SPECIALE - Talking about energy - Maria Toft

Maria Toft & Svend Elberg Thomsen University of Copenhagen
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TALKING ABOUT ENERGY
THE MAKING OF THE ENERGY UNION
By Maria Toft & Svend Elberg Thomsen
Master’s Dissertation
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen
Academic Advisor: Prof. Ian Manners
Authors: Maria Toft & Svend Elberg Thomsen
Words: 47.454 (135 pages)
Date: 7 October 2015

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ABSTRACT
On the 21st
of April 2014, the Financial Times brought an opinion piece on Eu-
ropean Energy policy. The author was Donald Tusk, then Prime Minister of Po-
land. From that day, the idea of an Energy Union entered the European policy
agenda. In less than seven months, the project became a top priority for the
newly installed European Commission led by Jean Claude Juncker. Due to its
broad and ambiguous formulation, the Energy Union easily gained widespread
support among member states, and it was agreed that the idea should be devel-
oped further.
This dissertation examines the following question: Why is ‘the Energy Union’ on
the European policy agenda? The dissertation applies an abductive strategy, go-
ing between theory and empirics before finding an adequate answer to the re-
search question. We start by applying the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF)
in order to systematically explore the case of the Energy Union and to identify
the most influential variables. Due to MSF’s lack of explanatory power, we look
to the theories within neo-institutionalism for explanations of causal inferences.
The empirical findings suggest that Discursive institutionalism is the best-suited
theory when explaining the making of the Energy Union proposal. In addition,
we add the Narrative Policy Framework in order to improve descriptive power
of the overall theoretical framework. By doing so, we are able to describe how
agents make use of strategic communicative action when marketing certain poli-
cy ideas. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that the Energy Union
should not be ascribed to the 2014 Russian aggression in Ukraine, although this
may have hastened the proposal of the Energy Union.
Instead, we find that the Energy Union is a holistic narrative marketed by main-
ly the European Commission with the intentional goal to give a new impetus for
the Europeanisation of national energy policies. The holistic narrative effectively
combines the different aspects of energy policy. We argue that the new holistic
energy narrative is primarily a result of substantial structural changes that have
taken place over the past decades within European energy policy. These struc-
tural changes within European energy mix, rules and ideology are a result of
competing energy policy narratives that all influenced the need for further Euro-
pean coordination. In order to overcome old barriers for further energy coopera-
tion in the EU, dedicated policy marketers strategically utilised this structural
momentum to promote the Energy Union proposal.

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Acknowledgements
First of all we wish to express our sincere thanks to Prof. Ian Manners, who
guided this dissertation to safe harbor. Second our interviewees; without their
contribution this dissertation would not have been possible.
We are also indebted to Anne, Andreas, Sophus, Leon, and especially Malte,
who spent their precious time making sure that both form and content was un-
derstandable and provided constructive pieces of advice.
Maria would like to thank Skrap, Admiralitetet and particularly Malte.
Svend would like to thank Cecilie, Cosmos and the LM crew.
A special thankyou from both of us goes to Johanne Holm for the beautiful
drawing on the frontpage.
- Maria & Svend

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract 3
Abbreviations 7
1.0 Introduction 8
1.1 Energy on the European policy agenda 12
1.2 The Energy Union 14
2.0 Literature review 16
2.1 Concepts of energy 16
2.1.1$Energy$security$ 20$
2.2 Multiple Streams Framework 21
2.2.1$The$origins$of$MSF$ 22$
2.2.2$MSF$conception$ 23$
2.2.3$MSF$in$an$EU$context$ 23$
2.3 Drivers of change: Neo-Institutionalism 26
3.0 Multiple Streams Framework 30
3.1 MSF outlined 30
3.2 Assumptions 32
3.2.1$Time$constraints$ 32$
3.2.2$Independent$streams$ 33$
3.2.3$Ambiguity$ 33$
3.3 Agents and structures 35
3.4 MSF and the EU 37
3.4.1$Advantages$ 37$
3.4.2$Changes$ 38$
3.5 Delimitations 40
4.0 Methodology and research design 41
4.1 Single case study method 42
4.2 The abductive strategy 48
4.3 Specification of the Problem and Research Objective 51
4.3.1$The$European$policy$agenda$ 53$
4.3.2$The$Energy$Union$ 56$
4.4 Data requirements and the semi-structured interview 57
4.4.1$Reliability$and$validity$within$the$premises$of$the$interview$ 59$
4.4.2$Theoretical$sampling$of$interviewees$ 61$
4.4.3$The$snowball$sampling$technique$ 65$
4.5 Conceptualisation and measurement 68
4.6 Conducting interviews 73
4.6.1$Interviewing$the$elite$ 74$
4.7 Coding and interpretation of data 77

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5.0 Analysis 79
5.1 Choosing Discursive Institutionalism 81
5.1.1$Order$of$ideas$ 85$
5.2 Adding the narrative policy framework 92
5.3.2$A$structuralist$approach:$Merging$MSF$with$NPF$ 95$
5.2.3$The$final$theoretical$framework$and$structure$of$the$analysis$ 97$
5.3 Narratives 99
5.3.1$The$geopolitical$narrative$ 100$
5.3.2$The$market$narrative$ 114$
5.3.3$The$climate$narrative$ 126$
5.3.4$The$holistic$narrative$ 137$
5.4 Ideologies 146
5.4.1$The$realm$of$social$and$economic$transformation$ 148$
5.4.2$Energy$as$an$issue$for$nationSstates$ 151$
5.4.3$Europeanisation$of$energy$matters$ 152$
5.5 Policy marketers and framing 154
5.6 Final hypothesis and analytical process tracing 157
6.0 Discussion 162
6.1 Counterfactual discussion 162
6.2 Normative discussion - the Energy Union a symptom of integration crisis?
165
7. Conclusion 170
8.0 literature 174
Appendix 1 - 14 184
Appendix 15 185
Appendix 16 186
Appendix 17 193
Appendix 18 196

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ABBREVIATIONS
ACER The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
CO2 Carbon dioxide
COP21 Conference of the Parties number 21 (in Paris in December 2015
DG Directorates-General
DI Discursive Institutionalism
DK Denmark
ECB European Central Bank
EESS European Energy and Security Strategy
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EPP The European People’s Party
EU European Union
Grexit Greek Exit (from the Eurozone and/or EU)
HI Historical Institutinoalism
IEA International Energy Agency
ITRE Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
LNG Liquified Natural Gas
MEP Member of European Parliament
MSF Multiple Streams Framework
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPF Narrative Policy Framework
OAPEC Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developmen
PE Policy Entrepreneur
PV Photovoltaic (solar power)
RCI Rational Choice Institutionalism
RES Renewable Energy Sources
S&D Socialists & Democrats
SI Sociological Institutionalism
TSO Transmission Systems Operator
U.K. United Kiingdom
UNSDSN United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network
US United States of America

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1.0 INTRODUCTION
“It is totally unacceptable that Russia is using gas as a political
weapon. The time for a European Energy Union has clearly come.”1
- Maroš Šefčovič, Vice President of the European Commission,
October 2014
Energy has been a centrepiece policy area in the European community ever since
the early days of the Coal and Steel Community. This has become particularly
evident in the recent decade where the important gas supplies to EU member
states from Russia have been affected, where oil prices have first skyrocketed
and then plummeted, and where conventional energy sources have fuelled the
climate debate. Given the early start of energy cooperation in Europe and the
advanced level of cooperation in the European Union, it is in many ways a curi-
osity that energy is not a fully integral part of EU policy-making today. In the
Treaty of Lisbon, however, the European heads of state agreed in 2007 that the
EU should “aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: (a) ensure
the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the
Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of
new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of en-
ergy networks.” (European Union 2007: 135). In the years after, the EU adopted
a series of pro-integration decisions, most notably the energy and climate targets
for 2020 and the Third Internal Energy Market Package.
1
(EurActiv.com 2014)

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Today, energy policies in Europe remain highly nationalised, and changes have
mostly gone through the low politics route via experts and specialised officials in
the administration (Alexandrova & Timmermans 2015: 46). The Treaty of Lis-
bon also provides the legal ground for the member states to determine their own
energy mix. Therefore, energy is still mostly an issue for member states. Howev-
er, in April 2014, a comprehensive energy proposal appeared on to the Europe-
an policy agenda. The debate about this policy was triggered by an article in the
Financial Times by the then Polish Prime Minister (and current President of the
European Council) Donald Tusk (Tusk 2015). The fundamental claim of the
article was that EU member states had neglected the security aspects of energy, a
fact that needed to be rectified immediately. Tusk called for a new policy ap-
proach centred around a new European Energy Union, where the great potential
of indigenous energy sources (e.g. coal, shale gas) and nuclear energy should be
recognised.
As the new European Commission under Jean Claude Juncker took office on the
1st
of November 2014, it made the Energy Union one of its five priority areas for
new legislation. A Vice President was appointed with the sole responsibility of
securing the necessary momentum, and on the 25th of February 2015, the
Commission revealed the first proposal for an Energy Union. The Commission
proposal had travelled a long way from Tusk’s initial article in the Financial
Times. It gave new impetus to further European integration within energy poli-
cy. Aligned with the statement (shown above) made by Vice President Šefčovič,
the main argument to build comprehensive energy cooperation was the recent
Russian intervention in Ukraine. However, if the Energy Union really is a result
of the crisis in Ukraine, why was a new approach to European energy policy not
already adopted after the first gas crisis in early 2006 - or after the Russo-
Georgian war in August 2008? The two events are somewhat similar to today’s
problematic relationship with Russia, yet the Energy Union represents a rather
fundamental re-thinking of energy policies. Yet, the broadly defined concept of
an Energy Union still remains rather ambiguous. This leads us to wonder about

