1. Stuck in the MID With You
Jason Bladen, University of Maryland Baltimore County
Previous research indicates that there are economic benefits to subsidizing housing. I will
demonstrate throughout this paper that the mortgage interest deduction (MID) was an unintended
consequence of how the US income tax law was originally written in Revenue Act of 1913. I
will also demonstrate that the MID is not the most efficient way to subsidize housing, if the goal
is to encourage greater levels of homeownership. In fact, contrary to most subsidies, the MID is
“upside-down” in the sense that it provides a greater benefit for those purchasing more expensive
homes and who are taxed at a higher marginal rate. As early as the period post-World War II,
people began to become aware of how inefficient the deduction was especially in the context of
30-year mortgages where very little equity was placed into the loan at its origination. Although
there are several ways to view efficiency, this paper will examine the cost of the MID with
respect to the stated goal of increasing homeownership. Nevertheless, once the MID was
codified into American culture, the politics surrounding the MID have continued to make it
difficult to transition from the MID to some more efficient form of subsidy. In fact, failing to
consider the political nature of the MID has been the single biggest shortcoming in attempts to
develop alternative policies.
Although there has been substantial research around the cost and benefits of the MID, as well as
research into alternative housing subsidies, I could only find one article that dealt with the MID’s
2. 2
political history. The fact that articles of this nature are not abundant emphasizes the extent to
which politics has been ignored in examining alternatives to the MID. Borrowing extensively
from the political history of the MID written by Ventry, Jr. (2010), I will discuss the politics of
the MID on a decade-by-decade basis. After discussing the political history, I will provide an
examination of some of the research on the MID and its effect on housing. However, before I
detail either of the items mentioned previously, I will also specify where and how I acquired the
data and information used in this analysis. I will also define what a subsidy is and whether it
differs from a tax expenditure used to promote a specific purpose. Additionally, I will attempt to
show that housing produces positive externalities not captured in the market price of housing and
thus is worthy of government intervention.
Next, I will look at the MID relative to four alternatives to subsidizing homeownership. The
status quo and alternative policies will be examined based on the following five criteria: (1)
effect on the level of tax expenditure; (2) effect on vertical equity; (3) likely effect on housing
tenure choices; and (4) political feasibility. After subjectively ranking these alternatives, I will
discuss whether any of these policies dominate based on those rankings and can overcome the
politics of the MID. Although there is currently a lot of focus by politicians and the media on
methods for reducing the federal deficit in the wake of the Great Recession, this paper finds little
reason to believe that the MID (the country’s third largest tax expenditure) will be modified in
the foreseeable future.
3. 3
Beginning of the MID
There is no record that indicates that lawmakers intended to subsidize housing when the Revenue
Act of 1913 was passed. Initially, the MID appeared to be more of a loophole than conscious
effort to encourage housing consumption. After the 16th
Amendment made the collection of
income tax in the United States constitutional in 1913 and the Revenue Act of 1913 was passed,
it allowed “all interest paid within the year by a taxable person on indebtedness” to be deducted.
1
For the most part, the homeownership rate was low and financing was not typically used for
home purchases when the law went into effect. The 30-year fixed-rate home mortgage was still
two decades away from being instituted and mortgages tended to be interest-only loans with
balloon payments at the end of the term.2
It is also true that most high-income households were
not using mortgages to finance real property. In fact, in 1910 only a third of homes were secured
by a mortgage. During World War I (WWI), the rates and exemptions were changed, which
increased the number of individuals and households paying income tax, but this still only
affected 15% of households.3
Some have noted that the MID’s beginning was probably more
attributable to the practical difficulty of distinguishing between interest paid toward personal
debt and interest paid in the operation of a business, such as family-owned farms. In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, this seems to be a fairly parsimonious explanation of why the MID
was allowed.
1
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
236.
2
Dennis
R.
Judd
&
Todd
Swanstrom.
(2012),
“City
Politics.”
Pg.
191
3
Ibid.
Pg.
240.
4. 4
The Revenue Act of 1913 was a product of America’s progressive era and adopted under the
rhetoric of making things fairer for the entire country. In actuality, the Federal income tax
allowed the Federal Government the ability to provide services for “states with lower per capita
incomes relative to those with higher per capita incomes.”4
Up until WWI, only those whose
incomes were significantly higher than the average American paid income taxes.5
In fact, when
the Revenue Act of 1913 first initiated income tax collection, only one percent was levied against
incomes that are the equivalent of $70,537 for singles and $94,050 for married couples in 2013
dollars.6
Although that level of income does not make an individual or household rich, we do
not associate those groups with poverty or needing as much in the way of government support. It
was not until a household earned upwards of $470,248 (in 2013 dollars) that a progressive surtax
between one and six percent was assessed.7
In the first year that taxes were collected after the
passing of the Revenue Act of 1913, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (the precursor to the
Internal Revenue Service) only collected taxes from about 358,000 people out of a population of
approximately 97.2 million people in the country at the time. 8 9
Of the eight deductions initially
specified by the Revenue Act, none of them explicitly mentioned the mortgage interest
deduction, but because one of them included interest on consumer debt one of the first income
tax loopholes was created.10
4
Randall
G.
Holcombe
&
Donald
J.
Lacombe,
(1998)
“Interest
Versus
Ideology
in
the
Ratification
of
the
16
th
and
17
th
Amendments.”
Pg.
152.
5
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
240.
6
Ibid.
Pg.
239.
These
values
were
originally
reported
as
$3,000
and
$4,000
for
single
and
married
filers
in
1913
dollars,
respectively.
7
Ibid.
Pg.
239
8
Ibid.
Pg.
240
9
The
US
population
in
1913
was
estimated
using
the
information
provided
by
the
US
Census
Bureau
as
can
be
found
here:
http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt
10
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
240.
5. 5
Historically, affluent individuals would attempt to live as far from city centers as the current
modes of transportation would allow. Coupled with a decrease in the cost of land, the value of
houses in suburbs is on average greater than to similar homes found within cities. The tax code
created an incentive for individuals who can afford more expensive properties to take out
mortgages and use their assets to make other investments capable of producing a greater return
on investment. This implies that the mortgages for affluent individuals will generate large
amounts of interest, especially early on, in the servicing of their loan. Thus, almost from its
inception, the MID has had the greatest benefit for many individuals who do not actually need
the deduction. This is especially true because there were sections of cities that banks would not
lend to up until the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 made the practice of redlining
illegal.11
However, the point remains, without mortgages being extended into large sections
within cities, there were many people who had no interest to deduct and that is assuming that
their incomes were high enough to make itemizing more attractive then using the standard
deduction.
Currently, the cost of the MID to the Federal Government is almost $70 billion and like most
other things is projected to increase over time.12
The MID is primarily defended on the grounds
that the credit provides an incentive for homeownership. As US tax law is presently worded, the
MID is also allowed on an additional residential property an individual or household might own.
People arguing for the expiration of the deduction point out that the deduction has no appreciable
11
Dennis
R.
Judd
&
Todd
Swanstrom,
(2012)
“City
Politics.”
Pg.
402
12
Joint
Commission
on
Taxation,
(2013),
“Estimates
of
Federal
Tax
Expenditures
for
Fiscal
Years
2012-‐2017.”
pg.
35
6. 6
effect on homeownership rates and is inefficient because it helps people who would have
purchased a home regardless of whether the deduction was available or not.13
Data and Methods
The method for collecting the articles used in this analysis was fairly straightforward. Using the
keywords “mortgage interest deduction” in the article search in the UMBC library’s website
returned many of the articles I opted to use. Upon finding relevant materials, I took note of the
articles that those authors referenced in their analyses to see what they added to the conversation.
I also searched keywords such as “housing externalities” and “housing subsidies.” When
appropriate, I incorporated material from Judd and Swanstrom’s (2012) textbook “City Politics”
as well as information from another textbook from Baumgartner et al. (2009) entitled “Lobbying
and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why.” Moreover, when the utilized text
provided figures such as income, standard deductions or other important monetary figures as of
the date when the piece was written, those figures were converted into 2013 dollars using the
calculator provided by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 14
This step was taken in order to preserve the magnitude of the monetary values those authors used
due to the effect of inflation. I performed another internet search using Google Scholar™ to find
information about the history of the mortgage interest deduction. The article I found written by
13
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
243;
Adam
J.
