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PUBLIC
NXP, THE NXP LOGO AND NXP SECURE CONNECTIONS FOR A SMARTER WORLD ARE TRADEMARKS OF NXP B.V.
ALL OTHER PRODUCT OR SERVICE NAMES ARE THE PROPERTY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS. © 2020 NXP B.V.
I E E E E t h e r n e t & I P Te c h D a y s – S e p t e m b e r 2 0 2 0
Don Pannell, Fellow
Automotive Ethernet Networking, NXP Semiconductor
Nicolas Navet, Professor
University of Luxembourg / Cognifyer.ai
Practical Use Cases for
Ethernet Redundancy
Cognifyer is the
research lab of RTaW
Interested to know more? Please contact
jorn.migge@realtimeatwork.com
1PUBLIC
OVERVIEW
• Examined Redundant Network Configurations
• Soft Error Rate Modeling
• Hard Error & Cost Factor Considerations
• Summary
2PUBLIC
THE NEED
➢Zonal networks, as shown in the figure, easily support
redundancy, especially on the highlighted Ethernet
backbone
➢IEEE 802.1CB is the TSN standard for Seamless
Redundancy, supporting zero recovery time from lost
frames
➢This presentation models CB in various topologies with
the CB function at various locations in the network so
these differences can be quantified
➢This is NOT a Safety presentation, but the data presented
will help Network & Safety teams develop cost effective
redundancy solutions
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Zonal
3PUBLIC3
PUBLIC
NXP, THE NXP LOGO AND NXP SECURE CONNECTIONS FOR A SMARTER WORLD ARE TRADEMARKS OF NXP B.V.
ALL OTHER PRODUCT OR SERVICE NAMES ARE THE PROPERTY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS. © 2020 NXP B.V.
Examined Redundant
Network Configurations
Single changes to a baseline are compared so their effect can be
extrapolated
4PUBLIC
4 CB Switches, Non-CB Talker & Listener
• Pros:
− Existing end-nodes can be used
− Hard or Soft errors on the backbone wires are protected
▪ A Hard error is a long duration error like a broken wire
▪ A Soft error is an intermittent error like a CRC errored frame
▪ The Brown & Blue wires are redundant paths for the packets
− Failure of S-B or S-Y is protected
• Cons:
− Backbone bandwidth is double+ for the redundant flows
▪ The ‘+’ is due to the added 6-byte R-Tag & possible 4-byte S-Tag
− Links from the Talker & to the Listener are not protected
▪ The Black wires
− Failure of S-A, T-1, S-Z or L-1 is not protected
T-1
S-A
L-1
S-B
S-Y S-Z
= CB Seq # & Split = CB Merge
5PUBLIC
6 CB Switches, Non-CB Talker & Listener
T-1
S-A
L-1
S-B
S-C
S-Y
S-D
S-Z
• Very similar Pros & Cons as the previous slide
• Only change is the addition of S-C & S-D in the backbone
• Modeled to see the impact of Soft errors on the increased
number of links in the protected backbone
= CB Seq # & Split = CB Merge
6PUBLIC
Non-CB Switches, CB Dual-Homed Talker &
Listener
T-1
S-A
L-1
S-B
S-Y S-Z
• Pros:
− Existing switches can be used
− Hard & Soft errors on the entire path are protected
▪ The Brown & Blue wires (dotted wires are not used for these flows)
− Failure of any single switch is protected
− Failure of anything in the Blue path (wire or switch) is protected
− Failure of anything in the Brown path is protected
− Backbone bandwidth is half of Network #1 for the redundant
flows as dotted wires are not used & are available
• Cons:
− Requires dual-homed end nodes (with dual Ethernet ports)
− End nodes replicate frames & eliminate the duplicates
