1. 201303634 - 30215: Maritime Securityin the 21st Century 3043 words
Will UNCLOSI-IIIreduce the likelihoodofconflict?
The UnitedNationsConventiononthe Law of the Sea (henceforthUNCLOS) gave statessovereignty
overthe highseas whichhad neverexistedpreviously andalthoughthisseemedlike anexcitingnew
era formany coastal and maritime statesUNCLOShasfailedinitscapacityto reduce the likelihood
of conflictinthe future.Thisessaywill argue thatUNCLOSfailstostrengthenglobal governance of
the sea due to manyfactors.The aforementioned acquisition of sovereigntyoverthe highseashas
ledto increasedresource competitionbetweenstatesandthe issue of whichstate hasthe strongest
claimoverareas of the highseas,particularly the South ChinaSea,have ledtoincreasedtensions
betweenregional actorsandcan onlymeanone thing,thatconflictwill occurand UNCLOShas failed
to preventthis. The impetustoexpandExclusiveEconomicZones(henceforthEEZs) hasalso
escalatedtensionsandledtoan increasedlikelihoodof conflict,andthiswill be examinedinregards
to UNCLOS ‘Increasinguse of the oceansresultedfromthe generalphenomenonof ever-increasing
populationsseekingeverhigherstandardsof living,andcommanding evermore sophisticatedand
powerful technology.’1
Inaddition,thisessaywill focusmainlyonthe SouthChinaSeaas a case
studyas it providesthe clearestevidence thatUNCLOShasfailedinreducingthe likelihoodof
conflict,withChina,Vietnamand Malaysiaamongstotherswhohave beeninvolvedinstandoffsand
the militarisationof the region. Thisessaywillalsoargue thatregional andbilateral agreements,
such as the 2002 Declarationona Code of Conductby the SouthChinaSeastates,have been far
more effectiveinreducingthe likelihoodof conflictthanUNCLOSbecause theyare tailoredtothe
involved parties’ interestsratherthanthe whole of the UnitedNations(henceforth,UN).
The preamble setsforththe aimsof UNCLOS and itis easyto compare the objectivesof the UN at
the time and itsfailedimplementationtoday,‘withdue regardforthe sovereigntyof all States,a
legal orderforthe seas andoceanswhichwill facilitateinternational communication,andwill
promote the peaceful uses of the seasandoceans,the equitableandefficientutilizationof their
resources’2
howeverfromitsinceptionUNCLOShadaconsiderable flaw inthatithaddue regard for
the sovereigntyof allstates.Thisisproblematicformodernapplicationsasthe potential conflictsof
the future are likelytooccurfromsovereigntydisputesinwhichneitherside iswillingtosacrifice
theirclaimso easily, anddespite UNCLOSjudicialsettlementsbeingbinding‘The StatesPartiesto
UNCLOS,includingChinaandthe Philippines,are obligedtosubmitanydispute concerningthe
interpretationorapplicationof the Convention…toajudicial settlementprocedure thatleadstoa
bindingdecision’3
there have beenoccasionswhere nationsaccusedof violatingUNCLOShave
statedthat bilateral talkswouldhave beenmore preferable ‘whilethe Philippineswaswithinits
rights,accordingto UNCLOS,to internationalizeitsdisputewithChinaovermaritimejurisdiction
withinthe WestPhilippine Sea(itsname forthe SouthChinaSea),the benefitsof callingfor
multilateral arbitrationremaindoubtful. As[Premier] Zhupointedout,bilateraltalkswouldhave
beenpreferable.’4
Manywouldargue thatthe Philippineswereforcedintointernationalisingtheir
dispute withChinadue tothe aggressive nature of the Chineseonsuchissues,yetthe Philippines
1 Buzan, B (1978) A sea of troubles? Sources of dispute in the new ocean regime: Introduction, The Adelphi
Papers,18:143, 1-4, accessed 16/03/2016 from
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/05679327808457309 p1
2 United Nations (1982) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea accessed 17/03/2016 at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf p25
3 Jia,B and Talmon, S (2014) The South China Sea Arbitration: A Chinese Perspective (Hart Publishing:Oxford)
p8
4 Billo,A (2013) Dialogue and the Deep Blue Sea Accessed 14/03/2016 from https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/overcoming-asia-s-territorial-disputes-by-andrew-billo

2. 201303634 - 30215: Maritime Securityin the 21st Century 3043 words
may have beenmore successful if theyhadengagedthe Chineseinbilateral agreements,asUNCLOS
isnot the onlymeansof conflict resolutionavailable tostates.
