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The South China Sea Dispute:
Evaluating the Drivers of Chinese
Policy in the Dispute
Matthew Popkin
Thesis Advisors: Markus Jachtenfuchs and Thanh-Dam Truong
Hertie School of Governance and the Maxwell School
Atlantis Programme
Master’s of Public Policy and International Relations

Popkin 2
Table of Contents
Table
of
Contents
.....................................................................................................................
2

Acknowledgements
.................................................................................................................
3

Executive
Summary
................................................................................................................
4

Acronyms
...................................................................................................................................
5

I.
Defining
the
Boundaries
of
Research
............................................................................
6

Research
questions
and
methodology:
......................................................................................
9

The
Research
Question:
................................................................................................................................
9

Research
Methodology
and
Structure
....................................................................................................
9

II.
The
Rise
of
China
and
the
Quest
for
a
new
approach
in
the
South
China
Sea:

Insights
from
Existing
Literature.
...................................................................................
12

III.
Energy
Security
and
the
South
China
Sea:
Internal
Doubt
and
External

Debate.
.....................................................................................................................................
18

China’s
Energy
Dilemma:
Why
is
China
stirring
the
pot
in
the
South
China
Sea?
.....
18

Going
Global:
Evolution
of
China’s
International
Energy
Policy
....................................
21

The
South
China
Sea
in
China’s
Energy
Policy:
An
Analysis
.............................................
25

IV.
Understanding
China’s
Maritime
Assertiveness
in
the
South
China
Sea:
The

Century
of
Humiliation
and
the
Reclaiming
of
China’s
Civilizational
Standing.

....................................................................................................................................................
30

The
Century
of
Humiliation,
Chinese
Culture
and
the
Civilizational-‐State.
................
31

Insecurity
and
Strategy
in
the
South
China
Sea:
Exploring
the
Relationship
between

history,
culture
and
behavior.
....................................................................................................
37

V.
Conclusion:
Understanding
the
Primary
Drivers
of
China’s
Maritime
Claims

in
the
South
China
Sea.
........................................................................................................
45

References
..............................................................................................................................
50

Map
of
the
South
China
Sea
Dispute
...............................................................................
57

Energy
and
Trade
Routes
in
the
South
China
Sea
......................................................
58

Popkin 3
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to my two supervisors Dr. Markus
Jachtenfuchs and Dr. Thanh-Dam Truong, whose expertise, understanding, patience and
support has proven invaluable in writing this. I would like to especially recognize Dr.
Truong for her diligent review, regional expertise and contribution(s) of time, effort and
patience as I have worked to complete this thesis. Without her care and support, I would
have been lost in this endeavor. I would like to thank my Professors at the Maxwell
School and Hertie School of Governance for helping me shape my research, academic
focus and assistance they have provided me over my course of time at both institutions.
A very special thanks goes out to my family, whose support during my life has
enabled me to be here. I thank my family with providing me with the inspiration to
pursue my dream and providing me with impetus to work on a challenging subject and to
thrive to learn. I also thank my friends and colleagues whose support and care have
aided me in my studies.
In conclusion, I would like to recognize the dedicated body of scholars whose
research, publication(s) and dedication in the field of China Studies made my research
possible. Furthermore, I thank Syracuse University, the Hertie School of Governance
and the International Institute of Social Studies for supporting my research and providing
a home for me these past few years.

Popkin 4
Executive Summary
The primary purpose of this study is to explore the causal determinants of China’s
recent behavior in the South China Sea. The South China Sea is subject to a long-
standing series of sovereignty and territorial disputes between Southeast Asian nations.
Furthermore, the discovery of hydrocarbon resources is inciting a regional competition
for control over exploration and development of these resources. As China’s claim(s) are
the largest and most diverse, determining the rationale for their assertive behavior could
provide an insight into attaining a peaceful resolution to the disputes. The discussion
within is centered on the intersection of culture and history to ascertain causal linkages
between their material needs and ideological insecurities.
This study presents the boundaries of existing research, the rationale underpinning
its orientation and an approach that deals with the mutual interplay between objective and
subjective domains. Building upon existing approaches to maritime disputes in the South
China Sea, this paper will explore China’s energy situation and its role in determining
Chinese behavior. In addition it aims to provide an understanding of China’s maritime
assertiveness vis-à-vis the cultural, historical and ideological realms. The emphasis is to
understand specific areas of contention where China is pursuing unilateral action in
asserting their claims. Beyond summarizing key findings, the conclusion will also offer
some ideas on the prospects for regional cooperation, conflict resolution and the
leadership role China envisions for itself in the South China Sea.
China’s economic transformation of the past several decades has affected their
perception of territory and in turn is shaping their behavior in the South China Sea. A
growing gap between their domestic production of oil and imports coupled with rising
instability in international energy markets is driving Beijing to seek increase its
exploration and production of oil and natural gas in contested waters of the South China
Sea. Efforts at coming to a diplomatic resolution to the dispute are further harmed by
China’s adamant refusal to pursue multilateral negotiations with smaller rival nations.
Furthermore, China’s historical insecurities are shaping its emerging regional position
and as such are leading it seek regional hegemony with Chinese characteristics.

Popkin 5
Acronyms
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone
BBL Billion Barrel. Measure for Oil
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation
CoC Code of Conduct
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA Energy Information Administration (US)
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IEA International Energy Agency
IOC International Oil Company
ITLS International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
LOS Law of the Sea
MBD Million Barrels/Day
NOC National Oil Company
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
SCS South China Sea
SOE State Owned Enterprises
TCF Trillion Cubic Feet. Measure for Natural Gas
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USGS United States Geological Survey

Chapter 1 Introduction Popkin 6
I. Defining the Boundaries of Research
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed and ecologically diverse body of water
that has provided sustenance and avenues of trade for its neighbors. With the rise of
globalization in the 20th
century, its role in global commerce has magnified exponentially
as it is a geopolitically critical body of water to both the regional and global economy. Its
position nested between small and large Asian economies that have experienced in the
past several decades’ immense economic growth continues to underscore the importance
of maintaining freedom of navigation and minimizing the potential for regional
instability. Due to its history and strategic location, the South China Sea is also subject to
a long-standing series of sovereignty and territorial disputes that have challenged the
regional order. Complicating the nature of the existing disputes has been the discovery of
hydrocarbon resources in the form of oil and natural gas. Competition for control over
these resources has driven regional claimants to take measures to control development of
potentially new “indigenous”1
hydrocarbon resources that can help sustain and expand
their economic development. While energy remains an important factor to Asian
economies that are primarily dependent on the sea as a corridor for trade in energy and
resources, other tertiary factors have given way to increased competition for control over
these disputed waters and there potential resources.
As competition in the South China Sea escalates, it has led scholars to focus on
the causes underlining the escalation of the disputes. In part, escalation has been fueled
by the discovery of hydrocarbon resources, the rise of nationalism and behavioral
uncertainty on behalf of regional claimants. The primary claimant, China, holds a U-
shaped line cover nearly the entirety of the South China Sea. The line is made up a
number of dashes that shifts in time from eleven in 1947, to nine in 1953 and now ten,
reflecting legal ambiguity in regard of the sources of the claim2
. Competing claimant
nations that include Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia adhere to international
1
Utilization of the term “indigenous” in this study refers directly to China’s perceived
desire to consider any material resource, especially hydrocarbon, as part of their domestic
oil and gas supply.
2
(Malik, Historical Fiction: China's South China Sea Claims, 2013)

norms, especially the Law of the Sea Convention (LOS)3
. The facilitation of lasting and
long-term measures towards dispute resolution remains elusive, and encounters between
primary claimants4
have recently become increasingly terse. This in part is due to a
common perception that Chinese behavior in the SCS is becoming increasingly assertive,
and whose umbrella claim to the SCS has managed to incite furor among rival claimants.
This perception of assertiveness has not been mitigated in part due to long standing
regional rivalries, but also due to uncertainty about China’s intentions in the region. At
this juncture, the focus of this paper is not to provide an in-depth study of the nature of
the dispute itself, but on assessing the behavior of the primary claimant. In light of
indiscernible Chinese behavior, the aim is to assess several primary determinants of
Chinese behavior; the intent being to unveil the ethos behind China’s claims and the
evolving nature of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.
At one level, China's assertiveness is inseparable from the transformation of East
Asia that is experiencing tremendous economic growth. Asia’s economic growth
measured by GDP will rise by 6.2% in 2014 and is predicted to rise by 6.4% in 2015.5
China has experienced a slight decline in its economic growth throughout this period,
transitioning from growth of 7.7% in 2013 to an expected growth of 7.4% in 2015.6
Despite this decline, China’s impressive economic growth averaging 10% since 1978 has
increased its importance and role in the region. To a certain extent, Asia’s economy is
highly interdependent and it is important to consider China’s role in driving the global
and regional economy. At the same time, scholars and policymakers question China’s
behavior in the region, which at times is consistent with its stated policies, but is
increasingly, diverging from its past policies of peaceful engagement and economic
cooperation towards more assertive and less consistent policies of engagement. A
3
Taiwan holds a similar claim to China, based on the line drawn up under the Chiang-
Kai-shek government in 1947; but because it is formally a Province of the PRC it is not
considered as an independent claimant. Indonesia has declared itself not a claimant under
the PRC’s U-Shape line since the line does not include Indonesia’s Natuna Islands.
However since early 2014 the country is facing the reality of China’s incremental claims
of the water surrounding these islands as its own territorial waters.
4
China, Vietnam and the Philippines
5
(Asian Development Bank, 2014)
6
ibid.

