1. Felgenhauer 1
Jarrad Felgenhauer
Che Guevara: Idol, Image, or Icon?
Everywhere we turn we are awash in images and imagery. They permeate us, structure
us, and infect us. It is as Guy Debord tells us in the very first of his 221 thesis The Society of the
Spectacle that, “In societies where modern conditions of production prevail, all life presents
itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved
into representations.”1 Or as Marx surmised over 100 years prior, “all that is solid melts into
air.”2 To state such theses in our present point in history may seem like a cheap shot and at the
same time overly cynical. However our metaphors certainly betray us: “To be, is to be seen,”
“appearance is everything,” and “perception is reality,” just to name a few. The message is thus
clear, what is, fully and precisely, is what appears. And to be is to individualistically construct,
represent, or be represented. Ours is a society of character masks, whose wearers insist upon
them and in fact become them. And the notion appears to dig itself deep, as Debord writes again,
“The image detached from every aspect of life fuse in a common stream in which the unity of
this life can no longer be established…The spectacle presents itself simultaneously as all of
society…as [an] instrument of unification.”3
The sundering of image and reality, it turns out, appears to be true all the way down.
What was once there to be claimed as real, original, or even perhaps essential, has been lost to
the image. The image, the abstract representation, has become “the effective dictatorship of the
illusion in modern society,”4 which, “…suddenly presents itself as a self-moving substance
1 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (Oakland:AK Press,1983) Chapter 1, thesis 1
2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto. From: The Marx Engels Reader: Second Edition. ed by
Robert Tucker (London: WW Norton, 1978) p. 476
3 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, Chapter 1, theses 2-3
4 Debord, thesis 213

2. Felgenhauer 2
which passes through a process of its own…”5 for which anything we might grasp as real is a
“mere form” to its content. In short it is driven from the arena, smashed into the form of an
invisible. That which is completely there to be seen but ultimately cannot, because of the tyranny
of the constructed imaginary—the image.
In his diagnosis to the problem Jean-Luc Marion, like both Hegel and Marx, is a
physician of the highest order. And the problem at its core is at one and the same time the
problem of modern philosophy itself, namely, the problem of the subject-object dualism. How is
what’s “in here” in my head interact or latch onto or interact with what’s “out there” external to
me. Or even worse, how do I know what sensuously appears to me in lived experience is really
what is real, really what the thing is? As trivial as this may seem, these problems have real
consequences. Consequences which Marion is quite in tune with. “…The images make available
to the gaze events not only without common measure, without connections of meaning between
them…” He writes. “The image, closed off to its original, thus no longer has any reality other
than itself.”6 Marion in this way helps illuminate and give new understanding to Marx, who
writes in one of his many critiques of these alienating abstractions “They [images] are thought
entities…nothing but the production of the abstract…it is the opposition…between abstract
thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness.”7 In this vain, Marion cuts right to the heart
of the issue: On the one hand, the incessant dualism between image (abstract ‘thought entities’)
and reality, appearance and essence, and, in his language, visible and invisible. And on the other,
the driving down into the dust of the invisible by the visible, the crushing of reality by
5 Karl Marx.Capital: Vol I. trans.Ben Fowkes. (London: Penguin Books, 1976) p. 256
6 Jean-Luc Marion.The Crossing of the Visible (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,2004) p. 49
7 Karl Marx.The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.From: The Marx-Engels Reader: Second Edition. ed
Robert Tucker (New York: WW Norton, 1978) p.110

