1. Mexico’s Controversial Competition Law Reforms:
A Second Antitrust Revolution?
B Y A L L A N V A N F L E E T
Económica (COFECE) as an autonomous agency, indepen-
dent of the Federal Executive branch. It comprises seven
Commissioners known as the Pleno. They are appointed for
nine-year staggered terms by the President from a list of
candidates submitted by a committee comprising the heads
of the Bank of Mexico, the National Institute for the Eval-
uation of Education, and the National Statistics and Geo-
graphy Institute. Among other qualifications, candidates for
each position must be among the top five scorers on a knowl-
edge exam, which must be formulated with the input of at
least two institutions of higher education and follow “best
practices” on the subject. Nominees must be confirmed by a
two-thirds vote of the Senate, and can serve only one term as
Commissioner. The initial Pleno of Commissioners includes
one lawyer and six economists, including the Presiding
Commissioner, Alejandra Palacios Prieto.6
The new LFCE created an Investigative Authority within
COFECE, independent of the Commissioners, which pur-
sues alleged conduct violations, reviews potentially illegal
mergers and acquisitions, conducts informal market studies
and new formal market investigations, and makes recom-
mendations for action—or inaction—by the Pleno.7
The first
Titular—head—of the Investigative Authority is the veteran
Carlos Mena Labarthe.8
The Article 28 amendments also created a Federal Tele-
communications Institute, the heads of which are selected in
the same manner as the members of the Pleno and which has
exclusive jurisdiction over competition in the broadcasting
and telecommunications sectors.9
Importantly, under Article
28, the transmission and distribution of electric energy and
exploration and the extraction of oil and other hydrocar-
bons continue to be designated (together with other indus-
tries) state-strategic sectors, which—by definition—are not
monopolies subject to the constitutional prohibition. These
sectors, however, are subject to specific regulation.
New Anticompetitive Conduct Definitions
Since its inception, the LFCE has specified anticompeti-
tive conduct as either “absolute” or “relative” practices,
approximating the U.S. concepts of per se and rule of rea-
son offenses.
The most controversial of the 2014 revisions is the addi-
tion of two offenses that have fallen from favor in the United
6 2 · A N T I T R U S T
C O V E R S T O R I E S
O
N DECEMBER 8, 2014, FORBES
announced: “Over the past year, Carlos Slim
Helú has gone from being the richest man on
the planet to the third place on Forbes World’s
Billionaires list.”1
Forbes cited analysts’ belief
that the plunge in value of Slim’s América Móvil telecom
empire was due to “Mexico’s new antitrust telecom regula-
tions which mandate that the company reduce its market
share below 50%” and force it “to cut its fees and share its
infrastructure with competitors.”2
Some have compared
América Móvil to Standard Oil and Slim’s long struggle with
Mexican competition authorities to the clash of American
titans John D. Rockefeller and Teddy Roosevelt.3
Will Mexico’s comprehensive revisions to its competition
laws and enforcement regime finally topple its monopoly-
dominated economy and break down barriers to effective
competition? Or will they, as some fear, “trip up multina-
tionals” and create disincentives to innovation and other
procompetitive business behavior?4
A New Constitutional Agency––Born of Broader
Economic Reforms
In 1992, Mexico enacted its first comprehensive competition
law as part of the economic reforms required by the North
American Free Trade Agreement.5
More recently, the revisions
to the Ley Federal de Competencia Económica (LFCE) were
part of the tri-partisan Pact for Mexico, following Enrique
Peña Nieto’s election as President in 2012 after campaigning
on a commitment to broad democratic and economic reform.
Comprising constitutional, legislative, and regulatory initia-
tives, one of the key objectives of the economic overhaul was
to open Mexico’s state-monopolized energy sector and pri-
vately monopolized telecom industry to effective competi-
tion, including from international players.
In 2013, Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution, which
contains general provisions addressing monopolies, was
amended to establish the Comisión Federal de Competencia
Antitrust, Vol. 29, No. 2, Spring 2015. © 2015 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not
be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
Allan Van Fleet is a Partner at McDermott Will & Emery LLP and a Former
Chair of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law. The author thanks Carlos Mena
Labarthe, Titular de la Autoridad Investigadora, Comisión Federal de
Competencia Económica, for comments.