puzzling question is what role does China envisage for itself in regional politics in the
coming century and how does this manifest itself in the maritime realm.
In line with the above concern, this paper explores key dynamics that are affecting
China’s behavior in the South China Sea. While considering the implications of China’s
regional ambition through the lens of hegemonic power, the paper will not directly assess
China’s regional aims vis-à-vis discourses on great power behavior, be it hegemonic or
post-imperialist. Rather, it follows Ikenberry and Kupchan's idea of the leadership role as
a position in which a state uses diplomacy, cultural learning7
and a shared vision.8
Whether China’s stated goal to promote development and peace in cooperation with its
neighbors9
will be realized to this effect remain to be seen given the recent challenges
disputes on maritime boundaries in the South China Sea, about which General Fang
Fenghui10
stated
“I want to underscore, finally, that for the territory, which has passed down by our
ancestors into the hands of our generation, we cannot afford to lose an inch”. Though
recent Chinese behavior in the South China Sea would position China as a “coercive
hegemon” who is willing to use all means of power or influence, short of military
intervention, to achieve it’s stated or unstated objectives11
, this paper aims to reveal the
underlying factors driving said behavior, and to a limited extent assess if this behavior is
one of asserting regional hegemony through leadership or coercion.
7
The establishment of Confucian Institutes worldwide, in affiliation with the Chinese
Ministry of Education, whose mission statement is “Learning Chinese, Experiencing
Culture”, aims to expand towards a “harmonious world.”
http://www.chinesecio.com/index.php
8
(Destradi, 2010)
9
(Qingguo, 2006), statement by Jiang Zemin expressed at the 16th
national representative
congress of the CCP.
10
(Johnson, 2014)
11
(Destradi, 2010)

Research questions and methodology:
The Research Question:
1. What are the key determinants behind China’s envisaged leadership position in
the South China Sea?
2. What role does China’s perception in the area of its historical “legacy” and the
“century of humiliation” plays in its behavior in this area and the likely
consequences for its aspiration for a leadership role?
Research Methodology and Structure
This paper will draw primarily from secondary literature using a chronological,
cross-disciplinary approach that will look at prevailing articles in international relations,
history and cultural studies to attempt to delineate and provide substantive analysis of the
material and ideological factors. There are several areas in the main body where primary
sources will be utilized. In assessing China’s energy situation, information12
will be
drawn from multinational energy companies including Chinese National Oil companies,
energy information agencies (EIA, IEA), as well as government documents written in
both English and Chinese. The use of figures and maps depicting the claims in the South
China Sea will be drawn, when applicable, from internationally recognized sources,
except by necessity.13
The selection of sources of research for this paper are intended to
draw from multiple disciplines, but focus primarily on China, its situation as it pertains to
the discourses under discussion and in reference to normative international law as it
pertains to maritime law in the fields of sovereignty and territorial boundaries.
In the field of China studies, it is difficult to provide an entirely objective
perspective, and there are multiple instances where I may be unable to draw upon
12
Data, Figures, Maps, Charts, Projections.
13
For example, if the motive is to demonstrate China’s regional claim, Chinese sources
are a typically better resource for presenting the Chinese position on the South China Sea.

information that is entirely accurate.14
Potential bias that are to be expected can come
from academic journals, think tanks and media sources that contain objective statements
in favor of their respective nation, and I intend to assess the outlined question utilizing a
minimalist approach and will address potential disparities as the paper progresses. As
mentioned in the introduction, China’s stated policies do not always correlate with their
recorded behaviors. Whether in ascertaining particular foreign policy, energy policies or
the behavior of the CCP, recognition of the changing nature of China’s regional and
international behavior must be considered, and as such, any potential conclusions that are
made within this thesis are the opinion of this author, and due to the evolving nature of
Chinese policy, subject to change.
The primary discourse will be formulated under the assumption that China is
undergoing a transitional change in its regional relations caused by perceived insecurities
in two distinct areas. The first and primary area surrounds an assessment of China’s
material interests that will assess their energy situation and the evolution of their energy
policy in the South China Sea. While China holds significant interests in expanding
access to maritime resources, especially the continued development of Chinese fisheries
in the SCS, these resources play a considerably smaller role in determining existing
policy. The second area surrounds an assessment of China’s ideological drivers and will
include an assessment of historical implications of the “century of humiliation” and how
it plays a role in their perception of territory. In addition, the discussion will be centered
on the intersection of culture and history to ascertain causal linkages between the material
and ideological domains. One of the critical functions of this paper is to address the role
culture plays in determining Chinese behavior; by drawing from China’s notions on its
own “imperial legacy” and “middle kingdom” status the paper shows how ideas about the
material, ideological and cultural domains interact and contribute to the shaping of
Chinese policy in the SCS. This could provide a more adaptive understanding of the key
differences between its perceived and actual behavior.
14
Data, especially in the field of energy studies, is rarely conclusive, and the South China
Sea remains a vastly underexplored region due to the nature and history of the territorial
disputes.

Chapter 1 presents the boundaries of this research and the rationale underpinning
its orientation and how an approach with deals with the mutual interplay between the
objective and subjective domain, i.e. China’s energy demands and the construction of its
identity as the re-emergence of an ancient civilization may provide a better understanding
of China’s regional assertion and the implications for interpreting SCS disputes. Based on
a review of selected existing literature on the South China Sea and the rise of China the
second chapter will provide a concise assessment of existing approaches used to analyze
and interpret the related maritime disputes concerning especially energy and SLOCs. The
third chapter provides a snapshot of China’s energy situation and the debate on its role in
the South China Sea dispute. The fourth chapter aims to provide an understanding of
China’s maritime assertiveness vis-à-vis in the realm of history, culture and ideology.
This chapter will emphasize areas of contention where China has pursued unilateral
action in asserting their claim and the relationship to the research focus of this study. The
concluding chapter presents the findings of the two predominant discourses, behavioral
and energy that this author has identified as key determinants of Chinese behavior.
Beyond summarizing key findings, it will also offer some ideas on the prospects for
regional cooperation, conflict resolution and the leadership role China envisions for itself
in the South China Sea.

Chapter 2 Literature Review Popkin 12
II. The Rise of China and the Quest for a new approach in the South China Sea:
Insights from Existing Literature.
Renewed tensions in the South China Sea have ignited the interest of scholars and
policymakers alike in the past several years. In turn this has led to the formation of a
series of discourses and proposed solutions, which integrate cross-disciplinary insights
surrounding the role of energy, sovereignty, regional security mechanisms and the role of
individual claimants. This review of prevailing discourses on the SCS will first focus on
the dispute in international law and maritime disputes taking into consideration the claims
of China, Vietnam and the Philippines15
. The focus will then address current approaches
towards conflict resolution in the region. Within this area, emphasis will be placed on
factors that are believed to be inciting a rise in regional tensions, and address pertinent
gaps in understanding the motives of the largest claimant, China. Furthermore, existing
discourses on the SCS dispute have increasingly turned to a policy centric perspective
that provides a cursory glimpse at a larger problem, omitting critical understanding of
history, domestic politics, economics and cultural factors that may be driving the rise of
tensions in the SCS.
The primary debate under contention is the interpretation and application of the
rules of international law as it applies to maritime jurisdiction. To this extent, the United
Nations has held since its inception several conferences that led to the formation of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).16
UNCLOS addressed
existing gaps in international law, providing clarification over what a coastal nation could
claim, extending the EEZ17
to 12nm in addition to allowing states “sovereign” rights of
exploration and exploitation of maritime and sea-bed resources to up to 200 nm.
(Townsend-Gault, 1998) There is dearth of literature that discusses in particular the
nature of UNCLOS, and its applicability to existing disputes in the SCS, but herein the
discussion is not aimed at addressing the specific nature of claims in the SCS. It is
15
Noted Earlier, the “Primary” claimants to the South China Sea. These three parties
have the most pronounced claims and have engaged in skirmishes and/or minor conflicts
pertaining to their relative claim(s).
16
(Guoxing, 1998)(Hong, 2013)(Townsend-Gault, 1998)(Dean, 1960)
17
Also considered almost exclusive maritime jurisdiction.

necessary to discuss the history of the SCS dispute. While UNCLOS codified the notion
of a 12 nm EEZ, of the claimant nations, China, through its “Declaration on China’s
territorial sea” in 1958 claimed a 12nm EEZ; this declaration was separate from the 1958
Geneva Convention on LOS.18
China extended this declaration to cover the “islands of
the South China Sea” as part of its initial “nine-dash” claim first established by the
Nationalist Chinese government in 1947 and subsequently supported by the PRC in
1949.19
Concurrent claims were made by both Vietnam and the Philippines at different
times over control of geographic features.20
The Philippines, first claimed in 1951,
following the renunciation by Japan of its sovereignty in the SCS under the San Francisco
Treaty, but its first “official government claim” was made in 1971 and covered an
extensive, and overlapping portion of the Spratly Island, in direct contention with China’s
nine-dash claim.21
Following the San Francisco treaty, South Vietnam (Republic of
Vietnam) declared sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratley islands in 1956.22
North
Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) initially accepted China’s claim in 195823
,
but after 1975, when Vietnam was unified under the name “the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, the government asserted its own claim that extended its sovereignty and
territorial claims to both the Paracel and Spratly Islands, in contention with both China
and the Philippines.24
The nature of the disputes under international law have been contentious and there
is a wide debate over the applicability of UNCLOS to the SCS dispute, as both China and
Vietnam, also utilize historical claim(s) to the region.25
According to Ji Guoxing, China
has maintained “administrative control” over the island chains and can meet the
18
(Cheng, 1969)
19
(Hong, 2013)
20
Spratly, Paracel Island Chains are cited by most scholars and claimants.
21
(Nguyen, 2006)
22
The San Francisco Treaty signaled the official end of World War 2. In addition it was
intended on establishing the notion of institutional norms, a regional security
infrastructure and reconcile international law as it applied to territory. The “San
Francisco System,” is still criticized for its inability to reconcile historical animosities
that resulted from Japanese “imperialism” prior to the treaty.
23
South Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong. (Hong, 2013)
24
(Hong, 2013)(Nguyen, 2006)
25
(Cheng, 1969)

