Professional Soldiers Masters Thesis

i
Evolution
of the
Professional Soldier
Private Military Contractors in Iraq
Exam number: B003496
August 19, 2011
Masters of Science International and European Politics

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Abstract
This dissertation will question the perceived roles and responsibilities of the private
military industry in the ongoing operation in Iraq. Much has been said about the potential
dangers of an increased reliance on military contractors and the media has created an
environment ripe for misinformation. Critics of the Iraq War have targeted this industry
to instill that mercenaries are a rampant problem. This dissertation will seek to highlight
the greater context within which these “mercenaries” operate to demonstrate that they are
professional soldiers undergoing an evolutionary process. The dissertation then explores
the contractors on the ground and the framework under which these professionals operate
suggesting a robust framework to mitigate fears of the private military industry in Iraq.

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Dedicated to the 257 American
contractors who lost their lives during the
Iraq War
Table of Contents

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Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1
History......................................................................................................................................... 2
Theory.......................................................................................................................................... 5
Iraq war........................................................................................................................................ 7
Chapter 1: Hamilton’s Empowerment of the State ......................................................................... 9
The Federalist Paper No. 8 .......................................................................................................... 9
The Root of Professionalism ..................................................................................................... 10
Chapter 2: President Eisenhower’s Farewell Address .................................................................. 12
The Military-Industrial Complex Emerges ............................................................................... 12
The End of the Cold War........................................................................................................... 14
The Private Military Corporation Comes of Age ...................................................................... 16
Chapter 3: The Iraqi War .............................................................................................................. 17
Background................................................................................................................................ 17
Revolution or Evolution............................................................................................................ 18
Chapter 4: Iraq War Accountability, Legal and Ethical Issues..................................................... 29
Evolution in the Fog of War...................................................................................................... 30
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 40
Bibliography.................................................................................................................................. 42
Books......................................................................................................................................... 42
CBO and CRS Reports .............................................................................................................. 42
Graphs........................................................................................................................................ 43
Academic articles ...................................................................................................................... 43
News Articles ............................................................................................................................ 46
Blogs entries .............................................................................................................................. 46

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Introduction
A tiered layered pyramid view will be used to explore the use of contractors during the
Iraq War. These layers will define the roles and attributes of the American military’s current
composition and framework. The base of the pyramid suggests that contractors have more in
common with their volunteer uniformed counterparts than what is widely perceived in terms of
identity and motivational drive to wage war.
The next layer of the pyramid contains entities and operational structure that act upon
these contractors representing military, business and congressional interests. These military-
industrial complex1 interests ultimately shape the Armed Forces.
The top layer of the pyramid overlays a wartime structure using the Iraq War as a case
study. This layer contains a framework that has evolved to improve the management of private
contractors and to clearly define their mission in Iraq. This paper hopes to provide a better
understanding of the contractor’s roles and responsibilities in supporting the United States to
wage war and identify improvements to the evolving framework to coordinate the use of this
increasingly important wartime resource.
Nature abhors a vacuum; this phenomenon, first observed by Aristotle in Ancient Greece,
applies to how the market views a vacuum today.2 The market will always rush to fill demand,
and thus fill the vacuum. The central argument of this dissertation suggests that the government
is responsible for creating an operational framework for the market that focuses on private
military contractors in the Iraq War. War market demand for business involvement expands
across the entire history of the United States.
Business involvement has taken different forms, from the dramatic rise of the military-
industrial complex to fill the demand for weapons during World War II, to the need for
contractors to augment Americans forces due to cutbacks in the 1990s. What has stayed true is
that when the American government has created the demand for a service the private sectors
1 What started as the influence between business, military and congressional interests in hardware
acquisition has become a framework for the both the acquisition of hardware and the creation of the
regulations which governs the United States Armed Forces
2 Isenberg, David “A Government in Search of Cover: Private Military Companies in Iraq.” Mercenaries to
Market. Chesterman & Lehnardt. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 82-93

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rushed to fill it. This dissertation will show two evolutionary time lines of when the market filled
government demand and evolved as the relationship developed. The decision to use a
professional standing army by the United States’ founding fathers evolved into a reliance on the
military-industrial complex through the massive armament process to compete against the axis
powers during the Second World War, and Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. More
recently, it has been used to fill the need for contractors after massive downsizing thus creating
the private military industry. This new industry, born out of need and on the foundation of the
military-industrial complex, has proven to be an integral actor in the Iraq War. The second
evolutionary process has been during the course of the Iraq War. Due to a lack of manpower and
poor planning, the demand was created for contractors which the market readily supplied.
The framework for these contractors and their interaction with the state has evolved and
changed over the course of the war. The relationship has not been without its pitfalls. Legal,
ethical and accountability issues must be overcome. Indeed, some believe that the United States’
monopoly on violence is at risk.3
This dissertation will show that even though issues remain, the
Iraq War has been the perfect example of how the market and state interact and that the
relationship has and will continue to improve.
History
A state should maintain a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force”4
, and
according to political scientist Max Webber only if it has this monopoly can it be classified a
state. 5 The American founding fathers had a similar belief when they outlined the American
system with built in checks and balances. Whoever controls the agents of violence also controls
the safety of its citizens and its means of war. Therefore, management of the men and women
whose business is violence is of the utmost importance for a state.
For the greater part of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, the state has
enjoyed this monopoly. However, for the majority of human history the control of violence has
been much more diffused. Throughout history, the monopoly on violence was controlled by
3 PW Singer “Corporate Warriors.” New Haven: Cornell University Press. 2003.
4 Weber, Max. “The Vocation Lectures.” Rodney Livingstone, Hackett Publishing 2004. 1918.
5 ibid

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various agents ranging from warlords to princes and from lords to generals.6 Ancient Rome
employed contract soldiers to fill its ranks even though at the time they were the model of
professional armies.7 In the sixteenth century Italian theorist Machiavelli pondered on the
privatization of warfare, noting “If anyone supports his state by the arms of mercenaries, he will
never stand firm or sure, as they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, faithless, bold
(amongst) friends, cowardly against enemies. They have no love or other motive to keep them in
the field beyond a trifling wage.”8
While more focused on direct combat, the idea that individuals hired for a wage were less
desirable than those who fought for a cause turned out to be largely justified. When conscript
armies of France invaded Italy the mercenaries showed a poor record of accomplishment. In
1775 the British army employed 30,000 Hessian mercenaries when it attempted to put down a
rebellion in the American colonies. Almost a quarter of the force was made up of soldiers with
little loyalty to the crown. Soon after the American Revolution another civilian army sent
shockwaves throughout the world when Napoleon rose up to challenge the entire system of
Europe. Only after 12 years of fighting was a coalition of European states able to halt this
‘civilian’ army.9 While this might not have been a culmination event, these two successes of
citizen’s armies meant that the mercenary armies of old were slowly pushed to the peripherals.
Instead, the idea of a professional civilian standing army as the norm emerged. However, two
hundred or so years after the Revolutionary War another conflict emerged for the United States
and it has the potential to be a turning point in the monopoly on violence.10
The current framework the United States uses in its control of the monopoly on violence
has occurred over a long, evolutionary timeframe. The process of the privatization of the
monopoly with the United States has occurred like most things in the military, as an incremental
6 P.W. Singer “Corporate Warriors.” New Haven: Cornell University Press. 2003. Pp. 20-23
7 P.W. Singer “Corporate Warriors.” New Haven: Cornell University Press. 2003.
8 Munkler, Herfried ‘The New Wars’ Cambridge: Polity Press Cambridge. 2002. Pp. 51
9 Committee of Public Safety announced and implemented the levee en masse because not enough volunteers
were coming forward. The success of this army led to an increase in conscripted armies around the world,
however, it was not the first. See Herman Beukema (1941) ‘Social and Political Aspects of Conscription:
Europe's Experience’ Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring, 1941), pp. 21-31
10 P.W. Singer strongly believes that the monopoly of violence is slowly moving from the state towards a
more dispersed pattern. This is largely in line with the New War proponents, however, hopefully this paper
will demonstrate to the reader that this fear is unfounded and instead the market and military-contractor
relationship, though young and still under-defined, is evolving in a direction that will reinforce the monopoly
as shown in the Iraq War.

