James MacLeod Nairn MSc Dissertation

James MacLeod-Nairn (st05002068)
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CARDIFF METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY, ANALYSING THE
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF BARCLAYS BANK
PLC AND RBS PLC FROM 2001 TO 2014
James MacLeod-Nairn
ST05002068
MSc Finance
School of Management
Dissertation Supervisor: Professor Chris Parry
1st
/June/2015
Word Count: 17,829

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Supervisors Statement:
StudentName/Number:JamesMacLeod-Nairn/ST05002068
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activelyengagedinthe dissertationsupervisionprocess. Theyhave providedregulartimelydraft
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Acknowledgements:
I am using this opportunity to express my gratitude to everyone who supported me
throughout the course of this MSc Finance dissertation. I am thankful for their guidance,
invaluably constructive criticism and friendly advice during the course of this work. I am
sincerelygrateful to them for sharing their truthful and respective views on a number of issues
related to the project.
I express my deepest thanks to my supervisor Mr. C. Parry, without his guidance this would
not be possible, in addition to Dr C. Larkin for his invaluable insights and advice, also special
mention to Dr S. Kyaw, Mr M. Gundermann, Mr M. Win-Pe and finally Mrs J. Stockford for
their invaluable support and guidance.
Furthermore I would like to thank Mrs J. Levy for her support and help, in addition to the CSM
personal tutors. I would also like to thank Mrs R. McNaughton, Mrs H. O’leary and Mr J. Hay
from the study skills team for their help.
I would also like to thank Dr Hafiz Hoque from the University of York for his direction.
Lastly, it is important to mention the love and support given to me by my family and friends
as they have givenme the strength and determination to getthrough what has been adifficult
but rewarding time.
Thank you,
James MacLeod-Nairn

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Abstract:
Since the recentfinancial crisisthat has had a devastatingimpactonthe global economy,the debate
over the prudential regulation of financial institutions has increased. The efforts made by
international regulators to try and prevent a reoccurrence of these events have started to be
implemented and the effects of which are becoming apparent.
Thispapertriestoaddressthisissue bycomparingthe performanceof BarclaysBankPlcandthe Royal
Bank of Scotland from 2001 to 2014 using standard performance metrics and data from annual
reports,in orderto make a comparisonof theirperformance pre and postcredit and sovereigndebt
crisis. This is important because Barclays was able to maintain its independence by seeking
independent funding from its investors in order to re-capitalise itself from the consequences of the
credit crisis, whereas RBS was not so fortunate and the UK government had to take an 81% equity
stake inthe companyto save itfromcollapse. Inthiscase,thisresearch attemptstoaddresswhether
the structural changesinthe UK financial industrythroughthe new regulations andregulatorybodies
createdhave impactedtheirperformance,furthermore have the actionstakeninordertosave these
banksincreased shareholderwealthinadditiontocreatingasituationwhere the culture excessiverisk
taking still exists therefore creating a situation of moral hazard.
The resultsof thispapershowthat the governmentownershiphas hada dramaticimpacton RBS and
it is clear that the recent events have made it considerably lessprofitable and reduced shareholder
wealth compared to Barclays post 2012. The independence of Barclays has not only increased its
performance buthas actuallyincreasedshareholderwealth. But what is evidentis that the changes
to RBS have substantially reduced its bonus culture and reliance on investment banking whereas
Barclays has not, suggesting the effect of nationalisation has made RBS a far more stable bank less
likely to have difficulties than Barclays if another crisis occurs.
Keywords:
Banking Performance, Moral Hazard, Nationalisation, Bailouts, Regulation.

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Table of Contents:
1) Introduction-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page12
2) Aims, Objectives & Rationale ----------------------------------------------------------------------Page15
3) Background Information ----------------------------------------------------------------------------Page16
3.1) Global Banking Industry Overview --------------------------------------------------- Page 16
3.2) Barclays Bank Plc ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 18
3.3) RBS Plc -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 19
4) Literature Review ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Page 20
4.1) Historical Examples of Banking Crises ----------------------------------------------- Page 20
4.2) Banking Issues from 2001 to 2008 --------------------------------------------------- Page 23
4.3) Banking Performance ------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 26
5) Methodology ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Page 29
5.1) Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 29
5.2) Research Philosophy -------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 30
5.3) Research Approach ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 33
5.4) ResearchStrategies ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Page34
5.5) Rationalefor choice of banks ---------------------------------------------------------- Page36
5.6) Rationale for events chosen ----------------------------------------------------------- Page 36
5.7) Performance metrics -------------------------------------------------------------------- Page37
5.8) Reliability and Validity ------------------------------------------------------------------ Page 38
5.9) Limitations --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page38
6) Findings &Analysis ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page38
6.1) Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 38
6.2) Analysis from 2001 to 2007 ------------------------------------------------------------ Page40
6.3) Analysis from 2008 to 2014 ------------------------------------------------------------ Page47
6.4) Overall -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 57
7) Discussion ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 58
8) Conclusions & Recommendations ---------------------------------------------------------------- Page62

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9) References --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 67
10) Appendix ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page73
10.1) Barclays Data from 2001 to 2007 --------------------------------------------------- Page 73
10.2) Barclays Datafrom2008 to 2014 ----------------------------------------------------Page74
10.3) RBS Data from 2001 to 2007 ---------------------------------------------------------Page75
10.4) RBS Data from 2008 to 2014 ---------------------------------------------------------Page77

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Table of Charts, Graphs and Figures:
Figure 1: UK Jobless Figures (ONS, 2015) -----------------------------------------------------------Page13
Figure 2: UK Productivity (Trading Economics, 2015) ------------------------------------------- Page 13
Figure 3: Total profits in top 1000 by country (thebankerdatabase 2014) ----------------- Page 17
Figure 4: Pre-tax profits by region (thebankerdatabase 2014) --------------------------------Page17
Figure 5: iShares Global Financials ETF 2001 to 2013 (iShares, 2014) ----------------------- Page 18
Figure 6: Research Onion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Page 30
Figure 7: Barclays and RBS share price July 1988 to May 2015 ------------------------------- Page39
Figure 8: DJI, FTSE 100, Barclays and RBS comparison from 30th April 1999 to May 26th 2015
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page39
Figure 9: MSCI World, MSCI World Banks, MSCI ACWI IMI Index from 2000 to 2015 (MSCI) ---
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page39
Figure 10: Barclays, RBS and FTSE 100 Share Price 2001-2008 (Google Finance) -------– Page 40
Figure 11: Barclays Operating Income, Operating Expenses and PPOP 2001-2007 ------ Page 40
Figure 12: RBS Operating Income, Operating Expenses and PPOP 2001-2007 ------------Page 41
Figure 13: BOEInterest Rates from 2001 to 2009 ------------------------------------------------Page42
Figure 14: FED Interest Rates from 2002 to 2014 ------------------------------------------------ Page 42
Figure 15: M4 Lending, M4 Deposits and NIM 1999 to 2008 (MoneyMovesMarkets) -- Page 43
Figure 16: Barclays and RBS Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts 2001-2007 --------- Page 43
Figure 17: Barclays and RBS EPS (Diluted) 2001-2007 -------------------------------------------Page44
Figure 18: Barclays and RBS ROA (Return on Assets) 2001-2007 ----------------------------- Page 45
Figure 19: Barclays and RBS ROE (Return on Equity) 2001-2007 ----------------------------- Page 46
Figure 20: Barclays and RBS Gearing 2001-2007 ------------------------------------------------- Page 46
Figure 21: Barclays and RBS P/E Ratio 2001-2007 ------------------------------------------------Page46
Figure 22: 3 Mont LIBOR from2004 to 2015 (Global Rates) ----------------------------------- Page 48
Figure 23: Barclays, RBS and FTSE 100 Share Price 2008-2015 (Google Finance) -------- Page 50
Figure 24: Barclays Operating Income, Operating Expenses and PPOP 2008-2014 ------ Page 51
Figure 25: RBS Operating Income, Operating Expenses and PPOP 2008-2014 ------------Page 52
Figure 26: Barclays and RBS Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts 2008-2014 --------- Page 53

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Figure 27: Barclays and RBS EPS (Diluted) 2008-2014 -------------------------------------------Page53
Figure 28: Barclays and RBS ROA (Return on Assets) 2008-2014 ----------------------------- Page 54
Figure 29: Barclays and RBS ROE (Return on Equity) 2008-2014 ----------------------------- Page 54
Figure 30: Barclays and RBSP/E Ratio 2008-2014 ------------------------------------------------- Page55
Figure 31: Barclays and RBS Gearing 2008-2014 ------------------------------------------------- Page 56

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List of Acronyms:
SIFI: Systemically important financial institution
CSR: Corporate social responsibility
FSB: Financial Stability Board
PRA: Prudential Regulation Authority
GVA: Gross value added
M&A: Mergers and acquisitions
FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FED: The Federal Reserve Bank
BOE: Bank of England
FSA: Financial Services Authority
ECB: European Central Bank
CDO: Collateralized Debt Obligation
CEO: Chief Executive Officer
LIBOR: London Interbank Offered Rate
CRD: Capital Requirements Directive
PPOP: Pre-Provision Operating Profit
ROE: Return On Equity
ROA: Return On Assets
P/E: Price-Earnings
QE: Quantitative Easing
SME: Small and medium-sized enterprises
NIM: Net Interest Margin
FOREX: Foreign exchange market