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some of the fundamentals in public policy, which firstly relate to the timing of
the proposal - or as Kingdon puts it: how can we explain “an idea whose time
has come?” (Kingdon 2003: xvii).
Why was the Energy Union suddenly proposed in February 2015 - almost ten
years after Russia first shut off the gas valves? Secondly, we wonder what
shaped the Energy Union and how it differs from earlier energy policies. These
two questions lead us to ask the following research question:
Research question:
“Why is ‘the Energy Union’ on the European policy agenda?”
In order to examine why the Energy Union is on the agenda, we need to uncover
what it is. Thus, we approach the question one step at the time, by first uncover-
ing the explorative aspect of the Energy Union, (1) what is it? Through inter-
views, we collect data and various perceptions of the Energy Union. On this ba-
sis, we will then describe (2) how the Energy Union has entered the agenda. This
identification of variables, and the way they influence each other, will enable us
to uncover causal inferences and thus the final explanatory element in our re-
search: (3) why has an agenda change taken place? These sub-questions implicit-
ly structure our research in which the final research objective is to achieve an
explanatory theory that adequately answers the overall research question (An-
kersborg & Watt Boolsen 2007: 12).
In the present dissertation, we take the reader upon a journey of increased theo-
retical reflection. We start with an empirical puzzle and explore it using a theo-
retical framework. We follow the abductive research strategy moving back and
forth between theory and empirical evidence until we have a satisfying answer to

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our research question. Due to the complex nature of the case of the Energy Un-
ion, we gather data by conducting elite interviews with individual experts on the
subject. We use the interviews as a source of information about events, and to
reveal the perspectives and discursive practices of those who produced them.
This way we gain rich data - and through a within-case method of congruence
using an analytical general process tracing, we will be able to answer the overall
research question.
In order to approach the research question systematically, we use the Multiple
Streams Framework (MSF) as proposed by Kingdon (2003) and further devel-
oped by Zahariadis (2007a). However, while the MSF is a valuable tool to ex-
plore complex policy proposals, it has difficulties explaining the real drivers be-
hind them. Therefore, we make use of an abductive research strategy that seeks
to refine our theoretical reflections and create an adequate hypothesis about the
causes that led to the Energy Union. We therefore turn to theoretical hypotheses
on the one hand and empirical puzzles on the other.
The empirical findings from our interviews lead us in the direction of the neo-
institutional theory Discursive Institutionalism (DI) as developed by Vivien
Schmidt (2008, 2010, 2012). This theory is chosen as we consider it the most
suitable overall explanatory perspective, from which we are able to uncover
causal inferences. However, while DI provides a satisfying degree of explanatory
power, we find that the theory needs further adaptation in order to provide an
adequate framework to assess our data. Hence, we merge the Narrative Policy
Framework with DI in order to identify how agents make use of strategic com-
municative action. The new theoretical framework guides our analysis and un-
covers the dynamic relationship between the various narratives and their struc-
tural premises. This leads us to an overall hypothesis, which we discuss by mak-
ing use of a counterfactual reasoning using the incidents with Russia in 2006
and 2008. Finally, we discuss whether the Energy Union should be understood
as more than merely a symptom of a legitimacy crisis within the EU.

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1.1 ENERGY ON THE EUROPEAN POLICY AGENDA
In order to give our reader an overall understanding of the energy policy area,
and of the developments within European energy policies in particular, we take
a brief historical tour. The review reveals different stages within energy policy.
The energy policy-making has only been high on the European policy agenda
twice. This is sometimes known as ‘the high politics route’ where problems enter
the political agenda as matters of high urgency, and a necessity to respond to
issues in the social and political environment (Alexandrova & Timmermans
2015: 46). However, issues may also become a matter of concern in the social
environment before policy-makers address them. Historical and structural fac-
tors must be considered when examining plausible causal inferences relevant to
our research question.
The first time energy was high on the European agenda since the establishment
of the Coal and Steel Community was in 1979 during the second oil crisis,
where the issue surged to 32% of the subjects in the European Council conclu-
sions. Energy policy narrowly surpassed macroeconomics as the most discussed
topic at the European Council meetings. The surge happened only to disappear
almost completely within a few years. From 1981 to 2005, the subject averaged
around 1%, only to become the second most discussed subject in 2006 when
Russia took a firm grasp on the gas handle. The only subject to surpass energy
in the council conclusions was foreign policy as shown in figure 1.1. Figure 1.1
shows this development by categorising the subjects in the council conclusions.
Figure 1.1: European Council conclusions by subject

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Chart from Alexandrova (et al. 2014) with our modifications.
Table 1.1 shows the general understanding of the developments within the field
of energy policy. The first stage was the founding of the European Coal and
Steel Community in 1951, and the European Atomic Energy Community in
1957. The main objective of these institutions was to guarantee the supply of
energy among the member states. Over the years, the European Commission in
particular made several attempts to modify the treaty law by including a chapter
on energy. These attempts repeatedly failed due to the resistance by member
states that were reluctant to transfer further competencies in energy matters to
the EU. However, by 1987, member states agreed to include the Environmental
Policy Integration principle in the Single European Act (Biesenbender 2015: 23).
Finally, the third stage of energy cooperation started when the Treaty of Lisbon
provided a broad mandate for energy policy-making. This decision enabled poli-

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cy-makers to pursue a number of – oftentimes – conflicting energy-related policy
goals.
Table 1.1: Energy policy and treaty law in the European Union
First stage Second stage Third stage
Time frame Mid 1950s to late 1980s Late 1980s to mid-
2000s
Since mid-2000s
Legal frame-
work
● European Coal- and
Steel Community (1951)
● Atomic Energy Commu-
nity (1957)
● Single European
Act (1987)
● Treaty of Maas-
tricht (1992)
● Treaty of Lisbon
(2007)
Focus of the
EU energy
policy
● Energy security
● Common market
● Environmental
policy integration
(EPI) principle
● Energy as a pri-
ority matter
● Energy supply
● Energy efficiency
● Renewable ener-
gy
● Interconnection of
energy networks
Source: Biesenbender 2015: 24
However, the third stage was still characterised by non-holistic policy initiatives
which member states were reluctant to comply with. In the present dissertation,
we will demonstrate that the proposal of the Energy Union could symbolise a
new stage of European energy cooperation.
1.2 THE ENERGY UNION
On 25 February 2015, the European Commission revealed the first proposal for
a strategy for an Energy Union. The context for this proposal was that the EU
imported 53% of its energy from outside the EU, which made it the largest en-
ergy importer in the world. Six member states depended on a single external
supplier for their entire gas imports and therefore remained highly vulnerable to

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supply shocks. At the same time, the Commission emphasised that wholesale
electricity prices for European countries were 30% higher than in the US, which
has a negative impact on the overall competitiveness. However, the Commission
stressed that the EU still had a leading role within global investment in renewa-
ble energy (EU Commission 2015: 3).
The proposed Energy Union consists of five interrelated dimensions:
“1. Energy security, solidarity and trust;
2. A fully integrated European energy market;
3. Energy efficiency contributing to moderation of demand;
4. Decarbonising the economy, and
5. Research, Innovation and Competitiveness” (EU Commission 2015: 4)
Within the first dimension, (1) emphasis was put on solidarity between member
states to secure a reliable energy supply and an optimal use of energy. In this
way, the EU will be able to speak with ‘one voice’ in global affairs. Achieving
this goal requires new and expensive infrastructure. The Commission suggests
using “all available Community funding instruments” (EU Commission 2015:
5), in particular the proposed European Fund for Strategic Investments. (2) The
second dimension relates to the further development of European energy mar-
kets based on competition, and the free flow of energy with effective regulation
where necessary. (3 & 4) The energy should be used more effectively, and
should preferably be based on sustainable, low-carbon and climate-friendly
sources that will safeguard Europe in the long term. (5) Achieving the last di-
mension would improve innovation and the overall competitiveness of European
companies.

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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we evaluate previous studies in the research literature that are
relevant to the case of the Energy Union. This is done in order to determine the
nature of our research and to clarify where our dissertation fits into the existing
body of knowledge. Furthermore, it will enable us to build upon previous theo-
ries and empirical findings on the subject.
Firstly, (2.1) we review the general approaches to energy in Political Science in
order to understand the area that we are studying. This is needed in order for us
to comprehend the object of our research question: what is energy all about and
why does it matter in our society? It is not our objective to explain the physical
aspects of various energy forms, but to present an understanding of the political
role energy plays, and to clarify the distinct characteristics of energy policy
compared to other public policy areas.
Secondly, (2.2) we will carry out a historical tour of the Multiple Streams
Framework from the garbage-can heritage to its conception in Kingdon’s semi-
nal book. We include the recent developments and adaptations to a European
context, as well as the suggestions for further research in the literature.
Thirdly, (2.3) we briefly look at the drivers of change, as it will become im-
portant at a later stage in our dissertation. We choose to look within the neo-
institutionalisms for causal chains that can explain why the Energy Union made
it onto the agenda.
2.1 CONCEPTS OF ENERGY
We have identified four main understandings of energy in the existing research
literature: ‘markets and institutions’, ‘regions and empires’, ‘environmental un-
derstanding’ and that of ‘distributional justice’. We briefly touch upon all story-

