1. A WWF Report,
produced for the 62nd
meetingreport CITES
A of the
Standing Committee,
produced for
REPORT
23-27WWF by
July 2012
2012
Kristin Nowell
WILDLIFE CRIME
SCORECARD
Assessing compliance with and enforcement of
CITES commitments for tigers, rhinos and elephants
4. selection of In the scope of this analysis, it was not
possible to carry out an assessment for all three compliance and
The above countries are assessed for
compliance and enforcement in the period since
countries for enforcement
species groups of every country involved in CoP15 (June 2010-June 2012), using methods
the international illegal trade chain (origin, which have precedent in CITES procedures
assessment
transit and destination). (Guide to CITES Compliance Procedures,
annexed to Resolution Conf. 14.3).
In the interests of fairness and transparency, a measured
pproach was required to select a subset of key countries, rather
Colour scores modelled on traffic signals (red, yellow, green) are given as a simplified
than simply relying on anecdotal information. The approach
indicator of government progress toward implementation of CITES Decisions and
was essentially a quantitative one, based on reports and databases of the TRAFFIC
Resolutions for the target species. Countries are evaluated only for the species groups
network, details of which are set out in Annex 1. The list of countries selected for
flagged in the country selection process (so that Indonesia and Malaysia, for example,
further analysis is shown below.
while being important rhino range countries, are not given rhino scores, as they were not
Countries are classified according to their primary role in the trade chain when all flagged in the country selection process for illegal trade) (Annex 1).
three species groups are considered together, but these groupings are not clear-cut.
Compliance refers to the alignment of national policy with CITES requirements, as
For example, concerning ivory, Viet Nam and Thailand are also countries of transit
described below, and enforcement refers to recent actions taken against wildlife crime.
(particularly for African elephant ivory) as well as origin (Asian elephant ivory).
Compliance and enforcement are determined to be generally good or failing in regard to
Central African countries are another example, grouped as primarily origin due to
implementation of the CITES requirements. This is not to say that there has been a
substantial losses in national elephant populations, although all have seen
resultant drop in wildlife crime pertaining to the target species. All the countries
substantial cross-border flows of illegal ivory.
selected are facing serious levels of crime associated with these species (and also with
many other species groups). This scorecard simply evaluates how well they are
Table 1. Countries selected for scorecard assessment employing the resources available to them to combat it.
Primarily destination Transit and origin Primarily origin
Yardsticks for evaluating compliance and enforcement
Compliance and enforcement are evaluated on the basis of the following CITES
Decisions and Resolutions, with particular attention to the key elements common to
China Kenya Cameroon
all three species groups:
Egypt Laos Central African Republic
Thailand Malaysia Congo
Viet Nam Mozambique Democratic Republic
Table 2. Countries selected for compliance and enforcement assessment
Myanmar of Congo
Nigeria Gabon
Tiger Rhino Elephant
Nepal India
Tanzania Indonesia
Conservation Conservation Action Plan for the Control of
Zambia Russia
of and trade in of and trade in Trade in Elephant Ivory (Decision
South Africa
tigers and other African 13.26 (Rev. COP15) Annex 2) and
Zimbabwe
Appendix I Asian and Asian associated elements of the Res.
big cat species Rhinoceroses Conf. 10.10 (Rev. COP15):
Res Conf. 12.5 Res Conf. 9.14 Regarding control of internal
(Rev. COP15) (Rev. COP15) ivory trade;
and Decisions
Selected elements of the African
14.66-69
Elephant Action Plan (Decision 14.75
and COP15 Inf 68):
* Enact adequate penalties (AECP
Activity 1.3.1.)
* Develop regional law enforcement
networks (AECP Activity 1.1.4)
* Enforce CITES provisions on
ivory trade (AECP Activity 1.4.2)
Continued
Wildlife Crime Scorecard page 6 Wildlife Crime Scorecard page 7
5. Compliance and enforcement
Common elements include:
assignment Country compliance and enforcement scores are
presented in three tables according to the country’s
of scores
• National policies permitting no uncontrolled internal trade
• Strengthened law enforcement position along the international illegal trade chain:
• International coordination primarily destination (Table 1), transit and origin
• Improved data collection for wildlife crime analysis
• Enactment of penalties that would constitute credible deterrents
(Table 2), and primarily origin (Table 3).