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1) Introduction
Due to the recent financial crises, the debate of financial regulation has increased, in
particular whether the current regulatory framework is adequate enough to deal with an
extremely complex industry that far outpaces regulators ability to keep up.
The reality is that up until the financialcrisis in2008,as there was a bull market and everybody
was happy to ride the upswing, very little attention was paid to what the banks where doing
with regards to complex derivatives and mortgage backed securities. There were some
prophesies of problems that stirred within financialmarkets, such as that by Raghuram Rajan,
the then the governor of India's central bank, who tried to raise awareness in 2005 of these
issues, however three years later his prophesy came to pass with disastrous consequences.
Due to the nature of the crisis, unprecedented actions were taken in order to stem the
problems causedby both the crisis in2008, then the Sovereign debt crisis inlate2009. Actions
taken, such as that of the intervention of central banks in financial markets with QE and the
bailouts and nationalisation of banks.
Rajan now suggests that central bankers “have convinced markets that we continuously come
to their rescue” (Schuman, 2014), implying they will come in and rescue distressed markets
every time they get into trouble, which implies that the problem of moral hazard may be
pervasive throughout financial markets and needs to be addressed.
Rajan also suggests that because of loose monetary policies and unorthodox programs
implemented, financial markets may be in more difficulty than economists and bankers are
leading us to believe, in so much as that asset prices are overly inflated and do not represent
their true fundamentals. This will in turn, at some point come crashing down, as the true
underlying problems have not been addressed.
Up until the financial crisis of 2008, it had been argued by economists bankers and politicians
that there was not enough regulation by some and too much by others, whatever the debate,
the reality was that there was not enough or effective prudent regulation as highlighted by
the various commissions set up by the governments to look into the financialcrises,which led
to excessive risk taking by banks to try and continuously provide above average returns for

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themselves and their shareholders. As a consequence, this was one of the main factors that
contributed to most damaging financial crisis in history (Nichols et al, 2011).
What is important to mention, was the devastating impact the recent banking failure has had
on the socio-economic conditions of the global economy, particularly in the UK where
unemployment has risen to levels not seen since the early 1990’s and there was a
considerable drop in productivity, as can be seen in the graphs below.
Figure 1: UK Jobless Figures (ONS, 2015).
Figure 2: UK Productivity (Trading Economics, 2015).
What is important is not to try and understand why and what caused these problems but to
try and identify weather the changes ex-post have made an impact on these two banks, as
their future success or failure is likely to have an impact on the UK economy as Banking
contributes substantially to GDP and tax revenue, as highlighted in a recent report “In 2014,

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financial and insurance services contributed £126.9 billion in gross value added (GVA) to the
UK economy, 8.0% of the UK’s total GVA” (Tyler, 2015) up from 5.6% in 2001. Furthermore,
the UK government owns 80% of RBS (UKFI, 2015) and at according to the mandate of the
company set up to manage its assets: “UKFI is responsible for devising and recommending
strategies to HM Treasury for returning the banks to private ownership, realising value for the
taxpayer and executing the chosen strategy”. Therefore it is important for the government
and the taxpayer that its successful performance will inherently determine at what price to
liquidate its holdings and at least provide a break-even of this asset, as it chose to bailout RBS
by becoming a shareholder rather different than the US Governments strategy to save some
of its banks.
This is why the issues of prudent financial regulation to deal with the complex nature of
financial markets and the entities that operate within them is extremely important for the
future stability and security of global financial markets. Because without trying to address
these issues, by looking at the fundamentals of banks and trying to identify if the events of
the past few years has helped to change them for the better.
Furthermore, it would be extremely difficult for any regulation that is implemented in the
future, to be successful in trying to curb behaviour that led us into these problems in the first
place, without looking at the effects these have had on their performance and their attitude
towards risky behaviour.
As to the researchers knowledge little or no research has been conducted on the changes and
performance of banks within the UK ex-post credit and sovereign debt crises, particularly
comparing a nationalised and non-nationalised bank.
This is why, for the purpose of this research, it is helpful to look at two banks which have been
designated as “systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs) from the UK, as a case
study, analysing their performance pre and post financial and sovereign debt crisis, in order
to find out whether the impact of new regulations, structural changes within the financial
market, bailouts and nationalisation has and in what way had an impact on them. In addition
looking at as a comparison, the financial data of both banks to identify whether the
nationalisation of RBS has improved its performance as opposed to Barclays who sought
independence from government intervention by sourcing funds from the Middle-East.

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2) Aims, Objectives & Rationale
Aim
To discover whether the implementation of new regulations, structural changes within the
UK financial market, nationalisation affected the performance of Barclays bank and Royal
Bank of Scotland post credit and sovereign debt crisis analysing data from 2001 to 2014.
Research Questions
1) Has there been an overall increase of decreased of shareholder wealth from 2001 to 2014?
2) Has the nationalisationexperienced by RBS created a situation where itcan continue taking
excessive risk, thereby adding to the evidence that safety nets create moral hazard?
3) Has the independence sought by Barclays post crisis improved its performance vis-à-vis
RBS?
Rationale
The recent events have undoubtedly had a huge impact on banking and its future,
furthermore it is obvious that the recent structural changes and the perception of banks will
have an effect on them, but what is unclear is if these changes have impacted them and
particularly in what way. Therefore this needs further exploration as it is extremely important
not only for the banks themselves but for also shareholders, governments, regulators and the
general public as any changes that impacts these banks will have consequences for its
stakeholders.
Furthermore, the outcomes of this paper will show, whether since RBS’s subsequent bailout
and nationalisation, it has improved its financial performance and made enough significant
changes so that when the government decides to liquidate its holding is it likely they will get
a good return but alsoif the bank does go back to private ownership what impact has the past
six years had on it and is it likely to go back to its old ways, or is it become a much safer bank
with a change in attitude towards certain risk taking behaviour.
As a comparison, Barclays was injected with private funds and was not nationalised, it is
interesting to know whether the private injection of capital has had a different impact,

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therefore allowing certain changes to take place which would allow it to operate in a different
way from RBS, such as curbing risk taking behaviour and increasing shareholder wealth
greater than RBS.
Furthermore, both Barclays and RBS needed assistance after the crises, does this fact suggest
that either of them will continue taking excessive risk or has the changes in regulation,
nationalisation, regulatory oversight and capitalinjection forced them to change the way they
operate, from an inherently risky bank to a safe bank. In addition how these events have had
an impact on their performance and the ramifications for its shareholders, because up till the
recent crises it could be argued they were successful banks providing shareholders with an
increase in shareholder wealth, but was this due to strong fundamental growth or excessive
risk taking behaviour.
3) Background Information
3.1) Global Banking Industry Overview
Since 2001, there have been radical and fundamental changes to the global banking industry
and just after recovering from the issues it faced in the 90’s; the events of 9/11 marked the
beginning of a period of growth up until 2007 when the financial crisis hit. Since then, banks
have had to shed thousands of jobs, had to make trillions of dollars in write downs of bad
assets and had to refocus their business models requiring them to shed non-core businesses.
However from recent data, it seems that the global banking is starting to look healthy;
according to Global profits for The Banker’s Top 1000 World Banks ranking for 2014, the
global banks made profits of $920bn in 2013 an increase of 23% from the previous year, for
the first time exceeded the profits in 2007 of $786bn (TheBanker, 2014). As can be seen from
the graph below certain countries are faring better than others, particularly the US and China
but while others are still have modest growth suggesting not all countries have overcome the
difficulties they have faced recently.

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Figure 3: Total profits in top 1000 by country (thebankerdatabase 2014).
What is important to note is the change in the geographical change of the biggest banks and
the profits made, as the graph above shows since 2007 China has surpassed the US in profits
made and also has some of the biggest banks in the world, in addition has the largest pre-tax
profits compared to the rest of the of the world as seen in the graph below.
Figure 4: Pre-tax profits by region (thebankerdatabase 2014).

