Who os Nagarjun?

1. Nagarjuna(Part 2)
(c. 150-250 AD)
The Fundamentals of the Middle Way
(Mulamadhyamaka-Karika)
(Text, pp. 77-98)

2. The Historical Evolution
of Buddhism

3. The Major Buddhist Traditions
 Theravada (“The Way of the Elders”) - Sri Lanka &
Southeast Asia
 Mahayana (“The Greater Vehicle”) - China, Korea, &
Japan (& Tibet & Mongolia)
 Vajrayana (“The Way of the Diamond Thunderbolt”) -
Tibet & Mongolia
Vajrayana is a development within
the Mahayana tradition.

4. The Early Schools
& the Rise of Theravada
(4th century BC - 1st century AD)

5. Council at Rajagraha (483BC)
Council at Vaisali (383 BC)
Sthaviravada Mahasamghika
Council at Pataliputta (247 BC)
Vibhajyavada Sarvastivada
Theravada Vatsiputriya
Sammatiya
Bhadrayamiya
Dharmottariya
Sammagurika
Golulika Ekavyavaharika
Vaibheshika Sautrantika
Caitika
Uttarashaila Aparashaila
Mahisasaka
Kasyapiya
Dharmaguptaka
(c. 225 BC) (c. 200 BC)
(c. 50 BC)
(c. 100 BC)
(c. 125 BC)
(c. 180 BC)
* *
*
*
*Contributed to rise of Mahayana

6. The Rise & Development
of Mahayana (& Vajrayana)

7. Mahayana Buddhism
India China Japan
Ashvaghosa
(1st century AD)
Madhyamaka
(2d-3d centuries AD)
Yogacara
(3d-4th centuries AD)
Tantrayana
(3d century AD)
Sukhavati
(Pure Land)
(1st century AD)
Tibet
Chen-yen Shingon
(True Word)
Vajrayana
Three Treatise School
San-lun Sanron
Mei-shih Hosso
Consciousness-Only
Ching-tu Jodo-shu &
Jodo-shin-shu
Ch’an
Ti’en-Tai
(Lotus)
Hua-yen
(Flower
Graland)
Zen
Tendai
Nicheren
Shoshu
*
**
*Nagarjuna
**Vasubandhu

8. The Spread
of Buddhism
Spheres of
Influence
Theravada
Mahayana
Vajrayana
Buddhism
out of India
by 1000 AD

9. Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamaka-Karika
(contains a dedication to the Buddha & 27 chapters)
 Causality (Ch 1)
 What’s Happening? (Ch 2)
 Arising, Enduring, &
Dissolving (Ch 7)
 The Agent & the Action
(Ch 8)
 Perceiver & Perception
(Ch 9)
 Fire and Fuel (Ch 10)
 Non-Beginning (Ch 11)
 Essence & Existence
(Ch 15)
 Self & Reality (Ch 18)
 Nirvana (Ch 25)
 The 12-Link Chain of
Interdependent
Causation (Ch 26)
Chapters contained in Readings (pp. 77-98)

10. Nagarjuna’s Philosophy of the Middle Way
The “middle way” between what?
metaphysical essentialism & metaphysical nihilism
See footnote 1 on p. 78 of the Text

11. Because the central concept in
Nagarjuna’s philosophy of the “middle
way” (madhyamaka) is shunyata
(“emptiness”),
his perspective is often referred to as “Voidism”
or “Shunyavada” (“the way of emptiness”).
(The world -- and the selves & other
entities that constitute the world -- are
devoid or empty of essence.)

12. Through the method of
“critical dialectic,”
Nagarjuna challenges the
assumptions of essentialism &
nihilism, attempting to
demonstrate through rigorous
logical analysis that both views
are self-contradictory, absurd, &
false.

13. If either essentialism or nihilism is
true, then (according to Nagarjuna)
 there can be no causes, no
conditions, & no effects (Ch 1);
 nothing can be happening (Ch 2);
 nothing can arise, endure, or
dissolve (Ch 7);
 there can be no agents & no
actions & thus no phenomenal
world (Ch 8);
 there could be perceivers without
perceptions & perceptions without
perceivers (Ch 9);
 either fire & fuel are
identical or there could be
fuel without fire & fire
without fuel (Ch 10);
 there can be no change; no
birth, no aging, no dying; no
samsara (Chs 11 & 15); and
 there can be no release from
self & world, no nirvana
(Ch 18, vv. 1-6).