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process. Because of this it is easy for major changes to slowly creep up and take effect without
many taking notice until it is too late. At first the privatization focused on the production of the
means of violence. After World War II this had become the cornerstone of the military-industrial
complex, as President Eisenhower discussed in his farewell address. Because of this a permanent
business interest was brought into the American conduct of war. They remained a powerful force
but relegated to role of production. Private soldiers continued to be active in the world but they
were small and operated in the periphery of the international system during the Cold war. With
the collapse of the Soviet Union the privatization process began to increase throughout the
military in order to deal with the rapid decrease in the size of militaries. This continued the
evolving make-up of the military industry. Then in 2003 a new point in the evolutionary process
was reached. Combat contractors emerged from the periphery of the world and found an
employer in need, the United States government. While direct combat contractors are a very
small part of the overall military-industrial complex they serve as an example of the industries
continued evolution and expansion. Therefore, it is important not to forget that these contractors
subsist as part of a structure that has long been in existence and is continuing to change.
The Iraq War and its use of private military corporations could have a profound impact
on the United States monopoly of violence, as many critics will attest,11 and on the military-
industrial complex. This dissertation will use the contractors to show the evolutionary process
within the military-industrial complex and the possible benefits and dangers that have or could
emerge. The key point being that the private military corporations the contractors serve in are
merely an evolutionary part of the military-industrial complex. If this is true then these
corporations may gain unwarranted influence as President Eisenhower warned but it is also true
that these professional soldiers, or contractors, would not be revolutionary. One in ten military
personnel was a contractor in the beginning of the Iraq War. Since the summer of 2010 their
numbers have exceeded deployed military ground forces. While not mercenaries in the
traditional sense12, each is taking an active role in the waging of war and doing it for a profit. A
legal, operational and ethical framework has had to evolve to meet these new contractors in order
11 P.W. Singer (2003) ‘Corporate Warriors’ Postscript: The Lessons of Iraq. 2011. Pp. 242-260
12 Some of the contractors are foreign nations (not from a country taking direct part of the conflict) and are
armed, however they are a small group from nations like India, Fiji and are almost exclusively used in base
defense. This is why most of the instance of contractors coming into hostile contact, likeBlackwater, are
British or America contractors because they dominate the convoy protection contracts and other more
dangerous mission contracts.

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to moderate and evaluate their actions. The American public and media are not familiar with
these types of actors leading to misperceptions and uncertainty in how to react to this new breed
of professional soldier. This is where comparisons to mercenaries have led to misinformation.
The evolutionary process is also far from over in Iraq, and there are still changes to be made and
improvements to be made. However, what certain is that they are here to stay and there is
nothing radically new about their arrival.
Theory
Some scholars believe we are at another revolutionary point similar to Europe and
America in the early seventeenth century and the nature of warfare itself has reached a point
where it has fundamentally changed; at the very least it has changed from what has been the
norm for the past few centuries.13
When observing changes in the appearance of war, such as privatization and contractors,
it can be misconstrued as a fundamental shift when in fact the conduct of war has experienced
evolutionary and incremental change. Instead, it may only apply to certain geographical and
economic regions and certain levels of the theater of operation (lower levels while the higher
commands stay relatively the same). This applies to others such as William S. Lind who claims
that “future war will be different from the past” and this is premised on the perceived decline of
the states control on the monopoly of force.14 Mary Kaldor, who introduced the idea of New
War, also expands on this idea of state decline with the idea that overall war is becoming “highly
decentralized”15. When viewing the Iraq War, and its use of contractors, for a brief period it was
decentralized (during the chaos due to poor planning). Soon the market and the state eventually
evolve to solve the problem. While using these theoretical arguments can be helpful for
understanding conflict and changing patterns in its conduct, it is important not to leap to
conclusions. When viewing the Iraq War it should have been the perfect moment for at least the
continuation of the supposed weakening of the state and emboldening of the private actors.
13 This theory began under Mary Kaldor and has been further by academics like Herfried Munkler. Sarah
Percy and William S. Lind. For further information please see Mary Kaldor’s New and Old War, Munkler’s The
New Wars and Creveld’s The Transformation of War. Each of these books proposes a change in the nature war
and on Creveld in particular attacks the use of Clausewitz to view modern conflicts.
14 Fleming, Colin (2009) New or Old Wars? Debating Clausewitzian Future The Journal of Strategic Studies
Vol. 32, No. 2, 213-241 April 2009
15 ibid

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However, the opposite has occurred and this paper will demonstrate this using the war in Iraq.
However, the appearance in which America wages war may have changed, the nature of war and
the United States control on its military is resolute.
This is the theory discussed by Herfried Munkler in his book The New Wars. He admits
that that the term ‘new war’ might be disingenuous and instead might be closer to classical wars.
Whatever they are called the idea is simple, these scholars believe that war has changed from
what has been a constant for the past 200 years. Within this theory attention is given to the idea
that economics have changed the nature of war. The commercialization of war and of military
force has led to the loss of the states monopoly on military force.16 War has reached a
revolutionary point where an identifiable break with the past can be made with theorists like
Clausewitz, who advocated war is politics by other means. Munkler says this is because war is
no longer politics by other means, but instead has become a realm upon itself. However, the case
study for this dissertation, the Iraq War, shows that war is still politics through other means.
President Bush viewed the Iraq War as a continuation of his policies after diplomacy had failed.
The idea that the conduct of war has changed due to commercialization can be helpful
when viewing the military-industrial complex. However, in regards to this paper the new war
theory runs into problems. Most of Munkler’s efforts focus on the third world or developing
world, states that do not have the rule of law or power to insure a states continued monopoly on
violence. Therefore, even if war has changed in the less developed states, war has not changed
for the United States. While Munkler focused on the economics of the perceived changing
dynamics of war, he was building upon works by other academics, such as Creveld and Kaldor.
These authors also argued that the traditional Clausewitzian way of understanding war was
obsolete. These authors see a revolutionary event occurring in warfare that will create a
marketable change from not just previous conflict but previous ways of understanding conflict.
“Clausewitz informs readers that war’s nature should not be confused with the way it looks. That
it alters its appearance and character ‘to a given case’ is unimportant. The unifying element that
ensures the universality of the nature of war has nothing to do with the way war is conducted.”17
16 Munkler, Herfried (2002) ‘The New Wars’ Cambridge: Polity Press Cambridge. pp. 16
17 Fleming, Colin (2009) New or Old Wars? Debating Clausewitzian Future The Journal of Strategic Studies
Vol. 32, No. 2, 213-241 April 2009

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This is an important observation not just for debating the nature of war but all observations of the
Iraq war.
Iraq war
Using Iraq as a case study, this dissertation shows that the United States has changed how
it wages war, not in who wields control. Instead of checks and balances and absolute civilian
control, a new relationship has emerged. Business, military and political interests that make up
the military industrial complex, about which President Eisenhower warned, have filled a void
with a framework that does not hold true to American values and principals. This framework
focuses power with the executive, financials with the Department of Defense and State and lacks
a clear legal framework that is required when overseeing the industry.
The words of America’s founding fathers must be invoked and a new private and public
framework must emerge based on checks and balances and civilian oversight of the armed force.
This framework should consist of a legal framework lying in the judiciary and subject to the law.
It should consist of a financial framework with the power vested in the legislative branch.
Finally, orders should be more clearly defined as the realm of the President, and be beholden to a
similar command structure as their uniformed counterparts.
The threat of private military corporations is not changing the nature of war but rather
potentially changing the nature of how war in America is conducted. It must be remembered that
private military corporations are an evolutionary child of the military industrial complex, born
out of necessity and demand, as well as a more globalized strategic environment. This has been
an incremental process spanning decades built on successes and failures. This process does not
imply revolutionary change; a draw down in operations and or an increase in funding for
uniformed soldiers potentially could stop this evolution from becoming anything more than a
blip in United States military history.
The dissertation will use the following structure. Chapter one will demonstrate the historical
roots of the use of professional soldiers that the American military was built upon. This
foundation and belief in professional soldiers is important when viewing contractors as they are
more evolved from this idea then the mercenary culture of Europe. Chapter two will discuss the
foundation of the military-industrial complex using President Eisenhower’s farewell address.

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The creation of this permanent arms industry laid the second piece of foundation in the
evolutionary arc. Chapter 3 brings the reader to the Iraq War. This chapter provides context
about the war and about the contractors operating on behalf of the United States. Chapter 4
discusses the evolutionary process that occurred during the war in terms of framework, legal and
ethical issues. This chapter shows how the market and government evolved together to meet the
challenges of the Iraq War.