• Raising public awareness to reduce demand and increase compliance,
Countries are listed in alphabetical order. The scores should not be interpreted as
especially among user groups
indicative of countries having solved their wildlife crime problems – since the three
species groups are threatened with unprecedented levels of poaching and illegal trade
While evaluation emphasis was placed on the common elements, key elements pressure – but rather of the degree of effort governments have directed since CoP15
pertaining only to certain species were also included, such as provisions related to towards this goal. Green denotes substantial levels of compliance and enforcement
preventing trade in captive tiger parts and provisions relating to controls for which should be continued and strengthened. Yellow is a warning that key aspects of
internal ivory trade. either compliance or enforcement fall short, and Red signals that little progress has
been made. Constraints facing many governments are acknowledged; corruption is a
Methods for monitoring compliance and enforcement persistent problem and wildlife authorities are often under-resourced. Compliance and
Compliance and enforcement were monitored on the basis of government enforcement pose steep challenges, but these challenges must be met and it would
announcements covered in the media, other news reports, documents for CITES appear that, at least in some cases, lack of political will, rather than lack of resources,
Standing Committee meetings 61 and 62, documents for the May 2012 Tiger is the primary impediment.
Stocktaking meeting in India, published market surveys by TRAFFIC and other NGOs,
and unpublished information collected by TRAFFIC offices. Although employing
Table 4. Compliance and enforcement scores Table 6. Compliance and enforcement
different information sources, this method was modelled on that outlined in the Guide
for destination countries* scores for countries of origin
to CITES Compliance Procedures: “Annual and biennial reports, legislative texts as
well as other special reports and responses to information requests, for example within
• • • •
Country Tiger Rhino Elephant Country Tiger Rhino Elephant
the Review of Significant Trade or the National Policy Project, provide the primary,
•
but not exclusive, means of monitoring compliance with obligations under the China Cameroon
•
Convention” (Res. Conf. 14.3 para. 15).
• • • •
Egypt Central African
•
Republic
Compliance and enforcement scoring
• •
Thailand
•
Congo
Countries are scored green, yellow or red in an assessment of their recent efforts to Viet Nam
comply with and enforce CITES trade controls for the three species groups. Democratic
•
Republic of Congo
Table 3. Country species score for period June 2010-June 2012
• • •
•
Gabon
•
Table 5. Compliance and enforcement scores
for origin and transit countries
•
India
•
General progress in key aspects of compliance and enforcement
• • • •
Indonesia
• •
Failing on key aspects of compliance or enforcement Country Tiger Rhino Elephant
Russia
• • •
Failing on key aspects of compliance and enforcement Kenya
• •
South Africa
• •
Laos
The Guide to CITES Compliance Procedures (Res. Conf. 14.3) highlights “appropriate Zimbabwe
• •
Malaysia
domestic measures” as an area of particular attention for compliance matters, e.g.,
• • •
Mozambique
“para. 2c taking appropriate domestic measures to enforce the provisions of the
* ote: A blank space indicates that the species is
N
Convention and prohibit trade in violation thereof.” Domestic measures evaluated for
• • •
Myanmar
not applicable for the country in question
this report include compliance with and enforcement of Decisions and Resolutions
•
Nepal
(the yardsticks) relating to international as well as internal trade controls. Progress
in enforcement was assessed based on governments’ capacity and use of resources
• •
Nigeria
available to them. Countries differ from one another in these regards but, after this is
• •
Tanzania
taken into account, the scores represent a comparative indication of their willingness
or otherwise to tackle the problems they face. Zambia
Wildlife Crime Scorecard page 8 Wildlife Crime Scorecard page 9
7. Discussion of advances and gaps in compliance and enforcement Discussion of advances and gaps in compliance and enforcement
trade in African elephant ivory in China in 2010 (SC61 Doc. 44.7). In Southeast Asia, in the port of Mombasa (WWF, unpublished information). Sniffer dogs are also being
the CITES Secretariat and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) are preparing introduced in China (WWF, 2011a), and used in DRC, India and Russia to track poachers
to train border guards in countries of the Greater Mekong region, including China, (GTI, 2012; Merode, 2012; WWF, 2012d).
Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam among others (SC62 Doc. 29). There were
Countries of origin
also advances in cooperation between countries playing different roles along the
trade chain, for example meetings between South African and Vietnamese officials There are several green species’ scores for the countries of origin which have served
concerning rhino horn trade (although these have yet to bear real fruit) (Milliken as the major sources of supply for international illegal trade, showing that a number of
and Shaw, in prep.), and creation of a Russo-Chinese working group for Amur tiger range states have made progress in compliance and enforcement. Since many of them
conservation (GTI, 2012). China has also increased its outreach to African countries still experience high levels of poaching, the ultimate effectiveness of their efforts remains
as well as South and Southeast Asia (Annex 2). Advances were also made with more to be proven, although there are indications that enhanced enforcement is providing
governments using DNA analysis and other laboratory tests to determine origin of a mitigating effect in countries such as India (TigerNet Mortality database), Indonesia
seized tiger, rhino and elephant products (Ogden, 2012; SC Doc’s 46.1 and 47.2). (which has protected critical populations of two Critically Endangered rhinoceros
species with its anti-poaching patrols [Fidelis, 2012; Konstant, 2012], to the extent that
Progress along the trade chain the country was one of the few in Asia not flagged for significant illegal trade in rhino
horn), Nepal (where zero tigers as well as rhinos were lost to poaching in 2011: GTI,
Primarily destination countries
2012), Russia (GTI, 2012) and South Africa (Milliken and Shaw, in prep.). Compliance
There are few green species’ scores for countries that are primarily destinations for and enforcement for countries of origin have been best implemented protecting wild
tiger and rhino products, and none for elephant ivory, indicating a serious lack of populations on the ground. These countries have all made progress implementing
progress. Major gaps in enforcement at the retail market level are primarily responsible intelligence-based and analytical anti-poaching systems (Law Enforcement Monitoring:
for the failing scores in destination countries, while Egypt, Thailand and Viet Nam LEM) (GTI, 2012), an approach which is now being adopted by Kenya (Koros, 2011) and
fail for key areas of compliance as well. It is critical that demand countries, including other countries in southern Africa. Several countries, notably India and Nepal, have also
China, Thailand and Viet Nam, urgently and dramatically improve enforcement effort established specialized wildlife crime agencies and units to improve enforcement up the
to crack down on illegal wildlife trade in their countries. trade chain (GTI, 2012).
Overall, the components of demand reduction and public awareness represent While Russia is generally in compliance regarding CITES and tigers, important gaps
a significant gap in implementation of CITES commitments in these countries. remain in legislative protections. A working group of the parliament (State Duma) has
International wildlife crime is demand-driven, and it is recommended that China held three hearings to improve national legislation on conservation and protection of
and Viet Nam, in particular, prioritize the development and implementation of well- threatened species, including tigers (Kovalchuk, 2011). Many recommendations identified
researched demand reduction campaigns. Targeted strategies should be developed by a recent assessment of Russian legislation carried out by WWF and TRAFFIC
to influence consumer behaviour around tiger parts, rhino horn, and ivory of illegal (Vaisman, 2012) were officially accepted for inclusion in the portfolio of proposals before
origin. Such strategies should include working closely with user groups, including the State Duma, and swift action upon these recommendations is desirable. Russia
the traditional medicine community, along the lines of the programme advanced by a received a CITES Certificate
recent creative experts’ workshop (TRAFFIC, 2012d) and included in the Global Tiger
Compared to Asia, scores are lower for compliance and enforcement in Africa,
Recovery Programme’s 2012 work plan (GTI, 2012). Egypt, Thailand and China need to
particularly in Central Africa. This could in part reflect a lack of resources, although
increase their efforts to educate consumers about the rules regarding ivory purchases.
Nepal’s efforts in this regard could provide a model approach, particularly the
While recognizing the efforts already undertaken (e.g., SC62 Doc. 46.2; Milliken and development of its community-based intelligence networks (SC62 Doc. 47.2). However,
Shaw, in prep.; Annex 2), China, Thailand and Viet Nam should increase efforts to corruption and lack of political will to combat illegal wildlife trade are also a major
educate their citizens travelling abroad about the illegality of returning with tiger, problem, with poor governance in Central Africa consistently linked to high levels of
rhino and elephant products. The CoP15 ETIS analysis found that (since 1989) Chinese illegal ivory trade (CoP14 Doc. 53.2; CoP15 Doc. 44.1 Annex). Central Africa also
nationals have been arrested within or coming from Africa in at least 134 ivory seizure attracts more Chinese nationals than any other sub-region of Africa, which has
cases, totalling more than 16 tonnes of ivory, and another 487 cases representing exacerbated the illegal ivory trade. Given the escalation of elephant poaching in Central
almost 25 tonnes of ivory originating from Africa was seized en route to China (CoP15 Africa and the increased levels of organized crime involved in the trade (SC62 Doc.