14. Nagarjuna’s critical dialectic
is also directed against various
realistic interpretations of the world
that appears in experience.*
*Metaphysical realism (in this context)
is the view that the phenomenal world
is real.

15. Essentialism & Nihilism
 Essentialism is the view that reality is made
up of eternal, unchanging, independent, &
substantial essences (self-essences as well as
thing-essences).
 Nihilism is the view that there are no such
essences & that therefore nothing exists at
all.
 Essentialism & nihilism agree that only
substantial essences can be “really real.”

16. Does it make any sense
to imagine that there are causes
without effects or conditions without
that which is conditioned?
Don’t the ideas of cause & effect go together,
i.e., mutually imply each other?
Isn’t that also the case with conditions & the
conditioned?
Chapter 1 Causality

17. If either essentialism or nihilism is true,
then “nothing whatever arises.”
 Suppose that nihilism is true. Nothing can arise
from nothing. (Ex nihilo nihil fit.)
 Suppose that essentialism is true. Only eternal &
unchanging essences are “really real.” Essences
neither come into being nor pass out of being.
Nothing can arise.
 Now, whatever arises must be caused to arise. But
if “nothing whatever arises,” then nothing is
caused.
Chapter 1.1

18. The same argument
applies to the
conditions from which
things arise.
 If things do not arise, then there can be no
conditions of arising.
 If nothing arises, then the idea of conditions
from which things arise has no application;
conditions are not conditions.
Chapter 1.2 & 1.5

19. The argument of 1.6-1.8
 1.6 Since neither being nor non-being can arise, neither
can be caused or conditioned.
 1.7 If absolutely nothing exists (nihilism), then there
can be no causes (or conditions) since causes would be
something rather than nothing.
 1.8 Can there be uncaused & unconditioned events? If
so, why do we need the ideas of cause & condition at
all? What does “effect” mean? Doesn’t “effect”
logically imply cause & condition? So that if there are
effects, there must be causes & conditions, which
makes both essentialism & nihilism (which imply no
causes or conditions) false.

20. Chapter 1.9
 1.9, line 1 If nothing
comes into being
(essentialism & nihilism),
then nothing goes out of
being.
 1.9, lines 2-3 If nothing
begins (essentialism &
nihilism), then nothing is
preceded by a precipitating
(immediately preceding)
condition.
 1.9, lines 4-5 That
which has ceased to
exist cannot be a cause
or condition of
anything else. Is that
true? If domino I
causes domino II to
fall & then ceases to
exist, it is still the
cause of domino II’s
falling, isn’t it?

21. Chapter 1.10
 Both essentialism & nihilism agree that if there are
no substantial essences, then nothing really exists.
 Essentialism holds that there are substantial essences;
nihilism holds that there are none.
 Either way, the ideas of cause & condition are
rendered meaningless.
 If nothing really exists (nihilism), then causes &
conditions do not really exist.
 If only substantial (i.e., unchanging) essences really
exist (essentialism), then, again, causes & conditions,
which are part of the process of change (becoming)
do not really exist.

22. So if either essentialism
or nihilism is true,
 then the changing
world we experience
(the phenomenal
world of causes,
conditions, effects, &
events)
is ontologically
unreal, an
ILLUSION.
(Does N. really disagree with this? If so, what is his
position in contrast to essentialism & nihilism?)

23. How about metaphysical
realism?
Does it fare any better than
essentialism or nihilism, according to
Nagarjuna?

24. According to the realist
perspective,
 the changing, pluralistic, & particularistic
phenomenal world of causes, conditions,
effect, events, and entities is real.
 That world really exists, but it is neither
Being (unchanging essence) nor Non-Being
(nothing).
 It is a world in which entities change as a
result of causes & conditions (cause & effect
relations). It is a world of Becoming.

25. Nagarjuna does not accept realism either.
 In 1.1, he denies that
– an event can be caused by itself,
– or by something other than itself,
– or by both itself & something other than itself,
– or by nothing at all (i.e., neither by itself nor by something other
than itself).
 In 1.11, lines 1-2, he states that an effect cannot pre-exist in
its causes & conditions. Why not? Is it because the pre-
existence of effect in cause/condition obliterates the
distinction between cause/condition & effect? Is it because
such pre-existence makes the effect the cause/condition of
itself, requiring it to exist before it exists (which seems
absurd)?

