3. ABSTRACT
This research project aims to analyze the positive impact of using marketing principles for pro-
democracy Burma advocacy groups based in Thailand. This endeavor is based on the theoretical
assumption that both disciplines at their core are about the same thing: Selling. In marketing
firms are selling a product while in advocacy people are selling a social cause. Considering that
these two disciplines therefore have very significant theoretical similarities, it could be
interesting to analyze whether the theories that have brought success in the business sector –
modern marketing – also can bring success for advocacy groups lobbying for a social cause.
The methodology is based on a mixed-method approach comprising of 35 surveys and 26
interviews with people who are working or have worked for Burma advocacy groups in
Thailand. Furthermore, 24 exploratory interviews have been conducted with Burma advocacy
groups not based in Thailand; NGOs dealing with Burmese migrants and refugees in Thailand;
Burma scholars; diplomats, human rights advocates and humanitarian workers who previously
worked in Burma; and three Burma documentary film makers.
In terms of the findings, this study tentatively confirmed the utility of marketing theory in
advocacy. This happened first of all because advocacy groups who used techniques resembling
modern marketing theory also tended to have a higher advocacy impact.
Secondly, a clear difference was seen between advocacy groups who used a conflict based style
and advocacy groups with a more accommodating style, which resembled the customer-driven
approach known from modern marketing. In this regard, advocacy groups with a more customer-
driven approach towards the Burmese government and its supporters tended to have a more
positive impact in a pro-democratic direction. Compared to this, while advocacy groups with a
more conflict based approach may also have had an impact, this was in most cases not likely to
be positive, because it would make the Burmese government even less inclined to engage with
other parties domestically and internationally. This further indicates the utility of marketing
theory in advocacy and warrants further research into this area.
4. TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF TABLES...................................................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................... viii
Chapter 1.......................................................................................................................................................1
1.1 Introduction to the thesis.....................................................................................................................1
1.2 Overview and objectives of the study.................................................................................................2
1.3 Significance and contribution of the study .........................................................................................3
1.4 Limitation of the study........................................................................................................................4
1.5 Definition of terms used in this study.................................................................................................4
1.6 Organization of the study....................................................................................................................5
Chapter 2.......................................................................................................................................................7
2.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................................7
2.2 Theoretical review ..............................................................................................................................7
2.2.1 Advocacy – the traditional solution .............................................................................................7
2.2.2 Marketing – the new solution.....................................................................................................12
2.2.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................16
2.3 Empirical review: Background about Burma....................................................................................17
2.3.1 Target audience analysis............................................................................................................17
2.3.2 The Burmese exile advocacy movement....................................................................................31
2.4 Exploratory research .........................................................................................................................37
2.5 Conceptual framework......................................................................................................................38
2.5.1 Theoretical framework...............................................................................................................38
2.5.2 Development of hypotheses.......................................................................................................41
2.5.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................44
Chapter 3.....................................................................................................................................................45
3.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................................45
3.2 Research design ................................................................................................................................45
3.3 Target population, sample size and sampling methods.....................................................................46
3.4 Development of interview guide and survey ....................................................................................47
3.5 Data collection ..................................................................................................................................49
3.6 Advocacy impact measurement ........................................................................................................50
5. 3.6.1 Change .......................................................................................................................................50
3.6.2 Impact on relevant target audiences...........................................................................................51
3.6.3 Techniques used.........................................................................................................................52
3.6.4 Individual and not cumulative impact........................................................................................53
3.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................53
Chapter 4.....................................................................................................................................................55
4.1 Summary of data collection ..............................................................................................................55
4.1.1 Overview of the collected data...................................................................................................55
4.1.2 Data validity...............................................................................................................................59
4.1.3 Data reliability ...........................................................................................................................60
4.1.4 Conservative statistical analysis.................................................................................................61
4.2 Hypothesis 1......................................................................................................................................61
4.2.1 Environmental analysis..............................................................................................................62
4.2.2 Goals ..........................................................................................................................................64
4.2.3 Targeting....................................................................................................................................64
4.2.4 Positioning .................................................................................................................................65
4.2.5 Marketing strategies...................................................................................................................66
4.2.6 Action plan.................................................................................................................................69
4.2.7 Budgeting...................................................................................................................................70
4.2.8 Evaluation ..................................................................................................................................71
4.2.9 Summary of findings..................................................................................................................71
4.2.10 Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................72
4.3 Hypothesis 2......................................................................................................................................73
4.3.1 Environmental analysis and goals..............................................................................................73
4.3.2 Goals and Target audiences .......................................................................................................74
4.3.3 Targeting and Positioning..........................................................................................................75
4.3.4 Positioning and Marketing strategies.........................................................................................76
4.3.5 Marketing strategies and Action plan ........................................................................................77
4.3.6 Action plan and Budgeting ........................................................................................................78
4.3.7 Evaluation and the rest of the steps............................................................................................78
4.3.8 Summary of findings..................................................................................................................79
4.3.9 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................80
7. LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Top-10 Burma trading partners in 2010 .......................................................................................28
Table 2: Level of influence on Burma's political situation .........................................................................51
Table 3: Demographics of the collected data..............................................................................................56
Table 4: Overview of the interviewed groups.............................................................................................57
Table 5: Educational background of the Burma groups’ management team..............................................58
Table 6: Professional background of the Burma groups’ management team .............................................58
Table 7: Number of employees and volunteers in the Burma groups.........................................................58
Table 8: Years with an office in Thailand for the Burma groups ...............................................................59
Table 9: Info gathering about how relevant target audiences understood Burma’s political situation.......62
Table 10: The Burma groups’ advocacy target audiences ..........................................................................64
Table 11: Internet channels used.................................................................................................................68
Table 12: Direct lobbying channels used....................................................................................................68
Table 13: How long time ahead was the advocacy planned?......................................................................70
Table 14: Budget size..................................................................................................................................70
Table 15: How often did the Burma groups evaluate their advocacy work? ..............................................71
Table 16: Burma groups making the Burmese government change its behavior........................................82
Table 17: Burma groups strengthening non-government actors in Burma .................................................83
Table 18: Getting Asian countries to put pressure on or engage in dialogue with Burma’s government...83
Table 19: Getting Western countries and UN to put pressure on or engage in dialogue with Burma’s
government .................................................................................................................................................84
Table 20: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on the Burmese
government and the environmental analysis on a certain group.................................................................90
Table 21: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on the Burmese
government and the choice of target audience............................................................................................90
Table 22: Significant correlations between choice of target audience and making the Burmese government
engage with the domestic opposition..........................................................................................................91
Table 23: Significant correlations between choice of target audience and making the Burmese government
implement more democratic policies..........................................................................................................91
Table 24: Insignificant correlations between a positioning based on pressure and having an impact on the
Burmese government (BG).........................................................................................................................92
Table 25: Significant correlations between a positioning based on dialogue and having an impact on the
Burmese government (BG).........................................................................................................................92
Table 26: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on Burma’s civil
society and the environmental analysis on a certain group.........................................................................93
Table 27: Significant correlations between the environmental analysis and strengthening the general
public ..........................................................................................................................................................93
Table 28: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on ethnic populations
and the environmental analysis on a certain group.....................................................................................93
Table 29: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on Burma’s civil
society and the choice of target audience....................................................................................................94
8. Table 30: Significant correlations between choice of target audience and strengthening the domestic
opposition....................................................................................................................................................94
Table 31: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on ethnic populations
and the choice of target audience................................................................................................................95
Table 32: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on ASEAN and Asian
countries and the environmental analysis on a certain group .....................................................................95
Table 33: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on ASEAN and Asian
countries and the choice of target audience ................................................................................................96
Table 34: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on Western countries
and UN and the environmental analysis on a certain group........................................................................97
Table 35: Significant correlations between environmental analysis and making the United States put
pressure on the Burmese government .........................................................................................................97
Table 36: Number of times that there was a significant correlation between impact on Western countries
and UN and the choice of target audience ..................................................................................................97
Table 37: Significant correlations between choice of target audience and making USA put pressure on the
Burmese government ..................................................................................................................................98
Table 38: Degree to which the Burma groups had an advocacy impact and followed the marketing plan
(MP) in general .........................................................................................................................................100
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Framework for advocacy groups working for democratic change ..................................39
9. 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction to the thesis
Change is over Burma with democratic reforms happening on a scale and with a speed
that very few people outside Burma anticipated before the 2010 elections. Compared to this, the
20 years preceding these elections were characterized by a highly repressive military government
that was very reluctant to implement or even consider discussions about democratic reforms.
This difference between the two periods is interesting considering that many of the decision
makers are the same and that the new government, although less overtly than before 2010, is still
backed and to a large extent controlled by the Burmese military (Linkewich et al, 2011: 4;
Callahan, 2012: 120).