Doc. 44.1 Annex). 46.1), it is clear that the situation is now critical. In addition, recent studies of elephant
meat trade in Central Africa found that it has a high earning potential as a prestigious
Countries of origin and transit
bushmeat, providing additional economic incentive for the illegal killing of elephants
There are also few green species’ scores for countries of origin and transit. Nepal in the region (IUCN, 2012a).
was recognized by the CITES Secretariat for its development of community-based
While most Central African countries face national crises of elephant poaching, they
intelligence networks, and 2011 was the first zero poaching year for rhinos in Nepal, in
also need to strengthen their regional cooperation to counter illegal ivory flows across
marked contrast to the trend in Africa (SC Doc. 47.2). Transit countries, and indeed all
national borders. Enforcement agencies from both Cameroon and Central African
countries, need to prioritize enhancement of the capacity of their customs and border
Republic indicate that significant amounts of ivory are trafficked across their respective
control authorities to intercept smuggling of wildlife products (SC62 Doc’s 29, 43.2 and
boundaries from northern Congo and Gabon. DNA testing has implicated Gabon as a
46.1). This includes training, awareness-raising and vigilance against corruption, as
major source behind some of the largest ivory movements in ETIS. Ivory also crosses
well as use of technology and tools such as sniffer dogs, which have been successfully
borders with DRC (CoP15 Doc. 44.1 Annex; WWF, unpublished information). In addition,
deployed in Kenyan airports to detect ivory (KWS, 2012) and are being extended to use
Sudan and Chad are linked into the picture. Recently, well-armed bands of poachers –
1 National Inter-Agencies CITES Enforcement Coordination Group.
Wildlife Crime Scorecard page 12 Wildlife Crime Scorecard page 13
8. Discussion of advances and gaps in compliance and enforcement
Discussion of advances and gaps in compliance and enforcement
allegedly from Sudan and coming through Chad and/or CAR – have penetrated deep Programme, and its responsibilities under CITES (Viet Nam NGOs, 2012). Viet Nam
into Central African Republic and Cameroon territory in search of ivory. also needs to develop a policy and enforcement mechanism to address the issue of
At present it is not clear how the ivory that is allegedly taken by Sudanese poachers finds online advertisements for tiger products (as with rhinos: Milliken and Shaw, in prep.).
its way onto the international market (since it is unlikely that the domestic clientele Although Laos has shown strong political will for tiger conservation, with a speech
in that country is sufficient to make poaching profitable). This is an issue that merits by the country’s President at the Heads of State Tiger Summit in Russia in 2010, and
investigation. made progress towards improving administration of legal protections for tigers, with
An associated issue of concern is the flow of arms in Central Africa and the high establishment of a new Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and upgrading
involvement of some national military forces in poaching. In recent years, significant the conservation agency to the Department of Forest Resource Management, it lacks
numbers of AK-47s have been confiscated in Central African Republic and Cameroon, controls to prevent parts from captive tigers entering into illegal trade, especially to
and can be easily obtained in Congo for prices as low as US$40 (WWF, unpublished Viet Nam, and has not made this an implementation priority (GTI, 2012).
information). This flow of arms, driven by a desire to poach elephants, exacerbates the In 2010, Vietnamese journalists gained access to a large tiger (and other exotic animal)
ease at which ivory is harvested from the forest, increases risks to people, and increases breeding farm near Thakhek, Laos, not far from the Vietnamese border. The well-
risks of arms being used in local conflicts. guarded facility is owned in part by Vietnamese nationals, and one owner told the
13
journalists that their main business was delivering tiger carcasses to Viet Nam for
discussion scores for tigers making tiger bone medicine (Anon., 2012c). Companies in Laos and Viet Nam also
Compared to African elephants, Asian elephants and African rhinos (though not, of began importing lion bone and lions of captive origin from South Africa in 2009, with
course, Asian rhinos), tigers have a much lower extant wild population and so are much agents from one of the Laotian companies also being prosecuted for illegal trade in
countries more vulnerable to illegal trade. Consequently, even relatively low absolute volumes of rhino horn in South Africa (Macleod, 2012). While the end-use of the lion bones is
trade pose a problem. Moreover, CITES has not agreed an external assessment process not known, it is likely that they are feeding into illegal internal markets for tiger bone
endorsed the for tigers equivalent to MIKE/ ETIS for elephants or the IUCN-TRAFFIC report that is medicine. Laos and Viet Nam should clearly enforce prohibitions against the use of
captive big cats to supply internal and international trade.
