1. Hip hop as a social movement: The case of Medellín, Colombia.
Theresa Mary Bean
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of
Masters of Arts by Research
The University of Leeds
School of Languages, Cultures and Societies
September 2014
3. 2
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Dr. Thea Pitman and Dr. Gregorio Alonso of the School of Languages, Cultures
and Societies for their excellent guidance and dedication through my Masters.
I am also grateful to my father, Dr. Kevin Bean for his support. He has been a constant source of
encouragement. I would also like to thank my family and partner for their support.
Finally, this thesis would not have been possible without the assistance of hip hop artists in Medellín.
Their dedication, passion and determination inspired me to undertake this researchproject.I am grateful
for their time and generosity in sharing their experiences with me. To this end, I would like to dedicate
this thesis to the hoppers of Medellín and in particular to the memory of M.C. Chelo.
4. 3
Abstract
This thesis argues that hip hop culture has emerged as a form of social protest and a tool for social
change in the Colombian city of Medellín. Given this, the author contends that in Medellín hip hop can
be classedas a social movement. Examining Political Opportunities and cultural perspectives,the thesis
will argue that Armstrong and Bernstein’s multi-actor model provides a suitable framework to account
for the evolution of the movement. This model will be utilised to explore the genesis of the movement,
with a focus on the role of violent illicit actors, the state and civic society in the 1990s. Furthermore,
charting the evolution of the movement also advances the case for considering emotions and culture as
significant factors for mobilization. The thesis will examine why hip hop culture is a suitable form of
resistance and social transformation, focusing on male youth and violence prevention. The author
suggests that hip hop provides an appropriate alternative culture as it mirrors values in accordance with
established local versions of masculinity.
The second part of the thesis seeks to explore the trajectories of the movement with a view to assess its
social, cultural and political impact. To this end, three case studies will be presented, charting the
development of three hip hop organizations in Medellín. The thesis will argue that the hip hop
movement’s impact on the political arena has been transformative and incorporative. Examining the
trajectory of the movement, also brings the author to propose that the movement can be considered as
a citizens’ rights movement.
The thesis concludes by suggesting that the production of art as a form of social mobilization should be
further explored as it will facilitate our understanding of social movements operating in oppressive
contexts.
Keywords: hip hop, social movements, Medellín, social change, mobilization, protest, youth
5. 4
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS P.2
LIST OF MAPS AND IMAGES P.5
INTRODUCTION P.7-21
CHAPTER 1:GRAFFITI, GANGSWITH GUNSAND THE STATE: BEYOND THE STATECENTRIC
APPROACH
P22-33
CHAPTER 2: ‘HIP HOP ISMY ART,HIP HOP ISMY LIFE’ P.34-52
CHAPTER 3: MEASURINGIMPACT: FRAMEWORKSAND ISSUES P.53-55
CHAPTER 4: ASSESSING OUTCOMES: HIP HOP MOVEMENTSIN THE‘TRANSFORMED MEDELLÍN P.56-82
CASE STUDY 1: JEIHHCO/LA RED ELITE/C15 P.58-65
CASE STUDY 2: CREW PELIGROSOS P.66-73
CASE STUDY 3: CULTURA Y LIBERTAD P.74-76
CHAPTER 5: A FRAGMENTED MOVEMENT: DIVERSE TRAJECTORIESAND OUTCOMES. P.83-89
CONCLUSION:ART ASPROTEST P.90-93
BIBLIOGRAPHY P.94- 115
6. 5
LISTS OF MAPS AND FIGURES
MAP 1 MEDELLÍN BY COMUNAS P.6
FIGURE 1.GRAPH-MURDER RATES 1987-2012 P.29
FIGURE 2.GRAFFITI IN COMUNA 1 P.40
FIGURE 3: GRAFFITI IN MEDELLÍN BY COMUNAS P.41
FIGURE 4: MCBATTLE IN COMUNA 13 P.47
FIGURE 5: CREW PELIGROSOS G-SHOCK WATCH P.70
8. 7
INTRODUCTION
‘HIP HOP ES UN MOVIMIENTO SOCIAL, UN MOVIMIENTO POLÍTICO.’(TEDX TIGRE, 2014)
‘NO ES SOLAMENTE UN MOVIMIENTO DE ARTE…, ES UN MOVIMIENTO POLÍTICO QUE ESTÁ PROPONIENDO
DE UNA FORMA DIFERENTE LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE UN PAÍS Y UNA CIUDAD QUE LOS JÓVENES ESTÁN
SOÑANDO.’(CAMINANTE, J, 2010)
Hip hop culture, punctuated by the four elements of rapping, break dancing, djing and graffiti, emerged
in the poorer areas of the Colombian city of Medellín in the late 1980s/early 1990s and was seen by
many of its activists as a platform for promoting peace, tolerance, social justice and political
consciousness. The movement has been variously defined by cultural studies scholars as simply a
counter cultural expression, whilst others have stressed that it is a form of collective social action. For
example, The Hip Hop Declaration of Peace,a UNsponsored initiative that outlines the code of conduct
and aims of hip hop culture (Malone and Martinez Jr 2010: 542), explicitly mentions the movement’s
commitment to social change by arguing that:
‘Hiphoppas are encouraged to eliminate poverty, speak out against injustice and shape a more
caring society and a more peaceful world. Hip Hop Kulture supports a dialogue and action that
heals divisions in society, addresses the legitimate concerns of humankind and advances the
cause of peace.’(Jackson 2012)
Similar themes are present in the opening quotations to this chapter from hip hop artists in Medellín and
support Craig. S. Watkins’ suggestion that hip hop is a unique social movement expressing hopes of
social transformation. However his reading is not unproblematic and he recognizes the differences
between hip hop and other forms of collective action by stressing that:
‘... this particular movement takes place on the field of popular culture, a site not immediately
discerned as political, or capable of producing social change. Second, hip hop is invigorated by
the creative labor of a constituency not ordinarily regarded as interested in effecting social
change: youth.’(Watkins 1998: 65)
9. 8
Following Watkins’ contention, the hip hop movement in Medellín provides an interesting and
challenging case study for scholars of social movements. Given these unusual characteristics of hip hop
culture, the centralquestion that this thesis seeks to address is how well contemporary social movement
theory interprets the emergence and impact of hip hop movements and how it can be applied to
understand its forms in Medellín, Colombia.
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE STATE: ONE SIZE FITS ALL?
On the surface,hip hop culture does not presentitself asanobvious social movement for severalreasons.
Firstly, as Watkins states, it is cultural, not overtly political, and thus it does not seek to influence nor
make demands on the state. Consequently, hip hop movements do not engage in typical conventional
forms of dissent such as demonstrations or petitions. Therefore, hip hop can be simply understood as
expressions of a counter culture to mainstream codes of dress, language, music, and lifestyle. Secondly,
hip hop culture appeals to children and young people, a demographic often associated with dissent as a
fashion ratherthan concernedwith affecting social change over a sustained period of time. Indeed, much
of the vast body of literature on contemporary social movements (to be understood here as post 1960s
movements) would question hip hop culture as a social movement given these features.
One dominant strand in social movement literature emphasizes political opportunity and argues that the
state is a precursor to the mobilization of social movements. These readings suggest that the emergence
of a movement, its form and repertoires for dissent is determined by the expansion of opportunities
within institutional political structures (Tarrow 2011:160). Responding to structural changes, civic
society mobilizes and through interactions with the state creates new political opportunities. Such a
hypothesis has led Political Opportunity scholars to interpret social movements as largely concerned
with affecting institutional political spheres. Following this approach would make it difficult to
understand hip hop culture as a social movement, given that its manifestations take place in the cultural
sphere.
Because ofthe dominance of this state-centric theory of collective mobilization, little attention had been
paid to the importance of the cultural sphere, expressed through counterculture and identity, as a form
of social dissent and agent of social change. When Political Opportunity theorists have acknowledged
10. 9
culture, its significance hasalways been explained aspart of a wider setof structuralfactors.Borrowing
anthropological definitions, culture can be regarded as a ‘particular way of life which expressed certain
values and meanings not only in art and learning, but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour. The
analysis of culture, from such a definition, is the clarification of the meanings and values implicit and
explicit in a particular way of life, a particular culture’ (Williams 1961; 57).
However, from the 1980s, the cultural or constructionist perspective has sought to address the
limitations of Political Opportunity theories. Departing from the emphasis that movements emerged
largely due to the expansion of political opportunities, culture, identity and emotions were increasingly
advanced as significant factors in understanding the emergence,form, and impact of social movements
(Jasper 1997, 2004, 2009, Earl 2004, Goodwin 2004, 2009, Gould 2004, 2009, Polletta 2004, 2009).
This view of culture as a form of social dissent and change emerged as an attempt to account for the
wave of collective action and new types of social movement witnessed in Europe and the US since the
1960s, such as the 1968 French student riots, the Mexican student protests, the Prague Spring, the civil
rights and anti-Vietnam war protest movements in the USA,and the rise of gay rights organizations. As
Veltmeyer has noted, the key characteristics of these diverse movements were their concern with
gaining ideological autonomy from traditional institutional political instruments such aspolitical parties
and trade unions, with a focus on the rights of particular social groups in specific localities rather than
a broader collective of people articulating the same material needs (Veltmeyer 2000:116-117).
In the 1990s, given the diverse aims and behaviours of new social movements, new social movement
literature classified the movements into two sub categories: cultural and political new social
movements. New ‘cultural’ social movements were characterised by non-negotiable principles where a
fixed doctrine results in the refusal to engage with agents in the state polity. Similarly, new cultural
social movements do not seek to influence the political sphere, electing rather to transform political
culture through everyday actions. Movements such as the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina,
have been defined as a new cultural movement given their refusal to negotiate or engage with the
government (Ellner 1994:71). Indeed, such a definition could also be applied to the hip hop movement
because it too takes place on a site of popular culture and is expressed in daily actions. In contrast, the
11. 10
new ‘political’ social movements, such as anti-abortion, environmental and anti-nuclear movements,
are regarded as flexible and pragmatic. They participate in the institutional political arena (albeit with
a degree of autonomy from political parties) with a view to winning concessions as part of a wider path
to either gradual or radical change (Ellner, 1994:71).