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In addition, as can be seen from graph below; the iShares Global Financials ETF which shows
a considerable growth since 2011 indicating a sustained period of growth in share price
recovering from considerably since 2008 and 2011.
Figure 5: iShares Global Financials ETF 2001 to 2013 (iShares, 2014).
However, there is some debate over the sustainability of this growth with changes in
regulation, cost cutting measures, alterations to banks balance sheets and changes in their
business models. What is important to note is to try and understand what is driving this
growth, whether it is strong fundamentals or an unsustainable bubble possibly leading to
another banking crisis.
3.2) Barclays Bank Plc
Barclays Bank PLC heritage comes from a London goldsmith bank in 1690 which predates the
Bank of England, started by John Freame and his brother in law Thomas Gould where money
was deposited and the depositor was issued with a receipt which was used as money.
Barclays entered into the picture in 1736 when James Barclay joined the firm and the firm
grew by helping to finance building of canals,bridges and various other enterprises. The bank
grew due to the help the British economy needed; over the next 100 years it merged with
other banking firms to become a nationwide bank. Such acquisitions included London,
Provincial and South Western Bank in 1918, British Linen Bank in 1919. Since the deregulation
in the 1980’s it slowly began to expand globally with various global affiliates and acquisitions
implemented. More recently; Mercantile Credit in 1975, the Woolwich in 2000 and the North

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American operations of Lehman Brothers in 2008 due to its collapse in the crisis. Up until
2007 it made many more acquisitions, making it one of the largest global banks operating in
50 countries, with 139,000 staff with assets of £1.3trn and an income of over £18bn (Barclays
Annual Report, 2013).
However, unlike RBS it was able to receive funding from a mixture of sources which included
sovereign wealth funds and Gulf Royal families which allowed it to avert nationalisation.
3.3) RBS Plc
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC is one of the world's leading financial services
providers, one of the oldest banks in the UK and was founded in Edinburgh, by royal charter,
on 31 May, 1727. During the 19th century it developed a large presence throughout Scotland
and in 1874 opened its first branch in London, since then through organic growth and
acquisitions has grown from a Scottish bank into a British bank. In an effort to diversify it set
up the Direct Line Insurance Company in 1980, which was the first telephone only insurance
company, which employs over 10,000 staff in the UK. Following this it acquired Citizens bank
in an effort to gain access to the US market in 1988. In 2000 it acquired National Westminster
bank and its subsidiary Ulster Bank which was the biggest takeover of a bank in UK history. In
2004 it acquired Juniper capital a US credit card issuer, in the same year Citizens acquired
Charter One bank for $10bn helping it to become aquarter of Barclays revenue stream. These
acquisitions helped it to become one of the largest financial institutions in the world with
assets of £1.027bn, income of £16.7bn and 118,600 employees (RBS, 2013), operating in 38
different markets.
However in 2007 it acquired parts of the Dutch bank ABN Amro with a consortium consisting
of Fortis and Banco Santander; after a battle with Barclays; subsequent difficulties arose with
the ABN Amro deal because this caused it a lot of problems just before the financial crisis in
2008 as it had to take on a large amount of debt to fund the takeover just before the crisis
hit. In April 2008, under the supervision of CEO Fred Goodwin the company issued a rights
issue of £12b from investors to sure up its balance sheet, not long after this the financial crisis
hit and its share price collapsed by 95% and had to be bailed out by the government. In late
2008 it had to make vast write downs on assets due to the credit crisis, and announced that
it would be making a loss for the first time.

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After 2008, it faced huge financial difficulties which like other banks required a huge injection
of capital to keep it afloat, unfortunately this was not enough and it found itself unable to
recapitalise itself and the government had to step in and part nationalise the bank.
4) Literature Review
4.1) Historical Examples of Banking Crises
Historically, there have been many examples of banking failure and collapse, some been
contained and managed, others causing financial contagion and economic crises. What is
evident from these examples highlighted below, as discussed by Calomiris (2009) is that
actions taken ex-post crises by regulators and central banks are not always successful in
dealing with the problem that caused the banks to getinto trouble in the first placeor manage
to mitigate further damage caused by banking failure. In addition, there is growing evidence
that the prominent reason for most banking crises is due to ineffective regulation, as
discussed below.
By conducting historical analysis of banking panics and waves of banking failures, Calomiris
(2009) suggests that they are not due to business cycles, monetary policy errors, balance
sheet restructures (due to liquidity injection), human nature, not random events and do not
necessarily coincide with each other. Instead, suggests they are due to “risk-inviting
microeconomic rules of the banking game that are established by government have always
been the key additional necessary condition to producing a propensity for banking distress”
(Calomiris, 2009, pg 1), such as that of government subsidies and safety nets.
The following examples prove useful as learning lessons, highlighting the myopic view of
human nature, particularly with regards to banking crises. Some events are more well-known
than others, but all are important and serve useful by providing a foundation for future
analysis and context for understanding the problems currently faced in the banking industry
and may shed some light on a suitable course of action ex-ante and ex-post financial crises by
regulators and banks.
One of the earliest known examples of a central bank becoming what today is referred to as
the “lender of last resort” and a banking rescue was in 1890, when the aptly named “Baring
Crisis” occurred, in which the house of Barings (which today is known as Barings Bank) had to

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be rescued by the British government due to excessive risk taking and poor investment
decisions in Argentina (Paolera and Taylor, 2001). Help from the governor of the Bank of
England and a consortium of banks, created a pool of funds in order to guarantee their debts.
This stopped this event from creating a larger financial crisis in Britain, but for some
Argentinian banks they were not so lucky and could not be rescued, consequently were
allowed to fail which led to an economic crisis, recession and somewhat of a global financial
contagion as many other countries were deeply impacted. As discussedby Paolera and Taylor
(2001) they suggestthat the problems with the banks in Argentina were due to a lackof sound
regulation and transparency in the operations of the banking system. This does add to the
debate over government intervention, as in one case intervention helped stem a crisis in one
country and no intervention led to a disastrous crisis in another, furthermore this case
highlights that sound regulation was not apparent and led to excessive-risk taking.
A more recent case to highlight, was in the US in 1929, whereby speculation, asset bubbles
and excessive spending led to the great market crash, proceeded by the banking failure the
following year which consequently led to the monumentally disastrous period after known as
the Great Depression. Friedman and Schwartz (1971, cited by DeLong 2015) argue that it was
the failureof the Federal Reserve to take the correct and necessary action to limit the damage
caused, which exacerbated and protracted this period longer than necessary. However, as
Pongracic Jr (2007) suggests the reason for both errors were that they “were due to factors
that are innate to the capitalist system, unchecked under the supposedly laissez-faire policies
of Herbert Hoover”, indicating that there might be more to the problem than just lax
regulation that allowed asset bubbles and excessive risk taking to take place, and this might
be just a symptom of a more inherent problem within a capitalist system if left to its own
devices especially when combined with lax regulation.
Recently, according to Edwards (2000), up until the late 1990’s there have been “90 banking
crises throughout the world where banking system losses have equalled or exceeded those
experienced by the US banking system in the Great Depression”, suggesting that there is an
increased rate of banking failure, crises and the damage caused becoming much greater.
Edwards (2000) continues by highlighting that even amongst academics they cannot come to
any consensus on the right course of optimal prudent regulation, consequently find it
extremely difficult to convince central bankers what course of action should be taken. This

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indicates that even after some of the most disastrous banking crises,some lessons have either
not been learnt or prospective regulation is extremely difficult to correctly deal with an ever
changing and complex industry.
One of the most notable examples of this problem, was that of LTCM (Long Term Capital
Management), where, under the supervision on the Fed, various financial institutions
combined to recapitalise the fund after the 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian financial crises, then
finally going into liquidation (Lowenstein, 2000). The reason for LTCM’s collapse as suggested
by Edwards (1999) was to due speculation, hubris and excessive risk-taking, but
fundamentally was an issue of lax regulation of the hedge-fund industry, as Edwards (1999)
describes: “regulation has fallen seriously behind market developments, perhaps especially
with respect to hedge funds and off-exchange derivatives markets”. This implies that the rate
of financial innovation and the use of new financial instruments may be at the heart of many
more recent banking crises and regulators may be slow to regulate these activities, as they
may be always trying to play catch up.
Another example of a banking crisis was the “Secondary Banking crisis”inthe UK which lasted
from 1973-1975, in which according to Lambert (2008) where an "estimate in 1978 put the
figure at around £100m” injected by the BOE into secondary lenders to stabilise and try and
stem a financial contagion, which was cause by erratic growth in money markets and
deregulation. What was different, as Lambert (2008) suggests, was that there was no media
coverage of what was going on and was kept behind closed doors, which may have actually
helped the situation as financial contagion may be (in part) to do with media coverage. As
today the media covers all crises and may actually exacerbate crises as customers may have
felt insecure and may have led to a run on the banks. What is interesting was that the then
governor of the BOE had enormous power over the banking industry and was able to wield
that power if banks did not adhere to the “status-quo”, consequently another blunder by
regulators which again led to a housing bubble coupled with risky lending and deregulation
led to another financial crisis that nearly brought down the banking industry.
Furthermore, in 1984 the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company became the
largest bank failure in US history up until the crisis of 2008 according to Haltom (2013), which
was due to the banks unrelenting pace of growth due to M&A’s, in addition to speculation

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and excessive risk-taking. Part of the problem, was as Haltom (2013) suggests was that this
bank was heavily interconnected with other banks, as the FDIC estimated that 2,300 banks
had invested with the bank. As the failure of this bank raised severe concerns over the
possibilityof financialcontagion, the FDIC unusually had to step in and provide assistanceway
beyond anything it had ever previously done in such situations; “Its failure raised important
questions about whether large banks should receive differential treatment in the event of
failure” (Haltom, 2013). This situation gaverise to a new debate over how banks that are “too
big to fail”, get into difficulty, and consequently have to be rescued due to the systemic risk
they pose due to failure. In addition the idea of moral hazard came into play, as banks of this
nature will take excessive risk after intervention as themselves and their creditors would not
bear the full cost of future failure.
Another important example was in the US from 1986-89 “the thrift cleanup was Congress’s
response to the greatest collapse of U.S. financial institutions since the 1930s.. the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), closed or otherwise resolved 296 institutions
with total assets of $125 billion” (Curry and Shibut, 2000). Again this is a case where the
taxpayers had to foot the bill, due to excessive risk taking caused by deregulation but also
volatility in interest rates and abull market inhousing. But as Curry and Shibut (2000) suggest,
lack of understanding by regulators of the true nature and severity of the problem ex-post.
This highlights again the problem regulators have with regards to managing a complex and
multi-faceted industry ex-ante and ex-post banking crises.
4.2) Banking Issues from 2001 to 2008
From 2001 onwards, there have been numerous events that impacted financialmarkets; most
notably where the events of 9/11, the sub-prime mortgage crisis leading to the credit-crisis
then the sovereign debt crisis. However, before addressing the issues of the sub-prime
mortgage, credit and sovereign debt crises, it should be mentioned that just before the
tragedy of 9/11, the events of the Asian Financial crisis in 1997, which raised concerns of a
global financial contagion (king, 2001) and the end of the Dot-com bubble in 2000, which was
partly due to capital markets and venture firms pumping money into companies combined
with expansion then contraction of the money supply (DeLong and Magin,2006), which was
termed “irrational exuberance” by Alan Greenspan.