3. Felgenhauer 3
representation in the current age.8 Why? Because reality itself has become invisible,
“Admittedly, it could still be said that such an image refers to its original, but…I will never
know it.”9
The worry that was once implicit now makes itself explicit: that when trapped in a world
of autonomous, self-perpetuating, and self-moving images, “the heart of the unrealism in the real
society,”10 we grow to construct ourselves and live vicariously through continuous cycles and
webs of faint abstractions and character masks. I am no longer a faithful presentation or authentic
narration of myself (although ideology tells me that I am), because ultimately any authenticity
claim is itself just another representation or commodity which I latch myself on to. Who I am
then is nothing more than a hollowed out image, a blank canvas whose presentation is the cutting
and pasting of other images of my own choosing onto the empty space. “I am because I am seen,
and as I am seen,” Marion writes. “What constitutes me is first and foremost the image that I
become always available for transmission, broadcast, and consumption.”11 Marion’s mention of
consumption almost necessarily forces us to mention money, the image and character mask par
excellence. In the untethered construction of ourselves as images, what we essentially reveal
ourselves as is buyers and sellers—this is the ultimate revelation of what it means for us to be
free or to have freedom. Essentially I am nothing, nothing but a blank slate. But I am free to
have money and free to make and remake myself according to my own image, fit for public
consumption by others. Who I am is the image which is put forth, and the image I put forth is
8 I say current age, but what I’m of coursereferring to is capitalism,the logic of which has remained the same for
hundreds of years.Also,I use the terms “invisible”and “reality” in this sentence as synonyms,but it must be said
most strenuously here and now that I do not hold (as we will see) that reality or the true nature of things is
inherently confined to a realmof invisibility.In factmy position will end up being quite the contrary, that the
invisible(or reality,or essence) MUST be made visible,itmust appear,and in factalways already isappearing—we
justfail to notice it.
9 Marion,p. 50
10 Debord, Chapter 1, thesis 6
11 Marion,p. 52

4. Felgenhauer 4
what I can purchase. “That which is for me through the medium of money—that for which I can
pay—that am I…The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power.”12 Marx writes.
“…That which mediates my life for me, also mediates, the existence of other people for me. For
me it is the other person.”13 This continuing saga of self-construction, representation,
deconstruction and re-representation falls in line with the perpetual quagmire which Hegel
referred to as unhappy consciousness, “a struggle against an enemy, victory over whom really
means being worsted, where to have attained one result is really to lose it in the opposite…” he
says. “…For therein consciousness finds only consciousness of its opposite as its essence — and
of its own nothingness…”14
It seems, then, that our problems are these: Can we at all regain an access to what is
original, what Marion refers to as the invisible? Or even better yet, can we find again the
invisible manifest squarely there before us in the visible itself? The good news is that Marion
thinks we can, and in this there is real progress. However our worry in this essay is that we can
do so only in retreat. That we must withdraw altogether from the sensuous world of the visible
and seek true reality elsewhere. For us this will ultimately unsatisfying, because instead of
overcoming, dialectically, this rupture of visible and invisible and doing so in the very realm of
the visible itself (which is the only place it can be truly be overcome—in the theater of action)
Marion only allows us to solve the issue one-sidedly, in ahistorical abstraction, while leaving the
matter in itself, the destruction of the cult of the image, untouched.
What Marion offers to us is not liberation from what he rightly calls “the tyranny of the
image”15 but instead an escape into the netherworld of the invisible through the icon. The icon,
12 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,p. 103
13 Ibid p. 103
14 GWF Hegel. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. trans A.V. Miller (Oxford University Press:Oxford,1977) p. 127
15 Marion p. 58

5. Felgenhauer 5
he tells us, “removes the prestige of the visible from its face, in order to effectively render it an
imperceptible transparency…” it allows itself “to be disfigured…in order to do the will of God.”
The visibility of the sensuous world, and living humanity itself, is thus crushed and in this we
have the same dualisms of our modern philosophical fathers, back from the dead. For Marion the
visible and invisible seem to be permanently cut off from each other. They are fixed, ahistorical,
and static entities, Thus the invisible is the complete other of the visible, there is no hope in
uniting them outside of complete abstraction. “The visible opens not onto another visible but
onto the other of the visible—The invisible Holy One…it [the visible icon] reaches the invisible
by never ceasing to transgress itself.”16 This is what Marx calls, “the duplication of the world
into a religious world and a secular one”17 and the appeal to the Holy One, the singular,
ahistorical, and immovable gives new credence to Horkheimer and Adorno’s worry that, “To the
enlightenment, that which does not reduce to numbers, and ultimately to the one, becomes
illusion.”18
Given Marion’s distrust of any hope left for sensuous reality and what he calls its
“mimetic logic” in which, “the image doubles in the visible what the original keeps in the
invisible”19 where the sensible world acts as “so many distorting filters,”20 where are we to find
the invisible? Yes, we have already stated in the religious icon. But the visibility of the icon must
deny itself in order to present the invisible, Marion tells us of a single (The One as stated above)
specific place. The black, invisible, pupils of the eyes. Why the eyes? Because, as Marion makes
explicitly clear to tell us that that this invisible (the two eyes of the icon), “signals not a new
16 Ibid p. 78 emphasis added.
17 Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach” p. 145
18 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer. The Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans by John Cumming. (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1972) p. 7
19 Marion p. 83
20 Ibid p. 79