However, some aspects of this new ‘cultural’ social movement theory have been challenged (Ellner
1994). In choosing to circumvent the state, so-called ‘cultural’ movements are indeed making a
politically calculated decision, thus demonstrating a degree of politically determined behaviour (Ellner
1994). This critique of new cultural social movements raises interesting questions: if electing to
articulate dissent through everyday actions is a conscious strategy on the part of the movement, what
factors influence social actors to make such choices? Furthermore, in taking this direction how far do
social movements simply reflect the social context from which they emerge?
Despite its limitations, new cultural movement theory made an important contribution to the notion of
expanding parameters to carve a new political terrain in civic society (Gamson 1998:57-77, Melucci &
Lyyra 1998: 203-227). As Melucci and Lyyra (1998:214) emphasise, social movements are seeking to
influence social order, thus collective action can be autonomous from political institutions and
expressed in everyday life. Furthermore, Snow supports this widening conceptualisation of social
movements by defining them as ‘collective challenges to systems or structures of authority,’ including
challenges that are not ‘manifestly political,’ or efforts aimed at affecting ‘various levels of social life’
(including the individual), and that come in various forms other than conventional social movement
organizations’ (see Haenfler, R, Johnson, B & Jones, E, 2012:3). Therefore Snow acknowledges that
dissent and change may be manifest in the cultural sphere and that consequently such a definition lends
itself to the view of the hip hop movement as a social movement.
Challenging the cultural status quo, even one that is relatively independent of the state,through cultural
defiance is essentially a political act if our understanding of the ‘political’ extends beyond traditional
channels of institutional politics. Depending upon the socio-political context, apparently mundane or
apolitical daily tasks can become channels for dissent and social change processes. As Stephen
Duncombe remarks, in this way ‘cultural resistance’ creates a free space to frame new meanings,
12. 11
networks, identities, visions, communities and organizations (Duncombe 2002:5-8). Thus, this ‘cultural
resistance’ can be regarded as a political act, an expression of dissent in the face of dominant culture
and a meansof producing social change (Duncombe 2002: 8). Addressing these conceptsof the political
through culture will facilitate our understanding of how hip hop culture can be a force for social dissent
and change.
Moreover, applying Duncombe’s notion of cultural resistance may facilitate our understanding of ‘non-
political’ movements in non-democratic contexts. For example, in dictatorial and totalitarian regimes
where possibilities for overt political actions may be limited, unfeasible or non-existent, apparently non-
political acts may be framed as political. Goodwin and Jasper, support such a contention, observing
that in repressive contexts, political action’… may take other forms, such as complaining, jokes and
gossip.’ (2004: 14). Thus, if we apply this interpretation more liberally, a counter culture, such as hip
hop can be seen as a form of social dissent and a political act in cases such as that of Medellín.
Cultural codes can also influence a person’s decision to participate in collective mobilization. In times
of social, cultural and political upheaval, or what Jasper refers to as ‘moral shock’ (Jasper 1997), the
decision to become involved in forms of mobilization may be influenced by culture, identity and
emotions, rather than by merely strategic motivations (Polletta 2004:103, Gould 2004:164). Whilst
emotions can be employed as part of a wider recruitment and funding strategy, they are also part of a
cognitive interpretation of a social reality and thus, feelings can influence people’s decisions to
mobilize. (Gould 2004:160-163). Therefore culture and emotions play a pivotal role in how social actors
understand the externalworld and consequently how they may respond to it. This clearly demonstrates
the case forexamining structural factors andculture and emotions asa setof dynamics that caninfluence
mobilization. Understanding how civic agents respond culturally and emotionally to externalstructures
and agents,and in turn how externalactors,such asthe state,interpret collective behaviour will enhance
our understanding of the multi-layered conditions that initiate and sustain mobilization. Thus, having
surveyed the current literature, it is clear that whilst Political Opportunity theory may not regard hip
hop culture in Medellín as a social movement, constructionist approaches and this understanding of
emotional capital help us to frame hip hop as a counterculture and thus a form of social protest.
13. 12
The limitations of political opportunity structure approaches arise primarily from its focus on western
post-industrial societies and rights based movements (Inglehart 1977, Davis 1999, Armstrong and
Bernstein 2008). Indeed, Tarrow, a significant contributor to Political Opportunity theory, has
acknowledged that this perspective has focussed on liberal democratic polities and societies and may
reflect endemic assumptions about the nature of democracy and the state (2011:28). Furthermore, this
narrow application tends to neglect the role of non-state actorsin accounting for the evolution and forms
of social movements (Goodwin and Jasper 2004:10-11, Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). Therefore,can
such theories account for social movements operating in a very different political and social context in
which democratic stability and security are still fundamental concerns?
In a context like Colombia, where political power hasoperatedoutside the liberal democratic ‘normative
consensus’, other non-state actors may play a pivotal role in accounting for the emergence, and
behaviour of a movement (Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008). Thus uncritically applying these
perspectives, with their assumptions of historically constituted and stable state authority, may not
adequately explain the state’s role in the mobilization of such movements in Latin America. Likewise,
whilst dissent might be directed overtly at the state and is thus confrontational by nature, such a bald
description could present an unduly oversimplified understanding of political culture in Latin America.
This is because Political Opportunity theory assumes that the state is or is perceived to be the cause of
dissent. For example, through the introduction of legislation or a failure to legislate which may give rise
to social action. In this reading it thus follows that social movements overtly direct their dissent at the
state as the state is perceived to have the capacity and/or the responsibility to address their grievances.
However,as Polletta (2004) underscores,culture is an important feature in the formation and evolution
of political structures and opportunities for mobilization within civil society. She suggests that we need
to give ‘more careful attention to the cultural traditions, ideological principles, institutional memories
and political taboos that structure the behaviour of both political elites and challengers’ (2004:103).
If this observation is conceptualised, then political cultures distinct to those of Western Europe and the
USA may produce different attitudes, expectations and knowledge of the state. Almond and Verba’s
(1989) work on civic culture noted that the maintenance of democracy hinges on a blend of roles
14. 13
undertaken by citizens: civil society, they suggest, takes on three distinct roles; parochial, subject and
participant. The parochial role is concerned with family and community life and does not involve
political institutions. In the subject role civil society receives and accepts outputs from the state polity,
whilst as a participant it is actively involved in the political decision- making process.
However,in societies with a legacy of a corrupt, absent or failed states,this conceptualization of civic
culture will not be easily applicable. Arguably during the decades of internal conflicts in Colombia, in
varying degrees, citizens have not (fully) performed the role of the subject or the participant. Thus, in
this context civic culture may result in pejorative or indifferent views of the state. Indeed,recent events
may create knowledge, attitudes, and expectations that generate a new set of civic norms regarding the
roles of citizens and the state. The result might be that the community, however it is defined, rather than
the state could be seen as responsible for or capable of addressing grave social problems. This suggests
that Colombia has an alternative civic culture very different to those described in Almond and Verba’s
study of civic culture and democracy in five countries and acceptedasrepresentative ofstable developed
democracies. Thus, a limited legacy of positive state intervention, a weakened/corrupt state apparatus,
or citizens’ perceptions of the state as an ineffective avenue for social change will affect attitudes,
beliefs and actions related to the state. Holding such perceptions and attitudes towards the state may
affect how social movements elect to articulate their dissent and whom they may target. Therefore,the
civic culture of a country ought to be considered not only to account for how and why a social movement
emerges but also to understand its repertoires for mobilization and collective action.
Tarrow has addressed these issues by noting that in repressive contexts apparently apolitical objects,
such as dress, music and graffiti can become symbols of contention (2011:10, 103). Whilst such an
alteration is welcomed, I would contend that reducing elements of hip hop culture, such as music and
graffiti to mere symbols of protest is ultimately flawed as I hope to demonstrate in Chapter 2. In his
revised Power in Movement (2011) Tarrow recognises that emotions, culture and identity can be
significant in determining and consolidating collective action (2011:141-156). However, whilst he
believes that culture and emotions need to be understood within the structural context in which they
operate,by focusing on the opportunities and constraints he avoids an unduly deterministic assessment
15. 14
(156). Heeding Tarrow’s warning, in Chapter one I thus seek to synthesise cultural and structural
approaches.
New social movement theory, like Political Opportunity theory, has tended to study currents in the
democratic West. The defining feature of this departure was a shift from class based social movements,
such as Trade Unions to rights based movements (Cohen 1985, Della Porta & Dani 2006).Thus, new
social movements are regarded as products of post-industrial societies in which social movements are
characterised by class or material demands have ebbed into issues and rights based or post material
values (Inglehart 1977).
This focus on movements in post-industrial democracies,poses some interesting questions for the study
of a social movement in Colombia. How can new social movement theory interpret a social movement
in an emerging country, characterised by fragile democratic institutions evidenced by continuing
internal conflicts?
Despite, the reservations of the new social movement approaches in developing country context, the
theory is not redundant. The conceptualisation of counterculture as a political act and producer of social
change gives credence to hip hop as a form of social protest. Equally, although Political Opportunity
theory may struggle to explain the emergence of a cultural movement in an unstable democracy, this is
not to suggest that the state is inconsequential to the study of hip hop culture in Medellín.
On the contrary, recent interactions with the state, such as participation in government programmes or
consultations, may aid our understanding of the impact and trajectory of the hip hop movement. Indeed,
examining these interactions will enable us to understand how the movement and the state have evolved
since the 1990s.
SHAPING THE TERRAIN: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA
Returning to Watkin’s observation that hip hop is a unique social movement prompts us to reflect upon
social protest and transformation in the region. To test this assumption it is necessary to survey social
movements in Latin America, focusing in particular on interactions between these currents, state
structures and institutional politics.
16. 15
The region provides a rich source for the study of social movements. During and since the erosion of
military dictatorships Latin America has born witness to an array of social movements. Currents have
emerged in diverse political contexts, with disparate aims and degrees of impact. Consequently, there
is a wide body of literature on social movements which explores these movements from a wide range
of theoretical frameworks. Despite this diversity, the study of both old and new social movements in
the region shares several common features. Firstly, many social movements in Latin America, like their
European and North American counterparts, have regarded the state as a legitimate target for dissent.
Secondly, many currents regard the state as a viable channel for social and political change. Thirdly,
the role of the state/institutional politics and political elites has been key in setting the conditions in
which these social movements emerged.
