2021-2022 Last Minute - HO 1 - Political Law.pdf

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2021-2022 LAST MINUTE
POLITICAL LAW
Handout No. 1
Legal Edge Bar Review legaledge8@gmail.com
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BASIC PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL LAW
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government; To the legislative branch of government, through Congress,
belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President,
belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court,
belongs the power to interpret laws. Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013
STATE IMMUNITY
The State may not be sued without its consent.
Basis: There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right
depends.
Exception: State may be sued if it gives consent, whether express or implied.
Note: Where private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being
paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action for
payment by the owners (Air Transportation Office v. Sps. Ramos, 2011)
POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER EMINENT DOMAIN TAXATION
As to exercising authority
Exercised only by the
Government
It may be exercised by the
public and private entities
Exercised only by the
Government
As to the matters of delegation
Upon valid delegation, it
may also be exercised by:
1. President;
2. Administrative bodies;
and
1. President;
2. Law-making bodies of
LGUs;
3. Public corporations;
1. President; and
LGUs.

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POLICE POWER EMINENT DOMAIN TAXATION
LGUs.
4. Quasi-public
corporations; and
5. Administrative bodies
As to purpose for the exercise of the power
Public necessity and the
right of the State and of the
public to self-preservation
and self-protection.
Public necessity for the use
of private property
Public necessity (life-blood
theory)
As to the nature of the property involved when taken
Property is generally noxious
or intended for a noxious
purpose and as such, taken
and destroyed.
Property is wholesome and is devoted to public use or
purpose.
As to compensation
Compensation is the
intangible, altruistic feeling
that the individual has
contributed to the public
good.
Compensation is the full and
fair equivalent of the
property taken.
Compensation is the
protection and public
improvements instituted by
the government for the
taxes paid.
As to the scope
Regulates both liberty and
property.
Affect only property rights.
The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be
vested in administrative agencies.
The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination, but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be
taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the
courts be precluded from looking into the ‘just-ness’ of the decreed compensation. Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Eugenio Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004, August 8, 2017, citing EPZA v. Dulay, 149
SCRA 305 (1987)

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When Payment of Interest is proper in Eminent Domain
The amount paid to a landowner, which is lower than the just compensation awarded, warrants
the payment of interest insofar as the unpaid balance is concerned. The award of 12% interest is
imposed in the nature of damages for the delay in the payment of the full just compensation
award. The rationale therefore is to compensate the landowners for the income they would have
made had they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the taking (Land
Bank v. Hababag, 2015).
Note: Inflation rate is not included for the purpose of determining just compensation since award
of interest helps eliminate the issue of constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the
currency over time (National Power Corporation v. Castillo, 2016).
BILL OF RIGHTS
While the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987 Constitution generally cannot be invoked
against the acts of private individuals, the same may nevertheless be applicable if such
individuals act under the color of a state-related function. Miguel vs. People, G.R. No. 227038,
July 31, 2017
The writ of amparo covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards
or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined as the
arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or
by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection
of the law. Lorie Marie Tomas Callo v. Comm. Jaime H. Morente, et al., G.R. No. 230324,
September 19, 2017

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Aspects of Due Process
1. Substantive Due Process
This serves as a restriction on the government’s law and rule-making powers. It requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty,
or property.
2. Procedural Due Process
It serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of the
government. It also refers to the regular methods of procedure to be observed before
one’s life, liberty, or property can be taken away from him.
Due process in administrative proceedings does not require the submission of pleadings or a
trial-type of hearing.
Due process is satisfied if the party is duly notified of the allegations against him or her and is
given a chance to present his or her defense. Furthermore, due process requires that the
proffered defense should have been considered by the tribunal in arriving at its decision. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213581, September 19, 2017
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality.
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be (SAGE) based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. Jesus C. Garcia v. The
Hon. Ray Alan T. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

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RA No. 9262 or the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004” is
constitutional.
1. R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws because it rests on
substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law.
2. R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
There is no violation of procedural due process in the ex parte issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO). Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to
be prevented,” the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice
and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable
ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and
imminent danger of violence or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.
3. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Barangay Protection Order (BPO) issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability,
by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,”
and to “maintain public order in the barangay. Jesus C. Garcia v. The Hon. Ray Alan T. Drilon,
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
To have an expectation of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show intention to keep certain
posts private through the use of privacy tools.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Networks (OSN) activity,
it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through
the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention
can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words,
utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of
his or her right to informational privacy.