Cole,
Geoffrey
Gee
&
Nicholas
Turner,
(2011)
“The
Distributional
and
Revenue
Consequences
of
Reforming
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
982;
Edward
M.
Glaeser
&
Jesse
M.
Shapiro,
(2002),
“The
Benefits
of
the
Home
Mortgage
Deduction.”
Pg.
38;
Rebecca
N.
Morrow.
(2012),
“How
and
Why
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction
Failed.”
Pg.
765,
769.
14
Figures
were
converted
into
2013
dollars
using
the
calculator
provided
by
the
Bureau
of
Labor
Statistics
at
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
7. 7
Dennis Ventry, Jr. was the only one that was helpful with respect to the MID’s history. Rather
than incorporating Ventry (2010) into the rest of the literature review, I felt that his analysis is
essential to understanding the political history of the deduction. Finally, some of the research
literature I use examined specific policy alternatives, so that information will be referenced when
critiquing the merits of those proposals. Generally, those articles did not expand on the political
feasibility of their proposals, so this is one of the areas I intend to build upon when covering
alternatives to the MID later in this paper.
The History of the MID
The beginning of the MID was an accident. When it provided for the discount of interest paid
over the course of the calendar year, the Revenue Act of 1913 never explicitly mentioned
mortgage interest, but because that is a form of interest it did not have to.15
In the beginning of
American economic policy, the concept of trying to control externalities with taxes and subsidies
did not start to advance until 1920 when economist Arthur Pigou introduced that idea in dealing
with pollution.16
Economic strategies for dealing with externalities were later refined by
economists like Coase and Baumol who introduced additional methods aside from taxation and
subsidies to deal with externality problems.17 18
15
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
236
16
Gideon
Parchomovsky
&
Peter
Siegelman,
(2012),
“Cities,
Property
and
Positive
Externalities.”
Pg.
221
17
Ibid.
Pg.
221
18
William
J.
Baumol,
(1972),
“On
Taxation
and
the
Control
of
Externalities.”
8. 8
Considering that most people during the 1920’s financed their homes using interest-only or
almost interest-only loans for periods ranging between three and 10 years, it is somewhat
dubious to describe those people as homeowners.19
Yet for those able to take out mortgages,
they now potentially had a deduction they could claim provided they had enough taxable income.
Homeownership continued to rise to almost 48% until the Great Depression sent home values
spiraling downward and banks no longer had the ability extend mortgages. 20
It is probably safe
to say that even though the number of households that benefited from the mortgage interest
deduction was very small, as the number of homeowners increased, so did the number of people
who could take advantage of that deduction. However, as the country started to feel the effects
of the Great Depression, the MID was not a deduction a significant number of Americans could
really take advantage of until some time later.
Government Intervenes on Behalf of the Housing Market
In the 1930’s, the Federal government took several steps to get the decimated housing market
back on track and would later create a new group of Americans who cared about the MID. In a
shift from the mostly hands-off position of the Hoover Administration, the Roosevelt
Administration signed the Home Owners’ Loan Act in 1933, which established the Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the National Housing Act of 1934, which established
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and was later amended in 1938 to create the Federal
19
Dennis
R.
Judd
&
Todd
Swanstrom,
(2012),
“City
Politics.”
Pg.
243.
20
Ibid.
Pg.
243.
9. 9
National Mortgage Association (FannieMae). 21
Although the primary concern of these agencies
was stabilizing the banking and housing sectors of the economy, the actions those agencies took
revolutionized the process Americans used to purchase homes. For example, the HOLC changed
home loans from nonamortizing, three to ten year loans to fully amortizing, twenty to twenty-
five year loans.22
Extending the length of mortgages in this way generated significantly more
interest that could potentially be deducted by income tax-paying Americans. The FHA created
an even bigger change by establishing 30-year loans terms that were also fully amortizing and
required as little as five percent down.23
Not only did the increase in mortgage length increase
the amount of interest an individual or household would pay, but also the smaller down payment
requirement increased amount of principal being financed, which also increased the total interest
to be repaid. Although there were many who were unable to take advantage of these more
favorable terms, particularly African-Americans, this also created a much larger group of
individuals who could exploit the MID loophole.24
The effects of the Great Depression had not yet subsided. However, to the extent that the
nation’s economy was beginning to recover, World War II (WWII) shifted the production of
goods to the war effort.25
However, once WWII ended, the changes that came with the
Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944 allowed even more individuals and households the
21
Dennis
R.
Judd
&
Todd
Swanstrom,
(2012),
“City
Politics.”
Pg.
122
22
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
247.
23
Ibid.
Pg.
248.
24
Dennis
R.
Judd
&
Todd
Swanstrom,
(2012),
“City
Politics.”
Pg.
xxx
25
Ibid.
Pg.
xxx
10. 10
ability to become homeowners.26
Thanks to less-restrictive criteria for extending credit, loans
with small down payment requirements (or even zero-down payment Veterans’ Administration
loans) and loans with 20 and 30-year terms boosted homeownership to 55% by 1950, up 11.4%
from 1940.27
Changes to tax laws passed during this period changed the number of people filing
tax returns from 14.7 million to 50 million between 1940 and 1945 with marginal tax rates now
ranging between 23% and 94%.28
These rates remained in place for over 20 years while the
exemption fell to $5,868 for individuals and $11,736 for married households in 2013 dollars and
differed wildly from the structure of the income tax when it was first enacted. 29
The post-WWII
efforts to promote homeownership coupled with those income tax base-broadening efforts now
created a much larger class of individuals who cared about and were in a position to take
advantage of the MID.
More Homeowners and More MID Beneficiaries
The 1950’s ushered in a period where the rate of homeownership grew dramatically even relative
to the late 1940’s. The changes put forth by the FHA and VA enabled this expansion. Mortgage
debt increased 295% from $55 billion in 1950 to $162 billion by 1960.30
As a function of the
increased debt, the amount of interest being repaid also increased from $2.5 billion to $7.3
26
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
249.
27
Ibid.
Pg.
249
28
Ibid.
Pg.
250,
251.
29
Ibid.
Pg.
251;
These
amounts
were
actually
written
as
$600
and
$1200
for
single
and
married
filers
in
1949
dollars,
respectively.
30
Ibid.
Pg.
250.
11. 11
billion (a 292% increase) by 1960.31
During this same time period, the number of people who
itemized their deductions also experienced a sharp increase in growth. In 1950, less than 20% of
taxpayers itemized, but by 1960 that percentage almost doubled to incorporate 39.5% of filers.32
The MID had become a much more costly tax expenditure, but was not the policy driving the
increase in homeownership. In fact, in spite of the number of homeowners affected, Ventry
(2010) notes that the government still did not view the MID as actual housing policy. Neither a
1950 Housing and Home Finance Agency study nor a more comprehensive study conducted in
1956 even mentioned the MID.33
However, this does not mean that Congress was ignorant of the
cost. According to the Joint Committee on the Economic Report of 1955, the personal interest
deduction (of which the MID was a large part) grew faster than any other deduction post
WWII.34
Clearly, the 1950’s became a time where many affluent and upwardly mobile
Americans learned about the portion of the tax law that allowed for the MID.
A marginal rate greater than 90% would be onerous if people were actually paying that much,
but as Randolph Paul (prestigious tax lawyer and former Roosevelt advisor) noted, “the bark of
our individual income tax was much worse than its bite.”35
In fact, in the late 1950’s soon-to-be
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, Stanley Surrey, noted that the effective tax
rate was more like 48%.36
Nevertheless, regardless of what a household’s marginal rate was, it
meant that the government might be paying up to that rate to subsidize the cost of housing. It is
31
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
250.
32
Ibid.
Pg.
251.
33
Ibid.
Pg.
251.
34
Ibid.
Pg.
252.
Supra
note
156.