In contrast to cultural manifestation of the hip hop movement, many existing currents in the region have
been classified as ‘old’ social movements. Henry Veltmeyer (2000: 124) considers the emergence of
social movements in Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s as both a response to the failure of neo-
liberal policies and an emerging form of ethnic politics. This rejection of neo-liberalism resulted in the
new wave of contemporary leftist politics in Argentina Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and
Venezuela.These countries provide convincing, if varying, examples of classbased movements in Latin
America which differ from the new social movement paradigm.
By charting the trajectories of these contemporary ‘old’ social movements two significant themes
emerge. Firstly, these movements underscore how the nature of collective mobilization is ultimately
shaped by the broader political terrain and state structure. Secondly, they illustrate how social
movements can have a significant impact and shape the formal political arena. The Rural Landless
Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil is a notable example. The movement successfully influenced the
political agenda and was also a factor to the electoral success of Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva in 2002.
Similarly, Evo Morales, a former coca famer and trade union leader has become a dominating figure in
Bolivian politics. Morales played a key mediating role in negotiations between the state and social
movements which prevented political upheaval in Bolivia, and successfully incorporated these
17. 16
movements into his political project and presidential campaign. These are but two examples that
demonstrate a much wider nexus between the state and social movements throughout Latin America.
Similarly the work of Raul Zibechi (2012) also frames the emergence of leftist movements in the region
as a response to failed neo- liberal policy. The global financial crisis and resulting austerity led to the
mobilization of the Piqueteros in Argentina and Zapatistas in Mexico, expressing demands for the
expropriation of land and hostility to the status quo indicative of class based movements. However,in
contrast to the Rural Landless Workers Movement (MST) and trade unions in Bolivia, the Piqueteros
and Zapatistas have rejected incorporation by the state. Instead the Piqueteros and Zapatistas elected
to circumvent institutional politics by creating alternative spaces for mobilization and attempting to
create autonomous social realities. Thus, these examples illustrate the diverse strategies ‘old’
movements have employed in responding to similar socio-economic and political conditions in different
parts of Latin America.
However, Latin America has also produced ‘new social movements’. These movements usually
mobilize to advance the interests of particular social groups, often in a specific locality. In contrast to
old social movements, they are more independent of political parties and take on a spontaneous
character.Examplesof such newsocial movements in the region include the Chilean Student Movement
in 2011 that mobilized to protest against privatized education and demand reform of the education
system (Salinas and Fraser 2012). Similarly, in Argentina, the LGBT rights movement mobilized to
demand rights for its constituents, making considerable political ground notably in gay marriage
legislation and anti-discrimination laws (Brown; 2002).
Whilst both new and old social movements have diverse modus operandi, goals, trajectory and
outcomes, the state is a common target. As the previous examples demonstrate, new social movements
like old social movements have largely directed their dissent at the state. Equally, regardless of whether
the presence of social movements is an indication of stable liberal democracies or repressive regimes,
the state plays an important role in ‘facilitating’ mobilization and shaping the forms of contentious
politics. Motta, for example, suggests that the flourishing of social movements in the region reflects a
18. 17
relatively healthy from of democracy (Motta 2009). In contrast, Hellman regards the emergence of new
social movements as the response to the repression of democracy, citing movements in Chile, Brazil
and Mexico as cases in point (Hellman 1992: 52).
Whilst the presence of hip hop organizations in Medellín could be seen as a response to state repression
and illicit actor violence and would thus support Hellman’s observations, in the wider context of Latin
America,the hip hop movement in Medellín appears to be somewhat of an anomaly. This view is based
on two observations. Firstly the state was not fundamental to the genesis of the movement. Secondly,
the movement in Medellín does not overtly target the state nor does it make demands on the state.
However, such anomalies can be explained. According to Goodwin and Jasper (2004) counter culture
movements, such as hip hop movements, by their very nature are not concerned with targeting the state.
Therefore,if hip hop currents are counter culture movements, then we would assume that other hip hop
movements in the region would not engage in institutional politics.
Hip hop movements in Bolivia and Cuba would appear to contradict this assumption. The visible
political nature of the hip hop movement in El Alto, Bolivia has been interpreted as a political current.
Critical of neo-liberal policies and concerned with indigenous and social struggles the movement has
targeted the state (Martinez and Malone 2010:545, Tarifa; 2012; 397-415). Similarly, Tickner’s study
of hip hop in Cuba emphasizes how the movement emerged as a protest against racial discrimination
and inequality, issues that allegedly did not exist under the Castro regime. Given this orientation, hip
hop was interpreted as an attack on the Castro system. Consequently, the state responded by attempting
to co-opt the movement through the creation of the Ministry of Rap in 2002 (Tickner 2008: 142,150).
The hip hop movements in Bolivia and Cuba thus provide examples of apparent counter culture
movements that have responded to and have targeted the state. This observation not only challenges
Watkins’s contention that hip hop is not overtly political, it also demonstrates how hip hop culture in
Medellín, differs from other hip hop movements in the region. Therefore, in order to understand why
the hip hop movement in Medellín is at variance to its counterparts in the region, it is necessary to
account for the local conditions in which the movement emerged.
19. 18
Having addressed some of the key issues related to social movement literature, this thesis will combine
a variety of current social movement theories to explore how the genesis and impact of the hip hop
movement in Medellín could be interpreted. The thesis will be divided into two parts: Firstly, in seeking
to understand the evolution of the movement, attention will be made to the historical and political
context in which the movement emerged, stressing the importance of agents and the fluidity of
processes. Equally, focusing on the unique features of the movement, youth and popular culture within
this context will also enhance our understanding of why and how hip hop emerged as a force for
resistance and change in the city-region.
20. 19
METHODOLOGY
The first task in hand is to understand how the movement emerged by surveying the historical,
socioeconomic and political circumstances in Medellín in the 1980s and 1990s. Applying Armstrong
and Bernstein’s plural agent model against empirical evidence will enable the discussion to transcend a
purely state-centric position. For this reason, Political Opportunity models have been discounted in
hypothesizing about the emergence of the movement. Drawing on Armstrong and Bernstein’s model as
mode of analysis of the hip hop movement will ensure that the significance of a variety of agents will
be given due emphasis. Thus the differing roles of, and the relationships between,civic society, the state
and illicit actors will be examined to understand the conditions for mobilization. Similarly, synthesising
this model with culture, identity and emotion theories as proposed by Goodwin, Jasper, Polletta and
Gould will also facilitate our understanding of the evolution of the movement.
Secondly, the thesis will attempt to survey the movement’s impact on the social, cultural and political
terrain, and assessthe differing motivations underpinning the developing relationship betweenstate and
the movement since the election of Sergio Fajardo and Medellín’s political transformation in the years
since 2004. Examining concurrently the trajectories of three hip hop organizations will provide
empirical evidence to measure the significance of the movement.
The observation that dissent is not directed at the state will be considered, drawing on and adapting the
work of Armstrong and Bernstein (2008).Gamson(1990;1998), Melucci and Lyyra’s (1998)work will
allow us to explore the impact of the movement at both a societal and cultural level. Likewise, the
political impact will also be addressed by examining a range of interactions between the state and the
movement. Thus, Giugni and Passy’sassertionson ‘conflictual-cooperation’ (1998:85-89) and Giugni’s
‘incorporation’ and ‘transformation’ (1998: xiv-xx) will be testedto understand the nature and outcomes
of these interactions with the state. Examining the impact of the movement of the political terrain will
illustrate how movements can both be influenced by and, in turn, influence the institutional arena.
Similarly, perspectives advanced by political opportunity theorists can provide a suitable framework to
21. 20
explore the relationship between the state and social movements today. These interactions will also
reveal an important background for understanding the movement’s outcomes and trajectories.
Thirdly, building upon the work of Melucci and Lyrra (1998) on culture in social movement, this thesis
will argue that hip hop is a counter culture in which dissent is manifested through the creation of distinct
values and norms in daily life, whilst rejecting dominant norms and values determined by illicit actors.
Fourthly, linking culture to social protest,it will be argued that artistic practices can play a fundamental
role in social change and dissent. Much social movement literature regards artistic practice as a mere
accompaniment to mobilization. For example, music is seen to be a supplement for other conventional
expressions of dissent, or is employed as an aid to further a movement’s interests or goals.
These hypotheses will be tested against empirical evidence drawn from both primary and secondary
sources. The research will draw upon academic literature, government documents and statistics, media
reports, interviews, videos, documentaries, song lyrics, artists’, NGO and government websites, and
social media pages to empirically support and contextualise these theoretical frameworks.
These questions emerged from both personal and professional observations of the hip hop movement
following my first visit to Medellín, in 2010. During this time I have developed personal and
professional relationships with key actors in the movement which has enabled me to gain aninsight into
hip hop culture in Medellín. Whilst this has given me unparalleled access to my subject of study, it has
also createdsome challenges. Firstly, analysing the actions and behaviours of acquaintancesand friends
has proved to be testing. Their work inspired me to write this thesis. However,the nature of this task
requires analytical awareness and critical analysis of their organizations.
Secondly, despite having a good relationship with these organizations, obtaining interviews was
challenging. Some expressed scepticism about participating in academic research as they do not wish
to be represented in this way or are experiencing ‘research fatigue’. For example, Crew Peligrosos gave
me an interview for this thesis. However, they stated they did not want the content of the interview to
be releasedinto the public domain asthey did not wantto be representedin this way.Thus, the interview
22. 21
was subsequently deleted. However, photographs from my visits to Medellín, have been included in
this study.
It is hoped that by synthesizing theoreticalhypotheses and testing them against empirical data a nuanced
account of the hip hop movement in Medellín can be achieved. Chapter 1 will explore the historical
context in which the movement evolved and advance the multi-actor model to account for the
emergence of the movement during this period. Chapter 2 will explore how and why hip hop developed
into a suitable tool for social dissent and transformation in Medellín in the early 1990s. Chapter 3 will
discuss appropriate frameworks to measure the impact of the movement since the election of Sergio
Fajardo in 2004. Chapter4 will survey the diverse (political, social and cultural) impacts and trajectories
of three hip hop organizations operating in the city. In particular, attention will be given to the
interactions between the movement and political elites to understand the movement’s trajectory and
impact. Chapter5 will discuss how the movement could be classified on the social movement spectrum.
