2. 248 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
Keywords
coaching; competence building; conflict dynamics; diplomacy; intractable conflict; mediation; Middle
East; negotiation; gaming; simulation; training
Simulations have long been part of training efforts in international relations.
Teachers of various disciplines and different institutional backgrounds often use
carefully designed simulations to train students and professionals in an attempt
to address learning objectives in terms of knowledge, skills and behavior. A
growing acceptance of simulation techniques in both educational and profes-
sional training programs is in line with the fact that approaches to learning have
shifted from ‘learning by listening’ in the past to ‘learning by doing’ in today’s
teaching paradigm (Ahler et al. 2002: 441).
In general, simulation games are thought to be an excellent tool to coach
understanding in complex subject matters and that the experiential element to
these games adds a specific educational value. In a parallel development, trainers
have embraced the role of personal computers as means to facilitate simulation
processes. However, there is an ongoing discussion on how best to use simula-
tions as effective learning tools. As Baker et al. (2005) argue: “without the evalu-
ation of the impact of games on specific learning outcomes, games will continue
to be categorized as motivating and fun, but instructionally useless.” As a result,
there is still little consensus on how to link specific learning objectives to the way
simulation games are being designed. Given the complex character of most sim-
ulation settings, this is not at all surprising. As Dempsey et al. (2002) point out,
this disconnect may be explained by the fact that occurrences in a gaming envi-
ronment are not easily reduced to a few variables. At the same time, however,
scholars in simulation gaming insist that trainers can and should make an effort
to bolster their argument on the unique educational value simulation games
offer to students. “The challenge is to make explicit or referred linkages between
gaming attributes and learning outcomes, and to tackle issues regarding develop-
ment and appropriateness [of games] that remain unanswered” (Bedwell et al.
2009). This article seeks to contribute to this discussion and argues that a spe-
cific simulation design can lead to reaching pre-defined learning objectives. The
type of learning experience is central to this argument and will be discussed in
the following section.
The Role of Narrative in Experiential Learning
Experiential learning has the power to give students a personal tie to the subject
matter. Drawing from constructivist theory, such an educational approach assumes
that knowledge has a personal meaning and is created by individuals through
narratives (Thanasoulas 2002). Trainers therefore have a facilitating role, in fact
enabling a creative group process where students immerse in preparing their spe-
3. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 249
cific roles. This type of approach goes beyond what early literature refers to as
‘banking education,’ and leads to a more dialogue-based relationship between
teachers and students: “they become jointly responsible for a process in which all
grow. In this process, arguments based on ‘authority’ are no longer valid...”
(Freire 1970: 61). A similar thought comes from Dewey (1966), emphasizing
“the importance of having a student’s knowledge grow from experience” and cre-
ate “a social environment, where students could come together to analyze mate-
rials and to build a community of learners who built their knowledge together.”
In essence, students create their own narrative during a simulation game and
learn from the evolving stories. Kolb (1984) provides a useful descriptive model,
as he defines four learning styles. Players have to do, watch, feel and think at the
same time, and must be adaptive in order to switch between different modes of
play in order to stick to their roles.
This goes beyond a positivist learning philosophy that puts emphasis on the
mere reconstruction of knowledge. Instead, students create new meaning about
the subject at hand and draw on their personal imagination. Students are encour-
aged to inhabit the being of a chief executive, a rebel leader or decision-maker.
At this point, the more emotional aspects of learning come to the fore. The
resulting narratives of such simulations have the power to make students ‘under-
stand the other’: why does a prominent leadership figure find him/herself acting
against their personal value systems? To what extent do high-ranking officials
enjoy or dislike their power position? How do leaders experience personal isola-
tion when facing two equally unattractive options? Some students actually migrate
into their roles and inhabit their character’s mindset. One participant once
claimed: “I wasn’t an American any longer, I was a Syrian.”1
Often, this transcen-
dence lasts well beyond the end of the simulation exercise.
This level of identification is only possible when the simulation design allows
for a level of authenticity about what is probable in the real world. Students are
generally more willing and better motivated when they feel that what they play
is not entirely hypothetical. For example, the learning curve can be considered
steeper when simulating political negotiations with the Taliban leadership in
2009, compared to playing a senior country representative at a multilateral meet-
ing to negotiate an imaginary peacekeeping operation in a non-existent country.
For trainers, it is an appealing thought that more realistic narratives in simu-
lations can enhance the level of motivation among students. For the purpose of
this article, however, this is not the core of the argument. Instead, the power of a
carefully coached narrative lies in the fact that it creates mental ownership over
the unfolding of events. If well integrated into the game design, this can then
feed into specific learning objectives. The project described in the following sec-
tions presents a way of going about this.
1)
Evaluations from simulation exercise University College Utrecht 2005.
4. 250 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
Background of the Project
In 2004, the Netherlands Defense Academy wanted to develop a simulation
exercise for 50 senior military officers. This was part of a nine-week curriculum
on international peace and security, which in turn was part of the so-called HDV –
Hogere Defensie Vorming.2
The HDV is a one-year course for Dutch Major-level officers from army, air
force, navy, military police and civilian staff members of the ministry of defense.
The course is aimed to develop the skills and knowledge needed in order to per-
form in the top management of the Dutch armed forces (which in a country like
the Netherlands often includes diplomatic responsibilities). The course consists
of three main themes 1) international peace and security studies, 2) military
operational science and 3) business and management studies.
The nine-week module on international peace and security focuses on the role
of the officer as a diplomat and gives the students insight into the international
and strategic relations within which the Dutch military operates. The course aims
to give an integral and comprehensive vision on foreign and security policy devel-
opments that are key to the Netherlands’ geopolitical standing. Participants are
also trained in diplomacy skills required for potential future positions in interna-
tional organizations. The curriculum consists of the elements as shown in Table 1.
Under an outsourcing agreement, the Pax Ludens Foundation modified an
existing simulation methodology, building on a year-long experience at Utrecht,
Amsterdam and Webster Universities.3
In order to integrate the simulation into
the rest of the HDV training program, it was placed at the end of the curricu-
lum, with a focus on the diplomatic challenges across the Middle East. Since the
first pilot in 2005, this exercise has gradually developed into a major pillar of the
curriculum.
The original methodology had been used for university courses in interna-
tional relations. At the time, the trainers used note pads for inner-team commu-
nication during the game. The setting for the HDV was significantly larger in
scope. The first HDV program included 48 students, and was supposed to last
for several days. In order to provide a professional environment that could cater
to these conditions, Pax Ludens decided to develop a new software program that
would facilitate communication among the students of the game. The name of
2)
The peace and security curriculum is one of three major blocks of a one-year course for Dutch Major-
level officers from the army, air force, navy, military police and civilian staff members of the Ministry of
Defense. The overall curriculum is being managed by the Netherlands Institute of International Rela-
tions ‘Clingendael.’ The latter has been outsourcing the final simulation to Pax Ludens.
3)
This simulation methodology was developed in the 1980s by Dr. Leonard Suransky. Basic teaching
principles and learning objectives stemmed from his research on gaming methodologies. For referenc,
see “International Relations Games and Simulations: An Evaluation,” in R. Horn and A. Cleaves eds.
The Guide to Simulations/Games for Education and Training, Beverly Hills, Sage Publishers, 1980, p. 163.
5. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 251
the software, InterACT, reflects the idea behind this methodology, combining
the two words “interaction” (communication) and “acting” (role play).
Since the inception of the software, this methodology has been applied in var-
ious university settings as well as professional teaching institutions, with more
than 450 students in total. However, the simulation designed for the Nether-
lands Defense Academy remains the most comprehensive training program, and
therefore provides the basis for the purpose of this article.
Linking Learning Goals to Game Design
The general learning objective for the HDV course is to prepare a carefully
selected group of mid-career staff members of the Dutch Ministry of Defense
to function in the ranks of the high and top-management level. Specific objec-
tives of the simulation include: 1) integrating the separate parts of the interna-
tional peace and security curriculum; and 2) enhancing understanding of and
Table 1: HDV Curriculum Elements
Theme Specific Topics covered
Introduction to
national and
international security
issues
Fundamentals of political philosophy
International organizations
Workshops with members of the parliamentary military
commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU, NATO
Working visits to Paris/London or Berlin/Warsaw
Role of the officer as
a diplomat
Training sessions in negotiation skills, bilateral and
multilateral negotiations
Writing policy papers and policy memos
Current trends in
international security
International law
Dutch security policy and security dilemmas
In depth: European security, ethnicity and conflict,
resource security and international terrorism
Simulation exercise:
The greater Middle
East
Introduction to Islam
Introduction to the Middle East
Simulation exercise (Pax Ludens)
Country and regional
studies
In-depth lectures on US, Russia, China, India, EU
(France, Germany, UK), Latin America, Regional
lectures on Afghanistan, Iran & Pakistan, Eastern
Europe, Africa, Caucasus
6. 252 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
improving personal skills in diplomatic decision-making processes in the context
of international conflict.