definition of “acquisition by discovery” under international law, though the author fails to
specify which international law.26
According to Nguyen, the codification of the LOS is
particularly challenging due to the overlapping nature of the claims and how UNCLOS
codifies the notion of both continental shelf and EEZ’s of claimant nations. At the same
time UNCLOS is impotent due to its political nature, and cannot “itself” be applied to
solve existing territorial disputes, due to what Scott specifies as “lack of binding
enforcement features”.27
At the same time, the International Tribunal on the Law of the
Seas (ITLS) has seen attempts at bringing a conclusion to the disputes through mediation,
with the Philippines seen trying to utilize the LOS vis-à-vis its overlapping claim with
China. The Chinese position, made clear in an August 2006 statutory declaration to the
UN Secretariat that “it would not accept any international court or arbitration in disputes
over sea delimitation, territorial disputes and military activities in the SCS.”28
Despite
the unwillingness of claimants to directly address and provide a resolution to these
disputes, there has been a lot of efforts made to establish means of conflict resolution and
establishing a binding code of conduct for behavior of claimants in the SCS. The
motivation behind the disputes and reaction also calls into question the behavior of the
region’s largest nation, and claimant, China, whose economic and military growth
parallels their growing position in international and regional politics. At the time, the
emphasis by scholars is on the importance of UNCLOS and international law to the
dispute, and how “China” must be willing to work within its contexts to resolve the long-
standing disputes. This belies that China is the only party to the dispute, and that the
action(s) of others, be them claimants or nations with a pronounced interest in
maintaining either international law, or freedom of navigation, but for the purposes of
this paper, the majority of literature that discusses the South China Sea dispute as it
pertains to United States policy or its objectives in the Asia-Pacific, are omitted.
Existing discourses on conflict resolution, cooperation and regionalism in the SCS
are focused in several areas. The regionalism discourse has primarily focused on the role
26
(Guoxing, 1998)
27
(Scott, 2012)
28
ibid.

of ASEAN29
, and its perception as a valid regional mechanism that could potentially be
used to reduce or solve existing tensions in the SCS30
. To this extent, there are two
primary debates within the regionalism discourse. The first debate centers on
establishing an actual “binding” code of conduct that would build upon the 2002 ASEAN
Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea31
that would mitigate potential
conflicts in the SCS. This can also be perceived as a normative view, in that economic
integration and willing cooperation through engagement is critical in dealing with China
and obtaining a lasting solution to the SCS dispute. The other debate should be viewed
as transitioning ASEAN into a security community along the lines of NATO, in which
collective defense and cooperation along those lines could subsequently strengthen ties
between China and its rival claimants. A problem with both approaches is that while
ASEAN nations and China are cognizant of the importance of economic cooperation,
there is a long history of animosity, mistrust and a growing level of nationalism amongst
claimant nations. Furthermore, reference to the 2002 Code of Conduct, often fails to
recognize that it has yet to be implemented32
, and that while there is a renewed effort to
implement a “revised COC”, it does not resolve the dispute. At the same time, a security
community requires trust and commonality in governance, for which Asian nations share
little similarity between each other.
In a similar discourse on regionalism and the potential for cooperation in the SCS, there
exist several tracks that distinguish between the economic and political parallels in the
regional power relationship. Expounding on the potential for regional security-political
forums, such as the ASEAN regional forum (ARF) or its annual defense ministerial
meeting (ADMM), debate has focused on the cultural and ideological norms necessary to
incite cooperation.33
In this context, China and non-claimant34
ASEAN nations have at
29
Association of South East Asian Nations. Formed in 1967, Expanded in the 1990’s to
include a Plus Three Grouping that included China, Japan and South Korea.
30
(Chakraborti, 2012)
31
See http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-
conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea
32
see http://news.usni.org/2012/07/18/code-conduct-south-china-sea-undermined-asean-
disarray
33
(Acharya, 2007)(Mansfield & Solingen, 2010)

times viewed the SCS as being a disruptive issue, and secondary to issues of economic
importance. Acharya goes as far as stating that he does believe that culture can be
viewed as an explanation or cause for the broad failure to establish a security community
in Asia.35
In this area, Acharya posits that the informal nature of interpersonal
relationships are “unstructured, with no clear format for decision-making or
implementation” that are pre-requisites for a collective security community.36
One of the critical functions of this paper is to address the role culture plays in
determining Chinese behavior; by drawing from China’s notions on its own “imperial
legacy” and “middle kingdom” status could provide a more adaptive understanding of the
key differences between its perceived and actual behavior. The emphasis in the policy
debate surrounding the SCS and its role in the regional and global economy is placed on
the on behavioral, policy and economic drivers of claimant nations. This debate is
inclusive of the discovery and role of hydrocarbon resources, maritime fisheries, freedom
of navigation and the risk of conflict over ensuring access to these rights. In the field of
energy security and related discourses on hydrocarbon exploration/exploitation, the
emphasis has recently focused primarily in three areas. The first is China’s domestic
energy issue, which is its fast-growing demand for oil and natural gas. The second is the
role the SCS plays in the transport of energy, not just to China, but also to Asia, which is
heavily reliant on imported energy supplies for its economic growth and success. The
third and less prevalent discourse is on existing and potential supplies of oil and natural
gas in contested, and uncontested areas of the SCS. Within the first discourse, scholars37
have found sufficient common ground in their approach that centers around questions on
China’s potential behavioral changes due to its perception of what is “energy security”, in
addition to China’s fear on depending on other nations for its supply needs. This
discourse covers a broad expanse that demonstrates a reticence within the “Chinese
Energy Community” that can be realized through either China’s military expansion, or its
34
Cambodia is a notable example. See http://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/south-
china-sea-dispute-off-asean-summit-agenda-609/
35
(Acharya, 1999)
36
(Acharya, 1999) p. 58
(Zhang, 2009)37
(Downs, 2004)(Buszynski, 2012)(Buszynski & Sazlan, 2007) (Kennedy,
2010) (Hong, 2013)

wave of “oil diplomacy” that has witnessed the rising size and strength of China’s
NOC’s, and how they adapt and shift their policies to adapt to functioning within the
international energy market. There has been limited debate on the role of NOC’s in
China, and potential correlation(s) between their internationalization and policy
convergence with international oil companies, and their continuing dependency role
within China. There is significant disagreement in this area, with many believing that the
internationalization of China’s NOC’s has led to a higher degree of independence from
the CCP and governmental control, yet at the same time, they are viewed suspiciously
because they are still state-owned enterprises. There is relatively sparse follow up
research into the extent of their relationship vis-à-vis China’s energy security policies,
and this in a nexus pertinent within the SCS, where I intend to look. This author holds
that there is a stronger than believed correlation between China’s “oil diplomacy”,
NOC’s and the role the CCP plays in determining their external behavior. Along these
same lines, policymakers have relied excessively on the reports of the EIA, IEA and
USGS surveys in determining potential hydrocarbon deposits in contested areas of the
SCS, for which estimates made by Chinese scholars and agencies are often significantly
higher than those of international energy agencies. The perceived failure to consider that
Chinese estimates could be the sole estimates trusted by China’s NOC’s or its recent
exploration/exploitation efforts in the SCS are a cause for concern.
The post-world war II period has given way to a shifting understanding of where a
nation can exercise its sovereignty. Furthermore, the “traditional” definition of a states’
boundary under the “Westphalian” system has become amorphous and encourages
nations to extend their boundaries into the maritime domain. The locus of the SCS
dispute is driven by questions of how and where a nation, in this case China, can
“legally” extend their claim in its near seas. There is no conclusive “node” or theory
behind Chinas’ behavior, and this paper clearly aims to discern potential “nodes” that are
potential driving forces in the South China Sea dispute. In the proceeding sections, the
paper will look at three areas under consideration; the areas of concentration being
energy, culture and history.

Chapter 3 Energy Security Popkin 18
III. Energy Security and the South China Sea: Internal Doubt and External Debate.
On May 2nd
, 2014, CNOOC deployed the Haiyang Shiyou oil drilling and
exploration rig to a contested area of water within Vietnam’s coastal zone. This
development incited a maelstrom of condemnation, from both Vietnam and the
International community. That this action started a wave of speculation over China’s
energy policy in the SCS is not surprising, but it reveals several of the primary challenges
facing China in addressing its energy needs vis-à-vis its SCS policies.
This chapter provides an assessment of China’s energy dilemma and how it
affects their policy in the South China Sea, focusing on three areas affecting Chinese
energy policy. A snapshot of China’s energy production-consumption situation is
presented showing and how potential hydrocarbon resources in the SCS may be
influencing a shift of China’s behavior and the responses of claimant states. This is
followed by an assessment of China’s international energy policy and how growing
demand for energy is driving the behavior of key actors in the energy sector, i.e. China’s
NOCs, and how this can become counterproductive, i.e. enhancing the suspicion of
neighbors and creating the justification for the formation of a regional security alliance
which in turn can enhance China’s insecurity in the region. Finally, this section will
provide an analysis of the South China’s Seas role in China’s energy policy and discern
their intentions for energy exploration and development in contested areas of the SCS.
China’s Energy Dilemma: Why is China stirring the pot in the South China Sea?
Before 1994, China was primarily an exporter of oil due in part to China’s
historical dependence on coal and the small role of oil in its domestic economy. Fast-
forward to today and China is the world’s second largest consumer of oil, and the largest
consumer of energy.38
As of 2011, oil and natural gas made up approximately 18% and
4% of China’s total energy consumption. Despite the recent global recession that
reduced consumption of non-renewable energy in Europe and the United States, China
saw a relative burgeoning in its consumer demand. Continued economic growth will
38
Energy Information Administration, China, Report, pp. 1
Figure 1 Consumption-Production Gap