Finally, the conclusion will advance the idea of art as a form of social protest and action, a ‘hidden
transcript’ available to civil society in repressive contexts.
23. 22
CHAPTER 1 GRAFFITI, GANGS WITH GUNS AND THE STATE: BEYOND THE STATE CENTRIC
APPROACH.
THE DECLINE OF THE STATE.
Medellín has been deeply enmeshed in the complex conflicts which have plagued Colombia for over
half a century. However, the 1980s was a critical period for the city, marked by political instability,
industrial decline, the rising dominance of drug cartels supplying an increasingly demanding crack
cocaine market in the US and the growing presence of criminal and paramilitary groups (Andreas et al
1991, Salazar & Jaramillo, 1992). The scourge of drug gangs, militias, hitmen (sicarios) and right wing
paramilitaries1
coupled with political corruption and clientelism in the city resulted in the weakening of
state authority, especially in terms of justice, security and law and order. (Hylton, 2010: 349– 352,
Alcaldía de Medellín 2011:38-43, Baird 2013). The 1980s saw the decomposition of the state as
Medellín ‘was transformed by the infiltration of nacrotrafficking into all areas of its social and
institutional life’ (Riaño Alcalá 2010:3).
This decomposition meant that the state apparatus was almost non-existent in the poorer districts on the
periphery of the city which had become the battlefields of Medellín (Rozema 2007, Riaño Alcalá 2010,
Baird 2013). Concurrently, these areas were becoming increasingly populated due to the influx of
displaced people fleeing from armed conflict in rural areas. Given their explosive, unplanned growth
and lack of state control, these districts were known as the informal city. In the absence of the state and
the rule of law, the informal city setthe scene for the execution of private justice and lawlessness.These
areas were controlled by paramilitary groups, drug cartels and other illegal actors who fought turf wars,
settled feuds and imposed their authority by physical force and extortion (Rozema 2007, Alcaldía de
Medellín, 2011:38). As a response to the violence, some communities organized community self-
defence associations to socially cleanse the neighbourhood of petty crime, drugs and gangs. However,
the cycle of violence continued with revenge killings, disputes over jobs, betrayals and internal group
disagreements. As Jorge Melguizo, Secretary for Social Development in the city (2005-2007)
1 For a detailed explanationofthediverseviolentactors in Medellin seeR.Ceballos (2000).
24. 23
acknowledged, ‘Cuando el estado no llega a una zona, entonces los delincuentes, las guerrillas y los
paramilitares se la toman.’ (Organisation of American States 2011).
The presence of these illicit actors resulted in the disruption of normal civic life as community spaces
became no-go areas for residents. The daily episodes of violence and the continued threat of violence
created a culture of fear (Riaño Alcalá 2010: 138) Commenting on the impact of the rise of gangs on
everyday life, Angel, a member of the self defence association, Los Capuchos noted that ‘…everyone
shut themselves up in their houses after six in the evening… Locked up indoors you’d hear them
shooting the hell out of each other.’ (Salazar 1990: 50).
Illicit actors also provided social and employment benefits as a means of gaining loyalty from local
communities and consolidating their power. For example, the Medellín Cartelheaded by Pablo Escobar
undertook typical state functions by building hospitals, houses, roads, sports grounds and schools as
well as providing employment through construction projects, (Salazar 1990:64, Nieves 1997,
McIlwaine and Moser 2004:54, Riaño Alcalá 2010: 45). As the president of La Junta de Acción Vecinal
in Comuna 9, Wberney Zabala, remarked ‘Se dedicó a ayudarle a la gente pobre de Medellín donde el
Estado nunca llegaba’ (La Nacion: 2011). Thus, illicit actors,such as the Medellín Cartel, behaved as a
proxy state, asserting their authority repressively and in certain areas constructing much needed
infrastructure where the state was absent.
THE STATE AS A PERPETRATOR, COLLABORATOR AND CHALLENGER
Far from acting as the protector of civil society the Colombian state has been directly complicit in
episodes of violence through corruption and collusion with illicit actors,notably the selling of arms to
gangs and taking bribes from criminal organizations (Salazar 1990, Ortiz, 1991, Cepeda Ulloa 1994,
Bagley, 2001, Riaño Alcalá 2010, Bedoya, 2010). However, the 1992 Villatina Massacre,in which 8
civilians were murderedby members of the Colombian Police Force is a clearexample of state violence.
Whilst the state was culpable of overt acts of violence against the civilian population, it could be
suggested that the state was also indirectly involved in illicit actor violence given its inability or
reluctance to perform the vital functions of maintaining law and order and justice. This is not to suggest
25. 24
that the state was completely inactive: the police did undertake raids, carry out arrests and prosecute
gang members. However, police action was sporadic and largely ineffective as gang members could
bribe the police, judges or the guards to be released from jail (Bagley 1988, Salazar 1990, Ortiz 1991,
Alcaldía de Medellín 2012:22). Equally, because gang members were easily replaced in the illicit
economy the criminal justice system did little to break the cycle of violence in these years. Although
the withdrawal or weakness of the state could be interpreted as inactivity, the decision not to act in the
face of illicit actor dominance constitutes an action on its part. Thus, given these levels of corruption,
decomposition and consequent inaction it could be suggested that the state, was, in effect,a constant
accomplice and facilitator of illicit actor violence throughout this period.
When state agents did attempt to curtail illicit actors, it was met with increased levels of violence. The
Medellín Cartel’s campaign against the state apparatus intensified by the late 1980s, characterised by
the bombing of aircraft, shopping centres and the assassination of judges police, journalists and
politicians, most notably the Governor of Antioquia, Antonio Roldán Betancur in 1989. Such acts of
violence led to a more robust response from the national government in the early 1990s and what was,
in effect,an attempt to regain its legitimacy and authority in the face of rising drug cartel dominance
and terrorism. In particular, the agreement to extradite suspected Colombian criminals to the USA for
trial and the passing of a new Constitution show the national government’s desire to curb the power of
illicit actors.
The 1991 Colombian Constitution was characterised by a strong degree of decentralisation such as the
election of mayors and senators by popular vote to ensure new checks and balances on the ailing state.
Concurrently the national government under PresidentCesarGaviria attemptedto re-legitimize the state
by repairing the relationship between the state and civil society through the creation of the Consejería
Presidencial in 1990. The Consejería aimed to ‘repay the social debt’ owed by the state to society by
financially supporting grass roots projects and community initiatives such as the creation of the NGO
Paisa Joven (Alcaldía de Medellín 2011: 43).
26. 25
In this way, it is apparent that the state was something of a political chameleon in the 1990s,
simultaneously adopting roles as a collaborator, a perpetrator and a challenger to illicit actor violence
and dominance. These blurred and entangled facets of the state illustrate the complex internal power
struggles within a state apparatus infiltrated and influenced by illicit actors. As Bob Jessop (2011)
remarks there are multi centres of power (political, economic, social and cultural) operating in society
that are not merely confined to the state. The way that illicit centres of power operated within and
alongside the state apparatus in Medellín support this hypothesis. The fluid and contradictory behaviour
of the Colombian state during the 1980s and 1990s, also supports Goodwin and Jasper’s contention that
Political Opportunity theory regards ‘structural factors as invariant’ and devoid of agency (2003: viii).
Whilst some leaders within the political elite, such as Luis Carlos Galan challenged illicit actor
dominance (which resulted in his assassination), other actors, such as the military and the Elite Police
colluded with right wing paramilitaries and criminal gangs (Ortiz; 1991, Bagley 2001:13). This
demonstrates the importance of viewing the state as multi-layered, comprising of diverse actors with
often opposing agendas. Viewing the state as a fluctuating and varied set of agents rather than a fixed,
rigid structure helps us to account for its contradictory behaviour. It also raises interesting questions
concerning how we can understand the role of the state in relation to the emergence of the hip hop
movement in Medellín.
Because the state was a direct perpetrator of violence and a facilitator of illicit actor violence in this
way, it played a key role in the emergence of the hip hop movement. However, it is important to
understand this role within a wider set of long-term dynamics, not just those predominant in the 1990s,
given that Medellín has been a site of conflict for over sixty years. Therefore attributing state sponsored
violence or lack of action to combat it as the sole motivation for mobilization is incorrect. Given this, it
is necessary to explore the role of the state in relation to other agents if we are to understand how these
interactions between various agents, including the state facilitated the emergence of the hip hop
movement. The escalation of violence provoked by the national government’s capture of Pablo Escobar
in 1993 and the resulting shift in the balance of power amongst illicit actors was a significant factor in
the evolution of the movement. Similarly, the continued collaboration of agents within the institutions
27. 26
of local government with illicit actors provided a context in which community groups organized to
combat the effects of violence.
In this way a contradictory pattern developed in which the local state’s continued withdrawal and
collusion in Medellín itself, and the national state’swaragainstthe Medellín Cartelcombined to provide
a key factor in the emergence of the hip hop movement. I would contend that the state impacted in three
ways during this period. Firstly, through collusion and withdrawal, local and national government
agents objectively and subjectively facilitated violence. Secondly, the power vacuum left by the
downfall of the Medellín Cartel led to the intensification of violence. Thirdly, the state’s inability and
reluctance to curb the cycle of violence, as part of the wider legacy of conflict in the country,
strengthened a political culture of civic participation and community problem solving. However,these
observations must be understood in relation to other agents,notably civil society and illicit gangs during
the 1990s.
