The 1950s was a period of great uncertainty for Thailand. With its neighbours caught up in communist insurrections, the kingdom needed a strong ally to protect it against a possible Red invasion. Meanwhile, the United States needed a friendly base to launch their anti-communist plans in Southeast Asia. Their interests converged and they hooked up. This paper studies US attempts to bolster Thailand against communism with the use of psychological warfare. During this period, neither country was involved in large-scale physical fighting in Southeast Asia at that time, taking the fight to the psychological level. Individual governments were making decisions and responding based on impressions and perceptions founded on what they thought the opposing side was doing.

1. Inoculating Thailand against Communism
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information from this paper.
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2. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS
1949: Communist victory in China
1950
February: Phibun recognised Bao Dai government.
July: Korean War. Thailand sent 4,000 soldiers and 40,000 tons of rice to Korea.
July: Educational exchange agreement (Fulbright)
September: Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement.
October: First loan from World Bank to a Southeast Asian nation
October: Agreement Respecting Military Assistance. (This provided authorization for
the US to give and Thailand to receive, military assistance.)
1951
June: Manhattan Rebellion
November: Silent Coup
1952: Stringent anti-communist law passed
1953
January: Dwight Eisenhower became President of the United States
January: Formation of “Thai Autonomous People’s Government” at Yunnan province
April: Vietminh launched an invasion into Laos
May: U.N. appeal on Laos
July: PSB-D23 report
August: Arrival of Donovan as US Ambassador
1954
April: US makes plans for direct military intervention in Vietnam
May: French defeat at Dien Bien Phu
July 1954: Partition of Vietnam at the Geneva conference
Sept 1954: Formation of Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
ABBREVIATIONS
BPP Border Patrol Police
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
MAAG U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC National Security Council
OSS Office of Strategic Services
PARU Police Aerial Reconnaissance (Resupply) Unit
PSB Psychological Strategy Board
SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
USIS United States Information Service
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3. CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 1
SETTING THE STAGE ......................................................................................................................... 2
AMERICA THE PATRON, THAILAND THE CLIENT .................................................................................... 2
CHANGES IN THE US ADMINISTRATION ................................................................................................. 6
PROCESS OF INOCULATION ............................................................................................................ 7
IN SEARCH OF A SOUTHEAST ASIAN BASE ............................................................................................. 7
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE STRATEGY .............................................................................................. 10
IMPLEMENTING PSB D-23 ................................................................................................................... 14
Donovan and guerrilla warfare ..................................................................................................... 14
Military and economic aid ............................................................................................................. 15
Anti-communist propaganda .......................................................................................................... 17
Education and training .................................................................................................................. 18
Geneva and Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) .......................................................... 19
FRUIT OF INOCULATION ................................................................................................................ 21
ANTI-COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA......................................................................................................... 21
AID ...................................................................................................................................................... 22
EDUCATION ......................................................................................................................................... 25
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 27
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................... 30
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4. INTRODUCTION
The 1950s was a period of great uncertainty for Thailand. With its neighbours
caught up in communist insurrections, the kingdom needed a strong ally to protect it
against a possible Red invasion. Meanwhile, the United States needed a friendly base
to launch their anti-communist plans in Southeast Asia. Their interests converged and
they hooked up.
Much has been written about the alliance between Thailand and the US (see
Darling, 1965; Surachart, 1985; Randolph, 1986; Fineman, 1997). While this paper
will still sketch out the mechanics of friendship between the two countries from the
late 1940s to the late 1950s, the objective of this paper is to study US attempts to
bolster Thailand against communism with the use of psychological warfare. During
this period, the ‘wars’ for Thailand and the US were fought more on the psychological
level. In fact, neither country was involved in large-scale physical fighting in
Southeast Asia at that time. Hence, that was why psychological warfare was all the
more important then because individual governments were making decisions and
responding based on impressions and perceptions founded on what they thought the
opposing side was doing.