Global Tiger
produced at each Conference of the Parties for rhinos.
Nevertheless, tigers are the species for which green country scores are most numerous, China has been identified as one of the main destination markets for the international
Recovery indicating that significant progress has been made by governments. Much of that success illegal tiger trade (Verheij et al., 2010), and is home to some of the world’s largest
can be credited to the Global Tiger Recovery Programme, developed and endorsed by collections of captive tigers, whose owners have advocated strongly for permission to
Program 13 tiger range countries at a Heads of State Tiger Summit in Russia at the end of 2010. use these animals to make tiger bone medicines (Nowell and Xu, 2007). China received
Still, TRAFFIC’s tiger seizure database found that seizures increased from an average a green score, however, for compliance and enforcement, indicative of significant
in 2010 of more than 175 tigers (minimum) per year from 2006-2008 to more than 200 tigers progress implementing CITES requirements since 2010 (see Annex 2 for details).
per year (minimum) in 2009-2011 (Stoner, 2012). Progress in enforcement is evident, In 2006-2007 China reassessed its 1993 policy prohibiting internal trade in tiger
and increasing seizures may be a reflection of this, but wild tigers remain under serious products and the use of tiger bone as medicine (Nowell and Xu, 2007). In 2009-2010
poaching threat and enforcement of trade controls must be further strengthened. the government made a series of announcements that the policy of prohibition would
Intelligence-led enforcement would benefit from a more robust data collection system continue (CoP15 Inf. 16, SC61 Doc. 41 Annex 2, Nowell et al., 2011). China has tightened
(SC61 Doc. 41 Annex 1), with governments directly providing information on seizures to regulation of animals in captivity, with particular attention to its large captive tiger
a centralized database (Stoner, 2012). population, although it is unclear if these measures are being enforced to a degree
sufficient to prevent illegal trade from these facilities (Nowell et al., 2011). While a 2007
Elimination of demand for tiger products (GTI, 2012) and preventing parts and regulation (SFA, 2007) permits trade in tiger skins which have been registered with
derivatives from entering illegal trade from or through captive breeding facilities (Res. the authorities and determined to be legally acquired, market monitoring by TRAFFIC
Conf. 12.5 and Decision 14.69) are viewed as key requirements for tiger conservation in (unpublished information) has not found evidence that this potential loophole is being
international agreements. Two countries failed on both compliance and enforcement exploited nor that such trade is being condoned by authorities. While substantial
related to CITES requirements regarding captive tigers – Laos and Viet Nam. While numbers of tiger products, especially tiger bone wine claiming to be pre-Convention
Viet Nam (and Laos, to a lesser degree), has clearly dedicated effort to enforcing its (EIA, 2012) or legally derived from captive animals (Nowell et al., 2011) have been
policy prohibiting internal trade in tiger products (TRAFFIC Tiger Seizures database), advertised on Internet sites, China substantially increased its policing of online trade
these efforts are undermined by the government’s consideration of allowing trade in in June 2012, introducing new regulations and cooperating with 15 major Internet
captive tigers, and it appears that captive tigers are supplying a substantial proportion auction sites, which signed a declaration stating they have a zero-tolerance policy
of the illegal trade, given the relatively high number of carcasses seized (SC61 Doc. towards their services being used to conduct illegal wildlife trading (TRAFFIC, 2012b).