24
These events help to mark the begging of a new bull market that lasted until 2008, however
it is important to mention that bubbles are not always coupled with banking crises and
recession, as Aoki and Nikolov (2011) highlights the examples of the dot-com and 1987 crash
in which “the collapse of asset prices did not result in a banking crisis and a severe contraction
of real economic activity”. This is also discussed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), who take a
historical view of economic and banking crises, suggest that they may be due to “a protracted
deterioration in asset quality, be it from a collapse in real estate prices or increased
bankruptcies in the nonfinancial sector”, in addition argue that large increases in non-
performing loans and bankruptcies may be a good indicators of banking distress.
Both of these events impacted financial markets just prior to 2001, as a result the role banks
that played in these events was in large part due to their speculative activities, which again
brought into question the issue of banking regulation and the possible damage excessive risk
taking could pose to financial stability. King (2001, pg 23) suggests that the Asian financial
crisis was an “unexpected consequence of international efforts to increase the stability of the
financial system by imposing a common risk-weighted capital standard on banks”, indicating
that the issue of implementing regulations on banks may have unintended negative
consequences not only on banks, but may as suggested, increase the likelihood of further
financial crises and the social consequences of such crises. This implies that regulation is very
complex both on how it is implemented and its consequences; therefore time may be the
main factor on how to determine its desired results and whether it is a success or failure, as
the implementation of any new regulations may do the opposite of creating stability in the
financial markets.
After Asian financial crisis and the collapse of the Dot-com bubble, the tragic events of 9/11
had a significant impact on financial markets causing global indices to become volatile due to
uncertainty and risk aversion (Neely, 2004). This event had a particularly detrimental effect
on the banking system due to banks in the US not being able to process and send payments,
because of the breakdown, this caused a liquidity issue and the Federal Reserve had to step
in (Neely, 2004).
In the EU, there was an increase in the demand for liquidity which was indicated by the
overnight interbank lending and interest rate spikes. In the UK the BOE had to act in much

25
the same way as the FED and ECBto stabilisefinancial markets, concerns that this event would
push the weak economies into a recession. At this point, it was necessary and warranted
intervention due to the issue that these economies had just recovered from economic
recession in the 1990’s and had maintained growth up until 2001.
The effect of 9/11 changed many things, as highlighted by Burger (2013), the banking industry
played a significant role in sanctions in addition to anti-money laundering efforts aimed at
cutting off the funding of terroristic governments and organisations. Legislation was
implemented, that changed the way banking was conducted such as stricter due diligence,
and digitisation of paperwork which help to reduce fraud, increased efficiency and reduced
costs. However there are those within the banking community that argue that it has made
the whole process of conducting business much more difficult.
However, the consequences of this event laid the foundation for what was a period of
exuberant government spending and an economic bubble, as highlighted by Warner (2011)
looking in hindsight at the events post 9/11, “With all major catastrophes, the long-term
damage tends to be inflicted not by the event itself but by the response to it”. Not long after,
the US and the UK went into two wars which dramatically increased government spending,
not only this but central banks went into overdrive with monetary easing which helped to fuel
a credit bubble.
From the period after 9/11 leading up to the crisis in2008, there was much fear of a recession,
central banks lowered interest rates, as cheap credit fuelled a financialbubble with escalating
property prices and financial firms willing to lend to anyone. This cheap money managed to
find its way into sub-prime mortgage holders, which in the infinite wisdom of firms like JP
Morgan, Bear Sterns, Merryl Lynch etc. repackaged these into CDO’s and these where then
sold onto global financial institutions. Then, as interest rates were increased and housing
market became saturated, in 2006 things started to go downhill with borrowers defaulting on
their loans. This in turn affected the CDO’s that where held by financial institutions, and the
problems of the sub-prime mortgage came into effect in 2007.
This then leads us to the financialcrisis in2008; whereby a complex, profit-motivated industry
with a lack of prudent regulation and transparency led us to the most devastating economic
crisis since the Great Depression. This was primarily due to the unfettered use of mortgage

26
backed securities, collateralised debt obligations and credit default swaps by banks that
brought the global finance industry to collapse. As the crisis hit in 2008, the response from
government was much like that of its response after 9/11, to drastically cut interest rates and
implement radical conventional and unconventional strategies to deal with a failing banking
system, such as implementing large amounts of quantitative easing to increase liquidity in the
financial system, which had dried up due to banks hoarding cash to sure up their balance
sheets. In addition to nationalising some banks and purchasing toxic assets fromthese banks
in an effort to stabilise financial markets.
4.3) Banking Performance
Consequently, since the financial crisis in 2008, there has been much academic research into
banking and their performance, to try and identify certain issues, such as why certain banks
performed better than others during these crises and what factors may have contributed to
this. There is still much debate, where some consensus has been in some areas made by
academics, regulators and policy makers as highlighted below, as to what be some of the
factors that helped certain banks performance and had a detrimental effect on others.
Firstly, Hoque (2013) analyses the performance of SIFI’s during the Credit and Sovereign Debt
Crises, and suggests that SIFI’s performance during the credit crisis was related to the fact
that banks could gain easy access to short term funding, consequently meant that they could
take greater risks and lend more. From Hoque’s findings; It could be argued that the
implementation of Basel IIIcapital adequacy provisions (increasedtier 1 capital)helped banks
performance during the sovereign debt crisis, but not the credit crisis, indicating that new
regulation implemented post credit crisis may have had a beneficial effect on performance,
therefore were less risky, which may support the argument in favour for greater regulation
and not bailouts or safety-nets. In addition, Hoque’s (2013) results suggest that there was a
negative effect of a safety-net (deposit insurance) on SIFI’s performance contributing to
evidence that having these mechanisms in place allows banks to take greater risks and further
add to the debate on the problem of Moral Hazard.
In addition, the results indicate some similarities between SIFI’s performance during both
crises and suggest Beta and Idiosyncratic risks may explain this. Hoque highlights that after
his report was published there was another financial crisis (European Contagion which had a

27
smaller impact than the previous two) which did have an impact on SIFI’s performance.
However as Hoque (2013) describes; there is “much variation in the cross-section of the share
price performance”, indicating that Hoque (2013) was able to make comparisons between
SIFI’s in both crises, but was not able to do so for the European Contagion crisis in 2012. This
may highlight the difficulty in being able to determine the performance of SIFI’s, in particular;
using share price as a metric because share price is not only effected by the financial
performance, but due to other factors such as market sentiment, as highlighted by the
previous example of the dot-com era in which companies share prices did not truly reflect its
fundamentals.
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) looked at the performance of banks from 2007 to the credit crisis in
2008, and from their research they indicated that companies with more shareholder friendly
boards performed worse, as management where only interested in satisfying the short term
needs of its investors consequently taking greater risks for short term gains. However, in
contrast Beltratti and Stulz (2012) suggest that “in contrast, banks with more Tier 1 capital,
more deposits, and more loans performed better” during the crisis, indicating that firstly the
new Basel lll regulations may have saved a lot of banks from greater difficulties, which is also
shown to be the caseby Demirguc-Kunt et al(2010). Secondly, banks that continued business
as usual instead of hoarding cash and restricting loans weathered the crisis as opposed to
others that did not. Furthermore, they conclude that banks with greater capital supervision
performed well, which adds credence to the “Stress Testing” tool used in order assess “the
ability of targeted financial institutions to weather the effects of unusually adverse economic
and financial market developments on their revenues, asset valuations, and loan losses”
(Furlong, 2011), which may have helped banks assess their weaknesses. Conversely, Beltratti
and Stulz (2012) suggestthat banks with stronger regulators performed worse, indicating that
intervention may do more harm than good at the expenses of shareholders.
This highlights the debate over the mandate of banks, whereby they are required to make
returns for the shareholders, but to some degree do shareholders have a moral responsibility,
as there is growing literature on the topic of the link between CSR, shareholders and
performance (Dam and Scholtens, 2012), particularly when short-termism and excessive-risk
taking lead to disastrous consequences.