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A person who places a photograph on the Internet (e.g., Facebook post in “Public”) precisely
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery. If such were the case, he/she
cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. Availment of the writ
of habeas data, therefore, requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College,
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
The constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not apply in
preliminary investigations.
Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand
the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to
establish his innocence.
Thus, there is no denial of due process in case of denial, during preliminary investigation, of the
respondent’s motion to call the witness against the respondent for clarificatory questions. A
respondent in a preliminary investigation is not yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand
the full exercise of the rights of an accused person, such as the right to confrontation. Estrada v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
Valid Warrantless Searches:
a. Consented warrantless search
b. Search incident to a lawful arrest
c. Search of moving vehicles
d. Customs search
e. Body checks in airports (RA 6235, Sec. 9);
f. Inspection of buildings and other premises for fire and sanitary regulations
g. Stop and frisk
h. Checkpoints (NOTE: limited to visual search only)
i. Aerial target zoning/saturation drives (Guazon v De Villa, 2009)
j. Plain view search
k. Doctrine of exigent circumstances (Valeroso v. CA, 2009)

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Searches Incidental to a Lawful Arrest vs. Stop and Frisk
Searches Incidental to a Lawful Arrest Stop and Frisk
Searches incidental to a lawful arrest
require that a crime be committed in
flagrante delicto, and the search conducted
within the vicinity and within reach by the
person arrested is done to ensure that there
are no weapons, as well as to preserve the
evidence (People v. Cogaed, 2014).
It is "limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons.” A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him (Malacat
v. CA, 1997).
Requisites of Plain View Doctrine
The seizure of evidence in plain view requires: (VI2P)
a. A prior Valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
b. The evidence was Inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are;
c. The evidence must be Immediately apparent; and
d. "Plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (Valeroso v.
People, 2009).
Valid Checkpoints
A checkpoint search may either be:
a. Routine checks – Peace officers are limited to routine checks where the examination of the
vehicle is limited to visual inspection.
b. Extensive search – When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e.,
upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction (People v. Libnao, et al., 2003).

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Requisites of Admissible Extrajudicial Confession:
a. Made with the assistance and in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a
valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse,
the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of
the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as
evidence in any proceeding;
b. In writing;
c. Voluntary;
d. Express; and
e. Signed (R.A. No. 7438, Sec. 2, Par. (d)).
Extrajudicial Confessions by the Accused Executed During Preliminary Investigation are
Admissible in Evidence
Extrajudicial confessions before the City Prosecutor during a preliminary investigation are
admissible in evidence for this stage of the proceedings only determines whether there is a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty and
should be held for trial. The inherently coercive nature of a custodial investigation is wanting in
preliminary investigations (People v. Omilig, 2015).
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Requisites of Judicial Review: (CLEM)
1. Actual case or controversy
A conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims which can be resolved on
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
2. The constitutional question must be raised by the proper party (locus standi)
A proper party is one who has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury
as a result of the act complained of.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question.
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

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General Rule: The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the
pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same.
Exceptions:
i. Criminal cases – at any time at the discretion of the court;
ii. Civil cases – at any stage of the proceedings if necessary for the determination of the
case itself; or
iii. In every case (except when there is estoppel) – at any stage if it involves the
jurisdiction of the court.
4. The decision on the constitutional question must be determinative of the case itself (lis
mota)
Lis mota literally means “the cause of the suit or action”. The petitioner who claims the
unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first that the case cannot be
resolved unless the constitutional question that he raised is decided. If there is some
other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted
and the question of constitutionality should be avoided. Katipunan ng Damay ang
Mahihirap vs. Secretary Jesse Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014
Doctrine of Operative Fact
The doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of
its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be
erased, ignored or disregarded. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no effect. It nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its
effects. Araullo v. President Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 and February 3, 2015
POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT
Section 23 (plea-bargaining) of RA 9165 is unconstitutional.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is [now] the Supreme Court’s
exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. Salvador
Estipona, Jr. v. Hon. Frank E. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017