Whereas the former objective is of a more contextual nature, the latter focuses
on a skills set that is of particular importance to the Defense Academy staff. In
contrast to civilian target groups, military officers with years of professional
experience in the defense organization are used to, in the words of Kolb, ‘do’
rather than ‘think.’ Staff is expected to deliver, execute orders under the most
daring circumstances, and improvise quickly in order to finish in time. After
10–20 years in the military apparatus, most officers have learned to appreciate
action-oriented behavior, adhering to the principle ‘tell me what to do, and I will
find a way to make it happen’. When confronted with the politics of interna-
tional diplomatic interaction, such an action-oriented attitude can be counter-
productive. The HDV organizers therefore agreed that a simulation exercise
should focus on the dynamics behind the decision-making process, in order to
enhance the understanding of why political negotiations often lack significant
progress. As a result, the key learning objective for the program was straightfor-
ward: to enhance the understanding of political impasse, and to improve per-
sonal skills to deal with it – in contrast to achieving measurable results.
Pax Ludens developed a simulation design tailored for this overarching learn-
ing objective. The concept includes a number of standard steps, including a
preparation phase before the game and a debriefing phase thereafter. In order to
match the needs of the academy, each element of the game design was linked to
the agreed learning objective.
Before discussing the operational implications of such a narrow learning
objective, it is illustrative to look at the way trainers expect this design to come
to effect during the game. The simulation is about diplomacy, and is therefore
driven by the need to engage with other players in order to promote and reach
one’s own objectives. Decisions have to be made throughout the game. They
come in fast sequence and are numerous in kind, ranging a wide spectrum of
issues and political trade-offs (in this case regarding, for example, the Golan
Heights or Iran’s nuclear program), and they have to be made quickly. The HDV
exercise plays with this element of fast-track decision-making, and uses the game
design to create a ‘pressure cooker’, where frustration builds up and players are
pressured to come up with adequate solutions. Students feel the heat of the
moment, and the entire learning experience is intense as a consequence. Every
aspect of the game design plays its part in creating this pressure and contributes
to an environment in which students have to: 1) deal with ever-changing condi-
tions; 2) decide whether to make concessions; and 3) find adequate compromise
in line with their strategy papers. Fig. 1 below visualizes how game experience
influences decision-making under pressure.
Both players and trainers have their responsibilities during the entire process.
The trainers, on the one hand, remain behind the scenes most of the time. They
7. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 253
select the various teams (in the case of the HDV, key stakeholders in the Middle
East), develop the scenario and facilitate the performance of the players during
the game itself. At the end, trainers synthesize the events of the game into a pre-
sentation and feedback session, the final debriefing. The players, on the other
hand, only start when receiving their roles, and are required to create their own
role profile (both individual and per team). They then develop corresponding
strategies for the game. After the game, all players submit a so-called justification
document in order to reflect on the events of the game. Fig. 2 illustrates the
three phases of the simulation design, how it unfolds into separate elements and
highlights the subsequent tasks for trainers and participants.
Taking account of the learning objective ‘understand and deal with political
impasse’, all of the individual elements described above link to the learning out-
comes. The underlying idea is simple: the more students find themselves con-
fronted with political dilemmas, the greater the chance they experience real
Figure 1. Decision-making under pressure in simulation games.
Figure 2. The seven elements of the HDV simulation exercise.
8. 254 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
frustration during the game – and can be coached how to deal with such a situa-
tion. The following paragraphs explain in short how every aspect of the game
design can be linked to the learning objective. This approach is also illustrated in
the figure below, making passing reference to Kolb’s four categories of doing,
watching, feeling and thinking.
The selection of teams and individual roles aims to create and increase ten-
sions between the players. For example, the team of Egypt would include the
president and the intelligence chief, rather than the minister of foreign affairs.
This way, trainers encourage students to find out how difficult it is for a presi-
dent to deal with a political rival who is in control of a significant part of the
security apparatus.
The students then create their personal role profiles based on literature, the
internet and personal interviews with experts. The training staff acts as tutors
during this process, and provides feedback on the evolving profiles. When stu-
dents have finished their profiles, they identify with a particular ‘real life’ charac-
ter. For example, Tony Blair might not only be interested in ‘scoring’ in his
function as British Prime Minister, but also in preparing a possible career as top
envoy for the region after his term in office.
Based on the individual role profiles, students are required to team up with their
‘colleagues’ and create a joint team strategy, which they want to pursue during the
game. This forces students, already during the preparation phase, to find work-
ing compromises between the personal ambitions of their characters (as defined
in the individual role profiles) and national (or organizational) interests.
With the individual profiles and team strategies as major inputs, trainers start
to develop a scenario for the start of the game. This way, students’ knowledge,
ideas, dilemmas and strategic goals are taken into account and create a scenario
with a ‘collective soul.’ While trainers have to ensure an adequate level of realism
when designing these parameters, they take the players’ diverse agendas into
account. Dilemmas can be highlighted; potential tensions can be brought to the
fore. For example, given the current US strategy to stem additional settlements
in the West Bank, trainers can opt to strengthen the conservative elements within
the Israeli government by including in the scenario a recent attack on Jewish
communities.
When the game is on, trainers make sure players keep to their roles and that
the evolution of the game retains an appropriate level of realism. At the same
time, teams and individual players are encouraged to deal with various levels of
frustration. For example, trainers could choose to obstruct the French team’s
pursuit of more active Russian involvement regarding the Iranian nuclear issue.
This is not to say that every constructive attempt at conflict resolution would be
thwarted. However, the software allows for continuous supervision of all com-
munications (as discussed hereunder) and enables the control team to encourage
students to consider all possible bottlenecks on the way to a sustainable solution.
9. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 255
After game playing has finished, it is time for players to reflect on their actions
and justify (in written form) how they view their own performance. If the game
design fulfilled its purpose, students highlight their experiences with personal
frustration and reflect on why impasses occurred during the game (see Fig. 3).
While the game design can do a lot to support such a learning objective, the
HDV training program also benefits from two additional features. First, it uses a
combination of both closed and open scenarios. Second, the developed Inter-
ACT software allows trainers to keep the players in check during the game, and
to draw on quantitative data for the debriefing. The following two sections dis-
cuss these features in more detail.
A New Way to Combine Open and Closed Scenarios
Out of the many types of simulations in today’s training practice, it is argued
that they all have four aspects in common (Wenzler 2008; Wenzler & Chartier
1999). First, a simulation enables you to understand the big picture by helping
students identify elements of a complex problem. Second, it facilitates the cre-
ation of memories of the future, allowing students to test approaches within a
safe setting. Third, it enhances communication between players and leads to a
collective construction of meaning. Fourth, simulations enable greater commit-
ment to innovation; to implement new skills and attitudes.
More specifically, the breed of international relations simulations generally
puts emphasis on the human aspect of learning, adding importance to individual
Figure 3. The link between game design and learning objective.
Trainers
Participants
Select teams
Online research Create profile
coaching
Develop kick-off
scenario
Write
strategy paper
Supervise
interaction
Prepare
debriefing
Gaming
Reflect & justify
choices
Evaluate
Control Team
Create antagonist
players
Nurture personal
identification
Integrate political
dilemmas
Stimulate
personal goals
Safeguard
confrontation
Explain reasons
for impasse
Feedback: deal
with impasse
stimulating political impasse
Kolb’s
learning styles
Diverging (feel and watch)
Assimilating (think and watch)Converging (think and do)
Accommodating (feel and do)
Legend:
10. 256 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
roles, interests and strategies. Simulations continuously demand that students
respond to certain situations, and to adapt when circumstances change during
the game. Many of these simulation exercises therefore revolve around a given
scenario. The scenario gives context and meaning to the simulation and defines
the kinds of limitations they have to deal with. This reflects the classic notion
presented by Suransky in 1977 that there are two factors that determine the suc-
cess of simulations in the classroom: 1) a willingness of the students to research
and develop their adopted roles seriously; and 2) the achievement of specific
educational goals. “Together, these factors promote a special, experiential learn-
ing process which can generate a foundation of knowledge and the motivation
for critical thinking” (Suransky 1980: 163). According to this view, a simulation
that offers a real-life link for students – and does so intensively in the prepara-
tion phase through the students’ own research for their role – is likely to deliver
valuable interactions during the exercise. Highly motivated students tend to take
away with them valuable insights into complex processes, to the benefit of their
future careers. The scenario is the key tool to make this happen. It creates a
(plausible) real-life situation in which all simulated action then occurs – and
provides the foundation for negotiated outcomes of the dilemmas at stake.