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Fahlenbrach et al (2012) conclude from their research that the experience of a crisis should
allow banks to adapt and learn from its mistakes so that it can perform better when another
crisis occurs which is termed the “Learning Hypothesis”, however they suggest that the
business model of a bank is directly related to their performance during crises and that if a
bank has the same model in one crises and does not change it so that when another crisis
happens they are likely to have poor performance; this is termed the “Business Model
Hypothesis”.
Their study tests the “Learning Hypothesis” and “Business Model” against the “Null
Hypothesis”; which concludes that each crisis is unique and that it affects banks in different
ways therefore its previous experience does not indicate its performance in another crisis.
They found that there was a correlation between poor performance in the first crisis and the
second; they suggested this was due to a culture of risk within the organisation and their
business models which did not change, therefore suggests that the null and learning
hypothesis is incorrect from the 347 banks it studied and that their evidence supports the
business model hypothesis.
Fahlenbrach et al (2012) also pose another question; whether there is a link between the
executives in charge and their personality traits contributed to the banks problems, from their
analysis they could not find a link; this is interesting as it has been said that the personality
traits of hubris and ego of Fred Goodwin led to many of the problems at RBS which suggests
that there may be a link between the personality traits of executives and the problems banks
faced in the crisis; the same could be said of John Varley the CEO of Barclays from 2004 to
2011 who was competing with Goodwin on many of the large acquisitions (for example the
ABN-Amro deal).
However in their findings they did find commonalities between the two crises,which was that
banks relied heavily on short term financing suggesting this formof financing is a contributing
factor to the riskiness of the banks and that they did not learn from their previous mistakes
Interestingly they conclude that deregulation in the US with the repeal of the Glass-Steagal
Act (1933) in 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) which some argue contributed to the financial
crisis in 2008 and the changes in employee compensation packages were not particularly

29
important in explaining the performance of banks, but what they do suggest is that their
performance in crises shows just how inherently risky they are and how exposed they were.
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) explored whether there was a link between the CEO’s financial
incentives and banks performance during the credit crisis. They found that banks with higher
compensation packages for their CEO’s did not necessarily perform worse than others with
less favourable packages. With regard to the argument that executives had poor incentives
to act in the long term interest of the bank and that their compensation packages where not
in line with shareholders’ interests is important. Because this is of great importance to new
regulations implemented in the US and the UK, in particular the Dodd-Frank and Consumer
Protection Act.
The reason for the increase in the bonus culture in the UK was due to de-regulation in the
1980’s otherwise known as the “Big-Bang”; this event completely changed the financial
markets in the UK, however as discussed by Murphy (2013) it could be argued will not reduce
excessive risk taking and could incentivise staff to take bad risks and avoid good risks, in
addition to curbing talent attraction and retention. The question is have recent events put
into motion a new “Big-Bang” which changes financial markets in favour of more regulation
to curb much of the problems which due to the actions to deregulate banks, but may force
banks to operate outside of these markets as they are believe more regulations stifles their
ability to increase shareholder wealth, however such actions may not create sustainable
shareholder value and alsomay hurt the economy, which may lead to asituation of regulatory
capture as discussed by Hardy (2006).
5) Methodology
5.1) Introduction
As can be seen below is a diagramproposed by Saunders et al (2009) that is referred to as the
‘Research Onion’, which helps to depict the different elements that need to be addressed
when conducting research. This is useful as it helps the researcher break down the necessary
steps from the outer layer to the core as research is a multi-level process for establishing a
perspective for collecting and analysing data, as can be seen throughout the description of
this research methodology.

30
This chapter will be highlighting the main research philosophies and the main approach to
this research. Secondly which research approach will be used, thirdly the research strategy,
time horizon that will be used, credibility and validity, ethical considerations.
Figure 6: Research Onion
5.2) Research Philosophy
For research it is important to understand the key concepts in the philosophy of social
sciences, which are paradigm, methods, methodology, epistemology and ontology. These
different aspect are part of the framework or view of research, therefore it is necessary to
consider the different aspects of research paradigms in addition to epistemology and
ontology.

31
Ontology is described as “the science or study of being” and “what is the nature of social
reality” (Blaikie, 2000), or fundamentally, “what constitutes valid knowledge and how can we
obtain It?” (Raddon, 2010). It is a part of philosophy that focuses in the nature of what exists
and how things interact with each other, or as Flowers (2009) describes; “is this an objective
reality that really exists, or only a subjective reality, created in our minds” when referring to
our view of the nature of reality. Furthermore, as Hatch and Cunliffe (2006) highlights that
complexity is introduced when addressing certain phenomena such as organisational culture,
control or power and as such, are they just an illusion or based in reality. Based on this, we
have to consider our ontological assumptions as these may add bias to our view and may
hinder our research because we must think about what the fundamental properties in the
social world are, because this may impact on what is studied and how it is studied, as
discussed by Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008). As this is not easy to answer there are different
views such as objectivism, and subjectivism which are the study of conceptions of reality.
Epistemology, as described by Blaikie (2000) “is a theory of knowledge, a theory or science of
the method or grounds of knowledge” and “considers views about the most appropriate ways
of enquiring into the nature of the world” (Flowers, 2009. Citing Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and
Jackson, 2008). Or as Raddon (2010) describes “what constitutes reality and how can we
understand existence”, but is fundamentally asking ourselves what is the limits of our
understanding and knowledge. Because there is no clear answers to this question there are
many approaches to this, briefly described are the four main approaches as suggested by
Saunders et al (2009) which are interpretivism, positivism, realism and pragmatism.
The First view, as Saunders et al (2009) highlights, is Interpretivism which “advocates that it
is necessary for the researcher to understand differences between humans in our role as social
actors”, in other words the way in which we try to make sense of the complex world around
us, by trying to discover irrationalities in behaviour because in the context of this research
irrationalities are part of the problem. This is evident particularly when the actors involved
may not fully understand the consequences of their actions, as Saunders et al (2009) suggest,
that “Not only are business situations complex, they are also unique. They are a function of a
particular set of circumstances and individuals coming together at a specific time”, this is
highly appropriate for this research as the nature of banks is not only extremely complex, but
it is at its heart, studying human nature, the consequences of their actions and social

32
phenomena. This is also discussed by Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) who suggest that “in
this view, reality is socially constructed by interconnected patterns of communication.
Therefore, reality is not defined by individual acts, but by complex and organised patterns of
ongoing actions”. Particularly important is that interpretivism has an integral role in aiding to
produce results from data collected and is important to interact with the environment but to
also interpret and make sense of events, and to infer meaning from it.
The second view; Positivism as described by Flowers (2009) “is derived from that of natural
science and is characterised by the testing of hypothesis developed from existing theory”, this
position is used heavily in the studies of organisations and management as Eriksson and
Kovalainen (2008) explain that the nature of business knowledge “is often functional by
nature, and there is a desire for universal truth that would hold across industries, businesses,
cultures and countries”. This is also important in this research because, there is existing
hypothesis that try to explain the behaviour of companies grounded in theory. However, it
has its shortcomings, firstly it makes assumptions about allprocesses;it inherently states that
all processes can be seen by the relationship between people or their actions. Secondly, for
business research it relies heavily on the status-quo and findings are descriptive and may not
true delve into the issues. Thirdly, some concepts (e.g. time, space and cause) are not based
on experience and do not derive themselves from knowledge (Research Methodology, 2015)
Thirdly, Realismas described by Saunders et al (2009) is similar to positivismin “that what the
senses show us as reality isthe truth: that objects have an existenceindependent of the human
mind. The philosophy of realism is that there is a reality quite independent of the mind”. They
go on further to explain the two distinguishing forms of realism, which is critical realism; in
which we as humans only experience the world through our sensations, whereas direct
realismin contrast, infers that what we perceive is reality. However, Eriksson and Kovalainen
(2008) explain that this approach combines some of the ideas in interpretivism
(constructionism) and positivism, because as Flowers (2009) argues that realism came from
frustration with the rigidity of the views of constructionism and positivism. Furthermore
Hatch and Cunliffe(2006) argue “whereby surface events are shaped by underlying structures

33
and mechanisms but that what we see is only part of the picture”, this is important in trying
to view a complex world particularly in the context of this research.
However, for the purpose of this research will be adopting the Pragmatic approach, as this
involves using the best approach which is suitedto the research problem as this allows greater
freedom by not being Pidgeon-holed into one approach. Furthermore, this approach allows
the researcher “the freedom to use any of the methods, techniques and procedures typically
associated with quantitative or qualitative research. They recognise that every method has its
limitations and that the different approaches can be complementary” (Alzheimer Europe,
2009). This is further discussed by Saunders et al (2009), from ontology allows the researcher
to view things externally and allows for multiple views, choosing the best view depending on
the nature of the research question. From what constitutes acceptable knowledge
(Epistemology); “Either or both observable phenomena and subjective meanings can provide
acceptable knowledge dependent upon the research question” (Saunders et al, 2009), this
therefore allows the use of quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods approaches which is
important in the context of this research as it is important to try and make connections
between the qualitative and quantitative elements that are used in order to find meaning to
the complex nature of field of study
5.3) Research Approach
There are two approaches; firstly the ‘Inductive’ approach which “aims to describe the
characteristics of people and social situations, and then to determine the nature of the
patterns of the relationships, or networks of relationships, between those characteristics”
(Blaikie,2000), which suggests thathas alimited capacityin answering certain questions, such
that of ‘why’ rather than ‘what’. It is used to produce generalisations to explain patterns and
then use these patterns to help to explain further observations.
Secondly, the ‘Deductive’ approach as Saunders et al (2009) describes, “involves the
development of a theory that is subjected to a rigorous test” and as Blaikie (2000) further
highlights that it works in reverse to inductive approach as “the researcher has to find or
formulate a possible explanation, a theoretical argument for the existence of the regularity in