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Section 5 of Article VIII does not limit the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction only to certain public
officials or that excludes impeachable officials therefrom.
Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct proceedings, although both may result in the
ouster of a public officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the relief of "ouster", while
impeachment affords "removal”.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or title to a
public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper action to inquire into a
public officer's eligibility or the validity of his appointment. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court,
a quo warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the right to the use or exercise of
the office
Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process undertaken by the legislature to
determine whether the public officer committed any of the impeachable offenses, namely,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust. It does not ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or
election, or challenge the legality of his assumption of office. Conviction for any of the
impeachable offenses shall result in the removal of the impeachable official from office.
In this case, the OSG's quo warranto petition challenged respondent's right and title to the
position of Chief Justice. He averred that in failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and
net worth as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice of
the Court, respondent could not be said to possess the requirement of proven integrity
demanded of every aspiring member of the Judiciary. The OSG thus prayed that respondent's
appointment as Chief Justice be declared void.
Clearly, the OSG questioned the respondent's eligibility for appointment as Chief Justice and
sought to invalidate such appointment. The OSG's petition, therefore, is one for quo warranto
over which the Court exercises original jurisdiction. Republic v. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, G.R.
No. 237428, June 19, 2018

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QUALIFICATIONS, DISQUALIFICATIONS, AND SELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATORS,
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRSENTATIVES (HoR), JUSTICES, AND JUDGES, THE
OMBUDSMAN, AND CONSITUTIONAL COMMISSIONERS
Rules of Succession of the President
Section 7, Article VII, 1987 Constitution – vacancy exists at the beginning of the term of the
President.
Situation Who takes the Seat?
1. President has been chosen but fails to qualify
Vice-President as “acting-President” until a
President qualifies
2. No President has yet been chosen at the time
he is supposed to assume office
3. President-elect dies or is permanently
incapacitated before the beginning of his
term
Vice-President-elect becomes the President
4. Both the President and VP have not yet been
chosen or have failed to qualify
Senate President or Speaker (in that order)
as “acting-President” until a President or VP
qualifies
5. Both shall have died or become permanently
incapacitated at the start of their term
6. Both shall have died, or shall have become
permanently incapacitated, or are unable to
assume office
Congress will determine by law who will act
as President until a President or VP shall have
been elected and qualified.
Section 8, Article VII, 1987 Constitution – vacancy occurs after the office of the President has
been initially filled (i.e. during his term)
Situation Who takes the Seat?
1. President dies or is permanently disabled,
removed, or resigns
Vice-President becomes President
2. Both President and VP die, or are
permanently disabled, removed, or resign
Senate President or Speaker (in that order) as
“acting-President” until a President or VP
shall have been elected and qualified
3. Acting President dies or is permanently
incapacitated, removed, or resigns
Congress will determine by law who will act
as President until a President or VP shall have
been elected and qualified.

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Jurisdiction of HRET/SET vs. COMELEC
Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be the sole judges of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.
COMELEC, on the other hand, under Article IX-C, Section 2, has exclusive original jurisdiction over
all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
To be considered as a Member of Congress there must be the concurrence of the following
requisites:
a. A valid proclamation;
b. A proper oath; and
c. Assumption of office (Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr., 2016).
Specific Disqualifications Under the Constitution
✓ The (1) President, (2) Vice-President, (3) Members of the Cabinet, and (4) their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure (Art. VII, Sec. 13), except:
• Secretary of Justice as ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
• Vice-President may be appointed as cabinet secretary
✓ No Senator or member of the HoR may hold any other office or employment in the
government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
• Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
✓ Members of the Supreme Court and other courts shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

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✓ No member of Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment, same with the Ombudsman and his deputies.
✓ The Ombudsman and his deputies shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election
immediately succeeding their cessation from office.
✓ Members of Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his deputies must not have
been candidates for ANY elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment.
✓ Members of Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his deputies are appointed
to a term of seven (7) years, WITHOUT reappointment.
✓ The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4th degree of the President
shall not, during his tenure, be appointed members of the Constitutional Commission or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, Chairmen or Heads of
Bureaus or Offices, including GOCCs.
STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT & IMMUNITY OF THE PRESIDENT,
PRIVILEGES OF SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HoR
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered
with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the
Constitution. The only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in:
(1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
206666, January 21, 2015

