 500 grams is punishable
by imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment.
Applying Section 1 of ISLAW, the minimum penalty shall not be less than
20 years and 1 day. Under Section 2 thereof, the rule on indeterminate sentence
will not apply if the penalty is life imprisonment. Hence, the maximum penalty
must be less than life imprisonment. (Concurring opinion by Justice Peralta,
People vs. Obias, G.R. No. 222187, March 25, 2019). A penalty of more than 40
years shall be considered as life imprisonment. Hence, the maximum penalty
must be 40 years of imprisonment or less such as 30 years. Thus, the court can
sentence the accused to suffer 20 years and one day of imprisonment as
minimum to 30 years as maximum. (People vs. Pis-an, G.R. No. 242692, July
13, 2020)
The Obias case and Pis-an case departed from the case of People vs.
Badilla, G.R. No. 218578, August 31, 2016 where the Supreme Court did not
apply the ISLAW where the penalty is 20 years and 1 day to life imprisonment.
GOOD CONDUCT ALLOWANCE – There are two kinds of prisoners,
detention prisoners, and convicted prisoners. A detention prisoner is an accused,
who is under detention although the criminal case filed against him is still
pending or on appeal. Although a detention prisoner is not yet convicted by final
judgment, he will remain under detention if he cannot afford to post bail, or the
crime with which he is charged is non-bailable. The detention of a detention
prisoner is called preventive imprisonment.
A convicted prisoner is entitled to a good conduct time allowance (GCTA)
under Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code for good behavior during detention.
For example, a convicted prisoner is sentenced to suffer 10 months of prision
correccional for committing serious physical injuries. Under Article 97, during
the first two years of imprisonment, he (convicted prisoner) shall be allowed a
deduction of twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention.
After serving 6 months in jail, the warden of the city jail granted him a GCTA of
120 days (4 months). Because of the GCTA, his sentence of 10 months of
imprisonment will be considered served out, although he was only imprisoned
for 6 months.
Before the controversial GCTA Law or RA No. 10592, a detention prisoner
is not entitled to GCTA. However, RA No. 10592 now grants GCTA to a detention
prisoner. Under Articles 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA No.
10592, whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a
period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged, he
shall be released immediately; for purposes of immediate release, the
computation of preventive imprisonment shall be the actual period of detention
with GCTA.
For example, a detention prisoner is charged with less serious physical
injuries, which is punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
After undergoing 4 months of preventive imprisonment, the warden granted him
GCTA of 80 days (2 months and 20 days). Because of the GCTA, his period of
preventive imprisonment will be considered 6 months and 20 days although his
actual detention is only 4 months. Since the period of his preventive
imprisonment (6 months and 20 days) is more than the possible maximum

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imprisonment (6 months) of the offense charged, he shall be released
immediately.
GCTA for detention prisoners is governed by Articles 29 and 97 of the
Revised Penal Code. While GCTA for convicted prisoners is governed by Article
97 thereof.
Article 29 on GCTA for detention prisoners has a qualifying proviso, which
is quoted as follows: “Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents,
escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the
coverage of this Act.” Heinous crime refers to those listed in RA No. 7659 (Death
Penalty Law) such as murder or robbery with homicide. (Miguel vs. Director of
Bureau Prisons, UDK-15368, September 15, 2021) Thus, a detention prisoner,
who is charged with murder, a heinous crime, is not entitled to GCTA while
undergoing preventive imprisonment.
Article 97 on GCTA for convicted prisoners has no qualifying proviso. In
sum, Article 97 does not exclude a person convicted of a heinous crime from the
benefit of GCTA.
Can the rule under Article 29, which excludes detention prisoners charged
with a heinous crime from the benefit of GCTA, be applied to convicted prisoners
even though Article 97 and not Article 29 governs GCTA for convicted prisoners?
Under the old DOJ implementing rules of RA No. 10592, a person
convicted of a heinous crime was still entitled to GCTA. In my opinion, this old
rule is correct. GCTA for convicted prisoners is governed by Article 97 of the
Code as amended by RA No. 10592. Unlike Article 29 on GCTA for detention
prisoners, Article 97 on GCTA for convicted prisoners does not provide an
exclusionary or disqualification clause or qualifying proviso.