34
the social phenomenon under consideration”. The deductive approach is the most suitable
for this research, as it is necessary to test theories from data, because from the deductive
approach it seeks to define relationships between variables by studying patterns and due to
the nature of this research it is necessary to use a structured methodology in order for
replication to occur for others to test the hypotheses of this study. This also requires a high
level of objectivity and independence which is necessary for scientific rigour, in addition
certain concepts have to be ‘Operationalised’ so that they may be measured quantitatively.
Thirdly the principle of ‘Reductionism’ must be followed, which is to say that complex
concepts or problems must be reduced to their simplest form. Finally, the last aspect of
deduction as Saunders et al(2009) highlights is known as ‘Generalisation’; “inorder to be able
to generalise statistically about regularities in human social behaviour it is necessary to select
samples of sufficient numerical size”. This is again useful for testing hypotheses as the bigger
the sample the more likely patterns can be measured and observed, therefore problems of
predictions are less likely to occur.
However there are both arguments for and against each approach, “Followers of induction
would also criticise deduction because of its tendency to construct a rigid methodology that
does not permit alternative explanations of what is going on.” Saunders et al(2009), and each
approach is more suited to a different type of methodology, however following an inductive
approach would allow for less rigidity in the methodology and may reveal different
explanations but tends to use qualitative approach rather than a quantitative approach.
5.4) Research Strategies
The casestudy approach has been chosen to investigatethe financialperformance of Barclays
Bank Plc and The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc post credit and sovereign debt crises, as this is
the most appropriate method as an approach as Yin, (2002, cited by Eriksson and Kovalainen,
2008, pg 118) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that “investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between the phenomenon and
the context are not clearly evident”.
It is important therefore in the context of this approach, as Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008 pg
115) explain that “the research questions are always related to the understanding and solving
of the case” as this is import to set boundaries especially in the context of this complex case.

35
Furthermore, investigating the caseinrelation to its historical, economic, technological, social
and cultural context, consequently it is a vital technique to look at this case in the context of
the problem, but most of all the case study approach helps to break down and present what
is an extremely complex situation with a multitude of issues in an accessible fashion to the
reader. However there are some who argue this method has its drawbacks, such as it being
anecdotal descriptions that do not stand up to scientific rigour.
Overall, the case study approach is extremely useful method for investigating the dynamics
and complexity of these two organisations, their performance and their relationship with
themselves and parties with a vested interest in their future success.
The use of descriptive statistics will be used as this enables the researcher to describe (and
compare) variables numerically with the use of diagrams.
Furthermore, quantitative data and qualitative elements will be used, so that both elements
can evaluated and ideas can be synthesised.
This will involve the use of descripto-explanatory studies, according to Saunders et al (2009)
combining both descriptive and explanatory research in order to show an accurate profile of
events then to establish causal relationships between variables.
The quantitative element of this research, for the purpose of effective analysis of the
performance of these two banks will be the use of standard performance metrics (e.g.
revenue, P/E ratio, EPS etc.) that are commonly used by financial analysts.
The qualitative aspect of this research will include several major events that have occurred
post credit crisis, and how have these events impacted these two banks by attempting to
make alinkage between these events and their financialperformance, particularly have these
events have had a detrimental or beneficial effect for the company’s analysed.
In the case of this research it is necessary to adopt a cross-sectional longitudinal approach as
the time horizon will be from 2001 to 2014 comparing two companies, the data will be
collected from the accounts and reports from the two banks in addition to share price data
collected from Yahoo Finance for each year and the share price will be taken as of last day of
trading (usually 31st December, unless bank holiday or weekend). The dates of events and

36
regulations implemented willbe taken from the various government agencies and recognised
news agencies.
The analysis of data will occur from the beginning of 2008 onwards to 2014 as this was the
year that both companies had to raise capital in order to bolster its balance sheet, however
data previous will be briefly shown as a historical context of their performance.
The data willcome from the annual reports and accounts and tabulated using Microsoft Excel,
where necessary the calculations will be done using this software. From these calculations
graphs will be created in order to aid the description and analysis of the data.
5.5) Rationale for choice of banks
1) There designation as SIFIs. “In November 2011 the Financial Stability Board published an
integrated set of policy measures to address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated
with systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). In that publication, the FSB
identified as global SIFIs (G-SIFIs) an initial group of global systemically important banks (G-
SIBs), using a methodology developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS)” FSB Report (2014). Barclays (Bucket 3) and RBS (Bucket 2) are the only banks in the
UK with this designation.
2) Market Capitalisation, with Barclays (43.72bn) and RBS (23.88bn).
3) Both banks are based in the UK with global operations.
4) For useful comparative purposes between a nationalised and non-nationalised bank.
5.6) Rationale for events chosen
1) The nationalisation of RBS in 2008.
2) The injection of private capital into Barclays by investors in 2008.
3) Banking Levy by UK Government; instituted a levy on banks from the 1st January 2011 which
is a tax on the banks debts which was implemented to curb risky forms of borrowing.
4) Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 which came into effect on the 1st April 2013,
according to Foxwilliams (2013) “the Act makes extensive amendments to the Financial

37
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), the Bank of England Act 1998 and the Banking Act
2009 in order to facilitate the structural reforms”, this act created the PRA and the FCA and
brought the LIBOR under the oversight of the FCA to try and stop future manipulation from
occurring, but fundamentally these organisation were created to maintain financial stability.
5) Dodd-Frank Act (2010). As both Barclays and RBS have operations in the US, this will have
an impact on them.
6) CRD IV: came into effect on 1 January 2014, according to the FCA (2014) “The aim of CRD
IV is to minimise the negative effects of firms failing by ensuring that firms hold enough
financial resources to cover the risk associated with their business”.
5.7) Performance metrics
The metrics chosen are basic performance indicators rather than complex econometric
models of analysis. Some obviously important indicators are used, however PPOP (Pre-
Provision Operating Profit) has been used as the profit figure used to calculate certain
ratios, as can be seen below. The reason for the use of this profit figure is that it is a clearer
picture of its profit making ability before any deductions are made and will have an impact
on the ROA and ROE ratio.
- Share price. Data taken from Yahoo Finance.
- Operating Income. Data taken from annual reports.
- Operating expenses. Data taken from annual report.
- Pre-Provision Operating Profit (PPOP). Calculated as: (operating income - operating
expenses).
- ROA (Return on Assets). Calculated as: (Pre-Provision Operating Profit/Total Assets)*100.
Data taken from annual reports.
- ROE (Return on Equity). Calculated as: (Pre-Provision Operating Profit/Equity)*100. Data
taken from annual reports.
- EPS (Earnings Per Share, Diluted). Data taken from annual reports.

38
- P/E Ratio (Price Earnings Ratio). Calculated as: (Share Price/EPS).
- Gearing. Calculated as: (Debt/Equity)*100. Data taken from annual reports.
- Provision for Bad and Doubtful Debts. Data taken from annual reports.
5.8) Reliability and Validity
The data was collected from reputable sites where the data has not been manipulated, in
addition the majority of the data will come directly from the annual reports and accounts of
the banks, therefore reduced the likelihood of bias. The data used has been taking from the
correct sources and has analysed using existing measures and it is scientifically rigorous.
5.9) Ethical Considerations
As the quantitative data is freely accessible and in the public domain, therefore it does not
require permission from its owners for its use.
5.9) Limitations
The main limitations of the research is word count due to the extensive nature of the
subject area many academic papers and research could not be included. Furthermore, due
to time constraints which limited the amount of data that could be used and analysed.
6) Findings and Analysis
6.1) Introduction
This chapter will show the findings from the secondary data collected and analysis from 2001
to 2007 in order to highlight the performance of these two banks pre-crisis, then to look at
their performance post-crisis inorder to find patterns that might indicate whether either bank
post-nationalisation and capital injection has performed better than the other and to
ascertain why this might be. However, it should be mentioned how devastating the financial
crisis impacted global equity markets particularly the banking sector as can be seen by the
graphs below, the crisis wiped vast sums off the value of global stocks and eight years on
some indices have still yet to reach their pre-crisis levels others have surpassed, particularly
the MSCI World Banks index which dropped from over 200 points pre-crisis to almost 50
points in 2009 and has taken almost five years to recover suggesting global banking stocks

39
have recovered. In the context of this analysis, from a longer term view of Barclays and RBS
share price as seen in the graph below the timeframes of analysis are pivotal in the history of
both banks and put into context how much of an impact these crises have had an impact.
Figure 7: Barclays and RBS share price July 1988 to May 2015.
Figure 8: DJI, FTSE 100, Barclays and RBS comparison from 30th April 1999 to May 26th
2015.
Figure 9: MSCI World, MSCI World Banks, MSCI ACWI IMI Index from 2000 to 2015 (MSCI).