− Failure of T-1 or L-1 is not protected
= CB Seq # & Split = CB Merge
7PUBLIC
Non-CB Switches, CB Single-Homed Talker &
Listener
T-1
S-A
L-1
S-B
S-Y S-Z
• Pros:
− Existing switches & end nodes w/new software can be used
− Hard or Soft errors on the backbone wires are protected
▪ The Brown & Blue wires between the switches
− Soft errors on the links from the Talker & to the Listener are
protected
▪ Temporally due to the doubled transmission
− Failure of S-B or S-Y is protected
• Cons:
− End-to-end bandwidth is double+ for the redundant flows
▪ The ‘+’ is due to the added 6-byte R-Tag & possible 4-byte S-Tag
− End nodes replicate frames & eliminate the duplicates
− Failure of S-A, T-1, S-Z or L-1 is not protected
= CB Seq # & Split = CB Merge
8PUBLIC
Mixed Switches, Mixed Talker & Listener
T-1
S-A
L-1
S-B
S-Y S-Z
• Very similar Pros & Cons as previous slide
• Only change is S-Z does the duplicate frame removal
− This means the S-Z to L-1 link is no longer protected
− But existing ECU’s without any software changes can be used
▪ With increased redundancy support achieved via firmware updates
▪ i.e., Network #1 → Network #5 → Network #4
▪ CB enabled switches are needed in this case
• Modeled to see the impact of Soft errors on the
unprotected link to the Listener
• This mixture is supported as long as T-1 creates the
Brown & Blue frames in accordance to 802.1CB
= CB Seq # & Split = CB Merge
9PUBLIC
NXP, THE NXP LOGO AND NXP SECURE CONNECTIONS FOR A SMARTER WORLD ARE TRADEMARKS OF NXP B.V.
ALL OTHER PRODUCT OR SERVICE NAMES ARE THE PROPERTY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS. © 2020 NXP B.V. 9
PUBLIC
Soft Error Rate Modeling
End-to-end protection is key for high-integrity communication
1 0PUBLIC
Error model used for soft errors
• Soft errors are limited to frames dropped due to CRC errors
• Bit Error Rate (BER) is assumed identical on all links & constant over time
• CRC errors are independent of each other, i.e., no “bursts” of errors
• 100BASE-T1 specifies BER ≤ 10-10, PHYs are much better in practice, thus
a BER of 10-12 is used in the experiments
With 100BASE-T1 BER = 10-12, the average
time between 2 CRC errors on a link is
≈18h13m at 20% load and ≈3h38m at 100%
load with minimum frame size
1 1PUBLIC
Replication solutions : requirements & Single Points of Failure
1 2 3 4 5
2 CB-aware
switches
2 CB-aware
switches w/more hops
CB-aware
talker & listener
+ dual-homing
CB-aware
talker & listener
+ temporal redundancy
CB-aware talker
+ 1 temporal redundancy
+ 1 CB-aware switch
+
= unprotected transmissions on that link → Single Point of Failure for Soft Errors
[RTaW-Pegasescreenshots]
T-1 T-1
L-1L-1 L-1
S-B S-B S-B S-B S-BS-AS-A
S-DS-C
S-YS-Y S-Y S-ZS-Z S-Y
S-A
S-Y
= CB Seq # & Split = CB Merge
1 2PUBLIC
Replication in action - packet loss rate
• Packets are lost when none of the copies are received by the listener(s)
• The data assumes a homogeneous Bit Error Rate = 10-12 regardless of link speed
• 2.44E-8 means 2.44 × 10-8
Network
Loss Rate for
1522B Packet
Loss Rate for
64B Packet
Improvement factor
vs. No Redundancy
Takeaways
2.44E-8 1.02E-9 2
The two unprotected transmissions
are by far the dominant risk factor
2.44E-8 1.02E-9 2.5
# of hops is a low order factor
as long as transmissions are protected
1.33E-15 2.36E-18 8.7E8 Very robust to soft errors!