6. Felgenhauer 6
visible, nor a counter visible, but rather the invisible origin of the gaze of the other upon me.”21
Thus, this power of the other’s (in this case Jesus himself, which is of course eventually The
One—God himself) gaze, “exempts itself from the power of the image…to cross there another
gaze.”22 Therefore Marion is wishing to tell us that any and all sensuous nature is at one and the
same time both sullied with the discriminatory and prejudicial nature of the “image” and that we
ourselves, as living sensuous being are the embodiment of this colonial attitude. “The image
wants to take over love,” he writes, sinking it to “pornography, meaninglessness, or a
combination of the two.”
The invisible thus is not only other to ourselves but wholly and completely other. It meets
in the icon only as a communion of the two (visible and invisible), but this communion is only
achieved by the icon’s complete and utter break with all things visible whatsoever, hence the
fixation on the pure blackness of the eyes. Furthermore, knowledge of this is something foreign
in nature, because the invisible can never appear in the richness of sensuous visibility but only by
way of sensuous nature’s full-fledged self-denial of itself, analogous to Christ’s self-denial of
himself23 during his passion, as he tells Pilate, “My kingdom is not of this world.”24 Marx both
highlights with precision and at the same time cuts right to the soul of when he argues that in this
line of thinking “it is [sensuous] objectivity which is to be annulled…the objective character that
is offensive and constitutes estrangement.”25 The problem of course being that if we seek to
retreat from sensuous nature, not only are we cutting ourselves off from any appearing of the
21 Ibid p. 56
22 Ibid p. 57
23 By “Self-denial of himself” I mean that Christdenies his sensuous humanity to reveal his divinity.He denies his
“visible”so as to make the “invisible”in some way transparent.
24 John 18:36
25 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,p. 117

7. Felgenhauer 7
essence, the invisible, but in a reversal of fortune we “confirm the pseudo-essence…the self-
estranged essence in its denial.”26
What is clear from Marion is that he finds the icon wholly unique because it denies
and/or resists the colonialism of sensuous nature and visibility by both denying is own
sensuousness in favor of the invisible lurking beyond it on the one hand, and at the same time
resisting our own colonial volitions on the other through the crossing of the gazes on the other.
The icon points to another gaze, and thus “solicits a veneration”27 from us because it comes from
the aforementioned pointed to gaze which in the icon gives, “an intentional transitivity of the
visible and the invisible…only in so far as it shows the other-than-itself.”28 But this veneration,
this declaration of respect for autonomous otherness, is all that we are allowed to give because
the essence, the invisible, this gaze never truly appears in the realm of the sensuous nature,
which is also by definition the realm of the living. “Only the one who prays,” Marion writes,
“can thus climb from the visible to the invisible.”29
We therefore are left floundered in a world of images in, out, and all the way down in our
sensuous lives, and because we ourselves are sensuous and earthly beings, the only out way is by
means of abstraction to either a Noumenal realm and/or through the veneration of the true
invisibility and autonomy of the other, in this case The One. The essence, the invisible is never
intimately or imminently presents in the visible realm30, which is to say the essence never
becomes appearance or actuality, or that invisible never becomes visible. There is only a “bond
26 Ibid p. 119
27 Marion,p. 87
28 Marion p. 84, 86
29 Ibid p. 75
30 The way for instance, Jesus is really and imminently present in the Eucharist.Or the way valueis likewise really
and imminently present in money.