However, in 2019 the DOJ issued new implementing rules of RA No. 10592
under which detention prisoner charged with heinous crime or convicted
prisoner, who is convicted of heinous crimes, are not entitled to GCTA, special
time allowance for loyalty, and time allowance for study, teaching, and mentoring
under Articles 97 and 98 of the Codes. The Supreme Court in Miguel vs. Director
of Bureau Prisons, UDK-15368, September 15, 2021, recognizes the validity of
the DOJ implementing rules (2019 Revised IRR). It was held that the GCTA Law
and 2019 Revised IRR have made abundantly clear that persons charged with
and/or convicted of heinous crimes are not entitled to the benefits under the
law.
For purpose of the bar exam, the Supreme Court decision must be
followed. Thus, detention prisoners and convicted prisoners, who are recidivists,
habitual delinquents, escapees, or charged with heinous crimes, are excluded
from the beneficial coverage of RA No. 10592 on good conduct allowance.
COMMUNITY SERVICE - RA No. 11362, which is approved on August 8,
2019, has introduced a new provision on community service, and that is, Article
88-a of Revised Penal Code. Community service is not a penalty but a mode of
serving the penalty of arresto menor or arresto mayor. Article 88-a of the Code
provides:
“Article 88a. Community Service. The court in its discretion may, in
lieu of service in jail, require the penalties of arresto menor and arresto
mayor be served by the defendant by rendering community service in the
place where the crime was committed, under such terms as the court shall

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determine, taking into consideration the gravity of the offense and the
circumstances of the case, which shall be under the supervision of a
probation officer: Provided, That the court will prepare an order imposing the
community service, specifying the number of hours to be worked and the
period within which to complete the service.
X x x
“Community service shall consist of any actual physical activity
which inculcates civil consciousness, and is intended towards the
improvement of a public work or promotion of a public service.
“If the defendant violates the terms of the community service, the court
shall order his/her re-arrest and the defendant shall serve the full term of
the penalty, as the case may be, in jail, or in the house of the defendant as
provided under Article 88. However, if the defendant has fully complied with
the terms of the community service, the court shall order the release of the
defendant unless detained for some other reason.
The privilege of rendering community service in lieu of service in jail
shall availed of only once.”
After promulgation of judgment or order where the imposable penalty for
the crime or offense committed by the accused is arresto menor or arresto mayor,
it shall be the court's duty to inform the accused of and announce in open court
his/her options within fifteen (15) calendar days from date of promulgation, to
wit: (a) file an appeal; (2) apply for probation as provided by law; or (3) apply that
the penalty be served by rendering community service in the place where the
crime was committed. It shall further be explained to the accused that if he/she
chooses to appeal the conviction, such resort thereto bars any application for
community service or probation. In the event accused opts to apply for
community service, the application must be filed within the period to perfect an
appeal. (A.M. No. 20-06-14-SC, October 6, 2020)
If the accused is sentenced with a penalty higher than arresto menor or
arresto mayor, and on appeal the penalty was lowered to arresto menor or arresto
mayor, which became final and executory, the accused may, upon written
application with the court of origin, seek community service in lieu of
imprisonment, which may be acted upon subject to the provisions of these
guidelines. With respect hereto, in no case shall community service be allowed if
the defendant is a habitual delinquent. (Ruego vs. People, G.R. No. 226745, May
03, 2021; A.M. No. 20-06-14-SC, October 6, 2020)
It must be emphasized that the imposition of the penalty of community
service is still within the discretion of the Court and should not be taken as an
unbridled license to commit minor offenses. It is merely a privilege since the
offended cannot choose it over imprisonment as a matter of right. Furthermore,
in requiring community service, the Court shall consider the welfare of the
society and the reasonable probability that the person sentenced shall not violate
the law while rendering the service. With the enactment of R.A. No. 11362, apart
from the law's objective to improve public work participation and promote public
service, it is expected that the State's policy to promote restorative justice and to
decongest jails will be achieved. (Alfonso vs. People, G.R. No. 228745, August 26,
2020)
IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGEMENT - Under the doctrine of finality
of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any

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respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land. Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard
and fast rule as the Court has the power and prerogative to relax the same in
order to serve the demands of substantial justice. (People vs. Layag, G.R. No.
214875, October 17, 2016)
If the death of the accused happened prior to the finality of the judgement
convicting him of rape and acts of lasciviousness, but the Supreme Court was
belatedly informed of such death only after the finality of such judgment, the
case will be re-opened for purposes of dismissing the case. (People vs. Layag,
G.R. No. 214875, October 17, 2016) If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
outside the range prescribed by law, the Supreme Court can re-open a final and
immutable judgement to impose the correct penalty under the law. (Bigler vs.
People, G.R. No. 210972, March 19, 2016; Aguinaldo vs. People, G.R. No.