Furthermore,manymajornationsatthe time refusedtosignthe UNCLOS as the UN were notable
to come to a consensuson issuessuchas deepseabeds‘from1974 onwards,complete agreement
provedimpossible onone outstandingissue,the future of the deepseabed.PresidentReagan’sUSA
loyallyfollowedbyitstwomostfaithful allies,Britainandthe GermanFederal Republic,refusedto
signthe resultingUnitedNationsConventiononthe Law of the Sea…’5
Thishas had a negative effect
on hownationsview the UNCLOStoday, as Grove continuestosay:‘Thishostile attitude still
preventsthe 1982 Conventionformingthe formal basisforthe international law of the sea.’6
The
attitudesfromthe signingnationstowardsUNCLOSwasnotuniversallysupportive andthishas
continuedtoexistinthe pastfewdecadesas manynationsdisregard UNCLOSas an effectivemeans
of global governance of the seas. Thishasledtomany infringementsbynations since,suchasthe
statesinvolvedinthe SouthChinaSeadispute,whichwill be examinedfurtherlaterinthisessay.
One majorfactor that the nationscreatingUNCLOSdid notconsiderfullywasthe environmental
strainthat wouldoccur fromincreasedglobal activityonthe highseasandthe rapidtechnological
expansionof maritimeindustries‘WhenUNCLOSwasnegotiated,the highseaswere protected
because theywere inaccessible.Buttechnological advanceshave enabledthe exploitationof
resourcestoextendfartheranddeeperthaneverbefore.’7
Manynew coastal statesopenedtheir
watersto foreignfishingfleets becausetheydidnotadhere toUNCLOS’ideaof efficientlymanaging
the use of the ocean’sresources‘Solongas oceanresourceswere eitherinaccessibleor
inexhaustible,itmade little difference tocoastal stateswhetherornototherscame to exploit
resourcesoff theirshores.’8
Nationshave sufferedimmenselyfromoverfishing,suchasSomalia
where manyex-fishermenhave turnedtopiracyinorderto survive andthisrepresentsone of the
issueswithUNCLOS,thatit is outdatedandlacksthe clarityandinfluence topreventconflictsarising
fromproblemssuchas overfishingandresource competition.
The exploitationof the ocean’snatural resourcesbecause of alackof governance fromthe UNCLOS
nationshasincreasedthe likelihoodof conflictinthe future.Forexample,the vastmajorityof post-
WorldWar Two coastal stateswere developingandinthatregard the acquisitionof resourceswas
paramount‘Many of these are coastal states,andmost of themare developingcountries- a
combinationwhichhasgreatlyheightenedthe competitionforcontrol overoceanresources.’9
Competitionwithmaritimenationssuchasthe UnitedKingdom(henceforthUK) meantthattensions
rose betweenthe twogroups:‘AfterWorldWarII a distinctpolitical cleavage begantodevelop
betweencoastal states…andmaritime states,anddisputesandconflictsbetweenthembecame
increasinglycommon.’10
UNCLOShasfailedtoresolve suchissues,itdoesnotprovide clearand
consistentdecisionsinthese casesbutrathertriestocontainthe disputes,asBuzanstatesonce
more:‘The conventionwill notsomuchresolve some disputesascontainthem.Itwill notcreate
5 Grove, E (1990) The Future of Sea Power (Routledge: London) p167
6 Ibid
7 Velasco,A (2014) The Lawless Sea accessed 13/03/2016 from http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/andres-velasco-outlines-an-agenda-for-saving-the-global-ocean-from-imminent-
life-threatening-risks
8 Buzan, B (1978) A sea of troubles? Sources of dispute in the new ocean regime: Introduction, The Adelphi
Papers,18:143, 1-4, accessed 16/03/2016 from
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/05679327808457309 p2
9 Ibid
10 Ibid

3. 201303634 - 30215: Maritime Securityin the 21st Century 3043 words
orderout of chaos,but ratherdefine the termsof disorder.’11
Buzanhighlightsakeyflaw toUNCLOS
inthat it doesnotcreate orderinresource disputeswhichhasledtoheightenedtensionsinareas
such as the SouthChinaSeaover the limitedresources,withChina’sbuildingof anoff-shore oil
platforminVietnamese watersleadingtoextremelytense relationsbetweenthe two‘afterChina
stationedanoil rigin watersclaimedbyVietnam, shipsfromthe twocountriesengagedinramming
and water-cannonbattlesatsea;anti-ChineseriotsinVietnamfollowed.’12
Because UNCLOSdoes
not resolve disputesmanynationshave beenstallingtalks‘ASEAN statesnotdirectlyaffectedbythe
Spratlysdispute were contenttokickthe issue downthe road’13
whichwill eventuallyreachaboiling
point, mostlikelyendinginconflict,particularlywithmanynationsindisputedterritoriesincreasing
theirmilitarybudgetsconsistentlyeveryyear.