8. Felgenhauer 8
of a communion”31 of opposed visible and invisible in the eyes of the icon, which Marion tells us
must be a ruptured otherness, because once it becomes truly or imminently visible to us, the the
imposing image is sure to follow.
The principle reason why this will not do for us is that Marion leaves us with a diagnosis
but not a prescription. Because by not grappling, not struggling with the other (the invisible) we
have no hope of achieving a new unity with it,32 and in fact by denying the struggle in his
insistence on the perpetual otherness of the invisible and by seeking it not in the visibility of
sensuous nature but in the invisible gaze of the invisible other we in fact end up reinforcing what
we had wished to cure—the detached world of the image. What we seek, however, is an
overcoming in dialectic of this dichotomy, “being thus at home with itself in it’s other—being as
such.”33 In other words, a unity in difference. “The conversion of the subject into the predicate,
and of the predicate into the subject,” Marx argues, “the exchange of that which determines for
that which is determined, is always the most immediate revolution.”34 To achieve such a unity
the invisible must be visibly present to us, certainly as an other, but not as perpetually distant,
accessible only as an escape through the gaze of another invisible (the eyes of the icon), but
instead imminent in sensuous nature. In short, the essence [invisible] must appear. “Separation,”
Debord tells us, “is the alpha and omega of the spectacle.”35 This separation, despite Marion’s
sound diagnosis is never fully resolved in him, but only given room to move by a choice: remain
in the forever tyrannical visible, or escape to the realm of the separated invisible through the
power of the icon and conteplative faith.
31 Ibid p. 87
32 Not as a colonial unity of domination,but a true overcoming—which is to say a unity in difference.
33 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,p. 117
34 Karl Marx.Kreuznach Notebooks 1 From: Peter Hudis.“Death of the Death of the Subject” (2005)
http://libcom.org/library/death-of-subject-marxist-humanismaccessed:10 December 2015
35 Debord, thesis 25

9. Felgenhauer 9
How do we propose to bear this imminence out? Through our own dialectical unity of
revolutionary theory and practice. We therefore need not take our eyes off the visible, but rather
embrace it as something, “…To be understood in its contradiction and revolutionized in practice.
Thus, for instance, after the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the
former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in practice.”36 Or as Chretien rightly reminds
us, that in the struggle, “new, unlooked for strengths spring forth suddenly from the wounds
received.”37 The secret invisible which we therefore seek is not up in the clouds or across an
invisible gaze, but right here.
The invisible lies in the contradictory and obscuring nature of the visible—in order to see
it, our eyes must not leave it. Which is to say ultimately that this visible is not set in stone or
written in blood, bequeathed to eternal posterity for once and for all time. If such were the case
then Marion would be 100 percent correct, that there is no exit in seeking the invisible from
within the visible, that it is tyrannical all the way down. But for us this tyranny of the visible has
movement, no less in the way that history itself has movement in the sense that it springs forth or
hurls back, it overcomes and is overcome, it unifies and contradicts, it revolutionizes and
succumbs to counter-revolution. But in this movement of force, counterforce, and contradiction
what is revealed are cleavages of openings and pockets of space from whence the invisible,
which was truly there to be seen along is grasped. “It is in the movement to the transcendence of
the opposition between Notion and Reality,” Raya Dunayevskaya says, “That the transcendence
36 Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach” p. 144
37 Jean-Louis Chretien. Hand to Hand: Listening to the Work of Art. Trans by Stephen E Lewis. (New York: Fordham
University Press,2003) p. 1

10. Felgenhauer 10
will be achieved…not only as a history in the consciousness of freedom, but, as we shall see, as
achievement in actuality…”38
In order to achieve this task, however, we will need a new icon. One which can expose
phenomenologically in lived experience the struggle both in theory and in action—in short, the
dialectical movement in its own becoming. In this task there is no better choice than Alberto
Korda’s 1960 photograph of the Argentine revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara entitled
Guerrillero Heroico.39
On March 4th, 1960, just over 14 months to the day that Fidel Castro, his lieutenants Raul
Castro and Che Guevara, and their revolutionary 26th of July Movement ousted U.S. backed
dictator Fulgencio Bautista to establish a revolutionary socialist state just 93 miles off the
American coast, a mysterious and tragic explosion occurred in Havana Harbor. The blast came
from the French freighter La Coubre, which had arrived earlier that morning. When Guevara
heard of the incident he immediately rushed to the scene, pushing back those who attempted to
stop him out of concern for his safety, as a secondary blast had struck the area.40 In the end about
100 people died in the explosion. Fidel Castro immediately blamed the CIA for the attack and
although there is some evidence to suggest the accuracy of the charge, it is ultimately
inconclusive who or what exactly initiated the blast.41
The follow day, March 5th, Castro called for a mass funeral and demonstration at the
Colon Cemetery in Havana to honor the victims. At the end, he (Castro) delivered one of his
most famous and fiery speeches, Patria o Muerte (“Homeland or Death”). At or near the end of
38 Raya Dunayevskaya.“Hegel’s Absolute as New Beginning” From: The Power of Negativity: Selected Writings on
the Dialectic in Hegel and Marx. Ed by Peter Hudis and Kevin Anderson. (New York: Lexington Books, 2002) p. 180
39 In English,“Heroic Guerrilla Fighter”
40 John Lee Anderson. Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Grove Press,1997) p. 442
41 Ibid