2.37E-15 4.19E-18 4.9E8 Same order of magnitude as #3
1.22E-8 5.12E-10 4
Twice as robust compared to #1 due to
the single unprotected transmission link
1
2
3
4
5
3 (dual-homing) and 4 (end-to-end temporal redundancy) stands out
additionally protects against any one hard error unlike
3 4
3 4
1 3PUBLIC
Replication in action – average time between 2 packet losses
• Assuming a transmission period of 1ms with min. size frames (e.g., actuator messages)
• The data assumes a homogeneous Bit Error Rate regardless of link speed
• Stated times are for one flow only with the low link utilization as stated above
Network BER = 10-11 BER = 10-12 BER = 10-13 BER = 10-14
Baseline: no
redundancy
13hours 33min 5days 15hours 56days 12hours ≈ 1year 6months
1day 3hours 11days 7hours 113days ≈ 3years 1month
1day 3hours 11days 7hours 113days ≈ 3years 1month
1.3E5 years 1.3E7 years 1.3E9 years 1.3E11 years
7.5E4 years 7.5E6 years 7.5E8 years 7.5E10 years
2days 6hours 22days 14hours 226days ≈ 6years 2months
1
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5
1 4PUBLIC1 4
PUBLIC
NXP, THE NXP LOGO AND NXP SECURE CONNECTIONS FOR A SMARTER WORLD ARE TRADEMARKS OF NXP B.V.
ALL OTHER PRODUCT OR SERVICE NAMES ARE THE PROPERTY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS. © 2020 NXP B.V.
Hard Error & Cost
Factor Considerations
Nothing is free, and not all solutions cost the same!
1 5PUBLIC
Cost Factor – Components
• Creating a Redundant backbone:
− 1st: Create a Ring network from a daisy-chain one
▪ Cost = 1 extra link only in the network
− 2nd: Add seamless redundancy: 802.1CB support in bridges in the critical data’s path
▪ Doubles the backbone’s bandwidth for the critical flows
▪ Cost = varies depending on the CB requirements needed, like the bandwidth & the number of critical flows
• Redundancy in the first & last links:
− Option A: Use dual-homed end nodes
▪ May keep the backbone’s bandwidth close to the same loading as before
▪ Cost = 1 extra link per critical end node & more CPU cycles to run 802.1CB for the critical flows only
− Option B: Use temporal redundancy single-home end nodes saving the cost of the extra links
▪ But the backbone’s bandwidth is still doubled and it also adds…
▪ Cost = More CPU cycles to run 802.1CB & duplicate frame transmission for the critical flows only
S-A S-B
S-Y S-Z
T-1
T-1
1 6PUBLIC
Cost Factor – For Sensors & Their Flows
• Sensors can be very high bandwidth devices like 8+ gig/sec cameras
• Many sensors are needed too, 8 cameras is becoming a low number in a car
• Can this data even fit on a backbone today (even with reduced requirements)?
− With 6 camera @ 4 gig/sec requires 24 gig/sec! With redundancy that grows to 48 gig/sec.
− What year will these Ethernet PHYs & Switches be cost effectively available for Automotive?
• This bandwidth does not take into account the added data for Lidar, Radar, etc.
• And why double the bandwidth requirements of a sensor when the sensor itself is a single
point of failure?
− A camera “failure” is more likely due to dirt on the lens vs. a silicon or a wire failure!
− Why not add more cameras such that they overlap instead? Then CB is not needed for these flows
• Sensor Fusion merges data from many cameras & other sensor types to form a “picture”
− This process repeats continuously such that a Soft error is likely not critical and even many Hard
errors (like dirt) may allow for continued operation at reduced speeds (i.e., limp home)
1 7PUBLIC
Cost Factor – For Actuators & Their Flows
• After Sensor Fusion, a decision is made on what to do
− Steer away from a problem or slow down, etc.
• Turning, braking, accelerating, etc. are Actuators
• Actuators:
− Are very low bandwidth devices
▪ Historically Actuators have been connected using CAN and LIN
▪ Thus doubling the bandwidth of these flows on the Ethernet backbone is totally feasible
▪ Even doubling the bandwidth, temporally, on a single link to the backbone is feasible
− Re-transmission (temporal redundancy) is quite often used today to overcome Soft errors
− Seamless redundancy greatly increases the likely hood that the 1st transmission is received
▪ Thus keeping the latency time for these Decision to Action messages low
1 8PUBLIC
Summary & Conclusions
1 9PUBLIC
Summary & Conclusion
• Hard, persistent errors are easier to see & plan around as noted in the examples
− The likely hood & impact of these errors (wire vs. software vs. silicon) is application dependent
• Soft, intermittent errors are harder to evaluate, but the impact of BER has been shown
− 1000BASE-T1 supports FEC making BER analysis much harder (possible future work?)