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Chapter 1: Hamilton’s Empowerment of the State
The idea of an evolutionary process is important when thinking about the private military
industry and influences acting upon it. Military contractors discussed in this dissertation
operating in the Iraq War are influenced by two very important and powerful forces – the identity
of the professional soldiers waging war and the framework in which these soldiers operate.
Therefore, they are bound to changes that have occurred in who the United States uses to wage
its wars and the make-up of the military industrial complex, which influences the structure of
those who wage war. A historical background and major events to reach the potential critical
point, which is the Iraq War, is therefore an essential beginning point.
The United States and its interactions with its military predate the adoption of the term
“military industrial complex”, which was first coined by Eisenhower (1961).18 He focused on the
new sheer size of the threat posed following the buildup in World War II. America’s founding
fathers were also greatly concerned with the military’s size and questioned having a standing
army at all. When the colonies began forming a continental army in 1775 they were well aware
of possible dangers of a standing army. These fears were fleshed out well after the fighting was
done and success was at hand. In 1787, a clear hierarchy was created in the United States
constitution giving the President, a civilian post, powers as the commander in chief; but even this
mandate was deemed as possibly not going far enough. Many architects of its creation and
founding members of the original cabinet wrote about the dangers the military posed to the state.
Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of Treasury, laid out many of these concerns in
Federalist Paper No. 8
The Federalist Paper No. 8
The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel
it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense. The continual necessity for
their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the
condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil.19
18 Eisenhower D., Dwight “Eisenhower Farewell Address.” 1961.
19 Hamilton, Alexander (1787) ‘The Consequences of Hostilities Between States’ Library of Congress
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_08.html

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The fact that the founding fathers were concerned about encroachment by the military into
civilian matters is a key concern that echoes today in Iraq. This was the first discussion of the
civil-military relationship in the United States and of concerns with a standing army. This
dialogue has evolved over the past 235 years, but the fundamentals have essentially remained the
same addressing the country’s desires from its military and how the country wishes to interact
with it.
While the early Americans could not foresee future conflicts or technological advances,
they could foresee potential pitfalls that have remained true throughout the centuries. The
dialogue that is presented in the Federalist Papers occurs between Madison and Hamilton and is
in reference to the new constitution of the United States. The Federalist papers and ideas
discussed inside them highlight the real fears that many early Americans had when trying to
create a union. Hamilton continued to discuss how America should approach its own military
structure, “The effectual truth of modern commercial republics is that they require professional,
reasonably well-paid soldiers because no one else in such republics is willing to spend a lifetime
preparing for war.” 20
The Root of Professionalism
Professionalism therefore became the foundation of the America military. These
professional soldiers would allow the majority of the “commercial republics” citizens to continue
to pursue other avenues not burdened by military service. This is in contrast to conscription used
during Revolutionary France or other conscription services that still operate today.21 With the
use of professionals instead of conscripts came the danger of removing the military from the
civilian world. Hamilton wrote that a standing army was a possible engine towards despotism;
therefore, strong civilian oversight was needed.22 This was advocated in the Federalist papers
and enshrined in the constitution that civilians would have absolute control of the military
through the Secretary of Defense and President.
20 Hamilton to John Dickenson, 25-30 September 1783, Papers, 3: 454; Walling, Karl (1995) ‘Was Alexander
Hamilton a Machiavellian Statesmen’ The Review of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 437
Federalist,8 : 47; Federalist2, 4: 156-57
21 Many countries continue have conscription to this day. http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/mil_con-
military-conscription
22 Cook, Martin ‘Moral Foundations of Military Service’ Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 117-129

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There is still the risk that the military can view itself as morally superior to the civilian
structure it is in charge of protecting and the control might become lax.23 The preservation of
civilian control and a robust system of oversight becomes important in keeping a professional
standing army. Unlike a citizen force the distinction between a professional force and uniformed
soldier becomes somewhat blurred as both are professionals specializing in an aspect of war
while operating under civilian control and oversight. The main difference is the uniformed
soldier draws on a historical background of the conscripted soldiers of the Civil War, World War
II, and Vietnam. The contemporary uniformed soldier shares more in common with their private
military contractor brethren than with the citizen soldiers of the past. Motivation, identity and
state representation separates professionals from citizen soldiers.24
The motivation for a citizen soldier is the state’s obligation to fight for a cause, differing
from current volunteer soldiers who fight for monetary gain, career incentives, personal
challenge or patriotism.25 These motivations are more in line with citizen contractors than the
obliged conscripted soldiers of America’s past. True citizen armies would also represent the
identity of the state equally however far more of the volunteer army is made up of the poor and
minority.26 The last difference is identity. For past citizen soldiers their identity was still civilian
and the military was only a passing phase. For the volunteers of today, much like their contractor
counterparts in the private military industry, the military is their life. This created the foundation
of the United States military, a professional all volunteer standing army which America relies on
to wage its wars. The military’s supporting framework has evolved through major evolutionary
events such as the decision to rely on professional soldiers and the dramatic increase in the role
of business in the art of war: the military-industrial complex.
23 Cook, Martin ‘Moral Foundations of Military Service’ Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 117-129
24 Cohen, Eliot ‘Twilight of the Citizen-Soldier’ Parameters, Summer 2001, pp. 23-28
25 ibid
26 ibid

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Chapter 2: President Eisenhower’s Farewell Address
The industrial-military relationship in the United States has evolved since America’s
initial founding to meet new challenges and threats posed by large and powerful militaries. This
evolutionary process resulted in a larger influential military. The process was slow but World
War II provided a second major turning point.
The massive build-up of military power needed to combat both the Japanese and German
forces on two different continents required retooling the American economy, expansion of the
military, as well as a massive arms procurement strategy. Even after victory the military did not
return to pre-War War II spending levels.27 After a brief post-war dip spending remained much
higher due to the Cold War and Korean conflict.
President Eisenhower had a perspective on the military build-up much like that of
America’s founding fathers in regards to the creation of a standing army. Being in a position of
power during revolutionary moments these men gained an important and credible perspective.
President Eisenhower warned us of the Military-Industrial Complex and the congressional,
military and business interests shaping the military and its structure. This structure is what
eventually evolved into what we call the private military industry 60 years before the Iraq War.
The Military-Industrial Complex Emerges
President Eisenhower had a unique perspective on the military-industrial complex due to
his time as the commander of military forces in World War II. A little known period that also
shaped his perspective was the two years he spent on the War Policies Commission28 where he
studied industrial mobilization for war and profiteering. He distinguished himself with an eye for
detail and this gave him his first introduction in what would become the military-industrial
complex. It is fitting that someone who rose to the highest echelons in the military and politics
choose to discuss this matter in his farewell speech.
27 Graph 2 shows spending levels from 1962 onwards, however the farewell speech of President Eisenhower
occurred in 1962. When President Eisenhower took office spending levels were 11.7% due to the Korean
War, down from 34.5% eight years earlier at the conclusion of World War II. While levels would drop at the
end of the Korean War they were higher than the 45 year 5.5% average.
28 Ledbetter, James “Unwarranted Influence.” New Haven: Yale University Press. 2011.

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“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential
for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”29
President Eisenhower’s focus on the newfound influence of war related business included
the loss of potential gains in other areas of business because of a switch from “plows to swords”.
The influence politicians, businesspersons, and military professionals began to exert on each
other posed potentially dangerous consequences, not just to a functioning American military, to
the Republic at large. “Eisenhower had begun to see private military contractors as self-
interested, malign actors in the budget process”30and that it “creates wasteful military
spending.”31 The idea that private actors and the increased use of contractors are counter-
productive and lead to wasteful spending carried through to the Iraq War.
The foundering fathers, in particular Secretary Hamilton, had foreseen the dangers of
having a standing army. President Eisenhower saw the dangers of a standing army becoming
unwieldy and prone to the influence from surrounding forces. These two great statesmen,
separated by 174 years and lived in very different environments, brought to light a very real
danger to the foundation of the American system. The notion had moved beyond the civil-
military relationship to include the civil-business-military relationship.
For the 50 years following President Eisenhower’s speech the military-industrial complex
continued to grow and evolve. With the Cold War ending the military was downsized, however,
its influence within the halls of politics remained. The size of the military, rather the structure,
was no longer a problem. Solicited or not the influence had become a part of the system just as
President Eisenhower had warned. If this influence serves to improve the military’s framework
and structure then the fears of unwarranted influence would be unfounded. However if this
influence is used to weaken the framework used to control acquisitions and the use of contractors
then it could prove dangerous. The end of the Cold War and the downsizing of the military
meant any negative influence towards a weakened framework would become even more evident
if the reliance of contractors increased.
29 Eisenhower D., Dwight (1961) ‘Farewell Address’
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=90
30 Ledbetter, James. “Unwarranted Influence.” New Haven: Yale University Press. 2011
31 ibid

