CT June July 2016

PSYCHOLOGY OF RADICALIZATION • MAVC-SOG • WOMEN IN COMBAT • GITMO
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Cover Photo: A money exchanger displays Somali shilling notes on the streets of the Somali capital Mogadishu. Some money transfer companies in
Somalia have been accused of being used by pirates to launder money received form ransoms as well as used by Al Qaeda-affiliated extremist group al
Shabaab group to fund their terrorist activities and operations in Somalia and the wider East African region. Photo by: STUART PRICE.
8
CONTENTS
COVER STORY:
32 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TERRORISM:
ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE 21ST CENTURY
by Jeff S. Sandy, CFE, CAMS, PI, Special Agent retired
FEATURES:
08 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RADICALIZATION
by Sheila Macrine, Ph.D.
20 TO DIE FOR: A WARRIOR’S ANALYSIS
OF WOMEN IN COMBAT
by SSG Derek Goeriz United States Army Special Forces NCO
46 TIME TO BUILD ANOTHER WING ONTO GITMO:
OBAMA’S DESIRE TO CLOSE DOWN THE DETENTION
FACILITY AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
by Jeffrey F. Addicott
56 INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING TECHNOLOGY
INTO MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
by Nick Perna
DEPARTMENTS:
06 From the Editor
A Zero-Sum Game
42 Book Review
It IS about Islam
68 Innovative Products
Improvised Weapons, A Higher Standard in Education, Lenco, Patriot3
72 Training Review
Alternate Reality Environment

6 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016
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CounterThe
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© 2016 Security Solutions International
errorist organizations are no longer fringe groups we fight from afar; what is happening
right now in France, Belgium, the UK, and Germany is at our back door. These are our
Western counterparts, our allies. Make no mistake that Islamists wants to commit genocide, not
only on their own countrymen in the Middle East and Africa, but also on Western nations who
have naively invited them to do so. Little by little they chip away at us; nothing is more evident
of this as the current situation in Germany. As of now, privately owned German railway company
Mitteldeutsche Regiobahn has introduced “women only” train cars, an action the company has
undertaken to protect women from Syrian migrants. The women will put their heads down and
take to the special cars without incident. In fact, it is the men who need to be in “special” rail
cars and sequestered, but this will not happen because it will incite rioting, burning, and violence
from that very population. Perhaps women in Germany should also have a curfew and only leave
the house when escorted by a male family member. Sound familiar?
I often think back to the sentiment that my grandfather felt towards the Japanese after service
in WWII or the contempt my parents felt in the ‘60s for communism. Strangely, they nor the
administration ever made a differentiation between “moderate communists” or noncombatants
when fighting the Axis of evil in WWII.
“Expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth,” said
President Truman, calling for Japan to surrender in 1945 before he made good on his promise.
Let’s be honest: if the U.S. wanted to, it could destroy, decimate, and kill all terrorist
organizations, but if the powers were reversed, would they show such restraint? Unfortunately,
moderate Islam is irrelevant and geopolitically inconsequential, therefore they are either radical or
nonexistent in this theater.
Islamists act on the assumption that the U.S. forces they frame as “The Great Satan” will be
deterred by their use of human shields. Ironic that a combat doctrine which they have adopted
relies on the fact that we do not want to kill noncombatants, like women and children. This alone
is the single greatest ethical disparity between us and them.
And all the while, they indoctrinate their youth from a young age to glorify violence against the
West in the name of Islamism. In every Muslim country, religion and politics are codependent
and comingled. The aim of U.S. involvement in the Middle East is simply a peaceful existence,
while the aim of our adversaries both there and abroad is seventh century theocracy and
barbarism. There is no way that these two objectives can coexist.
Even on a U.S. soldier’s worst day at war he will show more compassion than any Islamist
combatant anywhere.
Garret Machine
Editor, The Counter Terrorist
FROM THE EDITOR:
A Zero-Sum Game
by Garret Machine

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THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF RADICALIZATION

by Sheila Macrine, Ph.D.
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth
ccording to Banco (2014),
during the 1970s, it was
a widely held belief that terrorists
“wanted a lot of people watching, not a
lot of people dead”; however, today, it
appears to be more accurate to say that
terrorists “want a lot of people dead, and
even more people crippled by fear and
A
Terrorism is not new, but in today’s world it
is different. Over the past decade, we have
seen a shocking transformation in the nature
and uses of terrorism.
grief.” This shift in terrorists’ strategy
has signaled a dramatic change in the
tactical intent of modern terrorists, which
included attacking high profile targets
like the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon to cause the greatest stress in
the general population. However, ISIS
and al-Qaeda have stepped up efforts
to attack soft1
targets. They are now
targeting places where people felt safe,
like hotels, cafés, super-markets and
shopping malls. This evolution of the
terrorist tactics has resulted in attacks on
places like Charlie Hebdo and a small
kosher grocery store in Paris, among
others. ISIS also claimed responsibility
1

behaviors and increased support for
intergroup conflict. The Netherlands
Intelligence and Security Service’s
definition of radicalization focuses on
“the pursuit and support of changes
in society that harm the functioning
of the democratic legal order” (AIVD
2004, p. 24). Shira Fishman, et al.
(2010), a researcher at the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism, writes that,
“Radicalization is a dynamic process that
varies for each individual, but shares
some underlying commonalities that
can be explored” (p. 32). Despite being
composed of multifarious definitions
and pathways, radicalization involves
reinforcing processes that scholars have
identified a series of individual pathways
to radicalization (McCauley and
Mosalenko 2009).
In their recent 2009 book, Friction:
How Radicalization Happens to Them
and Us, Clark McCauley and Sofia
Mosalenko identify the various routes to
radicalization. They identify the Personal
Grievance, Group Grievance, Slippery
Slope, and Love pathways as well as the
Risk and Status and Unfreezing pathways.
The Personal Grievance is when a person
seeks revenge “for real or perceived harm
inflicted by an outside party.” Next, the
Group Grievance pathway is similar, but
in this instance the individual, “perceives
harm inflicted on a group that he/
she belongs to or has sympathy for.”
McCauley and Mosalenko argue that
this path explains “the larger portion of
political and ethnic radical violence, in
which action is taken on behalf of the
group at large, rather than as an act of
personal revenge.” Next, they offer the
Slippery Slope pathway, which “represents
a gradual radicalization through activities
that incrementally narrow the individual’s
social circle, narrow their mindset, and in
some cases desensitize them to violence.”
for these attacks as well as one on a sports
stadium, the Bataclan concert hall, and a
Cambodian restaurant.
So what drives people to terrorism?
As a psychologist, I was curious
about why someone would become
radicalized and become a terrorist. In
other words, what is the psychology
behind the radicalization of seemingly
normal people, especially young Muslim
males? The definitions of radicalization
are broad, with no commonly accepted
definition. Understanding terrorism
or radicalization is difficult. Most
psychologists agree that there are
three different ways to study these
concepts: through macro-sociological,
psychological, and/or psychosocial
approaches (De la Corte 2006). The first,
macro-sociological, involves the study of
various social dysfunctions or problematic
changes in the social system (ibid). Yet the
recent research has found this perspective
to be inconclusive (Crenshaw 1995; De
la Corte 2006; Newman 2006). The next
perspective is the psychological, which
includes disruptive or psychopathological
personalities. This involves examining
the individual for abhorrent behaviors,
as in their propensity for violence or
an inability to control their aggressive
impulses (De la Corte 2006). However,
these two approaches have also been
found to be inconclusive. The final
view, which combines both perspectives,
is the psychosocial. This multifaceted
perspective includes cultural factors,
i.e., poverty, desperation, fanaticism,
political influence, globalization,
economic development, greed, war,
intergroup polarization, within-group
glorification, moral exclusion, the power
of the situation, nationalism, and partisan
perceptions (De la Corte 2006).
According to McCauley and
Moskalenko (2008), radicalization
involves changes in beliefs, feelings, or
…radicalization
involves changes
in beliefs, feelings,
or behaviors and
increased support for
intergroup conflict.