In addition to this, Burma is one of the cases, where the most people outside the country
have been lobbying for political change. In numerous countries all around the world, for up to 20
years Burma advocacy groups were criticizing the Burmese government in strong words and
lobbying foreign governments and international organizations to put pressure on the generals.
Despite this, it took 20 years before the first new election was held since the annulled 1990
elections (ICG, March 2011: 1, 11-13).
Considering these peculiarities, it is reasonable to analyze more closely the degree of
effectiveness of the Burma advocacy groups. First of all, we should analyze whether the
advocacy groups were right in focusing on the outside world rather than on people and groups
inside Burma. Secondly, it should be examined whether the international political pressure that
the advocacy groups were supporting, actually had a positive or perhaps even a negative impact
on the Burmese government’s attitude to democratic reforms (Bynum, 2011: 11).
The traditional way to analyze the advocacy groups’ performance would be through an
advocacy framework. Doing this is a problem though primarily because using advocacy theory to
analyze advocacy groups is not likely to create much new knowledge. Furthermore, much
advocacy has a tendency to focus more on the social mission (i.e. democracy and human rights in
10. 2
Burma), rather than the feelings of the people involved in the conflict. While this may be a
general problem with much advocacy theory, a mission-driven approach may have been a
particular problem in relation to emotionally entrenched conflicts such as Burma. In this regard,
the main decision makers in the Burmese government and military felt strongly about their own
understanding of the conflict and were not likely to respond in an accommodating way to blunt
and hard-nosed criticism – especially if it came from foreigners or Burmese advocates residing
outside the country (Arendshorst, 2009: 103-105).
For those two reasons, this research paper will not adopt a theoretical advocacy
framework. Instead, the work of the Burma advocacy groups will be analyzed through a
marketing framework.
This is done first of all, because marketing constitutes a possible alternative framework
for how to analyze and think about advocacy. 30 years ago G.D. Wiebe pointed out that there is
no reason why selling soap and a social cause should be fundamentally different in nature.
Similarly, there is no obvious argument why this should not also be the case, when attempting to
sell democracy to people in- and outside of Burma (Graham, 1993: 3). Secondly, not only does it
seem possible to analyze advocacy with marketing theory, but it is potentially also a better tool
than traditional advocacy theory. In this regard, modern marketing has a track record of creating
business success by uncovering the customers’ needs and wants through market research and
then subsequently developing products satisfying these desires.
Compared to this, much advocacy tries to “sell” an already existing social cause
(democracy, human rights etc.). The consequence of this is that advocacy groups often neglect
the needs and wants of their target audience, which in turn results in a diminished chance of
gaining this audience’s support. As this shows, a customer-driven approach has clear intuitive
advantages over a mission-driven approach and justifies the attempt to analyze the Burma
advocacy groups through a modern marketing framework (Kurtz, 2006: 9-12; Kotler, 2005: 19-
20).
1.2 Overview and objectives of the study
The topic of this thesis is to assess to what degree Burma advocacy groups based in
Thailand had an impact in terms of changing Burma in a pro-democratic direction. Furthermore,
11. 3
this thesis wishes to test whether marketing theory can explain whichever level of impact that the
Burma advocacy groups are found to have.
In testing this correlation between marketing and impact, three primary objectives have
been developed for this thesis. First of all, this thesis wishes to determine to what degree the
Burma advocacy groups followed all the steps in the marketing plan, which is known as one of
the most important tools in modern marketing (Andersen, 2007). Secondly, this project aims to
examine whether the Burma advocacy groups adequately connected the steps in the marketing
plan with each other. Finally, this project wishes to determine if the advocacy groups that did
follow the steps in the marketing plan and were able to connect them, also were the groups who
had the highest impact on Burma’s political situation.
1.3 Significance and contribution of the study
This research project provides significant contributions in three areas. Firstly, the
research project will deal with a case (the Burmese exile advocacy community), which is
relatively under-researched academically. A substantial amount of literature exists about
Burma’s relations to other countries and international organizations in the 1990-2010 period.
However only a small amount of academic literature exists explicitly about the work of the
Burma advocacy groups, and what direct or indirect impact they had on Burma’s political
situation (Hadar, 1998).
Secondly, this research project is significant due to its originality in trying to apply
marketing theory in advocacy. While the technique of using marketing to solve social problems
has existed for decades in social marketing, there seems to be little research done in terms of
using marketing in advocacy1
(Kotler et al, 2009: 51). Furthermore, in the cases where marketing
has been used in advocacy literature, it has not happened in the comprehensive and rigorous way
that this thesis attempts to do (Bob, 2005; O’Shaughnessy: 2001).
Thirdly, this thesis is significant, because marketing with its focus on meeting customers’
needs and wants seems particularly useful in locked conflicts such as Burma. One of the main
reasons why the Burmese conflict has continued for decades has been a tendency for the
1
For the writing of this thesis, no previous studies about this subject were found. There may be some studies in
languages other than English, but it would appear that the use of marketing in democratic change processes up
until now is a relatively under-researched area.
12. 4
government and its opponents to go for absolute victories without compromise and without
trying to understand the feelings and desires of their counterparts. This inevitably made
negotiated conflict resolution unlikely in most cases. In this matter, marketing’s emphasis on
mutually beneficial exchanges based on an understanding of other people’s needs and wants
appears to be a useful tool to make progress in emotionally very tense conflicts (Callahan, 2003:
226-227).
1.4 Limitation of the study
This research paper has a number of limitations. First of all, this is a case study focusing
exclusively on Burma with the limitations in generalizability that this implies (Bryman, 2004:
51).
Secondly, the thesis focuses on the period between the 1990 elections and the 2010
November election. This time frame is chosen because it was in this period that the international
Burma advocacy movement really started to develop (Bynum, 2011: i, 10). Furthermore, the
period after the 2010 election has not been included, because of the markedly different behavior
of the new government compared to the previous, all-out military government which was in
place before the election (Callahan, 2012: 125-126).
Thirdly, the thesis is limited to Burma advocacy groups based in Thailand. The Burmese
exile movement is a worldwide phenomenon, but this will be too much to cover in this thesis.
Instead the research is limited to Thailand, which hosts more Burma advocacy groups, than any
other country outside Burma (Dudley, 2003: 9)2
.
Finally, this thesis specifically addresses the democracy groups working in exile and will
not discuss the work of the democracy movement inside Burma.
1.5 Definition of terms used in this study
In this section, the two most important concepts of this thesis – advocacy and marketing –
are defined. In terms of advocacy, this covers a very wide array of practices and has both narrow
as well as very wide definitions, where advocacy sometimes simply is defined as a person who
2
Furthermore, the author lives and studies in Thailand, which makes data collection much easier.
13. 5
speaks or writes in support of something. The definition, which will be used in this thesis, is
within the area of public policy advocacy and is as follows: Advocacy is the “process by which
individuals and organizations attempt to influence public policy decisions” (Snowdon, 2004: 6).
While many other definitions exist3
, this one is particularly useful for this thesis, which aims to
measure the Burma groups’ ability to specifically create public policy progress in a pro-
democratic direction4
.
In terms of marketing, then again multiple definitions exist. In this regard, a simple yet
straightforward and powerful definition has been made by Kotler et al (2010), who describes
marketing as “the process by which companies create value for customers and build strong
customer relationships in order to capture value from customers in return” (p. 29). This
definition will be used in this thesis, because it without any fluff pinpoints the central ideas and
mechanisms behind modern marketing.
1.6 Organization of the study
This thesis consists of five chapters with the motivation and goals being introduced in
chapter one.
In chapter two a theoretical and empirical literature review is provided, where the
theoretical review discusses how marketing can be utilized in advocacy. In addition to this, the
empirical review provides background information about Burma’s political situation and
discusses the work of the Burmese advocacy movement. At the end of chapter two, a conceptual
framework with three hypotheses are developed.
In the third chapter, the thesis methodology is presented. This chapter especially
discusses the choice of using mixed-method, non-probability sampling and snowballing.
In the fourth chapter, the findings of the data analysis are discussed. This discussion tests
the three hypotheses, and whether the advocacy groups that followed the marketing plan to a
higher extent also had a generally higher advocacy impact.
3
For example in relation to social justice advocacy or media advocacy (Klugman, 2010: 2; Staples, 2009: 175).
4
Often, for example, advocacy definitions do not require that change happens formally and officially through
public policy reform, but can also happen informally and unofficially through a strengthened civil society,
companies adopting better practices etc. (Mayoux, 2003: 4).