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6.2) Analysis from 2001 to 2007
As can be seen Barclays share price was quite stable with a minor dip from 2002-2003 but
gradually climbed from 500p in 2001 to just shy of 800p in 2007 helped by positive earnings
results year on year, from the data the operating income increased by 56% while its operating
expenses increased by 50% and PPOP increased by 68% from 2001 to 2007, suggesting that
up until 2008 it had been performing well and seemed to be a successful bank with continued
upward growth. However in comparison of PPOP as a % of revenue, it was 42% in 2001 and
this dropped to 35% in 2007 indicating that their expenses had increased, which may have
been due to an increasein staffcosts from 2003 to 2007 and other expenses having an impact
on its profit margins.
Figure 10: Barclays, RBS and FTSE 100 Share Price 2001-2008 (Google Finance).
Figure 11: Barclays Operating Income, Operating Expenses and PPOP 2001-2007.
In the case of RBS, its share price remained stable up until 2007 where it climbed from 5000p
in 2001 to 6800p at its pinnacle in early 2007. Much like Barclays it had positive earnings
0
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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Operating Income Operating Expenses Pre-Provision Operating Profit

41
results year on year which helped it to increase its share price to unprecedented levels.
However, it is worth mentioning that this was at the height of the bull market as large
amounts of capital flowed into equities combined with speculation which helped push the
FTSE 100 to levels not seensince 1999-2000, which againhad a direct impact on both RBS and
Barclays share price in addition to the acquisitions both companies were driving through to
help them grow extremely quickly under the guidance of Fred Goodwin and Bob Diamond.
As can be seen from RBS results, its operating income increased by 47% while operating
expenses increased by 58% and its PPOP increased by 37 % from 2001 to 2007 indicating what
should have been a very healthy and prosperous bank with good future growth. However in
contrast to Barclays it managed to increase its PPOP as a % of operating income from 43% in
2001 to 54% in 2007 indicating that it had decreased its expenses and costs through various
cost cutting measures helping it to increase its profit margins.
Figure 12: RBS Operating Income, Operating Expenses and PPOP 2001-2007.
In addition, from the two graphs showing the BOE and FED interest rates, both dropped rates
from 2001-2003 in an effort to stimulate their economies, which in turn helped to fuel an
asset bubble in both housing and equities up until 2007. Then consequently started to raise
rates from 2003 until 2007 as they realised inflationary pressures were having an impact on
the US and UK economies growth, which in turn meant that both Barclays and RBS raisedtheir
key lending rates which had an impact on their net interest margins as they could raise their
margins quicker than the cost of their own funding which may help to explain the
unprecedented PPOP growth figures for both Barclays and RBS in 2007.
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42
Figure 13: BOE Interest Rates from 2001 to 2009.
It is important to mention, that both Barclays and RBS have operations in the US and any
changes in interest rates in both the UK and US impact on their cost of borrowing.
Figure 14: FED Interest Rates from 2002 to 2014.
However as can be seen from the graph below which shows the estimates for lending,
deposits and NIM for UK banks, shows a gradual decrease in the NIM from 2001 to 2008 to
the lowest levels recorded. This suggests that the banks ability to make profits from lending
have been squeezed from 2001 onwards indicating that Barclays and RBS were using
government capital injection to bolster their balance sheets to protect themselves against
loan losses in addition to diversifying into other areas to increase profits as rate cuts were not
being carried through to the 3 month LIBOR rate due to the difficulties in financial markets.
0
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Thu,08Feb2001
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BOE Interest Rate %

43
Figure 15: M4 Lending, M4 Deposits and NIM 1999 to 2008 (MoneyMovesMarkets).
Barclays provisions for bad and doubtful debts remained stable from 2001 to 2004 where it
increased drastically from £m 1,091 in 2004 to £m 2,795 in 2007 as it increased provisions for
defaults on loans prior to the crisis in2007-2008. Much like Barclays,RBSprovisions remained
stable until 2004, at which point they increased from £m 1,428 in 2004 to £2,128 in 2007,
again suggesting the anticipation of substantial write-downs.
Figure 16: Barclays and RBS Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts 2001-2007
As can be seen from the graph, Barclays EPS grew from 36.7 to 66.7 from 2001 to 2007
indicating steady growth per share, whereas RBS EPS grew from 66.3 in 2001 to 193.2 in 2006
then dropped to 75.7 in 2007, which was due to an increase in the amount of shares. Overall,
these figures do show a consistent amount of growth for both EPS figures indicating that
shareholder value was in theory increasing, however what the underlying driver of their
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
£m
Provisions for Bad & DoubtfulDebts

44
profits is difficult to ascertain as they may have been utilising creative accounting to pad their
results to make it seem that there was genuine sustainable growth which turned out to be
false.
Figure 17: Barclays and RBS EPS (Diluted) 2001-2007.
Both the ROA and ROE are intended to see how the company’s ability to generate earnings
from its investments. ROA looks at management’s ability to generate profit from its assets,
whereas ROE shows whether management has been growing the company at an acceptable
rate for shareholders. For Barclays Its figures show a gradual decrease in its ROA from 1.3%
in 2001 to 0.6% in 2007 indicating that it was not able to efficiently produce growth in income
from its assets, suggesting that it was not actually performing well in this period due to a
number of factors such as the numerous M&A’s and restructurings that had impacted their
ability to sustain profitability suggesting the aggressive growth strategies were not working
and there was an indication that something was not right at its core. This is amplified be the
fact that investors were not looking at banks true fundamentals and the massive discrepancy
between what its share price should be and what it was up until 2007 again showed an over
inflated asset bubble and what turned out to be a very sick bank that investors still believed
was healthy until its collapse. Barclays ROE shows a gradual decrease as it increased the
amount of shares, but was unable to increase its profits.
What is interesting is the gearing ratio, as Barclays makes an effort to increase its equity
substantiallyby 942% from 2001 to 2007 thereby reducing itleverage, similarto RBS, however
it does not reduce its debt but increases it from by 52% in the same period.
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

45
In regards to RBS, much like Barclays sought to grow exponentially though M&A’s, however
its ROA was stable from 2001 to 2006, but in 2007 dropped by 50%, suggesting it was able to
make a better ROA than Barclays again the data shows weaknesses in its profit making
abilities towards 2007. However investors were blinded and were not looking at its
fundamentals. Similarly to Barclays it ROE decreased substantially as it increased the amount
of shares and was unable to increase its profits. This is also reflected by its gearing ratio as it
increased its equity by 3305% from 2001 to 2007 and its debt by 332%. This is interesting as
both banks sought to deleverage themselves drastically over this period.
For both banks P/E ratio, they drop over this period, but are fundamentally lower as they are
perceived by investors as having slower growth prospects, but more so because of numerous
factors. Such as the impact of interest rate volatility, their leverage, economic cyclicality
assumptions and expectations made about their financials in addition to the banks ability to
grow, which is very difficult to do organically and therefore has to be done by M&A’s but
these are fraught with danger for obvious reasons. Barclays P/E ratio drops by 50% from 13.9
to 7.0 from 2001 to 2007, whereas RBS drops by 77% from 21.6 to 5.0.
Figure 18: Barclays and RBS ROA (Return on Assets) 2001-2007.
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
%

46
Figure 19: Barclays and RBS ROE (Return on Equity) 2001-2007.
Figure 20: Barclays and RBS Gearing 2001-2007.
Figure 21: Barclays and RBS P/E Ratio 2001-2007.
0
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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Axis Title
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

47
6.3) Analysis from 2008 to 2014
In mid-2007, news came from the US as Bear Sterns stated that it had lost money in two of
their key hedge funds due to their sub-prime holdings. Banks, central banks and regulators
started becoming nervous over the situation and liquidity problems started to take effect as
banks started holding onto cash. The situation was exacerbated by the high interest rates of
5.75% (see BOE Interest Rate Graph) which had an impact on banks that relied on lending as
their main source of revenue. Both Barclays and RBS started to show difficulties and had to
raise capital to protect themselves against shocks, not long after the government had to step
in and part nationaliseRBSwhereas Barclays raised funds frominvestors because the previous
capital raising effort where not enough as both banks had to make huge write-downs in
assets. Furthermore the general economy started to show signs of weaknesses and the
central banks had to lower interest rates, but soon found out that this was not enough then
had to resort to unusual monetary policies such as QE when traditional methods proved not
to work as interest rates dropped to unprecedented levels.
As can be seen from the interest rate graphs, the BOE and FED had used the management of
interest rates to curb inflation but also to stimulate the economy, however as the crisis hit in
2008 it was deemed necessary to slash rates to historical lows in 2009 as the recession hit.
This in theory allowed banks to make greater margins as they could gain access to cheaper
funds due to operating both in the US and UK markets, however this did not work and what
is interesting is that the 3 Month LIBOR rate in drops from around 6% in 2008 to 0.6% in 2010
and remains around this level until 2015 indicating that money is cheap for banks to lend and
borrow, however banks were not increasing their lending, particularly to SME’s. In addition
to this, what is interesting is that the funding for lending scheme initiated by the government
to help banks to increase lending seems to be used by banks to bolster their balance sheets
(possible due to the capital adequacy provisions) rather than used for its intended purpose,
which may explain a decrease in lending by banks in addition to restrictive lending policies as
general concerns over the economic conditions.