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The End of the Cold War
The Cold War’s ending meant a new beginning for the military. While some heralded it
as the “end of history”,32 it was merely the beginning of a new chapter. With the changing
strategic landscape new enemies have emerged and the political landscape of the Cold War has
disappeared, the military-industrial complex has continued to grow and expand its influence. To
argue that the expanding size and budget of the military is raising the military-industrial
complex’s influence simply contradicts the numbers.33
The defense budget as a percentage of the gross domestic product has actually decreased
since the Cold War. Following World War II, spending levels were forced to stay high due to the
Cold War and commitments overseas. Spending remained mostly above 8% of GDPA for most
the 1960s. Spending spiked in the 1970s due to the Vietnam War which as a percentage of the
American economy continued downward. An upward tick occurred again in the 1980s due to
President Reagan’s massive armament push along with the recession induced increased
spending. The two factors lead to a visible increase: 4.7 to 6.2 percent of GDP.
Defense spending per GDP returned to lower levels and during the 1990s remained between 3-
4%. Even with President Bush’s build-up for the War on Terror spending per GDP remained
near 4%; similar to early 1990s. A higher percentage was reached recently due to operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq; still only 4.7% of GDP and well below 1980s levels. Therefore, the
amount America spends on defense cannot be the only reason for the growth of the military-
industrial complex. These numbers also show one of the reasons why privatization has taken on
new meaning.
With historically lower levels of spending during wartime the defense department lacks
the resources to carry out a war on its own, let alone two wars. This has meant that using
privatized resources, when its military equivalent is not available, has become a part of the
military apparatus. Thus, the demand was created and the market moved in to fill the vacuum.
This market is severed by the Private military Industry.
32 Francis Fukuyama. ‘The End of History?’ The National interest. 1989.
33 See graphs on page 15

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Graph 1: United States defense spending during armed conflict
Graph 2: The United States Defense Budget as viewed as a percentage of the gross domestic product
Graphs provided by Heritage Foundation, http://blog.heritage.org/

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The Private Military Corporation Comes of Age
The private military industry within the military-industrial complex has been taking
shape this last decade as spending has decreased and the role of commercial partners has
increased. When viewing the industry it is important to break down what the industry is actually
participating in and the extent of its participation. When a war is declared the area is titled the
theater of war. Within this there is the larger theater of operations and the smaller area of
operations. As we move closer to the actual area of operation the role of private personnel
diminishes as the role of the regular military increases. In terms of the actual companies who
make up the industry it can be viewed as a spear. The closer to the tip one gets the closer to the
actual combat a company and its contractors get. 34
Military support firms give non-lethal aid and assistance consisting of usually larger
companies that provide food servicing and transport. The next step towards the tip is the military
consultant firms providing advisors and training. The final level is the military provider firms
which specialize in implementation and command, or the tip. This group contains the most
controversial elements and actors, such as Executive Outcomes and Blackwater.35 This was the
general structure of the industry and its members before the outbreak of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. While the overall framework has stayed the same, some of the names have changed
and companies within have shifted around to find the niche where they are most competitive.
These companies were laying the groundwork to compete in the emerging private
military market created due to the massive downsizing after the Cold War. The industry however
was waiting for a moment that would allow these companies to become an integral part of the
war effort and prove their worth to the Pentagon and American people. This moment occurred in
2003 with the launching of Operation Iraqi Freedom or the Iraq War. This war, and the levels in
which contractors are relied upon, will most likely reflect how America will conduct military
operations for the foreseeable future. Through the war’s ups and downs the contractor’s failures
and successes proved to play a key part in the war effort.
34 P.W. Singer “Corporate Warriors.” Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2003. Pp. 92-93
35 ibid

17
Chapter 3: The Iraqi War
Background
All wars are controversial. The images a war brings to bear invoke some of the worst
periods of human history; trenches of World War I, bloody beaches of World War II, and bombs
dropping on villages in Vietnam. Attempts to mask conflict and armed violence as peacekeeping
operations matters little for the soldiers and civilians who pay the ultimate sacrifice. Therefore
the exact name of the ongoing conflict in Iraq, while carrying emotional weight, doesn’t impact
the focus of this paper. If it’s the Iraq War, Operation Iraqi Freedom or the Gulf War II it is an
ongoing conflict between American military ground soldiers and the established enemy
insurgency. For the purpose of this paper it will be referred to as the Iraq War.
Beyond the name, the reasons and motivations behind the Iraq War are also controversial;
and have been widely discussed. Research for this paper revealed an overwhelming amount of
bias and personal feelings towards the Iraq War. This was expected for an ongoing war that was
controversial in its purpose and conduct. It has been difficult at times to move past the bias and
get to the core problems of not just the Iraq War but more importantly for the contractors
participating in the conflict and what they mean for the future of the American military. It is my
hope that this paper will help tear away some of these misperceptions that have been created as
the fog of war has crept closer to home.36
Two hundred and sixteen years after the publication of the Federalist Papers, and forty
two years after President Eisenhower’s farewell address, another crucial point was reached in the
evolution of the United States military. The build up to the war began slowly over the twelve
years after the conclusion of the Gulf War. For twelve years after that war President Saddam
Hussein continued to defy American wishes and increasingly became a pariah on the
international stage. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 demanding
that Iraq end all weapons programs related to weapons of mass destruction and allow for
36 Fog of war is a term originally coined by Carl Von Clausewitz, for more information please see Kenneth,
Carl. “Warheads: Cable News and the Fog of War.” Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 2006.

18
inspections. The United States deemed Iraq uncooperative and in breach of the resolution and
gave Saddam Hussein and his sons a deadline to leave.
Upon the passage of this deadline the operation commenced on March 19, 2003.37 The
lightning fast invasion of Iraq drew comparisons to the Gulf War in both its success and speed.
The differences between the wars included the size of the American invading force which was
actually smaller in 2003 and in 2003 US and coalition partner forces were required to occupy the
country. This new approach was controversial and would have lingering effects that led to many
ups and downs.38
Revolution or Evolution
The Iraq War has undergone its own ups and downs and its own evolution. As the
conflict progressed contractors on the ground have had to cope with the demands of a dynamic
environment. The roles of contractors in Iraq began traditionally by focusing on logistics and
support; the back end of the spear. Contractors from the onset of the war gained an increased role
based on experiences gained in the former Yugoslavia, training Iraqi forces and supplying
America soldiers.
The security vacuum that existed in Iraq soon became apparent with the increased
violence and instability. The lack of troops due to the initial planning stage and overall size of
the military led to an important evolutionary, if not revolutionary, moment for the private
military industry and the military-industrial complex at large. The demand for contractors,
including those at the tip of the spear, to fill the security vacuum was created due to planning
mistakes by American leadership.
This idea of a vacuum is important because the lack of uniformed soldiers created the
demand for “dangerous” contractors. Without the vacuum the demand for contractors would
never have existed and therefore the private sector would have remained confined to roles
traditionally given even though small inroads may have been gained due to the evolutionary
37 Copson, Raymond. “Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview.” Congressional Research Service. 2003
38 For further information on mistakes made in the Iraq War please see Fiasco: The American Military
Adventure in Iraq by Thomas E. Ricks

19
nature of privatization. Troop numbers reflect this vacuum as well as accounts by the leaders
who were instrumental in both planning and implementation.
The numbers on the ground show how important contractors have become in the Iraq
War and beyond. In 2009 The Department of Defense hit a milestone when the number of
contractors operating in both Iraq and Afghanistan surpassed those of uniformed personnel. The
gap increased in 2011 when 155,000 contractors were employed compared to 145,000 men and
women in uniform. 39 Afghanistan and Iraq show two different stories. Afghanistan still has a
clear majority of uniformed personnel due to the recent surge of uniformed forces though the
number of contractors involved is still higher than in any previous conflict.
As of March there are nearly 65,000 contractors operating in country compared to only
around 46,000 uniformed personnel. 40 This is why the Iraq War was chosen for this paper as the
ideal example of the evolution within the industry and as a possible revolutionary moment in
how America conducts its military operations. Around 20% of the total Department of Defense
obligations for Iraq were for contracts for a total of $112 billion from 2005 to 2010. The
Department of Defense admits that these numbers could actually be much higher due to
accounting oversights.
In terms of the percentage of the overall workforce Iraq and Afghanistan are closely in
line with the last major American engagement in the Balkans when around 50% of the total force
was comprised of contractors. The numbers suggest an increasing difference in the percentage of
contractors to uniforms and an increase in contractor’s proximity to combat. This means that
while the ratio for the overall war is only .5 to 1, it has increased to the current ratio of 1.48 to 1
for Iraq. 41 While viewing uniform to contractor ratios it’s important to see the trends of a rapidly
changing structure.
Since December 2008 the military and private industries have slowly decreased forces as
operations declined with the number of contractors fluctuating more than uniformed personnel.
In June 2010 uniformed personnel, due to a large draw down, saw a massive dip while
39 Schwartz, Moshe & Joyprada Swain (2011) ‘Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq:
Background and Analysis’ Congressional Research Service
40 ibid
41 ibid

