Leadership Skills for Success in US Submarines

Leadership Skills Necessary or Success
Within the U.S. Submarine Community
Karl L. Stewart III
…
Leadership Skills Necessary
for Success Within the U.S.
Submarine Community

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Abstract
This research study focuses on leadership skills that senior leadership within the
U.S. Navy Submarine Community feel are necessary for success, as it pertains to
reactor plant and ship safety, mission readiness, and personnel job satisfaction, versus
the leadership skills junior personnel within the submariner community feel their
leadership ought to have for success. While this study seeks to analyze the entire
submarine fleet, participants for the study were limited to submarines within the Norfolk,
VA area. As a key part of the of U.S. Naval fleet, the submarine fleet often finds itself
operating with relatively young and inexperienced operators and leaders. Personnel at
key stations of the ship including the reactor and propulsion plant, atmosphere control
equipment, and those required to pilot a submerged submarine, to name a few, are
often not of legal drinking age. Sailors are often thrust into leadership positions such as
NNSY and LPO with as little as four years of naval experience.
This research project seeks to understand leadership qualities and traits that are
most important to submariners and assess the current state of leadership development
aboard U.S. Submarines. This study includes both qualitative and quantitative research
approaches. The first part of the questionnaire uses a qualitative approach to generate
a list of traits and values. The second part of the questionnaire uses a quantitative
approach in the form of open-ended questions. The questionnaire was distributed to
122 sailors across four submarines. The data was then collected, analyzed, and
combined with the literature review. The findings of this study were able to successfully
produce a list of ten traits and values to each group of Sailors as well as assess
leadership development aboard each submarine.

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Table of Contents
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................2
The Statement of the Problem................................................................................................5
The Challenges.......................................................................................................................... 5
The Hypotheses......................................................................................................................... 7
The Delimitations ...................................................................................................................... 8
Definitions of the Terms........................................................................................................... 9
Abbreviations.......................................................................................................................... 10
Assumptions............................................................................................................................ 11
The Importance of the Study.................................................................................................12
Literature Review .....................................................................................................................13
Summary................................................................................................................................ 17
Methodology..............................................................................................................................20
Summary................................................................................................................................ 22
Findings......................................................................................................................................23
Junior Officers......................................................................................................................... 24
Summary................................................................................................................................ 26
Senior Officers......................................................................................................................... 27
Summary................................................................................................................................ 32
Junior Officers vs. Senior Officers....................................................................................... 35
Junior Enlisted........................................................................................................................ 36
Summary................................................................................................................................ 40
Senior Enlisted........................................................................................................................ 43
Summary................................................................................................................................ 49
Junior Enlisted vs. Senior Enlisted....................................................................................... 52
Submarine #1........................................................................................................................... 54
Summary................................................................................................................................ 55
Submarine #2........................................................................................................................... 57
Summary................................................................................................................................ 58
Submarine #3........................................................................................................................... 59
Summary................................................................................................................................ 60
Submarine #4........................................................................................................................... 60
Summary................................................................................................................................ 63
Conclusions and Recommendations .................................................................................65
Summary.................................................................................................................................. 69
Limitations .................................................................................................................................71
Works Cited ...............................................................................................................................73
Appendix A – Leadership Traits, Values, and Leadership Development
Questionnaire............................................................................................................................75
Table 1 – Leadership Values & Traits – Average Scores ..............................................79

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Table 2 – Leadership Values & Traits –Scores Chosen Most Often...........................80
Table 3 – Responses to Question #5: Does your command have a leadership
development program? ..........................................................................................................81
Table 4 – Responses to Question #6 - On a scale of 1 to 5, how would you rate the
effectiveness of your command's leadership development program?.....................81
Table 5 – Responses to Question #7 - On a scale of 1 to 5, how would you rate the
effectiveness of your command's leadership development program?.....................82
Junior Officers......................................................................................................................... 82
Senior Officers......................................................................................................................... 82
Junior Enlisted........................................................................................................................ 82
Senior Enlisted........................................................................................................................ 83
Table 6 – Responses to Question #8: Do you feel that your command’s leadership
development program begins leadership training too soon, at about the right time
in a Sailor’s career, or too late? ...........................................................................................85
Table 7 – Responses to Question #9: If the answer to #8 was “too soon” or “too
late,” when do you think it should be started? Why .....................................................86
Junior Officers......................................................................................................................... 86
Senior Officers......................................................................................................................... 86
Junior Enlisted........................................................................................................................ 86
Senior Enlisted........................................................................................................................ 86
Table 8 – Responses to Question #10: Do you feel that your command's quality of
leadership has affected your decision to make the military a career? Why or why
not?..............................................................................................................................................88
Junior Officers......................................................................................................................... 88
Senior Officers......................................................................................................................... 88
Junior Enlisted........................................................................................................................ 89
Senior Enlisted........................................................................................................................ 91

The Statementof the Problem
Leadership within the U.S. submarine service does not typically begin until
Sailors are already in positions or are at a rank that requires leadership skills. For
example, an enlisted submariner is not likely to receive formal leadership development
training until he has reached the rank of FCPO; the same rank that he can expect to be
able to fulfill the role of a LPO. This is because the current ongoing leadership
development program for Sailors, CPO 365, is geared to train FCPOs in order to better
prepare them for the position of CPO. CPO 365 is broken up into two phases. The first
phase trains FCPOs throughout the year on naval traditions and policies and real word
scenarios to further develop leadership skills in order to become better WCSs and LPOs
(Stevens, 2014). The second phase of CPO 365 is reserved for FCPOs who have been
selected for the rank of CPO and serves as the final training period to prepare FCPOs
for their new role as CPOs (Stevens, 2014). Training on leadership development
sooner would serve to maintain the submarine fleet at a maximum level of combat
readiness through: well thought-out maintenance and refit periods, first time work
quality, clear communication, and a higher level of Sailor retention through a higher
quality level of leadership (Al Harbi, 1995).
The Challenges
1. The first challenge is to determine what leadership skills senior submarine
community leadership feels is necessary for success. Personnel who have reached
senior leadership level positions are likely to have the experience necessary to know
which leadership skills and values are necessary for success. These personnel will at

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the very least be able to look back and remember which leadership skills and values
were of the greatest importance throughout their journey to leadership.
2. The second challenge is to determine what leadership skills junior submarine
service personnel feel their leadership ought to have for success. Junior personnel
often have an idea as to what they would like to see in their leaders. As these junior
Sailors are placed into leadership positions, they often find that their ideal leadership
qualities are unable to produce less than ideal results. These less than ideal results can
show up as pushback and bad attitudes from fellow junior Sailors or unsuccessful
teamwork exercises. Being able to learn which leadership skills and values are actually
necessary from the experience of senior personnel who have already had to learn these
lessons would be able to save up-and-coming junior Sailors the heartache of having to
learn these same lessons all over again.
3. The third challenge is to determine the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy’s
ongoing leadership development programs. The U.S. Navy has leadership
development schools, each about a week to two weeks in length that are geared to
instruct Sailors on leadership skills and techniques at various points in their careers.
The effectiveness of these schools is measured through feedback provided by Sailors
prior to leaving to return to their parent commands. While the U.S. Navy also has
ongoing leadership development programs for its Sailors (i.e., CPO 365), this training
does not typically begin until enlisted Sailors have reached the level of a FCPO. By the
time a Sailor has reached this rank, he or she is typically already in, or expected to be
able to step into, a leadership position. If Sailors were already well versed in leadership
values and techniques prior to reaching this rank, they would then be better equipped to

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assume such roles and to lead their fellow Sailors. Furthermore, CPO 365 does not
currently have a formal method in place to measure its effectiveness. Unless Sailors
are willing to step forward to address relevant issues that may exist with proposed
solutions, this program is often accepted “as is.”
The Hypotheses
1. The first hypothesis is that junior service members within the submarine
community have their own set of ideal leadership traits and values when considering
necessary leadership skills dissimilar to that of their leadership. This may occur from
Sailors reporting to the fleet with a preconceived notion as to what it is to be a leader.
As these Sailors begin to gain experience within the workplace and as a leader these
beliefs often begin to shift and change. At other times, senior leadership may cause the
junior Sailor to shift his or her views through mentoring as wisdom is imparted to the
junior Sailor over time. By the time Sailors reach senior leadership positions these
viewpoints may have shifted quite drastically from their original stance.
2. The second hypothesis is that the development of a rating scale can aid senior
personnel within the submarine community. The rating scale can serve to show those
leadership skills each group of submariners consider the most important on average as
well as those leadership skills that each group of submariners tend the most important
the most often. The rating scale would then serve in the development and change of
leadership development policies to improve the quality of leadership, promote a healthy
work environment, and reduce the overall attrition rate.