35
Ibid.
Pg.
253.
36
Ibid.
Pg.
253.
12. 12
certain that people paying those higher marginal rates did not need additional help in choosing
between renting and becoming homeowners. Additionally, it is hard to imagine a scenario where
households at the top marginal rate would need more of a financial subsidy than those at lower
income levels. Nevertheless, encouraging greater levels of homeownership has been the primary
justification for the MID.
During the 1950’s, more and more reformers, economists, legal academics began to line up
against what they believed to be a very inefficient subsidy.37
They began to believe that if
presented with the facts, taxpayers would prefer to ditch the preferential treatment and high rates
for a more inclusive tax code with lower rates.38
Thanks to Rep. Wilbur Mills (D-AR), Congress
became very familiar with the “tax cuts for tax reform” strategy.39
They argued that even if
promoting homeownership was a worthwhile policy goal, the MID really only benefited
individuals who had abundant wealth and not those in lower tax brackets that actually needed
help in the purchase of a home.40
Even at this point in time, the thought of using direct subsidies
(and probably of a specific amount) was preferred over the MID to stimulate homeownership.41
If Washington, or more specifically Congress, is “where good ideas go to die,” as stated by
former Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC) in January 2013, it surely did not disprove his axiom in this
37
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
253,
254.
38
Ibid.
Pg.
255.
39
Ibid.
Pg.
255.
40
Ibid.
Pg.
258
41
Ibid.
Pg.
258,
259.
13. 13
instance. 42
Not only did politicians circle the wagons around the MID, they also added a couple
of provisions in 1951 and then again in 1964, which had the effect of sheltering capital gains
from the sale of a primary residence.43
The Revenue Act of 1951 was one of the vehicles used to
finance the Korean War.44
However, decreasing fear of inflation and the declining popularity of
the law meant that more concessions had to be made to get the tax increase passed.45
The
Revenue Act of 1951 allowed homeowners to exclude capital gains from the sale of their
primary residence as long as they used those gains to buy a new home in order to encourage
them to “trade up.”46
The Revenue Act of 1964 was passed for completely different reasons.
Through a series of tax cutting measures, the intent was to “stimulate the economy” and would
“raise (rather than lower) revenues…to eliminate deficits in the administrative budgets and then
reduce the public debt.”47
The Revenue Act of 1964 allowed homeowners a one-time exclusion
of capital gains on their primary residences if they were 55 or older.48
Clearly, as housing prices
rise so does the amount of capital gains realized when that property is sold and these policies
also favored the more affluent.
The 1960’s brought various changes to America, and fiscal policy would not be exempt. In 1961
Stanley Surrey shifted from his role as Harvard professor and began his eight-year tenure as
42
Jane
C.
Timm,
(2013),
“Sen.
DeMint:
Congress
is
a
mess,
so
we’re
going
straight
to
the
people.”
http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/01/17/sen-‐demint-‐congress-‐is-‐a-‐mess-‐so-‐were-‐going-‐straight-‐to-‐the-‐people/
43
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
259.
44
Rosella
Capella,
(2013),
“Pay-‐As-‐You-‐Go
–
The
Financing
of
the
United
States’
War
Effort
in
Korea.”
Pg.
19
45
Ibid.
Pg.
39-‐40.
46
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
259.
47
Charles
L.
B.
Lowndes,
(1964),
“The
Revenue
Act
of
1964:
A
Critical
Analysis.”
Pg.
668,
669.
48
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
259.
14. 14
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy when President Kennedy appointed him.49
Surrey began an inquisition into the taxation (or lack thereof) of imputed rent which is a missing
part of the rationale for the MID. 50
If a person owns a rental property, he or she allowed to
deduct mortgage interest and other property-related expenses, but has to claim the income he or
she receives from renting that property. However, for a private residence an individual or
household does not claim imputed income, but is still allowed to claim the MID. Surrey’s
suggestion was that imputed rent should be taxed the way it is in other countries.51
From a
theoretical standpoint, his approach was built on a strong and logical foundation. Conversely,
from a political standpoint attempting to tax imputed rent took little account of the incentives
individuals and households (especially the very affluent ones) had to protect the status quo. In
1963, the Treasury Department suggested capping itemized deductions to 5% of adjusted gross
income because of the revenue the government lost as a result of the increased number of people
who itemized. What the Treasury Department did not account for is the very vocal coalition that
would form between those other organizations who benefited from tax expenditures, such as
universities, charities, state and local governments as well as those special interests within the
housing sector.52
Working class and middle class voters also supported the MID, but probably
did not think about or care that more affluent received a greater benefit from it. Generally, the
politics of the MID and housing made it very easy to attach additional incentives that benefited
the affluent, but virtually impossible to make it more progressive.
49
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
253.
50
Litzenberger
&
Sosin
(1978)
use
another
author’s
description
of
“imputed
rent,”
which
describes
it
as
follows:
“a
homeowner
is
playing
two
separate
roles;
he
is
a
tenant
who
pays
‘imputed
rent’
to
the
landlord
and
he
is
a
real
estate
investor
who
receives
‘imputed’
rental
income
from
his
‘tenant.’
Since
the
same
person
plays
both
roles,
no
cash
changes
hand.”
Pg.
950.
51
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
260.
52
Ibid.
Pg.
260.
15. 15
As a counter strategy, Surrey pivoted from trying to decrease itemized deductions to attempting
to increase the standard deduction, which had been losing economic power because it was not
indexed for inflation.53
This strategy was pursued in the hope that as less people benefited from
itemized deductions like the MID, the MID would become more politically vulnerable in the
long term.54
The Treasury Department also attempted to take the “out of sight, out of mind”
dimension away from the MID by advocating for Congress to specifically budget for tax
expenditures.55
The thought was that this move would force Congress to examine the costs and
benefits of these tax expenditures.56
In the case of the MID, the research suggests it was the
Surrey’s hope that policymakers and the general public would question what the MID was
accomplishing for America given the growing cost.57
This was one of the rare attempts to
address the politics of the MID.
“In 1968, the first tax expenditure budget appeared in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the
Treasury.”58
Avoiding the temptation to become too theoretical in nature, the report stated that
the MID accounted for approximately 4.5% of the $44.5 billion dollars of tax expenditures in
that year. Even if Congress felt that a housing subsidy was justified on either an economic or
social basis, the Treasury Department now felt that it had the context to examine the cost-
effectiveness of the MID. The Treasury noted that the government was engaged in providing an
53
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
265.
54
Ibid.
Pg.
267.
55
Ibid.
Pg.
262.
56
Ibid.
Pg.
263,264.
57
Ibid.
Pg.
262.
58
Ibid.
Pg.
263.
16. 16
upside-down subsidy through the MID. The Treasury Department found that people in a
household making $63,426 (in 2013 dollars) would only get $19 dollars of assistance for every
$100 dollars spent on interest, whereas a household that made $1.27 million (in 2013 dollars)
would get $70 dollars for every $100 they spent on interest.59
Nevertheless, if the goal was to
encourage homeownership, those subsidies should be in reverse. Additionally, even if middle-
income households value their subsidies more than affluent households, such a policy does not
make our tax policy more progressive.
Those advocating for a more progressive tax policy accomplished a partial victory with the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 in the beginning of the Nixon administration. Even though it did not
succeed in creating a basket of deductions where taxpayers were no longer able to claim
deductions on excluded income, such as the MID, it reduced the depreciation rate on residential
property and changed the allowable depreciation method on low to moderate-income rental
property.60
Before the Act took effect in 1971, there were 35.4 million returns that itemized
deductions and by 1972 that number had fallen to 27 million.61
This decrease implies that within
the span of three years since the Act passed, there were eight million households who would
possibly be indifferent to the MID. Given more political space to attack the MID directly, a
1977 study noted that eliminating homeowners’ tax preferences could raise an additional $53
billion (62% of the FY 2013 sequester) in 2013 dollars. 62 63
Even though then-candidate Jimmy
59
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
264.
The
original
figures
compared
a
household
making
$10,000
to
a
household
making
$200,000
in
1969
dollars.