26. in 1.11, lines 3-4,
N. asks how
 an effect that does not
pre-exist in its causes
or conditions can arise
from them.
 That is, if the effect
exists outside of its
causes or conditions,
 then why should a particular effect
arise from any particular cause or
condition?
 Why should we think that it is
caused or conditioned at all?
 If the cause/condition is one thing
and the effect is another thing,
then why should THIS effect arise
from THIS cause/condition?
 Perhaps there are neither
causes/conditions nor effects, but
just EVENTS that come and go
without being caused or
conditioned.

27. So . . . . (as N. states in 1.1)
 events cannot arise from themselves,
 nor can they arise from something other
than themselves; and
 they cannot arise from both themselves
& something other than themselves since
the mere combination of two non-causes
does not produce a cause.
But, also, events cannot arise “without
a cause,” i.e., from nothing, since
nothing can arise from nothing;
“nothing” cannot cause or give rise to
anything.

28. it seems that
“nothing whatever arises”
(1.1, line 1)

29. N. points out another problem
with the idea of causality in 1.13:
 If the conditions that
give rise to an effect
are not self-created,
but rather are created
by something other
than themselves,
which is in turn
created by something
other than itself, & so
on to infinity, then the
effect can never arise.
 E cannot arise until C1
has arisen, but C1
cannot arise until C2
has arisen, but C2
cannot arise until C3
has arisen, but C3
cannot arise until C4
has arisen, & so on to
infinity.

30. it seems that
(contrary to metaphysical realism & common sense)
“nothing whatever arises”
(1.1, line 1)
(See also 1.14)
Isn’t this conclusion also contrary to the
Buddhist doctrine of the interdependent
origination of all things?

31. Chapter 2 What’s Happening?
 2.1 & 2.2 Past, present, & future. Neither past nor
future is Now; neither exists. Does the Now exist?
 2.3 & 2.7-9 Both essentialism & nihilism deny that
anything can really happen. So if either essentialism
or nihilism is true, then there are no happeners at all,
& the now-happening cannot happen.
 2.4 Realism holds that something is happening now
(although what is happening might not happen, i.e.,
its happening is not necessary but contingent).

32. Realism is closer to ordinary, common
sense experience on this matter.
Nagarjuna rejects essentialism &
nihilism, but he also rejects realism.
Should we, then, accept the realist
perspective instead of either
essentialism or nihilism?

33. If realism is true, i.e., if something is really
happening now,
 then we can distinguish between (1) what is happening now
and (2) the happening of what is happening now (2.5).
 That is, in any happening, there are two happeners -- the
happening & the happener (e.g., writing & writer) (2.6).
 If we think of the happener and the happening as two distinct
realities, then, it seems, there could be a happener without a
happening (e.g., a writer but no writing) (2.10).
 And doesn’t the happener as well as the happening happen
(the writer as well as the writing) (2.11)?
Doesn’t this analysis also imply an
infinite regress?

34. Take the distinction between (1) what is happening now
and (2) the happening of what is happening now (2.5).
 What is happening now cannot happen without the
happening of what is happening now.
 But the happening of what is happening now cannot
happen without the happening of the happening of
what is happening now.
 And the happening of the happening of what is
happening now cannot happen without the happening
of the happening of the happening of what is
happening now.
 And so on, ad infinitum.
 Nothing can begin to happen.

35. Consider also the distinction between
happener & happening (e.g., writer & writing).
 For the writing to happen, there must be a writer.
 But the writer must also happen in order to write.
 In the happening of the writer, there must be a
happening of the happening of the writer, and
there must also be a happening of the happening
of the happening of the writer, and so on to
infinity.
 No writing is possible.
(2.6, 2.10, 2.11)

36. In 2.12-14 & 2.17,
Nagarjuna considers
the beginning and the end (cessation)
of what is happening now.

37. Where is the beginning
of what is happening
now?
 It cannot be in the past
or in the future since
they do not exist.
 Also, if the beginning
of the present is in the
past (common sense &
realist view), then the
present began before it
existed (which makes
no sense).
 And the beginning of the
present cannot be in the
present since in that case
the beginning of the
present would follow its
existence (i.e., the present
would first exist & then
begin to exist).
2.12-2.14

38. where is the end
(cessation) of what is
happening now?
 It cannot be in the
present, for in that
case the now-
happening would end
before it ends.
 It cannot be in the past
since then the now-
happening would have
ended before it began.
 If the cessation of what is
happening now is in the
future (common sense &
realist view), then what is
happening now will never
cease because the future
never arrives.
2.17

39. whatever is happening now
can neither begin nor end.
But what does N. mean by the
following statement?
“Happening is the same as beginning to
happen, and having already happened is the
same as ceasing to happen.” (2.17, lines 5-6)
(Extra Credit Essay)

40. According to Nagarjuna,
 Neither happeners nor non-happeners are
unchanging (“standing still”).
 The idea of an unchanging happener (a happener
that does not happen) is nonsensical (i.e., self-
contradictory).
 Non-happeners are not unchanging (permanent)
because they do not exist.
2.15-16
[What about a Being (e.g., God) that neither
happens nor changes - a non-happener that exists?]