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lines and the different research agendas dealing with energy and elaborate on
how to utilise this knowledge. The understandings are outlined in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Understandings of energy in International Relations
Understandings Markets and
institutions
Regions and
empires
Environment Distributional jus-
tice
Energy is a mat-
ter of
The economy
and supply and
demand. Interde-
pendence creates
peace and eco-
nomic growth.
Security of the
state.
Environmental con-
cerns. Energy is a
means to mitigate
climate change.
Distributional jus-
tice. Inequalities
should be consid-
ered when imple-
menting energy
(and climate) poli-
cies.
Roots in Inter-
national Rela-
tions
Liberalism Realism Governance litera-
ture; Constructiv-
ism; and Poststruc-
turalism; Environ-
mental philosophy
International Politi-
cal Economy; and
World Systems
Theory
Representative
authors
Goldthau & Witte
(2009); Keohane
& Victor (2013);
Youngs (2009);
Haas (1968)
Gilpin (1981);
Mearsheimer
(1995); Morgen-
thau et al. (2006)
Hulme (2009);
Hajer (1995); Mol
et al. (2009); New-
ell & Bulkeley
(2010); Connely et
al. (2012)
Robert and Bradley
(2006); Krasner
(1985); Wallerstein
(1979)
The understandings outlined in table 1 form the basis for discussions about en-
ergy policy. The table shows that energy policy-making can be driven by com-
mercial interests, national energy security, mitigating climate change and distri-
butional justice. Within the recent decades, there have been a rise in studies fo-
cusing on environmental and climate policies based on distinct philosophical
assumptions (e.g. Connelly et al. 2012). Given that the largest component of
greenhouse gas emissions is the consumption of fossil fuels, energy is an im-

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portant component within this understanding. We believe that, in a European
context, the environmental understanding of energy is likely to be found due to
the substantial number of adopted climate policies within the last decade.
The understanding of energy being a matter of distributional justice has its roots
in World Systems Theory and (Realist) International Political Economy. This
approach especially revolves around the North-South divide and the unequal
climate change negotiations, i.e. the unequal negotiating capacity together with
the unjust cost of climate change (e.g. Robert et al. 2006). In this perspective,
the ability to implement climate-mitigating reforms should consider the differ-
ence between the countries’ economic and social stage of development. We find
that this understanding is mostly relevant to global climate negotiations.
However, the understandings of ‘markets and institution’ and ‘regions and em-
pires’ have historically drawn most attention, both scholarly and politically
(Youngs 2009). The fundamental conflict between the two main understandings
of energy is whether the economy is superior to political interests or not. Geopo-
litical views on energy were especially influential following the oil crisis in 1973
where OAPEC punished Western countries for their support for the State of Is-
rael. However, in the following decades, a stronger sense of market rule ap-
peared in the energy sector. Energy security in the geopolitical sense of the
1970s was now “a footnote[…] an empty phrase” (Youngs 2009: 7). The un-
derstanding of markets thus flourished especially from the mid-80s until mid-
00s. While the oil crisis had substantial implications for the political understand-
ing of energy, it also fuelled scholarly works, as seen in figure 2.1. where the
correlation between journal publications on energy and the oil price is remarka-
bly consistent.

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Figure 2.1: Correlation between journal publications on energy
and the oil price.
Source: Hughes & Lipscy (2013: 453).
Recent developments in the Middle East and the most recent crisis with Russia
have re-nurtured the storyline of regions and empires. Energy supply is once
again on the agenda as a political mean of exerting pressure. Political scientist
Robert Gilpin, who writes within the realist tradition of International Relations,
describes the mercantilist model and the object of economic means as ‘the at-
tempt of governments to manipulate economic arrangements in order to maxim-
ize their own interest’. (Gilpin 1975: 45). In this sense, the economic structures
become inferior in comparison to the political interest of the state. States should
not steer the energy policy based on the moods and whims of the market, but
rather based on self-interest. From this perspective, energy is securitized and the
challenge is first and foremost to secure the interests of the nation states.

20
The two main storylines can also be found when within the constructivist ap-
proach to International Relations. This is the case, when discussing the EU as an
international actor – especially within the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
In this perspective, the member states are subject to the dynamics of normative
socialisation and discursive persuasion. Thus, in this view, national interest was
constructed within the EU to be able to adapt to the ‘shared problem solving’
instead of competing against each other (Youngs 2009: 17). In the realist view,
it remains unclear whether energy security imperatives would undermine coop-
eration within EU or push the member states into a deeper self-protecting coor-
dination.
2.1.1 ENERGY SECURITY
Energy security has a number of aspects: long-term energy security mainly deals
with timely investments to supply energy in line with economic developments
and environmental needs. On the other hand, short-term energy security focuses
on the ability of the energy system to react promptly to sudden changes in the
supply-demand balance.
Energy security intersects with a range of wider security concerns because of its
physical nature. Energy security is a prerequisite for obtaining economic securi-
ty, social security, international security, and finally, it is intertwined with envi-
ronmental security (Raphael & Stokes in Collins 2010: 379). An often-used def-
inition is the following:
“Energy security exists when there are energy sources large enough to meet the
needs of the political community (the energy demands), which include all mili-
tary, economic and social activity. Those sources must be able to deliver such
quantities in a reliable and stable manner, and for the foreseeable future.”
(Raphael & Stokes in Collins 2010: 379).
This definition is problematic, however, because it defines energy security mere-
ly as a function of energy needs. Energy security has more aspects. For instance,

21
when the EU blames Russia of intervening in Ukraine and annexing Crimea, the
European dependency becomes a hot topic. However, there is little focus on the
energy import from Norway, although that country is also a crucial energy sup-
plier to the EU. One might then distinguish between negative and positive de-
pendency. The EU relation with Russia could be described as a ‘negative de-
pendency’, whereas the Norwegian example would be a ‘positive dependency’.
Hence, we prefer the International Energy Agency’s definition because it in-
cludes the subject of price:
“The uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.” (IEA
2015).
2.2 MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK
We use MSF to structure our data gathering, and we will therefore spend some
time assessing the field. Multiple Stream is sometimes called Multiple Streams
approach, occasionally the model, and other times framework. We will employ
the latter and use the abbreviation “MSF”.
In table 2.2, we have summarized the applications of MSF so far. Only full ap-
plications of MSF have found their way into the table, as sporadically uses of
MSF-tools do not substantially contribute to the field.
Table 2.2: Works where MSF has applied been applied fully.
Domain/System US EU Other
Theoretical Kingdon 2003,
Zahariadis 2007
Ackrill & Kay 2011
Ackrill et al. 2013
Olsen 2001
Energy Solati 2009
Karapin 2012
Nicole Herweg 2015a
THIS
DISSERTATION
Karapin 2012

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Other domain Zahariadis 2007 Hesting 2009
Ackrill & Kay 2011
Maricuţ 2011
Jeppesen et al. 2013
Note: Applications in italic are master theses.
The table shows that our thesis contributes to a developing field. Most of the
works are very recent, including the only other application in the EU energy
field.
2.2.1 THE ORIGINS OF MSF
The roots of Multiple Streams Framework can easily be traced back to Cohen,
March and Olsen’s 1972 “Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.” (Ol-
sen 2001). The original text is a mathematical model of decision-making, or
what Cohen et al. calls “a simple simulation model” (Cohen et al. 1972: 3).
Scholars using MSF today seldom follow the mathematical approach, and nei-
ther do we in this dissertation.
The scope of MSF’s applications is organized anarchies in which decision-
makers have limited time and attention. The attention span may differ from per-
son to person, but in the context of a large number of policy areas, any decision-
maker is limited to focusing on a few subjects at a time.
Given MSF’s original application in organisations, Garbage Can-model is con-
cerned with individuals: “Problems are the concern of people (...) A solution is
somebody’s product” (Cohen et al. 1972: 3; our highlighting). These solutions
may be rational at the specific time at an individual level, but not at an organisa-
tional level. As we shall see later, this has implications for our framework as we
study organisations, institutions, corporations, and countries.
The Garbage Can-tradition kept developing and today it can be viewed almost
independently of MSF. Below - like in the rest of the thesis - we focus on the
specific MSF strand, rather than Garbage Can-theory.

23
2.2.2 MSF CONCEPTION
The starting point for MSF is Kingdon’s book ‘Agendas, Alternatives and Public
Policies’, published in 1984. Although the book and its theory still employs the
terms used by Garbage Can Theory (Maricut 2011: 3), it is considered the actu-
al starting point for the Multiple Streams Framework. In the book, rather than
just listing concepts, Kingdon manages to put these into context and show how
to use them through his own application.
Kingdon carried out his test over four years (Kingdon 2003: 4). Through 247
continuous interviews with the same public officials, he was able to track differ-
ent agendas and their presence in lawmakers’ and public officials’ minds over
time. This enabled him to track where various policy initiatives/agendas started,
and how they spread or disappeared over time. Kingdon followed ‘agenda set-
ting’, but later, other researchers expanded MSF to the analysis of decision-
making as well.
A major advantage of MSF is its ‘holism’, which goes beyond cherry picking one
causal chain and analysing just one variable. Indeed, as Ackrill & Kay note:
“full understanding of EU sugar reform must integrate all reform pressures”
(Ackrill & Kay 2011: 86). Every aspect plays a part and everything can be in-
cluded.
2.2.3 MSF IN AN EU CONTEXT
The Multiple Streams Framework was originally developed to explain the Unit-
ed States’ health and transport policies. The lens shows how interactions be-
tween leading individuals and institutions in the US federal government can ex-
plain the conditions for successful policy-making. When applied to a European
context, the framework therefore needs to be adapted.
Many have suggested applying MSF in a European context, but only recently
has this suggestion been followed by action. Zahariadis finished his seminal arti-