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3. The third hypothesis is that attrition rates vary widely from one submarine
command to another. This is due to the fact that each submarine’s command climate
and morale will vary from command to command. This is simply because each and
every navy command’s leadership is unique. Some command leadership teams have a
very particular way of doing things, wish to have a say in how all tasks are
accomplished, and are not all that interested in hearing how things should be done
differently. On the other side of the spectrum, there are those commands that are
willing to try new things so long as the job gets done correctly, welcome feedback from
the crew, and are recognized often for a job well done. Admittedly, most submarine
commands will fall somewhere in the middle of these two spectrums. For submarines
that are currently experiencing a command climate “high,” submariners will be more apt
to stay in the navy for an additional term. The inverse would be true for submarines
experiencing command climate “lows.”
The Delimitations
This study will not attempt to evaluate any submarine personnel who are
stationed outside of the Norfolk, VA area. Submarine Sailors stationed aboard
Precommissioning Units at the NNSY will be included in the Norfolk, VA area.
This study will only attempt to evaluate submarine personnel who have earned
their submarine warfare device. Sailors qualified in submarine duty wear the submarine
warfare device, often referred to as dolphins. To earn this warfare insignia,
crewmembers must display a thorough knowledge in all aspects of damage control and
every system operated onboard their submarine. Earning this qualification takes a

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significant amount of time and effort and can be expected to take up to nine months to
complete. The only exception to this will be to personnel that are stationed aboard a
precomissioning unit for a period of at least six months.
This study will not attempt to evaluate any submarine personnel who have less
than two years of active duty service.
Definitions of the Terms
Attrition. Attrition, for the purposes of this study, will refer to military personnel
who do not stay in the military after completing a full first term.
Full first term. Full first term refers to the initial contract a Sailor agrees to when
enlisting or receiving a commission in the military. This varies from four to six years,
depending on the Sailor’s chosen field.
Junior Personnel. Junior personnel for the sake of this study will be enlisted
personnel at a pay-grade of E-5 and below and Unrestricted Line Officers at a pay-
grade of O-1 to O-3.
Limited Duty Officer. LDOs are officers who are selected for commission based
on a specific skill set and are not required to hold a bachelor’s degree. The men and
women who make up this type of officer community are selected from the enlisted ranks
of E-6 and above. These individuals will be considered senior personnel regardless of
rank due to their inherent experience level.
Motivation. Motivation is “the process that initiates, guides, and maintains goal-
oriented behaviors” (Cherry).
Precommissioning Unit. A precomissioning unit is a submarine currently
undergoing initial construction and testing.

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Sailor. A Sailor is any person currently serving in the U.S. Navy.
Senior Personnel. Senior personnel for the sake of this study are enlisted
personnel at a pay-grade of E-6 and above, LDOs, and Line Officers at a pay-grade of
O-4 and above.
Submariner. A submariner is a Sailor that has volunteered for submarine duty
and is currently stationed aboard a U.S. Navy submarine.
Work Center Supervisor. A WCS is a senior petty officer that is responsible to
his or her division officer via his or her Leading CPO and LPO for the effective operation
of the 3-M system for their respective work center (Department of the Navy, 2013).
Unrestricted Line Officer. An Unrestricted Line Officer is a commissioned officer
that is eligible for sea command.
Abbreviations
CCC is the abbreviation used for Command Career Counselor.
CDR is the abbreviation used for Commander.
CPO is the abbreviation used for Chief Petty Officer.
CO is the abbreviation used for Commanding Officer.
FCPO is the abbreviation used for First Class Petty Officer
LCDR is the abbreviation used for Lieutenant Commander.
LDO is the abbreviation used for Limited Duty Officer.
LPO is the abbreviation used for Leading Petty Officer.
LT is the abbreviation used for Lieutenant.
LTJG is the abbreviation used for Lieutenant Junior Grade.
MCPO is the abbreviation used for Master Chief Petty Officer

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NNSY is the abbreviation used for Newport News Shipyard.
SCPO is the abbreviation used for Senior Chief Petty Officer
WCS is the abbreviation used for Work Center Supervisor.
XO is the abbreviation used for Executive Officer
Assumptions
The first assumption. The first assumption is that the attrition of military
personnel to the civilian sector within the submarine force presents a real problem to
senior personnel within this program and mission readiness.
The second assumption. The second assumption is that this attrition rate will
continue to rise unless the factors are accurately identified and action is taken to
mitigate these factors.
The third assumption. The third assumption is that the criterion group consisting
of the population of military personnel within the submarine force stationed at NNSY
and Norfolk Naval Base at Norfolk, VA is representative of all personnel within the
submarine force.

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The Importanceof the Study
Military personnel working within the submarine community are little known to the
average American due to the nature of their work. Civilians who wish to enlist in the
Naval Submarine force go through a rigorous training program lasting anywhere from
four to eighteen months depending on the rating designation chosen by the individual.
Once complete, this training requires Sailors to undergo an extensive qualification
program to not only learn their jobs, but the basics of all ship’s systems, damage control
systems, and everyone else’s jobs as well. Following this training period, Sailors are
periodically made to change collateral duties in order to help mold them into well-
rounded Sailors. However, formal leadership training does not typically begin until the
Sailor is an E-6. For some Sailors this can mean being in the navy for over eight years
before leadership development is begun. Waiting this long to begin leadership
development puts Sailors at a disadvantage since they are already an E-6 by the time
leadership development begins. Leadership skills are already required by this point and
must be able to be put into use since these Sailors are likely to take on the position of
LPO. Sailors placed in a LPO position without the requisite skills are frustrated and
overwhelmed as they begin their steep learning curve within this new role. Followers
are left feeling frustrated since their leadership is ill prepared to fulfill the duties of a
position for which the senior leadership was not ready. Retaining Sailors is hard enough
already due to high operational tempo, poor work life balance, low service-wide morale,
declining pay and compensation (Kohlmann & Snodgrass, 2014). These factors only
exacerbate issues such as a waning desire for senior leadership positions and a
widespread distrust of senior leadership that could be otherwise avoided.

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LiteratureReview
The literature review will include three general areas: (a) the process involved
with this literature review, (b) how studies relating to military leadership have changed
over the last decade, and (c) how studies relating to military leadership have focused on
various leadership and management skills. The present review is limited to
investigations of military personnel who have shared their views on military leadership
and leadership development. Studies targeting leadership and leadership development
among the civilian sector are excluded.
Fiorina describes naval leaders as individuals who create a vision within their
organization, identify strategies to move the organization forward, and is effectively able
to communicate his or her vision and strategy to their fellow Sailors (Hackney, 2004).
Searches for relevant literature are limited to naval leadership, retention, and naval
leadership skills necessary for success. Studies led by Dulwicz & Young, Hackney, and
Kohlmann & Snodgrass focused on naval leaders and their ability to create a vision,
develop strategies, and communicate said strategies effectively to subordinates. While
all of the studies reveal much in lessons learned and invaluable insight, a 2014 study on
Navy retention study sounds a warning bell for Naval leadership. Nearly half of the
Sailors that participated in the retention study indicated that they did not desire their
boss’ job while the other half feels as if senior leadership does not care for subordinates
and is not held accountable. Furthermore, well over a third of Sailors said that their
trust in senior leadership had been lost (Kohlmann & Snodgrass, 2014). Why is this,
what types of leadership skills are necessary for future success, and what must naval
leaders do in order to regain their Sailors’ trust?