41 Annex 1) and the small tiger population in Viet Nam. In 2007, Viet Nam permitted It is too soon to assess the full impact of these measures, but preliminary monitoring
the establishment of “pilot breeding farms” for tigers, and in a 2012 report to the indicates a substantial reduction (more than 65 per cent) of illegal advertisements
Prime Minister, the Ministry for Agriculture and Rural Development (the CITES for tiger products (TRAFFIC, unpublished information). China carried out several
Management Authority) described three facilities and proposed that “dead tigers [from sweeping enforcement actions in 2010-2012 specifically targeting illegal trade in tiger
captive facilities] can be used to make specimens and traditional medicine on a pilot products (Annex 2), and demonstrated strong political will and commitment with an
basis” (MARD, 2012). A letter from conservation NGOs based in Viet Nam has urged unprecedented speech by Premier Wen Jiabao at the 2010 Heads of State Tiger Summit
the Prime Minister to reject the proposal, as it will undermine enforcement, Viet in Russia (Govt. of China, 2010).
Nam’s commitment to reduce demand for tiger products in the Global Tiger Recovery
Wildlife Crime Scorecard page 14 Wildlife Crime Scorecard page 15
9. Discussion of advances and gaps in compliance and enforcement
Discussion of advances and gaps in compliance and enforcement
China’s green score for tigers is contingent upon their continued policy of prohibition, and and to ensure that imports of hundreds of rhino horn trophies from South Africa in
there should be more active monitoring of captive facilities to prevent illegal trade. The recent years have been for non-commercial purposes as required under the white rhino’s
same is true for Thailand, which, like Viet Nam, has a high proportion of tiger carcasses Appendix II annotation (“for the exclusive purpose of allowing international trade
in its recent seizures (SC61 Doc. 41 Annex 1). Thailand has reported on the status of its in live animals to appropriate and acceptable destinations and in hunting trophies:”
numerous captive tiger facilities in detail to CITES, and is carrying out DNA testing on Ceratotherium simum simum, CITES Appendix II ). Many Vietnamese nationals have
seized tiger carcasses to try to determine their origin (SC61 Doc. 43 Annex 3). A CITES been arrested or implicated in South Africa for acquiring rhino horns illegally (including
Certificate of Commendation was awarded for their interception of a smuggled live tiger diplomats), but there has been little evident enforcement follow-up on information
cub at the Bangkok airport, and subsequent public awareness efforts in the Asian Year of provided by the South African authorities (Milliken and Shaw, in prep.). Viet Nam is
the Tiger (CITES Notif. 2012/030). urged to strengthen enforcement effort and provide effective deterrents to any of its
nationals who may be engaged in illegal rhino horn trade.
Myanmar’s national wildlife trade controls have been categorized as not generally in
compliance with CITES (CITES Notif. 2012/036), which has been noted as a deficiency for While Thailand is not a major destination for rhino horn, Thai citizens with Laotian
controlling illegal tiger trade (Shepherd and Nijman, 2008a), but it is strengthening its connections have been deeply involved with rhino crime in South Africa (Milliken and
legal protections for tigers with a new draft environmental law completed and submitted Shaw, in prep.), and both Thai and Lao authorities need to improve their investigation
for enactment (GTI, 2012). It failed on enforcement, however, reporting few seizures of their citizens’ links to organized rhino crime. Myanmar has been implicated in the
despite a well-documented trade in tiger and other big cat parts and products – especially movements of poached Indian rhino horn to China (CoP15 Doc. 45.1 Annex 1, Ching,
in border towns (Oswell, 2010). Although Indonesia has increased its efforts to protect 2011) and needs to strengthen international coordination on enforcement. According to
wild tiger populations and detect illegal trade (GTI, 2012), there remains a significant CITES trade data, Myanmar imported six live white rhinos from South Africa in recent
enforcement gap for tigers at the retail level, with Sumatra having a significant illegal years, for unclear purposes (Saving Rhinos, 2012c). None of the ASEAN countries are
2011-12
domestic market for tiger parts, as outlined in TRAFFIC surveys (Ng and Nemora, 2007 fully compliant with Res Conf 9.14 pertaining to rhino horn stock pile recording and
security. However, some ASEAN nations reported no rhino horn seizures in the past 10
discussion scores for rhinos and elephants years, indicating no need (or perceived need) for stockpile procedures. Viet Nam and
Thailand, the main seizing countries, are not fully compliant with the recommendations
In Africa, there are no green scores for rhinos and few for elephants. Indeed, 2011-2012
saw the
for stockpile management, according to a recent assessment (TRAFFIC, in prep.).