The psychological warfare comprised anti-communist propaganda, military and
economic aid, educational programmes, and collective defence treaties. I would
examine these various aspects in turn and assess their effects (both intended and
unintended) on Thailand.
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5. SETTING THE STAGE
By April 1948, the world situation had drastically changed – the communists
pulled off a successful coup in Czechoslovakia; the US was rushing large-scale
economic and military assistance under the Marshall Plan to Western Europe to
prevent further communist aggression; much of China had fallen under the control of
Mao Zedong’s communists and communist revolts began spreading to the newly
independent nations in the Southeast Asia. At the same time, US President Harry
Truman’s momentous decision to provide assistance to the Greek and Turkish
governments in their struggle against communist guerrillas marked the beginning of a
new US foreign policy – containment of communism.
Within the increasingly turbulent region of Southeast Asia, Thailand was the only
country which did not have a communist insurrection within its borders and was the
only area which remained relatively stable and calm. The US began to be interested
in the nation. On February 10, 1949, US ambassador Edwin Stanton wrote to the
Secretary of State, proposing more attention to be paid to Thailand:
I do not need to emphasize the advisability and timeliness of establishing
and implementing an affirmative policy regarding Siam in view of
developments in China and the certainty that communist activities and
pressure will be greatly intensified throughout Southeast Asia and this
country. It is not argued that this area is equally as important as Europe,
but communism being a global problem, it appears to us here to be both
wise statesmanship and good strategy to take steps now before this area
is completely dominated by communism, to contain this threat and give
support and encouragement to such countries as Siam which are not yet
seriously infected. (Randolph 1986:11)
America the patron, Thailand the client
Concerned with the developments in its Indochinese neighbours and with its own
military security, Thailand followed the lead of the US by recognising the French-
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6. supported Bao Dai government in February 1950. Prior to that, Ambassador-at-large
Phillip Jessup, while in Bangkok for a conference of American ambassadors in the Far
East, had met with Phibun and urged him to recognise Bao Dai. Jessup had hinted at
the prospect of aid and of getting a chunk of the money that had been earmarked for
China. But this aroused serious dispute within the Phibun cabinet. Foreign Minister
Pote Sarasin counselled against such a move, arguing that it was a mistake for
Thailand to commit itself so openly in a struggle whose outcome was still uncertain.
Seriously split, the cabinet left the decision to Phibun, who opted in favour of
recognition. Pote resigned in protest. Thailand recognised the Bao Dai government
and was duly rewarded with US$10 million from the US. (Baker and Pasuk 2005:144)
In June 1950, when the Soviet-supplied North Korean People’s Army invaded
South Korea, Thailand supported the US-sponsored “Uniting for Peace Resolution” in
the United Nations, which encouraged collective action wherever aggression arose.
(Wiwat 1982:133) And in July, Thailand went one step further – Phibun sent 4,000
soldiers and 40,000 tons of rice to Korea – and became the first Asian nation to offer
troops and supplies for the US campaign. The Americans seized upon its PR-
potential to counter accusations that the Korean War smacks of Western/US
imperialism and hailed Thailand’s involvement as an Asian country. Phibun knew he
was playing his cards right. He even told the parliament that, “by sending just a small
number of troops as a token of our friendship, we will get various things in return”.
(Fineman 1997:117)
In September, the US agreed to provide Thailand with economic and technical
assistance, and the United States Operations Mission (USOM) was set up. A newly
created Special Technical and Economic Assistance Mission (STEM) was given
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7. US$8 million to set up an American-supervised language centre to teach English to
Thais, as well as to improve the nation’s agriculture and infrastructure. In October,
the World Bank gave a US$25 million loan – the first loan made by the World Bank
to a nation in Southeast Asia – for further development projects. (United Nations 1950)
In the same month, the US signed an agreement to provide equipment and training for
the Thai army under the Military Assistance Group. By January, the arms started
arriving. During the following year, the US sent 28 shipments of military equipment
to equip 10 army battalions, fighter plans and modern naval vessels. (Nongnuth
1982:140)
The Thais were impressed with the speed of the US response and Phibun became
increasingly good at espousing anti-communist rhetoric. For example in July 1949,
he confidently told parliament that “there is now no communist unrest in Thailand”.