226615, January 13, 2021) If the new law prescribes a lesser penalty for the
crime of which the accused was previously convicted by final judgment, the
Supreme Court can re-open a final and immutable judgment judgment to impose
the lesser penalty under the new law. In sum, the new law shall be given a
retroactive effect. (Hernan vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874,
December 5, 2017). Layag case, Bigler and Hernan case are exceptions to the
immutability of final judgment rule.
CONDONATION - Reelection to public office (or criminal condonation of a
re-elected public officer by the electorates) is not provided for in Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability for a crime
committed by a public officer before his re-election. (Oliveros v. Judge Villaluz,
G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1974; 1974 and 1980 Bar Exams) Hence, re-election
to public office or condonation of a re-elected public officer is not a defense in a
criminal case.
Under the old rule, a re-elected public official could not be removed for an
administrative offense committed during a prior term, since his re-election to
office operates as a condonation of his misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right of the government to remove him therefor. (Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No.
94115, August 21, 1992) In sum, the reelection to public office or condonation of
a re-elected public officer was a defense in an administrative case.
However, in Morales v. CA and Binay, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10,
2015, doctrine of administrative condonation has been abandoned because it is
inconsistent with the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under
Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. The election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may only be condoned by the President, and not by the
constituents of the re-elected officers. The power to grant executive clemency
under Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution extends to an
administrative offense.
However, the Morales principle shall be given a prospective effect in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines (Ombudsman v. Mayor Vergara, G.R. No. 216871, December 6, 2017)
The abandonment of the doctrine of condonation took effect on April 12,
2016, when the Supreme Court denied with finality the OMB's Motion for

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Reconsideration in Morales case. (Crebello v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
232325, April 10, 2019)
The re-elected public officer can still use the condonation as a defense
subject to two conditions: (1) the administrative complaint is filed before April
12, 2016; and (2) the respondent was re-elected before April 12, 2016. In Office
of the Ombudsman vs. Malapitan, G.R. No. 229811, April 28, 2021, it was held
that the condonation doctrine was abandoned on April 12, 2016, when Carpio
Morales v. Court of Appeals attained finality. Nonetheless, despite its
abandonment, the condonation doctrine can still apply to pending administrative
cases provided that the reelection is also before the abandonment. As for cases
filed after April 12, 2016, the impleaded public official can no longer resort to the
condonation doctrine.
In Office of the Ombudsman vs. Malapitan, supra, the alleged acts imputed
to Congressman Malapitan were supposedly committed in 2009. He was re-
elected as member of the House of Representatives in 2010. On January 22,
2016, the administrative complaint was amended to include the respondent.
Since the respondent was reelected and the administrative complaint against
him was filed before April 12, 2016, he can still use the condonation principle as
a defense. Had the case been filed against the respondent on April 13, 2016, for
instance, he could no longer rely on the condonation doctrine.
In Herrera v. Mago, G.R. No. 231120, January 15, 2020, the
administrative complaint was instituted on January 9, 2015 (or before April 12,
2016) but the petitioner was re-elected as vice-mayor on May 9, 2016 (or after
April 12, 2016). The Supreme Court ruled that the condonation doctrine could
not be invoked.
NOVATION - Novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability
under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. (People v. Nery, G.R. No. L-19567,
February 5, 1964) Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or
novation of contract. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynando, G.R.
No. 164538, August 9, 2010; 1984 Bar Exam) Hence, as a general rule, novation
is not a defense in a criminal case.
However, a novation can extinguish the old contract, which may be the
basis of criminal liability. In such a case, novation is a defense. In estafa through
misappropriation, “receiving the property in trust” is an element thereof. In sum,
a contract of trust is an ingredient of this crime. Novation may convert the
contract of trust into a loan contract, or create doubt on the original transaction’s
true nature. (People v. Nery, supra) In these situations, the accused will be
acquitted for failure to prove the element of “receipt of property in trust.” Thus,
novation is a defense in estafa through misappropriation where the contract of
agency is converted into a sale. (Degaños v. People, G.R. No. 162826, October 14,
2013; 1988 Bar Exam)
Moreover, “receiving the property under an obligation involving the duty
to deliver, or to return” is an element of estafa through misappropriation. Novation
may convert a contract where the accused has the duty to return property into
a new contract where the accused has no such duty. Hence, estafa through
misappropriation is not committed. In Sorongon vs. People, G.R. No. 230669,
June 16, 2021 (Justice Caquioa), there is no longer any duty or obligation on
the part of the accused to deliver or return the cement mixer to the private
complainant or to any other person for that matter because the ownership
thereof had already been transferred to the accused by the private complainant's

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waiver and renunciation in his favor. The accused was acquitted of the charge of
estafa through misappropriation.