14. 6
Finally, in chapter five the findings of the hypotheses testing are summarized, and
whether marketing is a viable tool in advocacy. Furthermore, this concluding chapter discusses
to what extent the findings of this case study can be used under other circumstances, where
NGOs are engaged in pro-democratic advocacy.
15. 7
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
As explained in the previous section, chapter 2 consists of a theoretical and empirical
literature review. In the theoretical review, the concept of marketing is introduced and how it can
be an effective tool for advocacy groups.
Following this, an empirical review is conducted, which provides background
information about the political situation in Burma and the work of the Burma advocacy groups5
.
Finally, at the end of Chapter 2, a conceptual framework with three hypotheses is developed,
which aims to test to what degree marketing is a credible alternative framework for how to
analyze the work of the Burma advocacy groups.
2.2 Theoretical review
2.2.1 Advocacy – the traditional solution
In the following section advocacy and some of its major trends are introduced. In
particular, focus is given to the mission-driven approach of much advocacy. In this regard, the
implications of such an approach are examined and how it can be a problem, if the advocacy
goals have to be achieved over a prolonged period of time involving repeated interactions with
the target audience (Norrell, 1999: 9).
Focus on change
Advocacy is a very varied field both theoretically, and in terms of how advocacy is
performed in ‘the real world’. However, a common theme that seems to drive both advocacy
academics as well as practitioners is the focus on changing an existing unfair or undesirable
situation (Laney, 2003: 1).
5
In this thesis, the terms “Burma advocacy groups” and “Burma groups” are used interchangeably.
16. 8
In this regard, VeneKlasen et al (2007) for example defines advocacy as “an organized
political process that involves the coordinated efforts of people to change policies, practices,
ideas and values that perpetuate inequality, prejudice, and exclusion” (p. 1). Furthermore, the
World Bank has written that “advocacy is about influencing or changing relationships of
power,” while the United Kingdom’s well-known Department of International Development
(DFID) has an advocacy goal of using “our influence in the multilateral system to increase
international commitment to poverty eradication” (Mayoux, 2003: 5).
As these and numerous other examples show, the focus of much advocacy is on the issue
and achieving the political or social change that will resolve the issue. In other words, a mission-
driven approach that places primary importance on the advocacy group’s social cause and
therefore also is willing to accept various costs in the pursuit of this cause6
(Kimberlin, 2010:
165).
Change justifying the use of means
As a logical consequence of a mission-driven approach focusing on change, both
advocacy scholars as well as practitioners take a generally quite open approach to how political
and social change can be achieved. Jane Covey, for example, writes that NGOs are free to
choose between five different strategies in order to influence public policy: Collaboration,
education, persuasion, litigation and confrontation (Sibanda, 1994: 6).
In this regard, which particular strategy is chosen is of lesser importance, as long as the
desired change is achieved. One of the implications of this flexible approach is that many
advocacy scholars and practitioners do not rule out the possibility of achieving advocacy
objectives through conflict. Mayoux (2003) for example distinguishes between adversarial
advocacy and negotiated advocacy, where adversarial advocacy “uses actions that express
opposition, protest and dissent,” while negotiated advocacy “engages stakeholders with
decision-makers, and emphasizes consensus-building, negotiation and conflict management” (p.
18).
6
Kimberlin (2010) here talks about that “advocacy organizations make public interest claims either promoting or
resisting social change that, if implemented, would conflict with the social, cultural, political, or economic interests
or values of other constituencies and groups.” As this quote shows, the emphasis is on achieving the social cause if
not despite all costs then at least with a willingness to accept some costs, which in this case would be a conflict
about which values should be prevalent in a society (p. 165).
17. 9
Underscoring the point that no strategy is necessarily better than another, Mayoux (2003)
goes on to say that “advocacy campaigns may simultaneously employ elements of both
adversarial and negotiated advocacy, or may use the approaches sequentially. Adversarial
advocacy often serves as prelude to negotiated advocacy as the campaign gains momentum and
shifts its focus from problems and causes to solutions” (p. 18).
As this and other examples show, the center of attention is political or social change with
a flexible attitude to how this change can come about (Norrell, 1999: 10). The underlying reason
for this attitude often seems to be a belief that the pursuit of the advocacy group’s social mission
is just beyond dispute and therefore takes preeminence ahead of all other considerations. This
opinion is prevalent both among advocacy scholars as well as practitioners.
In this regard, Kimberlin (2010) for example notes that “many political theorists have
argued that advocacy is one of the most important roles played by nonprofit organizations in a
democracy. By representing the viewpoints of minorities and disempowered groups, and by
critically monitoring and pushing for changes in public policies, nonprofit organizations serve
as vital intermediary institutions that help maintain the quality of a democratic government and
its responsiveness to the needs of all its constituents” (p. 166).
As this shows, advocacy is often considered to occupy a moral high ground lobbying for
causes that are inherently good. This at the same time provides advocacy groups with a
justification of the work that they are doing, as well as a more or less free hand to choose
whatever means available to attain their morally just social cause in the interest of their
constituents or society more generally (Kudo, 2005: 12).
Target audience needs and wants
As the above section shows, social and political advocates usually feel that they are
justified in pursuing their mission, even though there may be collateral costs associated with it.
The danger however, both theoretically and in practice, of a mission-driven approach is that less
attention is given to the advocacy target audience. This is problematic, because it is ultimately
the target audience’s behavior that is sought to be changed (Wilson-Grau, 2007: 8).
In this regard, it is important to emphasize that much advocacy theory do place a large
emphasis on understanding the target audience. Krisch (2012) for example states that a
“systematic research phase needs to constitute the first step of any planning process for lobbying
18. 10
and campaigning. (…) Conducting a stakeholder analysis of relevant intermediates and decision
makers will not only provide a better understanding of the socio-political environment, but also
help in establishing contacts to potential supporters and possible adversaries” (p. 14).
In addition to this, it is not uncommon to see advocacy literature using terminology that is
quite similar to customer oriented terms known from modern marketing. Wolf (2009) for
example in this regard talks about the need of “audience identification and segmentation” (p. 5).
Furthermore, and much resembling modern marketing, Wolf goes on to say that “motivating
(advocacy) messages need to hit an emotional chord. People are busy. They resist change. In
order to get their attention and support for change, you have to connect with people by plugging
into their belief system, not trying to rewire it” (p. 8).
However, while there clearly is a focus on understanding the target audiences in much
advocacy literature and among many practitioners, this focus is certainly not nearly as strong as
it could be. Coates et al (2002) in this respect write that “the deepest pitfall of advocacy is failing
to understand the nature of the work it involves. This is scarcely surprising, given the paucity of
systematic research and analysis into its diverse forms, methods, institutional structures, and the
dynamics of decision-making processes it seeks to influence” (p. 531).
This lack of environmental analysis described by Coates et al (2002) leads many
advocacy scholars as well as practitioners if not to ignore, then at least to underestimate the
importance of their target audience’s needs and wants. This, in turn, will often lead to problems
with achieving the advocacy groups’ mission, and especially if this mission has a long time
frame (p. 531).
Longer time frame complicates a mission-driven approach
The likely consequence of not focusing enough on the target audience is, that advocacy
groups often will use methods which will further their mission in the short term, but without
fully compensating the target audience for its change of behavior. The unfortunate consequence
of this is that it will be harder to achieve longer term advocacy objectives, because of the target
audience’s increased hostility (Schoon, 1995).
Teles et al (2011) in this regard talks about that “problems fight back” and that
“advocacy efforts almost always involve a fight against a strategic adversary capable of
learning and adapting over time” (p. 13-14). This shows that while a mission-driven strategy can
19. 11
be effective in the short run, it becomes increasingly difficult to implement in the long run, and
especially when repeated interactions with the target audience are needed.
A relevant example in this matter is Greenpeace, who over the years has had an almost
unparalleled ability to bring environmental issues on the media agenda using strongly
confrontational and provocatory tactics. However, while Greenpeace often has had short run
advocacy success7
, it may have hurt the organization in the long run to alienate the politicians
and business people that they were trying to influence. An indicator of this is the numerous times
that Greenpeace has been sued by the very companies and governments, which you would
expect that Greenpeace wanted to influence in a positive direction (Schoon, 1995; CBC, 2009;
BBC, 2002; ENS, 2004; Los Angeles Times, 2004).
Another relevant example is the NGO Invisible Children, who called for military action
against the war criminal Joseph Kony in a YouTube video (Kony 2012) on March 2012. Kony
2012 became a worldwide phenomenon almost overnight and as of March 2013 had nearly a
billion views. However, Invisible Children in their advocacy failed to consider the geopolitical
interests of Sudan, Congo and Uganda. These interests were some of the most critical,
underlying reasons why Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army could continue their operations, and
why a public call for military action was likely to be futile (Izama, 2012).