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In a 2004 study into the beliefs and actions of naval leaders aboard U.S. Navy
ships, Hackney sought to examine the covenant of leadership aboard U.S. Navy ships
up and down the chain of command. This covenant of leadership begins with the
premise that all military members have taken an oath to support and defend the
constitution of the United States. Hackney conveys that taking this oath obligates
leaders to be respectful of others, provide clear direction, meaningful work and the tools
as well as training to do that work, recognition for a job well done, and the opportunity
for personal and professional growth that could be captured within a conceptual
framework for contractual versus covenant leader/subordinate relationships. Hackney
states that leaders include all individuals at all levels of the organization that understand
the organization’s vision and how to motivate people to accomplish it. Furthermore, this
study asserts that leadership development programs within an organization can and will
provide the necessary nudge for organizations that seek to modify subordinate
behaviors while continuing to develop them as leaders (Hackney, 2004). Hackney
believes that a successful leadership development program will focus on: implications of
new technology, ethics and actions of a leader, how to establish and communicate a
vision, and how to balance personal and professional lives. This is because leaders
need to be technical experts in their fields, credible, trustworthy, and passionate about
their vision with the knowledge and skills necessary to back that vision up (Hackney,
2004). Leadership development programs must be molded to each individual Sailor in
order to provide necessary skills with which to balance his or her personal and
professional life. Unless the Sailor is able to achieve some sort of balance in his or her
life, everything that Sailor is involved with will not reach its full potential (Hackney,

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2004). The thought process behind this is that if the Sailor is not able to perform well in
his personal life – whether it is in finances, marriage, or even leisurely activities – then
that Sailor will be too stressed to be able to properly focus on work related tasks. While
Sailors are expected to be able to perform under periods of extreme stress, such as
during an attack, forcing or allowing the Sailor to perform under such levels of stress will
not allow a proper balance between quality of life and quality of work life (Hackney,
2004).
Throughout the course of Hackney’s study of naval leaders, Hackney found that
senior leadership viewed their training development programs in a positive light. This
was shown through senior leadership’s responses to questions about their own
leadership style and through actions taken to instill those same leadership qualities in
their subordinates (Hackney, 2004). In fact, senior leadership was quite interested in
the development of their subordinates and felt that, overall, their methods of developing
leaders were appropriate and effective (Hackney, 2004). This is quite interesting when
compared to the negative viewpoint of leadership development held by that of
subordinates. The reason for this negative view is made clearer by the inconsistencies
found across leader groups in terms of leadership development in that, where this
training exists, it has been based more on personal preferences than that of strategic
plans of action (Hackney, 2004).
Dulewicz and Young conducted a study in 2008 focusing on differences between
leadership and management within the British Royal Navy. This study was able to
determine that leadership and management are quite related. This means that, while
there are competencies unique to leadership and management, there are many that are

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shared between both (Dulewicz & Young, 2008). This is further supported by Kotter’s
view that a single person can be both a leader and a manager. Understanding the
differences between leadership and management can only serve to aid organizations in
better molding their Sailors. This is because leaders will be better equipped to
recognize the dominant traits within their subordinates while developing the lesser traits
of these individuals such that both management and leadership may be taught
effectively (Dulewicz & Young, 2008). This study was able to determine that the single
most important ingredient for someone to be an outstanding performer is their desire to
use one’s own competencies to the fullest. It is not surprising then, that motivation was
found to be the most important competency within the British Royal Navy (Dulewicz &
Young, 2008). Of note, Dulewicz and Young found that there were six characteristics of
leadership that were completely unrelated to performance. This should serve as an
important warning to senior leadership as there are many who wish to exude the image
of leadership while not being able to support the image with actual performance.
(Dulewicz & Young, 2008).
Lastly, in a 2014 study, Leadership that develops other people: an empirical
study into the effect of humanist principles and therapeutic common factors on
subordinate development, Mike Young sought to consider the effect of humanist
principles and therapeutic common factors on subordinate development amongst British
naval officers. Humanistic leadership development is founded on searching for
meaning and purpose in human experience, focus on knowledge as the basis for action,
and action grounded in a moral ethos (Perruci & Schwartz, 2002). Humanist principles
that have been shown to deliver improved performance are empowered learning, goal

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setting, and action (Young, 2014). Therapeutic common factors center on the idea that
subordinates are viewed as an end and not just as a means (Young, 2014).
Interestingly enough the leadership behavior of caring and developing were found to be
the most significantly correlated with rating of subordinate development (Young, 2014).
This only further serves to substantiate the claim made by over half of U.S. Sailors that
they feel as if senior leadership does not “care what they think” (Kohlmann &
Snodgrass, 2014). Young define caring as “sympathetic and considerate towards
others, helpful and supportive, and gets involved in others’ problems” (Young, 2014). It
is easy to see the link between caring and developing as this second term “believes
others have potential to take on ever more demanding tasks, roles, and encourages
them to do so.” One would not be able to develop a fellow Sailor or subordinate if one
did not care to do so. Developing a Sailor’s competencies requires a large investment
in time and effort on the part of the leader so that the Sailor is then able to effectively
contribute to the organization and in turn develop others (Young, 2014). Within this
study, most leadership dimensions were significantly related to subordinate
development while nearly none of the personality characteristics were in turn related to
subordinate development. This only serves to say that a leader’s actions speak louder
than words, whether it is subordinate development or mere his or her credibility.
Summary
While there is a set leadership development program for all FCPOs, CPO 365,
the way in which the program is administered is left open to the interpretation of each
local command. This, coupled with the fact that the navy is filled with individuals from
all walks of life from all over the country have led to varying leadership techniques within
the navy as a whole. It can therefore be hypothesized that leadership techniques and

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skills also vary widely within the submarine force as well. Personnel manning these
submarines within the U.S. Navy have rarely been fully manned and are in high demand
amongst the civilian sector. Personnel within the submarine force can expect to make
over $60k per year by their sixth year of service with bonuses totaling over $100k to
stay in past the initial six-year enlistment. Due to the monetary value involved in
training and attempting to keep these personnel, more should be done to understand
just why these same personnel choose to get out rather than stay in as it pertains to
leadership techniques and skills.
The literature discussed above has looked into the similarities and differences of
leadership and management, beliefs and actions of naval leaders aboard U.S. Navy
ships, the quality of leadership development programs, and humanist and therapeutic
common factors on subordinate development. The literature, has not, however, sought
to look show differences between leader/subordinate viewpoints as it relates to
necessary leadership skills. As “one size fits all” programs rarely are able to truly fit the
needs of every individual, understanding these differences will help to provide a more
focused and customized leadership development experience for all Sailors. Changes in
leadership development that come as a result of these findings should be able to help
Sailors to plan out maintenance and refit periods more effectively, communicate more
clearly, and result in a higher rate of first time work quality. A higher rate of first time
work quality will come as a result of subordinates who are led by Sailors who will be
better able to communicate and lead with a consistency that will give subordinates a
routine that they can learn to depend on. These changes will save the government a
considerable amount in money through efficient job completion with less rework, time

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and energy in recruitment and training, and provide the ability to choose to retain only
the best and brightest individuals to lead the future of the nuclear navy.

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Methodology
For the purposes of determining if a disparity exists between valued leadership
skills amongst junior and senior personnel, a balance between quantitative and
qualitative approaches would be best. This is because the qualitative approach will tell
us which leadership traits are important to submariners and the state of leadership
development while the quantitative approach will tell us just how important those
leadership traits are, whether or not Sailors are informed of command leadership
development programs, and if those Sailors agree with when leadership development
begins. For the qualitative approach, utilizing an ethnography methodology will be most
appropriate. This is because, with ethnography, the researcher is looking at the entire
group in depth (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Ethnographies are typically conducted over
several months and in some cases several years (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).
Other types of qualitative methods would not have been appropriate. A case
study would only focus on one individual (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Since everyone is
different and, more importantly, not everyone can be pleased, the study needs to focus
on a representative sample that properly reflects the entire population of personnel
within the submarine fleet. A phenomenological study would not have been appropriate
either. Phenomenological studies try to understand people’s perceptions, perspectives,
and understandings of a particular situation (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Sample sizes for
these types of studies are too small, typically 5 to 25 individuals, and would not provide
an adequate picture of the entire submarine community as it represents several
thousand individuals. Grounded theories are especially useful when current theories
are inadequate or nonexistent (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Since there are ample studies

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on military attrition, this type of study would not be necessary. Lastly, content analysis
methodologies typically study forms of human communication. While communication
may indeed be a factor in military attrition it is by far not the only one, making this type
of study inadequate.
Questions should be short, to the point, and only asked if absolutely necessary to
obtain information to solve the research problem (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). The
questions should be clear and have very precise meanings (i.e. avoid using words such
as occasionally, usually). Questions should not have unwarranted assumptions within
them (i.e. the questions in the research study should not assume that all personnel
within the NNPP have decided not to stay in more than one term) (Leedy & Ormrod,
2005). The questions should also not be worded such that it seems more preferential to
choose one answer over the other (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Questions will be geared to
determine: what skills senior personnel feel are important for success and what skills
junior personnel feel that senior personnel need for success. An inherent goal would
also be to assign some sort of scale to the question to find out to what degree the
answer matters to the individual.
There are currently in excess of 7,500 personnel in the submarine community
attached to submarine commands at any given time (U.S. Navy). To obtain a
representative sample, the sample size would have to be about 400 personnel (Leedy &
Ormrod, 2005). For the purpose of this study, however, the sample size will be limited
to roughly 125 Sailors due to logistics constraints. Interviews may indeed be
appropriate for a study of this size. Conducting interviews through the use of a survey
would allow the questioning of multiple personnel simultaneously. While interviews