60
Ibid
Pg.
267
61
Ibid
Pg.
267
62
Dylan
Matthews,
(2013),
“The
Sequester:
Absolutely
everything
you
could
possibly
need
to
know,
in
one
FAQ.”
17. 17
Carter campaigned on changing the MID to make it a fairer policy before the 1976 presidential
election, he was labeled as attacking lower class and middle class homeowners.64
When asked
about his position on the MID by a reporter at Business Week, he replied:
“No, I have said this is one of the tax incentives I would consider changing. But I believe
we do need some incentives for private home ownership. If I made any changes, I would
maintain the stimulation for housing, but shift the tax credits towards lower- and middle-
income families.”65
Shortly after President Carter was elected, Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA) also proposed making
sweeping reforms that included changing the MID and other deductions into credits.66
Nevertheless, President Carter opted not spend political capital on that battle and the effort
remained dormant over the course of his presidency. This decision was reaffirmed when a 1978
CBS poll determined that 90% of the country wanted to preserve the MID even if only 25% of
returns itemized deductions.67
It appeared that Surrey and the Treasury Department’s hope that
Americans would reject the MID if less people benefited from it had failed.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/20/the-‐sequester-‐absolutely-‐everything-‐you-‐
could-‐possibly-‐need-‐to-‐know-‐in-‐one-‐faq/
63
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
268.
64
Ibid.
Pg.
269.
65
Robert
H.
Litzenberger
&
Howard
B.
Sosin,
(1978),
“Taxation
and
the
Incidence
of
Homeownership
Across
Income
Groups.”
Pg.
947.
66
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
269.
67
Ibid.
Pg.
269,270.
18. 18
The First Direct Modification of the MID?
Concerns about inflation, unemployment and the confinement of Americans in Iran led to
President Reagan’s victory in 1980 and signaled a shift in the public’s attitude towards
government spending. 68
According to a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report in 1983,
dealing with the economic downturn and spiraling budget deficit meant tough choices between
increased taxes and spending cuts over the next few years.69
The housing lobby saw this report
as a threat to the MID and stated that removing it would have a “devastating impact . . . on the
home building and real estate industries, let alone the status of the average American
homeowner.”70
Without leadership from President Reagan or Congress during his first term and
in the face of its popularity, the MID remained untouched.71
However, potentially emboldened by winning a second term in 1984, President Reagan had the
political breathing room to address the MID.72
His State of the Union address signaled that
reforming the tax code to promote “fairness, simplicity and incentives for growth” while
avoiding tax increases was a component of his second term agenda. Twenty years after Surrey’s
efforts, (and ironically in the same year that Secretary Surrey passed away) the tax cuts for tax
reform movement finally found a listener even if the reforms differed from what was initially
68
The
White
House,
(2013),
“Ronald
Reagan.”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/ronaldreagan
69
New
York
Times,
(1983),
“Excerpts
from
Congressional
Budget
Office
Report
on
Reducing
the
Deficit.”
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/02/11/us/excerpts-‐from-‐congressional-‐budget-‐office-‐report-‐on-‐reducing-‐the-‐
deficit.html?pagewanted=1
70
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
271.
71
Ibid.
Pg.
271.
72
Ibid.
Pg.
271.
19. 19
envisioned. 73
In spite of the president’s intentions, President Reagan was quickly forced to take
changes to the MID off the table by real estate representatives and other concerned lobbyists.74
A move which according to Eugene Steuerle, who served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Analysis in the late 80’s, “immediately made impossible consideration of a
number of promising options.” 75 76
It is not clear from President Reagan’s example if
presidential commitment is a necessary condition for MID modification, but it definitely is not a
sufficient condition.
Ultimately, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 did not act on the Treasury Department’s suggestion to
limit the MID to primary residences.77
However, it did accomplish the goal of lowering the
marginal tax rates and broadening the tax base.78
At the same time, it also strengthened the MID
by including Internal Revenue Code § 163(h)(3), which allowed deducting the interest on a loan
to purchase or improve a primary or secondary place of residence as long as that loan was
secured by the respective property.79
It was not all roses for the housing industry though because
the standard deduction was increased and the deduction of other forms of consumer debt was
repealed, effectively making the MID useless to households with incomes less than $90,263 in
2013 dollars.80
Nevertheless, if the late-1970’s CBS poll could be instructive, reducing the
73
New
York
Times,
(1984),
“Stanley
S.
Surrey,
74;Taxation
Law
Expert.”
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/08/28/obituaries/stanley-‐s-‐surrey-‐74-‐taxation-‐law-‐expert.html
74
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
271.
75
Urban
Institute,
(2013),
“Eugene
Steuerle.”
http://www.urban.org/about/EugeneSteuerle.cfm
76
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
272.
77
Ibid.
Pg.
274.
78
Ibid.
Pg.
274.
79
Ibid.
Pg.
274.
80
Ibid.
Pg.
275.
The
original
amount
was
$42,500
given
in
1986
dollars.
20. 20
number of people who could take advantage of the MID was unlikely to have a significant effect
on public opinion.
Presidents 41 through 43 and the MID
There were no changes to the MID attempted during the four years of President George H.W.
Bush’s term between 1988 and 1992. Additionally, in the 16 years that followed with President
Clinton and President George W. Bush, the MID continued its basically “untouchable” status. 81
As far as housing was concerned, Presidents 42 and 43 were primarily focused on removing the
barriers to homeownership for Americans.82
During President Bush’s second term, he commissioned a “blue-ribbon” advisory panel that
created a report entitled, “Simple, Fair and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax
System.”83
This report suggested that the MID be converted to a credit because the current
incarnation of the MID encouraged “overinvestment in housing at the expense of other
productive uses.”84
Once again, in spite of well-intentioned and theoretically sound
recommendations by the panel, the politics of acting on those recommendations was unappealing
even for a second-term president and as a result the recommendations from the report were
81
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
277.
82
Ibid.
Pg.
276.
83
David
C.
Ling
&
Gary
A.
McGill,
(2007),
“The
Variation
of
Homeowner
Tax
Preferences
by
Income,
Age
and
Leverage.”
Pg.
506
84
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
277.
21. 21
abandoned. Each and every time the MID came up over the last century, the best politicians
could do was tinker with who benefited from the MID. However, each of these modifications
only served to make the MID even more “upside-down” than it was before. Heretofore, the
politics of reforming the MID have been an insurmountable force to every politician, bureaucrat
or academic who has dared to challenge it.
Previous Research
Before I examine previous research, I believe a definition of the word “subsidy” is needed.
According to Merriam-Webster’s Concise Encyclopedia, the term subsidy is defined as:
“Financial assistance, either through direct payments or through indirect means such as
price cuts and favourable contracts, to a person or group in order to promote a public
objective. Subsidies to transportation, housing, agriculture, mining, and other industries
have been instituted on the grounds that their preservation or expansion is in the public
interest. Subsidies to the arts, sciences, humanities, and religion also exist in many
nations where the private economy is unable to support them. Examples of direct
subsidies include payments in cash or in kind, while more-indirect subsidies include
governmental provision of goods or services at prices below the normal market price,
governmental purchase of goods or services at prices above the market price, and tax
concessions. Although subsidies exist to promote the public welfare, they result in either
higher taxes or higher prices for consumer goods. Some subsidies, such as protective
tariffs, may also encourage the preservation of inefficient producers. A subsidy is
desirable only if its effects increase total benefits more than total costs.”85
Because a tax expenditure and a “tax concession” can be viewed as being synonymous, the MID
will be referred to as a subsidy for the rest of this paper.
85
Merriam
Webster,
(2013),
“Subsidy.”
http://www.merriam-‐webster.com/dictionary/subsidy
22. 22
The literature considered in this review examined positive and negative aspects of the MID and
its effect on housing tenure choices as well as considering alternative policies. Literature
favoring alternatives to the MID was more abundant than literature defending it. This literature
review also explores the basic question of whether the government should intervene in the
housing market at all.