− The numbers presented for 100BASE-T1 are felt to be a good rule-of-thumb for 1000BASE-T1
• Redundancy is not free & the biggest cost today could be the extra backbone bandwidth
− Therefore, apply redundancy only to those flows that absolutely require it!
− It appears to be more practical to apply redundancy on Actuator as compared to Sensor flows
• End-to-end protection from talker to listener results in the highest integrity communication
• Dual-homing & temporal redundancy both offer very high robustness against soft errors
where multi-homing additionally protects against a single hard error to/from the ECU
• Using IEEE 802.1CB as shown allows development migration from “no redundancy” to
“best redundancy” with progressive steps (firmware updates) in between
− This allows re-use of existing ECUs without needing to rewrite/redesign everything in one go
NXP, THE NXP LOGO AND NXP SECURE CONNECTIONS FOR A SMARTER WORLD ARE TRADEMARKS OF NXP B.V. ALL OTHER PRODUCT OR SERVICE NAMES ARE THE PROPERTY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS. © 2020 NXP B.V.
2 1PUBLIC
Verifying analytical model using Simulation-Based Fault-Injection
• Simulation with RTaW-Pegase, Bit Error Rate = 10-7
Solution Packet Loss rate by analysis Loss rate by simulation
Largest 2.44E-3 2.45E-3
Smallest 1.02E-4 1.04E-4
Largest 2.45E-3 2.47E-3
Smallest 1.02E-4 1.02E-4
Largest 1.33E-5 1.34E-5
Smallest 2.36E-8 2.14E-8
Largest 2.36E-5 2.35E-5
Smallest 4.19E-8 4.14E-8
Largest 1.23E-3 1.23E-3
Smallest 5.12E-5 5.12E-5
1
2
3
4
5
Simulation not suited for realistic BERs: e.g., one packet loss every 870 days
on average, for a 1ms stream (largest packet size) with BER=10-10

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Practical Use Cases for Ethernet Redundancy

  • 1. PUBLIC NXP, THE NXP LOGO AND NXP SECURE CONNECTIONS FOR A SMARTER WORLD ARE TRADEMARKS OF NXP B.V. ALL OTHER PRODUCT OR SERVICE NAMES ARE THE PROPERTY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS. © 2020 NXP B.V. I E E E E t h e r n e t & I P Te c h D a y s – S e p t e m b e r 2 0 2 0 Don Pannell, Fellow Automotive Ethernet Networking, NXP Semiconductor Nicolas Navet, Professor University of Luxembourg / Cognifyer.ai Practical Use Cases for Ethernet Redundancy Cognifyer is the research lab of RTaW Interested to know more? Please contact jorn.migge@realtimeatwork.com
  • 2. 1PUBLIC OVERVIEW • Examined Redundant Network Configurations • Soft Error Rate Modeling • Hard Error & Cost Factor Considerations • Summary
  • 3. 2PUBLIC THE NEED ➢Zonal networks, as shown in the figure, easily support redundancy, especially on the highlighted Ethernet backbone ➢IEEE 802.1CB is the TSN standard for Seamless Redundancy, supporting zero recovery time from lost frames ➢This presentation models CB in various topologies with the CB function at various locations in the network so these differences can be quantified ➢This is NOT a Safety presentation, but the data presented will help Network & Safety teams develop cost effective redundancy solutions c 3 5 3 C C 2 C C CC 2C C C 2 C 3 2 5 C C C 2 C C C C C cC 2 C 2 CC C C C C C C 2 2 C5 2 Zonal