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Presidential Appointments: Ad Interim v. Regular
Ad Interim Regular Appointment
When made
While the Congress is NOT in session or
during recess
While the Congress is IN SESSION.
Made before confirmation of
Commission on Appointments (CA)
Made after nomination is confirmed by the CA.
Effectivity
Ceases to be valid if disapproved by the
CA or upon next adjournment of the
Congress.
Once confirmed by the CA, continues until the end
of the term of the appointee.
Prohibition on Midnight Appointments applies only to the Executive Department
Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is “duty-bound to prepare
for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he or she should not do acts
which he or she ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his or her successor.”
(Aytona v. Castillo, 1962). An outgoing President should not “deprive the new administration of
an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
Constitutional Limitations on the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Declaration of Martial Law:
a. Grounds for Declaration: Invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it.
b. Duration: Not more than 60 days, following which it shall be lifted, unless extended by
Congress upon the initiative of the President.
Note: The Congress, if not in session, shall, within 24 hours following such proclamation
or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of call.
Note: The initial declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
is determined solely by the President, while the extension of the declaration and/or
suspension, although initiated by the President, is approved by Congress.
c. Duty of the President to report to Congress: Within 48 hours personally or in writing.

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d. Authority of Congress to revoke or extend the effectivity of proclamation: By majority
vote of all its members voting jointly.
Note: The framers of the Constitution only settled the manner of voting by the Congress,
i.e., “voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members,” in order to revoke
the President’s proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, but they did not directly take up and specify that the voting shall be
done during a joint session of both Houses of the Congress. Alexander A. Padilla, et al. v.
Congress of the Philippines, et al., G.R. Nos. 231671 and 231694, July 25, 2017
e. Authority of the Supreme Court: To inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis for
such action, at the instance of any citizen. Decision must be promulgated 30 days from its
filing (Art. VII, Sec. 18, Par. 3).
f. Effect of declaration of martial law: State of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
g. Application of the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ: Applies only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
Note: During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within 3 days, otherwise he shall be released.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed the President’s proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of
judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to question before
the Supreme Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension.
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a demandable
right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation or suspension. It further
designated [this Court] as the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the
sufficiency of the factual basis and to render its decision thereon within a limited period of 30
days from date of filing. Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Salvador C. Medialdea, et al., G.R.
Nos. 231658, 231771 and 231774, July 4, 2017

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The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers.
It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Supreme
Court. (Id.)
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Senate investigation of a case already pending in court does not violate the sub-judice rule
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On-
going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation. And the
Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and
testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. Romero II, et al. v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009
Parliamentary Privileges and Immunities of Congress
a. Privilege from Arrest extends to offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment
AND while the Congress is in session.
b. Privilege of Speech and Debate – No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate done in the Congress or in any committee thereof (Art.
VI, Sec. 11). However, he can be subjected to disciplinary action by the Congress itself (Chavez
v. JBC, 2013).
Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering refers to the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for
the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. It is not allowed under the Constitution.
The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering as it mandates each legislative district to comprise,
as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010

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JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Expanded Jurisdiction and Authority of the Supreme Court
Art. VIII, Sec. 1, Par. 2 of the Constitution expanded the power, authority and jurisdiction of the
courts of justice, particularly the Supreme Court, to determine whether any branch of the
government has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction.
Under the expanded jurisdiction conferred to the Supreme Court, the political question doctrine
is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable
shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review (Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., 1993).
To add another member in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) or to increase the representative
of Congress to the JBC, the remedy is not judicial but constitutional amendment.
While it is true that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution did not explicitly state that
the JBC shall be composed of seven members, however, the same is implied in the enumeration
of who will be the members thereof. And though it is unnecessary for the JBC composition to be
an odd number as no tie-breaker is needed in the preparation of a shortlist since judicial
nominees are not decided by a “yes” or “no” vote, still, JBC’s membership cannot be increased
from seven to eight for it will be a clear violation of the aforesaid constitutional provision. Rep.
Reynaldo V. Umali v. JBC, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017
JBC’s policy of requiring applicants for judgeship in the Regional Trial Courts to have served at
least for five (5) years of service as judge of first-level courts is constitutional.
The policy does not violate the equal protection clause. Substantial distinctions do exist between
lower court judges with five (5)-year experience and those with less than five years of experience,
and the classification enshrined in the policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose
of selecting those with proven competence. Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No.
211833, April 7, 2015