As this shows, a mission-driven approach for both of these prominent organizations led to
a superficial understanding of complex conflicts and the needs and wants of the parties involved.
While this gave them publicity in the short run, it also significantly decreased Greenpeace and
Invisible Children’s ability to come up with realistic, long term strategies to attain the social and
political change that they were claiming to be pursuing (Izama, 2012).
An example in the opposite direction is the think-tank Myanmar Egrees, which has
exerted significant influence on Burmese politics without the same “do-or-die” mentality that
characterized many of Greenpeace and Invisible Children’s strategies. Instead, Myanmar Egrees
has lobbied for its points of view through informal and cordial relationships with key players in
Burmese politics, in a way that if did not meet these key players’ needs and wants at least did not
hurt them either (Moe, 2010).
7
With the campaign against the dumping of Shell Oil’s Brent Spar oil platform as a famous and notorious example
(Schoon, 1995).
20. 12
A similar example is found in Elliot-Teague’s PhD dissertation about Tanzanian
advocacy. In this paper, Elliot-Teague concludes that advocacy groups with a more
accommodating approach had a higher impact than groups with a more confrontational approach
(Elliot-Teague, 2007: v). As these and other examples show (Raynor et al, 2009: 15), there
seems to be considerable justification for incorporating a higher focus on the target audience’s
needs and wants in modern advocacy theory and practice.
Supplement and not supplant the mission-driven approach
Finally, it is important to emphasize that building in a higher focus on the target
audience’s needs and wants would not necessarily entail supplanting the mission-driven
approach, but simply to complement it. In this regard, social marketing is an example of a
discipline that has been able to maintain a focus on achieving social change, while at the same
time basing any change efforts on an understanding of the target group’s needs and wants, and a
willingness to serve these needs rather than to work against them. This shows that mission-
driven and target audience-driven approaches are not mutually exclusive, but can actually work
hand-in-hand (Kotler et al, 2009: 48).
Conclusion
In the previous section, the dominant ideas in current advocacy thought were reviewed.
In this regard, much literature and practice is based on the idea that advocacy is and should be
mission-driven. However such a focus, while often useful in the short run, may also be a problem
in the long run due to a lack of attentiveness to the needs and wants of the target audience.
2.2.2 Marketing – the new solution
In the following section a brief overview of the most important elements of modern
marketing is provided. Furthermore, this section will explain how these techniques can be
incorporated in advocacy to secure a higher focus on the target audience’s needs and wants and
thereby increase the effectiveness of advocacy groups especially in the long run.
21. 13
Customer-driven approach
Modern marketing is characterized by being customer-driven, where the point of
departure of the company’s work is its customers’ needs and wants. Unlikely much mission-
driven advocacy and especially conflict-based advocacy, this is founded on the assumption that a
company can only be successful, if it can satisfy its customers’ needs and wants through the
products that the company is offering (Kotler et al, 2010: 35).
In this sense, marketing does not try to change the customers’ needs and wants or sell
them products that do not match with the customers’ preferences. Instead, modern marketing
seeks an equitable exchange, where value is created – and not taken away – from the customer.
The goal with this is to build long term relationships with the customer, which through repeated
sales over time is more profitable than one-shot sales, where the customer is tricked, pressured or
otherwise forced or manipulated into buying a product that does not sufficiently satisfy his/her
needs and wants (Kotler, 2005: 19-20).
In addition to this, the company’s value proposition must be better than those of its
relevant competitors. In other words, the company’s aim should not just be to create value, but to
create more value than its competitors. If that does not happen, the target market will likely
select a competing product over yours (Kotler et al, 2010: 237).
To incorporate this customer-driven approach in advocacy is significant because the
point of departure would not be the NGO’s mission and the belief that any mean – conflict or not
– would be justified in attaining this mission. Instead, rather than using pressure or flashy, but
hollow communication strategies to get the target audience’s support, the outlook of the
advocacy groups should be how best to serve the target audience’s interests more genuinely
(Kotler et al, 2010: 35).
In line with marketing’s focus on an “exchange of value”, this would happen through a
compromise that would create value for the target audience by meeting its needs and wants.
Furthermore, the value of this compromise should be greater than what the target audience
otherwise could have attained through alternative arrangements or courses of action. Finally – as
in marketing – the advocacy groups should ask the target audience for something in return that
would further their own social cause (Kotler et al, 2010: 19-20).
The benefit of this compromise would first of all be that the advocacy groups
immediately would get closer to reaching their overall goals. Secondly, the fact that the advocacy
22. 14
groups were able to meet its target audience’s needs in this first exchange would make it more
likely that they could agree on more mutually beneficial “deals” later on. This incremental
progress through one compromise at a time could over time result in the more substantial and
fundamental political and social change that the advocacy groups desired (Kotler et al, 2009: 48).
Customer research
As a consequence of marketing’s focus on providing customers with what they need and
want, marketing has a very high emphasis on customer research. The goal with customer
research is to understand the customers’ needs and wants, and how they can be fulfilled through
certain products or services. This research to a large extent happens by collecting data directly
from the customers through a variety of means (interviews, surveys, observations, experiments,
focus groups etc.) (Kotler et al, 2010: 125).
In addition to customer research, marketing also puts heavy emphasis on competitive
analysis, which entails analyzing competitors and other external forces that could influence the
company. Same as with customer research, this can happen through a variety of tools such as a
SWOT analysis, BCG matrix, GE/McKinsey Matrix, PEST analysis, micro and macro analysis,
Porter’s Five Forces analysis and more. Finally, the company also analyzes its own strengths and
weakness to ensure, that they have the capacity to deliver the products which will meet their
customers’ needs and wants (Kotler et al, 2010: 77).
As the above paragraphs show, marketing research is a highly rigorous process, where
the company tries to foresee all environmental factors that may affect the company’s ability to
sell its products. If the same approach was taken in advocacy, this would entail collecting as
much information as possible about the needs and wants of the advocacy group’s target
audience. Furthermore, as in marketing research, this should preferably be primary data and not
just secondary data (Kotler et al, 2010: 125).
In addition to their target audience, the advocacy group should also analyze existing
competitors, and whether these actors can offer the target audience better arrangements than the
advocacy group itself. ‘Competitors’ in this regard refers to all actors in addition to the advocacy
group that are able to influence the advocacy target audience. For example, in case of the
Burmese government being the target audience, relevant competitors could be Tatmadaw8
,
8
The Burmese national army, officially named Myanmar Armed Forces.
23. 15
business tycoons, USDA9
, domestic opposition, general public, ethnic armed groups, China,
Thailand, India, ASEAN10
and others with something “to offer” to the Burmese government
(Bergen et al, 2002: 160).
Finally, as in marketing research, the advocacy groups should also remember to evaluate
their own organization’s strengths and weaknesses to ensure, that they have the capacity to offer
their target audience a better deal than anybody else (Kotler et al, 2010: 77, 78).
Planning and implementation
In terms of creating a successful marketing campaign, carefully gauging customer needs
and wants is only the first step. The second step is designing and implementing a plan for how to
satisfy these desires. The favored tool for this task in marketing is the marketing plan. The
marketing plan in this regard lays out a highly structured and sequential plan starting with an
analysis of the company’s environment and ending with the ability to profitably promote and sell
a product in that environment (Kotler et al, 2010: 79).
In the marketing literature, the marketing plan exists in slightly different versions, even
though the majority of them follow the same overall pattern. In this thesis, the following
marketing plan model has been chosen, because it is very structured and flows logically from one
step to another:
1) External PEST analysis: Analyzing the political, economic, socio-cultural and
technological environment.
2) SWOT analysis: Analyzing the company’s strengths and weaknesses and the
opportunities and threats of the surrounding environment.
3) Goals & Objectives: Develop goals and objectives based on the environmental analysis.
4) Segmentation, targeting and positioning: Segment the market; find the target market; and
position the company relative to its competitors.
5) Marketing strategies: Implement marketing strategies that work hand-in-hand in meeting
the needs and wants of the target market.
6) Action plan: Develop a plan for implementing the marketing strategies.
7) Budgeting: Set a budget to implement the action plan.
8) Evaluation: Set up performance evaluation measures.
9
Union Solidarity and Development Association, a government controlled mass organization (Win, 2010: 27).
10
Association of South East Asian Nations.
24. 16
9) Contingency plan: Have an alternative plan if the marketing campaign is unsuccessful.
10) Executive summary of the marketing plan: Make a short summary of the marketing plan
to be shown to board of directors; upper management; shareholders; investors etc. (Kurtz,
2006: 66-68).