24
cles with a list of “Recommendations for Further Research” (Zahariadis in Sa-
batier & Weible 2007: 46ff). One of Zahariadis’ first recommendations is to test
whether the approach works in other domains: “Can lenses developed in one
context be extended to provide credible explanations in the other?” (ibid.)
Ackrill et al. (2013) take up this recommendation by adapting the theoretical
framework to the EU.
MSF is in fact quite versatile which the recent applications have proven: with
only a few modifications the framework can also be used to analyse an EU con-
text. Mostly, this can be attributed to its ability to incorporate complex struc-
ture and very diverse actors - something it does better than most other ap-
proaches. Some adaptations are needed, and we will treat this further in 3.4.
(Ackrill & Kay 2011; Ackrill et al. 2013). In the following paragraph we will
give a tour of MSF’s applications to the EU. This will eventually lead to us to
argue that MSF thrives in a complex organisation with many different actors at
different levels.
Peters (1994) and Richardson (2001) were among the first to advocate the use
of MSF in a European context. Peters, (1994: 19ff) however only used a few
isolated concepts (policy entrepreneurs and ideas) without genuinely endorsing
further research. Richardson (2001) engaged more fully with Kingdon’s ideas,
but still did not carry out a full analysis. Maricut, writing in 2011, believed that
MSF was underdeveloped and underapplied in a European context (Maricut
2011: 6). This was probably true in 2011; however, since then the developments
and applications have picked up speed, as seen in table 2.2.
Ackrill & Kay (2011) set out with a puzzle similar to the one in this thesis: “[...]
the 2005 EU sugar policy reform, which occurred after several reforms to other
sectors under the CAP. The paper sets out, first, why sugar was not reformed
sooner” (Ackrill & Kay 2011: 86). They believe that MSF is underdeveloped in
a European context and set out to rectify that. They separated policy entrepre-
neurs from the process of policy entrepreneurship (Ackrill & Kay 2011: 86) be-

25
cause policy windows are kept open longer due to authority that resides in sev-
eral different institutions.
Applying MSF to analyse the European Union is now gaining momentum, espe-
cially since Ackrill et al. (2013) presented a more fully adapted approach to us-
ing MSF within the EU. However, many still do not apply the full framework
(e.g. Richardson in Richardson & Mazey 2015).
Surely, Kingdon (2003) and Ackrill et al. (2013) are the most relevant theoreti-
cal sources for our thesis, but application-wise, the most relevant is Herweg
(2015a). Herweg’s application is recent and applies MSF to the area of energy,
as do we in the present dissertation.
Nicole Herweg addresses the question of why it was only in the late 1980s that
the liberalisation of the energy markets entered the institutional agenda, and
why it was finally adopted a decade later. (Herweg 2015a: 87). Herweg con-
cludes that the rise of energy policy on the political agenda was a result of the
Commission’s success in framing energy matters as a competition issue. Today,
three energy packages seeking to develop the Internal Energy Market have been
passed. Herweg finds the lacking focus on a comprehensive energy policy puz-
zling and analyses the area through the case of the liberalisation of the natural
gas market. The making of the first directive in 1998 is studied in-depth to ex-
plain the breaking down of the ‘legitimacy barrier’ (Herweg 2015a: 88). The
claim is that the low politics route suddenly became a success in terms of claim-
ing authority at the EU-policy agenda. In this respect, we differ from Herweg as
our case is set in a context of external security shocks (2006, 2009 and 2015),
thus explaining the difference in agenda setting going through the high politics
route.
While MSF provides a useful framework for data gathering, it has no ‘inner log-
ic’ or causal chain that can explain change. For this, we look to neo-
institutionalist theories.

26
2.3 DRIVERS OF CHANGE: NEO-INSTITUTIONALISM
In order to explain how institutions and public policy are being created and
changed, we turn to the theories of neo-institutionalism where the ‘second gen-
eration’ neo-institutionalists are concerned with questions such as: ‘How does
institutional change come about?’, ‘Where does it originate?’, etc. (Fligstein &
McAdams 2012; Thornton et al. 2012). In comparison with the old institution-
alism, the perspectives have a renewed focus on how political outcomes are be-
ing influenced by institutions (Hall & Taylor 1996: 937). Neo-institutionalists
are more concerned with stable patterns of action and meaning orientation cre-
ated by social processes of isomorphism, rather than as a reflection of efficiency
considerations (Morgan et al. 2014: 934).
While the Multiple Streams Framework can work as a lens to structure the cha-
otic policy-making within the EU, the theories of neo-institutionalism can also
explain the latent logics and drivers of change (or stabilisation). The theoretical
perspectives can roughly be divided into four types of institutionalisms: Rational
choice, Sociological, Historical (Hall & Taylor 1996), and Discursive Institu-
tionalism, as Vivien Schmidt and others have recently argued (Schmidt 2008;
Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2012). In the analysis of the conducted interviews, we
weigh the various theories against each other in order to identify the logic of
change with greatest explanatory power.
Rational choice institutionalism is essentially based on an actor-centred, inten-
tional and utilitarian ontology (Djikstra 2013: 8). Within an EU context, sover-
eign member states face the dilemma of whether they should perform desired
functions ‘in-house’ or ‘outsource’ them to the EU bureaucracies (Tallberg 2002:
25). This results in a cost-benefit analysis by the member states. By monitoring
and enforcing agreements, the Commission and the Courts of Justice can im-
prove domestic compliance. Rational choice institutionalism stresses that delega-
tion leads to a loss of agency on the side of the member states (Kiewet &
McCubbins 1991). The member states consider these sovereign costs when mak-

27
ing their initial delegation decisions. Uncertainty may result in non-delegation or
less delegation than is functionally optimal (Stone 2009; Miller 2005). Change
can happen when situation or policy environment is subject to external shock.
The focus of sociological institutionalists is a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that re-
sults in institutional development and human action (March & Olsen 1989;
DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Scott 1995). They prefer to study preference for-
mation of actors stemming from the context, rather than analysing their power-
struggles (Checkel 2005). Constructivist approaches suggest (in opposition to
RCI) that member states may delegate tasks for structure-related reasons, rather
than on the basis of calculation (e.g. March & Olsen 1984). In their delegation
decisions, member states create bureaucracies that they consider ‘appropriate’ or
legitimate. Through their experiences, member states internalise notions of what
is considered appropriate. Though constructivists focus on institutions as struc-
tural constraints, there is some focus on agency. EU officials and diplomats try
to reach mutually acceptable decisions as a result of deliberate problem-solving
(e.g. Joerges & Neyer 1997). In this process, the ability to put forward persua-
sive arguments on the basis of better information and expertise becomes crucial
(e.g. Hall 1997; Barnett & Finnemore 1999, 2004; Risse 2000)
Scholars within Historical institutionalism (HI) use concepts of path dependency
and commitment to explain how institutional formations emerge at the societal
level. . Unlike rational choice institutionalists, historical institutionalists place
emphasis on power and politics. HI emphasises not only the operation and de-
velopment of institutions, but also the path dependencies and unintended conse-
quences that result from such historical development (Hall & Taylor 1996).
More recent work in historical institutionalism (Streeck & Thelen 2005) have
focused on incremental institutional change where terms such as layering, drift,
and conversion are central. Change happens when rational actors are engaged in
“on-going skirmishing as actors try to achieve advantage by interpreting or redi-
recting institutions” (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 19).

28
The most recent contribution to neo-institutionalism is Discursive institutional-
ism. ‘Discursive’ as a concept refers to the notion that ideas plays a pivotal role
in explaining change (Schmidt 2008: 305). In Contrasting discursive text analy-
sis where ‘what is being said’ is the main object of analysis, the context of who,
what, when and where is also a central explanatory factor within discursive in-
stitutionalism (DI). The literature has pointed towards similar theoretical
frameworks, e.g. Ideational institutionalism (Hay 2001), Constructivist institu-
tionalism (Hay 2006) and Strategic institutionalism (Jabko 2006). The frame-
work being used and developed by Vivien Schmidt distinguishes itself on espe-
cially two accounts: Firstly, institutional changes are explained by endogenous
change within actors’ ideas and discourses (Schmidt 2008: 309). Secondly, insti-
tutions are not a priori a fact of the case or limited factors. Institutions are seen
as dynamic constructions with the possibility of change through ”a logic of
communication” (ibid.: 322). DI scholars therefore distance themselves from the
three older neo-institutionalisms where institutions primarily work as con-
straints, whether as rational incentives, historical paths, or cultural frames
(Schmidt 2010: 4).
The explanatory power of DI lies in its assumption that human ideas and dis-
course are explanatory variables in relation to institutional change. Therefore,
ideas can be institutions within DI (Bell 2012: 6). Schmidt denotes her approach
as moderately constructivist (Schmidt 2012: 708), and when it comes to change
of formal institutions, the so called ‘rules and regularities’, she is partly inspired
by historical institutionalism in explaining change through crises or incremental-
ism (Schmidt 2012: 707). She acknowledges that institutions can limit agents;
however, agents still have the possibility of criticising institutions by using the
foreground abilities (Schmidt 2008: 322) The foreground is the policy or pro-
gram ideas which are discussed on a regular basis; they are the arena for the dis-
cursive construction of institutions. The actors are able to relate critically to the
institutions. Background abilities are the ‘baggage’ of philosophical presump-
tions. They cannot be questioned and agents bring them everywhere - in this

29
sense, they relate to the Kuhnian or Lakatosian understandings of paradigm or
research agenda. The background is shaped by the institutions but cannot be
criticised by agents. Changes in background happen incrementally or suddenly
during crises, while the foreground is changing constantly in interaction with the
background. In this sense, Schmidt is open to actors as changing institutions.
The change within the individual agent happens as an endogenous process
through reframing and recasting of collective memories and narratives (Schmidt
2010: 5). This leads us to conclude that Schmidt sees institutions as creating and
created structures: “The institutions of discursive institutionalism [...] are simul-
taneously structures and constructs internal to agents whose ”background idea-
tional abilities” within a given ”meaning context” explain how institutions are
created and exist and whose ”foreground discursive abilities” following a ”logic
of communication” explain how institutions change or persist.” (Schmidt 2008:
303).