About halfway into the presidency of President Jimmy Carter, Litzenberger and Sosin (1978)
looked into the then-current structure of the MID and compared it to several alternatives such as
taxing imputed rent, eliminating the deduction, capping the MID, and providing a tax credit
rather than a deduction. 86 87
Their article was one of the first academic investigations into the
usefulness of the MID and probably the closest to being neutral to that question of what to do
about it.
According to their findings, taxing imputed rent would cause more middle-income households to
find it “advantageous to rent.” They also found that removing the MID would make renting
more expensive in terms of the proportion of income spent on housing. If a cap were placed on
the interest of all consumer loans (which was only relevant before TRA86), high-income
households would shift to self-financing and everyone else would be unaffected. Finally, they
found that if the MID was converted into a credit it would become more of an incentive for lower
income individuals to become homeowners while decreasing the subsidy for upper income
86
See
footnote
50
for
an
explanation
of
“imputed
rent.”
87
Robert
H.
Litzenberger
and
Howard
B.
Sosin,
(1978),
“Taxation
and
the
Incidence
of
Homeownership
Across
Income
Groups.”
Pg.
948.
23. 23
households in particular. 88
Changing the MID to a tax credit rather than a deduction would also
make the income tax code more progressive because a fixed amount of money would be worth
less to a household as household income increases.
Examining imputed rent is one of the alternatives Litzenberger and Sosin discuss because it
acknowledges that homeowners are distinct from rental property owners. The benefit
homeowners derive from their homes is not taxed like the income a rental property owner
collects from his or her tenants. Ling and McGill (2007), Poterba and Sinai (2008), Ventry
(2009), Landis and McClure (2010), Saarimaa (2010), Poterba and Sinai (2011), and Cole, Gee
and Turner (2011) also acknowledged this benefit in their research.89
Many of the aforementioned authors, as well as a few others, express varying amounts of
skepticism about the MID. Anderson, Clemens & Hanson (2007) state, “it may not be
particularly effective in altering the choice between renting and owning.”90
Pierce (1989)
suggests that removing it would “increase tax revenues and increase both horizontal and vertical
88
Ibid.
Pg.
948.
89
David
C.
Ling
and
Gary
A.
McGill,
(2007),
“The
Variation
of
Homeowner
Tax
Preferences
by
Income,
Age
and
Leverage.”
Pg.
505;
James
Poterba
and
Todd
Sinai,
(2008),
“Tax
Expenditures
for
Owner-‐Occupied
Housing:
Deductions
for
Property
Taxes
and
Mortgage
Interest
and
the
Exclusion
of
Imputed
Rental
Income.”
Pg.
86;
David
J.
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
236,
254;
John
D.
Landis
and
Krik
McClure,
(2010),
“Rethinking
Federal
Housing
Policy.”
Pg.
325;
Tuukka
Saarimaa,
(2010),
“Tax
Incentives
and
Demand
for
Mortgage
Debt:
Evidence
from
the
Finnish
1993
Tax
Reform.”
Pg.
36;
James
Poterba
and
Todd
Sinai,
(2011),
“Revenue
Costs
and
Incentive
Effects
of
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction
for
Owner-‐Occupied
Housing.”
Pg.
540;
Adam
J.
Cole,
Geoffrey
Gee,
and
Nicholas
Turner,
(2011),
“The
Distributional
and
Revenue
Consequences
of
Reforming
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
978.
90
John
E.
Anderson,
Jeffrey
Clemens
and
Andrew
Hanson,
(2007)
“Capping
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
769.
24. 24
equity.”91
Landis and McClure (2010) state, “the primary effect of the mortgage interest
deduction and capital gains exclusion has been to inflate housing prices, making homeownership
more difficult for less well-off households.”92
Morrow (2012) goes further and says that the
MID “fails to increase homeownership, increases housing prices and increases borrowing against
equity.”93
Also, because the MID “was instituted at the same time as the federal income tax, we
have no direct evidence of how much, if at all, it initially increased rates of homeownership.”94
However, academics are hardly unified in their opposition to the MID. Ling and McGill (2007)
argue, “homeowner tax preferences…are not skewed to higher-income households, as is widely
believed.”95
Woodward and Weicher (1989) make the argument that “it is inaccurate to
characterize the mortgage interest deduction as a subsidy to homeownership” because “the
treatment of interest as both taxable and deductible equalizes the cost of debt and the cost of
equity in a home, and by implication, equalizes the cost of owning for those who can pay cash
and those who must borrow.”96
Woodward and Weicher (1989) go further to state that the
additional tax preferences rental property owners receive, such as accelerated depreciation, make
the cost of renting less expensive for renters.97
They argue that if individuals were assessed a
charge for imputed rent, that charge would only be fair if it were levied against everyone
91
Bethane
Jo
Pierce,
(1989),
“Homeowner
Preferences:
The
Equity
and
Revenue
Effects
of
Proposed
Changes
in
the
Status
Quo.”
Pg.
65.
92
John
D.
Landis
and
Krik
McClure,
(2010),
“Rethinking
Federal
Housing
Policy.”
Pg.
326.
93
Rebecca
N.
Morrow,
(2012),
“Billions
Spent
Inflating
the
Housing
Bubble:
How
and
Why
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction
Failed.”
Pg.
755
94
Ibid.
Pg.
761.
95
David
C.
Ling
and
Gary
A.
McGill,
(2007),
“The
Variation
of
Homeowner
Tax
Preferences
by
Income,
Age
and
Leverage.”
Pg.
508.
96
Susan
E.
Woodward
&
John
C.
Weicher,
(1989),
“Goring
the
Wrong
Ox:
A
Defense
of
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
301,
302.
97
Ibid.
Pg.
305,
306.
25. 25
regardless of whether they are financing a home or had the assets to purchase a home outright.98
Unlike the previous authors mentioned before, Woodward and Weicher believe that the MID
“ultimately improves the efficiency of taxes on the more affluent, and thus potentially benefits
the poor also.”99
To make this claim, more information would have to be known about the
relative elasticities of rental property demand and supply. It could also be very possible that the
benefits from any efficiency improvements go directly to rental property owners. Additionally,
this viewpoint is not consistent with the rationale most commonly provided in defense of the
MID. It also has nothing to do with the goal of promoting homeownership.
Another article written shortly after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) by Pierce (1989) takes
a slightly more nuanced position. She notes that even though the removal or limiting of the MID
would create greater horizontal equity between renters and homeowners, it would create a new
distortion between those homeowners using a mortgage and those who do not.100
Woodward and
Weicher (1989) shared the latter half of that concern.101
I believe it should be noted that there is
only a tiny percentage of Americans who are in a position to buy a home without financing. This
disparity may also serve to motivate affluent households to become affluent enough to be in that
position. Regardless of whether that distortion is real, no deduction that declines in value over
time (as illustrated in Table 1) is going to bridge that gulf. Ultimately, Pierce (1989) finds that
98
Susan
E.
Woodward
&
John
C.
Weicher,
(1989),
“Goring
the
Wrong
Ox:
A
Defense
of
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
308.
The
authors
appear
to
be
referencing
fairness
in
the
sense
of
“horizontal
equity”,
which
compares
how
people
within
a
particular
income
group
are
treated
relative
to
each
other.
This
is
in
contrast
to
“vertical
equity,”
which
compares
how
individuals
across
varying
income
groups
are
treated
relative
to
each
other.
The
concept
of
vertical
equity
will
be
used
in
comparing
alternatives
to
the
MID
later
in
this
paper.
99
Ibid.
Pg.
311
100
Bethane
Jo
Pierce,
(1989),
“Homeowner
Preferences:
The
Equity
and
Revenue
Effects
of
Proposed
Changes
in
the
Status
Quo.”
Pg.
57.
101
See
footnote
97.