Another pathway that the authors suggest
is the Love pathway, which is about
“romantic and familial entanglement
that is often an overlooked factor in
radicalization.” The authors argue that
many extremist groups relate to this
particular structure, which involves “a
tight-knit group of friends who share
religious, economic, social, and sexual
bonds” (McCauley and Mosalenko 2009)
Pape and Feldman (2010) write that
“Disproportionate involvement in risk
taking and status seeking is particularly
true of those young men who come
from disadvantaged family backgrounds,
have lower IQ levels, are of lower
socioeconomic status, and who therefore
have less opportunity to succeed in
society along a traditional career path”
(2010). Individuals become susceptible
to indoctrination and radicalization when
they are isolated, in some cases in the
prison system. In prison, the strong prey
on the weak. Prisoners also come together
over “racial, religious, and gang identity
to a greater degree than in the outside
world and often bring their newfound
radical identity beyond prison to connect
with radical organizations in the populace
at large” (Fighel 2007, p.1).
There are also group-level factors,
according to McCauley and Mosalenko
(2009). They write that a group is a
“dynamic system with a common goal or
set of values.” As a result, an individual
can become more radical. One of the
group-level factors is called Polarization
and Isolation, in which “the discussion,
interaction, and experience within a
radical group can result in an aggregate
increase in commitment to the cause,
and in some cases can contribute to the
Delta Block captives kneel during midday prayers at Camp 6, a steel and cement prison
building on March 18, 2011 at the U.S. Navy Base at Guantanamo Bay Cuba.
Photo by: David P. Coleman

formation of divergent conceptions of
the group’s purpose and preferred tactics”
(p. 3). In addition there is, like with
most groups, concerns about internal
dynamics, which “can contribute to
the formation of different factions as a
result of internal disillusionment (or,
conversely, ambitions) with the group’s
activities as a whole, especially when
it comes to a choice between violent
terrorism and nonviolent activism.” As
a self-isolated minority, Islamic groups
in the West are especially vulnerable
to this form of radicalization. Lorenzo
Vidino (2010) adds that, “Being cut off
from society at large through language
barriers, cultural difference …, Muslim
communities become more vulnerable
to additional pathways of radicalization”
(2010). Essentially, an aversion or a
failure to assimilate into Western society
is an aggregating factor. There is also
Competition among radical groups
who compete for notoriety and press
and become more and more violent to
get attention.
With the concept of Mass
Radicalization (McCauley 2006), the
goal is to force the enemy to question
their own political and ideological
beliefs or disseminate counter-narratives
while strengthening their radical beliefs
(Rosebraugh 2004). David KilCullen
(2008), a counterinsurgency advisor to
David Petraeus during the Iraq Surge,
adds that, “al-Qaeda lures the West into
ground wars, while avoiding engagements
that would allow the American military
to draw on its technical superiority”
Iraqi Army and Hashed al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces of Iraq) fighting against the Islamic State in Saladin Governorate.
Photo: Ahmad Shamlo Fard

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(2008, p. 2). Another dynamic used
among radicals is developing a “Hatred
Mantra,” which positions the enemy as
less than human (Royzman 2005).
Finally, suicide bombers seeking
martyrdom die for a cause (or rewards
of the flesh in the afterlife, seemingly
unattainable in their societies) in the
act of jihad. This act within the field
of radicalization signifies the absolute
commitment of a radical’s way of life
and dedication to the cause, perceived
or actual. While the why and wherefore
of radicalization is still a mystery, there
are many commonalities that can help
us better understand the psychology of
radicalization and what radicalization
offers. The Pulitzer-winning author of
The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and The
Road to 9/11, Lawrence Wright (2006),
writes that certain recurring narratives
serve as a springboard for resentment—
most prominently, the notion or mantra
of an unjust occupation of the Muslim
nations of Iraq and Afghanistan. But he
concludes that after nine years, “there is
no single consensus explanation for why
some forgo peaceful forms of protest
and instead opt to become terrorist and
attempt mass-murders.” Unfortunately,
there is no consensus regarding a terrorist
personality and hence there is no one
pathway to radicalization (Rinehart 2013,
p. 7).
The purpose of this article was to
identify pathways to radicalization,
not to posit a solution. The solution or
solutions are still inconclusive. Even The
Washington Institute’s Stein Program on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence adds
that it has become clear that, “America is
at war with a larger enemy: the extremist
ideology that fuels and supports Islamist
violence.” Adding that unfortunately,
the United States is not well equipped
to fight on this ideological battleground,
and U.S. efforts to confront the ideology
A local Iraqi man tries to comfort an injured relative as U.S. Army Spc. Timothy Jovanovic
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worldwide have not kept pace with more
successful military targeting of high-level
al-Qaeda and ISIS leaders. •
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Sheila Macrine, Ph.D. is an Associate
Professor at the University of Massachusetts
Dartmouth. Her research focuses on
connecting the cultural, political,
psychological, and institutional contexts
of pedagogy as they relate to the public
sphere, democratic education, and
social imagination.
E-mail: Smacrine@umassd.edu
REFERENCES
Arendt, H. The Origins of
Totalitarianism. New York: Schocken
Books, 1951.
Banco, E. 2014. “Why do people
join ISIS?” International Business Times.
http://www.ibtimes.com/why-do-people-
join-isis-psychology-terrorist-1680444.
Crenshaw, M. Terrorism in Context.
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State
University, 1995.
DeAngelis, T. 2009. “Understanding
Terrorism.” American Psychological
Association, 40(10): 60. http://www.apa.
org/monitor/2009/11/terrorism.aspx.
De la Corte, L. 2006. La Lógica del
Terrorismo. Madrid: Alianza. http://
www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.
php/pot/article/view/8/html.
De la Corte, L. 2010. “Explaining
Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach.”
Perspectives on Terrorism. http://
terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/
article/view/8/html.
Fighel, John. “The Radicalization
Process in Prisons.” International
Institute for Counterterrorism. Presented
at NATO workshop, Eliat, 2007.
Fishman, Shira, et al. 2010.
“UMD START: Community-Level
Indicators of Radicalization: A Data
and Methods Task Force.” PediaView.
com. https://pediaview.com/openpedia/
Radicalization#cite_note-11.
Gerstenfeld, M. “Radical Islam in The
Netherlands: A Case Study of a Failed
European Policy.” Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs 4, no. 14 (2005).
KilCullen, D. 2008. The Accidental
Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the
Midst of a Big One. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
McCauley, C. 2006. “Jujitsu Politics:
Terrorism and Response to Terrorism,”
in Collateral Damage: The Psychological
Consequences of America’s War on
Terrorism, ed. P.R. Kimmel and Chris
Stout. Westport, CT: Praeger Press.
McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S.
“Mechanisms of Political Radicalization:
Pathways Toward Terrorism.”
Terrorism and Political Violence
20, no. 3 (2008): 415–433.
doi:10.1080/09546550802073367
McCauley, C. Mosalenko, S.
“Friction: How Radicalization Happens
to Them and Us.” Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009.
McCoy, T. “How ISIS and Other
Jihadists Persuaded Thousands of
Westerners to Fight Their War of
Extremism.” The Washington Post
(Washington, DC), 2014.
Newman, E. “Exploring the ‘Root
Causes’ of Terrorism.” Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006): 49-
772
NRC Handelsblad. 2004. “Nota
AIVD: ‘Westerse Leefstijl Doelwit
Radicalen.’”
Pape, R., and Feldman, J. 2010.
“Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of
Global Suicide Terrorism and How to
Stop It.” http://english.my-definitions.
com/en/define/radicalise.
Post, J. “Notes on a Psychodynamic
Theory of Terrorist Behavior.” Terrorism:
An International Journal 7, no. 3 (1984).
Rinehart, C. Volatile Social Movements

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 17The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 73
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and the Origins of Terrorism: The
Radicalization of Change. New York:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2013.
Rosebraugh, C. The Logic of Political
Violence. Portland, OR: PW Press, 2014.
Royzman, E.E., McCauley C., and
Rozin, P. “From Plato to Putnam: Four
Ways of Thinking about Hate,” in The
Psychology of Hate, ed. R.J. Sternberg.
Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association, 2005.
Schmid, A. P. “Radicalisation, De-
Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation:
A Conceptual Discussion and Literature
Review.” The International Centre for
Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 4, no. 2
(2013).
The Dawa Report. “Rekrutering in
Nederland Voor de Jihad Van Incident
Naar Trend,” AIVD (2002): 6. [Dutch]
U.S. Department of Homeland
Security. 2010. “Community-Level
Indicators of Radicalization: A Data
and Methods Task Force. Science And
Technology.”
Varshney, A. “Nationalism, Ethnic
Conflict, and Rationality.” Perspective on
Politics 1 (2003): 85–99.
Vidino, Lorenzo. “Countering
Radicalization in America: Lessons from
Europe.” United States Institute of Peace
Special Report, Nov. 2010.
Winter, C. 2016. Why ISIS
Propaganda Works. The Atlantic. http://
www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2016/02/isis-propaganda-
war/462702/
Wright, L. The Looming Tower:
Al-Qaeda and The Road to 9/11.
Camberwell, VIC.: Penguin, 2006.

and bandanas. Years of successful gang
conspiracy and RICO cases have taught
them that this is bad juju and only gets
them more prison time. Most wear the
same clothes that most young adults
their age wear. So, back to the Vietnam
analogy, it’s not unlike monitoring
a village where everyone wears black
pajamas (friend and foe) and trying to
determine who the good guys and bad
guys are. Or, in more modern terms, in
Afghanistan or Iraq, where insurgents
Circle 301 on Reader Service CardCircle 329 on Reader Service Card