  • 4. 3PUBLIC3 PUBLIC NXP, THE NXP LOGO AND NXP SECURE CONNECTIONS FOR A SMARTER WORLD ARE TRADEMARKS OF NXP B.V. ALL OTHER PRODUCT OR SERVICE NAMES ARE THE PROPERTY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS. © 2020 NXP B.V. Examined Redundant Network Configurations Single changes to a baseline are compared so their effect can be extrapolated
  • 5. 4PUBLIC 4 CB Switches, Non-CB Talker & Listener • Pros: − Existing end-nodes can be used − Hard or Soft errors on the backbone wires are protected ▪ A Hard error is a long duration error like a broken wire ▪ A Soft error is an intermittent error like a CRC errored frame ▪ The Brown & Blue wires are redundant paths for the packets − Failure of S-B or S-Y is protected • Cons: − Backbone bandwidth is double+ for the redundant flows ▪ The ‘+’ is due to the added 6-byte R-Tag & possible 4-byte S-Tag − Links from the Talker & to the Listener are not protected ▪ The Black wires − Failure of S-A, T-1, S-Z or L-1 is not protected T-1 S-A L-1 S-B S-Y S-Z = CB Seq # & Split = CB Merge
  • 6. 5PUBLIC 6 CB Switches, Non-CB Talker & Listener T-1 S-A L-1 S-B S-C S-Y S-D S-Z • Very similar Pros & Cons as the previous slide • Only change is the addition of S-C & S-D in the backbone • Modeled to see the impact of Soft errors on the increased number of links in the protected backbone = CB Seq # & Split = CB Merge
  • 7. 6PUBLIC Non-CB Switches, CB Dual-Homed Talker & Listener T-1 S-A L-1 S-B S-Y S-Z • Pros: − Existing switches can be used − Hard & Soft errors on the entire path are protected ▪ The Brown & Blue wires (dotted wires are not used for these flows) − Failure of any single switch is protected − Failure of anything in the Blue path (wire or switch) is protected − Failure of anything in the Brown path is protected − Backbone bandwidth is half of Network #1 for the redundant flows as dotted wires are not used & are available • Cons: − Requires dual-homed end nodes (with dual Ethernet ports) − End nodes replicate frames & eliminate the duplicates − Failure of T-1 or L-1 is not protected = CB Seq # & Split = CB Merge
  • 8. 7PUBLIC Non-CB Switches, CB Single-Homed Talker & Listener T-1 S-A L-1 S-B S-Y S-Z • Pros: − Existing switches & end nodes w/new software can be used − Hard or Soft errors on the backbone wires are protected ▪ The Brown & Blue wires between the switches − Soft errors on the links from the Talker & to the Listener are protected ▪ Temporally due to the doubled transmission − Failure of S-B or S-Y is protected • Cons: − End-to-end bandwidth is double+ for the redundant flows ▪ The ‘+’ is due to the added 6-byte R-Tag & possible 4-byte S-Tag − End nodes replicate frames & eliminate the duplicates − Failure of S-A, T-1, S-Z or L-1 is not protected = CB Seq # & Split = CB Merge
  • 9. 8PUBLIC Mixed Switches, Mixed Talker & Listener T-1 S-A L-1 S-B S-Y S-Z • Very similar Pros & Cons as previous slide • Only change is S-Z does the duplicate frame removal − This means the S-Z to L-1 link is no longer protected − But existing ECU’s without any software changes can be used ▪ With increased redundancy support achieved via firmware updates ▪ i.e., Network #1 → Network #5 → Network #4 ▪ CB enabled switches are needed in this case • Modeled to see the impact of Soft errors on the unprotected link to the Listener • This mixture is supported as long as T-1 creates the Brown & Blue frames in accordance to 802.1CB = CB Seq # & Split = CB Merge