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DELEGATION OF POWERS
General Rule: Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be
delegated.
Exceptions: Permissible delegations (PETAL)
1. Delegation to the people at large (initiative and referendum)
2. Delegation of emergency powers to the President [Art. VI, Sec. 23(2)]
3. Delegation of tariff powers to the President [Art. VI, Sec. 28(2)]
4. Delegation to administrative bodies (Power of Subordinate Legislation)
I. Completeness Test
II. Sufficient Standard Test
5. Delegation to local governments
PROCESS OF LEGISLATION
SECTION 26, ARTICLE VI, 1987 Constitution
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
First reading: involves reading of the number and the title of the measure and referring of it to
the proper committee by the Senate President or the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Second reading: the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon, and amended if
necessary. This is the most important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on the second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are
distributed at least three days before the third reading.
Third reading: members register their votes -either yea or nay and explain their vote if they
allowed by the rules.

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No further debate is allowed during the third reading.
The phrase “except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment”
qualifies not only the requirement that “printed copies of a bill in its final form must be
distributed to the members three days before its passage” but also the requirement that before
a bill can become a law, it must have passed “three readings on separate days”.
Appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives (Article
VI, Section 24, 1987 Constitution).
Enrolled Bill Theory
An enrolled bill is one duly introduced and finally passed by both Houses, authenticated by the
proper officers of each, and approved by the President. It is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
In case of discrepancy between the Journal Entry and the Enrolled Bill, the latter prevails, except
to matters, which under the Constitution, must be entered into the Journal.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Three-Term Limit Rule
Cause Effect Reason
Assumption of Office
by Operation of Law
(e.g. Succession)
Considered an
interruption
To count as a term, one must have been
elected and served.
Not a voluntary
renunciation of prior
office.
Law allows the severance to effectuate
succession.
Recall Election Service on the
remaining term not
Interrupted by defeat or non-
participation in the previous election.

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Cause Effect Reason
counted in the 3-term
bar.
Conversion of
Municipality to City
No interruption No break in service as local chief
executive.
Preventive
Suspension
Not considered an
interruption
Suspended officer continues to hold the
position, but only barred from dispensing
it’s functions.
Election Protest If unseated during the
same term;
interruption.
Not deemed elected for the said term.
If unseated after the
service of the full term;
not an interruption.
Managed to serve the term from start to
finish.
The period served by
the unseated officer is
considered an
interruption to the
service of the duly
proclaimed winner.
The proclaimed winner was deemed a
private citizen warming his heels while
awaiting the outcome of his protest
(Abundo v. Comelec, 2013).
CONDONATION DOCTRINE
Abandonment of the doctrine
The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to
the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the
idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a
prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even
another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there
is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an

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offense done during a prior term. Conchita Carpio Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay, Jr., G.R.
Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
While the doctrine of condonation has been abandoned, its application should only be
prospective.
In November 10, 2015, the Supreme Court, in Conchita Carpio Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay,
Jr., 774 SCRA 431 (2015), extensively discussed the doctrine of condonation and ruled that such
doctrine has no legal authority in this jurisdiction.
It should, however, be clarified that the Court’s abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines
Hence, the same doctrine is still applicable in cases that transpired prior to the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Carpio-Morales v. CA. Office of the Ombudsman v. Mayor Julius Cesar
Vergara, G.R. No. 216871, December 6, 2017
NATURAL RESOURCES
Alien Ownership of land in the Philippines
General Rule: Aliens are not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines.
Exemptions: Instances when aliens may be allowed to acquire private lands in the Philippines:
a. By hereditary succession (Section 7, Article XII);
b. A former natural-born Filipino citizen to acquire up to 5,000 square meters of urban land and
3 hectares or rural land, and he may now use the land not only for residential purposes, but
even for business or other purposes (RA 8179);
c. Americans who have acquired title to private lands during the effectivity of the Parity
Agreement (Section 11, Article XVII, 1973 Constitution); and
d. Ownership in condominium units (Sec. 5, RA 4726).
Note: A foreigner who married a Filipino is not entitled to a share of a parcel of land they acquired
during marriage even if the money used to purchase it came from him (Beumer v. Amores, 2012).