Contractual Relationship — Novation can only be used as a defense in a
crime where one of its elements is the existence of a contractual relationship
between the offender and the victim. Novation is a defense in estafa through
misappropriation since the juridical possession of the property by the offender,
which is a requisite to this crime, may be based on contract. Novation cannot be
used as a defense in case of theft or estafa through falsification of a document.
In a theft case, there is no contractual relationship or bilateral agreement which
can be modified or altered by the parties. (People v. Tanjutco, G.R. No. L-23924,
April 29, 1968) In complex of estafa by means of false pretense through
falsification of public documents, the liability of the offender cannot be
extinguished by mere novation. (Milla v. People, G.R. No. 188726, January 25,
2012) There is no contract where one consented due to false pretense employed
by the other party. Without a valid contract, there is nothing to extinguish
through a novation.
Novation under the Civil Code - In order for novation to effectively prevent
the incipience of criminal liability, its concept under the Civil Code has to be
followed as well. (Sorongon vs. People, supra, Justice Caquioa)
Novation may be express or implied. There is express novation when
novation has been explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal terms. There is
implied novation when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every
point. The test of incompatibility is whether or not the two obligations can stand
together, each one having its independent existence. If they cannot, they are
incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. (Sorongon vs. People,
supra, Justice Caquioa)
Partial payment and promise to pay the balance of obligation under a
contract of agency will not convert it into a sale. There is no novation since the
obligation of the accused in making a partial payment is not incompatible with
the obligation to give the proceeds of the sale of the property under the contract
of agency. (Degaños v. People, supra;)
The accused received jewelry from the complainant to sell the same on a
commission basis and with the express obligation on the part of the accused to
turn over the proceeds of the sale thereof, or to return the said jewelry, if not
sold. The accused interposed the defense that the agreement between her and
the complainant was effectively novated when the latter consented to receive
payment on installments directly from the buyers of the jewelry. The argument
was rejected. There has never been any animus novandi between or among the
parties. The changes alluded to by the accused consisted only in the manner of
payment. There was really no substitution of debtors since the complainant
merely acquiesced to the payment but did not give her consent to enter into a
new contract. (Quinto vs. People, G.R. No. 126712, April 14, 1999)
In commodatum, ownership of the thing loaned does not pass to the
borrower. In the settlement between the private complainant and the accused
before the barangay proceedings, the former waived her ownership over the
cement mixer in favor of the latter in exchange for the concession that he would
refrain from filing any case against her in the future. The obligation of the
accused (returning the property) under the old contract of commodatum is not
compatible with his obligation (refraining from failing a case) under the amicable

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settlement. Novation had effectively occurred. Being the owner of the cement
mixer, the accused has no obligation to return the same to the private
complainant. (Sorongon vs. People, Justice Caquioa) Being the owner of the
cement mixer, failure to return it to the private complainant is not
misappropriation since an owner has the right to possess his property. Thus,
estafa through misappropriation is not committed.
The obligation of the accused under a contract of agency is not compatible
with that under the contract of sale. Hence, there is novation. (Degaños v. People,
supra)
REVOCATION OF TRILLANES AMNESTY - Proclamation No. 75 issued
by President Aquino on November 24, 2010 and concurred in by Congress
granted amnesty to the participants of July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Manila Peninsula
Incident. Under Section 2 of Proclamation No. 75, they have to apply with the ad
hoc committee of the Department of National Defense (DND) to be entitled to the
benefit of the amnesty proclamation. In the case of Vera v. People, G.R. No. L-
18184, January 31, 1963, it was held that even though an amnesty proclamation
does not expressly impose this admission of guilt as condition, it is still necessary
for the accused to admit the commission of the crime charged to be entitled to
the benefits of amnesty proclamation.
The DND through Secretary Voltaire Gazmin on January 21, 2011 issued
certificate of amnesty in favor of Senator Trillanes.
President Duterte on August 31, 2018 issued Proclamation No. 572
declaring the granting of amnesty to Senator Trillianes as null and void for failure
to file application and as required in Section 2 of Proclamation No. 75 and admit
his guilt, which is an inherent condition to avail of amnesty.
Revocation of certificate of amnesty - Amnesty proclamation issued by
a former President under express authority of the Constitution and concurred in
by Congress has the nature, force, effect, and operation of a law (People vs.