41. The argument of 2.18-2.21
 Either (A) the happener is identical with the
happening, or (B) the happener is [ontologically]
different from the happening (2.18).
 If (A), then actor & action, deed & doer, are identical
(which seems false) (2.19).
 If (B), then there could be happeners without
happenings and happenings without happeners (which
also seems false) (2.20).
 The idea that happener & happening are neither
identical nor different is incomprehensible (2.21).
[What about both identical and different?]

42. That which is now happening
 is not caused by its own happening (i.e., by
itself) (2.22),
 nor by a happening other than itself (2.23),
 nor does its happening happen in the past,
or in the future, or in the present (since it
never begins) (2.24).
 The same is true of non-existent happeners
(2.24).

43. neither an existent nor a non-existent
happener’s happening happens --
neither in the past, nor in the present,
nor in the future.
The happening, the happener, and the
happened are all non-existent.
2.25

44. 7.1-7.3
Can anything arise?
 7.1 Arising either arises or not. If not, then it cannot give
rise to other, further arisings (nothing can arise from that
which itself does not arise). If arising arises, then it must
have the “three characteristics” of anything that arises, i.e.,
it itself must arise, endure for a time, and then dissolve.
 7.2 The “three characteristics” must occur either separately
or simultaneously. If they occur separately, then there is an
infinite regress, & nothing can ever begin to arise (see next
slide & fn 2 on p. 83 in the Text). If they occur
simultaneously, then arising would arise, endure, &
dissolve all at the same time, instantaneously, & thus
nothing could exist.
Chapter 7 Arising, Enduring, & Dissolving

45. The infinite regress problem implied in 7.2
 If arising must arise, endure,
& dissolve, then the arising,
enduring, & dissolving of
arising must each also arise,
endure, & dissolve, & so on,
ad infinitum.
 If enduring must also arise,
endure, & dissolve, then the
arising, enduring, &
dissolving of enduring must
each arise, endure, &
dissolve, & so on, ad
infinitum.
 Dissolving, too, must
arise, endure, & dissolve,
& the arising, enduring, &
dissolving of dissolving
must each arise, endure, &
dissolve, & so on, ad
infinitum.
 Thus, nothing could ever
arise in the first place.
(Other infinite regress passages in Chapter 7:
See Text, 7.3 & fn 4 [p. 83], 7.14, 7.18, &
7.19, lines 1-2, & fns 2 & 4 [p. 83].)

46. The infinite regress problem
can be avoided
IF
there is . . .

47. “a non-arising arising of arising,”
 i.e., an ontologically foundational arising (“first
cause”) that does not arise from anything else,
 that just IS & ENDURES but neither arises nor
dissolves,
 and which is the original, primary Source of all
arising, enduring, & dissolving (7.4-5).
7.19, lines 3-4: “But if that which
gives rise to all arising is non-arising,
then the now-arising could arise.”

48. But Nagarjuna does not accept this
(“first cause”) solution. Why not?
See Text, 7.4-8, 7.13, & 7.17.
(Are his reasons for rejecting
this approach good ones?)
(Extra credit essay)

49. Nagarjuna himself recognizes
that the thrust of his arguments,
i.e., that nothing arises, endures,
or dissolves (7.14, 7.20),
seems to be inconsistent with the Buddhist
doctrine of interdependent origination
(which he accepts [see Ch 26]).

50. After focusing on arising, N. directs
his attention to enduring & dissolving:
 Passages on enduring: 7.22, 7.25, 7.27, & 7.28
 Passages on dissolving: 7.21, 7.23, 7.24, 7.26,
7.29, 7.30, 7.31, & 7.32
He uses arguments similar to the ones
we have been discussing to arrive at
his radical conclusion in 7.33-34:

51. 33.Since arising, enduring, and dissolving cannot happen,
there are no [real] things that arise, endure, or dissolve.
If there are no such things,
how can the ordinary phenomenal world exist?
34.It is all a dream, an illusion,
like a city of the gods floating in the heavens.
So much for arising, enduring, and dissolving.