  • 10. 9PUBLIC NXP, THE NXP LOGO AND NXP SECURE CONNECTIONS FOR A SMARTER WORLD ARE TRADEMARKS OF NXP B.V. ALL OTHER PRODUCT OR SERVICE NAMES ARE THE PROPERTY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS. © 2020 NXP B.V. 9 PUBLIC Soft Error Rate Modeling End-to-end protection is key for high-integrity communication
  • 11. 1 0PUBLIC Error model used for soft errors • Soft errors are limited to frames dropped due to CRC errors • Bit Error Rate (BER) is assumed identical on all links & constant over time • CRC errors are independent of each other, i.e., no “bursts” of errors • 100BASE-T1 specifies BER ≤ 10-10, PHYs are much better in practice, thus a BER of 10-12 is used in the experiments With 100BASE-T1 BER = 10-12, the average time between 2 CRC errors on a link is ≈18h13m at 20% load and ≈3h38m at 100% load with minimum frame size
  • 12. 1 1PUBLIC Replication solutions : requirements & Single Points of Failure 1 2 3 4 5 2 CB-aware switches 2 CB-aware switches w/more hops CB-aware talker & listener + dual-homing CB-aware talker & listener + temporal redundancy CB-aware talker + 1 temporal redundancy + 1 CB-aware switch + = unprotected transmissions on that link → Single Point of Failure for Soft Errors [RTaW-Pegasescreenshots] T-1 T-1 L-1L-1 L-1 S-B S-B S-B S-B S-BS-AS-A S-DS-C S-YS-Y S-Y S-ZS-Z S-Y S-A S-Y = CB Seq # & Split = CB Merge
  • 13. 1 2PUBLIC Replication in action - packet loss rate • Packets are lost when none of the copies are received by the listener(s) • The data assumes a homogeneous Bit Error Rate = 10-12 regardless of link speed • 2.44E-8 means 2.44 × 10-8 Network Loss Rate for 1522B Packet Loss Rate for 64B Packet Improvement factor vs. No Redundancy Takeaways 2.44E-8 1.02E-9 2 The two unprotected transmissions are by far the dominant risk factor 2.44E-8 1.02E-9 2.5 # of hops is a low order factor as long as transmissions are protected 1.33E-15 2.36E-18 8.7E8 Very robust to soft errors! 2.37E-15 4.19E-18 4.9E8 Same order of magnitude as #3 1.22E-8 5.12E-10 4 Twice as robust compared to #1 due to the single unprotected transmission link 1 2 3 4 5 3 (dual-homing) and 4 (end-to-end temporal redundancy) stands out additionally protects against any one hard error unlike 3 4 3 4
  • 14. 1 3PUBLIC Replication in action – average time between 2 packet losses • Assuming a transmission period of 1ms with min. size frames (e.g., actuator messages) • The data assumes a homogeneous Bit Error Rate regardless of link speed • Stated times are for one flow only with the low link utilization as stated above Network BER = 10-11 BER = 10-12 BER = 10-13 BER = 10-14 Baseline: no redundancy 13hours 33min 5days 15hours 56days 12hours ≈ 1year 6months 1day 3hours 11days 7hours 113days ≈ 3years 1month 1day 3hours 11days 7hours 113days ≈ 3years 1month 1.3E5 years 1.3E7 years 1.3E9 years 1.3E11 years 7.5E4 years 7.5E6 years 7.5E8 years 7.5E10 years 2days 6hours 22days 14hours 226days ≈ 6years 2months 1 2 3 4 5
  • 15. 1 4PUBLIC1 4 PUBLIC NXP, THE NXP LOGO AND NXP SECURE CONNECTIONS FOR A SMARTER WORLD ARE TRADEMARKS OF NXP B.V. ALL OTHER PRODUCT OR SERVICE NAMES ARE THE PROPERTY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS. © 2020 NXP B.V. Hard Error & Cost Factor Considerations Nothing is free, and not all solutions cost the same!