If the marketing plan was to be used in advocacy, it is important that the advocacy groups
carefully follow each step of the plan. In this regard, the marketing plan is a general framework
intended to be used for any company engaged in the selling of any kind of product11
(Berry et al,
2001: 7). Considering that advocacy groups also engage in selling12
, all marketing plan steps can
be expected to be necessary components of a successful advocacy campaign as well.
In addition to this, it is crucial that the advocacy groups carefully connect the individual
steps with each other. As the above summary should show, all marketing steps are systematically
linked to one another, where one step logically leads to the next. Because each step is
interconnected, the company will eventually end up with a cohesive and holistic marketing plan,
which will minimize uncertainty and maximize chance of success (Kotler, 2005: 95-97). For
advocacy groups engaged in selling a social cause, the same can be expected to be the case.
2.2.3 Conclusion
In this section advocacy both among practitioners and in academia was examined. In this
regard, much advocacy was shown to be mission-driven. However, while a mission-driven
approach may help bring short term advocacy wins, it will often complicate goal achievement in
the long run, because it does not pay enough attention to the target audience’s needs and wants
(Izama, 2012; Schoon, 1995).
Considering these limitations of a mission based approach, advocacy could likely benefit
from incorporating elements of modern marketing. The focus of this marketing-inspired
approach would first of all be to understand the target audience’s needs and wants. Subsequently,
the advocacy group would then try to “manufacture” a deal or a compromise that would satisfy
the target audience’s desires, while at the same time furthering the advocacy group’s social cause
(Kotler et al, 2010: 35). In doing so, the advocacy group would also have to perform competitive
11
Although the marketing plan may be customized to some extent, depending on which industry the company is in
(Berry et al, 2001: 7).
12
Even though the currency is political progress and not money.
25. 17
analysis to ensure, that their deal fulfills the target audience’s needs to a higher extent than any
alternative arrangement. Finally, advocacy groups could likely also benefit from using the
marketing plan as a method to plan and implement their advocacy campaigns (Kotler et al, 2010:
77, 125).
2.3 Empirical review: Background about Burma
The following section will consist of background information about the political situation
in Burma. The first part provides a target audience analysis describing the most important
players in relation to Burma’s political situation, and what the needs and wants of these
audiences were.
In the second part of this empirical review, the work of the Burma groups – and how they
tried to influence Burma’s political situation – is described. In doing this, it will be evaluated to
what extent the Burma groups had chosen the right target audiences and whether they were
successful in winning over these audiences by offering deals fulfilling their needs and wants.
2.3.1 Target audience analysis
In the following sections, the advocacy target audiences with the highest potential
influence on Burma’s political situation are described. This target audience analysis is conducted
to determine, which audiences the Burma advocacy groups should have targeted in order to
change Burma in a pro-democratic direction. In addition to this, the following sections will also
analyze the needs and wants of these target audiences in order to find out, which desires had to
be accommodated, when lobbying these audiences to become more supportive of democratic
reform in Burma.
2.3.1.1 Most important target audience: Burmese government
Being the only actor with the means to immediately and singlehandedly start to
implement democratic reforms, the Burmese government was the group with the most power to
change Burma’s political situation. Furthermore, the Burmese government firmly controlled the
most important institutions needed to maintain political and social control. This included the
26. 18
Tatmadaw, USDA13
, the police force, intelligence service as well as keeping a tight rein on the
Burmese media.
All these factors made the Burmese government by far the most important advocacy
audience and should have been targeted by anybody with a genuine interest in changing Burma
in a pro-democratic direction (Clapp, 2007: 4). In this regard, the Burmese government had at
least three important needs that had to be considered, when approaching them with ideas of
promoting democratic reforms.
Personal interests
When lobbying the Burmese government, the first need that had to be considered was the
personal interests of the highest ranking generals and officers as well as their immediate
families. In this regard, many officers feared democratic reforms, because of the risk of
maltreatment or being retroactively sentenced for war crimes and human rights abuses.
Furthermore, the officers likely also feared what would happen to their wives, children and other
immediate family in the event of democratic reforms (Pedersen, 2000: 206).
Secondly, during the SLORC/SPDC14
era, the officer corps had become “a privileged
upper class (…) with superior access to everything from consumer products to education and
healthcare.” Losing these privileges in the event of democratic reform likely was a serious
obstacle against the officers even contemplating a quick transition of power (Pedersen, 2000:
206).
Thirdly, many officers had been able to get involved in lucrative business ventures
through their positions in the army and government. In this regard, many officers in all
likelihood feared that some or all of their assets would be taken away from them with a new
democratic government that represented the people that the generals had brutally repressed for
decades (Bunte, 2011: 11).
13
The USDA was a mass movement founded in 1993 with the purpose of establishing further governmental control
over the Burmese people. In 2006 USDA counted 22.8 million members – little less than half the population – and
constituted a formidable way to establish a government presence almost everywhere in Burmese society (Network
for Democracy and Development, 2006: 18-19).
14
In the thesis period (1990-2010), the military government operated under two different names. From 1988 to
1997, the official name of the government was State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). From 1997 and
to 2010, the official name of the government was changed to State Peace and Development Council (Callahan,
2003: 210; 217).
27. 19
As this show, the Burmese generals had significant personal interests intimately linked
with their own rule. Therefore, in order to have a realistic expectation that Burma’s leaders
would consider ideas of democratic reforms, they had to be assured that these interests would not
be seriously threatened, if they were to relinquish power (Pedersen, 2000: 206).
Security
The second need of the Burmese government was security on both an international and
domestic level. Internationally, security was sought to be achieved through a neutralist foreign
policy. This policy entailed, that Burma did not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, and
expected other countries to adopt a similar position towards Burma (Steinberg, 2010: 93-94).
A more active line was taken domestically, where security was tried to be attained
through a constant repression of dissidents and the general public. Furthermore, the Burmese
government in several ways15
tried to neutralize the domestic threat of the dozens of ethnic
armed groups operating along Burma’s borders (Steinberg, 2000: 100; Pasch et al, 2009: 37).
In terms of the government’s security concerns, it is important to note that they were
coupled with a significant fear and suspicion towards the motives of both domestic and
international actors. This fear especially existed towards Western countries16
and led the
Burmese government to consistently overestimate the West’s hostile intentions towards Burma.
This included an unrealistic, but deeply felt concern of a Western military invasion of Burma,
and a fear that Western countries wanted to strengthen the domestic opposition and ethnic armed
groups in their work to overthrow the Burmese government (Selth, 2008: 15-17).
Considering these feelings, it would be of utmost importance that reform proposals did
not appear threatening and were not seen as gambling with the generals’ security. If these
conditions were met, proposals for democratic change would have had a notably higher chance
of being considered by the generals.
15
The Burmese government used various tactics to deal with the ethnic armed groups. This included: 1) Armed
conflict (for example with KNLA and SSA-South). 2) Agreeing to ceasefires (for example with KIA and NMSP). 3)
Turning the ethnic armed groups into allies (for example with DKBA) (Core, 2009: 96).
16
Which in part can be traced back to Burma’s traumatic period as a British colony (1824-1948) with the
subjugation of the Burmese kings and the proud Burmese people that this entailed (Money, 2012: 102).
28. 20
Respect
The third need of the Burmese government was a significant desire for respect and to be
accepted and treated as equals by the international community. This showed itself primarily
through a notable inferiority complex especially towards Western countries. This complex
among other things was related to Burma’s underdevelopedness and perceived backwardness as
well as a lack of legitimacy and acceptance of the government’s rule by the Burmese population.
(ICG, 2001a: 4; Callahan, 2000: 35; Pedersen, 2000: 205).
In addition to this, the Burmese government’s need for respect was shown in the leaders’
always very proud attitude in dealing with domestic, but perhaps in particular international
actors. This pride was among other things evident in a hypersensitivity towards foreign criticism
and the assertion that Burma’s problems were too complex and uniquely Burmese to be
understood by foreigners. Furthermore, this pride was expressed in the generals’ consistent
refusal to bow to outside pressure and in their emphasis on the unique “Burmese way” of doing
things (ICG, 2001a: 7, 9; Pedersen, 2000: 209; Stern, 2009: 5).
Considering this insecure and inferior, but also proud worldview of Burma’s generals, it
was very important to have a high focus on appearing respectful, when approaching the Burmese
government with proposals for democratic reforms. This would first of all entail showing respect
to the generals’ leadership and their “Burmese way” of governing. Secondly, too strongly
worded criticism tapping into the generals’ inferiority complex should be avoided. If this method
of respectfully approaching the Burmese government was followed, the likelihood that they
would view foreign proposals for democratic reform in a if not accommodating, then at least not
completely hostile way would be substantially improved.