Resource disputesare widespreadtodayanditis notlimitedtodevelopingnationswhoare
competingwitheachother,Spainandthe UK have had disagreementsoverGibraltarandin1998
‘Over520 incursionsbySpanishfishermenof the claimedBritishterritorial waterswererecordedby
Gibraltarpolice’14
andthisoccurs eventhoughthe BritishclaimtoGibraltarisabsolutelyclear‘both
international customaryandconventionallaw supportthe Britishclaim.’15
Thiswouldtherefore
seemtosuggestthat UNCLOSin particulardoesnotstop resource disputesevenif there isnoclear
sovereigntyissue athandas well. Chinahasbeenparticularlyaggressive initssuppressionof foreign
vessels,examplesof thisinclude;‘The imposition,andespeciallythe enforcement,of fishingbanson
foreignvessels,aswell asthe confiscationof shipcargo(fishingcatches),andcrew detentions.’16
Whilstmanynationscan tolerate the banningof theirvesselsfromChinesewaters,the detentionof
theircitizensunderChinese interpretationof UNCLOShasledto increasinglyvolatile behaviourfrom
all involvedparties.Resourceacquisitionandexploitationhasnotbeenmanagedwell underUNCLOS
as statesare still willingtoviolateUNCLOSin orderto pursue economicgainsand thishasledto
statessuch as Chinabecomingincreasinglymore aggressive overtheirclaimedsovereignty.This no
doubtwill leadtoconflictinareassuch as the SouthChinaSeaas the Wall StreetJournal notedin
2011 '"Rightnow,Chinais nottoo aggressive there,butonce ithasthe technology,itwill gomore
aggressively"inthe area…"It's a race. This[sea] isdisputed,ithasa resource,andwhoevercanget
more of itcan getmore,"he said.If other countriesare prospecting,"whywouldn'tChina?"’17
Lin
Boqianghas identifiedone of the core reasonsbehindChina’saggressive expansioninthe South
ChinaSeaand whyit isso willingtodefend whatBeijingclaimsisChinese sovereignwatersbecause
the more territorya nationcan control,the more resourcesitcan exploit. Therefore, the failure of
UNCLOS to resolve sovereigntydisputeshascontributedtoincreasedaggressionbystatesin
attemptsto gainand control territoryforthe exploitationof resources.