TO DIE FOR
A WARRIOR’S ANALYSIS OF
WOMEN IN COMBAT

espite the fact that females
have been an important part
of the U.S. Armed Forces to varying
degrees since the country’s inception, the
recent opening of combat positions to
women, without significant public debate
or discussion, will fundamentally alter
the cultural essence and capability of our
fighting forces for the worse. Originally
announced by Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta and further implemented
by his successor Ashton Carter, this
drastic policy change has lifted the ban
on women in combat positions. The
ramifications of this decision will be
far reaching, affecting the very nature
of our combat units and their ability
to accomplish their missions. Although
certain limited situations may exist where
employing females in direct support of
combat units might make sense, allowing
women access to a broad array of combat
D
by SSG Derek Goeriz,
United States Army Special Forces NCO
For over 200 years, the role of women
in the American military has been limited
to non-combat positions due to an
inherent understanding of the multitude
of problems associated with the inclusion
of women in this deadly domain.

jobs is a fundamentally irresponsible
policy that will lower unit morale,
adversely affect good order and discipline,
and increase both mission failure and loss
of American life.
Arguments for women in combat tend
to emphasize three points: the unfairness
and inequality of precluding women
from combat specialties, the existence
of females with peak fitness who can
meet the physical demands of war, and
the need for the presence of females in
certain culturally sensitive combat-related
missions. Clearly founded on principals
of equality under the law and protection
of inalienable individual rights, the
U.S. government has progressed toward
ever greater fulfillment of these ideals
in society. But to misuse the mantra of
equality to justify foundational changes to
the structure of units engaged in violent
battle, with only perfunctory concern
for the pernicious effects of such a policy
on survivability and mission readiness,
…politics over
practicality.
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter conducts a press briefing at the Pentagon Aug. 20 2015. Carter answered questions from the media on a
variety of issues including regional threats across the globe and potential logjams in Congress over the budget this fall. Carter also pointed out
the recent graduation of the first two female soldiers of Army Ranger School a significant milestone in DoD's plan to test the integration of
women in combatant roles. Photo by: Glenn Fawcett

clearly puts politics over practicality.
Additionally, some argue that there are
without question a very small number of
women of outstanding physical prowess
who could likely handle the intense
physical demands of warfighting. Yet
the myriad of other issues caused by the
inclusion of women in male-dominated
fighting units still persist, beyond the
very real physical problems associated
with feminine hygiene during prolonged
exposure to austere environments (as
noted by former Director of the National
Security Agency, Lieutenant General
William Odom, in the author’s national
security policy seminar at Yale in 2003).
Finally, in traditional Islamic cultures
such as the culture of Afghanistan,
women are not to be touched by men
outside of kinship. For coalition forces
to do so would cause a loss of rapport
with the indigenous people, making a
sound counterinsurgency strategy more
difficult to successfully employ. In these
situations, Female Engagement Teams
or Combat Support Teams made up of
women have been attached to combat
units in dangerous environments but in
a supporting role. Even in this limited
combat related position, incidents of
poor performance and even cowardice
under fire have endangered the lives of
American combat soldiers. In fact, two of
the author’s colleagues were nearly killed
in separate incidents due to their attached
women’s inability to perform under fire in
deadly engagements with enemy forces.
Despite the largely superfluous
arguments for opening combat jobs to
women, proponents of such a policy
cannot compellingly address the essential
issue of decreased unit performance
due to lowered morale resulting from
this misguided policy. The great general
Napoleon declared that in war the moral
is to the physical as three is to one,
meaning that the human dimension of
warfare and a combat unit’s morale carry
great weight in determining that unit’s
ability to survive and accomplish its
brutal mission. The inclusion of women
on combat teams would undoubtedly
degrade morale for a multitude of
reasons. First, the type of men who
volunteer to kill and face death on their
nation’s behalf are by necessity rough
and aggressive by nature. This coarseness
and potential for violence is fostered
and magnified by a combat culture
designed to transform men into merciless
instruments of death and destruction.
Therefore, the presence of females among
hard men of this type would precipitate
a multitude of problems ranging from
romantic relationships—resulting
in morale-harming jealousies and
readiness-diminishing pregnancies—to
the imposition of stifling speech and
behavioral regulations that would
effectively neuter men’s combat culture.
These issues of unit morale are even
more acute for special operations units,
which operate in small, isolated groups,
often within confined quarters in
austere environments. Privacy concerns
and sexual issues are magnified in this
context, along with the inevitable
friction with the servicemen’s wives and
girlfriends precipitated by the presence of
females with the team in such intimate
circumstances. Anything that induces
further stress on a man’s relationship
at home while on a deployment will
without question harm unit morale and
its ability to successfully accomplish the
mission. Known to be key to a war-
fighting unit’s success in battle, unit
morale must be upheld and strengthened
by common sense policies, not made a
casualty in service of utopian schemes of
social engineering.
Far from the ivory tower of academia
and intellectual theory, at the pointy end
of the spear in combat on the ground,

discipline is an essential component of
battlefield success that will be greatly
diminished by the invasion of women
into the brotherhood of men trained to
kill. Strict adherence to hierarchy and
discipline is absolutely essential for the
performance of combat duties under the
extreme stresses of war. Such penetrating
control over individuals is necessary in
order to compel them to act contrary
to their instincts for personal safety
and security when threatened with loss
of life. The inclusion of females into
this hardened culture of male warrior
units would simply add an additional
stressor to an already corrosively stressful
environment, thereby diminishing
discipline. Feelings of lust, jealousy, and
the innately irresistible urge to protect
female team members will compound
the stresses that tax a warrior’s emotional
resources while under fire. In his book
On Killing: The Psychological Cost of
Learning to Kill in War and Society, LTC
(Ret.) Dave Grossman recounts major
problems in the Israeli Defense Forces
stemming from male soldiers reacting to
the inclusion of females in their infantry
units. During battle, men displayed an
utter loss of control upon seeing their
female comrades injured or killed. For
this reason, the IDF banned women
from direct combat roles from 1948 until
2000, when the mixed gender Caracal
Battalion was established. Women do not
serve in direct action combat capacities
in IDF Special Operations Forces or any
of the four front line infantry battalions.
The unnecessary psychic burden created
by introducing women into combat
roles will no doubt result in decreased
battlefield discipline, and therefore
increased casualties, among men in
mixed-sex fighting units.
In addition to the problems of
decreased control and lowered
performance among men who are
negatively impacted by women’s presence
on the battlefield, the fundamental issue
of substandard physical performance
by women will doom servicewomen
themselves, as well as their integrated
combat units, on the battlefield. For
instance, Katie Petronio, a 28-year-old
Marine Captain who deployed alongside
Marine infantrymen for seven months
in Afghanistan, recounts in her article,
“Get Over It: We Are Not All Created
Equal,” the severely debilitating injuries
she suffered trying to keep up with her
male counterparts: muscle atrophy,
spinal injury, and becoming infertile.
Based on her real-world, on-the-ground
experience of infantry life, she concluded
that placing women in combat roles
would lead to health issues and overall
diminished team performance. This fact
of substandard female performance in
the infantry realm is further detailed by
a Marine Corps study evaluating both
women in infantry training as well as
gender integrated teams as compared to
their all-male counterparts. The exercise
found that women were getting injured
twice as often as men, employing their
weapons less effectively, and struggling
far more in moving casualties. These last
two findings are particularly troubling as
these serious combat deficiencies, largely
inescapable due to women’s physiological
make-up, will no doubt lead to the
deaths of American servicemen if the
current policy is allowed to continue
into effect. Moreover, the all-male units
performed at a higher level in 69 percent
of the evaluated tasks when compared
with mixed-sex teams. Furthermore, the
male group outperformed the mixed
group in 132 of the 134 tasks evaluated,
particularly those involving obstacle
negotiation and casualty evacuation. So
young American men—sons, brothers,
fathers—will die due to this misguided
policy based not on the realities of
During battle, men
displayed an utter loss
of control upon seeing
their female comrades
injured or killed.