continue to fuel a significant increase in Chinese demand for oil and natural gas for the
foreseeable future. The challenge exerting itself on China is how to meet the growing
demand for oil.
As shown in Figure 1, China’s domestic oil production has been unable to keep
up with China’s growing demand for energy. In 2010, China domestically produced
approximately 4.1 mbd of oil, yet it imported over 5 mbd, which accounts for over half of
their total demand for oil.39
Complicating this is the declining production of on-shore oil
production40
in China’s primary oilfields41
. Offshore exploration and production of oil is
seen as one of the few areas that are seeing a rise in production.42
While the bulk of this
growth is northeast China, several recent discoveries have been made of “small-medium”
39
(IEA, 2012)
40
The introduction of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) mechanisms has helped sustain but
not boost existing field production.
41
(Hook, Xu, Xiongqi, & Aleklett, 2010)
42
(EIA, 2014)

sized fields in the SCS. Relatively new technological breakthroughs in oil and gas
exploration could sustain or increase domestic on-shore production of oil in China, yet
the SCS and offshore oil/gas development provides a lucrative and relatively untapped
frontier for increasing domestic production.
In the SCS, estimates of potential hydrocarbon resources are diverse. The EIA
estimates that the SCS holds 11 BBL of oil, the USGS estimates up to 5 BBL of oil,
whereas CNOOC estimates up to 125 BBL of oil. In the area of natural gas, the EIA
estimates up to 190 TCF, whereas CNOOC estimates the SCS possesses up to 500 TCF.43
There is little rationale for the diversity in estimated hydrocarbon resources, but the
nature of the maritime disputes in the SCS have so far prevented significant exploration
or development efforts, and until the events of May 2nd
, there has been no significant
effort made directly by CNOOC to potentially explore or develop additional contested
oil/gas fields.44
At the same time, it is apparent that China is taking a more proactive role
in determining the potential for energy in the SCS and the Chinese government has
repeatedly stated that the placement of the rig is routine, legitimate and exploration
efforts along these lines have been ongoing for a while.45
As China’s domestic supply constraints dwindle, dependence on imported oil46
is
increasing and is projected to grow substantially over the coming years. This in turn has
given rise to concerns in Beijing over perceived vulnerability to supply disruptions, price
fluctuations and a lasting concern that a country such as the United States or even India
could block or disrupt the delivery of oil, potentially crippling China’s economy.47
In
this area concern is centered on the role of the SCS and the Straits of Malacca to China’s
energy security as these areas represent an area of insecurity for Beijing.
43
(EIA, 2013)(Global Security, 1998)(EMECS, 2001)
44
(Manicom, 2014)
45
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t11551
54.shtml
46
China is currently able to supply approximately 90% of NG demand from domestic
fields.
47
(Kennedy, 2010)

Going Global: Evolution of China’s International Energy Policy
China’s shift to becoming a major importer of energy has had a tremendous effect
on international energy markets. It has also had a significant impact on how China’s
growing demand for oil has forced China and its NOCs to pursue a more proactive
“going abroad” policy in order to diversify and address Beijing’s longstanding concerns
of assuring energy access that is critical in sustaining China’s economic growth. In
reality, there are three primary areas under review. The first is centered on the role
China’s NOCs play in the international energy market, and provide a synopsis of how
these actions signify the importance of energy to China. This will focus on the oil sectors
investments in oil production and exploration efforts abroad. The second is to assess how
China’s perceived energy supply insecurities are driving it to pursue broad diversification
of how it receives its oil. This is a critical area as approximately 77% of China’s oil is
imported via the Straits of Malacca and the SCS.48
The third area intends to focus on the
role NOC’s have played in shifting China’s understanding of energy security and the
relationship between the two.
China’s big three oil companies (CNPC, Sinopec, CNOOC) began in the early
1990’s, a period of time when Chinese energy policy was focused on internal self-
sufficiency, to invest in international oil production. In part this was due to the declining
production of “indigenous” oil fields, but growing domestic demand for oil also played a
role.49
In turn, Chinese leadership advocated for a new “going abroad” policy50
that
pushed China’s NOCs’ into investing in oil exploration and production abroad.51
In turn,
these companies have gone on a veritable buying spree. Between 2002-2010, China’s
NOC’s have spent approximately $65 billion (USD) acquiring oil and gas shares and
approximately $77 billion (USD) on longer term supply contracts.52
These contract(s) are
viewed as longer-term “loans” in exchange for oil/gas, but also represent a fundamental
shift in energy policy for China. This shift, witnessed in the immediate aftermath of the
48
(Sinton & Jiang, 2011)
49
(Xu, 2007)
50
ibid.
51
Equity Oil: the purchase of a share or interest in a developed or developing oil field.
52

2008 global financial crisis gave way to what Zhang53
coins a “Go Abroad and Buy”
policy. It led to the formation in 2010 of a National Energy Commission54
that positions
energy security as a principle national security interest, witnessed by its leadership by
then Premier Wen Jiabao. It is no surprise that energy security is important to China, but
the global community is concerned over the willingness of China to sign massive oil and
gas contracts, and the ramifications that may have for their own energy security.55
China’s NOCs’ are some of the largest oil companies in the world, with CNPC the fourth
largest energy company56
, and their participation in global energy markets has yielded
significant results. China is continuing to expand both investment in and procurement of
oil and gas supplies as witnessed by the recent 30-year, $400 billion (USD) deal signed
with Russia.57
In addition, NOC’s have continued to invest significantly in future
projects, providing funding and technology that will enable them to attain access to
additional sources of oil. Today, China’s NOC’s are operating in 3158
countries with
their production of equity oil accounting for 2.0 mbd in 2012 and this is expected to grow
in the coming years.59
It would be a stretch to say that overseas production of equity oil
translates into increased “energy security” for China and Beijing continues to emphasize
the need for increased domestic production of oil and gas, whether through the adoption
of more advanced extraction and production technology or by the development of
realized offshore production.
The evolving geopolitical landscape in light of unrest in Africa and the Middle
East, particularly in Libya, Iraq and Sudan, are of concern. This is due to China’s heavy
reliance on these regions for oil imports, of which China receives approximately 46% of
its oil from the Middle East, and up to 40% from Africa and Latin America.60
The 2011
unrest in Libya, and the current unrest in Iraq and Syria have incited a measured level of
53
(Jian, 2011) p.6
54
(Yuan Cai, 2010)
55
(Jian, 2011)
56
EIA, IEA.
57
(Wan & Hauslohner, 2014)
58
(Lee, 2012)
59
(IEA, 2012)
60
(EIA, 2014)

apprehension over the potential for a broader conflict in the Middle East that could
threaten their access to Middle Eastern oil. Despite this, China has continued to develop
new exploration and production sources in both nations, and China’s NOCs’ were among
the first companies to sign production agreements with the new Iraqi government in 2008
and have made significant investments in oil production in Libya, Syria and Sudan over
the past two decades.61
Chinese energy policy is increasingly unconcerned about the
potential ramifications of its engagement with “rogue states”, but this strategy, while
bolstering China’s “access” to additional oil supplies, also poses a political risk.
Continued investment in these states bolsters the irresponsible stakeholder discourse that
is affecting China’s perception, while also having the potential to backfire. Chinese
investments in Iraq, Syria and Iran have been substantial, and recent unrest and potential
formation of a “caliphate” coupled with the potential formation of a sectarian conflict, are
increasing Beijing’s uncertainty about disruptions to their ability to access to Middle
Eastern oil. Furthermore, while conflicts in the regions have had a trivial affect on global
oil production so far, potential disruptions are more likely to affect Beijing than the
United States, due to their heavy investments in oil-related development in these
countries.62
Continued investment in equity oil and pursuit of addition supplies has provided a
modicum of relief for Beijing, yet Beijing still suffers from what Christina Lin coins a
distinct “Malacca Dilemma”, in that the majority of China’s energy (~80%) is transited
via the Malacca strait.63
The Straits of Malacca provide a linkage between the Indian
Ocean and the South China Seas that at its narrowest point is less than 3 km wide and is
critical to China and Asia’s energy security, in addition to being an important transport
corridor for global trade. This poses a “dilemma” for China in that potential blockages
would have a significant impact on China’s economy and energy supply., Beijing
maintains a trepidation-insecurity complex as it believes that dependence on the Malacca
strait makes it tacitly susceptible to containment by rival powers64
,65
Beijing’s stance on
61
(Kan & Yan, 2012)
62
(Al Jazeera, 2014)
63
(Lin, 2011) p. 4
64
United States, India, Japan.