(Fineman 1997:87) But a month later, he blatantly announced to the West that
communist pressure on Thailand had become “alarming” and internal communist
activity had “vigorously increased”. (Darling 1961:214) Phibun clearly saw how he
could kill two birds with one stone – use the communist threat as an instrument to
remove his political opponents and make the US happy at the same time.
The reunification of China in 1949 prompted another wave of nationalist feeling
among Thailand’s Chinese. Chinese names became fashionable, enrolment in Chinese
schools shot up and remittances to China increased. At the same time, conflict
between the Kuomintang and communists intermittently erupted in battles on
Bangkok streets. From late 1950, the government began to harass the press, deport
Chinese involved in political activity, smash labour organisations and use the military
and Sangha for anti-communist propaganda.
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8. The “communist” label became the latest tool to smear the reputations of political
opponents. During the Manhattan rebellion in June 1951 when Phibun was kidnapped
by the navy while officiating a ceremony aboard the dredger “Manhattan”, both the
navy rebels and government accused each other as “communist”. Although Phibun
finally claimed that communists were the cause of the three-day coup, linking the
navy rebels to Pridi and his Free Thai followers, observers concluded that it had
actually been caused by the increasing rivalry among the military services. The
suppression of this coup also marked and confirmed the rise to power of Phibun’s two
chief rivals in the 1947 Coup Group – police chief Phao Siyanon and army chief Sarit
Thanarat. The triumvirate quickly moved in to remove the 1949 constitution and the
power it gave to the monarchy before King Bhumibol Adulyadej returned to assume
his royal duties. While the king was at sea, en route from Singapore to Bangkok, on
November 29, the military simply announced on the state radio that:
because of the present world situation and because of communist
aggression and widespread corruption, members of the armed forces,
the police and leaders of the 1932 and 1947 coups d’état had decided to
put the 1932 Constitution in force in the kingdom. (Wyatt 2003:260)
The main justification for this Silent Coup was that communists were infiltrating the
parliament and Cabinet. This was the first time that the threat of communism was
used as the rationale for a coup. Hence the local battle over the control of the Thai
state was now being cloaked in the vestiges of a worldwide ideological struggle.
With the 1947 Coup Group taking more power, they were more determined than
ever to hush the internal political opposition. They put into place a slew of laws and
administrative changes to enhance the internal security powers of the government
even further. The most powerful tool was a stringent anti-communist law, which was
5

9. worded widely enough to target any dissent. The police began arresting suspects
under this law within 48 hours after it was passed on November 10, 1952. More than
1,000 were arrested; mostly Chinese who were deported but also sundry enemies of
the regime including Thammasat student activists. Thirty-seven Thais, including
leftist writers like Kulap Saipradit, were jailed. Three newspapers were also closed
down. (Darling 1961:290) The police continued to seize “communist” suspects, who
were accused of plotting against the government, and occasionally newspaper editors
at regular intervals. Dissent was not tolerated at all. A junior civil servant’s comment
to an American observer summed it up well:
“Only half of our members of parliament are elected. The others are
appointed. And the elections – such strange things happen that nobody
believes in them anymore. I love Thailand. Yet if I say freely what I
say to you, they will say I am communist.” (Darling 1961:307).
Within a short time, the stress on nationalism, the fear of communism and American
arms discouraged all but a few people from opposing the policies of the government.
Hence after 1952, the Phibun government gradually eliminated all remnants of
democratic or representative government in the country.