26. 26
among the various policy options she considers, the ones that reduce or eliminate the MID (and
also the deduction for property tax, which is not being considered here) have the ability to raise
revenue and improve horizontal and vertical equity.102
Aside from an individual or household’s level of affluence, the amount of benefit derived from
the MID is also dependent on the recipient’s age. When repaying a standard 30-year mortgage, it
takes years before the principle being repaid is greater than the interest. Unless a household is
very affluent and has many other types of deductions, or was compelled to purchase a larger
house due to changes in the size of their household, the standard deduction will eventually
become more appealing than itemizing. Poterba and Sinai (2008) note that “many older
homeowners do not even have a mortgage,” and this makes intuitive sense because older
homeowners would generally become more risk adverse and more conscious of their own
mortality. 103
Taking on significant new debt under such uncertainty would be less than ideal.
This implies the MID really only benefits those who are affluent enough to buy homes and
upgrade those properties at a relatively young age. If our society believes encouraging more
Americans to become homeowners is a worthwhile goal, this characteristic of the MID does
nothing to increase that outcome. Nevertheless, a broader question remains about whether the
government should even be involved in trying to encourage homeownership. The second part of
the review focuses on this question.
102
Bethane
Jo
Pierce,
(1989),
“Homeowner
Preferences:
The
Equity
and
Revenue
Effects
of
Proposed
Changes
in
the
Status
Quo.”
Pg.
65.
103
James
Poterba
&
Todd
Sinai,
(2008),
“Tax
Expenditures
for
Owner-‐Occupied
Housing:
Deductions
for
Property
Taxes
and
Mortgage
Interest
and
the
Exclusion
of
Imputed
Rental
Income.”
Pg.
89.
27. 27
The Rationale for Government Intervention in the Housing Market
From the available congressional records before the creation of the Revenue Act of 1913, it is
not apparent that much economic theory was used in the initial drafting of income tax policy or
its permitted deductions. Ventry (2010) only found a single reference to mortgage interest in the
Senate debate leading up to the passage of the Revenue Act.104
Frederick (2013) points out that:
“The Revenue Act of 1913 simply ‘was not clear on many points’ and it lacked the
abounding detail and precision of modern tax laws. This imprecision may have been a
natural consequence of the fact that the government had ‘not yet developed adequate
assessment machinery’ necessary to review, assess, and audit millions of complex tax
returns, and was therefore only prepared to process a very simple income tax.”105
Early research into externalities, the benefits or harm experienced by parties external to a
transaction, focused on negative externalities.106
The first to do so was Arthur Pigou in the early
part of the 20th
century.107
In order to address pollution, he recommended taxing polluters to
make their private marginal costs more in line the cost polluters impose on society.108
Later on,
Ronald Coase looked at the problem of negative externalities and determined that if were little to
no transaction costs, a better alternative to taxation would be for the parties to negotiate a
104
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
241.
Supra
note
55.
105
David
Frederick,
(2013),
“Reconciling
Intentions
with
Outcomes:
A
Critical
Examination
of
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
48.
106
Gideon
Parchomovsky
and
Peter
Siegelman,
(2012)
“Cities,
Properties,
and
Positive
Externalities.”
Pg.
220.
107
Ibid.
Pg.
221.
108
Ibid.
Pg.
221.
28. 28
solution.109
The best part of handling externalities in this manner was that it did not matter
whether someone had the right to harm or the right to be free from harm.110
However, if the
transaction costs of coming to an agreement were not nontrivial, Coase’s Theorem would not
hold.111
Harold Demsetz, with a focus on property, then determined that “resources held in
common would be over-exploited,” but this problem can resolved if the property belongs to a
single private owner.112
Parchomovsky and Siegelman (2012) argue that Demsetz solution does
not address “interasset externalities, namely those that are imposed on other asset owners by
one's use of one's own asset.” Without discussing whether homeownership imposes positive
externalities, negative externalities, or both, interasset externalities best describes what occurs
with housing.
Interasset externalities make housing more complicated than a purely private good, but are these
externalities reason for the government to get involved? Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) examine the
possible externalities and separate them into two categories: those derived from living around
homeowners and those derived from homeownership.113
The reason there is even a distinction
between renters and homeowners is because of principal-agent problem with renters. 114
Renters
have been observed to be poor caretakers in the multi-family units they occupy because of free-
rider problems and as a result the multi-family units they occupy depreciate much faster than the
types of properties occupied by homeowners.115
Renters actually have disincentives to improve
109
Gideon
Parchomovsky
and
Peter
Siegelman,
(2012)
“Cities,
Properties,
and
Positive
Externalities.”
Pg.
221.
110
Ibid.
Pg.
221,
222.
111
Robert
H.
Frank,
(2010),
“Microeconomics
and
Behavior.”
Pg.
540.
112
Gideon
Parchomovsky
and
Peter
Siegelman,
(2012)
“Cities,
Properties,
and
Positive
Externalities.”
Pg.
222.
113
Edward
M.
Glaeser
&
Jesse
M.
Shapiro,
(2002),
“The
Benefits
of
the
Home
Mortgage
Deduction.”
Pg
37.
114
For
a
detailed
explanation
of
the
“principle-‐agent”
problem,
see
Susan
P.
Shapiro,
(2005),
“Agency
Theory.”
115
Edward
M.
Glaeser
&
Jesse
M.
Shapiro,
(2002),
“The
Benefits
of
the
Home
Mortgage
Deduction.”
Pg
45,
46.
29. 29
their respective communities because their rent is not fixed and those improvements would allow
the owners charge higher rents.116
Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) also noted that there are positive and negative externalities of
homeownership worth considering. For example, homeownership is also “strongly correlated
with political activism and social connection.”117
Homeowners are more likely to engage with
local groups that try to improve local conditions such as non-profits, neighborhood watches or
parent-teacher associations. Homeowners are also much more likely to vote locally and on
issues with long-term neighborhood impact, such as the improvement of roads and other
infrastructure that would make renting in those same neighborhoods more expensive, vis-à-vis
voting for policies that have more of a redistributional bent like income transfers.118
Glaeser and
Shapiro (2002) also suggest that if government cares about the well-being of children, housing
can be viewed as a positive externality because “children of homeowners are 25% less likely to
drop out of school than children of comparable renters.”119
However, on the negative side, once
individuals become homeowners, they have very rational incentives to prevent increases in
housing supply. Additionally, policies that encourage housing consumption can simultaneously
make life in cities more expensive by reducing the number of citizens available to pay for the
services they provide.120
As Judd and Swanstrom (2012) note, “Cities cannot simply opt out of
116
Edward
M.
Glaeser
&
Jesse
M.
Shapiro,
(2002),
“The
Benefits
of
the
Home
Mortgage
Deduction.”
Pg.
60.
117
Ibid.
Pg.
38.
118
Ibid.
Pg.
67,
68.
119
Ibid.
Pg
71.
120
Ibid.
Pg.
57,
58.
30. 30
their responsibilities. Thus, when cities face budgetary shortfalls [partially created by suburban
flight], they walk a tightrope; there is only so much they can cut.”121
One assumption that Litzenberger and Sosin (1978) make in considering the MID is that if the
shelter provided from rental housing and from purchasing a home are perfect substitutes, then
anyone who is able to meet the down payment requirement (for some requirement greater than or
equal to zero) would opt to buy rather than rent.122
Without the presence of some kind of
subsidy, whether it is the MID or something else, less middle-income people would be able to
afford the homes they buy, while those amongst the very rich would be largely unaffected.123
Even among the authors who are for eliminating the MID, they still advocate for some subsidy
that more efficiently promotes homeownership for lower and middle-income segments of the
population. Positive externalities are often great candidates for government subsidies, but the
MID is not a very cost-effective means for subsidizing those positive externalities created from
new home purchases.
A Consideration of the Status Quo and Alternatives to the MID
The articles considered in the literature review typically ignored the role politics played in the
historically unsuccessful attempts to modify the MID. When those authors suggested
121
Dennis
R.
Judd
&
Todd
Swanstrom,
(2012),
“City
Politics.”
Pg.
344
122
Robert
H.
Litzenberger
&
Howard
B.
Sosin,
(1978),
“Taxation
and
the
Incidence
of
Homeownership
Across
Income
Groups.”
pg.
949,
954.
123
Ibid.
pg.
957.