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Constitutional requirements for a valid service contract for the large-scale exploration and
development of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard
or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in
provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times
over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to
give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose
timely objections, if any. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon
Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015
Nowhere in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the
construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the
background sight line or view of the Rizal Monument.
There is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila “to consider the standards set under
Ordinance No. 8119” in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since
under the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park.
While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila
is being built is a privately-owned property that is “not part of the Rizal Park that has been
declared as a National Heritage Site in 1995,” and the Torre de Manila area is in fact “well-
beyond” the Rizal Park. Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a
“heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure.” Knights of
Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017
AMENDMENT AND REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION
Two-part test to determine whether the proposal is a revision or amendment
a. Quantitative test – whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to
change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution. The Court examines only the
number of provisions and not the degree of change; and

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b. Qualitative test – whether the change will accomplish such far-reaching changes in the
nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision (Lambino v. COMELEC,
2006).
If a proposal passed either of these two tests, such proposal is to be considered as a revision.
Otherwise, the proposal is only an amendment.
Proposals for amendments/revisions may be made by:
a. Constituent Assembly by a vote of 3/4 of all the members of Congress (Art. XVIII, Sec. 1,
Par. 1);
The Constitution does not mention whether the bicameral legislature will sit in joint
session or in separate sessions, or whether the legislature will vote jointly or separately;
hence, it is submitted that each House may separately formulate amendments by a vote
of ¾ of all its members, and then pass it on to the other house for a similar process.
Disagreements can be settled through a conference committee.
b. Constitutional Convention called either by:
i. 2/3 of all the members of the Congress; or
ii. by majority of all the members of the Congress with the question whether to call for a
Constitutional Convention to be resolved by the people in a plebiscite (Art. XVIII, Sec. 3,
Par. 1); or
c. People’s Initiative through a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein (Art. XVIII, Sec. 2).
Note: While the President does not possess constituent powers, he/she may submit
proposals to the Congress, in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent
powers, or submit recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on
in a plebiscite but for their independent consideration of whether these recommendations
merit being formally proposed through initiative (Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace
Panel, 2008).

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INTERNATIONAL LAW
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PRIMARY SOURCES
1. International Conventions
2. International Customs
3. General Principles of Law (Article 38 (1), Statute of the International Court of Justice)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1. Judicial decisions – such decision has no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case
2. Teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations (Id.)
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice
International Criminal Court International Court of Justice
1. Jurisdiction may be exercised over
persons (Article 1, Rome Statute).
Only states may be a party to the case.
2. Jurisdiction deals with:
• genocide;
• crimes against humanity;
• war crimes; and
• aggression (Article 5, Rome
Statute).
Jurisdiction deals with contentious cases between
states concerning: 1) the interpretation of a treaty, 2)
any question of international law, 3) existence of any
fact which, if established, constitutes a breach of an
international obligation, and 4) nature or extent of
reparation for a breach of international obligation
(Article 36, ICJ Statute)
RELATIONSHIP WITH DOMESTIC LAW
Principle of Complementarity
The principle of complementarity means that the International Criminal Court (ICC) is intended
to complement, not replace, national criminal systems. It prosecutes cases only when States do
not or are unwilling or unable to do so genuinely. Article 17, Rome Statute

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Extradition is the surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of
an offense outside of its own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which,
being competent to try and to punish him, demands the surrender.
The right of a state to successfully request the extradition of a criminal offender arises from a
treaty with the requested state. Absent the treaty, the duty to surrender a person who has sought
asylum within its boundaries does not inhere in the state, which, if it so wishes, can extend to
him a refuge and protection even from the state that he has fled. Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region v. Juan Antonio Muñoz, G.R. No. 207342, August 16, 2016

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