30
3.0 MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK
After a short introduction and a brief historical overview of the MSF (2.0), we
now unfold the framework in greater detail and adapt it to the case of the Ener-
gy Union. We do this because MSF is structuring our data gathering and hence
much of our understanding of the Energy Union. We use it to obtain a necessary
overview, which MSF provides in a systematic manner. The framework provides
a wide and flexible lens, which is adequate in identifying the most influential
variables to our overall research question. In this section we clarify the sur-
roundings relevant to the case of the Energy Union and the delimitations of the
MSF.
First, we outline the framework in 3.1, and then we discuss the assumptions in
3.2 and what it means when MSF encompasses both agents and structure in 3.3.
In 3.4, we argue that MSF is the adequate lens for exploring EU agenda-setting
and policy-making, whereafter we assess the delimitations of this framework in
3.5.
3.1 MSF OUTLINED
Multiple Streams Framework consists of three streams: 1) policy, 2) politics, 3)
problems, and furthermore the elements: 4) policy entrepreneurs and 5) policy
windows. Each stream is “conceptualized as having a life and dynamics of its
own” (Zahariadis 2007: 1). The independent streams are both the greatest ad-
vantage and the biggest criticism of MSF. An advantage because it creates the
overview that is so needed in complicated policy processes, and criticism because
the different streams are difficult to separate in practice.
Problem stream contains problems that call for policy-makers’ attention. Prob-
lems are usually backed by data or an indicator of the particular problem. Prob-
lems jump on and off the agenda, often having a stronger effect the second time
that they emerge on the agenda. Agenda items perceived as ‘heavier’ push the

31
‘lighter’ items off the agenda as policy-makers’ attention is limited. We explore
this characteristic in depth by examining how agents perceive problems relevant
to the Energy Union.
Policy stream consists of ideas within a certain policy area, e.g. energy. Policies
are not connected to problems, but are rather independent ideas that will jump
onto any policy proposal regardless of whether it represents a solution to the
problem. If an idea refers to commonly agreed upon ideals (value acceptability)
it has a greater chance of succeeding. Also, the idea must be technical feasible.
For that reason, we ask our interviewees how they assess the chances of actual
implementation of the Energy Union.
Politics stream are, in this respect, the ‘surroundings’ to the Energy Union pro-
posal. Not only problems and ideas are affecting the viability of a proposal - the
general attitude is too. In the case of a proposal at the EU level, the general “EU-
mood” is important when proposing legislation. E.g. more powers to the EU
Commission, at the expense of member states, will have a tougher time when
public dissent vis à vis the EU is widespread. The balance of the European Par-
liament is also relevant to the surroundings. However, we do not expect it t be
crucial due to the Energy Union’s early stage in the decision-making process.
Policy windows are the rare moments when problems, policies and politics come
together. This is closely connected to policy entrepreneurs who advocate their
own ‘pet solutions’. The policy windows ‘open’ when policy-makers are aware
of a problem and willing to apply solutions (policies) and politics are not against
it. Hence, the window is where agency and structural momentum meet. In the
case of the Energy Union, we will look for these entrepreneurial events and ac-
tions.
Policy entrepreneurs can be anyone in or in the fringes of the political system.
They have one or more ideas that they advocate and connect their policy to any
problem in order to push it forward. The entrepreneurs frame their ideas in or-

32
der to convince important actors. Examining these framing activities are there-
fore crucial in order to identify relevant agency.
3.2 ASSUMPTIONS
The MSF rests on a couple of assumptions: 1) Time constraints, 2) Independent
streams and 3) Ambiguity. All of these concern what could be called ‘actor-
fails’. Actors are far from the omniscient, all-knowing, rational man that Ra-
tional Choice institutionalism presupposes. It even departs further from the
bounded rationality, as policy-makers can be fooled into connecting a policy to
a problem without there being a connection between the two. In this respect,
policy-makers’ attention shift from case to case without any particular order or
hierarchy, and is directed at one thing for such a short time that policy-windows
often close before entrepreneurs can act.
3.2.1 TIME CONSTRAINTS
The world does not stand still. While the hitherto largest number of refugees
and immigrants are knocking on the EU gates, Greece is close to defaulting, and
consumer lobbyists is frustrated about the TTIP agreement. Indeed, time is a
factor in policy-making - especially in the EU - and time constraints are a limit-
ing factor.
Policy-makers are busy people. They can engage in a limited number of cases
while representatives from all kinds of organisations try to divert their attention
to a large number of different issues. Only a few issues make it to the attention
of policy-makers. The ones that do are oftentimes based on the policy-makers’’
preconceived ideas about the case, the organisation delivering the message, etc.
Crucially, policy-makers “must accept outcomes that satisfice rather than opti-
mize” (Ackrill et al 2013: 872). Therefore, the understanding of focusing events
and problem perceptions become crucial in the MSF.

33
3.2.2 INDEPENDENT STREAMS
The causality from problem to solution does not exist in the MSF. Policies exist
at all times while problems appear unexpectedly, and politics has an individual
life as well. This controversial assumption is criticised as it turns the conven-
tional logic of problem solving upside down. This has to do with the actors who
are unable to know everything at all times. Entrepreneurs are seen as the reason
for the independent streams:
“Multiple streams argues that EU policies are the result of coupling by policy
entrepreneurs of three relatively independent streams—problems, politics, and
policies— during politically opportune moments. Each stream is conceptualized
as having a life and dynamics of its own.” (Zahariadis 2007: 6).
In analysing the streams, we recognize the critique of the rather artificially sepa-
rate streams as the streams indeed sometimes overlap. For analytical purposes,
however, we do believe that the separation has value, in the sense that it helps us
to identify important variables. Reminding ourselves that the purpose of theory
is not to create further confusion, but rather clarification, i.e. creating an over-
view and find causal inferences. After this step is executed, we construct an ade-
quate theoretical framework, which can lead us to answer how and why the En-
ergy Union entered the Agenda.
3.2.3 AMBIGUITY
The multiple streams framework is a lens that can be used to see and explain
how policies are made under conditions of ambiguity. The concept of ambiguity
is appropriate for both the EU policy process and the energy policy area. Feld-
man defines ambiguity as “a state of having many ways of thinking about the
same circumstances or phenomena” (Feldman 1989: 5 in Zahariadis 2007a).
Energy, as we have described earlier (2.1), is an ambiguous policy area that can
be viewed from different perspectives, i.e. energy as markets, geopolitics, distri-
butional justice, or as a means for a mitigating climate change. Ackrill et al.

34
(2013: 873) points out that the EU’s multi-level nature is an additional source to
ambiguity. Furthermore, the multitude of actors only creates an increased need
for a framework like MSF to provide an overview. Usually there is a distinction
between individual policy-makers and policy entrepreneurs due to the difference
in negotiating capacity. However, in the EU context, member states are obvious-
ly more resourceful than, for example, individual policy-makers in the US feder-
al government, and thus the distinction between policy-makers and policy entre-
preneurs can be rather opaque, a critique that has been raised before (Ackrill et
al. 2013: 881).
An important assumption about ambiguity is that actors are often unsure of
what they want to obtain. This is especially the case when time is scarce and
external events shape the agenda. Politicians often - due to time constraints -
make decisions before having formulated precise preferences (Zahariadis in Sa-
batier 2014: 67). In MSF, ambiguity and randomness are not anomalies that
need to be rectified. It is simply a normal EU policy-making process (Ackrill et
al. 2013: 872). In fact, when asking the Danish prime minister about the Energy
Union she felt a need to stress the character of the decision-making in the Euro-
pean Union:
“The great thing about Europe [...] is that whatever crisis we have to deal with,
we deal with it. [...] Even that we have to invent the path as we go along, we
invent a path and we find a way. That goes for the economic crisis, the financial
crisis, that’s the case with Ukraine where we have responded together, and that
will also be the case with the things we see in the Mediterranean sea. Conflict
upon conflict, crisis upon crisis. We deal with it“ (appendix 13: 2).
The ambiguity of the EU policy process is thus a premise for the decision-
making. Clearly, the Danish prime minister is proud that even under these diffi-
cult circumstances the EU is able to make decisions. Ambiguity hereby perme-
ates the process, and makes the process open to political manipulation biased in
favour of those who command information or those who control access to poli-

35
cy venues and communication platforms (Ackrill et al. 2013: 872). The ambigui-
ty of the policy process and the Energy Union proposal itself determines the
foundation for our choice of research strategy. In the methodology chapter, we
elaborate on our choice of following an abductive approach.
3.3 AGENTS AND STRUCTURES
The problem of agent vs. structure is probably as old as social science itself. In a
policy analysis-dissertation, we must address this issue as well. The Multiple
Streams Framework is a good point of departure for an overview of a compli-
cated process because “It draws insight from interactions between agency and
institutions”. (Ackrill et al. 2013: 871). It incorporates both agents and struc-
tural variables.
Our departing point is the quintessential puzzle in all of political science: How
does structure and agents influence each other. Most theories within social sci-
ences can be placed between the two outer positions that A) structure deter-
mines everything or that B) agents can roam independently of the structure.
Agents in particular play an important role in MSF: entrepreneurs can act seem-
ingly voluntarily - and in the MSF perspective indeed no action will happen
without them – due to their coupling of policies and problems. This is only the
‘popular’ (superficial) account of MSF, probably because it is easy to grasp the
concept of policy entrepreneurs. Where the research agenda stands today, an-
other area is more in need of scrutiny. Nowadays a larger emphasis is put on the
‘context’: “No entrepreneur alone will ever be enough to cause policy reform;
we always require an account of the context” (Ackrill et al. 2013: 879). The real
enabler is the context: “The expert and skilled advocacy of a policy idea, or
skilled brokering, in one context does not produce reform; but exactly the same
idea and brokering in a different context does produces reform” (Ackrill et al.
2013: 879).

36
Figure 3.1: Multiple Streams Framework’s position
Source: own depiction
MSF encompasses both the broader context (e.g. public mood) and the specific
situations (e.g. the activities of a policy entrepreneur). Even though the engineer-
ing of a policy window consists of microactions, agents act within a context that
is the basis for their actions: “No entrepreneur can cause policy reform alone;
we always require a set of background conditions for a PE [Policy Entrepreneur]
strategy to cause reform, fixed by a ceteris paribus clause” (Ackrill & Kay 2011:
76).
So, what does this going back and forth sum up? MSF takes a view that lies be-
tween structure and agent, but still lacks when trying to uncover causal infer-
ences. Hopefully we can contribute to this end: “The research agenda endures:
how to understand policy entrepreneurs’ situations in the broader context”
(Ackrill et al. 2013: 879). Thus, it is our goal to refine the theory by supple-
menting it with other useful perspectives.