THE STATE OFPLAY: ADVANCING MULTI ACTOR APPROACHES
Political Opportunity theory assumesthatthe state’sbehaviour setsthe condition of possibility for social
movements to emerge (McAdam, D, S, Tarrow, and C, Tilly. (2001). Tarrow defines opportunities as a
‘perceived probability that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving a desired
outcome…‘which are created when’ institutional access opens’ (Tarrow 2011; 160). Threats regarded
as ‘the risks and costs of action or inaction’ are also significant in accounting for mobilization (Tarrow
2011; 160). However,in the case of Medellín neither opportunities nor threats were present at the time
of the movement’s inception. Institutional accesswasnotopen given the withdrawal of the state in these
areas. Equally, it is arguable that given the assassination of high profile citizens who challenged the
power of illicit actors, the risks and costs of action were much greater than inaction. In this situation
Political Opportunity theory cannot adequately account for mobilization and leaves open the question
why sections of civil society eventually decided to mobilize and act in the 1990s despite such
unfavourable conditions. If the state was the determining factor in the development of hip hop
movements then, arguably, the movement would have emerged in the 1980s as this period marked the
28. 27
beginning of the decomposition of the state and the rise of dominant illicit actors in Medellín. The hip
hop movement could also have emerged during this period to protest at the state’s collaboration and
failure to act against the surge in violence. Thus, opportunities in the initial stages of the decline of the
state and the emergence of illicit actors would have been more favourable than at the height of violence
in the early 1990s. Thus, the fact that hip hop groups did not emerge until the 1990s clearly illustrates
that mono-actor state centric theories do not account for the development of hip hop groups. Rather,it
was a combined set of events and strategies involving multiple actors that determined the evolution of
the hip hop movement in the 1990s.
Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) seek to address some of the deficiencies in both Political Opportunity
models and NewSocial Movement literature. Their multi-institutional model considers how movements
may mobilize and effect change in varying social fields or institutions. They suggest that non-state
agents within civil society such as religious institutions, education, and business organizations may be
both the cause of contention and the site of transformation. As well as broadening their definition of the
institutional terrain and context, Armstrong and Bernstein interpret power in both material and cultural
terms. By extending the notion of power to culture and acknowledging the role of non-state institutions
in mobilization this approach improves our understanding of movements that do not target the state nor
attempt to effectchange in an overtly political manner.Highlighting the dialectical relationship between
institutions and the creation of material and cultural power, Armstrong and Bernstein argue that
‘…institutions are where distinctions made by individual social actors are translated into social
boundaries … [and]…where classification systems are anchored and infused with material
consequences.’ (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 84).
Redefining conceptions of power and institutional forms in society in this wayproposes a newdefinition
of social movements and political structures. Using this analytical framework, a social movement can
be interpreted as a collective challenge to ‘constituted authority’ that targets other agents rather than
structures to effect cultural or material change (Snow 2004: 11, Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 84).
Conceptualising political actions in this way has consequences on how we view constituents who
mobilize and how we understand the range of their repertoires for dissent and change. If we accept that
29. 28
the target may be a non-state agent and that challenging authority could be cultural as well as political
as usually understood, our definition of a movement will invariably alter along with our understanding
of its form and evolution.
THE RISE OF RAP
Whilst the exact date of the arrival of hip hop music in Medellín is contested,there is a broad agreement
amongst artists in Medellín that it had emerged by the mid-1980s as an exported US youth culture.
(Caminante, J 2010, TEDx Talks 2010, TEDx Talks. 2012). By the 1990s a number of the conditions
existed in Medellín that turned hip hop into a social movement.
Firstly, in the early 1990s at the height of the violence (with an average 5,885 reported murders per year
during 1990-1992) US hip hop music and films re-emerged in Medellín with the arrival of television in
the peripheral barrios. This provided marginalised young people with access to new forms of culture
and avenues for expression. Secondly, in the late 1980s/early 1990s there was a shift in the perception
of hip hop as purely a black cultural expression to a broader depiction of the realities of ghetto life, thus
enabling the participation of other ethnic groups, such as Latinos into hip hop culture. (Tickner
2008:124) Concurrently, the late 1980s-early 1990s marked the transformation of hip hop in the US
from a purely cultural to a more social and political force. Hip hop community organizations emerged
which focused on issues of social justice and poverty, a development stage described by Malone and
Martinez Jr as ‘social creation and institutionalization’ (2010: 537-539). Thirdly, the death of Pablo
Escobar and the fall of the Medellín Cartel in 1993 created a power vacuum. Initially this led to an
intensification of violence asmultiple illicit actorsengaged in micro conflicts to capitalise on the decline
of the Cartel. The collapse of the Medellín Cartel not only resulted in a bloody redistribution of
territorial control but also a diversification of illicit actor activity and services (Hylton 2010: 346 – 348,
Riaño Alcalá 2010: 3). Fourthly, by 1989, violence was increasingly adolescent in nature, typified by
the teenage sicario,with the average victim of violent death aged 14-20. The age of victims of violence
had fallen dramatically since 1986 when the average age of victims of violent deaths was 35-45(Salazar
1990: 111).
30. 29
Figure 1 Murder rate in Medellín per 100,000 residents, 1980-2012: Source Alcaldía de
Medellín.
Simultaneously, sections of civil society noted for high active levels of youth participation (perhaps due
in part to the increasing adolescent nature of the violence) sought to address issues of chronic violence
in the community (Riaño Alcalá 2010:3). During the 1990s there was a significant growth in a wide
range of local, regional and national social movements representing various educational, religious,
community, youth and business groups (Fernandez et al; 2004, Alcaldía de Medellín, ; 2011, 42,
Alcaldía de Medellín, 2012; 20). The hip hop movement evolved as part of these currents in parallel
with other collective opponents of organized criminal violence in Medellín, such as the performing arts
organizations, Nuestra Gente,the community organization CoVida, and the youth network RedJuvenil.
Significantly, this period marked a departure in the approach of these civic society organizations
towards violence, seeing a shift from direct intervention and conflict resolution to a focus on prevention
and resistance (Baird,2013:33). This was most apparent in a new emphasis within these currents which
aimed to create an alternative to the violence rather than directly challenging it.
This cultural shift within civic society is a significant feature in the development of the hip hop
movement. It also raises the question of why civil actors adopted new repertoires for mobilization and
collective activity. One explanation might be found in the social impact of violence in Medellín.
31. 30
Commenting on the situation in the city at the beginning of the 1990s, M.C Medina, gives an insight
into the psychological and social effects of conflict:
‘…los barrios estaba en guerra… en lo que respiraba en la ciudad era rabia y miedo…mucho temor de
conocer a la gente.’ (Babble Fish Productions 2010)
M.C Medina’s words illustrate people’s response to the conflict were emotional (‘anger and fear’). He
also reveals how violence altered social reality, negatively impacting on daily social interactions within
their community. Fear is a theme that is repeatedly used in literature to capture the mood of Medellín
in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, the term ‘cultures of fear’ would lend itself well to Medellín during this
period (Rozema 2007, Riaño Alcalá 2010, Alcaldía de Medellín 2011, 2012,). As Riaño Alcalá notes,
cultures of fear refers to ‘…an imposed way of life that regulates daily communications, responses to
fear,strategiesof resistance and social memory to account for the systemic presence of fear’(2010:137).
The evidence of forced displacements, forced recruitment into criminal gangs, death threats,
kidnappings, territorial controls, murders, and forceddisappearancesprovide clearexamples of a culture
of fear in Medellín.
However, as Riaño Alcalá notes, presenting cultures of fear as merely as the aggregate of a series of
events or external actions, does not allow us to consider how social actors and individuals internalize
or respond to them (2010:137). The increased levels and nature of the violence in the late 1980s-early
1990s, such as bombings in public spaces,and the role of youth in this violence revealed an unexpected
and appalling situation, provoking a ‘moral shock’ which contributed to the intensification of cultures
of fear. (Jasper, 1997). In Medellín, civil society responded to this intensified culture of fear by creating
new strategies,namely prevention and resistance. This extract from the Nuestra Gente website captures
how a culture of fear and anger towards the stigmatization of young people led to the evolution of their
organization.
‘Eran los años de 1987, nuestra ciudad Medellín, aquejada por la indolencia de la guerra entre
carteles no dejaba espacio para el sosiego, estas pulsiones mortíferas no permitían que niños,
jóvenes y adultos permanecieran en la calle, ya que el toque de queda no oficial entraba en
vigencia cada día y a toda hora; las calles se fueron oscureciendo, el temor se apoderaba de las
32. 31
gentes, la muerte se agazapaba en las esquinas esperando el corazón de un joven, que por el
hecho de vivir en la comuna ya cargaba con elestigma del sicario,delviolento asesino en moto,
del ‘Pelaíto (jóvenes) que no duró nada’, del ‘No Nacimos Pa'semilla’; y aquí sí vale decir que
la vida no valía nada.
En medio de la muerte y la tristeza causada por la barbarie, surge este proceso creativo
denominado Corporación Cultural Nuestra Gente…hace posible que algunos jóvenes de las
comunas de Medellín, opten por el arte y la cultura como una oportunidad de generar espacios
de alegría y vida.’(Nuestra Gente 2007).
These accounts of Medellín in the late 1980s underscore the importance of emotional responses to
violence and the cultures of fear.Amplified feelings of anger, terror,and sadnesswere catalysts for new
strategies of prevention and resistance employed by civic society, and the mobilization of a new wave
of civil peace movements, including the hip hop movement.
Useful comparisons can be made between the experiences of the gay community in the USA and those
of the communities in the peripheral areas in Medellín, especially in the ways that emotions and
subjective factors play an important role in both individual activism and collective mobilization.
Deborah Gould’s work (2004:155-175) on the rise of the ACT UP movement in the USA in the 1980s
highlights these processes. The 1986 US Supreme Court’s Hardwick ruling, which upheld Georgia’s
sodomy law criminalizing sexual acts between homosexuals, led to a moral shock for the gay
community. Simultaneously, the gay and lesbian community were experiencing a social, political and
health crisis due to the AIDS epidemic which led to further concerns and outrage. Similarly, AIDS
sufferers faced increasing stigmatization and ostracism, typified by the legislation to dismiss HIV
positive employees or introduce mandatory testing and quarantine (Gould 2004:165-167). It was as a
result of this culture of fear and moral panic, combined with heightened, emotional feelings of
persecution and marginalization amongst gays that ACT UP was born.
During the late 1980s/early 1990s Medellín witnessed a comparable series of moral shocks. The
intensification of violence, exemplified by bombings and high profile assassinations, together with the
33. 32
phenomenon of teenage victims and perpetrators created a moral shock. The assassination of high
profile politicians, such as the Minster for Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla by teenage hit men created a
moral panic about poor male youth and violence (Riaño Alcalá 2010:45-46). This led to public and
media outrage and a widespread sense of despair. It also resulted in the stigmatization of poor male
youth and the wider community in the peripheral barrios. Young males were labelled as sicarios and
the neighbourhoods and areas where they gathered informally were regarded as the breeding ground for
hit men (Riaño Alcalá2010:47-48). This stigma further ostracised the already excluded communities in
the ‘informal city’ on the periphery of Medellín (Alcaldía de Medellín 2011; 40, Riaño Alcalá 2010:47-
48).