31. 31
alternatives, they also typically ignored their political viability. An exception to this is Morrow’s
(2012) observation that “politicians wishing to change the level of incentive for homeownership
would have to upset the expectations of taxpayers who already own their homes.”124
Another
reason the MID has been so resistant to change is that the parties in favor of the status quo are
very well organized. Organizations like charities, state and local governments, universities and
others who benefit from federal income tax expenditures have often formed coalitions to protect
those deductions.125
Even though relatively small proportion of taxpayers actually benefit from
the MID, many support it out of the hope that they would be able to benefit from it someday.126
Despite the current focus on austerity brought on by the Great Recession, any policy that does
not account for the coalitions seeking to preserve the status quo will fail. In examining
alternatives to the MID, this paper will use the following criteria: (1) the effect on the level of tax
expenditure; (2) the effect on vertical equity; (3) the likely effect on housing tenure choices; (4)
and political feasibility. Table 1 provides a summary of how the status quo and the alternatives
rank according to these criteria.
124
Rebecca
N.
Morrow,
(2012),
“How
and
Why
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction
Failed.”
Pg.
781.
125
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
260.
126
Rebecca
N.
Morrow,
(2012),
“How
and
Why
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction
Failed.”
Pg.
759.
32. 32
Table 1
Alternative
Cost
Vertical
Equity
Housing
Tenure
Political
Feasibility
Status
Quo
$69.7
Poor
None
High
Full
Repeal
$13.9127
Good
None
None
Regional
Cap
$62.7128
Fair
None
Low
Homeowners
credit
-‐$14.9129
Excellent
High
Low
Dollar amounts are given in billions of 2013 dollars.
Starting With the Status Quo
According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the estimated cost of the MID is $69.7 billion
and is expected to rise annually until it reaches $83.4 billion by 2017.130
This subsidy is
currently third most expensive subsidy behind the subsidy for the “exclusion of employer
contributions for health care, health insurance premiums, and long-term care insurance
premiums” followed by “reduced rates of tax on dividends and long-term capital gains.”131
Approximately, 34 million tax returns currently claim the MID and 76% of the benefit went to
households with incomes greater than $100,000. 132 133
However, the $100,000 threshold is not
127
Adam
J.
Cole,
Geoffrey
Gee,
and
Nicholas
Turner,
(2011),
“
The
Distributional
and
Revenue
Consequences
of
Reforming
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
991.
According
to
their
results,
portfolio
reallocation
would
offset
revenue
from
repealing
the
MID
by
20%,
which
makes
the
cost
of
repeal
greater
than
simply
subtracting
the
cost
of
the
status
quo.
128
John
E.
Anderson,
Jeffrey
Clemens
and
Andrew
Hanson,
(2007),
“Capping
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
777.
129
David
C.
Ling
and
Gary
A.
McGill,
(2007),
“The
Variation
of
Homeowner
Tax
Preference
by
Income,
Age
and
Leverage.”
Pg.
536.
130
Joint
Commission
on
Taxation,
(2013),
“Estimates
of
Federal
Tax
Expenditures
for
Fiscal
Years
2012-‐2017.”
Pg.
33.
131
Joint
Commission
on
Taxation,
(2013),
“Estimates
of
Federal
Tax
Expenditures
for
Fiscal
Years
2012-‐2017.”
Pg.
38.
132
Brena
Swanson,
(2013),
“Debate
over
mortgage
interest
deduction
shows
a
great
divide.”
http://www.housingwire.com/news/2013/04/25/debate-‐over-‐mortgage-‐interest-‐deduction-‐shows-‐great-‐divide
33. 33
adjusted by location, so this statistic can be somewhat misleading. Currently, the average
interest rate is 3.57% with 0.8 points, which is almost as low as it has ever been since 1971.134
As the economy continues to rebound, albeit very slowly, it is unlikely that interest rates will
remain this low much longer. For some perspective, it is enlightening to recall that back in 1982
the average interest rate was 16.04% with 2.2 points.135
Although those 1982 rates were
indicative of another problem with the economy, it is easy to imagine a time where interest rates
are double or even triple the current average rate. Depending on the rate of inflation, this could
make the deduction even more expensive in the future than current projections would suggest.
Persisting with the MID is definitely an expensive policy choice.
In order for the status quo to have a positive impact on vertical equity, the benefit would need to
increase as household affluence decreases. There is a fairly broad consensus among academics
that the MID becomes more valuable as household affluence increases. Table 2 also supports
this claim as well. Even authors who support the MID like Woodward and Weicher (1989) do
not do so on the grounds that it improves vertical equity, but rather that it does not penalize those
who use debt to finance housing relative to households that can self-finance.136
Nevertheless,
with more than three-quarters of the Americans who benefit from the MID earning more than
$100,000 (twice the national median household income), the status quo ranks the absolute worst
in terms of promoting vertical equity.
133
Will
Fischer
&
Chye-‐Ching
Huang,
(2013),
“Mortgage
Interest
Deduction
Is
Ripe
for
Reform:
Conversion
to
Tax
Credit
Could
Raise
Revenue
and
Make
Subsidy
More
Effective
and
Fairer.”
pg.
1.
134
Freddie
Mac,
(2013),
“30-‐Year
Fixed-‐Rate
Mortgages
Since
1971.”
http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.htm
135
Ibid.
http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.htm
136
Susan
E.
Woodward
&
John
C.
Weicher,
(1989),
“Goring
the
Wrong
Ox:
A
Defense
of
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
308,
309.
34. 34
Without any changes to the MID, there is no reason to think that housing tenure choices would
be affected, positively or negatively, baring some other economic shock. However, several have
argued that there is no proof that the MID ever affected the choice between renting and owning
because it always existed alongside the income tax.137
Continuing the status quo is definitely the most politically feasible option. Any attempts to
change it would be met with the same swift resistance and derision that the Nixon, Carter,
Reagan, and Bush administrations faced when they considered altering the status quo.
Organizations like the National Association of Realtors and other real estate interests would
oppose it because of the evidence that it increases home values, which benefits everyone that
builds, sells or finances homes. Baumgartner et al. (2009), stated that one of the most basic
challenges anyone seeking to change the status quo faces is how to get the general public to care
about an issue, in this case the MID.138
The previously cited 1978 CBS poll and a more recent
2011 New York Times/CBS poll demonstrate that even if only a small percentage of Americans
are able to utilize the MID an overwhelming majority do not want to change it, which implies
that all previous attempts to get the public to care were unsuccessful. It is also important to note
that 33 years later, the proportion who support the MID is virtually unchanged. Although
majorities among Democrats and Republicans both favor the MID, the fact that it is slightly less
137
Rebecca
N.
Morrow,
(2012),
“Billions
Spent
Inflating
the
Housing
Bubble:
How
and
Why
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction
Failed.”
Pg.
761.
138
Frank
R.
Baumgartner,
Jeffrey
M.
Berry,
Marie
Hojnacki,
David
C.
Kimball
and
Beth
L.
Leech,
(2009),
“Lobbying
and
Policy
Change:
Who
Wins,
Who
Loses,
and
Why.”
Pg.
44.
35. 35
popular among Democrats shows there partisan tilt to opposition.139
Other dueling polls from
the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) and the National Low Income Housing
Coalition (NLIHC) found that Americans both want to preserve the MID as it is and want to
modify the MID to make it fairer to lower-income households. 140 141
The NAHB also reported
that two-thirds of their respondents would be less likely to support a candidate who attempt to
eliminate or modify the MID.142
Although the polls from the NAHB and NLIHC are likely to be
more biased than the CBS polls, the results do demonstrate that a clear majority supports the
MID and only a small minority would do things differently. Given that this position is also
supported by well-organized interest who also benefit from tax expenditures, the status quo is the
most politically feasible.
In pursuing alternatives, it would appear that comparing costs between the status quo and any
proposed alternatives would be as simple as examining whether they cost more or less than the
$70-83.4 billion range of continuing the way things have been. However, such a comparison is
not that straightforward. After all, any change that affects after-tax income can have profound
effects on economic behavior depending upon where an individual falls within the American
income and wealth continuum. For the purposes of this paper, the following alternatives will be
considered: (1) a complete repeal of the MID without a replacement policy; (2) a cap on the
139
Brian
J.