52. Chapter 8
The Agent & the Action
 8.1-6 If either essentialism or nihilism is true, then
there are neither agents nor actions. If there are neither
agents nor actions, then nothing arises. If nothing
arises, then there is no phenomenal world. If there is
no phenomenal world, then there is no liberation from
it & Buddhism is false.
 8.7-11 “It cannot be” verses based on the law of non-
contradiction (which N. accepts & uses).
 8.12-13 The principle of correlativity: no
independently existing agents or actions;
correlativity the key to understanding “all things.”

53. Chapter 9
Perceiver & Perception
 9.1-2 The idea that perceiver & perception have
separate existences (perceiver prior to perception)
 9.4, 9.8, & 9.9 Absurd implications of that idea
 9.3 & 9.6, 9.5, 9.7, 9.10, 9.11, & 9.12 The true view:
Correlativity of perceiver & perception
Chapter 9 is not in our text reading.

54. Chapter 10
Fire & Fuel
 10.1 Fire & fuel are either identical or different (distinct
realities)
 10.2-3 & 10.5 Criticism of the idea that they are different
 10.4 Criticism of the idea that they are identical
 10.6-7 Criticism of the interactionist theory
 10.8-11 Criticism of the common sense view that fuel is more
fundamental than fire
 10.12-14 The true view: the relationality & interdependence
of fire and fuel (correlativity again)
 10.15-16 Implications of the fire-fuel relationship with regard
to the nature of the phenomenal world (including the self)
Chapter 10 is not in our text reading.

55. Chapter 11
Non-Beginning
(Samsara)
 11.1-2 The nature of samsara
 11.3-6 Is birth prior [i.e., ontologically prior] to,
subsequent to, or simultaneous with aging & dying?
[None of the above.] Is there, in reality, any birth,
aging, or dying?
 11.7 “If samsara has no beginning . . . . ” [then nada?]
 11.8 Whatever is [IS], is without beginning.
(If either essentialism or nihilism is true, then there is
no samsara, & that would negate the message of the
Buddha. See fn on p. 91 in the Text.)
Chapter 11 is not
in our text
reading.

56. Chapter 15
Essence & Existence
 15.1-3 & 15.8-9 Implications of essentialism
 15.4-5 Entities without (devoid of) essence?
Shunyata vs essentialism
 15.6-7, 15.10-11 The Buddha vs essentialism
& nihilism

57. Chapter 18
Self & Reality
 18.1-5 The emptiness
(shunyata) of the self
& the consequences of
realizing that
 18.6 The true
Buddhist position on
the self (neither self
nor no-self)?
 18.7 Criticism of language
& thought
 18.8 A tetralemma: the
ontological status of the
[phenomenal] world
 18.9 The nature of reality
 18.10 The ontological
status of interdependent
entities

58. Chapter 25
Nirvana
 25.1-2 N’s problem:
How can nirvana arise?
 25.3 & 25.9 What
nirvana is not
 25.4-6 Nirvana not an
existing phenomenon.
 25.7-8 Nirvana not non-
existent (non-being).
 25.11-14 Nirvana does
not both exist & not-exist.
 25.10 & 15-16 The
true view: Nirvana is
neither an existing
phenomenon nor a
non-being

59. Tetralemmas on the ontological
status of the Buddha
 The Buddha in nirvana
– does not exist
– does not not-exist
– does not both exist &
not-exist
– does not neither exist
nor not-exist
 The Buddha during
his lifetime
– did not exist
– did not not-exist
– did not both exist &
not-exist
– did not neither exist
nor not-exist
25.17-18

60. The equivalence of samsara & nirvana
 25.19-20 The argument for the equivalence of
samsara & nirvana (they are both equivalent to
emptiness) (see fn 2 on p. 96 in the Text).
 25.21-23 If Shunyavada is true, it is pointless to
speculate about nirvana, the finite & the infinite,
identity & difference, permanence &
impermanence, etc. (If all things are empty
[shunya] of essence, then there are no real
predicates because there are no real subjects.)

61. Nagarjuna’s conclusion (25.24)
24. Liberation is the cessation of all thought,
the dissolution of all plurality.
The Buddha taught nothing
at any time, in any place, to any person.