11 Buzan, B (1978) A sea of troubles? Sources of dispute in the new ocean regime: Introduction, The Adelphi
Papers,18:143, 1-4, accessed 16/03/2016 from
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/05679327808457309 p2
12 Nye, J (2015) Avoiding Conflict in the South China Sea accessed 13/03/2016 from https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/south-china-sea-conflict-by-joseph-s--nye-2015-06
13 Hiebert, M and Poling,G (2011) ASEAN and the South China Sea from a Roundtable on The South China Sea
and U.S.-China-ASEAN relations accessed 14/03/2016 from
http://csis.org/files/attachments/111128_Hiebert_Poling_ASEAN_South_China_Sea.pdf p4
14 O’Reilly,G (1999) Gibraltar:Sovereignty Disputes and Territorial Waters IBRUBoundary and Security
Bulletin,Spring1999 p76
15 Ibid p80
16 Finkelstein,D (2011) Is China Getting Assertive on Territorial Disputes? Accessed 14/03/2016 from
http://csis.org/files/attachments/111128_Finkelstein_China_Territorial_Disputes.pdf p3
17 Barta, P and Larano,C (2011) Drilling Plans Raise Stakes in Disputed Seas in the Wall Street Journal Accessed
14/03/2016 athttp://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904292504576484073250205648 pp6-7

4. 201303634 - 30215: Maritime Securityin the 21st Century 3043 words
The escalationof tensionsinthe SouthChinaSeamustbe examinedinordertofullycomprehend
the failure of UNCLOSto preventfuture conflicts. The statesprimarilyinvolvedinsovereignty
disputeshave varyingclaimstothe areastheypossessorseektopossessandunderUNCLOSall have
a mandate to scrutinise andaccuse the otherunderinternational law.Thisposesmanyproblems,
the accusedmain aggressorinthe region,China,hasa historyof aggressionagainstallegedforeign
trespassersintheirterritory‘SkirmishesbetweenChinaandVietnamtookplace in1974 and 1988’18
whichculminatedinthe deathsof 74 VietnamesesailorsinJohnsonReef ‘Chinaclashedwith
VietnaminMarch 1988 while occupyingJohnsonReef,killingseventy-fourVietnamese sailors.’19
This
has ledtoincreasedtensions betweenthesenationsoversovereignty.However,effortsweremade
by the Chinese inanattempttocalm concerns overthe threat of a risingChina,forexample ‘China
has pursuedavarietyof escalationcontrol mechanisms,includingsigningthe 2002 declarationona
conduct of conduct,agreeingtoimplementingguidelinesforthe declarationin2011, and reaching
an agreementwithVietnamonbasicprinciplesin2011.’20
The 2002 declarationonaCode of
Conduct(henceforthDCOC) canbe arguedto be more successful thanUNCLOSin reducingtensions
inthe SouthChinaSeaand manywouldargue that regional andbilateral agreementsare more
effectiveatdoingsothan broadinternational lawssuchasUNCLOSthat lack the specificstoappease
partiesina dispute. Thisresonatestodayasmanynationshave feltthatbilateral talkshave been
more successful attimesin the past andtherefore canbe consideredoverusingUNCLOSasa
mediatorfordisputes.
Attemptshave beenmade bymostinvolvedpartiesinthe SouthChinaSeadispute tobringtheir
claimsinline withUNCLOS,whichgivesthe conventionmore legitimacyinthese matters,‘President
Aquinoinparticularhasprovenwillingtosetaside the long-termissueof control overthe Spratlys
for the sake of findinganacceptable solutiontomaritime claimsbasedonUNCLOS.’21
Howeverthe
attemptsof many to legitimisetheirclaimsinhope of reducingthe likelihoodof conflictthrough
UNCLOS will notleadtopeace inthe South ChinaSea.Many nationshave realisedthattheymust
come togetherthroughregional actorsinorderto fendoff Chinese aggression‘The Philippineshas
joinedVietnaminrecentyearsinrecognizingthatitcannot holdthe line againstChinawithouta
multilateral effortinvolvingall the ASEAN claimants.’22
The repercussionsof acombinedASEAN
efforttocombat Chinese claimstothe territoriesin the SouthChinaSeawouldbe phenomenal and
wouldmostcertainlyleadtodramaticallyincreasedtensioninthe regionandpossiblyevenconflict.
Whilstthisisan issue withthe nature of ASEAN regional effortsasan alternative toindividual states
usingUNCLOSto resolve disputesitdoeshighlightthe factthatUNCLOS isnot alwaysthe best
optioninthe opinionof the statesof the SouthChinaSea.