20
contractors maintained a more gradual draw down. Today both resources have leveled off; due to
the large military personnel decrease contractors still outnumber their uniformed peers. The
ongoing debate of how many American soldiers will maintain a presence will have an impact on
this ratio. As soldiers are withdrawn the supporting number of contractors will decrease too.
Sixty one percent of contract work is based on troop support and as the number of
soldiers decrease contractors numbers will follow suit. Eighteen percent of contractors work in
security related jobs including protecting military bases, VIPs, construction, aid workers, media
and other similar tasks. The draw down will continue as base security is no longer needed.42
Therefore 80% of the contractors are directly involved in support type duties for the Department
of Defense. Private security contractors represented only 10-15% (depending on the source) of
the total personnel in Iraq. Therefore, the vast majority of the work is still concentrated away
from the tip of the spear which is how personnel resources are distributed today.43
From 2003 to 2008 contractor levels were much higher. Before the current rate of around
65,000, there was more than double that number during the surge. 164,000 contractors were
employed in the summer of 2008. When viewing nationality numbers a different story emerges
the further back one goes. While only 9,000 local Iraqi personnel are now considered
contractors, that number was as high as 82,000 before the ‘surge’. While the number of
Americans and third-nationalities increased rapidly during the ‘surge’, the only group to decrease
was the number of employed Iraqi personnel.44 These numbers represent the end of a story that
has evolved over the last 8 years. They show the draw down that is occurring and that has been
occurring since the end of the 2008.The story concerning the build-up of Iraqi personnel from
2003 to 2008 is one of failure and adjustment.
Under the lead of General Tommy Franks, 150,000 troops in the south and another
90,000 in theater were deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom and the beginning of the ground
invasion of Iraq. 45 This would be a third of the force used in the Gulf War based on the Powell
42 Though a sizable number of contractors will have to be maintained to protect State Department assets as
uniform personnel will be unable to do so.
43 ‘Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq’ Congressional Budget Office. 2008.
45 President Bush’s autobiography provides a fascinating account of the lead up to the Iraq War and internal
discussions that were ongoing as to not just the tactics of the war but the potential aftermath. In his

21
doctrine.46 As soon as the invasion was complete, a transitional government was set up under the
leadership of the Coalition Provisional Authority led by L. Paul Bremer. It is at this transition
that two important events occurred that would lead to the rise in demand of not just more
uniformed personnel but contractors as well.
During this initial phase U.S. troops on the ground actually began to withdraw, going
from 150,000 to around 110,000. This was accompanied by the decision by L. Paul Bremer to
disband the Iraq army and former Bath officials. Therefore the security vacuum was
accompanied by a political vacuum. 47 President Bush states “In retrospect, I should have insisted
on more debate on Jerry’s orders… I’ve spent a great deal of time thinking about what went
wrong in Iraq and why. I have concluded we made two errors… the first is that we did not
respond more quickly or aggressively when the security situation started to deteriorate… cutting
troops levels too quickly was the most important failure of execution in the war.” (President
Bush 2011).48 Whether the mistake was with President Bush, his generals or Bremer is irrelevant
for this paper. What is relevant is that a vacuum was created in the security arena due to a lack of
ground forces and thus an increase was needed. Therefore the idea of the surge was created.
From 2003 to 2004 there was a draw down in forces in Iraq following the initial planning
and execution for the war. Once the security vacuum was created, changes had to be made to the
war’s planning. An increase occurred to raise the troop levels from 110,000 to 160,000 from
2004 to 200549 in order to try and secure the security vacuum. This followed by another draw
autobiography, Decision Points, President Bush states that General Franks and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
agreed that a smaller force was desired as not to give Iraqi’s the impression that the force was an
occupational force, instead they desired it to be viewed as only transitional force. This is the reason for the
low level of soldiers in the beginning of the war.
46 President Bush also clarifies that Secretary of State Colin Powell, who orchestrated the last invasion into
Iraq in the Gulf War, advocated larger troop numbers on par if not larger then were used in the Gulf War. He
came into disagreement with standing military advisors who viewed that this would be more of a lightning
strike and large troops numbers were not just unneeded but unwarranted.
47 President Bush notes that the decision to disband the army was one of the key mistakes, he views, in the
execution of the Iraq War. His view on troop levels is less clear as he states he only followed the suggestion of
his Generals and they recommended the draw down.
48 While this is the issue President Bush puts more emphasis on, others have put focus on the decision to
carry out a policy of de-Bathification, which resulted in the purging of the military.
49 Part of the reason for this surge directly ties to the use of contractors. Though a security vacuum was the
overarching issue the catalyst for the massive surge was the Battle for Fallujah. This battle began with the
murder of four Blackwater security guards protecting a food convoy. Due to the horrific scenes marines were
sent in the city which set off a wider escalation that led to the need to increase troop levels. Chan, Sewall
(2004) ‘U.S. Civilians Mutilated in Iraq Attack’ Washington Post

22
down in 2006 as the insurgency from the former Bath and Sunni insurgents subsided. However,
in 2007 another surge was needed to return the levels to the 160,000, and more, after instability
increased and a new security vacuum emerged. This creates a graph that is in constant flux,
consistently moving up and down. This constant flux in troop levels changed in 2008 when the
troop levels continued to decrease at a constant pace to the current levels of around 40,000.50
The overall use of contractors, both in terms of the numbers and the actual mission, goes
through a transformation during the Iraq War. In the beginning of the war the clear majority of
the boots on the ground were uniformed personnel. These were augmented by a smaller number
of logistics and support staff. However, as soon as a permanent presence is required, just as in
the Balkans, a massive private force is also required. The numbers between 2003 and 2007 are
murky to nonexistent due to the simple fact that no overall census was conducted. Many times
contracting companies were required to report hires yet locals weren’t counted towards total
contractors. This created a knowledge vacuum for the Department of Defense in its management
of the war and of its personnel as well as for observers.
On May 16, 2006 Robert A. Burton, Deputy Administrator of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy, issued a memorandum requesting that the United States Central Command
(CENTOM), which is in charge of operations in Iraq, conduct a census of contractors in its
employ.51 By the summer of the next year the data was made available and news outlets carried
the report with shock at the amount of contractors hired by CENTOM.52 This data showed
contractors surging from 130,000 to 160,000 in less than a year – primarily in support of the
‘surge’. What was more shocking was the sheer number of contractors and that total contractors
were almost 1:1 with uniformed troops. This lack of oversight was just part of a systematic
problem with how the Department of Defense dealt with its contractors in Iraq. It should be
noted that while the number of contractors increased the jobs associated with the private military
industry, security doesn’t change very much from 2007 to 2011. It hovers roughly around 10%
51Dow, Susie. ePluribus Media. October 31, 2008.
http://thejournal.epluribusmedia.net/index.php/features/1-latest-news/203-iraq-contractors-raw-data-
from-centcom-pt-ii
52 Articles by the LA Times and Washington Post highlight the shock and interest generated by the report on
contractors operating in the Iraq theater.

23
of contractors hired for security duty and most of these tasks are base security, fellow contractor
security, VIP security and convoy security.
Contrary to popular belief none of the primary security contractors are given contracts for
offensive military action. Most of these contractors from the beginning stages are locals hired to
support the troops and engage in reconstruction. When the reconstruction portion of the mission
was turned over to the Iraqi government these levels decreased. This shows an interesting
occurrence that while American and third party contractors increased from 2007 to 2008, the
numbers of locals hired begin to decrease. As troop levels decreased locals accounted for 27% to
15% of contractor personnel between 2009 to 2011. The reason is not given by the Department
of Defense, but the most likely reason is due to the Iraqi government taking on more
responsibility for the tasks that had been the job of the United States military. In addition, a surge
in violence might have made commanders less willing to hire locals who could be potential
threats.53
53 The graphs on the following pages show how the contractors in Iraq evolved over time to fit events on the
ground including the number of contractors needed to support the surge of combat troops.