48
Figure 22: 3 Mont LIBOR from 2004 to 2015 (Global Rates).
Furthermore banks main activities is maturity transformation, where they borrow at cheap
rates and invest to gain high yield returns, but as Genay (2014) suggests “The economic
conditions and low interest rate environment of recent years have been challenging for banks
that rely on a wide spread between long- and short-maturity yieldsto generate earnings”, this
again adds evidence to the tough conditions banks have to operate in which again helps to
explain the poor performance since 2010 and further force banks to resort to other methods
of making revenue. Consequently this situation forces banks to invest in longer term loans as
they provide higher yields but has the added problem of increasing interest rate risk which
may lead to greater use in hedging. Conversely when the interest rates do eventually rise
borrowing rates will increase which may impact on their NIM, however as improvements in
the economy have become evident may mean higher demand in loans and will seep through
to increased revenues.
What is also notable is the fact that Barclays purchased assets from Lehman Brothers during
the crisis, helping it to grow its investment banking arm, which attributed to the majority of
its net income which was £13,057m in 2010 and has dropped to £7,602m in 2014 indicating
that it has been substantially reducing its focus on this area onto other aspect of its business,
which may reduce the banks focus on risk taking activities suchas proprietary trading to other
less risky activities. However interestingly, Barclays move a large amount of its toxic assets
onto the SPV named Protium in 2009 which it brought back onto its books in 2011 suggesting
it may be using such SPVs to hide losses which is not truly reflected in its accounts and reports.
0
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
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49
What is evident is that it has reduced its employee count in its investment banking division,
similarly RBS investment banking arm Global Banking and Markets income was a large
proportion of its income which was £11,058m in 2009 to £4,292m in 2014 and has also
substantially reduced it number of employees in the bank most notably in its investment
banking arm, this is due to the fact that it has put in new management to oversee the
restructuring efforts and to try and reduce its global presence and to refocus on the UK
market. However, Barclays has been restructuring but not to the extent RBS has, its strategy
seems to maintain its global presence particularly expand into new markets (e.g. ABSA deal)
and to cut costs to make the bank more efficient.
As can be seen below stock markets recover from the collapse in asset prices, the FTSE 100
has returned to pre-crisis levels increasing by 62% from late 2008 to mid-2015, while Barclays
is trading at roughly a third of its pre-crisis levels but has increased by 76% over this same
period, RBS however is down by 37% over this period and trading at a fraction of where it was
at pre-crisis. What is interesting is how both companies track the FTSE 100 over this time
period, as both are still constituents of the index, whereas Barclays share price has
outperformed the FTSE, RBS however has underperformed against the benchmark.
Furthermore Barclays share price does look quite volatile in comparison to the FTSE and RBS
has been quite stable indicating different drivers in the share price other than fundamentals,
most likely due to market sentiment and speculation. The explanation for the stability in the
share price of RBS post nationalisation is the fact that the government owns 81% indicating
that there is a small amount of free float shares and has the lowest level of free float shares
on the FTSE 100, furthermore the reason for it remaining in the FTSE 100 is due to its large
market cap and if it were to be dropped to a lesser index would skew the data.
There is also much debate over the rise in equity markets post crises, leaving many to believe
there is another asset bubble due to governments QE measures, which helps to explain the
increase in equities since 2008. This adds credence to the issue of banking cyclicality, what
may be occurring is that because of Barclays independence may be more prone to cyclicality
than RBS due to the nature of their situation. Barclays may be more short-termist in their
attitudes because of their independence, whereas RBS has the government as its majority

50
shareholder which may indicate that its influence may be having a far more beneficial effect
in the long term as it has a different view of its investment than regular investors would have.
Figure 23: Barclays, RBS and FTSE 100 Share Price 2008-2015 (Google Finance).
As can be seen from the graph below, Barclays operating revenue and operating expenses
have increased from 2008 to 2011 suggesting that it may have been performing well or it was
stillartificiallytrying to show that it was performing welluntil it had to make substantialwrite-
downs in toxic assets up until 2012, where it made only £m 106 in PPOP. However this has
increased to £m 2692 in 2014 suggesting that it may be recovering and performing well as
economic conditions improved since both the credit and sovereign debt crises. Furthermore
its net interest income modestly climes from £m 11,469 in 2008 to £12,080 suggesting that it
has not increased the revenues made from loans, therefore any increases would have to be
explained from other trading aspect of its business.
The increases in operating expenses where due to the charges for litigation (e.g. provision for
litigation of foreign exchange manipulation in 2014 £m 1,250), regulatory penalties,
restructuring costs and banking levy and increased provisions due to interest rate swap mis-
selling and PPI mis-selling (total provision from 2011 to 2014 £m 5,220), however bonuses
and staff costs still remain high falling slightly from £11,916 in 2010 to £11,005 in 2014
suggesting that the attitude towards staff remuneration have not changed, particularly with
regards to its bonuses paid to its management and staff.

51
Figure 24: Barclays Operating Income, Operating Expenses and PPOP 2008-2014.
RBS share price has been affected by its lacklustre performance results as can be seen below,
where it made substantial losses in 2008 recovering in 2009 and then PPOP continues to fall
from £m 17,212 in 2009 to £m 114 in 2012, £189 in 2013 then increases to £m 1,291 in 2014
implying that since 2008 it has gone through considerable difficulties and changes but may be
on the mend as its operating revenue and operating expenses has remained relatively stable
since 2012. RBS net interest income has dropped considerably from £18,675m in 2008 to
£9,258m suggesting that lending over this period has plummeted and has failed to hit its
lending targets. This is further highlighted by its net interest income, as it has dropped from
£14,209m in 2010 to £9,258m, further indicating the decrease in the revenues made from
lending. Its staffcosts have dropped from £9,671m in 2010 to £5,757m in 2014 which support
the massive restructuring and cost cutting measures that have been implemented since
nationalisation, however still maintained its high level of bonuses to staff post crisis even
though it has been performing poorly over this period suggesting its attitude towards bonus
culture may not have changed post crisis, but since the restructuring has reduced its
remuneration up to 2014 suggesting the nationalisation has had an impact on reducing risk
taking incentives.
Fines and penalties, have had an impact on their profits from 2012 onwards including losses
on Greek Debt as a result of the Eurozone debt crisis (cumulatively has paid £3.7bn in PPI
redress, £1.4bn in interest rate product redress, £2,050m for mortgage backed security
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52
litigation, Euro392m for LIBOR fixing, since 2012 paid £1,119m in fines relating for FOREX
manipulation ). RBS has made a loss in 2014 of £m3,486 from its US banking division citizens,
which helps to explain the drop in operating income. Furthermore its PPOP has dramatically
deceased from 2009 to 2012 suggesting that the recent changes have impacted its
performance and this is also reflected in its stable but underperforming share price, however
since 2012 it has only marginally increased its PPOP compared to Barclays suggesting the
independence sought by Barclays has helped it to perform better than RBS in this time frame.
Figure 25: RBS Operating Income, Operating Expenses and PPOP 2008-2014.
As can be seen below, provisions jumped up for both banks for write-downs on loans in
addition to divesting of toxic assets post crisis, but since 2010 have dropped considerably
from £m 5,672 to £m 2,168 and for Barclays and from £9,256m to £8,432m in 2013 to a
positive figure of £m 1,352 in 2014 suggesting that RBS has gone through a substantial
restructuring of its loans in order to try and refocus the business. With regards to Barclays, it
still may be having write-downs on assets and loans but at a much slower rate than RBS
indicating that it might be moving some of these assets onto SPVs and not increasing its loan
portfolio.
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53
Figure 26: Barclays and RBS Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts 2008-2014.
As can be seen Barclays EPS has dropped considerably since 2008 where for two years it had
negative figures for 2012 and 2014 suggesting poor performance, whereas RBS EPS has had
negative figures for all but 2014. However what is important it the rate of increase of for RBS
where it has been gradually improving conversely Barclays has been declining,suggesting that
RBS performance may be improving and Barclays performance may be deteriorating over this
period.
Figure 27: Barclays and RBS EPS (Diluted) 2008-2014.
The figures for ROA and ROE continue to show a similar picture, as Barclays ROA slightly
increases from 0.16% in 2008 to 0.39% in 2010 but declines to 0.2% in 2014, its ROE drops
from 7.02% in 2008 to 4.08% again suggesting that its financial performance has weakened
-16000
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Provisions for Bad & DoubtfulDebts
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
EPS (Diluted)

54
over this period, however both RBS and Barclays figures for 2012 where similarly poor in
comparison as difficult economic conditions have affected their profits. From 2012 onwards,
because of RBS restructuring and asset selloff has managed to increase its ROA from 0.009%
in 2012 to 0.123% in 2014, suggesting that it has been making better use of its assets. This
upturn is also reflected in its ROE from 0.75% in 2012 to 22.91% in 2014 further indicating
better performance over this period. Barclays figure show a marginal improvement over this
period with its ROA increasing from 0.007% in 2012 to 0.198% in 2014 and its ROE 0.17% to
4.08% in the same period suggesting a slight improvement in its performance but still very
weak.
Figure 28: Barclays and RBS ROA (Return on Assets) 2008-2014.
Figure 29: Barclays and RBS ROE (Return on Equity) 2008-2014
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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James MacLeod Nairn MSc Dissertation

James MacLeod Nairn MSc Dissertation

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