Many simulations are based on the convergent model, in which there is an
emphasis on predictable paths of learning. In general, these training programs
use the so-called ‘closed’ scenario, where students are encouraged to make choices
between certain possible, predefined, decisions. Outcomes of these simulations
are – to a certain degree – predictable, and therefore allow for a pre-defined
debriefing at the end of the exercise. As trainers are fully aware of mistakes that
could be made and the amount of alternative outcomes (there is a limited num-
ber of possible combinations in these types of multiple choice scenarios), stu-
dents can benefit from a well-structured training program. Closed scenarios are
particularly useful when one can rely on existing ‘best practices’, such as the case
of learning methods for leadership approaches, management techniques or media-
tion strategies. Trainers of this type of simulation exercise often have access to an
existing body of knowledge that allows for generalizations, and can make stu-
dents appreciate learned lessons by others in similar settings. When teaching
goals include management and coordination, many rely on ICT infrastructure
to facilitate the exercise. This can include various levels of ICT applications,
from calculating the new ‘scenarios’ for a second or third round of play (i.e. in
international economy training programs) to full-fledged computer animations
with a multiple choice catalogue for each individual participant. The latter type
simulation can be very costly (particularly when it comes to military computer-
aided exercises), and critics say that the ensuing learning process is often too
technical in nature4
and that it suffers from the fact that it encourages ‘winning,’
rather than ’learning’ (Prensky 2001).
4)
Frans Kleyheeg, Applied Natural Research Institute of the Netherlands (TNO), interview with the
authors, May 2005.
11. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 257
The convergent model is grounded in the rational actor approach, where play-
ers’ actions depend on rational choices. It assumes that decisions are taken based
on a cost-benefit analysis rather than allowing for the more emotional elements
in human decision-making. In essence, this translates into the key question: “this
is the problem, how do we solve it?” (Christopher & Smith 1990).
An alternative to a closed simulation is based on the so-called divergent model,
which is also referred to as ‘high-fidelity’ simulation (Prensky 2001). These are
designed around more open-ended scenarios, where students have the freedom
to shape the simulation according to their own insights and abilities. These
games often center on a certain set of issues, and students are confronted with a
specific problem: “this is the situation and what could be done?” (Christopher &
Smith 1990). In these simulations, trainers mostly work with a broadly defined
framework, which serves as a guiding principle for coaching students during
the exercise. For example, when it comes to simulating the negotiations around
the independence of Kosovo,5
it might be decided in the simulation design to
not include neighboring states and instead focus on the negotiations on the UN
level in New York.
Within the academic debate, the divergent approach can be placed close to
existentialism, which claims that reality is not necessarily based on rational deci-
sion-making. Instead, it encourages inter-subjectivity as a basic learning princi-
ple. This approach underlines the importance of interaction, and that it is this
dialogue between individuals and its outcomes that is of value. Some argue that
the biggest problem of this model lies in the limited ‘reality-check’.6
As students
are free to explore alternatives, they tend to overlook critical real-life issues (be it
of an enabling or limiting kind), with unrealistic action as a consequence. Kauf-
man (1998) puts it well: “any simulation is only as strong as its weakest team”.
As a consequence, training results of open scenarios often suffer from a certain
degree of disappointment among students about the fact that the experience
might not be applicable in the real world.
However, the divergent model allows for learning experiences on issues where
there are no or little best practices available. This can be the case when exploring
new investment schemes in China’s current political order, or anticipating alter-
native futures for the oil industry.7
It also makes the simulation itself by far more
a product of their own ‘making’. For example, a participant playing Sudan’s Presi-
dent Bashir in a simulation on the Darfur crisis is likely to be more motivated
when simulating negotiations about future options in 2009 than reconstructing
5)
This simulation has been done by The Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG), available
at: www.publicinternationallaw.org.
6)
In the context of simulation exercises, the term realism does not refer to ‘reality’ as such. Rather, real-
ism should be understood as a functional understanding of the right balance between abstraction and
reality.
7)
These kind of scenario-based simulations are being developed on a regular basis by Shell International.
12. 258 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
the 2005 attempt to reach the ill-fated Darfur Peace Agreement. An open-ended
simulation therefore creates the necessary space for ‘learning by doing’.
Both the divergent and the convergent model have their raison d’être. Yet, for
the purpose of training programs in conflict resolution, a combination of the
two might prove of value to trainers. While closed scenarios have a distinct
advantage regarding the structure of simulations and the design of a debriefing
presentation thereafter, open scenarios ensure room for creativity and greater
motivation among students. When integrating the convergent (closed) and diver-
gent (open) scenario models into one setting, the hybrid result provides the best
of both worlds. The trainers take up a facilitating role that provides an open-
ended learning environment, while at the same time safeguarding the highest
possible degree of realism during the actual exercise. Also, this design increases
students’ motivation through a ‘collective ownership’ of the scenario.
While essential for the simulation, realism alone is not enough. For example,
motivation suffers when simulations refer to real-life scenarios that have occurred
in the past. Being a crucial part of the Pax Ludens training method, the scenario
is placed in the immediate future, based on consultations with subject-matter
experts and a multi-disciplinary assessment of the situation at hand. A couple of
carefully considered extrapolations, coupled with the students’ input, then lead
to a ‘future’ scenario. This in turn serves as a ‘kick-off’ reference for the simula-
tion exercise. In most cases, this scenario would be distributed (in written form
or digitally through the software) to the students just before the start of the
training.
This is not to say that such a simulation claims to forecast future develop-
ments. Rather, students are encouraged to pose the question: ‘what if...?’ For
example, a simulation would start with a scenario that confirms the election of
Barack Obama before his actual victory,8
or assumes a Palestinian unity govern-
ment before it came into being. Players therefore have to act fast in order to
adapt their strategy to the new situation (i.e. the standing of Israel’s leadership
towards the new US leadership or towards Hamas).
While it is tempting to suggest that such a hybrid scenario provides an inter-
esting learning environment, it requires well-orchestrated supervision during the
game. This is even more so when it comes to large simulations with up to 50
students. The following section lays out how controlling such complex interac-
tions can be done. In addition, it also shows how trainers can coach students
during the simulation, keeping in mind the HDV learning objective.
8)
In November 2008 (one week before the US presidential elections), Pax Ludens organized a training
course on the Greater Middle East in which Barack Obama was part of the US team. Similarly, in April
2007, Pax Ludens facilitated a training in which the election of French Presidential candidate Nicolas
Sarkozy was part of the kick-off scenario.
13. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 259
Using Communication Software to Keep it Real
In order to offer students a scenario, which features both a thorough (controlled)
teaching structure and a creative (unrestricted) learning environment, one needs
to keep maximum control of students’ action without restraining their freedom
to explore alternative scenarios.9
Combining these two elements might seem a
little contradictory at first, but the authors argue that with some minor innova-
tions (technical as well as managerial), simulations can do just that.
Simulating complex conflict dynamics includes various elements, and manag-
ing such an environment is a complex task. Trainers must have constant over-
view of all events unfolding at any given moment, and be ready to intervene or
coach where necessary. Technology is generally considered a welcome tool for
facilitating these types of training exercises, but although costs are coming down,
it is still an expensive affair. Many forms of technology have become a means to
facilitate training programs: Internet can speed up logistical arrangements, and
online networks often serve as data exchange platforms. At the same, time fully
computer-aided animations are used to simulate complex technical environments,
e.g. flight simulators. In most cases, however, particularly when it comes to social
sciences, there is little or no interest in incorporating substantial levels of IT
infrastructure into today’s simulation exercises. The case of the InterACT soft-
ware illustrates that there is a great, yet untapped potential for IT applications to
support such training courses.