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typically rely on past experiences and memories, interviews for this study would be
dealing with personnel who are actively in the situation being studied.
Data will be collected by visiting submarines that are currently not at sea within
the Norfolk, VA area. When visiting submarine commands that I am not a crewmember
of, permission will need to be granted to go onboard and talk with the crew regarding
the survey sheets for this research study. Since there is a great deal that goes into
running a submarine, care must be taken to not disrupt the normal workday of Sailors
stationed aboard each submarine. For this reason, each submarine command will be
visited slight prior to and around their lunchtime meal hours. This will help to facilitate
filling out the survey sheets while crewmembers are not busy conducting maintenance,
standing watch, or other evolutions that require their full and undivided attention.
Following completion of the survey sheet (See Appendix A), respondents will turn their
questionnaires back in for tabulation.
Summary
For the aforementioned reasons, the ethnography methodology will best suit the
needs of this research study. It utilizes a qualitative approach, works well when
attempting to analyze an entire group, and quantitative measures can easily be adapted
into the approach. While 125 submarine Sailors may not be a representative sample of
the entire submarine force, it will provide a representative sample for the submarine
force within the Norfolk, VA area. It can further be assumed that a representative
sample from the Norfolk, VA area can be applied to the submarine force as a whole.

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Findings
Throughout the course of the study, 122 submariners participated across four
different commands. The four submarine commands visited, by hull number, are USS
NEWPORT NEWS (SSN 750), USS MONTPELIER (SSN 765), PCU WASHINGTON
(SSN 787), and PCU INDIANA (SSN 789). For the sake of anonymity, each submarine
will be referred to as Submarine #1, Submarine #2, Submarine #3, and Submarine#4
when referring to a specific command. Two of the submarine commands that
participated are commissioned vessels, stationed out of Norfolk, VA, while the other two
submarine commands that participated are undergoing initial construction and have less
than two years of time as an operational command. Leadership traits and values that
were given the highest marks are displayed in the table below. Averages are displayed
in parentheses on the left while the mark chosen the most is displayed in parentheses
on the right.
Sailors also answered a question regarding how they felt towards the timing of
starting leadership development. Their options, upon which they could expound upon in
the follow-up question, were just right, too late, or too early. Leadership development
Leadership Traits/Values with the
Highest Overall Value Average
Leadership Traits/Values with the
Highest Marks Most Often
Good Communicator (9.20) Good Communicator
Trust (7.06) Trust
Proactive (8.70) Proactive
Credibility (8.65) Credibility
Confidence (8.60) Confidence
Resourceful (7.09) Resourceful
Consistent (8.31) Consistent
Decisive (7.54) Rule Following
Initiative (8.21) Emotional Resilience
Respectful (7.68) Organized

24
beginning at about the right time means that Sailors who feel that leadership
development begins early enough such that Sailors are ready to assume leadership
positions when the time comes. Beginning leadership development too late means that
Sailors who are to assume leadership positions will not be ready to do so. Conversely,
beginning leadership development too early means that Sailors begin leadership
development so early that, when the time comes to assume a leadership position, he or
she has lost some of the valuable information because it has been so long since the
information was covered.
Junior Officers
There were ten junior officers who participated in the study. Within this group,
there was one Ensign, four LTJGs, and five LTs. Three of these Sailors had the
additional experience of having served on more than one submarine. Positions ranged
from Division Officer, Quality Assurance Officer (QAO), and Assistant Department
Head. Leadership traits and values that were most important to junior officers are
displayed in the table below. Averages are displayed in parentheses on the left while
the mark chosen the most is displayed in parentheses on the right. Within this group,
sixty percent were not sure if their command had a leadership development program.
Of those that did, all felt that leadership development began at just the right time.

25
Of the junior officers who knew of a command leadership development program,
junior officers felt on average that their command’s program was neither effective nor
ineffective. Some said that it was effective in that it placed Sailors in positions with
responsibility with the tools necessary to succeed and forced Sailors out of their
respective comfort zones. Some felt that leadership development could stand to be
more engaging for junior Sailors and that there are too many conflicting opinions
teaching leadership lessons in completely different ways. One junior officer felt that it
was ineffective because his upper chain of command did not respect one another.
Finally, one junior officer from a submarine underground initial construction felt that his
command’s leadership development program had not been in progress long enough to
determine its effectiveness.
When asked if their command’s quality of leadership has affected their decision
to make the military a career, sixty percent of junior officers answered “yes.” The
reasons for an affirmative answer were due to several reasons. Thirty percent
answered “yes” because they felt their leadership was either discouraging and
Leadership traits/values with the
highest overall value by junior officers
Leadership traits/values that were
given the highest marks most often by
junior officers
Empowering (8.40) Empowering
Trust (8.60) Trust
Decisive (8.70) Decisive
Respectful (8.60) Enthusiastic
Resourceful (8.70) Humility
Confidence (8.50) Interested in Feedback
Proactive (8.60) Influence
Initiative (8.30) Emotional Resilience

26
demoralizing, that high quality leaders received harder jobs with worse periodic
evaluations, or that they felt powerless to stand up to anyone above them to the point to
where they just kept silent since their opinions and suggestions would “fall on deaf
ears.” Twenty percent answered yes because their command’s quality leadership had
allowed them to see effects of various leadership styles along with the impact on the
lives of those working with and for them, given them time and resources to become a
better leader, and improved their work attitude. These positive qualities were further
amplified with the experience of having been at a command previously that
micromanaged and given little time, resources, and respect from those of higher
authority. Of the junior officers that answered “no” to this question, one said the
decision to leave the military was family and career driven with command leadership not
being a driving factor. One other individual answered “no” because he felt that, after
having already served seventeen years, the decision was already made for him.
Summary
Sixty percent of junior officers did not know that there was a leadership
development program. The other forty percent did not see the program as particularly
effective. Furthermore, the ones that did know about a leadership development
program indicated that they were talking about the enlisted Sailors’ leadership
development in lieu of their own. Junior officers need leadership development just as
much as the enlisted Sailor, if not more so. In the time it takes an enlisted Sailor to fulfill
the role of leading a department, an officer will be leading the entire ship as CO.
Navy regulations dictate that the CO is to ensure that junior officers receive
training, as he deems advisable (Department of the Navy). Yet providing leadership

27
development need not fall solely to the CO of a submarine. Mentoring for junior officers
could go a long way in this area. Senior officers hold within themselves a wealth of
knowledge and experience that can be imparted on to junior officers attempting to learn
the ropes. Senior officers should be seeking out newly reported junior officers to aid in
the development and support of these Sailors. Similarly, junior officers should seek out
senior officers that they both trust and respect as mentors. While learning from ones
mistakes is a valuable way to gain experience, learning from the mistakes of others is
much more efficient. Senior officers have undoubtedly gained much experience through
their own mistakes and there is no need for junior officers to have to learn these lessons
by repeating the same mistakes. This mentoring program can help junior officers to
establish clearly defined goals, set a path to achieve those goals, develop skills and
abilities, and gain invaluable knowledge all the while creating a network of support
around them. This is certainly in keeping with Navy regulations with regards to the CO’s
responsibility to designate one or more senior officers to act as advisors to junior
officers (Department of the Navy).
Senior Officers
Fifteen Officers participated within the senior officer group. Within this group,
there were two Ensign LDOs, five LTs, six LCDRs, and two CDRs. All of the Sailors
within this group had served on more than one submarine. Positions ranged from
Assistant Department Head, Department Head, XO, and CO. Of note, two XOs and two
COs participated in the study. Leadership traits and values that were most important to
senior officers are displayed in the table below. Averages are displayed in parentheses
on the left while the mark chosen the most is displayed in parentheses on the right.