Macadaeg, G.R. No. L-4316, May 28, 1952). Hence, an incumbent president
cannot unilaterally revoke the bilateral acts of the former President and Congress
in making an amnesty proclamation. Same as a law, amnesty proclamation can
only revoke by concurrent actions of the President and Congress. Moreover,
amnesty extinguishes the criminal liability of the amnesty beneficiary. Hence,
revocation made after the criminal extinction will not prejudice the amnesty
beneficiary.
President Duterte through Proclamation No. 572 did not revoke Amnesty
Proclamation No. 75; he merely declared as null and void the granting of amnesty
in favor of Trillanes for failure to apply as required in Section 2 of Amnesty
Proclamation No. 75, and for not admitting his guilt. In sum, the President was
actually nullifying the granting of the benefit of the amnesty by DND through
Secretary Gazmin to Senator Trillianes. Proclamation No. 572 is an attack
against the decision of DND granting amnesty and not against the bilateral acts
of President Aquino and Congress in issuing Proclamation No. 75. By basing his
declaration of nullity of the granting of amnesty on failure to file an application,
the President is in effect invoking Section 2 of Amnesty Proclamation No. 75; and
by invoking Section 2 thereof, he is in effect, validating this amnesty
proclamation rather than revoking it.
In Court of Appeals in People vs. Soriano and Trillanes, CA-G.R. SP No.
159217, May 31, 2021, it was held that “The general grant of amnesty by
Proclamation No. 75 was not revoked or repealed by Proclamation No. 572. Only
the individualized grant to the petitioner was revoked.

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Presidential power to revoke conditional amnesty - President Duterte
can revoke the certificate of amnesty issued by DND through Secretary Gazmin
in favor of Trillanes for failure to file application for amnesty as an express
precondition to the granting of the benefit under an amnesty proclamation and
failure to admit his guilt. The DND is under the control power of the President.
Hence, he can nullify its decision granting amnesty benefit for failure of the
beneficiary to comply with required conditions.
In Court of Appeals in People vs. Soriano and Trillanes, CA-G.R. SP No.
159217, May 31, 2021, it was held that the grant of conditional amnesty to the
petitioner was subject to the pre-conditions of application and admission of guilt.
If it is then found and known that he indeed failed to fulfill these conditions
originally, then the grant of amnesty becomes susceptible to revocation. Since
the power to ultimately grant an individualized amnesty is lodged in the
President, the authority to revoke a conditional one can be logically ceded to that
office.
The granting of amnesty by the President is subject to congressional
concurrence, but the revocation of amnesty by reason of non-compliance with
required conditions is not subject to the power of Congress to concur. (See:
People vs. Soriano and Trillanes, CA-G.R. SP No. 159217, May 31, 2021)
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCOVERY - The 10-year prescriptive period for
falsification of document shall commence to run on the date of recording of the
falsified deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds because of the constructive notice
rule under the Torren system (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 74226, July 27, 1989).
The accused falsified a notarized Secretary's Certificate by making it
appear that a certain member of the board participated in the meeting where in
fact he is already dead. On the basis of this Certificate, and Deed of Sale, the
Registry of Deeds cancelled the title of the corporation’s property and a new one
was issued. Under RPC, the period tor the prescription of offenses commences
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents. However, the offender party constructively
discovered the crime upon registration of the Secretary Certificate with the Deed
of Sale in the Registry of Deeds because of the rule on constructive notice to the
entire world; hence, the period for prescription commences on the date of
registration of the falsified document. The case was dismissed since the 10-year
period of prescription for falsification lapsed because the information was filed
more than 10 years from the registration of the document. (Lim vs. People, G.R.
No. 226590, April 23, 2018)
The 15-year prescriptive period for bigamy shall commence to run on the
date of actual discovery of the bigamous marriage and not from the registration
of bigamous marriage in the Office of the Civil Registrar. The law on Civil Registry
and the Family Code, which governed registration of marriage, do not provide a
rule on constructive notice (Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454,
June 14, 1994).
PRESCRIPTION FOR OFFENSE – As a general rule under Act 3326,
prescription for an offense punishable under special laws begins to run from the
date of the commission of the offense, if the date of the commission of the
violation is known. However, if the necessary information, data, or records based
on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the public, the State
is to be presumed to know that the crime has been committed. Hence, the
prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the offense.
There is an exception. Prescription for an offense punishable under special
laws begins to run from the date of discovery thereof if the date of the commission
of the violation is not known. However, if the necessary information, data, or