The Ideological Underpinnings for the Assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat - Discussion

Author: Juliet Davis
Do Not Replicate Without Author’s Consent
The Ideological Underpinnings for the Assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat:
A Discussion
The assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat by Islamist militants on the sixth of October
1981 signalled to the world that all was not well within nationalist Egypt. Sadat was attending a
parade to celebrate the greatest victory of his presidency, the Egyptian army’s overrunning of Israel’s
Bar-Lev Line in Sinai in 1973, when four armed men leapt from a military truck in front of the
president’s grandstand.1
Upon commencing his fatal attack on the president, the leader of the
assassins shouted a phrase which would soon become famous around the globe: “I am Khalid al-
Islambuli, I have killed Pharaoh,and I do not fear death”.2
In searching for an explanation as to the
killing, scholars and political pundits have focused on the writings of a young Egyptian electrical
engineer, Abd al-Salam Faraj. Faraj’s manifesto, ‘al-Farida al Gha’iba’,known in English as ‘The
Neglected Duty’ or ‘The Absent Obligation’, has been advanced as the ideological underpinnings for
the assassination of Sadat. Faraj’s text draws upon the writings of famed medieval and modern
intellectuals including Ibn Taymiyya and Sayyid Qutb in order to establish his theory of jihad as an
individual duty directed against an internal enemy. However,scholars remain divided as to the
intellectual quality and inventive nature of Faraj’s writing. In examining the scholarly debate, this
essay seeks to argue that Faraj’s work is not merely a “collection of quotations” used to justify a
political killing, nor even a practical extension of an already established political theory. Rather,it is
claimed that Faraj’s text constitutes an innovative development in the theory of jihad due to its
characterisation of Egyptian society as predominantly Islamic and its overriding emphasis on
immediate action. This essay will examine the key elements of Faraj’s theory and seek to demonstrate
how Faraj’s decision to grant absolute priority to the waging of holy war against an “iniquitous
prince” led ultimately to the death of President Sadat.
1 Gilles Kepel and Jon Rothschild, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh (Berkeley:
University of California Press,2003), 191.
2 Ibid., 192.

2
Whilst it is largely undisputed among scholars that the assassins of President Sadat were
associated with the al-Jihad movement,of which Faraj was a leader, there is debate as to the extent to
which the killing was in fact ideologically motivated. Certain authors, such as Gilles Kepel, have
asserted that the actual killer of Sadat, Khalid al-Islambuli, was primarily motivated by revenge for the
Sadat regime’s imprisonment and ill-treatment of his brother Muhammed as part of a round-up of
Islamists for “confessional sedition” in September 1981.3
Additionally, certain contemporary Egyptian
commentators sought to minimise the Islamist sentiment behind the killing by pointing to secular flaws
within the nationalist project. Mohammed Heikal, former Egyptian minister of information and a
prominent journalist, claimed that: “In the case of Al-Jihad,although the assassins said that they killed
Sadat because they wanted Egypt to be governed by Islam’s sacred law…[d]ecoded, [the] grievance
can be summed up as the social and economic conditions in the country”.4
Emmanuel Sivan however
queries this attempt to downplay the religious nature of the Islamists’ justification by pointing to the
Egyptian government’s post-assassination decision to allow the People’s Assembly to formulate draft
bills incorporating the Sharia into certain criminal issues,5
as well as its trial and execution of Abd al-
Salam Farajfor his role as spiritual advisor to the assassins.6
Furthermore, Sivan relies on statements
made by the assassins at their trial to demonstrate that they had “read, commented and meditated upon”
‘The Neglected Duty’ before the killing of Sadat.7
In keeping with this ‘ideological’ thesis, this essay
asserts that the assassination of Anwar Sadat cannot be justified by secular motivations alone. As such,
it is necessary to examine the religious theory inherent in Faraj’s manifesto.
Significant controversy exists among scholars as to the intellectual strength of Faraj’s religious
theory. An electrical engineer without any formal theological training,8
Faraj has been criticised by
3 Kepel and Rothschild, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 205.
4 Moḥammed Ḥasanayn Heikal, Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat (London: Deutsch,1983), 246
quoted in David C. Rapoport, “Sacred Terror: A Contemporary Example from Islam,” in Origins of Terrorism:
Psychologies,Ideologies, Theologies, Statesof Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson
Centre Press, 1998), 106.
5 Emmanuel Sivan, ‘The Two Faces of Islamic Fundamentalism,” Jerusalem Quarterly 27 (Spring 1983): 137
quoted in Rapoport, “Sacred Terror,” 106.
6 Johannes J.G. Jansen, “The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins,” Die Welt des Islams 25 (1985), 1.
7 Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam. Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (New Haven; London: Yale
University Press,1985), 103.