26
Graphs on pages 24-27 provided by the Congressional Budget Office

27
Figure provided by Oregonstate.edu 1
This constant flux of troop levels from the beginning of the invasion in 2003 to the
beginning of the draw down in early 2008 paints a picture not simply of changes on the ground,
but also changes in contractors as well. As the majority of the contractors are in support of the
uniformed personnel you would expect the contractor levels in Iraq to run in unison. The lines
cross in 2009 and now there are now more contractors in Iraq then uniformed personnel. When
looking before the surge an interesting story emerges. When we compare this data to past U.S.
conflicts the reason why this conflict has the potential to be an important event in the evolution
of the military becomes evident. In the Revolutionary War it is estimated that for every 6
uniformed soldiers (then militia men) there was one contractor. In World War II the ratio was
seven soldiers to every one contractor, and in Vietnam it was five to one. The only conflict that
spiked the opposite way was the Gulf War, using the Powell Doctrine, of 51:1 uniformed
personnel to contractor. The Iraq War from 2003 to 2008 was at a ratio of one to one, on par with

28
the Balkans. However, in the post-2008 draw down it has for the first time surpassed that of
uniformed personnel. 54 These numbers show without a doubt that contractors are playing a more
important role than in any other past American conflict. What they also highlight is that
contractors, for the majority of the conflict, roughly follow the same pattern as uniform
personnel due to their support role. The surge and pull out followed the same trajectory showing
the interconnection between the two and that contractor utilization usually lags behind uniformed
personnel.
Using these numbers we can create an image of the war and the contractors who are
operating in it without having to be involved in political or military discussions. The reasons
behind the surge or the draw down and the changes in troop levels are unimportant for the
discussion at hand. What is important and can be gleaned from the numbers were three aspects
new to this war. First, this war, even before 2008, had the highest proportion of contractors to
soldiers. This is due both to the smaller military that exists due to budget cuts and to the security
vacuum that was created and needed to be filled. Second, the relationship between the two,
contractors and soldiers, is interconnected as the majority of soldiers work in base support
functions. Therefore contractors in the current structure will always be tied to uniformed
personnel. This is important as much has been said about the loss of the monopoly on violence or
mercenaries operating on their own. However, the numbers show that given the role and
relationship it will continue to be subservient. Last, in regards to role the vast majority of
contractors, nearly 80%, have direct base support role. Therefore, in future engagements that
don’t require long-term base support, contractors will be required much less and more on par
with Gulf War levels. These numbers show us the importance that the Iraq War has for the
industry and the boom it has been; yet, it also shows that the traditional roles are still preserved.
The framework, structure and environment that these contractors have been a part of have also
evolved over the course of the war and are continuing to evolve.55
54 Congressional Budget Office. “Contractors’ support of U.S. Operations in Iraq.” 2008.
55 Ibid

29
Chapter 4: Iraq War Accountability, Legal and Ethical Issues
Evolution in the military-industrial complex, as this paper has shown, has been ongoing
since the creation of the United States. It has shown that the military industrial complex has also
evolved, as a part of the industry, due to vacuums created at the end of the Cold War. The Iraq
War presented, even more then the Balkans, a test to the new privatized system that had
emerged. From the wars beginning in 2003 to the current draw downs in 2011 many aspects of
the relationship have evolved and changed. There have been mistakes and tragedies but also
triumphs and successes. What is certain is that this war has been a learning process from the
contractors and Department of Defense for how the military-industrial complex and its new
private military corporations operate when America goes to war.
As discussed in the contractor and troop numbers breakdown earlier, the picture from
2003 to 2007 was murky due to improper management and a lack of oversight. This began to
change as the Department of Defense realized serious flaws in how it interacted with the
contractors under their control and began to institute a series of reforms. The first one of these
was a memorandum on the census in order to gain a clear picture as to just what the reality on the
ground was and how to proceed. The staggering number of contractors showed them how far
behind the curve they had become and how their conduct until that point had been hurt by the
changing realities and needs on the ground.56, 57 Therefore this dissertation will show how the
Pentagon changed in three important areas; oversight, legal and ethical.
Changes in each of these areas not only allowed the Department of Defense to function
better but also laid the groundwork for future reforms. That is the key, future reforms, as the
process still has a ways to go, especially in addressing ethical concerns in the use of contractors.
The Department of Defense has many changes and improvements that must be made so mistakes
of the earlier stages, such as poor accountability and prosecution of illegal acts, aren’t repeated in
the future. The following will outline the incremental changes the Pentagon has instituted in the
three identified; oversight, legal and ethical.
56 Merle, Renae (2006) ‘Census Counts 100,00 Contractors in Iraq’ Washington Post, December 5 2006
57 Congressional Budget Office. “Contractors’ support of U.S. Operations in Iraq.” 2008.

30
Evolution in the Fog of War
Government oversight of something as vast as the military industrial complex is difficult
even when with self-regulation. Add to this equation the vested interest of many Congressional
leaders to protect niches for their State and oversight can become even more difficult. On top of
this the semi-new private military industry, or segment of the military industrial complex, is
difficult to manage as it is still evolving. This would make oversight difficult even in the best
situations. Add the fog of war and oversight becomes even more difficult.
The fog of war refers to the chaos associated with the battlefield as events evolve and
transform more quickly than leaders can understand them and the general lack of information
due to the dangerous environment. Throughout its history, the military has always tried to
overcome this fog, today using satellites and computers, to keep track of its forces and the
enemies. This is why it isn’t too hard to fathom that from 2003 to 2006 while Iraq was teetering
on the brink of collapse that the military’s highest priority would be to conduct a census and to
insure it had proper oversight. However, as the war waged on the problems of oversight became
more important as more contractors were required to support the long duration operation. The
logical first step was a census. The second step, however, proved more difficult. It entailed
ensuring the Pentagon had command and oversight over the 130,000 to 160,000 contractors that
were critical for the new occupational force.
With uniformed personnel there exists a proper chain of command that has its roots in the
British chain of command that has evolved over the centuries. It is a tried and true system. This
system dictates how individuals interact with each other and how orders are relied through the
system. This chain of command is important to ensure orders are fulfilled and responsibility
properly delegated. Above the individual chain of command there is the unified command. Each
unified command takes responsibility for missions within their geographical area and reports to
the President and the Secretary of Defense. This ensures that the Executive has proper oversight
and ensures civilian dominance of the military. With contractors no such system exists and no
clear authority exists in handling contractors and their assignments. However, over the course of
the war a rough framework for proper oversight has evolved in order to meet the vacuum that
existed in the management of these contractors.

31
Realizing this vacuum existed and that errors could be made due to a lack of coordination
and oversight the Department of Defense slowly began to make changes. Many of the changes
resulted from hearings that took place in Congress due to events on the ground and the
realization that mismanagement of contractors could be problematic. However, it should be
noted that the banning of contractors was never seriously entertained and instead the
improvement of the relationship was the heart of the matter. This culminated with the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2007 (H.R. 51222) and within this section 854 thus resulting in
changes in the Pentagon.58
The most important of these changes was the creation of the Assistant
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Program Support within the Department of Defense.
This position and the office it presides over took over responsibility for all contractors in
forward areas of operation.59 This gave responsibility to one man who could report not just to the
upper echelons of the Pentagon on contractor related matters but an office where the Congress
could go for additional information. This had been a major issue for Congress. Te lack of
communication between the Pentagon and Congress on this issue and a dearth of information in
the matter compelled Congress to push for reforms and greater oversight which would allow for
this information to be available. This new undersecretary position and the quarterly report it
began to publish alleviated much of these concerns.
In addition to Congress recognizing a lack of oversight the Department of Defense, and
more accurately commanders on the ground, saw this as a problem as well. Many commanders
characterized the lack of oversight as “a nightmare”60 and therefore pushed for greater oversight.
The realization by commanders, and with the blessing of Congress, led to the expansion of the
Armed Contractor Oversight Division61. This led to an increase in the number of personnel at the
Armed Contracting Management Agency (ACMA) which was responsible for rules and
regulations for contractors in Iraq, mandatory guidance for contractor conduct and general
oversight. This agency had been undermanned and ill-equipped to handle the massive number of
contractors needed to support the ongoing Iraq War. With greater Congressional awareness, a
59 ibid
60 ibid
61 Operates under Central Command within Joint Theater Support Contracting Command

32
Pentagon office solely responsible for their oversight and the expansion of the ACMA, the
oversight of contractors took a major step in the right direction.
A part of oversight is coordination. Without proper coordination between contractors and
uniformed personnel there existed the possibility for dangerous encounters and contractors
venturing into hot areas. However while the steps taken above addressed many of these issues
another problem presented itself. Contractors weren’t just employed by the Department of
Defense; in fact, in many cases more armed contractors were employed by the Department of
State than Defense. Therefore, steps needed to be taken by the State Department to implement
the policy prescriptions outlined by Congress and implemented by the Pentagon. In 2007 a
memorandum was signed between the two agencies for cooperation and coordination in regards
to contractors. This agreement gave greater authority to combatant commanders in the oversight
of both agencies armed contractors. Both agencies agreed to work together to develop shared
policies, standards and procedures to increase accountability and oversight. 62
All these steps helped to overcome the oversight gap that existed from 2003-2007. 2007
was a major turning point in the steps taken to increase oversight. Even though the Pentagon had
instituted some steps before then, like the census of contractors, it was clear that a catalyst was
needed for further reform. This event proved to be the shootings at Nisour Square in 2007.
Security contractors working for Blackwater63, a major tip of the spear security firm, were hired
to fulfill a security protection contract for the State Department. During a mission to protect a
State Department convoy contractors opened fire in Nisour Square killing 17 civilians.64 The
news of this alleged massacre quickly spread to media outlets around the world and outrage over
the shooting grew. Iraq canceled Blackwaters’ license to operate inside the country and
investigations were opened into the shooting. This shooting proved to be a major catalyst for the
case against an over reliance of security contractors. The FBI, State Department and even United
Nations began investigations into the shooting. Whatever the outcome, these investigations will
62 Elsea, Jennifer & Moshe Shwartz & Kennon Nakamura (2008) ‘Private Security Contractors in Iraq:
Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues’ Congressional Research Service
63 Now called Xe Services
64 Glanz, James (2007) ‘From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths’ New York Times, October 3,
2007

