1. Geostrategy on the River Bank:
How Raising the Iron Curtain led to War in Moldova
Dylan Thomas Farley
3 December 2015
Raising the Iron Curtain
Dr. Kyrill Kunakhovich

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The tiny Eastern European state of Moldova experienced a small war for a few months in
the middle of 1992, several years after it initially declared independence. In the conflict,
separatists from the east bank of the Dniester River sought independence and reunification with
Russia for their small state called Transnistria1. This conflict is presently no longer in the war
stage, but still lingers on as a frozen conflict over twenty years later. Unlike most other post-
Soviet conflicts, Transnistria does not share a border with Russia and instead is separated by a
large sovereign state. This anomaly is quite striking, although it is severely understudied in the
academic realm.
The Transnistrian War was caused by a myriad of issues relating to the fall of the Iron
Curtain. The economic issues caused the conflict to become geostrategic due to the comparative
value of Transnistria within Moldova. A vacuum of power in the area led to a rise of sub-state
actors and conflict in the area. Soviet nationalities policies exacerbated divides in the region that
additionally contributed to the conflict. Like all conflicts, the Transnistria conflict was caused by
a combination of events and cannot be traced to a single source. However, these three
intertwined attributes are the most important to study when analyzing the connection between the
fall of communism and the war in Transnistria.
Geostrategy
The valuable geopolitics of the Trans-Dniester region caused it to be of high importance
to the wider area during the post-Soviet reconsolidation period. Not only was Moldova trying to
hold onto this tiny parcel of land, but other countries actively sought to incorporate it into their
sovereign territory as well. Romania considered incorporating it along with the rest of Moldova
as a part of ‘Greater Romania’. Ukraine could easily annex it due to its geographic isolation next
1 ‘Transnistria’ is the term for the separatist state, whereas ‘Trans-Dniester’ is the term for the
geographic area on the east bank of the Dniester River.

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to Odessa oblast, including the protruding ethnically mixed Ukrainian region of Budjak. Most
importantly, however, Russia can utilize the economic foundation and pro-Russian sentiments to
keep a regional base, through which it can maintain economic and military operations in the
region. “Ukrainian. Moldovan, Russian, and Romanian responses to the threat of open warfare
between Moldova and forces of the self-proclaimed ‘Dniester Republic’ reflect the rising tide of
ethno nationalist tensions which has set off an entire series of conflicts in the lands of the former
Soviet Union” (Lamont 583).
The Trans-Dniester region is significantly more valuable than the rest of Moldova for
several reasons. The first reason is that overall the region is markedly more advanced
scientifically and economically than the rest of Moldova. Transnistria’s Kuchurgan power plant
is “one of the largest power stations in Europe”, exporting energy to Ukraine and other countries
(Beltel). This area has historically been a manufacturing powerhouse, including assets such as
the Moldova Steel Works, which makes it distinct from the rest of Moldova. Whereas Moldova
has an agrarian economy spread out amongst scattered villages, Transnistria is extremely urban,
manifesting as a string of highly industrialized cities.
The urban environment of Transnistria makes it demographically important as well.
Transnistria contains three of the five largest cities in Moldova, which strung together in a tight
area make it a conurbation. This high concentration of population makes Transnistria an axis for
regional control, a component of its geostrategic value. Even though Transnistria has all these
strong benefits within the region, it also is a handicap for anyone trying to control it from the
west bank of the river, which is nominally Moldova but could be part of a Romanian scheme as
well. The Achilles heal of Transnistria is that it is geographically isolated from the rest of the

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Moldavian2 region, making it easy to invade but hard to defend from the Moldovan perspective.
As a result, Transnistria is a strategic way for an eastern power, such as Russia or Ukraine, to
hinder Moldova, because it is geographically easier to control from the east bank of the Dniester.
There are several reasons that Moldova and Russia/Transnistria contest Transnistria. The
primary reason is that in the volatility of sovereignty in the immediate post-Soviet era, it was
necessary for all groups to solidify their geographic claims swiftly and forcefully. This happened
at state levels, but also at sub-national levels where regional groups attempted on occasion to
secede from a post-Soviet state3. In this case, Moldova tried to quickly regain control of
Transnistria, but the separatists there had already taken the initiative and had overwhelming
power due to the Russian manpower contributions. Part of the reason that these types of
territorial claims needed to be clearly made and acted on is that certain territorial assets provide
significant advantages, such as the economic advantages that Transnistria lends to the overall
region as described above. In a volatile system, having a strong economic base from which to
expand is extremely valuable to an emerging state. Not only was there a want to have
Transnistria, both sides knew they needed Transnistria because it controlled so much of the
economic viability of the region, which is why even in the present stage of the conflict, neither
side will back down.
Vacuum of Power
The vacuum of power left by the Russian political withdrawal from this remote corner of
the Soviet empire led to the rise of sub-state military actors. Not only did paramilitary groups
rise in regions of conflict, but also criminal organizations found a strong foothold for various
2 ‘Moldavia’ is the general historical region between the Prut and Dniester Rivers plus some
adjacent areas, whereas ‘Moldova’ is a modern state that occupies the majority of that region.
3 One prominent example is Chechnya trying to secede from the Russian Federation.