3
many commentators for his reliance upon citations from the Quran and Sunna, as well as certain
medieval authorities, such as Ibn Taymiyya.9
Dr Muhammad ‘Ammāra, in his 1982 work Al-Farīda al-
Ghā-'iba, `Ard wa-Hiwār wa-Taqyīm,argues that Faraj’s “cherry-picking” of Ibn Taymiyya quotations
reveals an inherent misunderstanding as to the teachings of the Great Traditionalist;10
whilst
contemporary articles in the Egyptian weekly newspaper Al-Liwā al-Islāmī claimed that Ibn
Taymiyya’s writings have a unique historical context which cannot be equated with twentieth century
circumstances.11
Even Faraj’s fellow Islamists, such as Karam Zuhdi, the head of the Middle Egypt
wing of al-Jihad,stated that “that the [‘Neglected Duty’] contained nothing really new and amounted
to not more than a collection of quotations from various ulema”.12
Rather than wholly dismissing Faraj’s work, Gilles Kepel and Danny Orbach regard ‘The
Neglected Duty’ as having some intellectual merit as a “practical variation” and “elegant remoulding”
of the sophisticated conceptual framework developed by the Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb (1906-
1966).13
According to this analysis, ‘The Neglected Duty’ should not be regarded as an independent
work, rather it is an “action plan” in which Qutb’s theory of contemporary Jahiliyyah is given practical
application as the justification for a national leader’s assassination.14
However, Johannes J.G. Jansen
dissents from this “practical application” thesis, and instead regards the theoretical precepts in ‘The
Neglected Duty’ as having “undeniable originality”.15
Indeed, Jansen claims that “The Neglected Duty
strongly suggests that it offers a comprehensive view of the history of Islam which is based on all
sources,and it does so impressively”.16
Whilst this essay asserts that Faraj’s theory of jihad is strongly
influenced by the writings of both Ibn Taymiyya and Sayyid Qutb, it diverges from the “practical
9 Ibid.
10 Jansen, “The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins,” 4.
11 Ibid.
13 Danny Orbach, “Tyrannicide in Radical Islam: The Case of Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj,” Middle
Eastern Studies 48, no. 6 (2012): 962, 969.
14 Ibid., 969; Kepel and Rothschild, Muslim Extremism in Egypt,194.
16 Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the
Middle East (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 152.

4
application” thesis in its assertion that Faraj’s characterisation of temporality constitutes an innovative
development in the theory of jihad.
The transfer of power from President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the demagogue of Egyptian
nationalism, to Anwar Sadat in 1970 saw the new president initially adopt a reconciliatory stance
towards Egyptian Islamists that differed significantly from the hard-line attitude of his predecessor.
Sadat sought to portray himself as ‘The Believing President’ who would lead Egypt with “knowledge
and faith”.17
Howeverhis continued friendship with the ousted Shah of Iran,and particularly his signing
of the Camp David Accords with Israelin 1978, caused many within the Egyptian Islamist movement
to regard his leadership as immoral.18
It is within this political context that Faraj sought to provide a
theoretical justification for the eventual attack on Sadat’s life.
In ‘The Neglected Duty’, Faraj advocates for the immediate waging of holy combat (jihad) to
establish an Islamic state. 19
Faraj’s characterisation of jihad as a duty,albeit one which has been denied
and neglected by the ulema, is grounded upon the Qur’anic verse: “Whoever does not rule by what
Allah has revealed, such are the disbelievers” (5:44).20
Faraj’s argument forms a logical progression
whereby as “the implementation of Islamic law is incumbent upon the Muslims…establishing the
Islamic State is obligatory upon them [and by] the same token, if the state can only be established by
fighting, then it is compulsory…to fight”.21
Egypt, according to Faraj, is not an Islamic state as it is not
governed by the Sharia but rather by kufr (infidel) laws imported from the West.22
Indeed, the present
rulers of Egypt have been indoctrinated by foreign belief systems, “be they Christian, Communist or
Zionist”.23
As such, it is implied that Egypt’s rulers must be “disbelievers” as they have failed to rule
by Allah’s law. Where Egypt’s ruler was raised a Muslim, as in the case of President Sadat, Faraj’s
logic therefore dictates that he is rendered a “disbeliever” upon taking power and thus liable to be
17 Gilles Kepel, Jihad,The Trail of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 83.
18 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary
Findings,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12, no. 4 (1980): 426.
20 Mohammad ‘Abdus Salam Faraj, Jihad:The Absent Obligation (Birmingham: Maktabah Al Ansaar
Publications, 2000), 19.
21 Ibid., 20.
22 Ibid., 22.
23 Ibid., 24.

