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Religious Extremism, Institutions, and Income: Theory and Evidence ESHIA June,2007 Michael Makowsky H.B. Earhart Fellow Ce...
Extremism, Religious or Otherwise <ul><li>For better or worse, religious extremism is associated with violence </li></ul><...
Extremist Groups and Violence <ul><li>Extreme = High Sacrifice </li></ul><ul><li>Extreme Sacrifice Groups  are not violent...
Why Can Groups Demand Sacrifice? <ul><li>Prisoner’s Dilemmas, Free-Riders, Principal-Agent problems – lots of reason’s why...
Sacrifice And Stigma Model <ul><li>Individuals use time and money to produce Private/Secular (S) and Group/Religious (K) g...
The Functions (key on social interactions)
An Agent-Based Model of a Religious Economy  (Built with the  lovely  MASON java library) <ul><li>Sacrifice and Stigma – s...
MARS – S&S <ul><li>Agents color- and shape-coded by group </li></ul><ul><li>Groups identifiable along a sacrifice spectrum...
 
Extremism as a Percent of the Population Income Substitutability
Empirical Connections – Krueger and Maleckova 2003 <ul><li>Terrorists from a country are decreasing in number as that nati...
Regression Analysis of the Model Quantile Regression Estimates: Fraction Log Full Income Dedicated to Club Production Stan...
ISSP 1998 + Bootstrap Quantile Regression Religion - Work Ratio 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 N -6.557 (2.344)** -13....
Testing Suggested Policy
Policy Test (continued) <ul><li>A public good competitive with the club good reduces the appeal of extremism </li></ul><ul...
Conclusions <ul><li>Substitutability is necessary and quasi-sufficient for Extremist groups to be sustainable. Population ...
The Rest are just Appendices <ul><li>The End </li></ul>
Experiment Parameterization <ul><li>Test Variables – Beta and Mean Income </li></ul><ul><li>Fixed Parameters </li></ul>1 (...
Nash starting condition <ul><li>iterated pure strategy interaction between an agent  i­  and a generic neighbor  j .  </li...
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Extremismpresentation