Changes in the US administration
By 1953, there was a Republican regime in Washington that had won the
presidential election partly on the accusation that the Democrats had been “soft on
communism”. Dwight Eisenhower’s administration promised to give a new look to
the American defence posture and attempts would be made to bolster the nation’s
anti-communist allies. It indicated a desire to increase the reliance on military power
and regional collective security in deterring communist aggression. At the same time,
Eisenhower recognised the need to economise on the government’s expenditures so
6

10. he called for an increase in the ground forces maintained by the countries in Asia and
a corresponding reduction of America troops. Local military forces could be
maintained at a smaller cost and would be supported by the mobile striking forces of
American air and naval power. The real architect of American foreign policy was not
Eisenhower but the secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. Dulles, whose father was a
Presbyterian minister, was almost rabid in his condemnation against atheistic
communism. Practising brinkmanship – the ability to get to the verge without getting
into war – with the Soviet Union, he often threatened massive retaliation if the USSR
launched a first strike.
PROCESS OF INOCULATION
In search of a Southeast Asian base
In early 1953, the situation in Southeast Asia looked increasingly bad for the
Western powers. The Vietminh had overrun vast areas of the Vietnamese countryside
and in April, it even launched an invasion into Laos which brought them to within a
few miles of the Thai border, spelling the death knell of French military and political
strategy in Indochina. The offensive convinced the US that France needed to grant
Vietnam genuine independence as well as change its military strategy to guerrilla
tactics in order to hold Indochina. The Americans also wanted a greater say in French
military planning, but the French said no on all counts.
At the same time, Red China was emerging as a regional power. Since the
Chinese intervention in the Korean War, China had in the eyes of Washington
policymakers replaced the Soviet Union as the chief adversary of the West in Asia.
This perception was shared by the Thais too. China continued its sabre-rattling with
7

11. strident and bombastic declarations blaring from Radio Peking and Washington was
not discounting the possibility of a Chinese Korea-style invasion, most probably
knifing through Northern Thailand.
So both Thailand and the US must have been spooked when China announced in
January 1953 the formation of a Thai Autonomous People’s Government at
Sipsongpanna in southern Yunnan province. That area had been the original
homeland of the Thai people and was still inhabited by some 200,000 Thai tribesmen.
The announcement stated:
At the inaugural ceremony the Chairman [a Thai] and the council
members pledged that they would … guide the Thai people to… make
concerted efforts to smash the sabotage activities of the American
imperialists and special agents of Chiang Kai-shek’s bandit gang… under
the leadership of the Chinese communist Party, Chairman Mao Tse-tung,
and the Central People’s Government. (Stanton 1954:79)
Further concern was sparked when Pridi Phanomyong suddenly appeared in Peking in
July 1954. He was referred to as the “Public Leader of Thailand” by Radio Peking,
leading the Thai government to believe that Pridi would be used as a puppet for the
subversive purposes of China. Although Pridi had little following left in Thailand by
then, and that he was unlikely able to lead the largely backward tribesmen who had
little prestige or support among the more advanced Thai population in Thailand in a
subversive crusade, it was still regarded as a potential communist threat by both the
Eisenhower and Phibun governments.
On top of that, the Vietminh incursions into Laos in April and again in December
1953 added to Thailand’s discomfort although they did not pose a serious threat to the
kingdom. Meanwhile, the Korean War was drawing to a close. It ended with a
ceasefire agreement between the two sides due to fierce opposition from the North
8

12. Koreans and the Chinese, as well as escalating domestic pressure in the US to end the
war. This made the Thai elite realise that the US was not as invincible as they had
earlier thought it to be. Consequently, Thailand started to pursue a two-pronged
policy of being overtly anti-communist while seeking covert rapprochement with
China. (Kullada 2003:55)
It was while the US was looking for a Southeast ally and Thailand was looking for
a protector when both became fitting bed partners. The US picked Thailand for a
variety of reasons:
Geographically, Thailand occupied a strategic area in the centre of mainland
Southeast Asia and was the best friend that the US had there – Burma was neutralist,
Malaya was under the British thumb and France was touché over its Indochinese
colonies. While the surrounding countries were embroiled in bitter military conflicts,
Thailand was an oasis of stability under Phibun’s authoritarian military regime.