5
punished with death for the crime of apostasy. 24
This apostate status is unavoidable, “even if they pray,
fast, and claim to be Muslims” as “[w]hat they carry of Islam is nothing but names”.25
In reaching this
conclusion, Faraj places reliance on the historical fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya in which the great medieval
theorist incites his fellow Muslims to fight the Mongol invaders of their homeland, despite the Mongol
leader’s purported conversion to Islam.26
Indeed, Faraj considers the present Egyptian leaders to be
more iniquitous than the Mongols as whilst the Mongol law code was formed by a synthesis of various
laws, including the Sharia,those laws imposed upon the Egyptian people by the nationalist regime were
“laid down by the west, which have nothing to do with Islam or any religious laws”.27
Upon proclaiming the Egyptian nationalist leaders’ inherent unworthiness to rule, Faraj
advocates for their violent overthrow by way of jihad. This stance is contrary to traditional Sunni
political theory which, still traumatised by the destructive civil war (fitna) that ruptured Muslim society
in the seventh century, prohibits rebellion against even iniquitous leaders on the basis that they are “a
scourge through whom God punishes those He decides to punish”.28
As such, Faraj’s invocation of the
“right to revolt” is heavily dependent upon the revolutionary writings of Egyptian ideologue Sayyid
Qutb.29
According to Qutb, the paramount principle within a truly Islamic system is hakimiyya,“the
singular recognition of God’s total and absolute dominion”.30
This ideal state of being is in strict
opposition to that of jahiliyya,which Qutb defines widely so to encapsulate an intangible attitude of
hostility towards the Islamic monotheistic faith.31
Qutb claimed that no society on earth,even ones that
declared themselves to be “Muslim”, could be considered a pure Islamic state as the establishment of
any secular form of government usurped the hakimiyya of Allah and, as such, plunged the society into
25 Faraj, Jihad: The Absent Obligation,24.
28 Abu Yusuf quoted in Orbach, “Tyrannicide in Radical Islam,” 962.
29 James Toth, Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual (New York: Oxford
University Press,2013), 123.
30 Ibid, 124.
31 William E. Shepard, “Sayyid Qutb’s Doctrine of Jahiliyya,” International Journal ofMiddle East Studies,35,
4, 2003, 522.

6
a state of jahiliyya.32
Qutb further asserted that a state could only reverse its condition of jahiliyya by
launching jihad against “idolatrous tyranny”.33
In keeping with Qutb’s dichotomous view that“apart from Islam there is only jahiliyya”,Faraj’s
tract calls for immediate revolutionary action against the domestic tyrant as the only effective means of
establishing an Islamic state. This serves as a clear rejection of recent transitional strategies employed
by the Islamist movement to promote Islam whilst avoiding brutal state reprisals.34
Faraj is dismissive
of attempts to re-Islamise society by way of charitable organisations or by da’wah (proselytising) on
the basis that they will not establish the Islamic state and are restricted by government or media
controls.35
He also rejects the political strategy advocated by many in the Muslim Brotherhood on the
grounds that it will lead to corruption of the movement as “no way will a Muslim personality hold a
ministerial post unless he completely takes those in the system as friends and protectors”.36
Faraj also
censures university student movements, such as the jama’at islamiyya, on the basis that knowledge
alone will not prevent humiliation at the hands of disbelievers. 37
Finally, Faraj describes as ineffectual
those Islamists, such as Shukri Mustafa’s Society of Muslims, who seek to withdraw from society and
build their strength in imitation of the hijra (migration) undertaken by the Prophet Mohammad. 38
Thus
according to Faraj, such reformist strategies are insufficient to establish an Islamic state and “the tyrants
of this earth will only be removed by the might of the sword”.39
By evincing that fighting is the only effective means of establishing an Islamic state, Faraj
deems jihad to be the duty of all Muslims. This fighting, Faraj confirms, “means (physical) opposition
and killing” of an enemy, not the seeking of knowledge or the struggle against one’s internal self.40
In
traditional jurisprudence, jihad is regarded as a collective obligation which allows some Muslims to be
32 John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism (New York: Columbia University Press,
2010), 1.
33 Ibid., 2; Toth,Qutb: The Life, 123.
35 Faraj, Jihad: The Absent Obligation,38, 43.
36 Ibid., 41.
38 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 60, 62.