The Caracal Battalion conducted
a concluding exercise in Southern
Israel testing the cadets' abilities
and knowledge in the field. The
Caracal Battalion was created to
accommodate women seeking to join
a combat unit and fight alongside
men. In 2004 the unit was
recognized as an official battalion.
Photo by: Israel Defense Forces

especially Special Operations Forces,
due to their challenge and prestige.
They know that only the very best
men will make it through the arduous,
soul-wrenching nightmare of earning
their way into elite combat units. Being
primarily motivated by this pride, based
on the perception of honor associated
with the conquering of extreme hardship,
many men who otherwise would have
tried out for and gained acceptance
into combat units will choose not to
volunteer if women are allowed to apply
as well. It is entirely immaterial whether
the differences between the sexes and
battlefield truths, but on what LTG (Ret.)
Jerry Boykin calls, “a social experiment.”
Beyond substandard physical
performance by women under the
acute stress of combat training and
operations, another pernicious effect
of this ill-advised policy will be the
resulting decrease in perceived prestige of
combat units, especially among Special
Operations Forces, leading to lowered
recruitment and thereby diminished
U.S. national security. Many men choose
to pursue service in the infantry, and
A combat instructor at the Infantry Training Battalion observes as a female student removes her pack after failing to keep up with the other
students on a 5-kilometer hike during the first week of training at Marine Corps Base Camp Geiger, N.C., Sept. 28, 2013. Students will
be counseled for failing any of the first three hikes during their training, but must pass the 20-kilometer hike midway through the cycle to
continue training. Fifteen female Marines were given the opportunity to attend the training after boot camp for the first time in Marine
Corps history as part of ongoing research into the acceptance of women into combat-related job fields. The female Marines go through the same
training and are held to the same ITB standards as their male counterparts. Photo by: Cpl. Chelsea Flowers Anderson

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this mindset is perceived by some in
the supple class to be anachronistic or
misogynist or chauvinist. What matters
is that this is a pervasive attitude among
military-aged men in the U.S., especially
those inclined to sign up for combat
jobs. So the practical result of this policy
change, allowing women admittance into
this deadly-serious men’s club, will be the
decreased recruitment of future American
warriors, thereby making the world a
more dangerous place.
In addition to the negative impact
on national security stemming from
the domestic attitude of fighting
men toward women in combat, male
cultural paradigms throughout the
world preclude the successful inclusion
of women in American combat units
engaged in unconventional warfare,
foreign internal defense, and other
operations that rely on close interaction
with foreign allies. Certain Special
Operations units, most prominently the
U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets),
work “by, with, and through” indigenous
partner forces in order to accomplish
their missions. The simple fact is that if
American warriors show up with female
team members to meet with a guerrilla
chief or warlord and their militias, the
Americans’ ability to build the essential
respect and rapport crucial to successful
joint operations will be disastrously
undermined. Undoubtedly, the vast
majority of warrior cultures potentially
allied with U.S. Special Operations
Forces would scorn the inclusion of
women in combat positions, thereby
sabotaging gender-integrated units’
successful completion of these already
challenging and sensitive missions.
Another often overlooked yet crucial
aspect of the debate about women in
combat is the fact that virtually all of the
current ground warriors are vehemently
against opening their ranks to women.
Having been tasked with completing
multiple surveys on their view of women
in combat, war-fighters’ opinions
have nonetheless been purposefully
disregarded by policymakers far removed
from the unforgiving realities of war.
Clearly, the warriors themselves are the
best positioned to provide informed
feedback as to the feasibility of such
a drastic and transformative policy
change. Moreover, they will be the ones
most directly affected in ways that, as
previously depicted, will make it harder
for them to complete their missions
and return to their families alive and
uninjured. Therefore, one is compelled
to ask why senior officials would even go
to the trouble of surveying our nation’s

warriors in the first place if their near-
unanimous opposition to this policy
would not preclude its implementation.
Unfortunately, the answer is inescapably
obvious: the dominant political class in
America is not concerned with whether
allowing women into combat roles will
help our fighting forces better accomplish
their missions and increase their
survivability. Tragically, they are, as C.S.
Lewis would say, men without chests.
Laughing at honor, they proclaim to
know best the way of the warrior. Sadly,
the price for their hubris and reckless
disregard for the timeless truths of war
and human nature will be paid in blood.
Considering the multitude of serious
problems that will be caused by allowing
women into combat roles, an unlikely
middle-ground may nonetheless exist. If
women combatants were not integrated
into male units but organized into their
own all-female fighting forces, many
of the problematic aspects of mixed-
sex dynamics outlined herein would be
obviated. Nonetheless, women would still
be afforded the opportunity to pursue the
perceived panacea of fairness and equality,
while not endangering their male
counterparts’ ability to accomplish their
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missions and survive. In this manner,
data could be collected regarding female
casualties and combat performance
without putting men at greater risk of
capture and death. Also, this course
of action would allow the military
additional opportunities to analyze
associated ramifications of females at
war, such as how the enemy forces react
to being confronted by women on the
battlefield or how the American public
responds to female POWs being raped,
tortured, and murdered. This ability to
afford women their desire to be combat
specialists, while not risking the lives
or mission success of male warfighters,
make this option more suited to an
objective pursuit of “fairness.” If women
are truly able to perform to standard in
the poisonous chaos of combat, such
segregation by sex should result in no loss
of warfighting efficacy.
Upon deeper reflection, the deadly
consequences of allowing women into
combat roles become painfully stark.
Unfortunately, senior military and
political leaders have failed in their
duty to put the mission and U.S.
national security first, above politicized
impulses to dream up utopian schemes
…the dominant
political class in
America is not
concerned with
whether allowing
women into combat
roles will help our
fighting forces better
accomplish their
missions and increase
their survivability.

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 29The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2015 29Circle 291 on Reader Service Card Circle 183 on Reader Service Card
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of social engineering and lifestyle
experimentation. Such proclivities
are the indulgence of a civilization so
affluent and leisured and cloistered as to
have become exhausted in the lethargy
of its therapeutic repose. But the tragic
reality of man’s nature persists: the
A student at the Infantry Training Battalion awaits her turn to perform a portion of the High Intensity Tactical Training assessment aboard
Marine Corps Base Camp Geiger N.C. Sept. 27 2013. Fifteen female Marines were given the opportunity to attend the training after boot
camp for the first time in Marine Corps history as part of ongoing research into the acceptance of women into combat-related job fields. The
female Marines go through the same training and are held to the same standards as their male counterparts. Photo by: Cpl. Chelsea Anderson
strong are but those who are perceived
to be so, taking what they can while
the weak endure what they must.
Transplanting women into the fiber of
America’s front-line fighting forces will
make her seem weak and invite needless
yet certain suffering and pain. •
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Staff Sergeant Derek Goeriz is a
United States Army Special Forces 18E
and a Yale Alumni.

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INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL TERRORISM
ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE 21ST
CENTURY

ariq Aziz was the Iraqi Foreign
Minister (1983–1991) and Deputy
Prime Minister (1979–2003) and a
close advisor of President Saddam
Hussein. Because of security concerns,
Saddam rarely left Iraq, so Aziz would
often represent Iraq at high-level
diplomatic summits. He was the face
of Iraq to the world.
After surrendering to American forces
on April 24, 2003, Aziz was held in
prison, first by American forces and
subsequently by the Iraqi government,
in Camp Cropper in Baghdad. In 2009,
he was sentenced to fifteen years for the
executions of 42 merchants and seven
years for relocating Kurds. In 2010, he
was sentenced to death. Iraqi President
T
By Jeff S. Sandy, CFE, CAMS, PI, Special Agent retired
Tariq Aziz died in prison on June
5, 2015 after being incarcerated
since April 24, 2003. What can
intelligence and law enforcement
officers learn from the former
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister?
Tariq Aziz. Photo by: Tpbradbury