11. Felgenhauer 11
the eulogy, Guevara emerged from the background of the horizon into the foreground on the
stage for a matter of seconds before disappearing again. Alberto Korda, Castro’s official
photographer, was in the crowd with his camera and snapped several pictures of Che as he
emerged, seemingly from the depths. Korda, who immediately realized what had just taken place
later reflected on the encounter, stating that after he saw the image he had captured that the first
thing that draws one in is Che’s facial expression, which he said reveals “absolute implacability,”
anger and pain.42 A man who at one and the same time is equal parts stoic and emotional,
resolute and reckless, violent and loving.
What is the most striking feature of the Korda’s photograph of Che, is that it is as close to
the perfect snapshot of the dialectic in motion ever captured (if such a thing is even possible to
begin with). How is this so? First and foremost, it is the shear spontaneity and pure fluidity of
picture. Of course, the picture itself (ie its physical substance) captures only a moment in time,
and is thus forever fixed. But before these substantial properties of the photograph ever see the
light of day, the picture is first and foremost a presentation of an event, a dynamic encounter. The
photograph itself was completely un-staged and unplanned. Its setting was not predetermined
and there was no prior awareness, either by Korda or Che himself, of what was taking place. He
(Che) was not asked to dress a certain way, stand in a certain place, or strike a certain pose and
Korda, for his part, was simply just another face in the crowd. Thus the dialectic enters the stage.
Because in capturing not a static photograph but an event, Korda is able with a single snapshot in
time to present to us something moving, i.e. which has movement. Something which emerges
from the fog in motion, in process, in dialectic, with a past, a present and a future. The picture
therefore, is not doomed forever to a singular/individual, out of context, and/or transcendent slice
42 Anderson p. 465

12. Felgenhauer 12
of time, but at once and in its very singularity and fluidity captures and presents to us the entire
movement of the dialectic: immediacy, mediation, negation, and sublation
As with Marion’s icon, the eyes of Che give something away to the viewer. But what do
his eyes tell us that Marion’s icon do not? As is noticed immediately Che is not looking at us, he
is looking beyond us as a being both intimately and inescapably visible, with clear
acknowledgment of the cold and calculative nature of the present (remember, the picture was
taken at a national day of mourning), while at the same time peering off into a distant future,
which is, in the final analysis, no less visible than the immediate present. Che’s eyes comfortably
draw us in, in a kind of unifying embrace but then immediately shove us away in difference and
otherness as if to say, “Not here, but out there. In the distance, beyond this visible moment, yet at
the same time intimately connected to it,” giving new found credence to his statement that, “I am
not a liberator. Liberators do not exist. They exist when people liberate themselves.”43
This dialectically connected duality, of drawing us in then pushing us out forces us, the
viewer, to remain firmly with our feet on the ground, echoing Che’s cautionary advice that to
view “aesthetic ideas as a unique being whose aspiration is to remain immaculate…is nothing
more than an attempt to escape.”44 Heading Che’s advice, the photograph implores us to remain
in the visible realm (because we cannot escape) in order to ascertain visible-to-visible
contradictions from whence a new visible (i.e. an imminent invisible) can appear. We find this as
the eyes of the picture give way to the distinctive and contradictory facial features.
43 Che Guevara. “Statement in Mexico.” From: Kaplan AP World History 2005.ed by the Kaplan staff.(New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2005) p. 240
44 Che Guevara, “Socialismand Man in Cuba” (1965) https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1965/03/man-
socialism.htmAccessed: 9 December 2015