One prominent example in the world of simulations in social sciences is the
‘ICONS’ methodology, which provides an interesting starting point. ICONS is
an initiative that originates from the University of Maryland and has been designed
to offer a fully online learning experience and create a virtual setting for a par-
ticular negotiation process (including online preparations and online debriefing).
As a consequence, its focus rests on the generation of procedural knowledge,
through the exclusive use of online communication: it aims to enhance writing
skills and, by excluding any kind of face-to-face interaction, can claim to
empower less vocal students.10
In addition, ICONS features an interesting detail:
it does not allow students to submit negotiation proposals without a trainer’s
scrutiny. There is a built-in control element for any attempt by players to con-
clude an agreement, and experts check whether submissions are realistic enough
9)
The key of this control process is to constantly assess whether things that happen are realistic and
weigh unrealistic actions in light of the learning opportunities posed by students trying unrealistic
actions. This is a constant dilemma for control, which leads to healthy discussion about the way the stu-
dents learn during the game and gives the flexibility to change things as the game progresses. One
important additional note is that control is never able to maintain objective realism in a fully open sce-
nario, e.g. we probably would not have allowed the Egyptian President to travel to Israel and address the
parliament if we had played the game in 1977, but this did happen in real life.
10)
Retrieved in May 2007 at: www.icons.umd.edu.
14. 260 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
to be validated for the simulation. This process extends over days, sometimes
weeks, depending on the design of the simulation.
It is this kind of control element that software can facilitate even more rigor-
ously. Control over the simulation process enables the trainer to keep a close
watch on the students and their agendas, which is of particular importance to
open scenario simulations. As argued earlier, simulations that provide a maxi-
mum negotiation space through an open scenario but do not maintain a strict
level of reality-check risk losing students who may veer off into unrealistic coali-
tions or initiatives. For example, a simulated peace process between the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government might see students set-
tling for an agreement that excludes the issue of the ICC indictment of the rebel
leader Joseph Kony. The choice by ICONS to allow a submission of negotiation
proposals only after having survived expert scrutiny therefore seems plausible.
However, ICONS uses the online platform to run all communication, and lim-
its its ‘control’ function to the final proposals.
The InterACT software goes one step beyond. It significantly enhances the
level of hands-on review during the simulation process and monitors the whole
process of the evolution of decisions, policies and relationships in real time. The
application is based on the basic principles of an email exchange program. It sets
up a local area network between computer terminals, provides separate accounts
for all players, and channels any given message via a control team. This way,
messages are allowed to reach their recipient only when validated by a trainer.
The software is used in a setting where students have no visual contact when
communicating by e-mail messaging (generally the players are located in sepa-
rate rooms in the same building), but are able – and expected – to set up face-
to-face meetings with each other in order to implement their prepared agenda.
Through the software, it is possible to safeguard realism at this stage of the simu-
lation. For example, some players might attempt to set up a meeting between
two parties that would normally not meet in person (i.e. US senior officials and
Hamas). Reading the incoming messages from party A to party B with the sug-
gestion to meet, the teaching staff can then decide to either validate or reject. If
validated, the expectation would be that party B would not accept the invita-
tion. In other words, students would be given the option to ‘rectify’ their own
mistakes. If meeting proposals and agreements become too unrealistic, the con-
trol function allows for additional intervention, at any given time. This can be
done by messaging through the software, or by face-to-face coaching. This
‘hybrid’ format enables the trainers to minimize restrictions for the players while
keeping the option to re-direct when needed.
The level of control described in the preceding section needs substantial exper-
tise and adequate staffing. This becomes clear when looking at the numbers:
when some 50 players are allowed to freely communicate through the software
messaging system, counts can go up to 1.3 messages per minute on average dur-
15. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 261
ing a simulation period of 15 hours (spread over 3 days).11
While the software
allows for full control, it generates a fast-moving environment with a substantial
amount of messages crisscrossing the network. This might include meeting coor-
dination messages, pre-negotiations before the start of a face-to-face meeting,
press releases or intelligence exchanges.
The task for the control team is to monitor the process and to make sense of
it all. In order to offer a genuine learning experience, there is not only a need
for permanent supervision, but for continuous reflection on the unfolding of
events. As a consequence, the software requires a sizable control team that at first
glance might seem large enough to run the operation center of a military exer-
cise. However, there are good reasons not to limit training staff to the absolute
minimum. The control team consists of a number of experts with interdisciplin-
ary backgrounds. During the simulation, the team is responsible for the overall
management of the simulation and performs a number of functions. It is also
available for assistance and coaching throughout the simulation. In other words,
without an adequate control mechanism, the software itself is meaningless; the
value of the IT application rather lies in its facilitating potential.
One of the control team’s core responsibilities is to monitor and to validate all
incoming messages, the so-called ‘validation desk’. Up to two trainers would be
in charge of this task at all times.12
In addition, the control team runs a number
of specific desks; one would be responsible for meetings and another for intelli-
gence (see Fig. 4). Also, some simulations benefit from one desk in charge of
world press and one for the rest of the world.
Despite full control over all communication, the highest priority for the con-
trol team is to remain in the background. It leaves maximum freedom to the
players and lets players explore new, creative paths in diplomacy. Experience has
shown that intervention in the game is only required if the realistic character of
the simulation is in danger. However, if learning objectives so require, it is possi-
ble to manipulate the state of affairs from behind the scenes, introducing new
developments plausible in the ‘real’ world into the ‘game’ world. Possible ways
of manipulation by the control team include: information leakages to third par-
ties, civil society developments, radical movements’ activities or economic shifts
(such as a failed government bailout during a credit crisis).
The method provides for a learning environment that generates a plethora of
messages, events and meetings. One of the distinct advantages is that, unlike
other simulations, there is no restriction to one or two main issues. Rather, the
11)
Statistics on interaction for the HDV exercise in 2008 are illustrative: 982 total messages, more than
100,000 words written, an average of 8 press releases per team, an average of 54 messages per team, an
average of 1.3 messages per minute.
12)
With no restrictions on the amount of messages per player, the following is indicative: for a group of
25 participants, 1–2 validation staff is appropriate; for 50 participants, 2–3 ‘validators’ would be
needed.
16. 262 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
complexity and the fast pace of this simulation requires students to multi-task,
make decisions quickly, delegate and give priority in order to achieve the goals
stated in their individual strategy. While doing so, they are repeatedly curbed in
their actions by the counter-initiatives of their peers representing divergent
group interests, and they often have to re-negotiate their prepared strategies, an
important aspect in view of the learning objective.
At the end of the exercise, the data generated by the software proves a valuable
tool for the debriefing. The trainers can use visual graphs, based on the students’
own actions, to illustrate communication streams and trends. For example, it is
possible to highlight the difference between the active brokering role of Egypt’s
Security Advisor (contacts with Hamas) compared to a more symbolic role
played by the Egyptian President (contacts with the Arab League). The software’s
data-mining tool can create any type of graph needed to debrief the exercise.
The Method in Practice: HDV 2005–2008
As discussed in the first part of this article, the HDV simulation exercise splits
into seven subsequent elements, each of which links to the learning objective,
and each of which requires action from trainers, participants or both. In order
to present the experience of the 2007 and 2008 HDV exercises, the following
sections combine these individual elements into three chronological clusters: the
preparations (including the selection of teams, the creating of the team profiles,
role profiles and strategy papers, and the scenario development), the simulation
itself (the control team functions and the players’ gaming activities), and the
Figure 4. The functional divisions within the InterACT control team.
Validation Desk:
…validates (or rejects) all incoming messages before they reach the receiving party(s).
The validation desk monitors progress of the simulation exercise and controls messages for their level of realism.
Meetings Desk:
…helps participants to set up their individual meetings, and monitors the meetings.
Any meeting requires stringent agreement of agenda items and a summary report by the chair.
Intelligence Desk:
…provides any information players would like to receive regarding their financial or military capacity,
number of troops in certain areas, poll results or developments elsewhere in the game.
World Press Desk:
…monitors world events and received input from trainers and players. The world press desk is responsible
for providing ‘neutral’ news on events that unfold during the simulation and coordinates media team
Rest of the World Desk:
…represents countries / stakeholders that are not part of the simulation. This desk assumes the role of any personality
that is not among the formal roles in the game with whom a player would like to discuss issues.