This negative stereotyping also created a self-fulfilling prophecy leading to increased youth violence
which simultaneously resulted in fear,anger, sadness and the normalisation of sicario culture amongst
sections of young people. In this highly charged situation many inhabitants of the barrios accepted and
internalized these interpretations which increasingly helped shape their own perceptions of themselves
and the social reality within which they lived (Salazar 1990: Ortiz 1991).The saying ‘No nacimos pa
semilla’ coined by youth in the peripheral barrios and the shift in the definition of the word sicario
reflect these perceptions of social reality at the time (Ortiz, 1991). The word sicario (hit man) which
became to mean young hit man (Oritz 1991). Paradoxically this febrile atmosphere also produced new
counter narratives which consciously rejected externally engendered stereotypes and facilitated the
development of new strategies for prevention and resistance to violence.
These developments provided fertile soil in the late 1980s forthe formation of groups such asLa Alianza
led by the artist Quintana (considered to be one of the pioneers of the hip hop movement) which
promoted hip hop as a tool for social change in Medellín. Quintana has been credited for setting up the
first hip hop school for young people in the city, based on a philosophy that art could facilitate peace.
His messages of resistance led to his murder and the group dissolved (Cultura y Libertad Medellín
2011).However, other groups such as Clika Underground founded in 1990, Sociedad FB7/Republica
34. 33
UND founded in 1993, El Laberinto founded in 1997 and Crew Peligrosos founded in 1999, followed
in Alianza’s footsteps making hip hop as a form of social protest and resistance2.
Outlining the context in which hip hop movements evolved has exposed the weakness of state-centric
theories in understanding the movement in Medellín. In contrast,the multi-institutional model provides
a framework to understand both the emergence of the movement and its particular orientation towards
violence. Equally, considering the significance of emotions in mobilization has added another enriching
dimension to interpretation of the emergence ofthe hip hop movement in the 1990s. However,important
questions remain about the nature of the movement. Why did hip hop emerge as a significant movement
rather than remaining just a youth subculture? Above all, why did actors from the wider community
choose this form of mobilization as a vehicle for dissent and a means of social change?
2 See Crew Pelgrisos sala deprensa (2013).SociedadFB7. (2013b), El Laberinto. (2009) listed in the
bibliography.
35. 34
CHAPTER 2:WHY HIP-HOP? PROTESTA A TRAVÉS DEL PARCHE
Hip hop emerged in the early 1970s amongst black urban youth living in marginalised New York
communities such as the Bronx (Rose 1994, Stapleton, 1998, Jefferies 2011:1, Tickner 2008, Malone
& Martinez, Jr, 2010). The four elements of hip hop (djing, break dancing, MCing and graffiti) emerged
as tools with which marginalised young people expressed dissent, formed alternative identities and
depicted and made sense of their everyday social reality. As Tickner notes, hip hop is unique in
‘…the way it relates to everyday life. In reflecting on poverty, inequality, exclusion, and
discrimination; claiming a positive identity based on these conditions; and offering musical,
linguistic, and corporal tools for commenting on them, it transcends the bounded sites where it
is practiced and participates in a symbolic network that circulates globally. However,hiphop is
also markedly local, in that lived experience is rearticulated in the contents of rap lyrics, which
speak to the daily concerns of its practitioners; and in graffiti and breakdancing, which occupy
and re-signify the streets and neighbourhoods where they are performed.’
(2004:1)
Such observations illustrate why hip hop can be a suitable tool for resistance and a manifestation of
dissent.
As hip hop emerged in New York at a time of socio-economic crisis resulting in the ghettoization and
alienation of urban black youths (Rose1994 27-33, Jefferies 2011:1), hip hop in Medellín also evolved
in a time of acute social upheaval, punctuated by a spiralling (youth)murder rate, terrorism,
displacement, political corruption and chronic poverty. Thus, despite the disparate historical, political,
economic and social features of 1970s New York and 1990s Medellín, parallels can be drawn between
the emergence of hip hop at times of youth social upheaval and urban crisis in the two cities.
Young people have played a salient role as both perpetrators and victims of Medellín’s violence,
accounting for over 40,000 homicides since 1987 (Yarce 2007).3
Young males, in particular, from the
3 Victims areaged between 14-26 years old.
36. 35
poorer neighbourhoods with limited life chances have been targeted by criminal gangs and drug cartels
as potential recruits lured by the culture of easy money and status (Ortiz,1991, Suarez Rodriguez et al
2005:205). As Riaño Alcalá suggests, life itself in Medellín in the 1980s and early 1990s was a
commodity, with young men willing to kill for a price (2010:2). Poor young men were stigmatised by
the media associated with the image of the hit man on a moped. Reflecting on the perception of youth
at this time MC Medina of Comuna 6 remarks:
‘… los jóvenes un estigma permanente porque para la ciudad todos éramos sicarios… todos enseñamos
algo de las pandillas eso es lo que los medios de comunicación dijeron pero también había mucha gente
haciendo arte en este momento.’ (Babble Fish Productions 2010).
M.C Medina’s words reveal a nexus between the labelling of young people as criminals and the
significance of artistic endeavours employed by the very same people. The fact that he elects to
contextualise the creation of art against this backdrop of negative perceptions of youth, demonstrates
that he positions art as a form of resistance. Artistic processes are deployed to challenge these dominant
perceptions of youth perpetrated by the media. Choosing to use ‘pero’ and ‘también’ in the above
statement, illustrates the contrasting, but related themes in the sentence, illustrating that he sees the
production of art and acts of criminality as opposing cultures operating in parallel.
The notion that art is a tool for resisting negative labels is also evidenced in a book about graffiti in
Medellín published by La Casa de las Estrategias which claims that graffiti has provided youth with a
means of not falling into stereotypical representations in debates on violence (2012:1). Within this
framework, art can be regarded both as a tool of defiance against the culture of criminality and a
challenge to the dominant perception of poor male youth advanced by the popular press and other
powerful agents (Garces Montoya 2010c:43). Therefore hip hop culture can be understood as an
instrument with which marginalised youth in Medellín transmit an alternative image to these stereotypes
of poor young men as criminals. Moreover, as Rose suggests in oppressive contexts in which
marginalised people have limited and unfeasible strategies and outlets to directly challenge dominant
37. 36
groups, culture canmanifest itself as an expression of rage,defiance and to mock powerful actors(Rose
1994: 99).
The song ‘Juan Pepito’, by Cultura y Libertad (Rapculturaylibertad. 2013) provides an example of such
mockery and defiance through music. The song, a tragic comedy based on a children’s clapping rhyme,
tells the story of the decline and death of a young boy who becomes involved in drugs and gangs. The
song charts the demise of the child as he engages in criminality, ending with his funeral in adolescence.
The video begins with rappersdressedasmiddle agedhouse wives, sweeping their houses and gossiping
about the death of Juan Pepito. The tone of the video is light-hearted, tongue-in-cheek with rappers
undertaking various characters as the story develops, yet also providing a covert and powerful means
of ridiculing criminal culture.
Marginalised youth oppressed by powerful cohort of illicit armed actorshave limited means to challenge
them. Direct confrontation is not a viable strategy as it could result in displacement, violence or death.
Thus, at times hip hop has taken on the role as a subtle instrument of defiance. Moreover,in this context
of illicit agents, traditional and overt forms of social dissent, for example, demonstrations or civil
disobedience would not be a feasible strategy as the dominant agents operate outside normative
institutional channels. Thus, defiance, having evolved in accordance with the limits of possibility
available to marginalised youth facing violent illicit actors,is masked.
This subtle form of resistance is an example of whatRose refersto asa ‘hidden transcript’, a clandestine
discourse formulated by oppressed social groups that implicitly challenges hegemony (Rose 1994:99-
100). Examples of this ‘hidden’ transcript are best evidenced in the lexis often used by hip hop crews
that is associated with war or struggle. Song titles such as ‘En medio de la guerra’ by Sociedad FB7,
(SociedadFB7 2013a) ‘Almas en guerra’ by C15 (Caminante, J. 2012), ‘el guerrero de microfono’ by
ESK-Lones (TheAcme CreW 2012) illustrate references to struggle and conflict. This reoccurring
theme of ‘guerra’ is clearly a declaration of resistance against the elite actors in both literal and
figurative terms.
38. 37
Cultural leader Jackgo from Comuna 1 provides a good example of hip hop as such a hidden transcript.
Jackgo lives in a poor area
‘…‘donde la ley es otra’ y no se van a ir frontalmente contra los criminales, entonces su labor social es
ofrece ‘otra opción’: ¿Qué armas tenemos frente a este conflicto? Mi arma es el aerosol, mi arma es el
micrófono, mi arma es los pasos de break que enseño’ (La Casa de las Estrategias 2012:92)
Like the references to war in songs, Jackgo chooses language related to war to contextualise his role as
a hip hop artist. In doing this, he considers his weapons in this war to be the four elements of hip hop,
a microphone and spray paints. Framed in this way hip hop is conceived as a force of resistance, subtly
challenging this dominant culture of violence prevalent in the poorer barrios of Medellín.
Despite the apparent subversive nature of the narrative, the number of murders and threats made against
artists in Comuna 13 shows that its meaning is clearly understood, especially by the targets of their art.
In 2012, sixty hip hop artists were forced to flee after receiving threats from a gang. The gang
purportedly interpreted the production of a music video entitled ‘La Furia de las Pandillas’ as an attack
on them (Ojo de Gatos Films 2014). However, the artists insisted it was not a critique of the gang and
that it wasa misunderstanding (Minuto30 2010). Since 2009, twelve hip hop artists have been murdered
in Comuna 13 with the most recent murder being that of a 14 year old rapper in January 2014 (El
Espectador 2014a). Some NGOs, civil movements, such as the Instituto Popular de Capacitación and
media reports have claimed that violent actors have particularly targeted hip hop artists and their
message of peace (Caracol2012).