In 2009 Chinasubmitteditsownclaimstothe SouthChinaSeaafternearlya decade of reducing
tension inthe region, thiswasinresponse to the jointMalaysia-Vietnamsubmissionof claiminline
withUNCLOS‘That situationbegantochange substantiallyinMay2009, whenChinasubmittedits
“9 dashedlines”claimtothe CLCSas part of itsNotesVerbale in response tothe jointMalaysia-
18 Glaser,B (2011) South China Sea Dispute: Causes and Solutions accessed 14/03/2016 from
http://csis.org/files/attachments/111128_Glaser_South_China_Sea_Dispute_Causes_Solutions.pdf p1
19 Fravel,T (2011) China’s Behavior in its Territorial Disputes and Assertiveness in the South China Sea accessed
14/03/2016 athttp://csis.org/files/attachments/111128_Fravel_China_Behavior_Territorial_Disputes.pdf p3
20 Fravel,T (2011) China’s Behavior in its Territorial Disputes and Assertiveness in the South China Sea accessed
14/03/2016 athttp://csis.org/files/attachments/111128_Fravel_China_Behavior_Territorial_Disputes.pdf p3
21 Hiebert, M and Poling,G (2011) ASEAN and the South China Sea from a Roundtable on The South China Sea
and U.S.-China-ASEAN relations accessed 14/03/2016 from
http://csis.org/files/attachments/111128_Hiebert_Poling_ASEAN_South_China_Sea.pdf p3
22 Ibid.

5. 201303634 - 30215: Maritime Securityin the 21st Century 3043 words
Vietnamsubmission.’23
AspreviouslymentionedinthisessayChinahasstatedtheywouldprefer
bilateral orregional discussionson sovereigntyissues,yettherehasbeenincreasingwillingnessto
abide byUNCLOS fromthe otherstates,for example VietnamusedUNCLOSfortwomainreasons
‘Vietnam’sdesire tobringitsclaiminline withUNCLOShasbeendrivenbytwofactors – the
realizationthatitcannotdefenditsclaimsagainstChinese encroachmentbyitself andthe desire to
stepup exploitationof offshore resources.’24
The message thatthissendstoChinaisnotone of
conflictresolutionbutof othermotives,andthe factthat manyare so willingtoblame Chinaasthe
lone aggressorinthisdispute ‘…othernationspointingthe fingeratBeijingasthe sole provocateur
inthe disputes’25
hascontributed toincreasedChineseaggressioninthe regiontoday.
Furthermore,previouslylowtensionsbetweenthe SouthChinaSeastateshave beenheightened by
a needto spendincreasedeconomicbudgetsondefence spending,inlinewithrenewedterritorial
disputesinthe region.Despite muchof the diplomatictalksbeingaboutpeaceful resolutionsuchas
fromSingapore ‘MinisterShanmugamalsosaidthatthisshouldbe done inaccordance with
international law …andstatedthat all partiesshouldrefrainfromprovocativebehaviourthatcould
raise tensionsinthe SouthChinaSea’26
there have beenincreasedeffortstomilitarise tocombat
Chinese defence spending‘uncertaintiesoverthe disputesinthe SouthChinaSeaandChina’s
militarybuilduphave ledmanycountriesinthe regiontobolstertheirmilitarycapabilities.’27
Infact,
overthe 2014-2015 periodSingapore’sdefence spendingincreasedby anestimated5.7%28
andthis
isminute comparedto China,whichmaintaineditsdouble digitbudgetincreaseonce again‘this
year,the Chinese defensebudgetwill rise by10.1 percent,toroughly$145 billion’29
whichisafar
cry from 1997 whentotal defence wasroughly$10 billion‘Chinesemilitaryexpenditures totaled
onlyabout$10 billion,roughlyonparwithTaiwanand significantlylessthanthatof Japan andSouth
Korea.’30
Despite the existence of UNCLOS,tensionsoverterritoryandresourceshave lednationsto
increase theirdefence spendingtoprepare forany potential conflict.
UNCLOS hasfailedthereforeinprovidingthe meansforconsistentconflictresolutionregardingthe
highseas,leadingtoincreasedtensionsandpotential forconflictand thiscan be contributedtothe
varyingclaimsof differentnationsinthe SouthChinaSeatothe same territoriesandalack of
willingnesstoresolve the disputespeacefully inlinewithUNCLOS.Chinaislesswillingtonegotiate
especiallysince itisbecomingone of the strongestmilitariesinthe world‘China’sbehaviorinthese
territorial disputesisalsomagnifiedbecause itsmilitarycapabilitieshave developedtothe point
23 Hiebert, M and Poling,G (2011) ASEAN and the South China Sea from a Roundtable on The South China Sea
and U.S.-China-ASEAN relations accessed 14/03/2016 from
http://csis.org/files/attachments/111128_Hiebert_Poling_ASEAN_South_China_Sea.pdf p4