Having never fallen under European domination completely, Thailand did not suffer
from xenophobia or the rabid nationalism surging through its neighbours.
Demographically, Thailand’s population of 20 million was the largest in the region
and literacy rate was estimated at between 30 and 40 per cent, a relatively high figure
for Asia. The traditional Thai antipathy towards the Chinese, who controlled much of
the private commercial sector, could be harnessed in the fight against communism.
Economically, Thailand was the world’s leading rice exporter and was rich in
resources (resources that the US would like to keep from falling into hostile hands).
The peasants were not likely to turn to communism because there was a surplus of
rice and they owned the land. Moreover, US aid and technical assistance programmes
had further increased agricultural production (especially in rice-growing), built up the
9

13. transportation system, increased productivity in mining industries and rapidly
improved public health, especially with regards to malaria control. (Norland 1999:91)
But the most important factor was Thailand’s obedient compliance to US requests
– despite intense opposition from European powers and despite the ensuing
embarrassment when they were left holding the buck. This was first tested in
Operation Paper1 in early 1951 and then in spring 1953 when the US asked the Thai
government to make an UN appeal on behalf of the Laos over Vietminh’s invasion.
Not wanting to internationalise the issue, the French protested strongly. The British
also urged caution. But Thailand stuck firm to the American lead. Although the
appeal fell through in the end, it showed Thailand’s potential for pressuring the
French and the communists and the kingdom was beginning to function as an anti-
communist, anti-French US bastion in Southeast Asia.
Psychological Warfare Strategy
On May 6, 1953, during the discussion on the Laotian crisis at the National
Security Council (NSC) meeting, C. D. Jackson, acting as special assistant to the
president for international affairs, suggested that the NSC “look into what could be
done by way of psychological warfare with Thailand as a base”. A deputy chief of
the Psychological Warfare Division during World War II, Jackson was a firm believer
in the efficacy of psychological warfare. (Fineman 1997:171) Eisenhower, who also
had a longstanding interest in this area, approved the idea. The Psychological
Strategy Board (PSB), an inter-agency body operating since 1951, was tasked with
drafting detailed plans. It presented its report – “U.S. Psychological Strategy with
1
Under Operation Paper, the Phibun government provided diplomatic cover and logistical support to
the CIA which was attempting a large-scale invasion of southern China with the help of Nationalist
troops in Burma.
10

14. Respect to the Thai Peoples of Southeast Asia” – on July 2. Designated as PSB D-23,
the report served as the blueprint for American Thai policy for the next year and a half.
The plan for Thailand was part of a larger psychological strategy for Southeast Asia,
whose objective was “preventing the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into
the communist orbit, and to assist them to develop the will and ability to resist
communism from within and without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free
world”. 2 (PSB D-23, 21)
The importance of a psychological strategy at this particular point in history
cannot be overstated. One has to bear in mind that this was pre-1960s – before the US
started fighting the Vietnam War and before communist insurrections flared up in
Thailand. In fact, neither Thailand nor the US was involved in any large-scale
fighting in Southeast Asia at that time. Sure, there were threats of imminent war but
the war was fought more on the psychological level than on the physical level.
Governments were making decisions based on impressions and intuition founded on
what they thought the opposing side was doing. For example, the establishment of the
Thai Autonomous State in Yunnan province and the reports that Pridi is in China and
collaborating with Free Thai leaders were in all probability part of a psychological
warfare operation launched by the Chinese communists to discourage the Phibun
government from cooperating too closely with the Western powers. (Darling
1961:255)
2
The concept of drawing a perimeter crops up again. On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, in a speech, drew an American defence perimeter encompassing Japan, the Ryuku Islands,
and the Philippines. Asian nations falling outside the line would have to fend for themselves. Korea’s
exclusion from the perimeter was seen by some as an invitation for communist aggression that led to
the Korean War.