its sovereignty over the South China Sea and supporting an activist energy-supply
diversification strategy is in part due to this concern.
The development of transnational pipelines from Russia, Central and Southeast
Asia aim to diversify how China receives its energy supplies. Of note is the
establishment of pipelines from Central Asia that have highlighted China’s rapidly
increased investment and participation in oil exploration, production and delivery in
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia. In developing pipelines and production capacity
in these regions, China is able to “assert” control over production and delivery of oil and
gas that provides a modicum of stability for its central planners. Development of a
Myanmar pipeline to bypass the Malacca Strait, in addition to other pipeline development
is expected to alleviate but not erase China’s dependence on the strait for the majority of
their imports.66
In this area, these pipelines, if they even reach their promised capacity,
would be able to transit under 30% of China’s oil imports.67
Pursuing such development
has required a balance of negotiation between official diplomacy vis-à-vis the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and high-level talks between leaders in addition to the direct
participation of the NOCs. This level of collusion or “oil” diplomacy in this author’s
opinion shows the strength of the ties between the CCP and NOCs, and while NOCs
demonstrate a certain level of independence in International energy markets, they are still
SOEs. As such, China’s NOCs demonstrate a certain level of mercantilist attitude both in
the SCS and in how they use multiple levels of negotiation to meet their production goals.
Prior to the global financial crisis, China’s NOCs were able to set production goals based
on their own internal growth strategies, but recently their production goals are lining up
directly with Beijing’s stated objectives of increasingly production in the South China
Sea. This also suggests that the recent reshuffling of their role in China’s energy security
policy is increasing and is representative of China’s growing emphasis on self-assurance,
65
(Kennedy, 2010)
66
67
(Shaofeng, 2011)

unilateralism and the rise of national interests in Chinese policy, especially in the field of
energy.68
The South China Sea in China’s Energy Policy: An Analysis
In recently years, the geostrategic importance of the SCS to China mentioned
earlier has become more acute, given that China’s domestic onshore production of oil has
been in a state of decline. Thus offshore oil and gas production is one of the few, and
potentially the largest areas where China can mitigate its high-level of dependence on
foreign oil. One of the key actors in this area of focus is CNOOC. Though the third
largest of China’s NOCs’, it is the most aggressive69
and most directly involved70
in
offshore oil and gas development and production. There is some merit to the hypothesis
that CNOOC in particular, in addition to other NOCs’, maintains a significant level of
influence in the CCP and on China’s foreign policy.71
CNOOC, in particular, has
invested heavily in international collaborative projects that have enabled it to expand its
technological capabilities specifically in the area of offshore exploration and
production.72
Whereas China used to rely almost exclusively on the deep-water expertise
of IOC’s in oil exploration and production efforts in China’s near waters; the introduction
of an oil rig in contested waters of the SCS merely portends the extent to which CNOOC
has focused on deep-water exploration and production capabilities.73
Their efforts have
ranged from developing more advanced seismic exploration technology to advanced
offshore exploration for oil and gas. These capabilities are enabling them to push further
into contested and uncontested waters in the SCS.
There are several reasons that should concern China's neighbors regarding
CNOOC. First, CNOOC's primarily tasked with offshore oil and gas technology and
68
(Downs & Meidan, Business and Politics in China: The Oil Executive Reshuffle of
2011, 2012)
69
70
CNPC subsidiary PetroChina holds interests in the very southern areas of the SCS.
(Downs, Business and Politics in the South China Sea: Explaining HYSY 981's Foray
into Disputed Water, 2014)
71
(Downs & Meidan, Business and Politics in China: The Oil Executive Reshuffle of
2011, 2012)
72
(Du, 2014)
73
(Hall, 2014)

development. Second, one needs only to look at the history behind the oil platform
currently in place in contested waters of the SCS. This platform is the direct result of
China 863 program that was launched in 1986; according to Erica Downs, CNOOC
chairman Wang Yilin characterized it as a “mobile national territory” and a “strategic
weapon.”74
The statement alludes to the notion that all operations in the SCS are
predominately policy/dispute driven; in addition CNOOC has a strong economic
incentive to maximize its economic profits as well. The development of deep-water
drilling technology would enable it to bolster its own production as well. Furthermore,
Beijing has direct control over NOCs operations in contested waters75
, and as Downs
speculates, provided the “blessing” enabling the placement and operation of the rig in the
disputed waters.76
Third, CNOOC is continuing to invest heavily in the production and
deployment of additional oil platforms in the SCS.77
CNOOC has gone so far as to target
daily production of offshore oil/gas at 120 million tons by the end of 2020, this roughly
translates into ~2 mbd of oil-equivalent offshore production.78
This a rather ambitious
goal considering that the majority of their existing production is in non-contested waters
and would inherently require production in contested waters in the SCS. China vis-à-vis
CNOOC and its NOCs’ is continuing development of additional deep-water offshore
platforms, and when taking into consideration the fact that they have substantial existing
production in non-contested areas in their near seas79
, one would assume that they are
destined for “new” projects in undeveloped areas. In this context, there is sparse
evidence to indicate that CNOOC or other NOCs have production intentions in disputed
areas of the East China Sea, where there is believed to be substantial oil and natural gas
74
(Downs, Business and Politics in the South China Sea: Explaining HYSY 981's Foray
into Disputed Water, 2014)
75
In the 1990’s and early 2000’s, Beijing actively prohibited NOCs from operating in
contested waters.
76
ibid.
77
(Manicom, 2014) (Rajagopalan & Zhu, 2014)
78
(Testing CNOOC's Deepwater Credentials, 2012)(Manicom, 2014)
79
Bohai Bay/Shengli Field, Pearl River Basin. (EIA, 2014)

deposits, however there is clear evidence80
that CNOOC/NOCs want to operate and
increase production in the SCS.81
Ascertaining why energy development in the South China Sea may be more likely
than in the East China Sea is a challenging proposition. Returning to the discourse on
how one should view their behavior vis-à-vis the notion of regional hegemony and threat
perception, China’s apprehension-trepidation syndrome is more applicable in areas where
China recognizes the danger of potential engagements with more capable states.82
In the
context of the broader dispute over control of resources in the SCS, China is facing a
hesitant ASEAN and nations with limited national defense capabilities. Furthermore,
China has shown that it is willing to engage ASEAN and at times has been able to disrupt
any potential coalition against its claims in the SCS.83
The evolution of China’s energy
policy from one of peaceful engagement, learning and participation within the
international energy market has increasingly moved towards becoming one of “creeping”
assertiveness. Whether this is demonstrated by CNOOC’s exploratory contracts awarded
to foreign IOCs or involvement by China in preventing similar contracts or exploratory
activities by Vietnam or the Philippines in contested waters, is a relatively mute point.84
It
can be said that energy is certainly not the sole rationale for Chinese interests in the SCS.
As will be discussed in the proceeding chapter, rising nationalism in China and China’s
desire for economic and territorial security play a factor as well.
The South China Sea holds far greater importance to China when considering that
it is responsible for channeling the majority of China’s energy imports through SLOCs.
This factor may outweigh even the potential for energy within contested waters. As
mentioned earlier, China attempts to circumvent the Straits of Malacca is one part of their
attempts to move from reliance on the sea for the transport of oil. The SCS also plays a
pivotal role in China’s recent efforts pushing the establishment of a new “maritime silk
80
(Hall, 2014) (Downs, Business and Politics in the South China Sea: Explaining HYSY
981's Foray into Disputed Water, 2014)
81
(IEA, 2012)
82
(Ramirez, 2014)
83
(Symonds, 2012)
84
(Buszynski, The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims and U.S.-China Strategic
Rivalry, 2012)

road” and revival of the historical Silk Road. Evocative of its historical significance,
China envisions this new road through a variety of lens. Within this chapter, emphasis
will reflect its role on China’s broader energy strategy in Central Asia, the Middle East.
Along the same line, the new “maritime” Silk Road is envisaged as a series of
partnerships built upon the Shanghai Cooperation Organization85
, a quasi security-
economic intergovernmental organization.86
The context behind China’s supply-side
diversification87
strategy is part of a broader hedge against instability in the Middle East
and China’s own perceived insecurity regarding the Straits of Malacca. This perception
has been exacerbated by China’s perception of its own encirclement by the United States
vis-à-vis its own “pivot” to Asia and its involvement in the Middle East. As analyst
Christina Lin puts it, China strategy resembles a “string of pearls.”88
From providing
China’s military with port access in strategic locations in the Indian Ocean to the
development of new facilities89
across primary SLOCS that connect Africa and the
Middle East to China, the strategy aims to bolster their security and provide assurances
against the risk of maritime embargoes or realized encirclement. In this area, the revival
of the Silk Road carries both contemporary and historical contexts. The proceeding
chapter will touch on how this strategy dually reflects China’s self-perception and the
role history and culture play in it.
This chapter provided a snapshot of the broader energy narrative and its role in
determining Chinese policy. Having established that China does indeed have an energy
dilemma, it can be argued that their behavior in the South China Sea is derived in part by
a pressing need for oil and natural gas. The evolution of China’s international energy
policy has yielded significant results for China, from obtaining additional routes for the
transportation of energy to acquiring new supplies. It has also raised doubts, both
85
(Sznajder, 2006)
86
It consists of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
Observer nations are Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan.
87
Pipeline and Overland Transit of Oil/Energy/Trade.
88
(Lin, 2011)
89
Additional Oil Platforms, landing strip in the Woody Islands and upgraded military
facilities in Hainan. With the exception of Hainan, these new “facilities” fall within
contested areas of the SCS.

internally and externally. The international community at times has been very
apprehensive over NOCs “buying sprees” and the risk they may pose to their own energy
interests, but in this area, there is noticeable separation of NOCs internationalization from
that of the CCP objectives; in this area they have functioned in alignment with the
international energy market. China’s “internal insecurities” have also resulted in
international apprehension as to their derived behavior, however in this area there is
distinguishable collusion between the objectives of the CCP and their NOCs. In
considering China’s “Malacca dilemma” or their planned development of offshore
hydrocarbon resources in the South China there is evidence of China’s strategic goals
aligning with those of CNOOC or other NOCs and evidence that the development or
placement of oil platforms in contested waters can only be done at the behest of Beijing.
In the words of Christina Lin, Beijing’s deeper involvement in “energy security” is “too
important to be left to market forces alone”.90
This belief adequately describes the
importance of energy security to Beijing and this chapter positioned the role of energy
security in the context of the South China Sea.
90
(Lin, 2011) pp. xv