Conclusion
In the previous section, the three most important needs of the Burmese government were
presented: Security, respect and protection of personal interests. For advocates hoping to
persuade the generals to implement democratic reforms, these needs had to be accommodated. If
that happened, the ability of maintaining some dialogue and even apply slight pressure on
29. 21
Burma’s leaders would be improved (as for example was the case with the International Labor
Organization17
) (Wilson, 2010: 298).
2.3.1.2 Second most important target audiences: Civil society and ethnic armed groups
In addition to the government, two other very important target audiences were Burma’s
civil society and ethnic armed groups. Even though they were not as important as the
government, they still had a very significant influence on Burma’s political situation and were
obvious target audiences for pro-democratic advocacy groups.
Civil society
In this section the opportunities of lobbying the very influential Burmese civil society are
examined. In this regard, it is preferable to split the civilian population up into the following
groups, because of their differences in needs and wants: The general population, the National
League for Democracy (NLD) and Aung San Suu Kyi, monks and international NGOs
(INGOS)18
(Restrepo, 2003: 1).
NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
Having won the annulled 1990 elections with a landslide victory, the NLD and Aung San
Suu Kyi had tremendous moral power within the general population. Even though the NLD from
the mid-1990s became increasingly marginalized by the Burmese government, the party
maintained its huge popularity among ordinary people. Furthermore, Aung San Suu Kyi at least
for the Burman population continued to be the country’s uncontested beacon of democracy,
justice and hope. This made both NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi very legitimate advocacy target
audiences (Zaw, 2000).
17
Wilson here explains how the ILO by dealing with the Burmese government in a respectful and largely non-
threatening manner was able to create small, but notable progress over the years vis-a-vis forced labor.
Furthermore – perhaps exactly because of this accommodating and engaging approach – ILO was one of the very
few cases, where an outside agent could apply pressure on Burma’s government without alienating the
hypersensitive Burmese leadership at the same time (Wilson, 2010: 298).
18
In relation to students, then they are often considered a powerful and possibly subversive force in dictatorships.
In Burma, however, during the SPDC period universities were closed, distance learning emphasized and the
education system centralized. This to a large extent meant that students as political force from 1990-2010 were
mostly eliminated (Lall, 2008: 132).
30. 22
For most of the 1990-2010 period, NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi’s political objectives
centered on especially three points: 1) A recognition of the 1990 elections. 2) Three-way
dialogue between the Burmese government, NLD and ethnic groups. 3) A relatively speedy
transfer of power to a civilian government. The Burmese government was opposed to all three
objectives, which were therefore not realistically attainable, unless the government was
overthrown (Hlaing, 2011: 5; Pasch et al, 2009: 28).
That these goals therefore were clearly too ambitious also meant that people engaged in
pro-democratic advocacy should not have supported the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi in
maintaining these policy goals19
. Instead, foreigners should have tried to persuade NLD and
Aung San Suu Kyi that engaging in constructive dialogue, rather than making strong demands,
was the best way to influence a Burmese government hypersensitive to criticism. Furthermore,
the Burmese government had a most negative and strongly condescending view of both NLD and
Aung San Suu Kyi, which meant that pro-democracy advocates should advise NLD and Aung
San Suu Kyi to approach the government in a very considerate way that did not seek to
antagonize them further20
(Hlaing, 2007: 16).
General population
As in any society, the general population was one of the groups with the largest potential
influence on Burma’s political situation. During the 1990-2010 period however, the general
population remained mostly politically passive, because of the dangers involved in being
politically active. Therefore, any attempt to approach the general public to be more active in
promoting democratic reforms had to accommodate ordinary people’s need of not exposing
themselves or their families to too much risk by doing so (Linkewich: 6-7; Huxley, 2007: 15;
Dudley, 2003: 12).
Monks
A third civil society group with influence on Burma’s political situation was the Burmese
monkhood the Sangha with over 300,000 monks and novices. In a devoutly Buddhist country,
19
Which however many of the Burma advocacy groups still did (Farmaner, 2009).
20
Towards Aung San Suu Kyi, this often was reduced to a level of personal attacks and even name calling implying
that she was working for Western powers as well as being a Burmese “race destructionist”, because of her
marriage with the British scholar Michael Aris (Callahan, 2000: 35).
31. 23
the Sangha was a hugely influential moral force that the Burmese generals had to treat with great
care (Steinberg, 2000: 101).
Except for the 2008 Saffron demonstrations, monks did not participate much in politics
directly. Still, monks listened to political news21
and discussed politics among themselves and
with trusted civilians. Furthermore, eminent monks on several occasions publicly called for
national reconciliation between the government and pro-democratic groups. Finally, many ex-
activist monks had close relations with senior military officers. All these factors meant that
Burmese monks were a legitimate and important potential target audience for advocacy groups
(Hlaing, 2007: 19-20).
However, in engaging with the monks – as with the general population – the risk of
government crackdown on political activity had to be considered. Therefore, any attempt to
approach Burmese monks, monasteries or the Sangha as such to be more active in promoting
democratic reforms had to accommodate the monks’ need to work discreetly and informally and
without engaging in direct confrontation with the Burmese government (ICG, 2001b: 18).
INGOs
The last prominent civil society group with influence on Burma’s domestic situation was
international NGOs. Since the mid-1990s several INGOs and UN agencies worked in Burma,
which gave them a direct channel into Burmese society, economy and politics. Even though
INGOs predominantly dealt with humanitarian issues22
, their direct access to military officers,
bureaucrats and government agencies gave the INGOs a certain amount of leverage in
influencing Burma’s political situation (ICG, 2001b: 21-22). These factors made INGOs and UN
agencies working inside Burma highly valid target audiences for advocacy groups
Still, obtaining permission to work in Burma was difficult and once there, the Burmese
government would watch these INGOs and UN agencies closely to prevent them from engaging
in anti-government activities. Therefore, as with the monks, any attempt to approach INGOs and
UN agencies to be more active in promoting democratic reforms had to accommodate their need
of working informally as well as not jeopardizing their cordial working relationships with the
Burmese government (ICG, 2001a: 22).
21
Voice of America, Radio Free Asia and BBC (Hlaing, 2007: 19).
22
HIV, malnutrition, clean drinking water, micro loans etc.
32. 24
Ethnic armed groups
In addition to Burma’s civil society, the populations in the ethnic areas – and especially
the ethnic armed groups – were another target audience with a very considerable influence on
Burma’s political situation. From 1990 to 2010 however, the ethnic armed groups steadily lost
power compared to the central government. This happened primarily because of shrinkage in
territory, resources and recruits as well as numerous ceasefires, which significantly reduced the
number of groups actively engaged in armed struggle against the government. Still, any national
reconciliation had to include the ethnic armed groups, which represented the populations in the
ethnic areas, and who the Tatmadaw despite overwhelming resources were never able to
completely root out of their territories (Rudland et al, 2000: 10, 14). These factors made the
ethnic armed groups a most important advocacy target audience for anybody involved in
transforming Burma’s political landscape.
In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the ethnic armed groups had substantial
differences in terms of outlook and political goals23
. These differences had to be taken into
account, when the ethnic armed groups were approached by pro-democratic advocates (Pasch et
al, 2009: 8). Still, a number of common interests for most of the ethnic armed groups can be
identified.
Local authority
One of the things that nearly all of the ethnic armed groups wanted was some level of
local authority over their own areas within a greater Burmese union24
. This would include
political authority and a right to maintain ethnic armies. Furthermore, it should entail a right to
promote their own ethnic languages and culture as well as various business concessions (Pasch et
al, 2009: 8; Steinberg, 2000: 104).
Considering that many of the ceasefires had included special privileges and some local
authority, the ethnic armed groups’ desire for local authority on a more permanent basis did not
seem completely unrealistic or farfetched (ICG, 2003: 8). This also meant that pro-democratic
advocates approaching the ethnic armed groups could be supportive of their wish for local
23
For example was the Karen National Union under the rule of strongman Bo Mya “unlikely ever to compromise”
with the Burmese central government (ICG, 2003: 5).
24
Originally, many of the ethnic armed groups still wanted independent states for their people. At the end of the
2000s however, nearly all ethnic armies had “accepted the Union of Myanmar as a fact and merely seek increased
local authority and equality within a new federal state structure” (Pasch et al, 2009: 8).
33. 25
authority. This accommodating attitude would then in turn have improved the ability of engaging
in more serious discussions with the ethnic armed groups about national reconciliation and
finding a more permanent resolution with the Burmese government rather than engaging in
unwinnable armed struggle.
Cultural respect
A second need common for all ethnic armed groups was a desire for cultural respect. In
this regard ethnic armed groups, and the populations which they represented, felt discriminated
against by the Burmese government. In addition to political and economic factors, this feeling
extended to cultural and religious discrimination including an attempt of the Burmese
government to ‘Burmanize’ the ethnic areas and its people (Pasch et al, 2009: 8).