Mainstream Mapping:
…keeps an overview of all events and collects relevant data for the final debriefing by comparing actual developments
during the simulation with each team/players’ submitted agenda.
…into the control team:
17. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 263
debriefing (including the players’ individual justifications and the official feed-
back session at the end of the exercise).
The two most recent HDV simulation exercises took place from November
19–23, 2007 and November 3–7, 2008. Both scenario settings placed the ‘world’
two months into the future (January – April 2008/2009 respectively). The game
converted real time into game time, so that 15 minutes in real life represented
one day in the simulation (see Fig. 5).
Both simulations lasted for five working days. The actual simulation started
on Monday morning and ended Wednesday afternoon, with an analysis session
on Thursday and the final debriefing on Friday. A quick, informal debriefing was
held straight after the final message had been sent. Thursday would serve as a
‘free’ day, where all participants only submitted a written ‘justification’ of their
actions during the simulation. On Friday, the control team presented an official
debriefing as a final event. The control team consisted of ten and twelve staff
respectively, including experts in international relations, country specialists and
some support staff from various related disciplines. In addition, a professional
media team assisted the world press desk in gathering information during the
exercise and editing compilations of news flashes for the morning plenaries on
the second and third day.
Preparations: Teams, Roles and the Scenario
At the beginning of the preparations (seven weeks before the start of the actual
simulation), trainers assigned participants to pre-defined teams to represent a
country, institution or political organization. Each participant would play an
existing public, authoritative figure or authority from that particular team. In
total, there were 17 teams in 2006, 14 teams in 2007 and 13 teams in 2008,
with a minimum of two and a maximum of five players per team (see Fig. 6 for
the 2007 mark-up).
In order to prepare for the simulation, participants were expected to research
their character, their team and the relationship with other players in the context
of the Greater Middle East. In order to deliver on the learning objective, the
trainers selected the teams with a view to instigate possible tensions during the
game between antagonistic players. For example, both Blair and Sarkozy featured
Figure 5. Selected moments in game and real time from the 2008 simulation
exercise.
18. 264 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
in the 2008 exercise in order to play out inner-European differences regarding
their national policies in the region.
Before the start of the simulation, each player was then asked to write an indi-
vidual ‘role-profile’ (5–6 pages) about the person they embodied during the
exercise. In many instances, this made participants identify with their roles, as
evaluation responses illustrate:
in the end we reunited Fatah and Hamas. Personally I’m still living in exile and my goal was to return
safely to the new Palestinian state and play a prominent role in the new government. That part was
[not] successful.
In addition, participants worked together with their team members in order to
prepare a joint team profile. The latter could be distinctively different from the
role profile, for example considering the difference in interests between President
Bush and Condoleezza Rice. Finally, participants were required to submit a strat-
egy paper, in which they outlined their personal strategy for the simulation
(summing up the main goals in bullet points). These three documents would
later provide a key input for the debriefings at the end of the simulation exercise
(Fig. 7).
Figure 6. The teams and roles used for ‘The Greater Middle East’ simulation
exercise 2007.
Team # Functions Team # Functions
Egypt 3 President, Minister of Intelligence,
Prime Minister
Jordan 3 King, Prime Minister and Minister
of Defence
European
Union
4 EU Commissioner of Foreign
Affairs, President of France, British
Prime Minister, Quartet Envoy
Lebanon 3 President, Prime Minister, Minister
of Foreign Affairs
Fatah 3 President, Chairman, Prime Minister Russia 3 President, Prime Minister, Minister
of Foreign Affairs
Hamas 3 Head of government, Leader Gaza
strip, Hamas Leader in exile
Syria 3 President, Prime Minister, Minister
of Foreign Affairs
Hezbollah 3 General Secretary, Deputy
Secretary, Chief of Operations
Saudi Arabia 3 King, Crown Prince, Foreign
Minister
Iran 3 President, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Secretary of the Supreme
National S.C
United
Nations
3 Secretary general, Spec. Coordinator
Middle East, Head IAEA
Israel 4 Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Minister of Defense, Deputy
Prime Minister
United States 4 President, Secretary of State, Vice
President, Defense Secretary
Team # Functions Team # Functions
Egypt 3 President, Minister of Intelligence,
Prime Minister
Jordan 3 King, Prime Minister and Minister
of Defence
European
Union
4 EU Commissioner of Foreign
Affairs, President of France, British
Prime Minister, Quartet Envoy
Lebanon 3 President, Prime Minister, Minister
of Foreign Affairs
Fatah 3 President, Chairman, Prime Minister Russia 3 President, Prime Minister, Minister
of Foreign Affairs
Hamas 3 Head of government, Leader Gaza
strip, Hamas Leader in exile
Syria 3 President, Prime Minister, Minister
of Foreign Affairs
Hezbollah 3 General Secretary, Deputy
Secretary, Chief of Operations
Saudi Arabia 3 King, Crown Prince, Foreign
Minister
Iran 3 President, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Secretary of the Supreme
National S.C
United
Nations
3 Secretary general, Spec. Coordinator
Middle East, Head IAEA
Israel 4 Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Minister of Defense, Deputy
Prime Minister
United States 4 President, Secretary of State, Vice
President, Defense Secretary
19. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 265
Based on the participants’ strategy papers and their envisioned agenda’s (submit-
ted after some five weeks into the course, one week before the start of the five-
day exercise), the trainers filtered out some key themes to use as a guideline for
the game and as reference points for the final debriefing at the end of the simu-
lation. As a result, one of the key issues included in the kick-off scenario was
based on the submitted strategy papers: the challenge of forging a National
Unity Government between Fatah and Hamas, and the enormous difficulty to
do so. With additional input from policy experts on conflict resolution and the
Middle East, they then integrated the players’ preparatory work with the real-life
trends that were shaping the political power play in the region at the time. For
both the 2007 and 2008 exercise, the overarching themes could be summed up
in six categories: 1) mediation 2) peace talks (Israel-Palestine, Israel-Hezbollah),
3) proliferation (nuclear and small arms), 4) radicalization (religious, political,
military), 5) energy diplomacy, and 6) politics of exclusion (being part of certain
geopolitical alliances).
In addition to these main themes, the trainers identified a number of key top-
ics that would be monitored during the game. One such issue referred to the
emerging role of China, particularly regarding the Chinese quest for energy
Figure 7. The role of the control team in each phase of the simulation.
20. 266 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
resources (this was considered an important element for the game even though
there was no team to represent China). The control team therefore emphasized
in the kick-off scenario the likelihood of Chinese negotiations over weapon deals
with several antagonistic Middle East players, and the building of a possible oil
pipeline.
Trainers provided relevant background information and coached participants
while working on the preparatory documents (Fig. 8). As part of the HDV cur-
riculum, participants attended a series of lectures on the Middle East and were
provided a selection of articles on the region. A first introduction to the general
rules and features of the simulation was also part of the preparations. In addi-
tion, a tailor-made news-feed provided the participants with up-to-date infor-
mation from a range of selected authoritative online news sources. In order to
ensure adequate preparation, the trainers took the time to coach participants per
team (i.e. a Syria expert would coach the Syrian and Jordanian team, etc.). This
was done largely by distance, through online feedback, by email or telephone.
The coaches spent up to six hours per participant for these contacts. A face-to-
face feedback session at the end of the coaching period served as a last chance to
discuss ‘role research’ in person. As part of these feedback efforts, coaches would
keep in mind the importance of ‘antagonistic players’ in the game design. In
order to do so, they advised participants to take account of the personal back-
grounds of their characters, such as track records, personal disliking towards
other personalities in the game, or non-political issues such as their family situa-
tion or health problems.
Figure 8. The required elements of a role profile.
21. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 267
The Unfolding Game: Communication, Interaction and Control
On the first day, the teams were assigned to different rooms, and each partici-
pant had his/her own terminal and login. Before trainers started the software, all
players assembled in one of the meeting rooms for a plenary inaugural session.
Each team had a prepared speech that laid out each team’s official view on the
situation in the region (the speech could be delivered by the highest ranking
official or, if in line with a team’s strategy, a lower ranking representative). Only
then were the teams allowed to start communicating – through the software and
scheduled meetings – with their counterparts. With 48 players online, the con-
trol team included two trainers to attend full-time to the validation task, moni-
toring the content of all incoming messages.