24 Ibid.
25 Glaser,B (2011) South China Sea Dispute: Causes and Solutions accessed 14/03/2016 from
http://csis.org/files/attachments/111128_Glaser_South_China_Sea_Dispute_Causes_Solutions.pdf pp1-2
26 Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) Press Statement accessed 14/03/2016 from
http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/asean/press_statements_speeches/2013/201301/pres
s_20130123.html
27 Barta, P and Larano,C (2011) Drilling Plans Raise Stakes in Disputed Seas in the Wall Street Journal Accessed
14/03/2016 athttp://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904292504576484073250205648
28 Singapore’s Defence Ministry (2014) FY2015 EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES
http://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/data/budget_2015/download/25%20MINDEF%202015.pdf
29 BItzinger, R (2015) China's Double-Digit Defense Growth accessed 18/03/2016 from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-03-19/chinas-double-digit-defense-growth
30 Ibid.

6. 201303634 - 30215: Maritime Securityin the 21st Century 3043 words
where theyare greaterthan those of mostof the otherclaimants’31
andthishas promptedthe U.S.
to intervene inthe region,despite havingnoclaimoveranyof the disputedterritories.Of course,
the U.S. is there topreventthe sealanesfrombeingclosedbyanaggressive China,oranypotential
conflict‘the UnitedStateshasa stake inensuringthatthe vital sealanesof communications
throughoutthe region’32
buthave beeninvolvedintensestandoffswiththe Chinesethroughoutthe
PRC’sExclusive EconomicZone.GarethEvansarguedthatthere wasa shiftinpowerinthe Asia-
Pacific‘a majorshiftinthe Asia-Pacificbalance of powerhasalreadytakenplace.The daysof
America’sunequivocal primacyandunilateral capacitytowrite the rulesare over’33
anditis hard to
disagree thatChinaisbecomingmore willingtobreachinternational law due toan increasingly
powerful military.
In conclusion,whilstUNCLOSisa stepforwardinglobal governance of the sea‘UNCLOSarticlesare
increasinglyregardedasprovidingthe frameworkforinternationalmaritimecooperation’34
thereis
a vast disconnectionfromthe intendedoutcome of the articlesandtheir use bynationstoday.
UNCLOS isvastlyoutdated,failingtokeepupwiththe rapidtechnologicaladvancesof statesand
theirindustriesthathave made accesstothe sea far easierforall.Furthermore,thisessayhas
arguedthat UNCLOS hasfailedinresolvingdisputesbetweennations,insteadithasmerely
containedthemfornowwhichhasresultedinnationsinregionssuchasthe South ChinaSea
increasingtheirdefence spendinginthe eventthe tensionsturntoconflict.Furtherinvestigation
was made intothe SouthChinaSeadispute,withthe U.S.becomingheavilyinvolvedinthe region
and the rise of Chinaas a militarypowerhasledtoa powerbalance struggle,althoughthe U.S.can
expecttoremainthe dominantpowerinthe regionforsome time itisno longerunchallenged.
Finally,whilstthisessayhasarguedthe detrimental effectsof the gapsinUNCLOS one cannot
disregarditas a keypiece of international maritimelaw,butitmustbe modernisedandgiven
strictercontrol of decisionmakinginthe disputesthatcouldleadtoconflictinthe worldtoday.
31 Finkelstein,D (2011) Is China Getting Assertive on Territorial Disputes? Accessed 14/03/2016 from
http://csis.org/files/attachments/111128_Finkelstein_China_Territorial_Disputes.pdf p7
32 Ibid
33 Evans, G (2015) Serenity in the South China Sea accessed 13/03/2016 from http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/south-china-sea-territorial-claims-unclos-by-gareth-evans-2015-06?barrier=true
34 Till,G(2009) Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (Routledge: London) p352

7. 201303634 - 30215: Maritime Securityin the 21st Century 3043 words
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8. 201303634 - 30215: Maritime Securityin the 21st Century 3043 words
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