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illicit activities in the post-Soviet region as a whole. Specifically in Moldova, the Soviet
communist leaders were mostly Transnistrian, leading to attempts to continue the communist
legacy in the area. Overall, these manifested as Soviets wrestling to maintain the bits and pieces
of their former empire. The Soviet and then Russian army stationed in Transnistria enabled the
pro-Russian locals to effectively maneuver both politically and militarily to solidify de facto
independence.
During the Soviet era when Moldova was a Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), the majority
of its local communist leaders were from Transnistria. This is probably related to Transnistria’s
industrial nature, as many workers formed soviet councils in the factories. Moldovans felt
empowered by the Soviet regime, with many Moldovans serving in the Red Army and gaining
military experience. Once the official ties between Moldova and the Soviet Union were severed
however, many Moldovans sought to reconnect those ties. This was especially prevalent in
Transnistria, which had a strong communist presence, in addition to a sizable Russian ethnic
minority. As Moldova became independent, the Transnistrians were empowered to seek an
official joining with Russia and maintain its communist heritage because they felt more aligned
with Soviet Russia than with the westernizing Moldova. Transnistria has repeatedly voted to join
with Russia, and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in 1992 openly stated that Russia
‘would not rule that out’ (Kashi; Lamont 589).
The perpetual Russian involvement in Transnistria initially developed as a death throw to
retain the old Soviet empire. As the Soviet Russian empire collapsed quickly, it sought to grab
and hold on to anyplace it was able. For example, in 1992 Russian Vice-President Aleksandr
Lutskoy “urged lawmakers to take a stand” with Transnistria (Lamont 585). In Transnistria,
Russia found an area of partial geostrategic value and with a favorable population base to

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support any unilateral involvement. In addition to preserving a base, Russia also would retain the
manufacturing powers of the region, and more importantly would keep control of the energy
sector due to the large power plant. This is a key factor because Russia uses energy control as a
significant form of soft power. Another way that Russia’s involvement in Transnistria is
connected to its imperial tendencies is that Transnistria borders Ukraine. Any Russian presence
in Transnistria allows Russia to have a second border with Ukraine, through which it can
manipulate the rival state. This blocking maneuver would hamper Ukraine’s relations in the area,
in effect geostrategically blocking Ukraine in the area and keeping Russia as the regional
hegemon.
Russia had the initial infrastructure set up in Transnistria to easily facilitate maintaining a
force there. The USSR had troops already stationed in the Moldovan SSR when it declared
independence and never moved the troops out after Moldovan independence. Because of the
military structures in place, it was very easy and cheap for Russia to keep the Soviet-era base. If
Russia would reengage in the region, it would be expensive to deploy units but here they already
had systems in place. A big factor as well was that the units were made up of mostly Moldovans,
which is an extremely high number. As stated earlier, many Moldovans and Transnistrians in
particular served in the Red Army and gained important experience there. Because the army was
made up of mostly Moldovans, there was no great desire to withdraw the army, so it remained in
place in Transnistria maintaining Russian influence through hard power.
Border Drawing
The ad hoc border deliberations of the Soviet authorities caused ethnic anomalies within
the Moldovan SSR. “The most contentious issue affecting Moldovan-Russian conflict is the
population” (Lamont 581). The border defined by the Soviets is unnatural both geographically

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and ethno-politically. Although Moldovans for centuries have settled the area between the Prut
and Dniester Rivers, Soviets including the Trans-Dniester area in that historical region, mixing
together distinct ethnic identities. There are many possible explanations for such action,
especially political pacification of different ethnic groups.
The geography of Moldova contributes significantly to the conflict because of the issues
that arose from the physical separation. Moldovans, who some ethnologists categorize as a
subgroup of Romanians, have historically settled in the area between the Prut and Dniester
Rivers, in between other Romanian regions like Wallachia and Transylvania and the Slavic lands
of southwest Ukraine throughout Ottoman times and even as part of a Greater Romania. When
the Soviets took control of the region post-WWII however, they added on a small parcel of land
that they called the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which was on the east
(Slavic) side of the Dniester. By putting a small addendum to contiguous territory, it becomes
hard to maintain even in a strong government, which facilitates local feelings of a need for
autonomy. The isolation of Transnistria makes it immediately at odds with the rest of Moldova,
and ensures that it does not fully integrate into the country.
Another reason that the border is extremely strange is because the Moldavian ASSR only
had a small number of Moldovans and Romanians. The Soviet central government liked to
compartmentalize the different ethnic groups into the separate SSRs, but including Transnistria
in the Moldovan SSR instead of Ukraine did not make sense. Statistically both groups were
about a third of the population of the area, so if this is the case it would make more sense to just
group it with the group it is geographically closest to (Andrei). The only possible reason is that
Soviet authorities wanted to keep all Moldovans in the same SSR, even if in some areas they
were a minority.

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The root of the issue with the border drawings is that there was little precision and care
by the Soviets to make a border. They were only trying to draw borders of internal divisions, not
the state boundaries that they eventually became. Although the Soviets appear careless to our
modern observations, they very possibly just wanted to join the Moldovan minority area with the
greater population in an attempt to “radically simplif[y]” the regional ethnic make-up (Suny
21). Soviets were not approaching the Moldovans as enemies, but rather as socialist partners, so
they were not addressing the situation with animosity. Regardless, due to some questionable
decision-making, the anomaly of a geographically isolated minority region still was created,
although that is a clear recipe for unrest. Due to this lack of foresight of potential issues, the
Transnistria conflict would eventually erupt.
Conclusion
In order to understand any conflict, one must look at it holistically and take into account
all the different factors across the spectrum. With Transnistria, three particular areas jump out as
causing the majority of the conflict issues. First, the economic power of the region in relation to
the overall area is very important geostrategically for any regional hegemon. Next, because
Russia politically withdrew, there was a rise of sub-state actors and paramilitary groups when
otherwise more peaceful transitions could have occurred. Last, the Soviet treatment of its
constituent ethnic groups inadvertently created awkward borders that eventually became
untenable. Issues within the USSR were exacerbated by its dissolution and coupled with the fall
of the Iron Curtain, directly caused the Transnistrian conflict.

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