33
damage the reputation of the industry at large.65 However, out of this tragedy the reforms
discussed above were implemented and the evolutionary process of perfecting the use of the
private military industry was accelerated. Beyond simply more oversight, due to the criminal
nature of the incident, legal reforms were also implemented.
Legal authority in regards to contractors is another area that suffered due to poor
planning and a lack of clear vision. Having a proper legal framework for contractors to operate in
is important not just to ensure that any illegal activity conducted by contractors is punished but
also to set up the rules by which contractors are bound to operate in. Without it contractors
cannot be sure what rules of war apply to them. A legal framework and an oversight framework
have seen the greatest evolution within the Iraq War and will serve as important milestones for
the future use of contractors.
As the incident in Nisour Square demonstrated there is a need for a legal apparatus to
govern the actions of contractors similar to the system used for uniformed personnel operating in
foreign countries. In 2004 the Coalition Provincial Authority dictated order 17 to protect the
contractors in their employ which exempted contractors from Iraqi law. The issue however was
that uniformed personnel operate under the military code of justice, while civilian contractors (in
particular American citizens) are not allowed to be persecuted under its statutes. Also non-
combatants, even though the United Nations tries to portray them as combatants are not given
impunity under international law as lawful combatants. A void exists in international law and
American law in how to deal with these individuals and in how the Pentagon and local
commanders would deal with crimes committed by contractors. 66
65 It should be noted that so far investigations into the shooting have been far from conclusive. While the
United Nations focused on the use of mercenaries, even though the participates were engaged in security
operations, other departments did engage in a lengthy investigation that also brought Iraqi’s into the process.
In April 2009 it was found that ballistic tests on the bullets found at the scene did not match guns used by the
Blackwater contractors and therefore their existed the possibility of a third-party or randomized gun fire
might have been responsible for the contractors response. Some first party testimonies laid the blame at a
contractor named Paul Slough who had manned a turret gun though charges have been brought against him.
In the end a U.S. judge threw out the case due to issues with the investigation in regards to how testimonies
were gained. While no contractors were found guilty public opinion already turned against them and
therefore the shooting no longer mattered. The case was reopened again in 2011 against five of the six
contractors (one had already pled guilty and cooperated with prosecutors) and found that the court had
mishandled the case and therefore should be reexamined. Therefore the case is ongoing.
66 Elsea, Jennifer & Moshe Shwartz & Kennon Nakamura (2008) ‘Private Security Contractors in Iraq:
Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues’ Congressional Research Service

34
This came to the forefront after the massacre and the need for a way to investigate and
prosecute the Blackwater contractors who were involved. However, the groundwork for dealing
with illegal activity had been laid even before the incident. Under previous legislation,
particularly the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 or MEJA, persons who are
employed or are accompanying the military can be tried under MEJA or in certain cases even
Uniform Code of Military Justice, UCMJ (though the later is difficult as constitutional provisions
prohibit this).67 Court Martial though controversial was expanded in the National Defense
Authorization Act in 2007. Pushed by Senator Warner it further outlined that contractors serving
with the armed forces should be subject to court-martial in contingency operations as well as
war, therefore UCMJ and MEJA. Most acknowledge that this was more for appearance and most
prosecutions would have to be done under MEJA due to constitutional questions. While this
dealt with contractors with the armed forces it did not apply to contractors with the State
Department who will begin to make up the overwhelming majority of security contractors as the
military draws down and whose contractors had been the target of investigation due to the Nisour
Square massacre.
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which even though already under law
though not readily used, became the main piece of legislation to dictate legal oversight in 2007.
This clarification of who and how MEJA would be applied greatly helped to facilitate a clearer
picture in how the Pentagon would deal with legal issues and was welcomed by the industry.68
The fact that the industry welcomed the clarification showed that the private military industry
wanted oversight and to be viewed as responsible partners. This was a key realization that any
legislation and reform would only strengthen the relationship. MEJA and contractors persecuted
under its framework is led by the Department of Defense Inspector General who then informs the
Attorney General of the Department of Justice.
Under MEJA 12 people have been charged with crimes.69 Only three contractors though
have been charged and none for operational offenses. One contractor was charged and found
guilty of child pornography, one for sexually abusive contact and one for assault with a deadly
68 ibid
69 ibid

35
weapon.70 Therefore while the means for prosecution exists it does seem that given the small
number of actual cases that the Attorney General isn’t prosecuting many crimes. However there
exists a clear legal framework for both commanders on the ground and the Department of
Defense Attorney General to prosecute any illegal activity. A culture of responsibility is needed
to encourage commanders and contractors to bring offensives to the proper authorities. What
hasn’t been as clearly resolved is how State Department contractors will be prosecuted once the
military leaves and therefore MEJA cannot be invoked.
The evolution that has occurred in both the oversight and legal framework for contractors
in the Iraq War shows a positive pattern. These contractors evolved to fill a void that was created
with the downsized military and the great demand the security vacuum created in Iraq. While
mistakes were made in the beginning, and 2003 to 2007 could be characterized as chaotic,
progress has been made. The Department of Defense, true to its nature, has implemented
incremental steps to resolve these problems. Most have been addressed even without catalysts,
though events like the Nisour massacre only furthered the demand for reforms. It is important
that even though additional reforms were taken after the massacre the groundwork and initial
framework had already been created on the Department of Defense’s own accord before the
tragic event.71
The Pentagon has given clear mandates to its commanders to oversee contractors. The
contractor’s census and increased communication with Congress facilitates proper legislation.
Expansion of oversight agencies improves accountability. For legal action MEJA laid out the
groundwork before the outbreak of hostilities, further Congressional clarification will help
establish a proper framework. These agencies are still poorly staffed to handle the number of
contractors and legally the culture doesn’t exist to prosecute the majority of offenses.72 The
70 Beyond the Nisour Massacre contractors have also been found guilty of widespread fraud and misconduct.
Fraud cases, like those tried under the False Claims act, found cases of misconduct for the $8.7 billionthat
was awarded to various contractors in support of the war. One example found a contractor defrauded the
government of $40 million. There has also been cases of rape and assault, which do have a higher prosecution
rate than those of violent on the job instances. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/10/07/former-iraq-
contractor-pl_n_132754.html and Schwartz, Moshe (2009) ‘Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan: Background and Analysis’ Congressional Research Service
71 ibid
72 Isenberg, David “A Government in Search of Cover: Private Military Companies in Iraq.” Mercenaries to
Market. Chesterman & Lehnardt. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 82-93

36
greatest problem foreseen is the void that will be left once the military begins to leave and the
State Department operates its own security force.73 With all these reforms the picture has
become clearer and the ability of the private military industry to operate effectively has
increased. Nonetheless, it hasn’t alleviated many of the ethical fears individuals have for
contractors that were only increased by the actions of Blackwater.
Ethical considerations are an area where Congress and the Pentagon cannot simply pass
an act or create a new agency to deal with the problem. To address the concerns of certain
individuals only time and success will accomplish the goal and even then certain individuals will
always view contractors disparagingly. Yet, the critiques are important and they delve into the
issue beyond simply the threat to the monopoly on violence but also to the fundamental
motivation of contractors: profit. The threat that many critics have raised never came to fruition
even in the perfect storm that was the Iraq War. The government-industry relationship has been
strengthened, the roles further defined and a framework for oversight and legal prosecution
established.
Much of these negative feelings accurately portray the mistakes that the Executive branch
and military made in handling the increased use of contractors. Being true to its nature the
military slowly realized these mistakes and incrementally made changes. Critics have focused on
the “grey zone” in which contractors operate and the fact that prosecutors taking action is rare
and crimes are not being reported. 74 This valid concern is an area that the Iraq War and the
changes to how the Pentagon deals with contractors have been most effectively addressed. While
continued reform is needed, this dissertation has demonstrated how the Department of Defense
slowly evolved its relationship with the military industrial complex to deal with the needs and
challenges of the time.
73 While the Defense Department has been working towards correcting mistakes in how in managed
contractors earlier in the conflict the State Department hasn’t been as proactive. Though cooperating in
Department of Defense reforms they have been slowto reform on their own. It should be noted that the
Nisour Sq Massacre was carried out by contractors under contract by the State Department and now the
Department of Defense and once the military withdraws the State Department will still have significant
presence though without the back of military accountability. For further information on this new ‘private
army’ see Hodge, Nathan (2011) U.S. Plans Private Guard Force for Iraq’ The Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2011
74 Jose L. Gomez “Needs to take PMSC out of grey zone.” Journal of Conflict & Security Law. Oxford Press.
2009. Pg. 429