will tell you the same, I know nothing
about weapons of mass destruction.”
Aziz looked in disbelief when Agent
Sandy stated, “I am here to talk to you
about money.” Aziz’s facial expressions
showed he knew a lot and could help.
However, he refused to talk at this time.
Since the beginning of time, scholars
have articulated that money is the
root of evil, but many intelligence
and law enforcement officers for
whatever reason fail to discuss this
piece of the puzzle. Most intelligence
and law enforcement officers want to
solve the crime, not necessarily what
financed the crime. We have had so
many occasions in history when agents
of evil spoke of the need for money
to facilitate their acts of terrorism.
Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, who
was convicted for his role in the 1993
World Trade Center bombing, stated
that with more money they could have
brought the towers down. A majority
of terrorist scholars state that without
money there is no terrorism. Usama
bin Laden, in a 2001 interview with a
Pakistani journalist, stated that al-
Qaeda’s supporters are as “aware of the
cracks in the Western financial system as
they are aware of the lines in their own
hands.” Without question, Usama bin
Laden wanted to obliterate the U.S. by
destroying the U.S. economy. Usama
bin Laden was surrounded by financiers
who controlled billions of dollars and
knew the weaknesses of our financial
system. The 9/11 attack on the World
Trade Center was well funded with
approximately $400,000 to $500,000.
Usama bin Laden knew the importance
of every target that was attacked and
made sure the soon-to-be martyrs were
well funded.
Jalal Talabani declared that he would
not sign Aziz’s execution order, thus
commuting his sentence to indefinite
imprisonment. Aziz remained in custody
the rest of his life and died of a heart
attack last year.
In 2003, President George W. Bush
signed an Executive Order authorizing
the U.S. Treasury to enter combat
zones to investigate violations of United
Nations sanctions and terrorism finance.
Aziz had been held in prison by the
U.S. forces, and many felt he was not
cooperating since he could not supply
information when asked the question
“Where are the weapons of mass
destruction?”
When Special Agent Jeff Sandy was
introduced to Aziz, he quickly stated, “I
have been asked dozens of times and I
It should be quite clear to all
intelligence and law enforcement officers
that an effective anti-terrorism program
requires authorities at all levels to look
in advance of the terrorist attack and be
proactive in stopping the flow of money
required to finance the terrorist act
before it happens.
After several visits with Aziz, talking
pleasantries, eating grapes, and smoking
Cuban cigars, Agent Sandy asked
Aziz if he would like to watch TV, if
approval could be obtained from the
military. Aziz stated that that would be
wonderful, and the U.S. Army approved.
On September 21, 2003, Sandy and Aziz
went to a private room that contained a
television that was showing the NCAA
football game between sixth-ranked
Kansas State and Marshall University.
Sandy advised Aziz that he was alumni
of Marshall University and asked Aziz
if he was alright with watching American
football. Aziz stated, “Where else could
I go, back to my cell?” Marshall upset
Kansas State that day and Aziz stated
it had been a long time since he had
seen anyone so happy as Agent Sandy.
Aziz looked at Agent Sandy and asked,
“What do you want to know about the
money?” Aziz was now willing
to cooperate.
For hours Aziz explained:
• How Iraq circumvented United Nations
sanctions and moved money in and out
of Iraq.
• How oil was sold in violation of United
Nations sanctions.
• How front companies were used to
conceal and disguise the movement
of money.
The flow chart written by Aziz explains
how companies were used to purchase
missile casings from North Korea and
The 9/11
attack on the
World Trade
Center was well
funded with
approximately
$400,000 to
$500,000.

Photo by: Jeff Sandy

A member of an Afghan and coalition security
force seizes multiple passports and money during
a night operation in Nahr-e Saraj district,
Helmand province, Afghanistan, April 27,
2013. The operation resulted in the detention
of a Taliban leader and two other extremists,
the leader was in charge of a cell of fighters
responsible for planning and executing attacks
against government officials in Helmand
province. He also facilitated the production and
distribution of home-made explosive materials
for use in afghan enemy operations, and possessed
significant experience with improvised explosive
devices. Photo by: Sgt. Richard W. Jones Jr.

evade detection by the U.S. and the
United Nations.
So what can we learn from Aziz?
Before we start, it is important to note
that the majority of ISIS is former Iraqi
military and intelligence officers that
served under Saddam Hussein. These
individuals were fired from their jobs
by the coalition forces, primarily by
the U.S. military. They were experts
in espionage and many of them were
trained by the Soviet Union’s KGB.
They were experts in using front
companies and they were trained to
purchase many untraceable assets we
are now seeing on TV, like their new
Toyota trucks.
So let’s take a look how ISIS can
be driving new Toyota trucks and the
world is wondering how.
SOURCE OF FUNDS:
ISIS acquires money from the sale
of oil and antiquities, and even steals
money from banks in the cities they
have captured.
STEP ONE OF THE
MONEY LAUNDERING:
The money is deposited into the bank
accounts of high ranking military or
intelligence officers or even their family
members. They also have a history of
depositing funds into the accounts of
unknown or unaware individuals and
even fictitious business bank accounts.

38 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 201638 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016
Lance Cpl. Justin R. Harris, a
disbursing clerk augmented to
the Sahl Sinjar Airfield Marine
Corps Exchange in northern
Iraq, counts money from his
change drawer, Mar. 3, 2009.
The exchange is run by Marines
from Combat Logistics Battalion
7, 2nd Marine Logistics Group
(Forward), and provides services
to all personnel on Sahl Sinjar.
Photo by: Cpl. Bobbie A. Curtis

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 39The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2016 39

STEP TWO OF THE
MONEY LAUNDERING:
The individuals in Step One transfer
the funds into a bookkeeping or law
firm bank account that services multiple
clients. The firm makes the deposit and
comingles the funds with other clients’
legal funds.
STEP THREE OF THE
MONEY LAUNDERING:
The bookkeeping or law firm negotiates
a contract with a trading company
to purchase the Toyotas. The trading
company receives a commission for their
services. The trading company only
knows the trucks are being purchased by
the bookkeeping or law firm.
STEP FOUR OF THE
MONEY LAUNDERING:
The trading company sends out notice
and asks for bids for Toyota trucks. The
distributor only knows the trucks are
being purchased by the trading company.
STEP FIVE OF THE
MONEY LAUNDERING:
The trading company secures a contract
to purchase the Toyota trucks, and
forwards the contract to the bookkeeping
or law firm and requests payment.
STEP SIX OF THE MONEY
LAUNDERING:
The funds are transferred from
the bookkeeping or law firm to the
trading company.
STEP SEVEN OF THE
MONEY LAUNDERING:
The funds are then transferred from
the trading company to the distributor.
An Afghan Local Police member counts his money after receiving his month's pay at the Nilay
checkpoint in Nawbahar district, Zabul province, Afghanistan, Jan. 12. The ALP is a defensive,
community-oriented force that brings security and stability to rural areas of Afghanistan.
Photo by: Petty Officer 2nd Class David Brandenburg

In most cases the distributor will not
know, want to know, or even ask who is
purchasing the trucks.
STEP EIGHT OF THE
MONEY LAUNDERING:
The trucks can be shipped to one
or more of any of the surrounding
countries, where customs officials can
be bribed to allow the trucks to enter
ISIS controlled areas.
Organized crime has operated for
centuries and ISIS is currently the new
syndicate on the block. They are also the
most vicious organized gang operating in
the world today, and they learned their
financial prowess from some of the best-
trained intelligence officers in the world.
It is imperative that the world cooperates
to strangle their financial strength. •
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Jeff Sandy is currently is the head
of the Forensic Accounting Unit for
Perry & Associates, Certified Public
Accountants. He is a highly decorated
Internal Revenue Service Criminal
Investigation Special Agent and former
Sheriff of Wood County, West Virginia.
He is a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE),
and a Certified Anti-Money Laundering
Specialist (CAMS). He received the
Honor Award from the Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Treasury and a
Department of Defense Joint Services
Achievement Medal from U.S. Army
General Keith W. Dayton for his financial
investigations in Iraq. He is guest
lecturer for the Department of Justice,
Drug Enforcement Administration,
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, West
Virginia State Police, and dozens of
colleges and universities across the United
States. During the last 36 years, he has
investigated and supervised some of the
nation’s largest financial fraud cases. He
has been admitted as an expert witness
in the field of money laundering in five
U.S. District Courts. He has taught
financial investigative techniques to
federal, state, and local law enforcement
officers, Iraqi police, and police officers
and dignitaries from Russia and the
Baltic countries. He is the author of a
book for law enforcement titled “Trace
It”: A Law Enforcement Officer’s Guide
to Simple, Accurate, and Convicting
Financial Investigations.
November 14-16, 2016November 14-16, 2016

B
BOOK REVIEW
It IS about Islam
Reviewed by Editorial Staffby Glenn Beck, 2015
eck’s book is worth the time it
takes to read, if only for the first
few chapters alone. The book begins by
doing two critical things that I believe
the average American can immediately
benefit from reading. The introduction
to the book tells the story of Thomas
Jefferson’s interest in learning about
Islam. The book describes in great
historical detail about how Jefferson
owned the first Koran in North America
and was the first president to go to
war with Islamic radicals. Beck argues,
“It is clear, however, that Jefferson
was, to put it mildly, suspicious of
Islam. He compared the faith with
Catholicism, and believed that neither
had undergone a reformation. Both
religions, he felt, suppressed rational
thought and persecuted skeptics.
When combined with the power of the
state, religion would corrupt and stifle
individual rights. Islam, to Jefferson’s
mind, provided a cautionary tale of
what happened when a faith insisted on
combining religious and political power
into one…”
Further, Jefferson gives credit to Islam
for showing him why the new nation
of The United States of America should
not have an official religion and that
church and state must be separated
with equal rights for all. Beck writes,
Both religions, he felt, suppressed rational thought
and persecuted skeptics.
Official Presidential portrait of Thomas Jefferson. Photo by: Rembrandt Peale (1778–1860)