28
Within this group, twenty percent were not sure if their command had a leadership
development program. Of those that did, 63.6% felt that leadership development began
at about the right time, 27.3% felt that it began too late, and 9.1% felt that it began too
soon.
One senior officer gave the leadership trait of optimistic a rating of one and
expounded upon his reason for doing so. He wrote, “Optimism is detrimental to
subordinates. Optimism causes complacency in planning for retests and operations
(i.e., optimistic testing dates leave no room for rework. This mentality extends
availability timelines.).” This is actually quite true. Notice also that this officer was not
talking about optimism in the sense of a positive attitude or outlook. This officer was
talking about optimism in the sense that leaders cannot afford to discard the negatives
when planning for the future. When planning for operations, retests, maintenance, or
other evolutions, it is necessary to consider more than simply the time it takes to
perform the evolution. Planning, setup for the evolution, common errors made, and the
time it takes to correct equipment failures must be included as well. If these types of
highest overall value by senior officers
Leadership traits/values that were given
the highest marks most often by senior
officers
Proactive (8.80) Proactive
Empowering (8.93) Empowering
Trust (9.13) Trust
Interested in Feedback (8.07) Interested in Feedback
Initiative (8.07) Vision
Confidence (8.40) Delegator
Decisive (8.47) Relaxed

29
things are not accounted for in planning, then the submarine is being setup for failure in
that it is unable to complete tasks on a regular basis in the time requested. This not
only shows subordinates that their leaders are unable to adequately plan, but creates
an environment where it is okay to not complete tasks on time. This domino effects into
longer working hours, extended refit times, and being unable to meet operational
commitments. Yet a submarine’s inability to meet operational commitments does not
affect that one submarine alone. If one submarine has to stay in port longer than
expected for any reason, that means there is another submarine out there somewhere
that must stay out for longer in order to complete the mission, whatever that mission
may be.
Of the senior officers who knew of a command leadership development program,
63.6% felt that their command’s program was effective. Those that felt their command’s
program was effective said this because of the ability to have candid interactions with
their CO, feedback up and down the chain of command, a robust mentoring and training
program with an open environment, being engrained in their command’s philosophy,
discussions held at all levels, a minimal level of problems with a high level of retention,
and active involvement of Sailors. Remember that a healthy and robust mentoring and
training program focuses on implications of new technology, ethics and actions of a
leader, how to establish and communicate a vision, and how to balance personal and
professional lives (Hackney, 2004). One senior officer said that his command’s
program was neither effective nor ineffective because its success cannot be measured
by the completion of a training program. Opportunities for leadership development are
provided through a cycle of on the job training (OJT), informal mentorship, and

30
feedback. OJT is provided through tasks that are meant to stretch the Sailors’ abilities
while providing them the opportunity to exercise leadership throughout the tasks
completion. At times, Sailors must be provided positional authority since they are the
same rank [or in some cases a lower rank] than their peers. Once the task is complete,
feedback is provided to the Sailor about what went well and what requires improvement.
Sailors are encouraged to seek mentors, more senior Sailors that they wish to emulate,
that can serve to provide consistent feedback and advice throughout a Sailor’s
progression at a command in order to help stimulate personal and professional
development. The aforementioned senior officer says that the results of these
interactions are not quantifiable but merely subjective. One other senior officer felt that
his command’s program is neither effective nor ineffective because it had no particular
model and was more “learn as you go” for officers.
Two senior officers answered that their command’s program was very ineffective.
One of these two indicated this because the command attempted to bring leaders into
briefs and training for events but has no way to track level of involvement or ability to
assess effectiveness of any leadership development training. The other senior officer
said this because his command does not train or develop leadership beyond the CO’s
quarters and OJT but indicated that officer shore tours showed significant improvement
in the area of leadership development.
While 63.6% of senior officers felt that leadership development began at just the
right time, just over one in four felt that it began “too late” with 9.1% saying “too soon.”
Every senior officer who answered “too late” felt that leadership development ought to
begin from the very first day the Sailor reports to a command. These officers indicated

31
that the leadership development program should be clearly defined and assessed as
well as establish goals and expectations of the Sailor’s performance. One officer felt
that leadership development begins “too soon” in that it should not be started until at
least the 2nd Class Petty Officer level. This officer backed this up by saying since it is
not possible for everyone to be a leader there is a need for some to be followers.
In my experience, this last point was best displayed at a training command that I
was stationed at. The training command was run by instructors that were all FCPOs
and above working alongside civilian employees. While all of the instructors had been
leaders at their previous submarine and aircraft carrier commands, not all could be
leaders at the training command simultaneously. In order for tasks and training events
to be conducted successfully, only a select few could actually fulfill the leadership role to
ensure all aspects of the evolutions were performed correctly. If some of the FCPOs
and above were not willing to fulfill the role of follower, there would not be anyone left to
actually get their hands dirty and perform the day-to-day tasks necessary for the training
command to run smoothly and provide well-trained Sailors to the fleet.
to make the military a career, a third of them answered “yes.” One officer answered yes
because of his command’s inability to consistently plan and execute the ship’s mission
or training plan. This Sailor indicated that this assessment was consistent with other
submarines he had served on. Another answered yes because having to work for poor
leaders leads Sailors to believe that they will always have to work for poor leaders and
eventually leave the military. One Sailor said that, while he was not pleased with his
current command’s quality of leadership, his decision to make the navy a career began

32
on a submarine fifteen years ago where command leadership was empowering and
level-headed all the way up and down the chain of command. Another officer answered
yes because quality leadership makes the job rewarding and fun. According to
Stephens, qualities such as integrity, fairness, and recognition of hardworking Sailors is
the key to generating the respect and loyalty necessary for the officer to enlisted
relationship (Stephens, 2006). It is these types of qualities that make working for any
leader rewarding. Those that answered “no” to this question said this because tour
lengths are short enough that, even if a command currently has poor leadership,
eventually better leadership will transfer in. Similarly, another officer felt that Sailors
should be able to recognize that even a bad command is only one command and
personnel who base career choices off of their first command are making shortsighted
decisions.
Summary
Effective leadership development for the submarine officer community is
evidenced through junior officers candid interactions with their CO, feedback up and
down the chain of command, a robust mentoring and training program with an open
environment, is engrained in the command’s philosophy, discussions are held at all
levels, with active involvement of all Sailors involved. All of this works together to
minimize problems with leadership, creates an atmosphere of open communication, and
aids in higher levels of retention. Robust training and mentoring programs focus on
implications of new technology, ethics and actions of a leader, how to establish and
communicate a vision, and how to balance person and professional lives (Hackney,
2004).

33
While some may feel that a command leadership development program’s
success cannot be measured through the completion of a training program, there is a
need for its success to be measured. This is evidenced through senior officer’s
concerns that leadership development programs are ineffective due to an inability to
assess effectiveness of such training. Other training programs within the submarine
fleet already have a means in place to assess effectiveness. Training critique forms are
filled out during the conduct of each training with an officer(s) present available to
provide feedback to the individual providing the training as well as to provide last minute
comments and nuggets of information at the end of the training session. These
comments serve to ensure that all desired aspects of the training are covered and to
develop the training and public speaking skills of the individual giving the training.
Adapting this method for use with leadership development programs would help to raise
the program’s effectiveness among submarine commands.
There is a need for additional leadership development outside of the CO’s
quarters. This goes along with the aforementioned mentorship program discussed in
the junior officer’s conclusive comments. Senior officers should be empowered to seek
out newly reported junior officers in order to develop officer-like qualities that will help
them to succeed as submarine officers (Department of the Navy). Senior officers
should establish a set of goals for the new junior officer to work towards in order to help
ensure the time and effort junior officers spend in this area is not wasted on frivolous
tangents.
While some senior officers feel that junior Sailors ought to be able to see that a
bad command is only one command, many junior Sailors, regardless of officer or

34
enlisted, have never seen any other command to know any better. Shortsighted or not,
when junior Sailors are forced to endure a bad command, they have no reason to think
that another command should be any different. Sailors that have gone through rigorous
training programs are consistently told the whole way through that “it gets better in the
fleet.” If their first command in the fleet is a bad command, why should they think the
next one would be any different? Younger Sailors simply do not have the experience
and/or maturity to be able to acknowledge that better leadership may indeed exist at
other submarine and shore based commands.
Effective leadership development in the submarine officer community is
evidenced in a multitude of ways including active involvement by COs, feedback
throughout the entire chain of command, an environment that fosters open
communication, and active participation from all Sailors involved. Command leadership
development programs need to be assessed frequently with minor course corrections
made along the way to ensure that the program is on track with where the chain of
command feels it needs to be. Senior officers within each command should be looking
for opportunities to take some of the burden off of COs and provide necessary
mentorship to junior officers. Maintaining a positive attitude at work is not only okay, it
is actually quite important. Yet leaders must take care by allowing for enough time to
complete the evolution at hand as well as everything that goes into that evolution,
including setbacks. Lastly, senior officers need to recognize the impact they have on
junior Sailors. Until junior Sailors have reached a point at which they are able to see
varying quality levels of leadership, current command leadership is the only thing they
have to base their opinions and decisions upon.