Chapter 4 History and Culture Popkin 30
IV. Understanding China’s Maritime Assertiveness in the South China Sea: The
Century of Humiliation and the Reclaiming of China’s Civilizational Standing.
This chapter provides a perspective on the relationship between the subjective and
objective realms that may help explain China's behavior in the SCS beyond the demand
for energy. China’s fear of being encircled by Western powers, the US, Great Britain,
France as well as Russia, though subjective, has a clear role in promoting national unity
and determination to no longer allow its territory and cultural standing to be subject to
insult and humiliation at the hands of western imperialism and aggression. Mao Zedong
coined this as the “Century of Humiliation” upon the founding of the Chinese Communist
Party in 1949, in the immediate aftermath of a wave of Japanese aggression. By assessing
the significance of the “century of humiliation” and how it resonates within Chinese
leadership and culture of governance, the chapter makes a connection between China's
maritime claims and rising nationalist sentiment that may be affecting Chinese policy and
perceptions in the South China Sea. Section 1 highlights key aspects of China’s
perception of its own history and the notion of the Chinese “Civilizational-State” within
the context of the “century of humiliation.” This also focuses on the notion of “culture”
in the creation of a national identity, or what it means to be “Chinese” in the broader
narrative of “civilization” and “humiliation”, highlighting the key subjective factors that
have driven policy formation, perception(s) on national identity, hegemony and
sovereignty in the South China Sea. Section 2 explores the intersection of history, culture
and insecurity as it pertains to the South China Sea, and discusses China’s demonstrated
behavior in the maritime domain in this part of the world and how its national
“insecurities” have and continue to pose a major challenge to its neighbors. In this
context, Chinese behavior should be viewed as both reactive and proactive in asserting a
uniquely conceived view on hegemony, in which Chinese “assertiveness” is distinctly
different from western “imperialism” despite the apparent similarities.

The Century of Humiliation, Chinese Culture and the Civilizational-State.
In order to understand the effect of the “century of humiliation” discourse within
the Chinese psyche, we must first look at the historical and contemporary understanding
of the Chinese “civilization-state”. This discourse accounts for the long history of
Chinese civilization in the context of perceived cultural and material superiority
throughout the world that dates back to Imperial China. Chinese thought has long
centered on the “middle kingdom” as a notion that depicts Chinese “exceptionalism”.91
The notion of Tianxia or “all under heaven” was emboldened by Imperial China’s tribute
and periphery “system” in which China92
is positioned as the lone kingdom tasked with
protecting its culture and friendly relations with neighboring nations considered to be
inferior in civilizational terms but pacifiable through benevolent rule.93
The notion of a
nation-state versus civilization in this context measures the durability and difference that
characterizes Chinese self-perception of their lasting legacy as a civilization and not a
“country or nation”, be it their sense of exceptionalism or centralism.94
From the
perspective of the CCP this notion of civilization when intertwined with the national
consciousness produces a notable differentiation of what it means to be Chinese and
presents a different school of thought from the Westphalian system of a nation-state.
Accordingly this psyche builds upon the historical sense that Ancient China was
organized around a system that predated Westphalia and had its own institutional norms
that were able to define territorial boundaries and had an established system of law.95
As
Zhang explains, Pax Sinica has come to define the identity of the “Chinese” civilization
as possessing “hegemonic beliefs in the moral purpose of the word,”96
that is embodied in
a Confucian sense of hierarchical order that positioned China as the center of a
civilization, and not just an empire/nation-state. Rather than “cutthroat competition,
91
(Zhang F. , 2013)
92
China, as a title, is a modern-day construct, whereas during its long history, what is
now China witnessed multiple “dynastic” periods of control.
93
(Rozman, 2012)
94
(Wei-Ming, 1991)
95
Some Chinese scholars have contended that the norms of Li or rituals, in Ancient
China, are an equal measure to present-day international law. (Zhang Y. , 2001)
96
ibid. pp. 56

military strength and expansionism” that characterized the western system97
, Pax Sinica
was an institutionalized tribute system in which peripheral, inferior cultures paid tribute
to China in return for protection, by and through such practices further expanded the
historical belief in Chinese superiority.98
Yet, from the vantage point of ancient China
being the sole civilization in the world, Pax Sinica embodied the inseparability of both
notions: innate superiority and invulnerability. This also set the conceptualized mythos
of what Chinese civilization was, and henceforth the period of history of defeat by
Western powers came to be referred to by the CCP as the “century of humiliation.”
Accordingly, the humiliation discourse is multi-faceted; there is the historical
underpinning that resonates in China’s national psyche and on the other hand there is the
strategic-political that has been used by the CCP in its official narrative. In a sense, the
First Opium War (1839-1842) represents its’ beginning, and it came to a conclusion with
the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. During this period,
“western” nations99
through the use of force and coercive negotiation100
forced China into
ceding large swaths of “peripheral territory101
” including Hong Kong and Taiwan to the
“imperial aggressors.” Subsequently, this period was also rife with internal collapse
dominated by a series of rebellions and uprisings in protest against the foreign
presence.102
Further reductions in Chinese territory occurred due to independence
movements in Tibet, Mongolia and Xinjiang during the early 20th
century.103
This period
that gave rise to the fall of Imperial China, and the end of Sino-Centrism left China104
with a growing sense of vulnerability and weakness. Consequently, China also lost to
Japan in the first Sino-Japan war in 1895, what was believed to be a “shameful” and
97
(Wang, 2012)
98
(Zhang Y. , 2001)
99
Britain, France, United States, Russia and Germany.
100
Aptly coined “gunboat diplomacy”; this terminology is attributed in part to actions by
the British in the 1st
Opium War, in Canton, what is now modern day Guangzhou.
101
Coastal Port Cities such as Qingdao, Canton, etc. were also ceded to foreign control.
102
(Kaufman, 2010)
103
(Kaufman, Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission on China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy, 2011)
104
(Zhang F. , 2013)

“humiliating” defeat at the hands of a perceived “inferior” nation.105
There should be no
denial that the historical events that predated the formation of the People’s Republic of
China occurred, but as will subsequently discussed, is the central role that these events
play in understanding the broader “century of humiliation” narrative. This narrative may
be fundamental in explaining and understanding the role nationalism and insecurity plays
in present-day Chinese behavior.
Contemporary understanding of Chinese culture paints a complimentary picture
on China’s perception and creation of self. As mentioned before, the notion of Sino-
Centrism or Pax Sinica is also built upon the achievements Chinese “civilization” has
contributed to the world and stretches to include “majestic” achievements in the fields of
science, technology, economic, military and culture.106
At the height of “Imperial
China”, the notion of benevolent pacifism107
is continually attributed to the Confucian
value system. This system, as argued by Chinese scholars, places emphasis on the idea
that Confucianism “suppresses the assertion of individualism and promotes the
harmonious coexistence of differences and is thus tolerant of other cultures.”108
Yet,
being “Chinese” was a unique construct of self-identity and semi-hypocritical. It was
hypocritical in the sense that Chinese viewed themselves as cultured and civilized,
surrounded by uncivilized barbarians that “needed” Chinese benevolence to survive, and
thrive.109
The most radical manifestation of Chinese culture could be viewed as their
perception of territory, and the broader narrative that accompanies it. The
“decentralizing” humiliation by the west “took” from China, not just Hong Kong, and
Taiwan, but also Burma, Vietnam, Thailand. In essence, it affected China’s periphery to
105
Side note: The Treaty of Shimonoseki is considered to be a pivotal historical
underpinning of the East China Sea dispute between China and Japan over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Chains.
106
(Yahuda, China's Foreign Relations: The Long March, Future Uncertain, 2009)
107
(Zhang F. , 2013)
108
ibid. pp. 313
109
(Wei-Ming, 1991)

an extent that vis-à-vis the “century of humiliation” and contemporary Chinese foreign
policy discourses, is manifesting itself in Chinese behavior in the SCS.110
The “century of humiliation” discourse in the context of the present-day CCP
should be viewed as underlying driver behind party ideology, nationalism and identity.111
In the ideological sense, Mao sought to revolutionize, reform and change the mentality of
China and sought a “return” to great power status. The CCP in this sense instilled into
the system of historical, cultural and “patriotic” education that China was entitled to great
power status solely on the basis of its civilizational history and that the west “must”
recognize and recompense for the humiliation it imposed on China through the years
preceding the rise of a “triumphalist” China.112
Nationalism and humiliation in this
context have been “constructed” socially and ideologically, via “patriotic education that
builds upon the past.”113
The most interesting aspect(s) of CCP ideology in this area is
the differing periods and different focuses on the past. As a reader, you might expect
notions of being a “victim” of the west to be a construct of the Mao years114
, when Mao,
according to Zheng, emphasized a “victor” narrative, but China as the victim is a post-
cold war construct.115
In fact, under Mao’s leadership the focus of the broader discourse
was on how the CCP defeated “western” imperialism and Mao’s belief that China was at
the center116
of anti-western, anti-imperialistic “revolution.117
” Mao strongly believed
that as part of its anti-imperialist stance, that the need to cleanse China of its humiliating
past was the CCPs’ “raison d'etre” and it became apparent in how China interacted with
110
(Callahan, National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation and Chinese Nationalism,
2004)
111
(Callahan, 2004)
112
(Callahan, Nationalism, Civilization and Transnational Relations: The Discourse of
Greater China, 2005)
113
(Wang, National Humiliation, History Education and the Politics of Historical
Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China, 2008)
114
1949-1972.
115
116
A return to being the “center” of the world.
117
2004)