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15. The PSB believed that the secret of Vietminh success lay in Ho Chih Minh’s
ability to win the war at the psychological level. The Vietminh were seen as
defenders of Vietnamese nationhood against the French oppressors and thus won wide
support among the locals. Despite the numerical and technological superiority of
French forces, the Vietminh’s ability to maintain the military initiative created an
impression of invincibility. Ho’s constant harassment of the French troops with his
small guerrilla units also contributed to the psychological discouragement of the
French. Because “the French have demonstrated their inability to formulate and
implement a [counter-strategy]”, the US was convinced that it needed to take
leadership throughout the whole area so that it could force the French to adopt an
offensive, guerrilla-warfare strategy as well as to grant Vietnam genuine
independence. (PSB D-23, 4) This would then create “an atmosphere of victory” and
the “impression that the US is determined not to abandon Southeast Asia to the
communists”. It would also hopefully “raise the morale of non-communist
indigenous nationalist elements in Indochina – particularly in Laos and Cambodia –
because it will suggest the possibility of greater US pressure on the French to
accelerate reform.” (PSB D-23, 6) But since impressions count, the US was also
conscious that its moves might generate “British and French suspicions that US
leadership in Southeast Asia is a cloak for US ‘ambitions’ detrimental to their
interests” or stir up “similar suspicions of US ‘imperialism’ on the part of extreme
Asian nationalists”. (PSB D-23, 8)
Moreover, the PSB was quick to trump up Thailand’s ethnic make-up as an ideal
factor in psychological warfare against the Vietminh.3 Thais living in the northern
3
The PSB had wrongly presumed that there was an affinity between the Thai-related groups of Laos.
12

16. and northeastern part of the country shared the same language as those in Laos and
Thailand actually has several times more ethnic Lao than lightly-populated Laos. The
report made certain sweeping generalizations of Thai ethnography, beginning with the
assertion that since the present Thai regime was too corrupt to “satisfy the idealistic
side of the complex Thai character, there is an urgent need for American moral
leadership to fill this psychological vacuum before the communists do”. Continuing
in the same vein, the report claimed that although the Thais are “courageous and
intelligent” they are also “gentle and frivolous”; they are “incorrigible individualists”
but also “amazingly ingenious improvisers”. On top of these, the Thais supposedly
lack foresight and dislike systematic planning. Based on these traits, the PSB advised
that the Thais are “peculiarly unsuited to military institutions of the Western type”
and “any attempt to develop rapidly a large-scale efficient modern army in Thailand is
probably foredoomed to failure”. However, the organisation of Thai manpower into
small guerrilla-type units “would minimise their military defects and give maximum
score to their virtues”. (PSB D-23, 14)
Yet one wonders if this American version of Thai ethnology is simply a case of
tailoring the description to meet the need. The US did not need an army with German
or Swiss efficiency in Thailand; it needed guerrilla-type units. So the US needed the
Thais to be courageous and “ingenious improvisers” instead of, say, efficient and
clear thinkers. With that, the US concluded that “Thailand is the logical – in fact the
only possible – focus of the integrated, offensively-defensive strategy needed to
defeat the communists in Southeast Asia”. (PSB D-23, 5)
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17. Implementing PSB D-23
Eisenhower once described psychological warfare as “anything from the singing
of a beautiful hymn to the most extraordinary kind of physical sabotage”.
(Presidential papers, No. 481) This just about describes the two-stage plan in PSB D-
23. Phase one involves psychological warfare operations to strengthen Thailand –
increased propaganda activities, appointment of diplomats sensitive to Thai culture,
stepped up efforts to convince the Thai people of America’s commitment to the
country sans imperialist ambitions, and aiding development. However, the key to the
programme lay in its military goals to “develop, expand and accelerate to the greatest
extent sound programmes for the creation and employment of guerrilla and
paramilitary forces” in Thailand. (PSB D-23, 22) This would then facilitate phase two,
where the US hoped to send the guerrilla units into Indochina to defeat the Vietminh.