registered the highest levels of poaching and illegal trade in rhino horn and ivory in many
years (SC62, Doc’s 46.1 and 47.2). Widespread failures of compliance and enforcement China was the only country to receive a green score for rhinos. On the face of it, this
highest levels in Africa are in part due to the relative lack of resources available to these countries, but
lack of political will is also a factor. Whatever the cause, given the escalation of this illegal
may seem extraordinary given China’s strong historical tradition of using rhino horn
medicine (SC62 Doc. 47.2 Annex) and an escalating number of rhinos poached in Africa.
of poaching trade, its level of organized criminal involvement, and the threat it now poses not just to
wildlife but to national security, stability and human lives; it is imperative that implicated
However, China has made progress on both compliance and enforcement for rhinos
in recent years (see Annex 2 for details). Its 1993 policy banning the use of rhino horn
and illegal countries undertake a significant up-scaling of enforcement and compliance. The more medicine continues, and an entrepreneurial project to breed white rhinos imported from
trade in rhino
prosperous countries of Asia, which are the destinations of illegally exported rhino horn South Africa for their horns (SC Doc. 47.2 Annex) has not been given permission by the
and elephant ivory, are urged to increase their support for wildlife crime control in Africa. government to engage in any rhino horn trade (TRAFFIC, unpublished information).
horn and
According to monitoring of major Chinese e-commerce websites, the availability of
Rhinos – Africa and Asia
illegal rhino horn items dropped by more than 70 per cent (TRAFFIC, unpublished
ivory in many
South Africa, the epicentre of the African rhino poaching crisis, received a yellow score information) after major enforcement actions in April and June 2012, as described in
for failing on key areas of enforcement, as outlined by recommendations for improvement more detail in Annex 2. While comprehensive surveys of traditional pharmacies in
years
in a recent TRAFFIC report (Milliken and Shaw, in prep.). The report acknowledges that China have not been carried out in recent years, in 2006 TRAFFIC found that only about
South Africa has made great strides in compliance and enforcement since 2009-2010, 2 per cent of hundreds of retail outlets investigated across the country were apparently
and it is possible that the increasing number of arrests and breaking up of organized engaged in illegal trade (SC62 Doc. 47.2 Annex), and there is little indication this
crime syndicates linked to Southeast Asia has started to pay off (Milliken and Shaw, proportion has changed much (TRAFFIC, unpublished information).
in prep.). However, the absolute numbers of rhinos poached is still increasing (Saving
The role and dimensions of China (and Thailand) in the illegal international rhino horn
Rhinos, 2012a), and South Africa is urged to address the recommendations in the
trade remain somewhat out-of-focus and imprecise, but based on available information
TRAFFIC report, while working with Viet Nam, and other implicated Asian countries on
it is Viet Nam that appears to be the major destination market (Milliken and Shaw, in
international enforcement coordination.
prep.). However, the growing influx of illegal African ivory provides an opportunity for
Viet Nam, the major destination for South African rhino horn, has not shown nearly the criminals to also attempt to smuggle rhino horn, as shown in a recent case. Authorities
same level of effort (Milliken and Shaw, in prep.), and received a red score for rhinos, in Hong Kong seized 33 rhino horns as well as worked ivory in November 2011, an action
failing on compliance and enforcement. While Viet Nam made a number of seizures of for which a CITES Certificate of Commendation was awarded to them (CITES Notif.
illegal rhino horns from 2004-2008 (numbering several tens), since 2008 there have 2012/020). After SC61, the CITES Secretariat issued a confidential enforcement Alert to
apparently been none (SC62 Doc. 47.2; Milliken and Shaw, in prep.). A review of Viet Parties regarding import of rhinoceros horn to China (SC62 Doc. 29). The substance of
Nam’s national policy and legislation with a specific focus on rhino horn trade is needed CITES Alerts are not public information, but the CITES Secretariat has recommended
to identify and close gaps and legal loopholes which currently give rise to rhino horn trade enhanced enforcement between China and South Africa on rhino crime (SC62 Doc.
and consumption. Special attention should be paid to the following issues, as outlined by 47.2). China must continue to strengthen its intelligence-led enforcement and, as with
Milliken and Shaw (in prep.): legal penalties adequate to serve as a deterrent for illegal tigers, direct more effort toward demand reduction and continued monitoring of captive
trade and possession; and legal measures sufficient to curtail illegal trade on the Internet; populations to prevent illegal trade.
Wildlife Crime Scorecard page 16 Wildlife Crime Scorecard page 17