In dealing with the ethnic armed groups, pro-democracy advocates therefore needed to
appear highly respectful of ethnic cultures. Furthermore, advocates should be supportive of the
necessity of the Burmese government treating ethnic cultures with dignity and respect. If the
advocacy groups adopted this strategy, it would increase their chance of maintaining a cordial
dialogue with the ethnic armed groups and perhaps even to make them more inclined to engage
in a more constructive political dialogue with the Burmese government about peace and
reconciliation.
2.3.1.3 Third most important target audiences: Domestic power bases, ASEAN and
Asian countries
In addition to the Burmese government, civil society and ethnic armed groups a number
of other groups had some, although less power to influence Burma’s political situation. The most
important of these groups were the Burmese government’s domestic power bases, ASEAN and
Asian countries generally.
Domestic power bases
In terms of the government’s domestic power bases this included groups such as the
Tatmadaw, police force, intelligence service, civil servants, legislative system and local media.
All these power bases were needed to remain control with the population; fight off the ethnic
34. 26
insurgents; and enable the government to carry out its day-to-day tasks (Chachavalpongpun,
2010: 171). This made these groups very valid target audiences.
In this regard, it is important to mention that the members of these groups were not
uniformly in support of the way that the government was managing the country and would not
have been opposed to some political reform. In this regard, Selth (2000) for example writes that
“many members of the Tatmadaw appear to retain a hidden sympathy for Aung San Suu Kyi and
the idea of a return to democratic government. While the regime is always watching for signs of
dissent in its ranks, a split may still occur, triggering a wider crisis that would alter the entire
power balance in Burma” (p. 67).
This hidden dissent and dissatisfaction indicates that individuals employed within these
power bases indeed could be approached with ideas of democratic reform. However in doing so
it had to be considered, that it would be very difficult or even impossible for these individuals to
become openly engaged in politics. For example in the case of the civil servants, they had to stay
largely politically inactive, because they were not allowed to join political parties, unions or any
other organization not approved by the government (ICG 2001: 7, 25).
Instead, any attempt to approach members of these groups had to accommodate their
need to work discreetly and informally and without engaging in direct confrontation with their
immediate superiors or the Burmese government more generally. If these conditions were met, it
would not have been impossible to work with these groups as indeed several INGOs, foreign
human rights advocates and local pro-democracy NGOs actually did in the 1990-2010 period
(Wilson et al, 2007: 370-371).
ASEAN
An international organization with some potential influence on the Burmese government
was ASEAN, who Burma became a member of in 1997. In this regard, ASEAN was well aligned
with the Burmese government in favoring non-interference in other states’ domestic affairs as
well as in preferring non-confrontational engagement rather than sanctions and further isolation
of Burma. In addition to this, ASEAN countries and leaders came from the same region as the
Burmese government, which made Burma’s leaders feel better understood than with Western
35. 27
governments. Finally, ASEAN countries constituted some of Burma’s most important trading
partners25
(Bunyanunda, 2002: 123; Than, 2000: 155-156).
All these factors combined gave ASEAN some, although still limited influence on the
Burmese government’s position towards democratic reforms. This at the same made ASEAN a
valid advocacy target audience, which may especially have been the case in the period after the
1998 Asian financial crisis.
From 1990-1998, ASEAN did not show any particular interest in promoting a serious
dialogue with the Burmese government about democratic reforms. Since the 1998 crisis and
onwards however, ASEAN started to take a markedly stronger interest in promoting democracy
in Burma26
. Especially in this second period, pro-democracy advocates would have had some
leverage to lobby ASEAN leaders to accelerate their already existing push for democratic
reforms in Burma (Pedersen, 2000: 196-197; Malik, 2000: 261-262).
Asian countries
In addition to ASEAN, Asian countries more generally constituted other important target
audiences with some level of influence on the Burmese government. This influence was first of
all cultural, where the Burmese government harbored less distrust towards culturally more
similar Asian countries compared to Western countries (ICG, 2004: 21). Secondly, the Asian
influence was economical, where Burma’s trade was heavily skewed towards other countries in
the region, which is evident from the below table showing Burma’s top-10 trading partners in
2010.
25
In 2010 ASEAN countries Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam made up 45.1 % of all Burma’s
foreign trade (European Commission statistics, 2011).
26
This shift in attitude was among other things caused by: 1) The Burma policy was costly for ASEAN’s international
image. 2) Frustration with the slow pace of reforms in Burma. 3) Growing Chinese influence in the country despite
Burma’s ASEAN-membership (SIGUR Center for Asian Studies, 2012).
36. 28
Table 1: Top-10 Burma trading partners in 2010
Trade partners Mio. Euro %
Thailand 3,681 30
China 3,548 28.9
Singapore 1,019 8.3
India 997 8.1
South Korea 507 4.1
Japan 484 3.9
Malaysia 463 3.8
Indonesia 255 2.1
EU 235 1.9
Vietnam 111 0.9
Source: European Commission statistics, 2011
As Table 1 shows, 9 out of Burma’s top-10 trading partners were from Asia, which is one
of the most important reasons why Asian countries generally had much more influence on
Burma’s political situation than Western countries. In the following paragraphs there is a more
narrow focus on the three Asian countries with the highest influence on the Burmese
government: China, Thailand and India.
China
During the 1990-2010 period, the by far most important country vis-à-vis the Burmese
generals was China, who served as Burma’s international patron and provider of much needed
loans. For China’s part, their interest in Burma consisted of import, export, substantial
investments in development and energy projects as well as using their influence in Burma to
counterbalance their longstanding rival India (Chenyang, 2010: 114, 120; Than, 2010: 129).
These geo-political and economic interests meant that China would not be in favor of
promoting a quick and uncertain replacement of the Burmese generals. Still, China was not
known to be particularly fond of the unpredictable and “troublemaking” generals either; rarely
took extraordinary measures to protect them internationally27
; and had several border disputes
with the Burmese government28
. Furthermore, China always maintained a dialogue with NLD
and ethnic groups in opposition to the generals. This indicates that China would not have been
27
Except for the blocking of a 2007 Burma resolution in the UN Security Council (Haacke, 2011: 115).
28
For example in 2009, where China was upset by the huge number of refugees running across the border after
Tatmadaw’s attack on ethnically Han Chinese Kokang militias (Branigan, 2009).
37. 29
opposed to gradual governmental reform towards a more reliable partner than the SPDC, as long
as their economic and geopolitical needs were not jeopardized (Haacke, 2011: 128-126).
Thailand
Another important country for Burma in the 1990-2010 period was Thailand. Politically,
Thailand was one of the Asian countries with some ability to approach the Burmese leaders, even
though the reception would often be reserved and tentative29
(Stern, 2009: 5). Economically,
Burma supplied Thailand with up to 40 percent of its energy consumption, while Thailand
exported cars, electronics and other industrial products and consumer goods to Burma (Rieffel,
2010: 10-11; Mizzima, 2012). This interconnectedness between the two countries made Thailand
an obvious advocacy target audience.
Furthermore, same as China, the Thai government showed no particular love for the
generals and had a number of running disputes, which included: Ethnic minorities on the Thai-
Burma border in opposition to the Burmese government; presence of Burmese troops and
artillery on the Thai-Burma border; Burmese refugees and refugee camps in Thailand; illegal
Burmese migrants; and the constant flow of vast amounts of drugs from Burma into Thailand. As
with China, this indicates that Thailand would not have been opposed to political reforms in
Burma, as long as Thai commercial interests were not hurt in the process (Chongkittavorn, 2001:
122, 124-125; Pedersen, 2000: 199).
India
A third very important country during the 1990-2010 period was India, who were
Burma’s fourth largest trading partner; imported Burmese oil and gas; invested in Burmese
hydropower projects; and provided substantial development aid. Furthermore, India and the
Burmese government had a joint agreement to help apprehend anti-government militias hiding
on each other’s territory. Finally, India maintained a relatively good political relationship with
the Burmese government in order to balance off China (Rieffel, 2010: 15, Chenyang, 2010: 116-
117). These factors gave India some ability to influence the Burmese government, which at the
same time made India a relevant advocacy target audience.
29
This would especially be the case with Thai military leaders and less so with Thai civilian-political leaders, who in
the eyes of the Burmese leaders had let their country fall victim to decadent Western influence (Chongkittavorn,
2001: 120).
38. 30
When that is said, India did not have the same notable, disgruntling issues with the
Burmese government as was the case with China and Thailand. Furthermore, India was
significantly less critical towards the Burmese government from the early 1990s and onwards
than Thailand and China were (Yhome, 2008:19). These factors indicate that while India may not
have been opposed to political reforms, they may not have been as actively supportive of them as
China and Thailand possibly would have. Still, it is possible that India could be convinced to
promote political reforms in Burma in a slightly more assertive way as long as their financial,
geopolitical and security concerns were taken into consideration.