2. S P R I N G 2 0 1 5 · 6 3
States. LFCE art. 56 (XII) subjects to scrutiny the denial,
restriction, or discriminatory access to an “essential input”
(insumo esencial)—echoing the discredited “essential facili-
ties” concept.10
Art. 56 (XIII), moreover, codifies the offense
of “margin squeeze” (estrechamiento de márgines), consisting
of reducing the margin between the price of an essential
input and the price of consumer goods or services using that
input, and thereby impeding competition downstream.
Although these concepts have not gained purchase in U.S.
antitrust jurisprudence,11
preventing margin squeeze, and
generally ensuring access to essential inputs, is considered
vital to opening Mexico’s entrenched monopolies (such as
energy and telecommunications) requiring substantial infra-
structure. Indeed, as discussed below, the new LFCE empow-
ers COFECE to investigate and eliminate such barriers to
competition, even in the absence of a specific conduct com-
plaint. The ABA Sections of Antitrust Law and International
Law, however, commented that “requiring broad access to
inputs deemed ‘essential’ may create long-term disincentives
to efficiency-enhancing investments in the production of
such inputs and dampen dynamic competition.”12
Further,
they argue, applying margin squeeze and essential facilities
doctrines “requires antitrust courts [and agencies] to act as
central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and
other terms of dealing . . . .”13
COFECE recently adopted regulations implementing the
LFCE,14
including two controversial “indications” of absolute
offenses, which provide probable cause to start a full-blown
investigation. First is the “invitation or recommendation”
by one or more competitors to coordinate prices or other con-
ditions of production or distribution—or sharing informa-
tion with that purpose or effect. The ABA Comments warn
that “given potential ambiguities in communication, per se
condemnation of such invitations may inadvertently chill
efficient communications.”15
Although the ABA Comments
focus on public communications—for example, a statement
to the markets about possible price instability—strict inter-
pretation of the law could deter potential joint-venture part-
ners from discussing how they could provide their products
more efficiently.
Second is the existence of a substantial and sustained dif-
ference in the domestic and international prices at which
two or more competitors offer the same goods or services,
except when these are caused by duties or costs of trans-
portation or distribution.16
Although also criticized in the
ABA Comments, the regulation resembles a recently intro-
duced bill authorizing the Canadian Competition Bureau to
investigate discrimination in prices offered in Canada and the
United States.17
The new Regulations include standards for defining rele-
vant markets and determining whether “economic agents”
possess substantial power. Article 9 expressly recognizes that
two or more entities may share market power if they demon-
strate similar market strategies and conduct. More contro-
versial is Article 7’s treatment of barriers to entry, which
includes consideration of the financial cost of entry and lim-
itations on access to financing––which the ABA Comments
condemn as “inappropriate”––as well access to technology, or
channels of distribution.18
Modernized Merger Control
The new law and regulations streamline and make more rig-
orous Mexico’s review of mergers and acquisitions—called
concentraciones.19
First, and globally most welcome, the report-
ing thresholds now apply only to assets and sales within
Mexico, not world-wide.20
Thresholds are expressed in mul-
tiples of the minimum daily salary in the Federal District,
today about US$5, but proposed to increase to just over
US$6. Currently, concentraciones must be reported when they:
(1) are valued at more than approximately US$90 million;
(2) cause an accumulation of 35 percent of the shares or
assets of an entity with sales or assets exceeding US$90 mil-
lion; or (3) accumulate assets or shares worth more than
US$42 million among entities with combined sales or assets
in excess of US$240 million.21
The new law clarifies that reportable concentraciones have
no legal effect until authorized by COFECE,22
and it specif-
ically forbids gun jumping, including any sharing of infor-
mation that would otherwise violate the law.23
LFCE art. 89 specifies eleven categories of information
and documents the parties must provide in their notification,
including—to the consternation of the ABA commenters—
data about the market shares of the merging parties and their
competitors.24
The Commission has 60 days to decide to
authorize, object, or condition the concentración, which may
be extended 90 days for “exceptionally complicated cases.”25
Article 63 sets out what COFECE will consider in review-
ing a concentración, and accompanying regulations specify
how evidence, including expert testimony and reports, must
be presented. Although the law provides that efficiencies
derived from the concentración are always to be considered, the
regulations clarify that the burden is on the combining par-
ties to demonstrate efficiencies that derive specifically from the
transaction.26
COFECE’s predecessor created an “Index of
Domination,” a variant of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
that diminishes the quantitative impact of a market’s largest
participants.27
The Commission currently proposes to begin
using the HHI (which it shortens to “H”). The proposal pro-
vides that a concentración will be considered not to harm
competition when: (1) the increase is less than 75 points;
(2) the resulting H is less than 2000; or (3) the increase is
75–150 points, the resulting H is 2000–2500, but there will
be at least four larger players in the relevant market.28
In a twist on early termination, parties may present evi-
dence to the Commission that it is obvious (notorio) that the
concentración will not have the purpose or effect of diminish-
ing, harming, or impeding competition. This is recognized
when the acquiring party does no business in markets related
to the relevant market under review and any one of the fol-
lowing is shown: (1) the transaction will bring the acquiring

3. party into the relevant market for the first time;
(2) prior to the transaction, the acquiring party did not have
control of the target and, although the transaction will lead to
an increase in the acquiror’s stake, it will not increase its abil-
ity to influence strategy or operations of the target company;
or (3) the acquiring party already has control and is simply
increasing its shares.29
The Commission has five days from the
filing either to agree or set the matter for full review. If the
Commission agrees, it must approve the transaction within 15
days, after which it is understood COFECE has no objection.