35
Junior Officers vs. Senior Officers
When comparing the ideal leadership traits and values between junior officers
and their senior counterparts, it is evident that most of the ideal traits remained the
same. Leadership traits and values that were on average most important to junior and
senior officers are displayed in the table below. Yet there are a couple of differences.
While junior officers still felt that being consistent is important, with a mean score of
8.30, being interested in feedback only brought a mean score of 6.80, placing it in the
bottom third when compared to how junior officers felt about all of the leadership traits
and values polled. Conversely, the senior officers placed less importance on being
resourceful and respectful. Yet the leadership traits of being resourceful and respectful
for senior officers were still in the upper fifty percent when compared to the other
leadership traits and values polled. This means that, while senior officers place
emphasis on these two traits, they simply did not score high enough on average to
make the list of top ten.
highest overall value by junior officers
highest overall value by senior officers
Credibility (9.20) Trust (9.13)
Good Communicator (9.00) Empowering (8.93)
Resourceful (8.70) Good Communicator (8.87)
Decisive (8.70) Credibility (8.87)
Proactive (8.60) Proactive (8.80)
Respectful (8.60) Decisive (8.47)
Trust (8.60) Confidence (8.40)
Confidence (8.50) Initiative (8.07)
Empowering (8.40) Interested in Feedback (8.07)
Initiative (8.30) Consistent (8.00)

36
Senior officers rated being competitive the lowest at a one 26.67% of the time,
while junior officers rate being competitive a five 30% of the time. Seven was the rating
given to this trait most often. Depending on how competition is treated, leaders must
take care with this trait. Competition, when used properly, can spark innovation, higher
performance, and new technologies. Yet this type of competition is usually seen
between teams of people (i.e., countries, organizations, sports, etc.). Within these
teams an uncanny use of teamwork must exist if that team is going to become the
victor.
Within this sense, competition can actually prove detrimental. This is because
competition amongst members of the same team detracts from performance and
innovation. When team members, in this case submariners, instead work together
towards a common goal, much more can be accomplished than if each individual Sailor
worked towards that same goal on their own. By Sailors working with each other
instead of against each other, they are actually guaranteeing their own success by
helping their shipmates to succeed (Brady & Woodward, 2005).
Junior Enlisted
Fifty-four Sailors participated within the junior enlisted group. Within this group,
seven were E-3 and below, thirteen were Third Class Petty Officers, thirty-two were
Second Class Petty Officers, and were frocked FCPOs. Seven of these Sailors had the
additional experience of having served on more than one submarine. While all Sailors
within this group were active members of their respective divisions, only one Sailor had
an official leadership position, LPO. Leadership traits and values that were most
important to junior enlisted are displayed in the table below. Averages are displayed in

37
parentheses on the left while the mark chosen the most is displayed in parentheses on
the right. Within this group, almost fifty-four percent were not sure if their command had
a leadership development program. Of those that did, 60.0% felt that leadership
development began at about the right time, 32.0% felt that it began too late, and 8.0%
felt that it began too soon.
Of the junior enlisted who knew of a command leadership development program,
fifty-six percent felt that their command’s program was effective. Those that felt their
command’s program is effective said this because level of knowledge standards are
exceptional, the program holds Sailors accountable for knowing the next pay grade’s
responsibilities, trains and assists people in improving their leadership skills, quality
training provided by prior leaders, the command provides a means for self-improvement
and professional growth, high promotion rate, places responsibility where it belongs,
and everyone is given a chance to develop leadership skills. Those that felt their
command’s program is ineffective said this because it is given too early and either
forgotten or not cared about, only a CPO’s opinion is accepted on a day-to-day basis
highest overall value by junior enlisted
Leadership traits/values that were given
the highest marks most often by junior
enlisted
Trust (9.00) Trust
Confidence (8.76) Confidence
Organized (8.39) Organized
Respectful (8.34) Respectful
Initiative (8.25) Flexible
Proactive (8.80) Interested in Feedback

38
and only FCPOs are included in the program. Several Sailors felt that 2nd Class Petty
Officers, at the very least, should be included in leadership development training since
many newly promoted FCPOs fail at leadership due to a lack of experience and
maturity.
While sixty percent of junior enlisted felt that leadership development began at
about the right time, almost a third felt that it began “too late” with eight percent of junior
enlisted Sailors saying “too soon.” Those that indicated “too late” said this because
there are multiple instances of 2nd Class Petty Officers being placed in leadership roles
whether they are ready or not, it ought to happen after being onboard for a year, 2nd and
FCPOs need to be better prepared for the responsibilities expected of them. One Sailor
said that, since all Petty Officers are told they are leaders, leadership training really
ought to begin at the Seaman level. Those that said the program begins “too soon” said
this because Sailors are unable to relate the training to practical application since it is
given prior to having any real responsibility.
Sixty percent of junior enlisted saying that leadership development begins at
about the right time means that they feel trained sufficiently in leadership such that they
feel ready to assume a leadership role when the time comes. Yet the fact that nearly a
third of junior Sailors say that leadership training is beginning too late indicates that
leadership development is not being provided to all of the Sailors equally. There are a
few possible reasons for this. One reason is that some Sailors just seem to have a
naturally ability to accomplish a given task, including those tasks related to leadership.
It is natural for senior personnel to select Sailors such as these to groom for positions of
greater responsibility and authority. Another possible reason is that there may simply

39
be too many Sailors and not enough tasks to go around when looking to develop
leadership skills within those Sailors. Submarine divisions are made up of a Chief and
upwards of twelve to fifteen Sailors, including the LPO. Since the LPO billet is already
taken by one of these Sailors, this means that there are up to eleven to fourteen other
Sailors who need to be developed in the area of leadership. Naturally, there are only so
many tasks to go around when looking to develop these Sailors.
This can also help to explain why two Sailors felt that leadership development
began too early. In the hypothetical division of fourteen Sailors and an LPO, only one of
those Sailors is going to relieve that LPO when he or she transfers. If the majority of
these Sailors are able to be given leadership development training, and only a few of
them are able to assume the role of LPO, then the remaining Sailors may begin to feel
as if the time spent on leadership development could be better utilized completing other
more seemingly relevant tasks. If this were to continue, then these Sailors may begin to
lose, or forget, leadership development lessons taught to them early on, forcing them to
relearn the same lessons all over again.
to make the military a career, over half of them answered “yes.” Furthermore, seventy-
three percent of those that answered yes to this question felt that their command’s
leadership had negatively impacted their decision to make the military a career.
Personnel that were negatively impacted by their command’s leadership felt that
leadership is ineffective in that command climate did not allow for a questioning attitude,
rules were made or changed without any apparent reason, leadership consistently
overreacts to situations, exhibit too much and then too little control over subordinates,

40
leaders do not lead by example, leadership appeared to be “yes” men before their
bosses, leaders are unable to plan for important tasks, personnel are constantly worried
about how they will be held responsible due to their leadership’s shortcomings from one
day to another, leadership has little or no vision, a lack of communication, and a lack of
common sense. One Sailor felt that he could not approach his leadership with a
problem regarding another Sailor because the issue would inevitably get back to the
other Sailor. Those who had felt their leadership had positively impacted their career
decisions felt this way because they had watched their leader’s effectiveness and
command morale rise significantly, their command was very open and displayed a high
degree of common sense, leadership is fair, just and effective, and leadership is
proactive. Those who responded by saying their command’s leadership had not
affected their career decision said this because they had only joined the navy for work
experience, the opportunity to pursue higher education, they understood that good and
bad leadership came in cycles, attitudes of peers had a higher impact than that of
leadership, excessive working hours had a higher impact than that of leadership, and
some Sailors joined the navy with the intent of not making it a career. One Sailor said
that, while command leadership had not affected his own personal career decision, he
was able to see the negative impact command leadership was having on those around
him.
Summary
Junior enlisted Sailors yearn to be developed as leaders. This is in part because
enlisted Sailors are told from the first day that they are Petty Officers that they are
leaders and in part because only so much time passes before they realize that they will
be required to fulfill a leadership role. In fact, all of us at some point or another will be

41
called to fulfill a leadership role (Brady & Woodward, 2005). The fact that over half of
junior enlisted Sailors are not aware of a leadership development program indicates that
they are either not being developed in this area or are having their leadership skills
developed unawares.
Since there are only so many official leadership positions to go around, enlisted
leaders should be looking for opportunities to let junior sailors lead whenever possible
such as during complex maintenance procedures, creating preventative maintenance
and refit schedules, and divisional and departmental training to name a few. Junior
Sailors should also be taught and have experience with their division’s various duties
since, as an LPO or divisional CPO, they will be responsible for the proper conduct of all
divisional duties. Junior Sailors should also be taught to consistently look for deficiency,
as well as how to look for those deficiencies, and be encouraged to come up with their
own solutions to such deficiencies. All of these things work together to create a well-
rounded Sailor ready to lead who will at least know where to find answers to questions
as they arise and better prepared to teach the next generation of junior enlisted Sailors.
For the junior enlisted Sailor, an effective leadership development program
involves having high standards for level of knowledge, holding Sailors accountable for
knowing the next pay grade’s responsibilities, training and assisting Sailors in improving
leadership skills, and bringing in prior leaders to learn from their experiences and points
of view. Junior enlisted also desire to have opportunities for self-improvement and
professional growth. Using the methods from the preceding paragraph as examples will
serve to accomplish this goal. Furthermore, junior enlisted Sailors desire to have a part
in coming up with solutions to everyday problems onboard submarines such de-