However, this has been contested by some artists and other NGO organizations, such as Corporación
Jurídica Libertad, who have claimed that artists have not been targeted for being artists, but rather for
being young in Comuna 13 (Hidalgo, Arias. W 2014). Whilst some of the motives for these murders
are unclear, others reflect the wider dynamics of Comuna 13 (La Semana 2011). For example, rapper
Daniel Alejandro Sierra Montoya was murdered in 2011 for crossing an ‘invisible border’ (El
Espectador, 2011b). Invisible borders are informal territorial markers that indicate an area controlled
by different gangs. Non-gang members moving outside of their local area into territory controlled by
39. 38
another gang can result in death. Equally, refusing to join a gang can result in murder. In 2012, Robert
Steven Barrera was allegedly killed for refusing to join a gang (Hidalgo, Arias. W; 2014). These cases
illustrate that the motivation for the murders of artists is complex. They can be attributed to prevailing
issues in Comuna 13, such as territorial control and gang recruitment or as a resistance to violent gangs.
However, the threat of violence against hip hop artists does raise questions about the extent to which
hip hop is a completely hidden transcript as Rose suggests.
Given that predominantly young males have been the protagonists in Medellín’s conflicts, it is logical
that hip hop emerged asa powerful tool for challenging hegemonic perceptions of poor youth. However,
hip hop culture also serves as a tool for resistance as the next section will illustrate. Furthermore,
examining hip hop culture as a form of dissent will enable us to understand how it can be a force for
social change.
RECLAIMING THE BARRIO: HIP HOP AS RESISTANCE AND DISSENT
The presence of illicit armed actors and their power struggles in the peripheral barrios of Medellín
resulted in violence being played out in public spaces. Community spaces were transformed into
battlegrounds between rival gangs or as sites of executions by hit men. Hip hop in Medellín is a public
and collective activity. It occupies parks, squares, school playgrounds and the streets to give new
positive meaning to the public spacesthathave beenengulfed by violence. Consequently, in this context
hip hop allows marginalised people to carve their own space into a landscape dominated by violence.
In this way it defies Lifestyle Movement theory assertions that hip hop is a private, individual choice to
frame and construct identity (Haenfler,R., Johnson, B. & Jones,E. 2012). Hip hop schools are the most
overt examples of this public and collective action. The schools were set up to teach children and young
people the four elements of hip hop. Operating in public, outside spaces they create what Rose terms an
‘open-air community centre’ which allows youth to transform their locality through the ownership of
space (Rose 1994:22).
Graffiti functions in a similar mannerby providing the most obvious manifestations of spatial ownership
through public images reflecting artists’ individual or collective interpretation of daily life in the barrio.
40. 39
Graffiti artist ‘Eyes’ illustrated this when he remarked that ‘quiero representar nuestra vivencia porque
es lo más importante’ (Casa de las Estrategias 2012:68). The use of the pronoun
‘nuestra’ reveals that graffiti is not always focused on individual representation. It can also be a
symbolic process of collective expressions of shared and lived experiences. The use of the collective
pronoun could variously be interpreted as ‘our’ experiences referring to the hip hop crews or the wider
community.
In a similar vein reflecting this theme of collective and lived experiences, ‘El Perro’ from Comuna 13
framed graffiti as a ‘… revolución, es formación de artistas y es museo abierto en el barrio.’(Casa de
las Estrategias 2012:40).Therefore, in creating an open air museum for the barrio, graffiti not only
constructs and recounts collective experiences from the perspective of the imagined community, it also
gives newhistoric meaning and identity to public spaces.Itprovides marginalised agentswith the means
to interpret and shape their own locality, rather than having it imposed upon them by dominant actors,
such as the illicit agents, the state or the popular press. Furthermore, creating or arguably reclaiming
public spaces in which to construct an alternative social reality constitutes an act of defiance or, as El
Perro remarks, a revolution.
42. 41
Figure 3 Graffiti works in Medellín, by Comuna and social strata.Source: Casa de las Estrategias,2012.
As Figure 3 suggests an interesting geographical relationship between graffiti and violence in Medellín.
The map shows pieces of graffiti by comuna. The red dots represent pieces of graffiti whilst the red
lines depict a cluster of pieces. From the map, there are clusters of graffiti in Popular (Comuna 1)
Aranjuez (Comuna 4), La Castilla (Comuna 5) La Candelaria (Comuna 10), San Javier (Comuna 13)
and Guayabal (Comuna 15). These comunas have endured some of the worse episodes of violence and
consistently register the highest levels of murder, displacements and other human rights abuses
according to Personería de Medellín data (Personería 2011, 2012, 2013). Whilst there is no clear causal
relationship and it would be wrong to attempt to correlate high levels of illicit activity to the strong
presence of graffiti in these comunas, this map certainly adds a degree of credibility to the hypothesis
that graffiti can act as a form of spatial resistance.
Music also vocalises this appropriation of space and a strong sense of habitus with lyrics often making
reference to the barrio. For example, the song by Crew Peligrosos ‘Esto tiene la suyo’
(Crewpeligrososmusic 2013) is littered with references to locality. In the video for the song, Aranjuez
43. 42
(Comuna Four) and the city of Medellín is referenced both lyrically and aesthetically throughout the
video. The area of Aranjuez, in the north of Medellín, is a violent area,with the fourth highest murder
rate,high incidence of human rights abuses and widespread poverty (Personería de Medellín 2012:
18, 74,139). The locality is apparent in the first verse with the rapper stating that ‘Medallo esta
marcado’. (Medallo is a local name for Medellín). Having framed the song in Medellín, the artists
continue to make references to locality. However, as the song develops they become more
geographically specific focusing on their Comuna:
‘Soy del norte,
del barrio donde hay buenos cortes la B 94,
Aranjuez es el soporte’ (Crewpeligrososmusic 2013)
At this point in the video, the artist removes his cap which has the word ‘Aranjeuz’ written on it and
points to the word. In doing this, the artist highlights the significance of this word ‘Aranjuez’ and his
desire to transmit this to the audience. Similarly, a shot of a local bus with the word ‘Aranjuez’ further
demonstrates the significance of locality. Further aesthetic references are made to Medellín with
members of the crew wearing t-shirts and caps ’Calles de Medellín’. The repetition of these overt visual
and verbal references to locality suggests that this is a key element of the song. This gesture of
emphasising locality canbe understood asa meansof appropriating space by transmitting an alternative,
positive view of ‘Aranjuez’ and its young residents to a local, national and global audience. Stressing
the locality and the imagined community in the song can also be interpreted as a means of challenging
negative perceptions of Aranjuez as constructed by powerful external, and thus antagonistic, agents
such as the media and the state (Anderson 1991). Thus, hip hop culture challenges cultural and social
hegemony of the media and other powerful institutions by transmitting another image of youth through
graffiti or local hip hop parches (hangouts).
Equally, creating spaces for hip hop also facilitates the building of community youth relations and
collective identity in barrios fractured by turf wars and rival gangs as it
44. 43
‘… constituya espacios de solidaridad y encuentro entre hermanos de barriada… para que se generen
espacios en los que jóvenes de las comunas reconozcan lugares comunes de encuentro, espacios donde
nosotros los jóvenes tengamos la palabra y con ella nuestra herramienta de visibilización frente al
mundo.’(Cultura y Libertad 2010).
This statement, from the hip hop network Cultura y Libertad’s website, illustrates the process of
appropriating space in the barrio is also an act of youth empowerment. It is a means of determining
one’s own culture and visibly displaying this culture and identity to the wider community and the world.
In this way, the construction of this space defies and challenges hegemony in several guises. Firstly,
this space can provide an alternative space for youth in their free time and physically removing them
from the lure of illicit actor recruitment. Secondly, hip hop culture allows young people to shape the
landscape of the barrio in the face of illicit actor control. Thirdly, defiance is articulated by creating and
nurturing an alternative culture of non-violence through workshops and socialization into an alternative
type of social organization. It is to this process of creating an alternative culture that we now turn.
HIP HOP AS A COUNTER CULTURE. ‘HIP HOP IS MY ART. HIP HOP IS MY LIFE’4
Within these appropriated hip hop spaces children and young people are socialised into an
alternative culture. ‘Cultural education’ is focused on the four elements of hip hop and the
philosophy of non-violence. Thus children and young people learn and reproduce an
alternative culture to gang culture.
However,as Alexander 2003 and Hays 2000 have noted culture can be both constraining and
transformative. Thus, whilst hip hop culture may provide an alternative to gang culture, there
are also similarities between them. For example, hip hop members develop a collective sense
of identity as part of a group, a crew or family which mirrors collective identities fostered in
criminal gangs (Rose 1994:34). Belonging to a group can provide the benefits of the support,
friendship and loyalty which are often important for adolescents as they make the transition
to adulthood (Stretesky & Pogrebin, 2007:88).Thus, despite the socialization into disparate
4 Quote taken from graffiti sketch at a hip hop school in Comuna 15.
45. 44
norms and values, belonging to hip hop crews or criminal gangs can provide the same
emotional support and sense of belonging. Furthermore, as Vigil (1988a: 63) acknowledges
being part of a gang enables ‘members to internalize and adhere to alternative norms and
modes of behaviour and play a significant role in helping…youth acquire a sense of
importance, self-esteem and identity.’ Salazar also notes the importance of gang culture in
forming identity and social cohesion (1990:123-124)
Whilst Salazar and Vigil’s analysis is focused on violent gangs in Medellín and the USA, it
can be contended that the socialization into a hip hop group produces similar outcomes in
terms of a sense of importance, self–esteem, identity and social cohesion. Therefore,drawing
upon the parallels between hip hop culture and criminal gang culture, will facilitate our
understanding as to why hip hop is a suitable alternative culture for youth (with a particular
focus on males) in the peripheral areas. Firstly, the prevalence and consequences of gang
culture will be examined.
In the peripheral barrios young people experience high levels of unemployment (exacerbated by the
stigmatizing and stereotyping of poor young men as sicarios) and socio-economic deprivation. This
leads to very limited life chances and legitimate opportunities for male youth (Riaño Alcalá 2010:48).
Thus, in this context, ‘being employed’ by a criminal gang can be an attractive prospect (Suarez
Rodriguez et al 2005:204-205).