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Extremismpresentation

  1. 1. Religious Extremism, Institutions, and Income: Theory and Evidence ESHIA June,2007 Michael Makowsky H.B. Earhart Fellow Center for the Economic Study of Religion Department of Economics George Mason University
  2. 2. Extremism, Religious or Otherwise <ul><li>For better or worse, religious extremism is associated with violence </li></ul><ul><li>Are there social and economic conditions under which extremist groups thrive or fail? </li></ul><ul><li>Can we model this emergence of viable extremist groups within a population? </li></ul><ul><li>Can we gain insight into peculiar characteristics of violent extremist groups </li></ul><ul><ul><li>“ Approximately 90 percent of [Hamas’s] work is in social, welfare, cultural and educational activities. These are important elements of Hamas's popularity that keep it closely tied to the public.” - Reuven Paz(2001) </li></ul></ul>
  3. 3. Extremist Groups and Violence <ul><li>Extreme = High Sacrifice </li></ul><ul><li>Extreme Sacrifice Groups are not violent by nature (the heavy majority are entirely peaceful) </li></ul><ul><li>But…extremist groups possess the characteristic group loyalty and commitment necessary for the recruitment and training of martyrs (Iannaccone IJRR 2005) </li></ul>
  4. 4. Why Can Groups Demand Sacrifice? <ul><li>Prisoner’s Dilemmas, Free-Riders, Principal-Agent problems – lots of reason’s why large groups should fail (Olson 1965) </li></ul><ul><li>Religious/Ideological groups manage to survive without contracts, high-cost monitoring, or wage incentives </li></ul><ul><li>Solution: Sacrifice and Stigma (Iannaccone JPE 1992) </li></ul>
  5. 5. Sacrifice And Stigma Model <ul><li>Individuals use time and money to produce Private/Secular (S) and Group/Religious (K) goods </li></ul><ul><li>Religious groups prevent free-riding by Sacrifice & Stigma (S&S) </li></ul><ul><li>Effectiveness of S&S depends on relative prices (via income) and the substitutability of S for K </li></ul>Quick Version High Beta= Happy with one or the other Low Beta= Need a combination of both
  6. 6. The Functions (key on social interactions)
  7. 7. An Agent-Based Model of a Religious Economy (Built with the lovely MASON java library) <ul><li>Sacrifice and Stigma – single group </li></ul><ul><li>Agent-based extension - macroscopic level, winners and losers </li></ul><ul><li>Dynamic, interactive, rules-based agents operating in a spatial and temporal world </li></ul>Max( U )
  8. 8. MARS – S&S <ul><li>Agents color- and shape-coded by group </li></ul><ul><li>Groups identifiable along a sacrifice spectrum from 0 to </li></ul><ul><li>100 % of secular productivity loss </li></ul><ul><li>Lognormal Income Distribution </li></ul>
  9. 10. Extremism as a Percent of the Population Income Substitutability
  10. 11. Empirical Connections – Krueger and Maleckova 2003 <ul><li>Terrorists from a country are decreasing in number as that nation’s civil liberties, as measured by Freedom House Civil Liberties Index, are increasing. </li></ul><ul><li>When Civil Liberties are controlled for, the relative wealth of the country and its illiteracy rate have no statistically significant effect. </li></ul>
  11. 12. Regression Analysis of the Model Quantile Regression Estimates: Fraction Log Full Income Dedicated to Club Production Standard errors in parentheses, all coefficients significant at 0.1% level 52272 52272 52272 52272 52272 N (0.014) (0.032) (0.014) (0.022) (0.001) 1.519 1.173 -2.543 -4.959 -9.12 Constant (0.013) (0.032) (0.017) (0.040) (0.002) 1.928 0.184 -3.539 -5.940 -8.478 Log Substitutability (β) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.000) -0.519 -0.961 -0.817 -0.828 -0.250 Log Full Income 90% 75% 50% 25% 10% Quantile
  12. 13. ISSP 1998 + Bootstrap Quantile Regression Religion - Work Ratio 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 N -6.557 (2.344)** -13.362 (3.208)** -34.246 (5.667)** -29.100 (2.630)** -19.814 (4.092)** -7.041 (2.764)* 15.677 (3.762)** Constant 0.450 (0.140)** 0.921 (0.210)** 2.076 (0.338)** 1.640 (0.140)** 1.035 (0.248)** -0.104 (0.182) -1.486 (0.231)** Muslim 0.332 (0.153)* 1.119 (0.260)** 2.641 (0.223)** 2.475 (0.164)** 1.712 (0.336)** 0.681 (0.100)** -1.092 (0.318)** State Religion -1.025 (0.210)** -0.824 (0.309)** -2.460 (0.694)** -1.554 (0.240)** -1.092 (0.329)** 0.239 (0.446) 1.994 (0.205)** Religious Regulation -0.318 (0.034)** -0.238 (0.041)** -0.348 (0.048)** -0.342 (0.064)** -0.338 (0.068)** -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) Earnings 0.376 (0.335) -3.337 (0.641)** 0.210 (1.181) 0.269 (0.433) -0.266 (0.433) -0.375 (0.576) -2.450 (0.331)** Economic Freedom 2.290 (0.623)** 5.660 (1.243)** 12.701 (1.490)** 11.096 (0.814)** 6.071 (1.233)** -0.448 (0.892) -6.618 (1.048)** Civil Liberties 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30%
  13. 14. Testing Suggested Policy
  14. 15. Policy Test (continued) <ul><li>A public good competitive with the club good reduces the appeal of extremism </li></ul><ul><li>The popular shift is towards the strict groups, and not the most liberal (secularists) </li></ul><ul><li>BUT there is no impact on the sacrifice profile of a population unless the public good is subject to group sacrifice requirements </li></ul><ul><ul><li>This is potentially a good thing – sacrifice of the public good is most likely to be realized by groups operating outside the law. </li></ul></ul>
  15. 16. Conclusions <ul><li>Substitutability is necessary and quasi-sufficient for Extremist groups to be sustainable. Population Income matters, but is dominated by Subsitutability. </li></ul><ul><li>Extremist groups have incentive to package themselves as strong substitutes for privately productive activities </li></ul><ul><ul><li>This correlates to Hamas and Hezbollah dedicating the bulk of their resources to social services </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Public Goods competitive with the club good are a potentially viable mechanism for reducing the appeal of extremism </li></ul>
  16. 17. The Rest are just Appendices <ul><li>The End </li></ul>
  17. 18. Experiment Parameterization <ul><li>Test Variables – Beta and Mean Income </li></ul><ul><li>Fixed Parameters </li></ul>1 (prices of good) p S, p R 60 (number of Groups) G 0.3 b 0.7 a 0.3 α 1.25 s 1 b s , b k Value Related Function Parameter
  18. 19. Nash starting condition <ul><li>iterated pure strategy interaction between an agent i­ and a generic neighbor j . </li></ul><ul><li>is assumed to be common knowledge, as is the rationality of both players. Player turns are executed sequentially (as opposed to simultaneously) with t incrementing by one when an agent makes a calculation. The starting value is a parameter value assigned to avoid indefinite solutions. </li></ul>R j R i R i =R j

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