In its most recent Trimester Report, COFECE observed
that it took an average of 18 business days from filing to
resolve notified concentraciones—12 business days under the
notorio procedure.30
This timeframe sits comfortably at the
lower end of review periods in a number of more mature
jurisdictions around the world.
Enhanced Enforcement Powers
Fines under the new LFCE continue to be measured by a vio-
lator’s revenues (generated from Mexican sources): up to 10
percent for an absolute monopolistic practice; 8 percent for
a relative practice or an illegal concentración; 5 percent (pre-
sumably from each party) for failing to file a required con-
centración notice. Failure to follow conditions required for a
concentración approval can result in a fine of 10 percent of rev-
enues, as well as a break-up order. Indeed, any failure to
comply with an injunctive order results in a fine of up to 10
percent of revenues. If revenues cannot be determined, the
law provides alternative fines up to 1.5 million times the DF
minimum salary—today the equivalent of US$7.5 million.
Individuals implicated in a violation can be barred for
five years from being a director, executive, manager, agent, or
representative of any business and can be fined up to 200,000
times the DF minimum salary—or US$1 million. Anyone
who assists, facilitates, or induces the commission of a
monopolistic practice (whether absolute or relative) or illic-
it concentración can be fined up to 180,000 times the DF
minimum salary (or US$900,000). Indeed, even a notary
public (fedatorio public—a much more important position
in Mexico than the equivalent in the United States) can be
fined the same amount for assisting in effecting a concen-
tración that has not been authorized by COFECE.31
Fines are doubled for repeat offenses (within ten years).
Further, COFECE can order the dissolution of a recidivist
company or the disgorgement of shares or assets to the extent
necessary to eliminate anticompetitive effects.32
The new LFCE confirms COFECE’s ability to conduct
“dawn raids” on business premises (although under the law
such “visitas de verificación” normally must not be conduct-
ed at dawn, but during business hours). The law also sets out
the rights of those raided, such as the right to inspect the
order authorizing the raid, and the ability to make a com-
plaint about the conduct of the visit. Perhaps more unusual-
ly, the law also provides that if the company, its managers,
or those responsible for the site do not allow access to the
premises, refuse to turn over information or documents
(including those on computers and other electronic devices),
or otherwise interfere with a visita de verificación, it may be
presumed that they were responsible for any infringement
found to have been committed.33
The new law and regulations extend COFECE’s amnesty
program, offering complete immunity to the first entity to
report a cartel and a reduction in fines by 50, 30, or 20 per-
cent for those that follow.34
In a variation on the amnesty
theme, Articles 100–102 of the new LFCE establish formal
procedures to allow entities to avoid or reduce the fine for a
relative monopolistic practice or illegal concentración. At any
time prior to the issuance of a statement of probable viola-
tion, an entity may petition COFECE and agree to end or
correct the conduct or concentración under investigation
and propose steps to restore the competitive process. Within
five days of receiving a written solicitation, the Investigative
Authority must suspend its investigation, and it may require
the economic agent to provide additional information.