13. Felgenhauer 13
When we look at Che’s face what do we see? Korda gives us a hint, telling us the face
reveals the mark of the true revolutionary: firmness, anger, stoicism, and pain45 But it also
reveals a visibly contradictory otherness, that of revolutionary love. “Let me say that the true
revolutionary is guided by great feelings of love. It is impossible to think of a genuine
revolutionary lacking this quality,” Che says, “We must strive every day so that this love of
living humanity is transformed into actual deeds, into acts that serve as examples, as a moving
force.”46 Thus, the contradictory emergence of Che’s face, the conflict of anger and love as a
moving force, gives us the dialectical clue to which his eyes give the rubberstamp in their
piercing beyond us into a new visible which has yet to come but which at the same time must
only be called forth from the present situation. The new possibility of a yet to come visibility,
beyond the circumstances of the current condition, therefore must emerge from the old as an
imminently present invisible47 yet, “…still stamped with the birth marks of the old society from
whose womb it emerges.”48
What appears before us in the experience of the photograph is the visible snapshot in time
of what we as viewers are after: a unity in difference, a unity in otherness. “In the relation of
inner and outer, the essential moment of this emerges,” Hegel says, “namely, that its
determinations are posited as being in negative unity in such a manner that each immediately is
not only its other but also the totality of the whole.”49 As a purely internal relation, we view the
dialectic of Che himself as the subject of the photograph—a man who reveals a living and
45Quoted in: Trisha Ziff."Che Guevara: Revolutionary & Icon" (New York: Abrams Image, 2006) p 33
46 Guevara, “Socialismand Man in Cuba,” emphasis added
47 As we have said before, invisibleonly in the sense that itis failed to be recognized. As we have argued all along,
the invisibleis essentially visible.
48 Karl Marx,“Critiqueof the Gotha Program” From: The Marx-Engels Reader: Second Edition. Ed by Robert Tucker
(London: WW Norton, 1978) p. 529
49 GWF Hegel, Science of Logic. “Vol. I, Book II, § 1152”
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlessenc.htm#HL2_526 accessed:13 December
2015

14. Felgenhauer 14
breathing embodiment of a personal subjective dialectic of the pain and healing, the anger and
love, and the stoicism and emotion so strikingly apparent on his face and in his eyes. While at the
very same time we experience Che, as a fully formed object of the photograph emerging as an
external relation against the visible horizon of present history, i.e. he appears from what “is,”—
“here” and “now,”—to present us with a counter or contradictory “new” visible, not only of what
appears in the immediacy of today but what might appear in the imminence that is tomorrow. It
is in this internal-external unity in otherness50 from whence we become conscious of what was
there all along—the invisible as new visibility. The metaphorical reference to pregnancy
mentioned above (see footnote 50) now gains further traction because today, what is visible, is
always pregnant with tomorrow, that which will be made visible. “The Essence must appear or
shine forth,” Hegel writes. But, “Essence accordingly is not something beyond or behind
appearance, but – just because it is the essence which exists – the existence is Appearance.”51
Che’s emergence, his springing forth in the photograph is thus at once and always
completely visible to us, something John Dewey references as an “unanalyzed totality.”52
But at the same time his visibility is foreign to us, it is a contradictory otherness that is not
supposed to be there when compared to the mundane habits of the visible horizon of being from
which he emerges. The icon of Che is not, nor is Che himself for that matter, the invisible. Nor
does he allow the invisible to pass through him through visible self-denial as Marion’s icon does,
collapsing the visible into the invisible. Instead, Che shows us a contradictory sensuous visible
encounter within and against the very horizon of the tyrannical visible itself. It is in this very
50 As both a unity of theoretical (internal) and practical (external) matters as well as subject-object.
51 GWF Hegel. Shorter Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences: The Logic, §131
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.htm#SL131n accessed:13 December 2015.
Emphasis added
52 John Dewey. “Experience and PhilosophicMethod.” From: Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy:
Second Edition. ed by John J Stuhr (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2000) p. 463

15. Felgenhauer 15
dialectical and contradictory struggle in which cleavages of space are carved out, from whence
the invisible, which was intimately visible all along, makes itself conscious to us. We therefore
come to see the invisible as the interrogation the movement, and the method of the visible itself
as an historical concept and artefact.