37
Using the Iraq War as an example one can reason that improvements will continue. The
idea that the state should be the key holder of the monopoly on violence is one that critics, from
Gomez to P.W. Singer, are quick to point out.75 It is also one that still has the potential to be
degraded in the future. The Iraq War has confirmed that the monopoly has been strengthened
through reform. Though the case exists for unwarranted influence it is within the same apparatus
as the concerns raised 60 years earlier by President Eisenhower suggesting that recent
developments are not revolutionary.
There is also the idea that what is occurring is leading to a fundamentally new security
industry.76 The number and size of companies and contractors have actually increased this
security industry which is not new but rather an emerging segment within the military-industrial
complex. It’s easy to forget classical examples of mercenaries and focus on the idea of civilians
in war related roles. America has used contractors throughout its history. The Iraq war has
proved that they are a growing and important part of the military industrial complex.
There are also important concerns for how the increase use of contractors, and therefore
civilians, will impact the conduct of war. The concern is that all civilians might begin to be
viewed as combatants and vital to the war effort. By not distinguishing uniformed from civilian
personnel the number of acceptable targets will increase. Beyond this there is the risk that
civilians not part of the war effort, nongovernmental organizations or reconstruction could be
targeted based on the perception that all contractors are combatants. 77 One could argue that the
Iraq War is an example of this as the insurgency regularly target civilian staffers who are not
engaged in military type actions. The idea that these individuals would not have been targets by
performing only non-war functions proved to be false. The blurring of the lines is important
however as we have seen in Iraq the distinction remains and the roles have been clarified. The
idea that civilians are beginning to be viewed as combatants by the United States military or
government has not happened.
75 Jose L. Gomez “Needs to take PMSC out of grey zone.” Journal of Conflict & Security Law. Oxford Press.
2009. Pg. 431
76 Ibid. Pg.435
77 Hedahl, Marcud “Blood and Blackwaters: A Call to Arms for the Profession of Arms.” Journal of Military
Ethnics. 2009. Pp. 23

38
Economic concerns have raised ethical issues. The reason why the private military
industry came into existence was to fill a vacuum. It was allowed to flourish because the United
States’ culture values privatization. This leads to two questions. Can war related activities be
privatized effectively? What should remain the domain of the government?
What we have seen in the ongoing use of contractors is that they can be used and have a
vital part of the war effort. However, are they effective? That is to say just because you can
privatize does that means it is best for America. The case against this is that privatization only
works when the free market is allowed to function and a free market does not function during
times of war. 78 This means that the market is not truly competitive and is not free due to the
nature of war. The Iraq War is a difficult case to use for this as total war has not been achieved
and a free market still exists on the home front and even in parts of Iraq.
The chaos of war does by its nature lead to an unfriendly free market environment where
information isn’t equal and competition isn’t level. An example of this are the number of bad
contractors that have emerged from the war, in both regards to contractors and overall
procurement. However because this exists in peacetime as well it most likely has less to do with
the free market not functioning in Iraq and more to do with the poor procurement strategy, using
cost plus contracts, the Pentagon and the influence between military, industrial and congressional
leaders. However, if a total war was ever declared then the idea that the free market wouldn’t be
the best solution for the allocation of resources does hold sway. There is also the field of
transaction economics which views the contracts and dictates if the actual transaction is actually
positive.79
From this emerged clear improvement in the contracts awarded in Iraq and the
environment becoming more fair and balanced as the chaos of the early war and systematic flaws
in the framework were improved including the reduction of uncertainty, asset specificity and
frequency. Improvements in each of these three areas led to improvements in the transaction
cost. However it’s important that when looking at transaction economics combat operations
would appear as one area that will never become economically viable. This is one reason to
78 Hedahl, Marcud “Blood and Blackwaters: A Call to Arms for the Profession of Arms.” Journal of Military
Ethnics. 2009. Pg. 23
79 Fredland, Eric J.” Outsourcing Military force: A Transaction Cost Perspective on the role of Military
Companies.” Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 15. 2004.

39
explain, in addition to ethical concerns, why the private military industry was halted in its role at
security operations and was never allowed to become involved in combat operations.80
The Congressional Budget Office has also looked at the economic merits of using
contractors. According to the CBO the costs associated with using private security contractors in
Iraq “did not differ greatly from the costs of having a comparable military unit performing
similar functions. During peacetime, however, the military unit would remain in the force
structure and continue to accrue costs at a peacetime rate, whereas the private security contract
would not have to be renewed.” This is the crux of why the use of contractors can be a positive
even if it wasn’t a necessity. The ability to wage a major war and not have to pay for a large
peacetime military is important. With budget cuts and military downsizing the military must be
able to rely on the private military industry to protect its ability to wage major war with a highly
trained and well equipped military. Therefore, even though they were created to fill a void,
expanded to fill the countries desperate need for manpower, the case for its continued existence
is its ability to augment American military strength and therefore fill a critical need as the
military continues to become leaner.
80 This is an important distinction that though private security contractors have engaged in combat it has
only been in self defense (or a criminal act) when protecting their asset. Never has a contractor been hired by
the military or State Department to engage in combat operations.

40
Conclusion
The Iraq War has presented a unique case study from which to examine the use of private
contractors in the United States military. The war was an important event for the military
demonstrating how quickly the United States adapted to wartime changes. Though structural and
appearance changed this military still consists of professionals who wage war under firm state
control. Two hundred and thirty five years ago the founding fathers debated whether America
should even have a standing military and what the military should resemble.
As America grew so did its commitments around the world. America addressed these
challenges with an industrial complex to support a large military leading to fears as well as hope.
Fears of unwarranted influence and hope that the possibility of a stronger America with new
partners in the commercial sector.
With the fall of the Soviet Union many of America’s commitments fell away and the
military’s robust size was no longer needed. In the wake of these downsizes new operational
challenges arose creating a demand for private corporations. The Iraq War presented a
revolutionary opportunity for these corporations, their contractors and the industry at large. Some
contend that this ushered in a new age of warfare with an increased void of state control. This
paper has demonstrated that the America military has realized the increased importance of a
contractor’s roles and responsibilities leading to a strengthening of the state’s capabilities. True
to its roots, the US military implemented incremental steps in order to ensure a more perfect
relationship between uniformed personnel and contractors.
Steps were taken to regulate and ensure that proper accountability existed and robust
coordination maintained between the military and contracted soldiers. A clear mandate was
given to all levels of Government that commanders on the ground, and within the unified
command, continue to hold power. And that these individuals and their chain of command would
dictate to the contractors the realities in their respective theater of operation.81 Legal reform has
also occurred to help refine the framework. However, execution of the law has fallen short of

41
desired standards. The evolution continues and the execution of law will soon, hopefully, rise to
the level of the framework mandated.
As the capacity vacuum is filled and rules are put into place, order will begin to take over
replacing the chaos experienced in the beginning of the Iraq War. The process of establishing a
clear and reformed framework should continue as the military draws down in Iraq. The
Executive, together with the Department of Defense, must continue to improve the framework
for the use of professional contractors. The Congress must be given proper financial oversight
over deals related to contractors and must be given information so that they may inform the
public to ensure that the civil-military relationship remains strong.
The judiciary must be allowed to take part in ensuring a stronger relationship and be
allowed to execute its part of the balance of powers by ensuring the laws apply to contractors.
When breaches occur these contractors must be held accountable just as a civilian at home would
or a uniformed soldier abroad. The separation of powers as they apply to the military must also
apply to contractors and only then will ethical fears begin to be alleviated. America must not
allow another vacuum to be created and must ensure that the gains since 2003 are not threatened.
This process is far from over and as this paper has highlighted the military more than
most branches of government operates on a slow evolutionary timeline, putting changes into the
system incrementally. Not accustomed to rapid changes the military rose to the challenge by
quickly responding to demands of the Iraq War. As the framework develops that rivals its
uniformed counterpart the lines between the two will become blurred until it is simply
professionals waging war and whether they wear a uniform or not will no longer matter. While
challenges remain and flaws will be discovered what is clear is that professional soldiers will
continue to evolve to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

42
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