Each player had a range of options in order to engage with others during the
game. First, participants could send standard messages as basic means of com-
munication, such as information exchange, lobbying or preparing the grounds
for face-to-face meetings. Second, meeting requests from individual players alerted
the meeting desk that a number of actors had decided to meet in person to
discuss a clearly negotiated agenda. The control team would then decide on a
case-by-case basis whether to send trainers to observe specific meetings. Third,
intelligence messages could be sent to the intelligence desk in order to receive
specific information about a team’s own (or their adversaries’) capabilities.
Fourth, participants could opt to send out press releases (only per team, not per
individual player). The world press desk would monitor these messages and
Figure 9. The InterACT participant interface.
22. 268 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
gather additional information by holding interviews with certain players at cer-
tain moments. For example, the TV crew went to interview Syrian President
Bashir after he came out of a meeting with President Ahmadinejad in order to
record his take on the diplomatic encounter with his Iranian counterpart.
The last, ultimate ‘tool’ available to participants could have drastic conse-
quences. The so-called ‘action request’ gives individual players or teams the oppor-
tunity to change the current status quo of the simulation. The example below
shows that in order for the control team to approve such a move, participants
have to make an analysis of the situation and consider various options. They also
have to argue how their action will impact the game (see Fig. 10).
The control team – and in particular the validation desk – is tasked with keep-
ing a watchful eye on the level of realism of the simulation. In order to do this,
trainers could reject every seemingly unrealistic message. As argued earlier, how-
ever, the Pax Ludens methodology gives preference to the peer review effect,
assuming that participants tend to correct and remind each other of their mis-
takes.13
Still, there are moments when control can re-direct the simulation to
safeguard reality and, more importantly, the learning objectives. For example,
the control team sends targeted messages in order to confront an intransigent
Israeli cabinet with evidence that President Obama is considering to withdraw
13)
In effect, the majority of messages sent during the 2006, 2007 and 2008 simulations were validated;
only 5% of all messages were rejected by the control team on average.
Figure 10. Example of a submitted action request.
23. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 269
the United States blanket veto protection in the UN Security Council if they
refuse to stop any building or expansion of existing settlements. A less subtle
way to influence the events of the game could include the intelligence desk
inserting a successful Hamas attack to send a Kassam rocket deeper into the Ash-
kelon area of Israel where it happens to cause a direct hit on a military convoy.
The resulting gaming environment is complex, fast-paced and extremely
dynamic. The open-ended scenario encourages players to become actively involved,
to find new ways to achieve their personal and team agendas. Because partici-
pants have invested some serious thinking into their preparations and benefited
from professional coaching, the game quickly leads to high quality ‘diplomatic’
interaction that often features very detailed, technocratic debates on the various
issues at stake in the region. The selected main themes serve as a rough guideline
and enable the trainers to facilitate the process with a view to prepare a pointed
debriefing at the end of the game.
Meanwhile, the participants work under pressure, forced to deal with the vol-
ume of messages, parallel meetings and the necessary diplomatic balancing acts.
They have to think fast, act quickly, persuade judiciously, and always prioritize
given the limited time at their disposal. Invariably mistakes are made, and impasse
and frustration quickly become a reality. However it is these very missteps and
miscalculations that enable the participants to appreciate how important it is to
prioritize and decide what issues are central to their strategic goals, and which to
let go of as peripheral. They also come to appreciate how difficult it is to focus
their team’s attention on achieving a carefully thought out proposal, as they sort
through the deluge of messages from other teams trying to do the same.
Debriefing: Justification and Feedback
The personal experiences from the simulation are intense and useful; however
the learning effect depends on a thorough analysis thereafter. There were two
debriefing elements as part of each simulation. The first informal style debriefing
session took place at the end of the last gaming day, Wednesday. During this first
‘hot wash up,’ everybody was free to give a quick contribution from his/her per-
spective to unravel what had happened in the game, to lay bare secret agendas,
present clever strategies, unravel betrayals – all critical fodder for the learning
experience. On Thursday, participants were free, except for the submission of a
one-page justification document including their reading into what had hap-
pened to their original strategies and why. They also filled in a short a multiple-
choice questionnaire on their experiences during the game.
The final debriefing took place on Friday morning and was based on the care-
ful analysis of the players’ original agendas, actual events during the gaming
hours, the justifications and the vast amounts of collected data on players’ gam-
ing interactions. As part of the debriefing (and the plenary presentation thereof),
InterACT proves a valuable asset: the software is able to generate graphical
24. 270 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
overviews and research all interaction patterns, and can help to identify and
explain the underlying dynamics of the game (see Figure 11).
Learning from the Evaluations
Since the beginning of this project, a significant amount of data has been collected.
This data consists of participants’ perceptions based on filled-in digital question-
naires, as well as communication patterns stored by the InterACT software. This,
in combination with the experiences gathered during the four years of the HDV
training program, provides some interesting insights on how this type method-
ology contributes to simulation gaming – both in general terms and, more
importantly, when it comes to reaching specific learning objectives.
General Observations
Before discussing the participants’ judgment regarding the overall learning objec-
tive of the HDV simulation exercises, it seems useful to reflect on the more gen-
eral experiences gathered during the various HDV debriefing sessions between
2005 and 2008. They allow for four key observations.
First, from a trainer’s perspective, the strategy papers prove particularly useful
for the training staff to prepare the debriefing session. Comparing the different
Figure 11. Illustrative graph from the HDV debriefing 2008: assessing commu-
nication patterns.
25. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 271
documents submitted before and after the game indicates whether participants
are aware of their actions in retrospect. On the one hand this refers to the real-
ization that, in order to succeed diplomatically, one needs to spend a lot of pre-
decision-making time building and nurturing coalitions. On the other hand,
this before-after assessment allows trainers to judge whether participants under-
stand that there is a payoff between a short-term success, such as single-mindedly
hammering home an element of your individual team’s strategy, and the likely
alienating of important allies and adversaries.
Second, there are clear indications that participants enhanced their personal
knowledge about conflict dynamics and the Greater Middle East. Individual
evaluations make clear that the majority feels the simulation contributed signifi-
cantly to their understanding of the region:
this game has been a unique opportunity to give you insight information about the complexity of
the Middle East problems. We have had some fantastic lectures but you will never reach the same
level of understanding as with this simulation game.
Evaluations from 2006, 2007 and 2008 are consistent in this regard. Selected
statements provide some additional insights in how participants judge their new
level of understanding of the region and its conflicts:
Conventional means don’t get you to prepare as well as the game did. You really have to think
about the role you have and therefore also the role of others. This significantly increases the under-
standing of the situation. The preparation in this way is probably more important than the game
itself. The game is needed to create the necessary preparations.
Another interesting illustration for the increased level of understanding is the
decreasing number of rejected messages over time. This indicates that in the
course of the game, players become more acquainted with the intricate details of
the political issues at hand and know how to engage with others in a diplomatic
simulation:
the combination of all the individuals with own ideas creates a different set in which I as one of the
individuals had to learn very quickly all the different issues and strategies of the other individuals
and countries (2008).
Middle East policy experts involved in the game as control team members con-
firm this effect:
While participants specialize in preparing for one specific team and role, in the interaction with
others, they become familiar with the domestic or regional constraints on their opponents making
compromises with them... they become familiar with the making of complex compromises that
each side can sell to their home base citizen or elites.
26. 272 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
Third, the simulation helped participants increase their ability to ‘understand the
other.’ Participants identified with the roles and countries they played and gained
useful insights in the way leaders, countries and organizations look at and deal
with the world: “I learned to look at the conflict through different (Arab) glasses.”
A participant who had played the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas stated:
I found it difficult to get things done, to get deals closed. A couple of times I had a deal with a
country or organization, however having returned to [the capital] the deal was off due to fact that
the highest representative of a country (who did not attend the meeting) did not agree with the
deal I had made with his subordinates.” Another participant explains: “[most revealing was... ] the
impact that the personality of the players has. They are only human beings with their attitude,
characteristics and personal relations. It is not just a game with facts and figures but with emotions
and personal strives.
Fourth, the game contributed to the more procedural aspects of learning: nego-
tiation skills improved, as well as meeting management skills.
[The simulation helped me...] to play chess on the different boards. Give and take in one situation
can help to gain results on another topic.
A different quote illustrates:
[...] as [a] mediator I found that if your are moderate, the negotiations never get stuck (com-
pletely). If you are a hardliner, you get (probably) away with one success once (2006).