the international system before it “opened” up under Deng Xiaoping.118
In this area,
policy formulation during the Mao years was centered on China’s perception of
sovereignty and national security.119
As Chung puts it, the “pursuit of autonomy” was dictated by the need to oppose
both the USSR and the United States.120
Along the same line, Chinese foreign policy of
the time emphasized that China would “never act as a hegemon”121
and that the cultural
notions of peaceful pacifism and benevolence was to determine Chinese behavior. It
became a prevalent narrative in Chinese foreign policy both during and proceeding Mao’s
tenure. Beijing’s constant emphasis on its goal of “peaceful development” or “peaceful
coexistence” for all was to become the official party line throughout leadership changes.
Despite its constant emphasis on peaceful coexistence and the habitual utilization of this
discourse in its foreign policy, China has been unable to reconcile its statements into
action due to one particular policy area. This is the notion of China’s desire to reclaim
not only lost prestige, but also to restore China to its former civilization-state. In almost
every area of external debate, foreign interaction and neighborly relations, China also
reiterates the importance of sovereignty and territorial control. As mentioned earlier, in
the viewpoint of the CCP, China’s loss of its “peripheral territory122
” was due to western
imperialism, corrupt leadership and that in order to be “whole again” and to reverse
national shame, it is necessary to reclaim what is believed to have been once part of
“China.”
The desire for territorial reclamation has become a symbol of rising nationalism
and ideological change in China that occurred during the regime of Deng Xiaoping and
subsequent Chinese leadership. This ideological change, conducted post-cold war, has
moved from revolutionary to national-interest driven.123
Factors supporting the notion of
a unique Chinese identity and nationalism often move hand-in-hand. In 1991, China
118
2004)
119
(Zhang Y. , 2001)
120
(Chung, 2011)
121
(Yahuda, China's Foreign Relations: The Long March, Future Uncertain, 2009)
122
Extending beyond just Taiwan and Hong Kong.
123
(Chung, 2011)

instituted124
a new “Patriotic Education Campaign” that sought to rejuvenate the century
of humiliation discourse, while also imparting a sense of loyalty to party, state and
selective history.125
This selective history was inclusive of the need for territorial
reclamation, of the broader struggle for dignity and also imprinted upon students what
exactly constituted China’s territory. In this area, students were taught that the
southernmost border of China was not continental, but maritime, ending at James Shoal,
which is the southernmost part of the SCS and coincidentally at the far end of China’s
claim to the SCS.126
It also enhanced the perception amongst Chinese that prior conflicts
with Vietnam in the 1970’s was an expression of Soviet and Vietnamese hegemony, and
that in order for China to be successful, reversing the century of humiliation was on-
going and essential for every “Chinese” to take part in ensuring the realization of this
mission. In this context, to be Chinese, extended beyond being a citizen of the PRC,
aiming to also appeal to the Chinese diaspora living abroad. It was aimed at restoring the
notion of China being a sum of a greater entity, that being the “descendants” and
inheritors of a great civilization.127
This “re-education” campaign is ongoing and
scholars have witnessed a rise of Chinese tourism not only to areas of focus, but also to
contested territory in both the East and South China Seas. As Kim puts it, China was
successful in “institutionalizing” patriotism in order to achieve a political goal.128
In this context it is important to understand the potential role nationalism (i.e.
patriotism) has on Chinese behavior and strategic thought. While the CCP is an elite-run
political entity at this point, it is cognizant of the action(s) or desires of its citizens. Their
construction of historical events has led their citizens to strongly believe in the discourse
of lost territory, humiliation and the role of “imperialism” in Chinese history. This
should be of concern to policymakers, scholars and claimants to the SCS dispute. As
mentioned earlier, Chinese foreign policy has seen the reiteration of “peaceful
development” and “harmonious coexistence” discourses in a popular context, not only in
124
Emphasized and focused upon are also apt characterizations.
125
126
(Kim, 1998)
127
(Wei-Ming, 1991)
128
(Kim, 1998)

public statements, but also in how Beijing has utilized history to defend its action(s) and
to oppose “revisionist” history in neighboring countries. For example, China continually
chides Vietnam and the Philippines historical claims in the SCS as being irredentist and
false, while continually reinforcing their perspective through popular action.129
Historical
memory in this context is invoked in larger international crisis such as the relatively
minor 2001 US Spy Plane incident130
where China was the “victim” and again suffered at
the hands of the “aggressor”. Therefore it should not be a surprise that China is
increasingly reactive to actions that it perceives as humiliating. If China is willing to
frame a minor incident as a “devastating loss of face” it could be theorized that China
would be willing to go a lot further to protect its own territory.
Insecurity and Strategy in the South China Sea: Exploring the Relationship
between history, culture and behavior.
Today, China is a nation that is experiencing economic, social and geo-political
change. In the context of the South China Sea, confluences of factors are at play in
determining the rationale for its behavior and strategic thought. The 1st
Opium War and
the subsequent “century of humiliation” has shifted China’s strategic perception and
created a crisis that has added an element of insecurity that is shaping how China
formulates policy in the South China Sea. This section will focus on exploring the role
history and ideology play in China’s behavior in the SCS. The first area under
consideration is the broader geographical importance of the near seas to China. The
second area will explore how Chinese insecurity and threat perception is shaping their
long-term strategy in the region. The third area will explore how China is potentially
seeking to expand it territorial boundaries and its engagement with regional organizations
and claimants to the South China Sea dispute. Strategically, China has been increasingly
129
Inciting nationalist/patriotic fervor to mobilize popular support of the official position.
130
(Eckholm, 2001)

adept at utilizing history to bolster its claims, while also bolstering its strategic and
operational behavior in defense of its claims in the sea.131
Prior to the 1st
Opium War, China132
had spent a disproportionate amount of effort
in securing its territorial frontier from potential invaders. Evolving Chinese dynasties
constructed the Great Wall with deterrence and protection in mind. With the exception of
the early Ming period, under which the Ming emperor Zhu Di (Yong Le) provided
material support for the voyages of Zheng He, China did not pay significant attention to
naval development. Subsequently, China maintained an inward approach to deal with
threats from its continental neighbors and to maintain its territorial integrity. Since the
inception of the CCP, Chinese leadership has cited maritime/coastal vulnerability as a
primary focus for their defensive and strategic efforts.133
As such, China’s leadership
began to shift its focus towards their maritime geography to serve as a strategic and
defensive barrier. As China perceives the Straits of Malacca and strategic chokepoints134
in the South China Sea as potential limiter(s) for trade and the transit of energy, it can
also utilize the same geographical limitations as a strategic benefit. It was in the early
1990’s that the concept of using the island and geographical features of the SCS as a
mechanism for coastal defense arose. Scholars, analysts and the CCP began to use the
term 1st
island chain to create a conceptualized line that extends from the southernmost
tip of Japan and extends to the southernmost area of the SCS, as claimed by China.135
The notion of the 1st
island chain as a defensive perimeter provides a better idea of the
impetus for Chinese assertiveness in the SCS for three primary reasons. The first reason
reinforces the notion that China feels that it must protect and assure its access to energy
and trade via the Strait of Malacca. In this area, by claiming or bolstering military,
131
In this area analysts have focused predominately on structural and military policy,
whereas this study omits this analysis in favor of exploring the perceived role of the
South China Sea to China.
132
Imperial.
133
(Cole, 2014)
134
Maritime Geographical feature that limits access to an area, in the case of the South
China Sea, there are only several access points to the area, increasing the importance of
the Straits of Malacca and other entry/exit points in the sea. (Dutton, 2014)
135
(Yoshihara, China's Vision of its Seascape: The First Island Chain and Chinese
Seapower, 2012)

political or legal claims to the seas provides a perception of securing China’s southern
maritime boundary. The second reason is that China has increasingly felt that the recent
US rebalance to the Pacific enhances the threat of containment, while control of the area
would allow China to construct structural defense mechanisms while also serving to
bolster their legal claims to contested islands/areas in the SCS. The third reason is that
by bolstering its territory to include the entirety of the SCS it is also able to enhance
popular support and further institutionalize its control over maritime resources136
. As
Jiang Zemin put it, China sought to create a “maritime great wall” with the intention of
assuring that China, would never again, be invaded by sea.137
China’s strategic “gamble” in the South China Sea also represents a return to the
notion of centrality. Chinese perception of self has increased due in no small part to the
immense economic growth China has experienced in the past thirty years; this growth is
leading China to restore its belief in the notion of its own centrality. The 1st
and 2nd
island chain conceptualized defense is one part that positions China geographically as the
central part of a broader economic and diplomatic strategy. Additionally, the notion of a
rejuvenated “maritime silk road” as mentioned earlier, seeks to rejuvenate historical and
modern trade relationships and routes with the Middle East. Coinciding with increased
diplomatic relationships with maritime nations between China and the Middle East is the
development of additional facilities138
both within the SCS and alongside the SLOCs
transiting via the Malacca Strait.139
This strategy has a two-fold benefit. On one hand it
would bolster China’s ability to ensure access to energy and trade routes in a contest area.
On the other hand it also bolsters the notion that China has an interest in restoring its
historical influence, specifically in energy rich regions such as the Middle East. The
problem with the “string of pearls” strategy is that it calls for further development in the
South China Sea on contested islands and stands to further inflame existing disputes and
136
Including potential energy deposits. (Yoshihara, China's Vision of its Seascape: The
First Island Chain and Chinese Seapower, 2012)
137
(Cole, 2014)
138
Deep-Water Ports, Airstrips in the South China Sea and bolstered defense facilities in
Hainan.
139
(Lin, 2011)