Donovan and guerrilla warfare
The man tasked with implementing PSB D-23 was William “Wild Bill” Donovan
– former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) chief, cofounder of the CIA, Wall Street
lawyer and lobbyist for foreign governments4. As the new US ambassador to
Thailand, he was told to coordinate the efforts among the Foreign Operations
Administration (FOA), United States Information Service (USIS) and the CIA in
Thailand to go hand in hand with PSB D-23. Donovan felt that he understood the
Vietminh because the OSS had worked with Ho Chih Minh. Like the PSB, he
believed that only a guerrilla strategy shaped after Ho’s could defeat the communists.
4
Donovan continued to be a highly paid lobbyist for Phao in the US after he finished his stint as
ambassador in Thailand.
14

18. Since Donovan considered the police to be the most flexible and effective fighting
force in the country, he centred PSC D-23’s guerrilla-warfare programme on Phao’s
department5. In late 1953, the CIA helped the Thais to establish a new intelligence
organisation which followed communist (and non-communist) dissident activities in
the kingdom and its neighbours. The Border Patrol Police (BPP), consisting of 5,000
policemen trained for military-style patrol of the border with Laos and Cambodia, was
formed under Donovan’s tenure. The unit implemented most of the guerrilla-warfare
aspects of PSB D-23. Donovan also helped Phao to set up the elite of the police
paramilitary units, the Police Aerial Reconnaissance (Resupply) Unit (PARU). The
recruits, high-school graduates proficient in the languages of neighbouring countries –
were trained in parachuting, sabotage, jungle warfare and survival. The CIA paid the
salaries of PARU and BPP troops. (Fineman 1997:182)
Tapping into the local peasants, the US gave the BPP US$4 million to distribute
light weapons to villagers and train them to fight communist guerrillas and
propaganda agents. Another civilian-based guerrilla-warfare programme focussed on
the 200,000 non-Thai hill tribesmen in Thailand’s northern mountains. The BPP,
with CIA funding and equipment, started to secretly arm and train them in guerrilla
warfare, with the eventual hope of deploying into Laos6. (Fineman 1997:183)
Military and economic aid
Armed with the objective to “prepare the country for an eventual communist
assault”, Donovan pushed Dulles to give more military aid to Thailand to boost its
military defence. (Darling 1961:260) Washington gave the green light and in 1953,
5
This was the beginning of a close friendship between Phao and Donovan.
6
In the mid-1960s, the US fought, through an anti-communist army of Hmong hill tribesmen,
America’s so-called Secret War in Laos.
15

19. the US$56 million of military aid actually exceeded the Thai military budget by 250
per cent. (Nongnuth 1982:145) Donovan was also largely responsible for the
enlargement of the MAAG mission from 300 to 400 men in 19547. By then, the
Eisenhower administration had reduced the technical cooperation programme to about
half its former size while the defence support programme increased by more than six
times. (Nongnuth, 141)
Although US economic aid lagged far behind the astronomical sums of military
aid, American non-military aid to Thailand did increase from less than US$10 million
per year before 1953 to about $25 million per year by the late 1950s, peaking at
US$46 million in 1955. (Muscat 1990:295) It should be noted that the peak came the
year after the fall of Dien Bien Phu and Thailand’s entering SEATO. The US poured
a sizeable portion of this money into the northeastern region. In 1954, although the
area contained only about a third of the country’s population, 40 per cent of all
American economic aid for Thailand went there. (Fineman 1997:180) Being dry and
impoverished, the Isan region was the most susceptible to communist attack and
subversion8. In fact, by the 1950s, leftist politician Thep Chotinuchit found his
political base there. Responding to the threat, the US sped up rural development
projects there and established Thai public relations offices in Udon Thani and Ubon
Ratchathani. The most important project that the US initiated in Isan after PSB D-23
was probably the construction of the Friendship Highway from Saraburi to Nakhorn
Ratchasima, which linked the central region with the northeast by paved road for the
first time. Since the World Bank was not interested in supporting it, the US forked
7
This is also related to a later discussion on SEATO in this paper.