A Lebanese delegate from the 2008 simulation stated: “[At] a certain moment in
the process I got stuck because of the differences in opinions and a lack of trust
(on my side I think).”
Linking Game Design with Learning Objective
When discussing the envisioned link between game design and the defined learn-
ing objective to enhance understanding of and improve personal skills to deal
with political impasse,’ it is useful to consider some more insights from debrief-
ing sessions, data sets and evaluation findings.
Clustered in themes, participants’ responses to the evaluation questionnaire’s
open-ended section include: 1) enhanced negotiation skills – greater awareness
of the (lack of) personal proficiency; 2) frustrations when dealing with political
impasse; 3) increased understanding of regional issues in the Greater Middle
East, especially the complex nature of the conflicts and how this creates deadlock
in negotiation processes. The latter two indicate that indeed the frustrations
about political deadlock kept players very busy in the course of the game – and
thereafter.
A similar effect comes to the fore regarding the limited prospects for substan-
tial progress in real life negotiations. When players were asked to list three
27. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 273
aspects or events of the simulation they perceived to be realistic in the context of
the actual situation in the region, the level of political impasse featured high on
the list: 25% of the responses to the question mention tensions, political impasse,
hardliners and the inability to come to clear results. A participant explains: “the
frustration that arises when you deal with so many hidden agenda’s as a negotia-
tor (2008).” – “The very slow process of getting together for talks. This is partly
caused by geographic constraints but also different agendas and priorities.” –
“The very difficult peace negotiations with the Palestinians and the Israelis. Prog-
ress was just as slow and frustrating as in the real world (2008). Adding to these
perceptions, it is interesting to note that more than one third of participants
stated that secret agendas and poor country relations reflect real life diplomacy;
while others emphasized slow progress as a key problem in realpolitik:
it is impossible to make a giant step in the progress towards peace. Small steps are even difficult to
make during multi-lateral negotiations (2007), and maybe Barack Obama can break open the
impasse in the peace process if he gets involved personally.
Another interesting outcome of the evaluation refers to the participants’ personal
experiences during the simulation. When asked to score the seven challenges (as
presented in Fig. 1) in terms of how they impacted on achieving their personal
agendas, participants present a revealing set of key problems (see Fig. 12).
14)
A number of options that were added in 2007 were not present in 2006 and vice versa. We have cho-
sen to omit the responses to this questionnaire to make it comparable. In 2008, the questionnaire was
consistent with the 2007 questionnaire.
Figure 12. The biggest challenges during the game – from a participants’ view.14
28. 274 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
Ranking highest on average for all simulation exercises feature the two aspects
‘unwillingness of others to cooperate’ and ‘unexpected events.’ Other challenges
receive various, generally lower, score levels over the different years. Quotes from
written evaluations emphasize the notion that participants reflected upon the
way they had to deal with political impasse, and how this relates to their profes-
sional background:15
“the awareness that you can also achieve your goals with a
more reactive attitude... (not quite soldier-like!!).” – “Don’t press too much on
results (typical military). Take time and invest in relations. Be proactive, although
in a sensitive way (2006).” – “I have a tendency to go too fast from problem to
solution. In some cases I was too enthusiastic in initial negotiations.”
These findings support the argument that it is possible to directly influence
learning objectives through game design. Unlike the lower scoring challenges
such as ‘lack of information,’ ‘time limits’ or ‘unrealistic aims,’ the game is designed
in a way to enhance the type of challenges that score highest in the evaluations.
Each of the seven elements of the HDV game design enables trainers to increase
the level of antagonism between the players, thereby steering towards more ten-
sions in order to sustain the simulation of political impasse during the game.
Conclusion
Given the HDV simulation experience, the authors suggest that the simulation
setting discussed in this article adds an interesting element to today’s simulation
practice. When it comes to training the military in understanding, accepting and
dealing with political impasse, a carefully conceived game design provides a use-
ful framework in order to make the feeling of frustration a key part of the learn-
ing experience.
The methodology allows trainers to include participants in the development
of the kick-off scenario. The fact that participants’ own agendas are then used
results in more ownership over the simulation, and players become more involved.
When trainers create additional challenges limiting players’ ability to achieve
their stated goals, the training program offers a dynamic environment as part of
which frustration kicks in at various levels.
When it comes to the simulation itself, the InterACT software as developed
for this particular exercise presents a useful tool for trainers in order to control
the level of reality – every time when simulated events unfold during the game.
By combining an open scenario (which leaves sufficient freedom to players in
order to explore new diplomatic avenues) with a closed scenario (which gives
control to trainers whenever deemed necessary), the game design allows for ade-
quate supervision on learning objectives. Coupled with the ability to add ele-
15)
Participants of the HDV course were asked to answer the following questions: How did you perform
as a negotiator? What have you learned about yourself? What would you do differently next time? What
skills would you like to improve?
29. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 275
ments of frustration during the game through the functionalities of the software,
the control team has a range of tools at its disposal in order to create a learning
environment that fits the needs of the target group.
The debriefing also benefits from this particular game design, as trainers can
draw from participants’ own insights and expectations collected ahead of the
game. This way, trainers can compare the players’ justification documents with
their original ambitions at the beginning of the exercise. During the debriefing,
trainers are able to address specific events in the light of what happened, and
why certain teams or players could not reach their set goals.
Notwithstanding these benefits, the methodology is still a work in progress
and has various shortfalls. The most important problems are of operational nature.
First, the set up is comprehensive and requires participants to thoroughly pre-
pare for their roles over an extended period of time. If, in contrast, trainers chose
to distribute pre-fabricated profiles in order to save preparation time, ownership
suffers – a critical ingredient for the HDV exercises. Second, the use of a local
area network and the need for separate rooms for each team requires a substan-
tive physical infrastructure, which also needs to be available for the period of the
simulation exercise. Third, the size of the control team – while one of its strong
characteristics – remains a significant bottleneck. In university settings, this can
be redeemed by using student volunteers in order to fill some of the positions
within the control team (such as the media desk). However, it would be useful
to develop a light version of this game design, which integrates the learning effects
of the HDV experience within a more compact, less comprehensive setting.
An additional problem stems from the fact that the suggested link between
game design and learning outcomes might not work in other learning environ-
ments. Given the specific training requirements in a diplomatic training pro-
gram for military officers, it is possible to pinpoint issues around political
impasse as the overarching learning goal. This is not necessarily the case in, for
example, a university course in international relations. However, it might be use-
ful to consider similar ‘narrow’ learning objectives in order to further the discus-
sion about game design and resulting learning outcomes.
The Way Forward
Reflecting on the experiences from the HDV exercises since 2005, the Pax Ludens
Foundation has been refining the methodology over the years and continues to
work on improvements. Particularly, it would be useful to find ways of applying
this method in other educational settings. The authors encourage suggestions
and critiques from simulation professionals in various fields and disciplines. At
the time of writing, the main modification attempts for this methodology center
on three of the methodology’s problematic aspects.
First, Pax Ludens has developed a pilot simulation that is shorter and less com-
prehensive in set up. This way, it is possible to keep preparation and downsize
30. 276 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
the control team. Also, this type simulation does not require the amount of space
needed for the HDV simulation. Instead, it suffices to reserve two rooms in rela-
tive vicinity. The pilot has been launched in 2008, and first evaluations have
been positive. However, these training programs have not been designed to sup-
port very specific learning objectives, and therefore would benefit from further
adjustment in order to do so.
Second, the software is still desktop based and will be changed into an online
application. This way, there is no need for the client (be it a university or a teach-
ing institution for professionals) to install the software up front, and it opens
the door for additional features such as online control members. The question
remains to what extent it would be valuable to develop new ways of using this
software, moving away from a design that requires all players to be physically
close to each other at all times.
Third, it would be an attractive option to link the game design to the learning
of personal competencies. In order to test this, future HDV simulations will
give participants a greater say in selecting their roles. For this purpose, trainers
would come up with a chart that lists all players, including personal competen-
cies (for each character, trainers would mark the relevant competencies required
from the individual player).16
Participants would then select the top three they
would like to play during the game, knowing which competencies they could
expect to improve during the exercise.
16)
The list of competencies should be based on the standard teaching guidelines as used by the Nether-
lands Defense Academy:
Table 2: HDV Competencies
HDV COMPETENCIES
COMPETENCE KEY BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE
Analyses • Sees the big picture and has an overview of
complex problems.