42
conflicting maintenance schedules, watchbill issues, and cleanliness routines. On the
flipside of this coin, if junior enlisted Sailors are given opportunities, they then need to
take the opportunity seriously and efficiently in order to prove that they are able to
handle the added responsibility.
To go along with this, junior enlisted Sailors want to know that their voices and
inputs have been considered. For the junior enlisted Sailors to see the opinion of only
CPOs being heard from day to day is discouraging. Admittedly, it is not reasonable for
every opinion or proposed solution to be taken onboard and utilized. There is a time
from junior enlisted Sailors to get in line and do what they are told and a time for them to
question things and provide backup to senior personnel. There is also a difference
between a junior Sailor providing backup and trying to be difficult. Yet much like the
principle “watchteam backup,” backup provided from the junior enlisted should not be
discouraged. While junior enlisted Sailors may not have the whole picture in the way
that senior officers do they are often able to look at a situation with an objective eye,
allowing them to ask the right question and save the command from unnecessary work
stoppages.
Junior enlisted Sailors are often some of the first to openly voice their concerns
regarding their leadership and are often able to express what they do not want to see in
their leadership more so than what they would like to see. These Sailors desire leaders
that are consistent, desire feedback, lead by example, and are not simply “yes” men
before their bosses. Junior personnel also desire for their leaders to have a clear
vision, a goal in mind for where senior leadership desire to go, and for that vision to be
disseminated to junior personnel. Junior Sailors also want to be able to talk with their

43
leadership about issues that might arise. They also want to be able to trust that their
leadership will not gossip about these issues with other leaders in the command.
Finally, junior enlisted Sailors want leaders that are fair, just and effective, and
proactive. Leaders ought to be planning ahead for upcoming tasks and evolutions that
are over the horizon so that each and every task does not appear to be an emergency
for the division to carry out.
Junior enlisted Sailors have a strong desire to be developed as leaders and they
should not be deprived of this. If junior enlisted Sailors are going to be told that they are
leaders from the first day they are promoted to Petty Officer, then they ought to be given
opportunities to be developed as one. These Sailors can be groomed for supervisory
positions by giving them the opportunity to lead various evolutions, conduct training, and
taught the various collateral duties within their division. Junior enlisted Sailors are also
very adept letting people know what they do not like about certain situations and
leaders. If leaders every desire to know what these complaints are, all they have to do
is listen from around the corner to hear the latest concerns from their junior Sailors. Do
not be too quick to discount these concerns, since the root cause of their concern may
actually indicate an area that requires much needed attention.
Senior Enlisted
Forty-Three Sailors participated within the senior enlisted group. Within this
group, twenty-six were FCPOs, fifteen were CPOs, one was a SCPO, and one was a
MCPO. All but five of these Sailors had the additional experience of having served on
more than one submarine. Positions ranged from WCS, Department Training Assistant,
First LT, CCC, LPO, Divisional CPO, Medical Department, Representative (MDR),

44
Department CPO, and Chief of the Boat (COB). Leadership traits and values that were
most important to senior enlisted are displayed in the table below. Averages are
displayed in parentheses on the left while the mark chosen the most is displayed in
parentheses on the right. Within this group, just over sixteen percent were not sure if
their command had a leadership development program while almost five percent were
sure that their command did not have such a program. This is actually quite surprising
since this is the group of Sailors that is supposed to be leading and receiving the navy’s
official CPO 365 program.
Of those that did recognize the existence of a command leadership development
program about fifty-seven percent felt that leadership development began at about the
right time and about forty-three percent felt that it began too late. Since this group of
Sailors includes those who are supposed to be receiving leadership development, the
FCPOs, and those who are supposed to be providing leadership development, the
CPOs, these statistics can be further broken down. Roughly eighty-one percent of
CPOs felt that leadership development began at about the right time while only thirty-
highest overall value by senior
enlisted
Leadership traits/values that were given the
highest marks most often by senior enlisted
Trust (9.40) Trust
Decisive (8.37) Decisive
Rule Following (8.26) Rule Following
Confidence (8.49) Emotional Resilience
Respectful (8.28) Interested in Feedback
Proactive (8.57) Organized

45
eight percent of FCPOs said the same thing. Conversely, almost sixty-two percent of
FCPOs felt that leadership development began too late while only about nineteen CPOs
felt the same way.
Of the senior enlisted who knew of a command leadership development program,
sixty percent felt that their command’s leadership development program was effective.
Those that felt their command’s leadership development program is effective said this
because the COB leads the CPO quarters and FCPOs at CPO 365, junior personnel
are given the ability to lead early in their career, group discussions and exercises, an
effective utilization of mentors, training focuses of programs and situations that will
FCPOs will be faced with as CPOs, leadership development is a continuous process
instead of quarterly or yearly, the leadership development process is informal between
CPOs and the rest of the boat, the training is generic, personnel have a desire to
improve themselves, leaders take time throughout the day to model correct behavior
and work practices for junior personnel, feedback, leadership development training
helps Sailors learn from the experience of others. Those that said their command’s
program was neither effective nor ineffective felt this way because the program
appeared to be merely a check in the box for all parties involved, the program did not
include enough training on leadership principles, more could be learned from reading
books, the CPO 365 program was really meant for surface Sailors, and inconsistencies
through the development process. One CPO felt that mentorship programs were much
more effective. He followed this up by saying that any program’s effectiveness is going
to be affected by the mentor, how much personnel involved care, and the motivation of
both the giver and the receiver. Some Sailors at the submarine commands undergoing

46
initial construction felt this way solely because of how recently the command had
formed up and begun working together. Sailors that said their command’s program is
ineffective said this because training is often cancelled. Training is often cancelled or
delayed when scheduling conflicts arise due to a change in ship’s schedule, unexpected
repairs, and when the person providing the training must cancel to fix those unexpected
repairs, to name a few. Sailors also said that when the training does occur that the
Sailor giving the training is unprepared. This leads to a wasting Sailors’ time in that the
person attempting to give the training is not actually ready, regardless of what is their
topic is supposed to be. Another suggestion that was brought up is that training ought
to be more focused on submarine scenarios instead of surface navy scenarios. What
this means is that much of the premade training is geared towards scenarios that are
only applicable to Sailors serving in the surface navy. Two other worrisome comments
are that no one seems to care about the leadership program and personnel are
consistently trying to only provide the minimum productivity, with no tangible goal set.
Developing leaders is much like any other investment. Sailors will not be able to get out
more than they put in. This is true for junior and senior enlisted personnel. If junior
enlisted do not care about leadership development, than the senior enlisted can talk
until they are blue in the face and it will not make a bit of difference. If senior enlisted
do not care about leadership development, they are not only setting up their own reliefs
for failure, junior enlisted will also recognize that their time is being wasted, leading to
more disgruntled Sailors. Finally, senior enlisted pointed out that “death by PowerPoint”
is ineffective at getting people to change the way they operate. While PowerPoint
presentations have a certain level of usefulness, Sailors need real-life scenarios and

47
group discussion. Real-life scenarios help to make the training relevant to the Sailor
while group discussion serves to share ideas in a room full of developing leaders.
Opinions of this group widely differed with regard to when leadership
development should start. Yet over forty-three percent of the overall group did feel that
leadership development began too late in a Sailor’s career. One FCPO said that
leadership should start the moment a Sailor steps onboard the submarine. Other
FCPOs followed, albeit unknowingly, this up by saying that leadership training early in
one’s career would help them to be ready for such positions prior to being assigned as a
leader, one-time Petty Officer indoctrination training is simply not enough due to the
sheer volume of information that can and should be covered, and FCPOs simply are not
the only leaders in the navy. Other FCPOs said that personnel ought to always be
trained for the next rank in order to prevent Sailors from becoming too comfortable
within their current position as well as to help leaders from having to struggle when
taking on new positions, and that FCPOs should ideally be seasoned leaders prior to
being an LPO. This is because Sailors are routinely thrust into positions of leadership.
At times Sailors are thrust into leadership positions because their LPO or WCS is
promoted out of the position and someone is needed to fill the spot. Occasionally,
LPOs are forced to relinquish their position due to issues at home, an inability to lead
the division, or because someone else needs the chance to be an LPO for further
leadership development. This results in the LPO stepping down so that someone else
can take go ahead in leading the division. Yet another FCPO said that most training
ought to begin early because most Sailors do not even know what to look for to be able
to determine what good or bad leadership qualities are. While CPOs were by in large