could lead to conflict escalation with Vietnam, the Philippines and potentially the United
States.
China’s umbrella claim and desire to control access in the SCS goes beyond a
desire to control resources. China, as part of the broader “silk road” strategy seeks to
control access to the maritime domains. This extends to a desire to establish credible
control over SLOCs and the ability of other claimant nations to access disputed resources.
Beyond territorial/sovereignty claims, Chinese leaders retain a distinct insecurity
complex due in part to the geostrategic importance of the SCS for both economic and
energy needs, but primarily due to historical memory that is enhancing their perception
that the SCS poses a distinct security dilemma.140
In this area, China has been acting
unilaterally to enforce its claims. First, over the past several years, China has been
increasing its detainment of Vietnamese and Filipino fishing vessels in contested waters.
Second, China has worked to impede the energy development efforts being conducted by
Vietnam, including the severing of a Vietnamese seismic survey vessel in 2010.141
Third,
China has deployed nautical beacons, island facilities and deployed civilian fishing fleets
within contested areas of the SCS.142
The buildup of facilities across the Spratly and
Paracel islands are viewed by the CCP as means of establishing permanent control.143
China’s unilateral action(s) serve as a medium between China’s stated control and their
utilization/perception of international law in furthering their case in the SCS.
In the area of international law, understanding China’s position and goals
becomes more complex. While China signed and ratified UNCLOS in 1982, they did so
with reservations. Their reservations are perplexing and should be of significant concern,
both to regional claimants and the international community. First, as mentioned earlier,
China utilizes history and legacy of control in the South China Sea to bolster its claims.144
140
(Blazevic, 2012)
141
With Regards to the Philippines, China has resorted to official statements condoning
similar acts by the Philippines, in part, due to their existing treaty with the United States.
142
(Chakraborti, 2012)(Blazevic, 2012)
143
(Blazevic, 2012) (Buszynski, The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims and U.S.-
China Strategic Rivalry, 2012)
144
Vietnam and China utilize similar historical claims to both the Spratly and Paracel
islands.

Second, as Blazevic observes, China utilizes the term EEZ not as an exclusive economic
zone but an “economic exclusion zone”145
that has no international legal basis. Third,
China has made two material declarations, in 1958 and 1992, on the law of their
territorial seas.146
These declarations emphasize that the SCS is China’s sovereign
territory and that all vessels and aircraft must obtain express permission to utilize existing
SLOCs or to conduct any military or civil activities. Subsequent declarations with the
later 1996 Geneva Conference on the Law of Seas147
(GCLOS) have held similar
declarations that further expand China’s base claims to territorial and sovereignty control
in the SCS.148
China has yet to make a move to implement a similar enforcement
mechanism as they did in 2013 with the ADIZ149
and there is not enough evidence that
point to a similar intention in the SCS.
In the context of the South China Sea, Nguyen argues that control over the Spratly
island group, in particular is tantamount, as it would provide the controlling nation the
ability to exercise jurisdictional control over SLOCs and resource access.150
Within the
Spratly Islands themselves, multiple claimants have maintained occupation over different
formations over time in the hopes that it would bolster their sovereignty claims in the
region. International law following the inception of UNCLOS provides no support for
occupation or coercive subjugation for attaining sovereign control over geographical
features. Despite this, China’s declarations on its territorial seas and consolidation of civil
and military regulatory agencies in Hainan province have sought to bolster Chinese
control and circumvent international law. China has emphasized the importance of
demonstrating extended control and administration of both the Spratly and Paracel
islands in hopes of supporting their broader sovereignty claim in the SCS.151
China’s
selective implementation and interpretation of international law has confounded fellow
claimants and is contributing to the potential for conflict in the South China Sea.
145
(Blazevic, 2012) pp.89
146
(Jie, 1994)(PRC, 1992)(Blazevic, 2012)
148
(Blazevic, 2012) p.90
149
East China Sea. Air Defense Identification Zone
150
(Nguyen, 2006)
151
(Poling, 2014)

The multiplicity of methods that China is utilizing to enhance, enforce and sustain
control over the SCS suggests that China may seek to further strengthen and enforce their
territorial declarations, despite running contrary to international law. This entails broader
maritime strategies that enforce stricter interpretation of Chinese strategic territorial
requirements that coupled with PLAN and Civil developments would support a
conclusion that China has a long-term strategy in the SCS that aims to address their
trepidation and concern of encirclement and maritime vulnerability. In addition, China is
seeking to control access to maritime resources within the SCS, while ensuring that rival
claimants are unable to counter-balance China and attain access to what China considers
their own indigenous resources.152
Evolving Chinese foreign policy vis-à-vis rival
claimants remains ambiguous and contentious. In this area there is significant concern
that diplomatic efforts to address potential conflict, resource management and dispute
resolution have failed due to Chinese interference in regional and international
organizations.
There is broad separation between regional economic and political diplomacy. In
the SCS, ASEAN remains the largest regional multilateral quasi economic-political
organization under which China actively participates that involves primary claimants to
the dispute. The 2002 ASEAN-China CoC for parties in the South China Sea remains at
an impasse and is largely considered to be an ineffective document. There have been
recent diplomatic efforts amongst ASEAN-China to resurrect a CoC, but multiple factors
have halted significant progression towards its implementation. The primary factor is
China’s active efforts to shelve or sideline discussion of the dispute at annual ASEAN
meetings, while concurrently utilizing official development aid and non-concessional
loans to non-claimant ASEAN nations.153
In the same line, the CCP official line is that it
values its “close relationship” with ASEAN and that it is always willing to discuss a CoC,
yet it also utilizes public diplomacy to criticize and blame its failed implementation on
rival claimants. In particular, China has been very vocal that Vietnamese hydrocarbon
exploration and fishing vessels are operating “illegally” in Chinese waters, despite a lack
152
(Cole, 2014)
153
(Sutter & Huang, 2013)

of tangential evidence.154
The same applies to the Philippines efforts within their own
territorial waters155
, while China, at the same time, actively works to isolate the
Philippines and Vietnam within ASEAN.156
China is adamant that the South China Sea dispute is solely an affair between
claimants, and attempts to internationalize the issue have been met with stern opposition
from Beijing. Of the primary claimants, the Philippines, have filed for international
arbitration vis-à-vis ITLS on their claims in the SCS.157
Along the same lines, both
Vietnam and the Philippines have also sought closer ties with the United States to bolster
their position. China’s has been adamant that the SCS is a regional issue and despite
ratifying UNCLOS, has so far refused to participate in dispute arbitration. This is widely
believed to be the result of fear by China that arbitration or mediation by an international
body would rule against them.
Whereas China was once seen as being willing to participate in multilateral
negotiations on the SCS dispute, its policy changed with the global financial crisis toward
one favoring bilateral negotiation. As a result, diplomacy is increasingly viewed as being
an ineffective means towards resolving the disputes. This is due to increasing hesitancy
of ASEAN nations, highly dependent on China for their own economic growth, to pursue
resolution of the disputes at ASEAN ministerial level meetings, and also within their own
bilateral relations with China.158
It remains to be seen what affect the recent resurgence
of Chinese activity in disputed waters will have on ASEAN nations willingness to
counter China’s ambition(s) in the SCS, but needless to say ASEAN nations remain
concerned about growing Chinese assertiveness in the region.159
China continues to
promote its expanding presence in the SCS and underlying behavior as being beneficial
to the region. Furthermore, China views the reluctance of ASEAN, rival claimants and
154
(Jie, 1994)
155
3nm EEZ
156
Utilization of ODA and non-concessionary loans are also used to bolster support for
China’s claims and mitigate cohesion amidst ASEAN nations.
157
(Hong, 2013)
158
ibid.
159
ibid. (Sutter & Huang, 2013)

the international community to counter its presence as tacit approval for its ambitious
claims in the South China Sea.

Chapter 5 Conclusion Popkin 45
V. Conclusion: Understanding the Primary Drivers of China’s Maritime Claims in
the South China Sea.
Understanding the primary drivers of China’s maritime claims in the South China
Sea seems crucial in attempting to evaluate its behavior, which continues to be a
challenge for analysts concerned with its rise and implications for the conduct of China’s
International Relations. It appears that China’s economic transformation of the past
several decades – seen through the country’s growing influence in International Affairs
and an equitable shift in how they formulate policy – is affecting their perception of
territory and how they seek to strengthen their sovereignty in the South China Sea. By
exploring the causal factors behind China’s resurgent policy in defense of its claims in
the South China Sea this paper hopes to provide a contextual understanding of China’s
perception of itself taking more seriously into account its notion of a civilization-state
and its role in shaping the dynamics of its regional interaction. In part, China’s rising
demand for material resources and assertiveness in pursuing them may influence its
potential leadership role in the region and further promulgate the perception of China as
an irresponsible stakeholder in the international system. Due China’s shifting worldview
and how its foreign policy has had to adjust to understand and cope with changing global
conditions in areas of its’ national self-interest, the concluding remarks presented here are
to be taken as tentative.
In the field of energy and diplomacy China’s assertiveness in, and incremental
control over, the South China Sea may be understood as an attempt to bolster its energy
security situation. Its’ heavy dependence on non-renewable resources is in turn leading it
to take measures to increase domestic production of hydrocarbon resources and mitigate
potential supply-side disruptions. The approach that is taking in the South China Sea has
the potential to further destabilize its perception of security. By seeking to bolster
domestic production in contested waters while also bolstering its civilian-military
presence in the region, it is in turn serving to shape regional reaction(s) to its increased
presence. Furthermore, Beijing’s recalcitrant attitude in its diplomacy vis-à-vis ASEAN,
where its selective application of international law especially its refusal to accept any

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