• Quickly identifies the core of a problem.
• Identifies different ways of approaching a
problem.
• Identifies causal relations in complex situations.
• Makes connections between different sorts of
information.
• Draws sound conclusions from a wide range of
information.
• Employs relevant previous experiences in order
to solve a problem.
31. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 277
HDV COMPETENCIES
COMPETENCE KEY BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE
Vision • Able to take distance from daily affairs and take
into account future developments.
• Has insight into the direction of possible
professional and organizational developments.
• Able to formulate broad organizational goals.
• At least able to formulate medium range goals.
Organizational Awareness • Maps decision-making structures and political
playing field.
• Displays sensitivity towards internal and
hierarchical power relations.
• Takes into consideration formal and informal
rules within an organization when taking action.
• Addresses the relevant actors with the right
amount of authority.
• Anticipates the consequences that one’s actions
have for other parties.
• Makes effective use of the organizational
language and culture.
• Knows who is necessary to create buy in and
participation.
• Aware of developments in other parts of the
organization.
Flexibility • Adapts one’s manner of thinking to correspond
to changes in situation.
• Changes opinion, attitude and approach in case
initial approach fails to work.
• Navigates effectively between the different tasks
and responsibilities.
• Able to function in different terrains.
• Engages effectively with people from different
backgrounds and educational levels.
Awareness of
surroundings
• Interested in societal developments relevant to
one’s own field of work.
• Uses knowledge and capability from other
sources (external) to aid one’s own work.
Table 2 (cont.)
32. 278 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
References
Ahlers, Robert et al. (2002) “Games, Motivation, and Learning: A Research and Practice Model.”
Simulation and Gaming: 441–467.
Baker et al. (2005) “Classification of Learning Outcomes: Evidence from Computer Games Liter-
ature.” The Curriculum Journal: 455–474.
Bedwell, W.L. et al. (2009) “Relationship Between Game Attributes and Learning Outcomes:
Review and Research Proposals.” Simulation and Gaming: 217–268.
Christopher, E.M. & L.E. Smith (1990) “Shaping the Content of Simulation/Games,” in D. Crookall
& R.L. Oxford, editors, Simulation, Gaming, and Language Learning. New York: Newbury
House.
Dempsey, J. et al. (2002) “Forty Simple Computer Games and What They Could Mean for Edu-
cators.” Simulation and Gaming: 157–168.
Dewey, J. (1966) Democracy and Education. New York: Free Press, available at: Classroom Com-
pass, Building an Understanding of Constructivism 1, 3 at http://www.sedl.org/scimath/compass/
v01n03/2.html.
HDV COMPETENCIES
COMPETENCE KEY BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE
• Acts on societal developments that are relevant
for the organization
• Establishes contacts with relevant third parties
(people and organizations).
• Takes into consideration the possible publicity
value outside the organization of intra-
organizational decisions when making these.
• Takes into account the dynamics between the
various third parties when dealing with them.
• Can get along with people from different
backgrounds.
Ability to form sound
judgement
• Makes sound choices on the basis of available
information and is able to justify them.
• Distinguishes between facts, experiences,
opinions and emotions when forming an
opinion on a certain matter.
• Anticipates consequences (pros and cons) of a
certain course of action.
• Takes into account the feasibility of a chosen
course of action when confronted with a choice
between various alternatives.
Table 2 (cont.)
33. U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280 279
Freire, P. (1970) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Penguin Books.
Kaufman, J.P. (1998) “Using Simulation as a Tool to Teach about International Negotiation.”
International Negotiation 3: 59–75.
Kolb, David A. (1984) Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Prensky, M. (2001) “Simulation – Are they Games?,” available at www.marcprensky.com.
Suranksy, L. (1980) “International Relations Games and Simulations: An Evaluation,” in R. Horn
and A. Cleaves, editors, The Guide to Simulations/Games for Education and Training. Beverly
Hills: Sage.
Thanasoulas, D. (2002) “Constructive Learning.” Language Learning Articles, available at: http://
www.seasite.niu.edu/TAGALog/Teachers_Page/Language_Learning_Articles/constructivist_
learning.htm.
Wenzler, I. (2008) “The Role of Simulation Games in Transformational Change,” in W.C. Kritz,
editor, Planspiele fur die Organisationsentwicklung. Berlin: WVB.
Wenzler, I. and D. Chartier (1999) “Why Do We Bother with Games and Simulations: An Orga-
nizational Learning Perspective.” Simulation and Gaming 30, 3: 375–385.
Appendix: Overview of the international security module
Week 1
Monday Welcome and general introduction to the international security
module
Tuesday Introduction to political philosophy, international security studies
and international relations
Wednesday International peace and security studies and Dutch security policy
Thursday International law
Friday Panel: classic international organizations
Week 2
Monday European security
Tuesday In depth security dilemmas
Wednesday Country studies
Thursday Security dilemmas
Friday Presentations on international organizations
Week 3
Monday Ethnicity and conflict / Africa
Tuesday Panel: resource security (scarcity) / international terrorism
Wednesday Research day
Thursday Research and develop policy papers
Friday Research and develop policy papers
34. 280 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
Week 4
Thesis week
Week 5
Monday Country studies
Tuesday Working session with Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wednesday Working session with Parliament
Thursday Working session with NATO/EU
Friday Working session with NATO/EU
Week 6
Monday Security dilemmas
Tuesday NGO Forum
Wednesday Country Studies
Thursday Diplomatic negotiations and bilateral negotiations training
Friday Submit draft of role and team profiles simulation exercise
Week 7
Working visits to Paris/London or Berlin/Warsaw
Week 8
Monday Coaching simulation exercise preparations
Tuesday Submission of final role and team profiles simulation exercise
Wednesday Training day
Thursday Training multilateral negotiations
Friday Submission of memorandum
Week 9
Monday Simulation exercise
Tuesday Simulation exercise
Wednesday Simulation exercise
Thursday Simulation exercise
Friday Debriefing simulation exercise and closing of the module
(cont.)
![248 U. Mans et al. / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 247–280
Keywords
coaching; competence building; conflict dynamics; diplomacy; intractable conflict; mediation; Middle
East; negotiation; gaming; simulation; training
Simulations have long been part of training efforts in international relations.
Teachers of various disciplines and different institutional backgrounds often use
carefully designed simulations to train students and professionals in an attempt
to address learning objectives in terms of knowledge, skills and behavior. A
growing acceptance of simulation techniques in both educational and profes-
sional training programs is in line with the fact that approaches to learning have
shifted from ‘learning by listening’ in the past to ‘learning by doing’ in today’s
teaching paradigm (Ahler et al. 2002: 441).
In general, simulation games are thought to be an excellent tool to coach
understanding in complex subject matters and that the experiential element to
these games adds a specific educational value. In a parallel development, trainers
have embraced the role of personal computers as means to facilitate simulation
processes. However, there is an ongoing discussion on how best to use simula-
tions as effective learning tools. As Baker et al. (2005) argue: “without the evalu-
ation of the impact of games on specific learning outcomes, games will continue
to be categorized as motivating and fun, but instructionally useless.” As a result,
there is still little consensus on how to link specific learning objectives to the way
simulation games are being designed. Given the complex character of most sim-
ulation settings, this is not at all surprising. As Dempsey et al. (2002) point out,
this disconnect may be explained by the fact that occurrences in a gaming envi-
ronment are not easily reduced to a few variables. At the same time, however,
scholars in simulation gaming insist that trainers can and should make an effort
to bolster their argument on the unique educational value simulation games
offer to students. “The challenge is to make explicit or referred linkages between
gaming attributes and learning outcomes, and to tackle issues regarding develop-
ment and appropriateness [of games] that remain unanswered” (Bedwell et al.
2009). This article seeks to contribute to this discussion and argues that a spe-
cific simulation design can lead to reaching pre-defined learning objectives. The
type of learning experience is central to this argument and will be discussed in
the following section.
The Role of Narrative in Experiential Learning
Experiential learning has the power to give students a personal tie to the subject
matter. Drawing from constructivist theory, such an educational approach assumes
that knowledge has a personal meaning and is created by individuals through
narratives (Thanasoulas 2002). Trainers therefore have a facilitating role, in fact
enabling a creative group process where students immerse in preparing their spe-]()