  • 16. 1 5PUBLIC Cost Factor – Components • Creating a Redundant backbone: − 1st: Create a Ring network from a daisy-chain one ▪ Cost = 1 extra link only in the network − 2nd: Add seamless redundancy: 802.1CB support in bridges in the critical data’s path ▪ Doubles the backbone’s bandwidth for the critical flows ▪ Cost = varies depending on the CB requirements needed, like the bandwidth & the number of critical flows • Redundancy in the first & last links: − Option A: Use dual-homed end nodes ▪ May keep the backbone’s bandwidth close to the same loading as before ▪ Cost = 1 extra link per critical end node & more CPU cycles to run 802.1CB for the critical flows only − Option B: Use temporal redundancy single-home end nodes saving the cost of the extra links ▪ But the backbone’s bandwidth is still doubled and it also adds… ▪ Cost = More CPU cycles to run 802.1CB & duplicate frame transmission for the critical flows only S-A S-B S-Y S-Z T-1 T-1
  • 17. 1 6PUBLIC Cost Factor – For Sensors & Their Flows • Sensors can be very high bandwidth devices like 8+ gig/sec cameras • Many sensors are needed too, 8 cameras is becoming a low number in a car • Can this data even fit on a backbone today (even with reduced requirements)? − With 6 camera @ 4 gig/sec requires 24 gig/sec! With redundancy that grows to 48 gig/sec. − What year will these Ethernet PHYs & Switches be cost effectively available for Automotive? • This bandwidth does not take into account the added data for Lidar, Radar, etc. • And why double the bandwidth requirements of a sensor when the sensor itself is a single point of failure? − A camera “failure” is more likely due to dirt on the lens vs. a silicon or a wire failure! − Why not add more cameras such that they overlap instead? Then CB is not needed for these flows • Sensor Fusion merges data from many cameras & other sensor types to form a “picture” − This process repeats continuously such that a Soft error is likely not critical and even many Hard errors (like dirt) may allow for continued operation at reduced speeds (i.e., limp home)
  • 18. 1 7PUBLIC Cost Factor – For Actuators & Their Flows • After Sensor Fusion, a decision is made on what to do − Steer away from a problem or slow down, etc. • Turning, braking, accelerating, etc. are Actuators • Actuators: − Are very low bandwidth devices ▪ Historically Actuators have been connected using CAN and LIN ▪ Thus doubling the bandwidth of these flows on the Ethernet backbone is totally feasible ▪ Even doubling the bandwidth, temporally, on a single link to the backbone is feasible − Re-transmission (temporal redundancy) is quite often used today to overcome Soft errors − Seamless redundancy greatly increases the likely hood that the 1st transmission is received ▪ Thus keeping the latency time for these Decision to Action messages low
  • 19. 1 8PUBLIC Summary & Conclusions
  • 20. 1 9PUBLIC Summary & Conclusion • Hard, persistent errors are easier to see & plan around as noted in the examples − The likely hood & impact of these errors (wire vs. software vs. silicon) is application dependent • Soft, intermittent errors are harder to evaluate, but the impact of BER has been shown − 1000BASE-T1 supports FEC making BER analysis much harder (possible future work?) − The numbers presented for 100BASE-T1 are felt to be a good rule-of-thumb for 1000BASE-T1 • Redundancy is not free & the biggest cost today could be the extra backbone bandwidth − Therefore, apply redundancy only to those flows that absolutely require it! − It appears to be more practical to apply redundancy on Actuator as compared to Sensor flows • End-to-end protection from talker to listener results in the highest integrity communication • Dual-homing & temporal redundancy both offer very high robustness against soft errors where multi-homing additionally protects against a single hard error to/from the ECU • Using IEEE 802.1CB as shown allows development migration from “no redundancy” to “best redundancy” with progressive steps (firmware updates) in between − This allows re-use of existing ECUs without needing to rewrite/redesign everything in one go
  • 21. NXP, THE NXP LOGO AND NXP SECURE CONNECTIONS FOR A SMARTER WORLD ARE TRADEMARKS OF NXP B.V. ALL OTHER PRODUCT OR SERVICE NAMES ARE THE PROPERTY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS. © 2020 NXP B.V.
  • 22. 2 1PUBLIC Verifying analytical model using Simulation-Based Fault-Injection • Simulation with RTaW-Pegase, Bit Error Rate = 10-7 Solution Packet Loss rate by analysis Loss rate by simulation Largest 2.44E-3 2.45E-3 Smallest 1.02E-4 1.04E-4 Largest 2.45E-3 2.47E-3 Smallest 1.02E-4 1.02E-4 Largest 1.33E-5 1.34E-5 Smallest 2.36E-8 2.14E-8 Largest 2.36E-5 2.35E-5 Smallest 4.19E-8 4.14E-8 Largest 1.23E-3 1.23E-3 Smallest 5.12E-5 5.12E-5 1 2 3 4 5 Simulation not suited for realistic BERs: e.g., one packet loss every 870 days on average, for a 1ms stream (largest packet size) with BER=10-10