Within ten days, the Investigative Authority must provide the
Pleno with its evaluation of the proposed remedial action. The
Commissioners then weigh whether the proposed measures
(or others) will restore competition, as well as the benefits of
ending the investigation with the elimination or reduction of
fines. The petitioning entity has to accept in writing the
Pleno’s statement of conditions and fine, if any. The com-
promise does not affect private actions for damages, and an
entity may take advantage of the procedure only once every
five years.35
Wild Cards: Determining Essential Inputs and
Other Barriers to Competition
Perhaps most controversial, the new law allows the Com-
mission to investigate markets in which competition may
not be effective and to determine whether essential inputs or
other barriers have anticompetitive effects, even where no
breach of competition law is suspected.36
The Commission
may initiate such “Special Procedures” on its own or at the
request of the Federal Executive (either directly or through
the Secretary of the Economy).37
The process starts with
publication of a notice in the Diário Oficial of the Federation,
allowing any interested party to participate in the investiga-
tion, which must be completed in not less than 30 or more
than 120 days (which may be extended up to two times for
cause). Within 60 days from the conclusion of its investiga-
tion, the Commission issues its preliminary findings and
what measures it proposes to eliminate restrictions on the effi-
cient functioning of the market. Notice must be given to enti-
ties that would be affected by the proposed corrective meas-
ures, as well as governmental agencies with responsibility in
the relevant sector. Following procedures set out in the LFCE,
affected entities may present their own factual and expert evi-
dence and may propose alternative measures (as well as evi-
dence to support arguments that none are needed). Public
authorities may offer non-binding opinions.
C O V E R S T O R I E S
6 4 · A N T I T R U S T

4. S P R I N G 2 0 1 5 · 6 5
The final order of the Pleno must address the arguments
of private parties and the recommendation of public author-
ities. If COFECE concludes there are barriers to competition,
it may include an order directing particular entities to take or
eliminate specific actions in order to eliminate a barrier to
entry, or it may order the divestiture of assets or shares. It may
determine the existence of an essential input and issue guide-
lines to regulate access, including terms, prices, rates, tech-
nical and quality standards, and it may also set a schedule for
applications for access. The Commission may even order an
entity to divest shares or assets to the extent necessary to
eliminate anticompetitive effects when other measures are
insufficient. The Commission must explain how its propos-
als will generate greater efficiency in the market and address
any arguments that the alleged barriers to competition or
restrictions on access to essential inputs themselves produce
efficiencies greater than their anticompetitive effects, in par-
ticular that they result in greater innovation in the produc-
tion, distribution, or commercialization of goods or services.
In February 2015, COFECE announced its first formal
market investigation—of air transportation services provid-
ed at Mexico City International Airport. (The investigation
leading Carlos Slim to divest substantial portions of this
telecommunications empire was conducted by the Federal
Telecommunications Institute.) COFECE has conducted
less formal “market studies” and made non-binding recom-
mendations to other government agencies about measures to
enhance competition.
Failure to follow an order directing access to an essential
input or a regulation to eliminate barriers to competition car-
ries a fine of 10 percent of annual revenues.38
COFECE
orders may be challenged in the new specialized courts dis-
cussed below. At a recent roundtable of North American
competition enforcers, Carlos Mena, the first head of the
Investigative Authority, stated that he intends to use these
new powers as a last resort, preferring to tackle cartel conduct
and abuse of dominance as absolute or relative violations of
the LFCE. He believes the UK has moved too quickly to ini-
tiate market investigations, but notes that it is important to
have them among COFECE’s tools to address impediments
to free competition.39
Specialized Competition Courts
Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution was amended to pro-
vide that the general rules and acts or omissions of COFECE
(as well as those of the new Federal Telecommunications
Institute) may be challenged only in specialized courts, cre-
ated under amended Article 94 of the Constitution. Only
COFECE orders imposing fines or requiring the divestiture
of stock or assets may be suspended pending resolution of
such indirect court challenges (called amparos). Pursuant to
Article 94, the Federal Judicial Council determines the num-
ber of specialized judges to be appointed to circuit and dis-
trict courts, as well as their territorial and specialization com-
petence.
Authority over Other Government Entities
Since the inception of the LFCE, the definition of an
“Economic Agent” subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction
has included all “federal, state or municipal public adminis-
trative agencies.”40
COFECE’s predecessor was expressly
empowered to issue binding opinions that proposed govern-
mental regulations would harm competition. Some regret
that under the new LFCE, such opinions are non-binding.