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UNDERSTANDING
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“As a member of the Virginia House of
Delegates, Jefferson cited Islam as an
example for why Virginia should not
have an official religion. A state religion,
he argued, would quash ‘free enquiry,’ as
he recorded in his notes at the time.
He knew Islam held little tolerance for
other faiths…”
The second criticality is covered by
section one, on the history of Islam, the
Prophet Muhammad and how the current
statuesque came to be normalized.
Geography plays a big part in this
explanation, and although a historian
will not learn anything new, most readers
would benefit from learning a little
history, if not for context alone.
The next section of the book exposes
facts and fictions and debunks common
misconceptions. The final section
outlines what the average person can
do and how they too can be effective in
combatting what some would say is a
threat to liberty.
To me, one of the most interesting
assertions made in the book is as follows.
In WWII, the Greatest Generation did
not make the distinction between Nazis
and those who sympathized with them
or were moderate Nazis. It was made
very clear who was part of the Axis and
that we would combat Germany first
and Japan second. During the Cold
War, the administration never made
the distinction between moderate
communists or extreme communists.
Nazis and Communists as a whole were
openly recognized as enemies of the free
world. This is largely due to the fact that
the moderate or sympathizer was equally
an adversary and we had little tolerance
for Nazis or Communists of any kind. •

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TIME TO BUILD
ANOTHER WING
ONTO GITMO
OBAMA’S DESIRE TO CLOSE DOWN
THE DETENTION FACILITY AT
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

In late February 2016, President Obama
made yet another pitch to the
American people and the Congress for
the complete closure of the detention
facility for radical Islamic unlawful
enemy combatants at the naval facility
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GITMO).
Offering no specifics in his new “plan”
of where the remaining detainees would
actually go, Obama stated: “The plan
we’re putting forth today is not just
about closing the facility … This is about
closing a chapter in our history.”2
This call for closure and the
accompanying rhetoric is nothing new.
President Obama has repeatedly expressed
this desire from day two of taking
his oath of office, almost eight years
by Jeffrey F. Addicott
“We are at war. We are at
war with al-Qaeda.”1
–Barack Obama
President Barack Obama delivers a statement on the global campaign to degrade and destroy
ISIL as well as Syria and other regional issues at the U.S. Department of State in Washington
D.C. on February 25 2016.Photo by: U.S. Department of State from United States

ago. At that time, instead of creating
an interagency task force to conduct
a detailed study of all viable options
and recommendations on how best to
proceed in the shutdown of GITMO,
Obama naively issued an executive order
on January 22, 2009, for the closure of
GITMO within one year.3
It is now 2016 and a frustrated
Obama laments that GITMO is still
Soldiers assigned to the 115th Military Police Company of the Rhode Island Army National Guard stand guard at a sally port inside Camp
Delta at Joint Task Force Guantanamo. The Rhode Island Army National Guard unit is on a one-year deployment providing security at the
Joint Task Force Guantanamo detention facilities. Photo by: Tech. Sgt. Michael R. Holzworth

open. Yet, the so-called “chapter in
our history” is far from over. While
Americans are not used to long wars
(Europe had the Hundred Years’ War),
this is a long war.
Indeed, considering that the conflict
with al-Qaeda and their off-shoot ISIS is
accelerating, it is actually time to build
another wing onto GITMO, not close
it down.
Following the al-Qaeda terror attacks
of September 11, 2001, the Bush
Administration instituted a series of
policy and legal initiatives designed to
disrupt the Islamic terror organization
Army and Navy guards cross-train while escorting a detainee to a recreational area in Camp
One at Joint Task Force Guantanamo September 30, 2007. Detainees at Camp One spend
up to two hours daily in the recreational area.
Photo by: Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Michael Billings

(and its affiliates) and to prevent future
terror attacks against the homeland. As
part of this ongoing war, confinement
facilities were established to detain certain
unlawful enemy combatants captured in
Afghanistan and other parts of the world
at Bagram Air Force Base, Afghanistan,
and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.4
In conjunction with the War on Terror,
the Bush Administration designated
certain individuals as enemy combatants
and detained them indefinitely.
Under the law of armed conflict, an
enemy combatant—whether lawful or
unlawful—can be held indefinitely until
the war is over. The purpose of detention
is not penal in nature, but necessary
to keep the enemy combatant from
rejoining enemy forces and continuing
the fight.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly
acknowledged the validity of the premise
A Navy guard assigned to Joint Task Force Guantanamo’s Navy Expeditionary Guard Battalion patrols Camp Delta’s recreation yard during
the early morning of July 7, 2010. Camp Delta is a communal living facility and the detainees housed at Camp Delta are able to use the
recreation yard for up to 20 hours a day. The Sailors of the NEGB provide a portion of the guard force inside Joint Task Force Guantanamo’s
detention facilities. Photo by: U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Michael R. Holzworth

A detainee goes after a soccer ball within the outdoor recreation area
of Camp Six at Joint Task Force Guantanamo.
Photo by: Petty Officer 2nd Class Jordan Miller
The purpose of detention
is not penal in nature, but
necessary to keep the
enemy combatant from
rejoining enemy forces and
continuing the fight.

that the United States is engaged in a
state of war with “al-Qaeda, the Taliban,
and associated forces.” Therefore, the
United States is entitled to detain such
fighters as unlawful enemy combatants.
The Court has only considered narrow
issues dealing with status and review
processes applicable to detainees in
Guantanamo Bay. The Court held in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that, although the
detainees were not entitled to POW
status, Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions did in fact apply to the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay. In 2008,
a bitterly divided (5-4) Supreme Court
held in Boumediene v. Bush that aliens
designated as enemy combatants and
detained at Guantanamo Bay had the
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus
review of the legality and possibly the
circumstances of their detention.
At one time, GITMO had a peak
population of around 700 detainees
from approximately 40 countries,
with Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and
Yemen the most represented. When
President Bush left office in January
2009, around 250 detainees remained;
Bush had released those he deemed to
be “rehabilitated.”Today around 90
detainees remain, as Obama has released
about 150 under the same theory as
Bush—they were rehabilitated and posed
no threat.6
Of course, as we now know,
as much as a third of these “reformed”
radical Islamic terrorists had lied and
returned to the battlefield.
The misguided idea that we need to
close GITMO implies that the United
States has been in the moral and legal
wrong for the past 14 years and must
make atonement. It was al-Qaeda that
incinerated 3,000 people on 9/11.
We are at war and under the law of
war have every right to detain them
indefinitely. America has nothing to
apologize for.
An Air Force service member attached with the 118th Base Engineer Emergency Force in
support of Joint Task Force Guantanamo welds chain link fencing to an exterior structure at
U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay June 18. The 118th BEEF is constructing a storage
unit while deployed here for training. JTF Guantanamo conducts safe humane legal and
transparent care and custody of detainees including those convicted by military commission
and those ordered released by a court. Photo by: Spc. Cody Black
Army 1st Sgt. Tina Brown Army Maj. Jennifer Reed and Army Sgt. Rosalyn Anderson
deployed here with the 525th Military Police Battalion in support of Joint Task Force
Guantanamo run in front of the Honor Bound sign at Joint Task Force Guantanamo's Camp
Delta during a physical fitness session. Photo by: Petty Officer 3rd Class Joshua Nistas

Thankfully, President Obama’s
desire to close the detention facility at
GITMO never happened and will not
happen. In part this is because Obama’s
reasons for wanting to close GITMO
are fallacious, but in the larger picture,
the battle against Islamic extremism is
increasing, not declining. With the rise
of ISIS, the war is far from over and
the need for detention more necessary
than ever.
While President Obama and his
Justice Department may wish to blame
his inability to close GITMO on the
Republican-controlled Congress and
“uniformed Americans,” the facts show
just the opposite. First, Obama’s strong
desire to close the facility has always
been met with a firestorm of opposition
from the American people, even from
his own Democratic Party.
For the first two years in office,
Democrats controlled the Senate
and the House of Representatives,
not Republicans. Not only did the
Democrat-controlled Congress in
2009 refuse to provide the Obama
Administration with the $80 million
it requested to close the facility, but
the Democrat-controlled Congress
also placed numerous caveats on when,
where, and how the President could
transfer detainees, particularly if he
wished to send them to the United
States.7
The Republican-controlled
Congress has simply followed suit.
Watchtower security teams at Camp X-Ray man positions during a rehearsal for handling incoming detainees. Camp X-Ray will be one of the
holding facilities for Taliban and Al Qaida detainees. Photo by: PhotographerÕs Mate 1st Class Shane T. McCoy

Detainees in orange jumpsuits sit in a holding area under the watchful eyes of Military Police at Camp X-Ray at Naval Base Guantanamo
Bay Cuba during in-processing to the temporary detention facility on January 11, 2002. The detainees will be given a basic physical exam by a
doctor to include a chest x-ray and blood samples drawn to assess their health. Photo by: Petty Officer 1st class Shane T. McCoy U.S. Navy