48
silent on this question, one CPO felt that that some of the 2nd Class Petty Officers
should be invited to attend CPO 365.
to make the military a career, thirty-nine percent of them answered “yes.” Thirty-eight
percent of those that answered yes to this question felt that their command’s leadership
had either negatively impacted their own decision to make the military a career or the
decision of their subordinates. Personnel that were negatively impacted by their
command’s leadership because the command had made their junior sailors feel as if a
career in the navy would not be desirable, scheduling conflicts and lack of operational
planning had destroyed the submarine’s retention of its Sailors, and bad leadership
makes Sailors feel as if their lives and time are being wasted. One CPO felt so
personally impacted by his command’s leadership that he would not be pursuing further
qualifications so that he could get out of the military sooner. While Sailors must remain
flexible, as the ship’s schedule changes on a regular basis, too many changes to the
daily schedule make it difficult to plan and carryout preventative maintenance, training,
and other administrative duties. Other reasons for being negatively impacted by their
command’s leadership are the command overreacts to developing situations and
leadership is unwilling to trust competent Sailors with even menial issues. Command
leadership overreacting to developing situations occurs more often than most would
probably likely to think. When mistakes are made, such as personnel tardiness or
errors in the conduct of maintenance, the tendency is to begin having an entire
department come in early for the tardiness of an individual, or for the department to

49
have further restrictions on the conduct of maintenance for an entire department when
the problem could very well lie with just one or two individual Sailors.
Personnel who indicated that their command’s leadership had impacted their
career choice in a positive manner said this because their command’s leadership care
about their Sailor’s lives, the command promotes positive outcomes through mentorship
and training, and quality leadership serves as an indicator at how good one’s career
could be. One Sailor indicated that if he had not already put in twenty years of service,
he would be rethinking his decision to make the navy a career. Most of the Sailors who
said that command leadership had not impacted their career choice indicated that this
was due to the amount of time that they had already served in the navy. One Sailor
said that poor leadership had actually motivated him to stay in so that he could provide
better quality leadership for future generations of Sailors. Some Sailors aboard
submarines undergoing initial construction indicated that their commands were too new
for the leadership to have a significant impact on career decisions.
Summary
Senior enlisted leadership was able to paint a fairly clear picture as to what made
an effective leadership development program. An effective program has the COB
leading the CPO quarters and FCPOs at CPO 365, provides opportunities for junior
personnel to lead early in their career, includes group discussions and exercise based
on realistic scenarios, is conducted on a continuous basis, and effectively utilizes
mentors. Leadership development between CPOs and the rest of the boat should be an
informal process with leaders providing an example of correct behaviors and work
practices for junior personnel to model. The leadership development program should

50
also encourage feedback, include training on leadership principles, and help Sailors to
learn from the experience of others. Leadership development programs should not
merely be a check in the box where personnel merely sit through an hour-long lecture or
PowerPoint merely because they are supposed to. If personnel giving the training are
unprepared or personnel involved simply do not care about the training, then the time of
all parties involved will be wasted.
The other chief complaint regarding CPO 365 is that its scenarios are currently
geared towards Sailors serving aboard surface ships. This means that until such a time
exists where there is a separate CPO 365 program for submariners, and while many of
the principles in CPO 365 are applicable to all Sailors, submariners should be prepared
to either adapt surface-based scenarios to make them more applicable or be ready to
simply train the surface-based scenarios the way they are. It is also possible that the
MCPON and those involved in creating CPO 365 program are not aware of the need for
a separate submarine based program. If senior enlisted are able to adequately develop
submarine-based scenarios, these should be submitted for review to be added to the
CPO-365 program so that other submariners may benefit from the input.
Forty-three percent of senior enlisted Sailors said that leadership development
began too late in a Sailor’s career. While it may not be reasonable for a Sailor to begin
leadership development the moment he steps onboard the submarine due to the sheer
amount of initial training and qualifications, leadership development should start early
enough for Sailors to start preparing for the next applicable pay grade. Leadership
development of junior Sailors ought to be on an ongoing basis, much like CPO 365 is,
such that FCPOs are ready to LPOs and even CPOs when the time comes.

51
When considering whether or not to punish the few or the masses, a few things
ought to be considered. Has the error occurred as part of a trend with the individuals in
question or is it an isolated incident? Has the same error been made by other Sailors
within the department or division? Was the error recognized and corrected because of
processes that are already in place or by happenstance? Would placing further controls
and restrictions, or extra layers of defense, in place truly correct the problem or will the
controls and restrictions simply make Sailors’ jobs more cumbersome to carry out? If
these questions are truly given an objective consideration, then a reasonable solution
can be created. Furthermore, the Sailors at fault should help to create the solutions to
the problem at hand. This will not only empower them by allowing them to have a say in
how the department is run, but will also help them to better understand how to not make
the same mistake twice. This better level of understanding may also equip these
Sailors to help prevent other Sailors from the making the same mistake as well.
Leadership development programs accomplish more than simply develop
leaders. It also shows Sailors that their command’s leadership cares about their lives
and careers. It Mentorship and leadership training also serve to promote positive
outcomes. Ultimately, quality leadership helps junior Sailors to see just how good their
career can actually be. In order to accomplish this, leadership development needs to
begin early, include group discussions and exercise based on realistic scenarios, is
conducted on a continuous basis, and effectively utilizes mentors. It should also
encourage feedback, include training on leadership principles, and help Sailors to learn
from the experience of others.

52
Junior Enlisted vs. Senior Enlisted
When comparing the ideal leadership traits and values between junior officers
and their senior counterparts, it is evident that most of the ideal traits remained the
same. Leadership traits and values that were on average most important to junior and
senior enlisted are displayed in the table below. There are a couple of differences, of
course. While junior enlisted still felt that being decisive is important, with a mean score
of 8.15, following the rules only brought a mean score of 7.57, placing it in the bottom
half when compared to how junior enlisted felt about all of the leadership traits and
values polled. While senior enlisted placed less importance on being organized and
having initiative, they still showed a mean score of 7.95 and 8.19, respectively. This
means that senior enlisted still placed initiative and organized in the top third when
compared to all of the leadership traits and values polled. For junior enlisted, this is
certainly understandable. Junior enlisted are often concerned with “getting the job
done” and less concerned able following every single rule and regulation along the way.
While senior enlisted obviously still feel that initiative and being organized are important,
they have been around long enough and learned some hard lessons throughout their
tenure to understand the importance of following rules and regulations. Senior enlisted
understands that rules and regulations are not simply there to get in Sailors’ way; they
are more importantly there to protect the Sailors.

53
Junior enlisted felt that it was more important than senior enlisted to be
democratic with an average score of 5.34 and 4.21, respectively, and an overall
average of 4.65. Admittedly, there is little room for democracy in a military organization
on a regular basis. A successful military relies on a strict adherence to order and
discipline with a clear rank structure. With each progression in rank a higher level of
courtesies, respect, and authority are bestowed upon the individual. One of the things
that comes with this authority is a latent expectation of prompt action from orders that
are given out to subordinates. While there may be appropriate times in the military to
make use of democracy in decision making, formal orders are expected to be carried
out promptly and often without question.
One of the few exceptions to this lies within the nuclear community. These
Sailors are taught to question orders and procedures as well as to be constantly looking
for underlying problems so that they can be corrected immediately. This does not mean
that these Sailors are to be questioning every order, however. Rather, orders are to be
carried out unless the order would cause injury to personnel, damage to equipment, or
violate procedures. Yet even these Sailors must exercise care when questioning
highest overall value by junior enlisted
highest overall value by senior enlisted
Good Communicator (9.39) Trust (9.40)
Trust (9.00) Good Communicator (9.14)
Proactive (8.80) Credibility (8.95)
Confidence (8.76) Proactive (8.57)
Resourceful (8.46) Consistent (8.54)
Organized (8.39) Confidence (8.49)
Credibility (8.26) Resourceful (8.49)
Respectful (8.34) Decisive (8.37)
Consistent (8.26) Respectful (8.28)
Initiative (8.25) Rule Following (8.26)

Leadership Skills for Success in US Submarines

Leadership Skills for Success in US Submarines

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