However, COFECE can bring an action against any eco-
nomic agent—including a governmental entity—for viola-
tions of the LFCE, and it can order governmental agencies to
end barriers to competition or to afford access to essential
inputs under the special procedures discussed above. The
Investigative Authority may issue guidelines to regulate access
to essential inputs, and it may make recommendations to
public authorities. Unlike private parties, governmental enti-
ties may file a direct constitutional challenge to COFECE
orders in courts of general jurisdiction.41
Short of issuing formal orders, COFECE can influence the
actions of other governmental agencies. For example, it
recently conducted a market study of Mexico’s financial sec-
tor and made 36 “recommendations” to various authorities
to increase competition and consumer welfare.42
In its recent
Trimester Report, COFECE reviewed these recommenda-
tions, noting the many that have already been adopted, and
in February 2015, it opened an investigation into potential
conduct violations by credit reporting agencies.43
In Decem-
ber 2014, the Commission tweeted that it had initiated a
market study of the food and agriculture sector.44
Of course,
a market study can reveal serious impediments to competi-
tion that can cause the Investigative Authority to initiate a
formal market investigation.
The new LFCE continues to authorize the Commission to
issue opinions and resolutions regarding licenses, conces-
sions, permits, and analogous government-controlled bene-
fits.45
During 2014, for example, COFECE provided gener-
al recommendations on the procedures for electricity
concessions and made specific determinations whether par-
ticular applicants should be included or excluded in the bid-
ding.46
And, as of this writing, COFECE will be reviewing
the bidding procedures and assessing the bidders for the ini-
tial round of offshore petroleum exploration contracts.
Conclusion
Armed with new tools and detailed regulations dedicated to
transparency, COFECE is already playing a critical role in
President Peña Nieto’s quest to open Mexico’s economy to
effective competition. Backed by COFECE’s strong strate-
gic plan, the Investigative Authority has signaled an aggres-
sive anti-cartel agenda and a commitment to use its new
powers to tackle historic structural issues with Mexico’s
most important economic sectors, especially energy, finan-
cial services, agriculture, and transportation. Perhaps most
important, given the government’s continuing dominant
role in the economy, COFECE reviews the process and bid-

5. ders in public procurement, including for contracts with
the Social Security Institute and the Federal Electricity
Commission. Even with “non-binding” recommendations
following market studies, COFECE is nudging the public
sector to open key markets for competition—including from
foreign competitors.Ⅵ
1 Dolia Estevez, Mexico’s Carlos Slim Unseated as World’s Second Richest Man
by Warren Buffett, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2014, 3:07 PM), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/doliaestevez/2014/12/08/mexicos-carlos-slim-unseated-as-
worlds-second-richest-man-by-warren-buffett/.
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Roundtable
Discussion with Enforcement Officials, ANTITRUST SOURCE 16 (June 2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_
source/jun11_fullsource.authcheckdam.pdf (remarks of Allan Van Fleet
and Eduardo Pérez Motta, Presidente, Comisión Federal de Competencia).
Whereas Rockefeller at his zenith controlled 2% of the U.S. economy, in
2011 Slim controlled 8% of Mexico’s economy. Id.
4 See Melissa Lipman, Antitrust Reforms in Mexico to Trip Up Multinationals,
LAW360 (May 3, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/534268/
antitrust-reforms-in-mexico-to-trip-up-multinationals.
5 See generally Allan Van Fleet, Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Law:
The Dawn of a New Antitrust Era, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 183 (1995).
6 Four boast Ph.Ds, from Chicago, Rice, Stanford, and Texas A&M. See
Integrantes Del Pleno, COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICA,
http://www.cofece.mx/index.php/cofece/pleno (last visited Jan. 22, 2015)
(follow “Alejandro Ildefonso Castañeda Sabido,” “Benjamín Contreras
Astiazarán,” “Eduardo Martínez Chombo,” and “Jesús Ignacio Navarro
Zermeño” links).
7 See Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [hereinafter LFCE], Title III, arts.
26–36.
8 Mena served as the first Chief of COFECE’s Planning, Institutional Relations
and International Affairs Unit and, for six years, as Director General of
Investigations of Monopolistic Practices and Interstate Restraints of
Commerce with the predecessor CFC.
9 In fact, FTI regulations were the catalyst for Slim’s decision effectively to
break up his telephone and broadcasting holdings.
10 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398 (2004); Phillip E. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need
of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989).
11 See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009);
Eric N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, The Viability of Antitrust Price
Squeeze Claims, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 273 (2009).
12 COMMENTS OF THE ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW AND SECTION OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN RESPONSE TO THE MEXICAN COMPETITION COMMISSION’S
REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED REGULATORY PROVISIONS IMPLE-
MENTING THE MEXICAN COMPETITION LAW 3 (Aug. 19, 2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_
law/at_comments_201408_mexico.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA
REGULATORY PROVISIONS COMMENTS].