Drug cartels’ contacts with the US resulted in the exposure of these peripheral barrios to a consumer
culture. This encouraged material aspirations which were unattainable through legitimate channels
given the high levels of inequality and poverty in these areas. This emerging consumer culture was
typified by showing off material wealth in the form of fashion, brands, houses and carsto affirm oneself
as part of the nouveau riche (Salazar 1990: 120, Ortiz 1991, Riaño Alcalá 2010: 47). 5
However, the
economic benefit of joining a gang is not the only appeal; the status and power attached to belonging to
5 Henry Arteaga also makes reference to this in his TEDx Talk 2010.
46. 45
a gang, access to training and using guns are also attractive to adolescent and youth adult males (Ortiz
1991,Riaño Alcalá 2010: 45-46).
Indeed, Baird’s research on gang culture in the peripheral barrios of Medellín reveals that this culture
of consumerism, status and power are consistent with local, established masculinities which are
characterised by traits of economic power, toughness, respect and leadership (2013:11). Thus, this
version of masculinity is often typified by gang participation asmen seekchannels to construct identities
in accordance with local expectations and within the limitations of their socio-economic reality. Riaño
Alcalá account of the Calientes in Barrio Antioquia illuminates how gang activities and language
‘…reinforce warrior values and a model of masculine heroism’ (2010: 88). Ortiz (1991) also notes how
the cultural acceptance ofgangs and sicarios can be understood as part of a legacy of Colombia’s violent
past and the inheritance of cultural norms regarding violence and masculinity. Thus, it is apparent that
violence as an expression of masculinity is woven into the cultural fabric of the barrios. Similarly, the
changing role of women since the 1960s and the increasing tendencies towards emasculation of /in
Colombian society have also impacted on the construction of masculine identities.
Traditional male identities are increasingly unrealistically attainable due to the feminist movement and
growing inequalities between rich and poor within Colombian society. However, participation in
criminal gangs provides a route for the construction and reinforcement of traditional male identities.
(Cleaver,2002; Barker,2005). Activities undertaken by gangs provide spaces for overt expressions and
constructions of these traditional local masculine identities: combined with symbolic and violent action,
these expressions of violence provide an opportunity to attain status amongst peers (Anderson 1999).
Being part of a gang allows members to construct and act out local masculine identities by playing the
role of the sicario,paramilitary, criminal or drug dealer (Baird, 2013: 97-101). These roles demonstrate
power and economic success,thus allowing gang members to attain status and recognition within their
local community, especially amongst women (Riaño Alcalá 2010:53).
In many respects hip hop culture acts as a substitute for gang based socialization as it mirrors these
expressions of local masculine identities. Hip hop crews and gangs both provide an arena which allows
young males to demonstrate and learn masculine traits in accordance with local gender role
47. 46
expectations. However, masculine values are manifested through diverse expressions. Therefore hip
hop can be understood as a variant of existing local masculinities. Whilst it reproduces the core values
of local masculinities, it alters the ways they are manifested. Thus, hip hop simultaneously reinforces
aspects of local masculine culture whilst challenging the normalised culture of violence. In this way hip
hop culture concurrently reinforces and alters established versions of masculinity. Hip hop artists, to a
certain degree,are constrained by established versions of masculinity, but they are also able to alter this
masculine culture characterised by a culture of non-violence.
The four elements of hip hop exemplify this function of constraining and transforming masculine
culture. MCing, graffiti, djing and breakdancing all provide opportunities for the non-violent
expressions of local masculinity. Breakdancing is an expression of physical strength ascomplex moves
require athleticism and thus could be understood asan articulation of the masculine value of aggression.
Furthermore, break dancing battles between crews also provides a competitive arena in which
participants can demonstrate aggression and be accordedstatusamongst their peersfor particular moves
or their victory in a non-violent, if aggressively ritualized, competition (Banes 2004:14, Schloss 2009).
In the same vein, being recognised as a talented graffiti artist because of an innovative painting style or
the risk sometimes involved in painting in public spaces also elevates the status of the artist amongst
their peers. Similarly, as rapper,El Flacho comments improvised verbal eloquence (toasting), an ability
to rap to complex rhythms, boasting to an audience and orally belittling your opponent in public MC
battles also provides an opportunity for status and recognition (Caminante 2011b). These ‘battles’
constitute non-violent expressions of competition and confrontation which satisfy the construction and
positive affirmation of local versions of masculinity. They provide an arena in which male youth learn
about aggression, physical strength, assertiveness and leadership from older hoppers. In these ways hip
hop culture actsin a similar, if non-violent way,to gang culture by providing avenues for the formation,
articulation and the affirmation of prevalent versions of masculinity.
48. 47
Figure 4 MC Battle Comuna 13: Source Un-Convention
Indeed, the creation of the hip hop organization Zulu Nation, founded by a former gang member Africa
Bambaataa,which sought to provide alternatives to non-criminal activities for former gang members,
is a representative case in point. Similarly, some prominent members of Medellín’s hip hop scene,such
as El Flacho and El Perro are former gang members who give credence to the hypothesis that there is a
certain level of continuity between hip hop crews and criminal gangs. Fernando (1994) supports this
view when he notes that hip hop allows youth to fight with creativity rather than guns. In this way hip
hop challenges the normalisation of violence that emerged in the late 80s-early 1990s, and attempts to
act in a transformative way. However, hip hop culture also simultaneously reinforces local masculine
traits, and can thus reinforce less positive aspect of barrio culture, such as ‘traditional’ gender roles and
relationships.
Consequently, it would be impossible to discuss hip hop as a form of masculine identity without
discussing female participation in this culture. GarcesMontoya’s (2010a) work on female hip hop artists
in Medellín seeks to understand how hip hop appeals to women given that it is an expression of local
perceptions of masculinity (2010a, 47). The study reveals that hip hop contests local perceptions of
femininity and reconstructs new female identities. Through interviews with several prominent female
artists, hip hop is framed as challenging established female values resulting in conflicts between
families, friends and boyfriends (2010: 48, 50-52).
49. 48
Furthermore, traditional perceptions of femininity held by male artists have also hindered female hip
hop artists as they are often judged on their looks rather than their talent (2010:52). Therefore,female
artists have to work hard to be accepted by their male counterparts. Given that perceptions of
masculinity and femininity cannot be divorced, Garcia Montoya’s research on female hip hop artists
illustrates local aspects of masculinity and male identities. Discussing female participation in an
apparently masculine space suggests a challenge to local accounts of hip hop as purely an expression
of masculinity, and therefore supports the notion of hip hop, in these aspects at least, as a suitable
substitution for established local masculine identities.
Given this, the few women that are involved in the hip hop movement are negotiating new forms of
femininity and in turn are altering perceptions of masculinity. Mc Natrix highlights this theme by
suggesting that…’una mujer hip hop no responde a la estructura tradicional, entonces tienen que
enfrentarse a sus propios límites y superarlos…se convierte en una mujer combativa que no se
conforma’ (quoted in GarcesMontya 2010a: 52). Herwords reveala nexus betweenhip hop and female
empowerment as she overcomes her limits, breaks with traditional (patriarchal) structures and becomes
a fighter. The tone of her language could be interpreted as aggressive and powerful, characteristics not
normally associated with female identities in the peripheral barrios. Thus, just as hip hop has provided
a space for the construction and articulation of a modified version of local masculinities, it could be
argued that the perceived masculine nature of hip hop has also provided a space for women to contest
established femininities and reconstruct new female identities. Given this, the potential for behavioural
change and shifts in cultural codes facilitated by hip hop has another dimension encompassing not only
non-violent norms and values but also affecting gender identities and roles as well.
Socialisation into these non-violent manifestations of masculinity provides a foundation for the
development of distinct norms and values which fostera culture and sense of collective identity. Names,
language, gestures and fashion are the most apparent articulation of a distinct culture. Hip hop groups
reinforce collective identities through names that usually contain lexis related to collectivity, such as
‘crew’,’ klan’, ‘red’ or ‘familia’ or more original names like ‘Sociedad FB7, familia del barrio 7 (7
represents the number of original members of the group) or El Laberinto ELC (en las calles). The
50. 49
appropriation of a name by a group provides both a private and public affirmation of collectivity by
signalling publicly membership and belonging to a particular group. Similarly, logos, websites and
social media also act as aesthetic markers of collective identity.
Within this collective, members also carve out individual identities, assuming a particular role as a DJ,
MC, producer,break danceror graffiti artist. Individuals select an artistic name or are given one by their
peersin recognition for a particular skill or characteristic.For example, the graffiti artist ‘Eyes’of Crew
Peligrosos was given this name by his peers as he developed his own writing style by observing other
artists’ work (Casa de las Estrategias 2012:64).
These aesthetic symbols have become synonymous with hip hop. They are the visual representations
that are understood within the group, other hip hop groups and the wider community. Thus, the
aesthetics of hip hop have emerged as another facet of this resistance to social and cultural hegemony.
Names,fashions and logos are visual manifestations of dissent as they are indicators of one’s affiliation
to hip hop culture rather than to gang culture or another culture. Thus, oversized t-shirts, baggy jeans,
baseball caps and trainers are more than a fashion statement or part of a youth subculture style; they are
part of this narrative of resistance and an expression of an alternative culture .6
These aesthetic symbols
enable individuals to be identified by their hip hop crews,other crews,the wider community, the media,
the state and criminal gangs as a hip hop artist which in Medellín has become associated with a culture
of peace and positive change (El Espectador 2012, Sanchez, 2012, Giraldo Aragno 2013).
Thus, aesthetic and linguistic are overt signs of difference and belonging to the ‘other’. However,these
markersare part of a wider culture of distinct norms and values that are produced within hip hop spaces.
Children and young people are socialized into alternative norms and values to that of the culture of easy
money and violence offered by illicit agents. In this way, hip hop culture can be regarded as a toolkit to
inform behaviour and one’s understanding of reality (Swidler 1986). Hip hop organizations allow young
people and children to be socialized into an alternative culture based on non-violence and good
6 Whilstthis stylemay also beassociated with fashions appropriated by Chicano gangs in the US, in Medellin
this styleis associated with hip hop cultureas stated by Henry Arteaga of Crew Peligrosos.SeeBritish Council
(2014).