Second, while other radical Islamic
terrorists must be processed by domestic
criminal law, the War on Terror is a
real war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban,
and associated forces. These qualify
as unlawful enemy combatants, not
domestic jihadists. Obama has always
thrived off of a lack of clarity to
distinguish the domestic jihadist from
the unlawful enemy combatant. This
lack of leadership only provides fuel
for America’s enemies to perpetuate the
false propaganda that the United States
is acting illegally by detaining people
without trial at GITMO.
If the events of 9/11 have taught
Americans anything, it is that the United
States must operate under the law of
war against those individual al-Qaeda
and ISIS Islamic terrorists designated as
unlawful enemy combatants. The next
president will have to come to terms with
this matter in a bipartisan manner that
rests firmly in the proper rule of law. •
ENDNOTES
1
Obama, Barack. 2010. “Remarks
by the President on Strengthening
Intelligence and Aviation Security.”
Available at 2010 WL 40113. (“We are at
war. We are at war against al-Qaeda, a far-
reaching network of violence and hatred
that attacked us on 9/11, that killed
nearly 3,000 innocent people and that is
plotting to strike us again. And we will do
whatever it takes to defeat them.”).
2
Korte, Gregory and Tom Vanden
Brook. “Final Push to Shut Down
GITMO.” USA Today, February 24,
2016.
3
Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed.
Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009); see
also Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed.
Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009) (establishing a
special task force on detainee disposition).
4
Joint Task Force Guantanamo.
Accessed February 25, 2016. http://www.
jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/. The mission of
the U.S. military task force is to conduct
“safe, humane, legal and transparent care
and custody of detainees, including those
convicted by military commission and
those ordered released.”
5
Traditional law of war authority
allows the government to hold enemy
combatants until the end of hostilities.
See Geneva Convention III, supra note
17, art. 118.
6
Korte, Gregory and Tom Vanden
Brook. “Final Push to Shut Down
GITMO.” USA Today, February 24,
2016.
7
Murray, Shailagh. “Senate Demands
Plan for Detainees.” Washington Post
(Washington, DC), May 20, 2009.
See also Linzer, Dafna and Peter
Finn. “White House Weighs Order
on Detention.” Washington Post
(Washington, DC), June 27, 2009.
(Explaining that the appropriations bill
signed by President Obama “forces the
administration to report to Congress
before moving any detainee out of
Guantanamo and prevents the White
House from using available funds to
move detainees onto U.S. soil.”)
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Lt. Colonel (U.S. Army, ret.) Jeffrey F.
Addicott is a full Professor of Law and
the Director of the Center for Terrorism
Law at St. Mary’s University School
of Law, San Antonio, Texas. An active
duty Army officer in the Judge Advocate
General’s Corps for twenty years, Professor
Addicott spent a quarter of his career
as the senior legal advisor to the United
States Army’s Special Forces. As an
internationally recognized authority on
national security law, Professor Addicott
not only lectures and participates in
professional and academic organizations
both in the United States and abroad
(over 700 speeches), but he also testifies
before Congress on a variety of legal
issues. He is also a regular contributor
to national and international news
media outlets, including Fox News
Channel, MSNBC, CNN, BBC,
The New York Times, The Washington
Post, The Wall Street Journal, and
USA Today (with over 4,000 media
interviews). Addicott is a prolific author,
publishing over 60 books, articles, and
monographs on a variety of legal topics.
His most recent book (2014) is entitled
Terrorism Law: Cases, Materials,
Comments, 7th
edition.
e-mail: jaddicott@stmarytx.edu
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (ret.),
Professor of Law and Director, Center
for Terrorism Law, St. Mary’s University
School of Law. B.A. (with honors),
University of Maryland; J.D., University
of Alabama School of Law; LL.M., The
Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and
School; LL.M. (1992) and S.J.D. (1994),
University of Virginia School of Law. This
article was prepared under the auspices of
the Center for Terrorism Law, located at
St. Mary’s University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas

INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING
TECHNOLOGY INTO MILITARY
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
INTEGRATING

ne of the tasks he was
assigned was coming up
with a winning strategy for the Vietnam
War. Like most people, when faced
with a dauntless task, he fell back on his
strengths. In McNamara’s case this was
his superior intellect. McNamara, in part,
attempted to use technology to defeat
the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
guerillas. When large numbers of men
and materiel were coming into South
Vietnam by way of Laos and Cambodia
via the Ho Chi Minh trail, McNamara
tried to stem the flow. He was the chief
proponent of what would come to be
known as the McNamara Line, which
O
by Nick Perna
Robert McNamara was Secretary
of Defense under Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson. President
Johnson inherited him from the
previous administration, and
to a certain extent he was an
anomaly. McNamara was a
large-brained individual of
exceptional cerebral talents.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and
General Westmoreland, Vietnam Assistance
Command Commander, talks with General
Tee on condition of the war in Vietnam.
Photo by: United States Marine Corps
Guerillas assamble shells and rockets delivered along the
Ho Chi Minh Trail. Photo by: U.S. Army

was a series of electronic sensors strewn
about the jungle that were designed to
alert American units to the presence of
incoming enemy troops and equipment.
It was an invisible electronic line that the
enemy would trip, allowing U.S. forces to
launch air strikes, artillery barrages, and
so on to prevent the enemy from getting
into South Vietnam.
A great idea but doomed from the
start. The Ho Chi Minh trial was not an
Interstate highway that could be easily
monitored. It was hundreds of trails,
highly camouflaged and invisible from
the air, leading from the North to the
South. Some trails were barely wide
enough for one man to walk on. Even
given the technology of today it would
be impossible to make an electronic wall
hundreds of miles across in the middle
of a war zone designed to detect all
movement. (If you don’t believe me, look
at the border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan or, closer to home, the U.S./
Mexico border). Large amounts of enemy
men and materiel flowed into South
Vietnam throughout the war despite the
best efforts to stop it (Daugherty and
Mattson 2001).
As the war dragged on, many
Americans, including McNamara, began
to feel the war was unwinnable. I can’t
help but wonder if this was due in part
MACV-SOG reconnaissance team in Vietnam

to the fact that, despite his best efforts,
McNamara wasn’t able to outsmart
an enemy lacking in the same level of
technical expertise.
This is true in law enforcement as well.
When a problem or challenge presents
itself, we often try to come up with a
technological or cerebral approach to the
problem. If the problem is gang violence
in a particular area, the heavy-minded
approach may consist of the following:
analysis of times when gang violence
is most prevalent, generation of lists of
known gang members who frequent an
area, installation of pole cameras and
license plate readers to track the coming
and going of people and vehicles.
All good ideas, right, but like
McNamara’s line it isn’t a stand-alone
solution. In my experience, gang
members frequent areas within a specific
neighborhood, gravitating toward certain
places but often remaining mobile. They
leave their territory to attack rival sets and
commit other crimes such as robberies,
residential burglaries and drug deals. They
may operate out of a specific “hood” or
area but they are relatively mobile when
“conducting operations” (not unlike the
Viet Cong or Taliban). I doubt many
agencies have the financial wherewithal to
have cameras installed throughout their
cities to monitor this activity and, if they
do, I think the ACLU would have a field
day with them.
Along those same lines, gang members,
like most criminals, are relatively
unpredictable when it comes to times
and days of the week when they are
active. There may be some patterns that
evolve (most gangsters don’t get out of
bed until noon, for example) but when
(and where) they do their dirt is hard
to predict. It can even be difficult to tell
who the members of the gang are. Unlike
in the movies, they don’t generally stand
around all wearing the same color clothes
MACV-SOG Insignia

Police officer conducting surveillance from a hide site
during a counter narcotics operation. He relayed timely
information to undercover officers on the ground regarding
narcotic sales in an area known for that activity. A
remotely operated camera in his place would be useful as
well, freeing him up to assist in other areas.