13 Id.
14 See Disposiciones Regulatorias de la Ley Federal de Competencia Econ-
ómica, D.O., art. 3 (I), Nov. 10, 2014 [hereinafter LFCE Regulations].
15 ABA REGULATORY PROVISIONS COMMENTS, supra note 12, at 1; see also
COMMENTS OF THE ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW AND SECTION OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN RESPONSE TO THE MEXICAN COMPETITION COMMISSION’S
REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED REGULATION IMPLEMENTING THE
MEXICAN FEDERAL COMPETITION LAW (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/at_
comments_mexican_201304.pdf [hereinafter ABA PROPOSED REGULATION
COMMENTS].
16 See LFCE Regulations, supra note 14, art. 3 (II).
17 See Bill C-49, Price Transparency Act, 2d Sess, 41st Parl., 2014.
18 See LFCE Regulations, supra note 14, arts. 7–9; ABA REGULATORY
PROVISIONS COMMENTS, supra note 12, at 2.
19 See Allan Van Fleet, Consolidation con Salsa: Mergers and Acquisitions in
Mexico, ANTITRUST, Spring 2001, at 39.
20 See LFCE art. 86(f) (III).
21 See id. art. 86.
22 See id. art. 87. Certain concentraciones are exempted, including corporate
restructuring of related entities; increasing holdings in a company already
controlled; and foreign transactions having no increase in control, shares,
or assets within Mexico. See id. art. 93.
23 See id. art. 88.
24 ABA PROPOSED REGULATION COMMENTS, supra note 15, at 4 (arguing that par-
ties are unlikely to know market shares at the time of their filing). However,
merging parties in the EU, the UK, and several other jurisdictions are accus-
tomed to including in their filings non-binding estimates of market shares.
25 See LFCE art. 90 (V). There are short time periods within which to object that
the filing is incomplete. COFECE may ask generally for additional informa-
tion from the merging parties or third parties, but that does not suspend the
time limit for decision.
26 LFCE Regulations, supra note 14, art. 14.
27 See Van Fleet, supra note 19, at 42.
28 Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica, Technical Criteria for the
Calculation and Application of an Quantitative Index in the Analysis of Pos-
sible Effects on Competition and Free Enterprise Derived From a Concen-
tración (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.cofece.mx/images/Consulta/Criterio_
Tecnico_Indices_Concentracion_CP.pdf
29 LFCE art. 92. The Comision may establish other circumstances by regula-
tion, but did not do so in its initial set of LFCE Regulations.
30 Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica, Third Trimester Report 2014,
at 16 (Oct. 2014), http://www.cofece.mx/attachments/article/38/3er_
Informe_Trimestral_2014.pdf [hereinafter Third Trimester Report].
31 See LFCE arts. 127–128. COFECE itself cannot receive any fines.
32 See id. art. 131.
33 See id. art. 75.
34 See id. art. 103; LFCE Regulations, supra note 14, art. 114.
35 See LFCE arts. 100–102.
36 One of the only other competition agencies with a similar power is the UK’s
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which is able to conduct a mar-
ket investigation reference into a sector in order to determine whether “any
feature, or combination of features, of a relevant market prevents, restricts
or distorts competition.” Under recent changes, the CMA has 18 months
(extendable once) to carry out such an investigation. The LFCE provision is
based on UK procedure.
37 See LFCE art. 94. These procedures are not required to find essential
inputs or barriers to competition in the course of investigating monopolis-
tic practices or illegal concentraciones.
38 See LFCE art. 127 (XIV).
39 Carlos Mena, Remarks at North American Enforcers’ Roundtable, ABA
Section of Antitrust Law Midwinter Meeting (Jan. 17, 2015) (cited with per-
mission).
40 See LFCE art. 3 (I), (III).
41 See LFCE art. 95.
42 See Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica, Report of the Inves-
tigation and Recommendations on the Conditions of Competition in the
Finance Sector and Its Markets (July 9, 2014), http://www.cofece.mx/
images/Estudios/COFECE_trabajo_investigacion_prot.pdf.
43 See Third Trimester Report, supra note 30, at 45–51.
44 See Press Release, COFECE Initiates Market Study of the Agri-Food Sector,
available at http://www.cofece.mx/images/Comunicados/COFECE-025-
2014.pdf.
45 See LFCE art. 98.
46 See Third Trimester Report, supra note 30, at 74–75.
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