7
excused from fighting provided its execution can be assured. 41
Jihad will only become an individua l
obligation when Muslims are forced to take part in a defensive conflict. 42
Faraj concludes that the
performance of jihad against the contemporary rulers of Egypt is an individual duty as “the enemy
resides in [the Muslim lands as] these rulers who have snatched the leadership of the Muslims”.43
He
furthermore establishes that the freeing of Egypt from its “close enemy” is more important than fighting
the “distant enemy” of Israel for the liberation of Jerusalem as jihad against such imperialist centres in
the Arab world would lead to the shedding of Muslim blood whilst perpetuating a non-Islamic system
of governance.44
Whilst Faraj’s descriptions of the circumstances giving rise to jihad may be regarded as a
continuation of Qutb’s religious theory, his timeframe for action constitutes a significant departure.
Qutb regarded the whole of Egyptian society, but for a small vanguard, as apostates and thus did not
harbour any hopes of a popular uprising against an un-Islamic leader.Assuch, he advocateda pragmatic
two-stage approach for the establishment of an Islamic state which mirrored the two phases of the
Muslim community during the life of the Prophet Mohammed. During the first “Meccan” stage, the
Prophet and his followers were surrounded by a hostile jahiliyya society, and thus were ordered by
Allah to proselytise (da’wa) but not to perform an active jihad. Only after the Prophet migrated to
Medina (al-Hijra) was the Muslim community allowed to fight the polytheists.45
Qutb regarded the
Islamist movement as still being in the “Meccan stage” and thus advocated a mere “struggle by word
of mouth”.46
Only after this long-term educational endeavour had gathered popular support for the
vanguard’s mission did Qutb support a battle against the jahiliyya state.47
In ‘The Neglected Duty’, Faraj counters Qutb’s conception of Egyptian society as jahiliyya by
invoking Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa concerning Mardin, a city with an infidel government, in which the
42 Ibid.
45 Orbach, “Tyrannicide in Radical Islam,” 967.
46 Calvert, Origins of Radical Islamism, 2.
47 Sivan, Radical Islam, 89.

8
Great Traditionalist held that “[I]t is neither the land of peace – where the laws of Islam hold sway- nor
the land of war- whose population are infidels-but lies in a third zone.48
Thus in Faraj’s ideology, a
society could remain Muslim, even if governed by infidel leaders.49
This characterisation of Egyptian
society as predominantly moral caused Faraj to criticise Qutb’s imitation of the “prophetic model” and
its attendant phases of weakness and strength.50
Faraj did not consider lengthy delays in launching
internal jihad to be necessary as the jihadists could be assured popular support. Faraj’s ideology did
not extend beyond the successful assassination of Sadat as “when the Rule of the infidel has fallen
everything will be in the hands of the Muslims”.51
Thus, Faraj’s theory of jihad regarded President
Sadat’s assassination as the catalyst in ensuring the inevitable triumph of Islam through the intercession
of Allah and the Egyptian people.
In conclusion, ‘The Neglected Duty’ by Abd al-Salam Faraj serves as the ideological
underpinning for the assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. In his manifesto, Faraj draws
upon the seminal writings of Ibn Taymiyya and Sayyid Qutb to proclaim both the apostate status of the
nominally “Believing President” and the resulting duty imposed upon each individual Muslim to wage
holy war against their infidel leader. However, Faraj’s rejection of the “prophetic model” of waging
jihad in favour of immediate action constitutes a break with previous revolutionary Islamic thought. It
is therefore the combination of these vital elements that triggered the assassination of President Sadat.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 236.
51 Rapoport, “Sacred Terror, 115.

9
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