37
3.4 MSF AND THE EU
As stated above in the literature review (2.2.3), the MSF application to the EU
has been desired for a long time, but it has only recently picked up speed. In this
section, we theorise the main changes that we make to the framework in order
to apply MSF to the EU. First, we argue that MSF is an obvious candidate to use
as a lens for the EU and the Energy Union; second, we highlight a few adjust-
ments to the model.
3.4.1 ADVANTAGES
As seen above, the MSF is particularly useful for exploring systems where the
actors’ participation is fluid and uncertainty rules. This is the case with the EU
where the number of actors is much larger than in the average national political
context.
Fluid participation: While MEP’s are elected for five years, many employees at
the national representations (e.g. COREPER and their subordinates) generally
stay for fewer years and then return to capitals. Ministers and their participation
in the various EU council meetings also change with elections and changes in
governments of member states. This institutional setup also complicates agenda-
setting profoundly. MSF is well equipped to catch this variety. As Ackrill et al.
notes:
“In 2001, Johan Olsen identified the EU as ‘an obvious candidate’ for study
using a garbage can approach (Olsen 2001: 196). He also stated that ‘it may
also be necessary to accept that significant political phenomena sometimes are
complex enough to make any simpler theory of them unsatisfactory’” (Ackrill et
al. 2013: 875).
In Olsen’s words, a theory focusing on only one causal chain is bound to fail,
why we find that a mere deductive approach would risk to narrow the scope of
possible important explanatory factors.

38
Actors and institutions: The EU institutions and member state leaders use hereof
also merits our choice of MSF. This was seen during Greece’s debt crisis where
European institutions like the ECB, the Commission, the Council and the Euro-
zone-countries were on high alert. However, the real decision-making power
seems to be present only when Merkel and Hollande are in the room. An odd
opt-out of the institutional set-up that according to flow-charts and hierarchies
should make the decisions. A similar scene was set when Merkel flew rendez-
vous between Moscow and Washington in an attempt to help resolve the Cri-
mea-crisis in 2014. The MSF as a lens has a broad outlook that ensures to in-
corporate all relevant actors, which is why the multitude of actors is not a prob-
lem.
External events: External events often play a part in major policy shifts. As
Ackrill et al. notes: “the wider the open window, the greater the possible change
– with unpredictable events opening the window wider” (Ackrill et al 2013:
876). External events are important to Energy policy, which MSF takes into ac-
count. Furthermore, lately it seems that EU policy-making has been driven most-
ly by external events: financial crisis, debt crisis, Ukraine-crisis and most recent-
ly the refugee-crisis. Using a lens that incorporates these crises seems appropri-
ate.
3.4.2 CHANGES
Pollitt (2008) believes that “the further one travels from […] the distinctive
characteristics and procedures of the American legislature – the more Kingdon’s
analysis may require adaptation.” (Pollitt 2008: 127). Ackrill & Kay call this
decontextualisation. We build on Ackrill & Kay and others when applying the
lens to the EU. We agree that decontextualisation is a valuable way of develop-
ing the framework to fit many different political systems; however, the frame-
work also needs to be adapted to fit the EU context.

39
Different authors point to different adaptations. In the following, we will focus
on what we believe are the most important adjustments.
The Public Mood: The public mood is inherent to the MSF; however, in the EU
“[t]he existence of an EU ‘public sphere’, a pre-condition for having a public
agenda, is questionable” (Herweg 2015a: 90). It could be argued that the refu-
gee-crisis has created just this. A pan-European agenda with every European
from Lisboa to Helsinki discussing the same events and reacting to the same pic-
tures. Within the energy agenda, however, this Europe-wide engagement is yet
to be seen. Therefore, we put less emphasis on the ‘public mood’ as a part of the
politics stream. This does not exclude the ‘private mood’, however. Lobbying
from private companies, their interest organisations, environmental NGO’s, etc.
is substantial, as this affects many companies and the climate at large.
Composition of governments: Composition of government is obviously an im-
portant factor in national systems. However, this changes at the EU level where
each national government only participate as a part of the Council. According to
Herweg (2015a: 90), we should abandon this traditional partisan way of think-
ing about governments and instead see the governments' influence as a kind of
national attitude. For that reason we also investigate the influence of important
member states.
Personal turnover: Personal turnover is part of the original MSF; however, as
Herweg points out, the focus should be increased and include “personal turno-
ver in positions with agenda-structuring power. This refers to the start of the
terms of office of the Commission President, of Commissioners […]” (Herweg
2015a: 90). We incorporate this by asking our interviewees about the new
Commission, especially Juncker and the Commissioners for Climate and Energy
Union.

40
3.5 DELIMITATIONS
We find that MSF has a good fit - even when applied to the EU. However, we
only apply it to one case, and one policy area, where the Commission does not
have a lot of power: “To clarify: in those sectors where the Union has exclusive
competence [...] ambiguity may no longer be the case, since the Commission
already has extensive powers over agenda-setting.” (Maricuţ 2011: 15). If ap-
plied to another area where the Commission is a much stronger actor, the MSF
may be a poorer fit. Only further studies can tell: “it can ultimately be argued
that the MS model can be very useful for explaining policy-making at EU level
in some areas, but fails short in explaining the factors characterising its policy
process more generally.” (Maricuţ 2011: 15). If the Energy Union ends up
changing the character of EU Energy Policy-making, perhaps MSF will not be an
appropriate approach to evaluate agenda-setting within EU energy policy in the
future.
MSF has another, and for this dissertation, greater delimitation. MSF provides a
framework for exploring a policy area or policy proposal, i.e. MSF explains the
what of our research question. However, the framework has no logic of change.
While it provides an overview of actors and their beliefs, it cannot explain why
actors believe what they do. For this reason, we need to supplement the MSF
with a theory containing alogic of change. For that reason, we turn to the neo-
institutionalist theories for explaining change using the rich data from our inter-
views.

41
4.0 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN
In this chapter we first outline advantages of the single case study method, both
in terms of practical research and of the causal conclusions that can be drawn
from the method. Secondly, we develop a research strategy that seeks to refine
the immediate choice of using MSF as an easily accessible way of understanding
a complex policy proposal, it’s context, content and timing. However, this lens
has its own challenges, as it rather artificially separates policies, politics, and
problems, only to have entrepreneurs combine them once again in windows.
Thus, it’s clear that MSF cannot give an adequate answer to our research ques-
tion and we therefore follow an abductive strategy with the object of refining
theory and its explanatory power. Finally, we formulate data requirements, how
we obtain and assess them, and operationalise interview questions. When em-
barking on this journey, it is imperative to find an approach to the Energy Un-
ion that deals with the plurality of causes. In this chapter we therefore elaborate
on how we do research and how we gain knowledge, whilst being clear about
what principles to follow in our research in order to adequately answer the re-
search question. We therefore explain why we make use of certain methods in-
stead of others.
We are driven by a critical realism that straddles the ontological positions of
positivism/naturalism (as represented in both Popper and Hempel’s work) and
postmodernism/constructivism (as represented in Kuhn’s work) (Lopez & Potter
2005:7). However, we recognise that a social structure exists independent of our
own experience and activity: like Durkheim, we think to some extent that it pre-
exists us. We furthermore embrace Weber’s constructivist maxim, that man is an
animal suspended in webs of meaning that he himself has spun (Moses &
Knutsen: 13). Yet, we believe it is possible for human beings to critically observe
and achieve a conscious understanding of the foundations of society and culture
and act according to this realisation. Therefore, while we do not ‘create’ social
structures, we do transform them. Thus, we align ourselves with one of the most

42
important thinkers in the development of critical theory, Roy Bhaskar (2015).
Critical realism puts forward epistemological caution with respect to scientific
knowledge. Human beings produce knowledge and human beings can be mis-
taken. Science is not pure and can contain an ideologically distorted element in
both explanations and the methods used to conclude them. Hence, we find it
imperative to be transparent about our own background relevant to the research
and reflect upon how our pre-understanding affects the outcome of the research.
However, knowledge cannot be reduced to its sociological determinants of pro-
duction. Truth is relative, to be sure, but there is still both truth and error (as
well as lies) (Lopez & Potter 2015: 9). We are pragmatic in the sense that we
recognise that the world is complex but still expect to find social patterns that
agents act upon and perceive as being real. This starting point will lay the
ground for our epistemology. That is how we establish the accuracy and truth of
our conjectures, perceptions and findings.
4.1 SINGLE CASE STUDY METHOD
How do we create a research design that facilitates and optimises conceptual
validity? In the analysis, we wish to identify the causes that resulted in the mak-
ing of the Energy Union proposal. The case study method offers multiple ways
of strengthening theory testing and developing when conducting no-variance
research designs. Several works in comparative politics have e.g. used most-
likely, least-likely, etc. research designs to good effect2
(George & Bennett 2005:
33). Several pragmatic considerations have led us to choose the case study
method. First, our research object, the Energy Union and European energy poli-
cy, is most easily accessed by qualitative means. Secondly, single case studies
provide an excellent method for assessing causal relationships. Studying and
identifying variables and the causal relation between them are of crucial im-
2
Ronald Rogowski makes this point, citing works by Arend Lijphart, William Sheridan Allen,
and Peter Alexis Gourevitch.