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by Nung and Montagnard mercenaries
and, in certain cases, South Vietnamese
commandos, clandestinely entered
Cambodia and Laos (usually by
helicopter). The small units would
conduct reconnaissance and surveillance
in areas believed to be used by the enemy
to infiltrate South Vietnam. These teams
would roam through the jungle quietly
looking for signs of enemy activity,
especially the roads and trails used by
them. When a team would find such
The author in Iraq briefing a mission. A map can’t display the latest changes in terrain,
human or otherwise. Without timely information from intel-gathering nodes, there’s no way
to ensure the information briefed is timely or relevant.
look pretty much like everyone else in
their neighborhood.
Around the same time that the
McNamara Line was attempted, there
was another way U.S. forces attempted
to close the door on the Cambodia and
Laos route into South Vietnam. A highly
secretive organization known as MAVC-
SOG (Military Assistance Command
Vietnam, Studies and Observations
Group) was using a different tactic.
Small units of Green Berets augmented

The most important reason to get timely, accurate intelligence is make sure it
is in the hands of the operators who will be using it.

a location, they would monitor it for
enemy activity (Plaster 1997).
When large numbers of enemy supply
trucks or personnel would venture down
a trail, the green berets would call in air
strikes on them. A couple of trucks here,
a squad of enemy there, and the Special
Forces teams chipped away at the enemy.
Similar missions were conducted in South
Vietnam by U.S. Army LRRP (Long
Range Reconnaissance Patrol) units.
The “Lurps” would also move in small
teams, seek out the enemy, and either kill
them in ambushes, call for air or artillery
support, or request conventional units to
deploy to the area to seek them out and
attack them.
Unfortunately, the idea didn’t appeal
to more conventional military forces,
so the MACV-SOG and LRRP teams
were never deployed in sufficient enough
numbers to accomplish their goal. We
can only speculate as to what the effect
there would have been regarding the
outcome of the war if we had hundreds
of these teams operating near the border
and elsewhere with sufficient tactical air
power on hand. Pound for pound they
were some of the most successful units
in theatre, killing and capturing large
numbers of the enemy disproportionate
to their own numbers and casualties.
Interestingly enough, though, some
MACV-SOG teams actually located
enemy convoys by using information
provided by acoustic sensors that
were part of the McNamara Line. The
combination of technology coupled with
“boots on the ground” proved a successful
combination. Along those same lines,
the Green Berets used overhead aviation
assets in the form of pilots and spotters in
single engine prop planes to provide aerial
observation and to better coordinate for
air support.
An acoustic sensor, a pole camera, or
even a plane is of limited value if there
isn’t way to act on the intelligence it
provides. It’s one thing to have actionable
intelligence; it’s another thing entirely to
act on it. Here are some suggestions that
would not only apply in law enforcement
but the military as well:
Place intelligence-gathering nodes in
locations recommended by operators. The
ones who actually work the terrain (or the
hood) can best say where an intelligence-
gathering device should be placed.
Deciding on a location by looking at an
overhead image or basing the decision
on where the activity has been in the
past may garner some success, but isn’t
it better to ask the ultimate end user of
the information where he thinks it would
best be placed?
This can become a bit of a “chicken
and egg” argument, but it’s always best
to deploy your assets based on input
from sources that have recently had “eyes
on.” In addition to providing input as to
where intelligence gathering nodes should
be placed, operators should (whenever
possible) be put in a position to be part of
that process.
As part of MACV-SOG, there were
forward air controllers (FACs) who
were the observers in the single engine
prop planes. The FACs themselves were
experienced Special Forces operators
who had worked on the ground as team
leaders in previous tours. Their experience
was essential when making decisions in
choosing helicopter landing and pick up
zones, locations for air strikes, and so
on. When fixed or rotary wing assets are
used for law enforcement surveillance
operations, accommodations should be
made to have specialized officers in the
aircraft who aren’t involved in flying.
Rather, their focus should be providing
intelligence to operators in the field
during suppression operations.
Give operators real time access to the
intelligence. Armed with current, up to

date information, operators can directly
target criminal (or enemy) activity as it
happens. This may have been difficult
in 1968 but in 2016 it really isn’t. In
the agency where I work, we deployed
a vehicle containing a series of hidden
cameras in an area where multiple gang
shootings had occurred. The video could
be observed via a smart phone app. The
app was provided to detectives assigned
to gang suppression activities there. We
were able to respond almost immediately
to issues and eventually the problem
was negated through rapid responses to
in-progress activity based on the timely
intel provided.
This could also be done with aviation
assets as well. If it’s not reasonable or
feasible to have an experienced detective
on board an aircraft, why not have the
information gathered remoted to a device
such as a tablet or laptop? Officers on
the ground could vector aircraft into
an area and view what the aircraft can
see via its onboard cameras. To take
it a step further, the detectives on the
ground could remotely operate those
camera systems, requiring the pilot only
to stay at a certain altitude and heading.
My experiences working with aviation
assets in law enforcement have required
the use of non-visual assets (radios) to
guide aircraft so they can use their visual
assets (FLIR, cameras), only to have the
information they passed back to me using
the radio. Time is wasted and an accurate
picture isn’t painted.
Everyone remembers the scene in
Blackhawk Down when the relief
column lead by LTC McKnight is trying
to get to the beleaguered rangers to
rescue them. The convoy is receiving
guidance from a rotary wing aircraft
high above. The information provided
by the observers in the helicopter is a
few seconds too late and, because of the
lag time, the convoy fails to make crucial
lefts and rights. Intel, like bad news,
doesn’t get better with time.
Military Joint Terminal Attack
Controllers (JTACS) currently use a
system that allows them to do this.
JTACs are responsible for requesting
Close Air Support (CAS) from military
aircraft. They request and coordinate
missiles and bombs as well as gun runs
from everything from helicopters to
fast-moving attack craft. To ensure
accuracy, they use the Video Scout
system (Golembresky and Bruning
2014). With Video Scout, a JTAC can
remotely access live video feeds from
aircraft tasked to support them. In this
way, the JTAC sees what the pilot sees,
rather than trying to relay back and
forth what each of them are seeing.
This ability becomes crucial when using
highly lethal munitions when “danger
close” to friendly troops. Similar systems
are seeing limited use by Tactical Flight
Officers on law enforcement aircraft.
With all that being said, it’s also
important to not over-rely on aviation
surveillance assets. Prior to the current
conflict, airborne intelligence came from
either satellites or manned reconnaissance
aircraft. With the advent of unmanned
drones and their use in the current
conflict, decision makers often depend
too much on its use. I’ve heard more
than one operator who has returned from
the sandbox complain that commanders
won’t launch missions unless a drone
flies over the battle space first, possibly
compromising the operation.
Embed intelligence analysts with field
units. I’ve never been able to do this as
a cop since I’ve never been assigned to
a team with its own intel analysis assets.
I’m familiar with gang and narcotics
suppression units that have this available
to them and I know they quickly become
indispensable. I’ve observed them being
used in investigations and gang task
With the advent of
unmanned drones
and their use in
the current conflict,
decision makers
often depend too
much on its use.

forces I’ve been on temporary assignment
to and I can attest to their usefulness.
I have however seen it used extensively
in the military, though. We had an intel
analyst assigned to my unit in Iraq, which
was very beneficial, especially given the
volumes of intel data received through
both open and classified sources. On
the modern battlefield, it’s usually not
a lack of information but rather too
much information that is the problem.
Direct action assets don’t have time to
process it as well as act on it. As a street
crimes suppression team detective, we
often had large amounts of information
gathered through surveillance, interviews,
informants, social media, and other
sources. What we didn’t have was the
time to analyze it and connect the dots.
Intel analysts are also useful when it
comes to deconfliction. Very important
for both the near and far battlefields to
avoid fratricide. In law enforcement,
there is also the need to avoid ruining
other agency’s investigations. On the
West Coast we have WSIN, Western
States Information Network. WSIN does
many things, but, most importantly,
it is a clearing house/fusion center for
information regarding law enforcement
operations. It’s like an electronic dry erase
board where current law enforcement
operations that are being conducted are
listed. If you have an operation such as a
high-risk search warrant you can contact
WSIN and tell them when and where
you are going. In a very short time, they
will let you know if you are about to land
in someone else’s area or compromise
another agency’s operation.
CONCLUSION
Here at home, as well as abroad,
specialized units are spread pretty thin.
Whether it be military special operators
deployed all over the world in support of
current operations or their counterparts
in law enforcement, gang suppression
units, and narcotics task forces, there
just aren’t enough of them to go around.
Unfortunately there is no shortage of
terrorists overseas, or their gang banging,
drug dealing counterparts here at home.
Technology, in and of itself, is a force
multiplier that can help fill the gaps in
manpower. But it only works well when
it is used properly for the direct benefit of
the end user, the operator in the field. If
not, it’s just a line in the sand. •
REFERENCES:
Daugherty, Leo and Gregory Mattson.
Nam: A Photographic History. New York:
Metro Books, 2001.
Golembresky, Michael and John R.
Bruning. Level Zero Heroes: The Story of
U.S. Marine Special Operations in Bala
Murghab, Afghanistan. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 2014.
Plaster, John L. SOG: The Secret Wars
of America’s Commandos in Vietnam.
Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1997.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Nick Perna is a Police Officer with
the Redwood City Police Department in
Northern California. He has spent much
of his career as a gang and narcotics
investigator. He is a member of a Multi-
Jurisdictional SWAT Team since 2001
and is currently a Team Leader. He
previously served as a paratrooper in the
U.S. Army and is a veteran of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. He has a Master’s Degree
from the University of San Francisco.

CT June July 2016

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