McCabe,
(2011),
“Despite
Benefit
Disparities,
Middle
Class
Supports
Mortgage
Deduction.”
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/despite-‐benefit-‐disparities-‐middle-‐class-‐supports-‐mortgage-‐
deduction/
140
Rick
Judson,
(2013),
“Keep
Homeowners'
Tax
Deductions:
Opposing
view.”
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/04/02/mortgage-‐tax-‐deduction-‐editorials-‐debates/2047927/
141
Amy
Clark,
(2012),
“New
Poll
Highlights
Broad
Support
for
Modifying
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction,
Funding
Affordable
Housing.”
http://nlihc.org/press/releases/1937
142
Brian
J.
McCabe,
(2011),
“Despite
Benefit
Disparities,
Middle
Class
Supports
Mortgage
Deduction.”
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/despite-‐benefit-‐disparities-‐middle-‐class-‐supports-‐mortgage-‐
deduction/
36. 36
amount of mortgage interest a household can deduct, adjusted for regional cost of living; and (3)
a complete repeal of the MID that would be replaced with 15% tax credit on mortgage interest up
to $25,000 regardless of marginal tax rate.143
Repealing the MID
One of the arguments commonly made in favor of the MID is that it boosts levels of
homeownership, but there is a large body of research to the contrary. Americans who claim the
largest MIDs probably would have bought the same house in its absence. However, it may be
the case that affluent households would shift from bank financing to self-financing in varying
degrees depending on relative wealth, which would decrease might decrease tax revenue from
other investments such a household might have held.144
In many respects, the effect of repealing
the MID would almost be the exact opposite of maintaining the status quo. Additionally, relative
to the other alternatives discussed in this paper, only repealing the MID and replacing it with a
tax credit would have a larger impact on cost.
The first change over the status quo is the cost to the federal government. Almost immediately,
the government would have recovered $55.8 billion dollars and would avoid the projected
143
This
alternative
is
slightly
less
aggressive
than
the
credit
suggested
by
the
2005
President’s
Advisory
Panel
who
recommended
that
the
cap
be
reduced
to
FHA
limits
over
5
years.
However,
because
it
is
independent
of
a
household’s
marginal
rate,
it
would
mean
less
to
more
affluent
households.
John
E.
Anderson,
Jeffrey
Clemens
&
Andrew
Hanson,
(2007),
“Capping
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
776;
Rebecca
N.
Morrow,
(2012),
“Billions
Spent
Inflating
the
Housing
Bubble:
How
and
Why
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction
Failed.”
Pg.
800.
144
Tuukka
Saarimaa,
(2010),
“Tax
Incentives
and
Demand
for
Mortgage
Debt:
Evidence
from
the
Finnish
1993
Tax
Reform.”
Pg.
21,
22;
Adam
J.
Cole,
Geoffrey
Gee
and
Nicholas
Turner,
(2011),
“The
Distributional
and
Revenue
Consequences
of
Reforming
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
988.
37. 37
growth of the MID due to tax bracket creep.145
Although the MID has little effect on increasing
homeownership, it is true that some people, especially younger affluent (but not rich) people,
would see their disposable incomes decrease in such a way that it has a somewhat negative effect
on the overall economy. Conversely, research by Follain and Melamed (1998) suggest that:
“Elimination of the MID would induce households to refinance their homes, substituting
equity for debt. Taking this portfolio shuffling into account, they estimate that
elimination of the MID would add only $10 billion in additional revenue each year.”146
Additionally, repealing the MID would remove what has been previously described as an “upside
down subsidy.” This characterization is not hyperbole because larger loans are granted on the
basis of ability to pay and assuming a conventional 30-year loan with a loan to value (LTV) ratio
of 80%, the column “1st
Year Interest” in Table 2 illustrates how much more interest a household
pays as the cost of a home increases. The amount of subsidy a household receives from the MID
is also impacted by the household’s marginal tax rate.
Repealing the MID would have a positive effect on vertical equity by restoring some of the
progressivity embedded within the nation’s income tax code. It would increase the extent to
which households that earn more income pay more in taxes, which is what makes our income tax
progressive. Cole, Gee and Turner (2011) state that repealing the MID would have “the biggest
145
Adam
J.
Cole,
Geoffrey
Gee
and
Nicholas
Turner,
(2011),
“The
Distributional
and
Revenue
Consequences
of
Reforming
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
991.
146
John
E.
Anderson,
Jeffrey
Clemens
&
Andrew
Hanson,
(2007),
“Capping
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
769.
Supra
note
1.
38. 38
effects on high-income taxpayers and taxpayers who are married, have children, and live in
expensive housing markets.”147
Removing the MID would marginally reduce the cost of buying a home because “the MID
lowers the cost of capital for housing, which will translate into higher home prices in areas where
housing supply is relatively inelastic.”148
The extent of this housing price reduction has been
estimated to be “between two and 13 percent.”149
Table 2
Home
Price
LTV
Amount
Financed
1st
Year
Interest
1st
Year
Principal
2nd
Year
Interest
$100,000
0.8
$80,000
$(2,711.76)
$(1,556.32)
$(2,605.98)
$200,000
0.8
$160,000
$(5,423.51)
$(3,112.64)
$(5,211.97)
$250,000
0.8
$200,000
$(6,779.39)
$(3,890.79)
$(6,514.96)
$300,000
0.8
$240,000
$(8,135.27)
$(4,668.95)
$(7,817.95)
$400,000
0.8
$320,000
$(10,847.02)
$(6,225.27)
$(10,423.94)
$500,000
0.8
$400,000
$(13,558.78)
$(7,781.59)
$(13,029.92)
$750,000
0.8
$600,000
$(20,338.16)
$(11,672.38)
$(19,544.88)
$1,000,000
0.8
$800,000
$(27,117.55)
$(15,563.18)
$(26,059.84)
This table illustrates how much interest an individual or household pays in the first two years and how this varies
depending on the amount of the loan.150
147
Adam
J.
Cole,
Geoffrey
Gee
and
Nicholas
Turner,
(2011)
“The
Distributional
and
Revenue
Consequences
of
Reforming
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
986.
148
Adam
J.
Cole,
Geoffrey
Gee
and
Nicholas
Turner,
(2011)
“The
Distributional
and
Revenue
Consequences
of
Reforming
the
Mortgage
Interest
Deduction.”
Pg.
987.
149
Ibid.
Pg.
987.
150
An
interest
rate
of
3.42%
was
used
based
on
the
overnight
average
rate
ascertained
by
visiting
bankrate.com
on
May
5,
2013.
The
LTV
of
80%
was
chosen
as
the
typical
amount
financed
under
a
conventional
mortgage.
39. 39
In contrast to the status quo, the political feasibility of repealing the MID would be the lowest.
This alternative starts out with approximately 90% of the electorate against it. Organizations like
the National Association of Realtors and NAHB would be instantly and vehemently against this
policy and would probably be rejoined by organizations like universities, State and local
governments, charities and organization that represent medical interests like the American
Medical Association, as they have in the past.151
Homeownership is a fundamental part of the
American Dream and because of belief systems like the Protestant work ethic, many American
probably feel that homeowners are entitled to whatever benefits they can claim. Considering that
there are so many Americans who do not benefit (and will probably never benefit) from the MID
who still favor its preservation, it is hard to imagine what organized coalition could be formed to
counteract such a well-organized group. In the 100 years since the institution of the federal
income tax, no such coalition has developed.
A Regionally-Based Cap on the MID
TRA86 created a one million dollar cap on the MID and although that cap has not been adjusted
for inflation since then, a million dollars is still significantly more than most Americans will ever
spend on a home purchase. 152
However, it “will affect more mortgages over time as home-price
151
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
260.
152
Dennis
Ventry,
Jr.,
(2010),
“The
Accidental
Deduction:
A
History
and
Critique
of
the
Tax
Subsidy
for
Mortgage
Interest.”
Pg.
275.