43
portance when wishing to find the drivers behind the Energy Union. Critical
ontologists endeavour to identify characteristics of ‘things’ and their tendencies
of interaction. ‘Things’ in a realist ontology may be powers, forces, mechanisms,
characteristics, or sets of relations (Lopez & Potter 2015: 11). The causal mech-
anisms within our research object are not yet realised, and hence the aim is to
identify the ‘things’ of the Energy Union.
Before moving on, we need to elaborate a bit on the case study and what this
implies for our analysis. George & Bennett defines a case study “as a class of
events. The term “class of events” refers here to a phenomenon of scientific in-
terest [...]. A case study is thus a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that
the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself.” (George
& Bennett 2005: 17f) The recent discussion of the Energy Union on the EU
agenda, for example, is an instance of many different events: crisis management
in regards to energy security, working in the direction of more competitiveness,
a wish to mitigate climate change, etc. But why do we choose the case study
method and not the statistical approach? MSF is not fit for a statistical method
due to its non-linear and contextual character. Statistical methods require a
large sample size; therefore, models of complex interactions with many contex-
tual and intervening variables can become rather difficult to interpret (George &
Bennett 2005: 22). The method of controlled comparison, the study of two or
more instances of a well-specified phenomenon that resemble each other in every
respect but one, seems at first glance to be the most appealing approach. It ena-
bles the researcher to make use of experimental logic to draw causal inferences.
When securing analytically equivalent phenomena when comparing cases, it be-
comes possible to achieve high levels of conceptual validity or ‘to identify and
measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher
intends to measure’ (George & Bennett 2005: 19). However, this perfect setup is
very difficult to achieve (George & Bennett 2005: 151). In the beginning of our
research, we did in fact aspire to design a longitudinal case study design that
compared three events where neighbour conflicts with Russia served as an ex-

44
ternal shock to the energy policy in Europe (2005/06, 2008 and 2014). These
conflicts serve to uncover why the Energy Union - being a comprehensive holis-
tic energy policy initiative - was not proposed until 2014. As initially stated, we
were puzzled that the Energy Union only recently entered the agenda, especially
due to the fact that there have been other focusing events or external shocks that
were similar to the Ukraine-crisis that we are currently dealing with. We are
therefore interested in the agenda setting going through the high politics route as
opposed to the low politics route, the latter characterised by experts and admin-
istrative specialist officials trying to push the agenda (Alexandrova & Timmer-
mans 2015: 46).
The first similar incident was the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in 2005 that
resulted in the Russian gas supplier Gazprom cutting off the energy supply in
January 2006, affecting European countries that were dependent on Russian gas
supplies. A few days later, the gas flow was restored and the situation settled.
However, this had a political effect on the EU member states’ perception of Rus-
sia as a trustworthy gas supplier. The second incident came when simmering
long-time tensions escalated between Georgia and its Russia-friendly breakaway
regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. Russia launched air at-
tacks throughout Georgia and Russian troops engaged on Georgian ground with
forces in South Ossetia. Alleged attempts were made to bomb the Georgian sec-
tions of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyan oil pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline
that both provide fuel to EU member states. Again, this enhanced the distrust
between EU on one side and Russia on the other.
However, it quickly became evident in our research that it was difficult to com-
pare these events, due to many contextual differences. Furthermore, we realised
pragmatically that it was difficult to find individuals who still remember the in-
cidents, and what it meant to the European energy policy at that particular time.
A search through relevant news articles on the subject – in languages that we
comprehend – revealed little more. Last, but not least, we tend to believe that

45
the experimental paradigm promises more than it can deliver. The quasi-
experimental logic seems meticulous and militarily precise, yet findings often
seem to emerge in a prone-to-equivocation sort of way (in line with Pawson et
al. 1997). Instead, we optimised our research design within the single case of the
Energy Union while embracing the complexity of reality and our own embed-
dedness in it. To overcome some of the problems with equifinality that refers to
a plurality of causes to the same outcome (George & Bennett 2005: 157), we use
a within-case method of congruence together with an analytical general process
tracing. The latter method is used to further test the causal inferences made from
the congruence method. Finally, we discuss the hypothesis by making use of a
counterfactual reasoning (as a form of controlled comparison).
The essential characteristics of the congruence method are that we begin with a
theory and then attempt to assess its ability to explain the outcome: the Energy
Union on the European Agenda. However, as already mentioned, the Multiple
Streams Framework is not adequate in explaining the drivers behind the making
of the union. It can only gain a superficial description of what had happened
and not explain why it happened. So far, too much focus has been put on entre-
preneurs as individuals with their own personal life experiences (e.g. Corbett
2005 in Ackrill & Kay 2011). The ambitious goal of MSF is to illuminate the
ceteris paribus clause for the comparative analysis of policy processes (Ackrill et
al. 2013: 87). When mainly looking at the entrepreneurs, this goal will be
downplayed significantly. A ceteris paribus clause signifies an analytically fixed
moment. Ackrill et al. (2013: 880) suggest that more work should be done with-
in the literature of MSF in comparing windows of opportunity. This task has
not yet been fulfilled - or at least not in a satisfactory manner. “Theoretical
work on windows of opportunity where change or reforms do not eventuate is
limited; as is sustained empirical analysis which recreates through counterfactual
reasoning moments where reform possibility appears to exist but where no re-
forms are observed” (Ackrill et al. 2013: 880) Thus, it becomes evident that a
counterfactual discussion of the hypothesis should be an element in the disserta-

46
tion. The priority is therefore not to test MSF, but to refine it so a congruent
hypothesis can be further strengthened (or falsified) by the counterfactual ques-
tion: “Could there have been a comprehensive holistic energy initiative eg. ‘the
Energy Union’ on the European agenda in 2006 or 2008?” and “Why were no
holistic frameworks proposed at these moments?” Therefore, the goal is to come
up with an adequate hypothesis about the making of the Energy Union. Before
moving on to describing our strategy to reach this goal, we elaborate on what an
adequate explanation and congruent theory is.
Adequate explanation and congruent theory
First of all, the final explanation should have a level of concreteness with which
variance in the dependent variable can be measured. The dependent variable in
this dissertation is whether or not the Energy Union (being a holistic energy pol-
icy initiative) is put on the agenda. However, we believe that there are several
social factors (or ‘independent’ variables) that are interrelated and forms a dy-
namic relationship. Furthermore, we expect that the Energy Union itself is an
element with the purpose of influencing other social factors, which is often the
case with public policies. Our task is to uncover the various factors and their
intertwined relationship. We aim to end up with a theory that posits a relation
between variance in the independent variable and variance in the dependent var-
iable; it can be deductive or take the form of empirical generalisation. An im-
portant general standard for congruence tests is ‘congruity’, that is, similarities
in the relative strength and duration of hypothesised causes and observed effects
(George & Bennett 2005: 181). Therefore, we must take into account theoretical
reasons why the effect of hypothesised causes might be amplified or sped up -
e.g. due to a shift in the European Commission (agency could serve as a trigger).
This means that we will have a stronger focus on the dynamic between the dif-
ferent variables when identified adequately.
To deal with the possibility of spurious correlation, we will seek to provide a
plausible and a convincing argument that the created hypothesis fits our re-

47
search data well, and is not rivalled by competing theories, or at least is better
than conceivable alternative theories (ibid.: 184). The more evidence we can pre-
sent in line with our reconstruction of ’things’, the more convincing our hypoth-
esis will be. But, even though our theory complies with these standards, and
there is no convincing counter-evidence, it can be questionable to draw causal
inferences from congruence observation as not every correlation indicates a
causal relation. Correlation between presumed causes and effects may be due to
other, unobserved factors (George & Bennett 2005: 133). Hence, we need to be
sensitive to possible confounding influences to the making of the Energy Union.
Process tracing is a type of method that directly addresses the causal mecha-
nisms linking initial conditions with eventual outcomes (ibid.: 205ff; Collier
2011). However, it is of crucial importance that the variant of process tracing
being employed fits the nature of the causal process embedded in the phenome-
non being investigated (George & Bennett 2005: 213). The variant can take the
form of a detailed narrative (highly specific without explicit use of theory),
which is often the case when doing inductive descriptive research. It is, however,
common that the investigator starts out with a theoretical hypothesis and begins
to collect evidence to support it. The process tracing can then aim to foster an
analytical causal explanation couched in explicit narrative form. This is usually
as detailed as the narrative process tracing. However, because we use an abduc-
tive strategy, the final hypothesis about the causal relationship is created after
the data collection. Thus, the data necessary for a detailed analytical explana-
tion will, with great probability, be lacking. However, we take the stand that we
do not wish to narrow down the explanation to minute detailed events in order
to uncover the larger picture of change and the dynamic structure and agent. If
there is too much focus on several single events, this can blur the overall level of
explanation. Therefore, we will also consider in our general process tracing how
grand changes within historical, social and political structures may have influ-
enced the making of the Energy Union. Thus we aim to construct an explanation
couched at a higher level of generality and abstraction, using a more general

48
process tracing together with counterfactual reasoning to support our main
method of congruence (ibid.: 211).
Before specifying the problem and research objective in order to guide the re-
search further, we wish to give the reader an understanding of the research jour-
ney and the iterative process of reasoning. We aim to develop our theory using
an abductive strategy, which refers to an inferential process of producing new
hypotheses and theories, based on regularly assessments on our empirical find-
ings. This is crucial to understand how we collect and process data.
4.2 THE ABDUCTIVE STRATEGY
We follow an abductive approach to our case. The reason is firstly that at the
time of writing this dissertation, the Energy Union is a new phenomenon and
thus undescribed in literature. On the face of it, this would seem to call for an
inductive approach. However, we are more curious to know why the Energy
Union has come about than merely describing empirically how it has come
about, which we believe would be the result of a purely inductive approach.
Thus, we need to regularly test our theoretical expectations. Secondly, we em-
brace the fact that our theoretical slate is not clean. We do have some expecta-
tions about the Energy Union. This leads us to believe that it is possible to iden-
tify the concepts in MSF in our case. However, we know that this theoretical
approach cannot give an adequate answer to our question. Therefore, it would
be flawed and unambitious to reduce the level of complexity by narrowing it
down to one explanation in MSF at the expense of many different theoretical
explanations. The American philosopher Charles Pierce explains the differences
in strategies of reasoning:

49
“Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only
logical operation which introduces any new ideas; for induction does nothing
but determine a value, and deduction merely involves the necessary consequenc-
es of a pure hypothesis” (Peirce 1934: 171)
When choosing the abductive approach as our research strategy, we align our-
selves with the German sociologist Jo Reichertz who describes the very premise
of the sociology of knowledge. In this respect, we therefore embrace the fact that
we as researchers and human beings have a natural ‘feeling’ for knowledge. This
is not to say that it is the same type of feeling as disgust or shame, but it is just
as basic (Reichertz 2014: 26). Our natural curiosity about the Energy Union did
not start by being the only ‘feeling’ we had. Other ‘feelings’ were a latent frus-
tration and anxiety caused by the many possible answers to our research ques-
tion, together with the complex context of the Energy Union, its many variables
and levels of action. This is, however, a normal starting point for research
(Reichertz 2014: 30), and we thus embrace the feeling of frustration in order to
build a research strategy that acknowledges this starting point.
Our logic of reasoning will therefore not be built upon a stringent deductive or
inductive strategy of inquiry. Rather, we will follow an abductive reasoning that
refers to an inferential creative process of producing new hypotheses and theo-
ries based on surprising empirical findings. This is a way of embracing our criti-
cal realist position because the abductive mode of uncovering inference is, at
heart, a way to explore underlying levels of reality and identifying their mecha-
nisms and events. By using the lens of MSF, we explore the Energy Union and
then decide what hypothesis is worth pursuing. We therefore alternately turn to
theoretical hypotheses on the one hand, and empirical puzzles on the other. We
will regularly assess whether we have given an adequate explanation to our re-
search question. The abductive strategy within this thesis can be illustrated as
follows:

50
Figure 4.1: Abductive strategy within this dissertation
Note: adapted from Beach & Pedersen (2013: 20)
Fear not, dear reader: although figure 4.1 may look like the demented scrib-
blings of a traffic-flow planner, it illustrates merely that we wish to find an ade-
quate explanation of why the Energy Union is on the European agenda. We do
this by adding new theoretical perspectives on the empirical findings that in the
end will give an explanatory hypothesis. Our empirical findings govern the
choice of theory. Specifically, this means that we compare our interpretation of
interviews with pre-existing theory of policy change and on this basis, we seek
to explain the results (Andersen et al. 2010: 73). Figure 4.1 illustrates that we
choose to use Discursive Institutionalism (DI) as the most suitable overall ex-
planatory perspective when aiming to identify causal inference within our data.
However, while DI provides satisfying explanatory power, we find that the the-
ory needs further adaptation in order to provide a framework to assess our data.
Thus, we merge the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) with DI in order to

51
identify how agents make use of strategic communicative action. Additionally,
the indexed codes from MSF are used to describe the structure within the narra-
tives. Finally, we end up with a theoretical framework that enables us to answer
the full research question.
However, while it is easy to come up with a good hypothesis, it is more difficult
to decide which hypothesis is worth pursuing. How should we choose one par-
ticular direction within an endless universe of possibilities? Peirce suggests using
a ‘truth instinct’ (Peirce 1934: 591). However, while we acknowledge that the
researcher has an instinct that is most often worth pursuing, this reasoning is
challenged by the fact that instinct is influenced by the researcher’s cultivated
position. The disposition to perceive the world and its ‘surprises’, including the
very reflection on one’s positions in this world, is predicated by the researcher’s
familiarity with broader theoretical fields. The abductive analysis therefore rests
primarily on the scope of the theoretical background we bring into the research.
Consequently, we will try to be open in terms of various theoretical explana-
tions and weigh them critically against each other. Furthermore, we will reflect
on what our theoretical background means to our analysis.
4.3 SPECIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
After elaborating on our logic of reasoning and our inferential process of collect-
ing and understanding our data, we now turn to the very objective of our re-
search. This is imperative in order to guide our research and point out the prop-
er data requirements. We therefore need to specify our research question further,
hereby clarifying how we understand the different elements and concepts within
the research question. Thus, the taxonomy within the research objective should
become more obvious, and it will work as a structuring guide throughout our
research.

52
The renewed focus on energy policy in Europe did not come as a surprise. It was
obvious that the Energy Union somehow symbolised a common European re-
sponse to the eastern neighbours in the wake of the Ukraine-crisis. However, we
were still puzzled. It was clear that the Energy Union was more than the drafted
proposal the Commission presented on 25 February 2015. It was the first time
that energy policy was discussed in a comprehensive and holistic manner in the
EU. Furthermore, the Commission acted with a different enthusiasm than nor-
mally; big words, a changed communication strategy, and a vice president Mr.
Šefčovič was put in charge of the Energy Union, which in turn was to be show-
cased on ‘the energy tour’ in every member state. Why has so much political
effort and will been put into this specific policy initiative? What will it contrib-
ute and what is understood by it? Our curiosity was further strengthened by the
fact that the Russian-Ukrainian crisis was often used as an explanation as to
why the Energy Union was proposed in the first place. We knew, however, this
could not be the only reason, as the proposal came almost ten years after Russia
initially shut off the gas valves supplying Ukraine.
These surprises were mainly empirical but along the way, we have come upon
theoretical surprises as well. Nicole Herweg’s research suggests that a renewed
focus on energy as a competition issue rather than a security issue fuelled the
energy cooperation in Europe. Thus, a focus on security will not lead to pan-
European solutions (Herweg 2015a: 103). However, the Energy Union may be a
policy initiative that suggest otherwise. Furthermore, Herweg and others (e.g.
McLendon & Cohen-Vogel 2008: 31) suggest that “regarding the explanation
of agenda change, the MSF does not manage to explain it entirely” (Herweg
2015a: 104). Thus, we believe that this dissertation is relevant for both empiri-
cal surprises and theoretical surprises. We hope to transform our wonder into
explanation by answering the research question: Why is ‘the Energy Union’ on
the European policy agenda?

53
The question contains different elements that we need to elaborate on. The ele-
ments can roughly be divided into three: (1) ‘Why’ implies that there is an ex-
planatory and a causal relation between different factors. At the same time,
‘why’ seeks a higher level of abstraction than ‘what’, ‘who’, ‘where’, and ‘when’.
Thus, the sub-questions listed in the beginning implicitly structure our research,
i.e. What is the Energy Union; how has the Energy Union entered the agenda;
and lastly why has this agenda change taken place? (2) ‘The Energy Union’ is
more than the drafted proposal from the Commission presented on 25 February
2015. We need to define what we need to know about the Energy Union and
how this knowledge should be gained. (3) ‘The European policy agenda’ nar-
rows down the area of research. However, this term has its own distinct features
and puts up some natural and much needed limitations on our research. We
start by defining the latter element in our research question first: What is the
European policy agenda and what does it mean for our research objective?
4.3.1 THE EUROPEAN POLICY AGENDA
In this dissertation, we use Kingdon’s definition of agenda: ”the list of subjects
or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government
closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any
given time” (Kingdon 2003: 3). The MSF is both used for analysing agenda set-
ting and decision-making (Zahariadis 2007a). We argue that the agenda shaping
and decision making process in the EU is quite different from e.g. the US. MSF
was developed in a US context, but lately the framework has been applied in a
multitude of different political systems, including the EU (Ackrill et al. 2013:
871). Every political system has distinct characteristics that call for a bit of ad-
aptation, and this is especially true when it comes to a system such as the Euro-
pean Union, which, due to its supranational character, is even more distinct.
Fortunately, we are not the first to explore a policy process in the EU through
MSF. In this, we rely on the theoretical work of Ackrill et al. (2013) who have
adapted the framework to a European context, as well as the recent analysis by
Herweg (2015a).

54
Nicole Herweg argues that MSF’s single coupling process, encompassing both
agenda setting and decision-making, is too imprecise to describe the EU policy
process. This is due to the distinct features of the legislative process in the EU,
which is characterised by the many actors and policy entrepreneurs involved and
several steps in the process. Thus, the streams of policy, politics and problem
rarely remain the same over the whole period of investigation (Herweg 2015a:
91). Herweg therefore introduces an additional coupling process and thereby
makes a distinction between the agenda setting and the decision-making. The
European policy agenda therefore consists of both steps:
Figure 4.2: The agenda and decision-making process in the EU as
viewed by MSF.
Source: Herweg 2015a: 91
The first coupling process is rather similar to the framework used by Kingdon.
However, the policy window is labelled the ‘agenda window’. Herweg describes
the output of the first coupling process as the following: ‘The output of this
coupling process is a worked-out proposal that increases the number of alterna-
tives available in the policy stream and opens the “decision window”.’ (Herweg
2015a: 91). Thus the Commission’s draft proposal on the Energy Union on 25
February 2015 marked the first policy proposal in the decision making process.

55
At the time of writing, the Energy Union is being discussed among the Council
and the Commission, and is therefore in its second stage before actually being
decided upon. If we only focused on the first coupling process, it would bias our
research towards the Commission and their detailed process in making the first
draft proposal. This would narrow down the complexity and cut away im-
portant explanatory variables in our search to answer the research question.
Furthermore, we argue that the agenda setting and decision-making process is
more intertwined than Nicole Herweg suggests. In reality, there will be more
going back and forth, and a more thorough policy proposal will be a result of an
iterative process where different actors (member states, the Commission, inter-
ests groups, media etc.) have gone through a comprehensive negotiation. The
Energy Union therefore needs to be high on the agenda for a long time to
strengthen an actual decision and policy output. So, in our view, the distinction
that Herweg makes is a theoretical exercise that can highlight some of the dis-
tinct features of the policy process in the EU, but in reality, the two coupling
processes are closely related and feed into each other. This means that we also
have to take the current negotiations between member states and the Commis-
sion into consideration when looking at the European policy agenda as shown in
figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: The focus of our dissertation: The European policy
agenda

SPECIALE - Talking about energy - Maria Toft

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