2.3.1.4 Fourth most important target audiences: Western countries and UN
Finally, our attention turns to Western countries and the United Nations, who both had
only a small potential influence on Burmese domestic politics in the 1990-2010 period. For
Western countries, this was among other things caused by a lack of economic interdependence
especially due to the economic sanctions (Hlaing, 2011: 21). In addition to this, the West’s
highly critical approach likely further reduced their influence, because it reinforced the Burmese
government’s mistrust towards the motives of Western countries (Nyun, 455: 492; ICG, 2001a:
13-14).
For the United Nations, their lack of influence was primarily caused by having very
limited direct powers to impact Burma’s government, politics, society and economy (Pomfret,
2010). In addition to this, the strongly worded criticism in important forums such as the General
Assembly, Security Council and Human Rights Council likely made the hypersensitive, but
proud Burmese government even less willing to engage with UN about democratic reforms
(DVB, 2007).
2.3.1.5 Conclusion
In this section, the most important target audiences in terms of Burma’s political situation
were examined. In this regard, the Burmese government was the most powerful and therefore
also the most important target audience par excellence. In addition to this, Burma’s civil society,
ethnic armed groups as well as the government’s domestic and regional supporters were other
important target audiences. Finally, Western countries and the United Nations only had a small
39. 31
possible influence on Burma’s political situation and focusing on these audiences was not likely
to create substantial political change in Burma.
Finally, this section also showed that all target audiences had certain needs that had to be
accommodated in order to make progress. If these needs were met, it seems likely that political
progress could be made with the majority of the most important target audiences, when
considering the widespread frustration with Burma’s government and the general state of affairs
in the country.
2.3.2 The Burmese exile advocacy movement
In the following sections, the work of the Burma advocacy groups in exile is discussed.
In this regard, the Burma groups’ pro-democratic advocacy was mostly limited to countries,
international organizations and audiences outside of Burma. In relation to targeting audiences
inside Burma – according to the existing literature at least – this only happened to a small extent
by distributing government critical news and materials through shortwave radio and the websites
of news groups such as Irrawaddy Magazine, Democratic Voice of Burma, Radio Free Asia,
Mizzima News, BBC and Voice of America (Zaw, 2002; Dudley, 2003: 17).
2.3.2.1 International advocacy
In terms of the Burma groups’ international advocacy, there is little doubt that the
Burmese exile movement succeeded in raising the global awareness of the conflict in Burma
(Hlaing, 2007: Page 21). Furthermore, most Burma scholars believe that the Burmese exile
movement was one of the key factors in influencing especially Western governments to maintain
economic sanctions and political pressure on Burma (Hlaing, 2011: 21; Dudley, 2003: 9).
However, whether this increased awareness, political pressure and economic sanctions actually
had any beneficial effect on the political situation in Burma is a heavily disputed question
(Hadar, 1998; Roughneen, 2011).
In the following section, this dispute will be attempted to be settled by looking at how
well this international pressure matched with the three main needs of the Burmese government
stated in section 2.3.1.1: Security, respect and safeguarding the government and army leaders’
personal interests. This in turn will provide a more clear impression of the success or failures of
40. 32
the Burma groups, which will be necessary when developing a strong conceptual framework at
the end of this chapter.
Personal interests
First of all it is examined how the international pressure correlated with the Burmese
leadership’s personal interests vested to their own rule. In this regard, there can be little doubt
that the generals were concerned what would happen to them, their families and their assets in
the event of the relatively speedy democratic transition that the Burma groups as well as the
international community were advocating for (Pedersen, 2000: 206).
To make matters worse, the Burmese government’s concerns were likely heightened by
the fact that this reform message was communicated in a way that resembled pressure more than
it did dialogue. This tapped into the government’s fearful and paranoid worldview and likely did
little but to increase the mistrust towards the motives of the Burma advocacy groups and Western
countries. This in turn reduced the chance of getting the Burmese government to accommodate
to demands for a quick democratic transition, because Burma’s leaders were not convinced that
their assets and physical safety would be protected (Pedersen, 2000: 206).
Security
The element of the international pressure that most significantly tapped into the generals’
need of security was the use of economic sanctions. In this regard, the idea of the sanctions was
that it would make it more difficult and costly for the Burmese government to maintain control
over the country. This – in theory – would increase the generals’ level of insecurity, which at the
same time would give them an incentive to implement democratic reforms in order to get the
sanctions lifted (Pedersen, 2000: 203, 205).
The sanctions in this regard took on many forms and covered a wide variety of issues.
For the European Union, sanctions included an arms embargo, cancellation of trade preferences
and suspension of all kinds of aid except for humanitarian aid. For the United States, sanctions
included freezing Burmese assets, an import ban, an investment ban and a financial services ban
(US Embassy, 2011; Rieffel, 2010: 22). Furthermore, both EU and United States had an arms
embargo against Burma and a visa travel ban preventing Burma’s leaders and their closest
relatives to travel into EU or the United States (SIPRI, 2011; Martin, 2012; Selth, 13: 2008).
41. 33
Over the years, sanctions hurt the government’s revenue sources to some extent as well
as making both exports and imports more difficult30
(Maung, 2006). Still, government revenue
was never significantly affected either, and the generals were able to make up for it by increasing
trade with China, India, Thailand, Singapore and other Asian countries (Dudley, 2003: 9).
Because of that, economic sanctions were not an imminent threat to the security of the Burmese
government, which at the same meant that the generals were unlikely to implement democratic
reforms to get rid of them (Dudley, 2003: 13; ICG, 2004: 17).
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the generals’ may have perceived a democratic
Burma without trade restrictions as constituting a much larger security threat than a military led
Burma under economic sanctions, because of the heightened insecurity that a democratic
transition would entail. In this view, the Western idea of trading sanctions for democratic
reforms did not constitute a good bargain for a Burmese leadership preoccupied with security
and not with economic development (Pedersen: 203, 205; Pasch et al, 2009: 38).
Respect
Finally, it is time to examine how international pressure impacted on the Burmese
government’s strong need for being treated with respect internationally. In this regard, the often
very strong Western criticism would on many occasions – at least in the eyes of the
hypersensitive Burmese government – send the opposite message. Instead, rather than showing
respect such criticism would often question the leadership of the Burmese government and
thereby tap into the generals’ inferiority complex (ICG, 2001: 12).
Furthermore in the eyes of the Burmese government, Western countries unfamiliar with
Burma and Asia had little moral authority to criticize and make moral judgments about Burma’s
political situation. These two factors likely resulted in a hardened attitude of the highly insecure,
but also very proud and nationalistic Burmese government against international engagement
with Western countries (Nyein, 2008).
30
For example by making it difficult for Burmese companies to attain the needed foreign currency to trade
internationally (Maung, 2006).
42. 34
Conclusion
In this section it was examined how well the international political and economic
pressure – supported by the Burma advocacy groups – matched with the Burmese government’s
needs. In this regard, most of the pressure did little to fulfill the needs of the Burmese
government. Furthermore, many things indicate that accommodating to Western pressure and
rolling out democratic reforms in most cases – in the eyes of the generals at least – would have
compromised their needs in terms of security, respect and safeguarding personal interests
(Pedersen: 203, 205). From a needs-based perspective, this made it unlikely that the generals
would start to implement democratic reforms on account of the pressure from Western countries.
2.3.2.2 Alternative approaches and target audiences
In the previous section the target audience strategies of the Burma advocacy were
examined. As this section showed, the Burma groups made some questionable choices by
targeting predominantly UN and Western countries with a limited influence on Burma’s political
situation. Furthermore, promoting pressure did not seem like the optimum strategy to influence
the Burmese government. Because of these factors, the following section will examine if the
advocacy groups could have chosen alternative approaches and target audiences with a higher
chance of creating political change in Burma.
Alternative approaches with UN and Western countries
In terms of the Burma groups’ existing target audience, then they mainly focused on
supporting the critical message of Western countries and the United Nations. However as already
explained, strongly worded criticism was not likely to create much progress with the Burmese
government (Nyein, 2008). Instead, the Burma advocacy groups should have tried to persuade
UN and Western countries to take a more accommodating and engaging line with the Burmese
government (Allan, 2010: 251).
This shift indeed seemed possible, because it would predominantly focus on the way the
message was delivered, rather than the content of the message itself. In this regard, UN and
Western countries would still be delivering a pro-democracy message with the only difference
being that they would be careful not to tap into the government’s inferiority complex and their
fearful and paranoid worldview. That this different message was not supported by the Burma