8
Thailand’s first communist insurgency was birthed there in 1965.
16

20. out US$13 million of the US$20 million price tag because it considered the highway
crucial to possible military operations in the area. (Randolph 1986:22)
Anti-communist propaganda
One of the first things Donovan did when he arrived in Bangkok was to intensify
the anti-communist propaganda, leveraging on the substantial USIS substantial
presence in Bangkok. In December 1953, he convinced Phibun to establish a high-
level US-Thai psychological warfare committee whose target was to “disclose [the]
aims and techniques of communism through press, church [sic], universities, youth
groups, radio, military indoctrination and cultural groups”. (Fineman 1997:180) With
USIS aid, the Thai public relations offices opened libraries, broadcast radio
programmes, exhibited photographs and showed movies, all with an anti-communist
message. Local writers who wrote anything against communism were given wide
support. For example, USIS saw to it that Kukrit Pramoj’s anti-communist book
“Red Bamboo” was translated into 18 languages although it was at best, a mediocre
novel, and at worst, an outright plagiarised version of Giovanni Guareschi’s Don
Camillo stories. Mobile units were also sent to villages to preach the anti-communist
message. There were singers and dancers, comedians, soldiers who fought in the
Korean War and Chinese who lived under the communist regime in those caravans.
With parades, lectures, bawdy songs, movies and drama, they instructed the people in
the evils of communism. (New York Times Magazine, July 1956)
Some people saw communism as a new form of religion and sought ways to tap
on traditional religions to combat it. Wichit Wathanakan, Phibun’s ideologue, wrote:
“If we can build nationalism in people’s hearts in the same way that communists
17

21. make people believe in communism like a religion, we don’t need to worry that the
country will fall to communism.” (Baker and Pasuk 2005:147) Buddhist scholars
urged young intellectuals to form study groups to seriously study Buddhism,
reminding them that “communist practices are against Buddhist ethics” and that “a
Buddhist does not start off solving his problems by first blaming others… so remedies
for social ills are far more complicated than the readymade formulae offered by
communism”. (Bhavilai 1967:88) Christian preachers also took a strong line against
communism and this was boosted by the influx of American missionaries into
Thailand after China fell to the communists and expelled all the missionaries. About
half of the 700 missionaries in Thailand then were Americans. (Wells 1966:3)
Donovan then extended the propaganda campaign, originally targeted at the
peasants, to the Thai bureaucracy and involved the “indoctrination of the Thai
government officials at national, provincial, and local levels”. The USIS sponsored
the first of a series of anti-communist lectures to government officials in May 1954.
(Fineman 1997:180) Seni Pramoj spoke at one such lecture where he told horror
stories about communism, compared this “new faith” against Buddhism and
Christianity and found it wanting because: “Man is a spiritual animal. Communism,
seeking to satisfy only man’s material need, will fail because it fails to provide such a
spiritual answer.” (Seni 1958:25)
Education and training
“If not the educational exchanges, then what better means is there to
change the attitudes of men – what better way is there to break the
pattern of recurrent violence and destruction?” – William Fulbright.
(Indorf 1982:96)
18

22. One of the key ways of “indoctrination” takes place when the Thais are sent
abroad for education or training. It could be long-term, usually for graduate education,
or short-term, for special courses, on-the-job training and observation tours. The aid
programme began sending participants to the US right from the start, with an initial
14 in 1951 and 77 in 1952. The numbers rose rapidly and reached a cumulative total
of 8,000 by 1970. Typically about a quarter to a third of the participants go to the US
for graduate education. The Fulbright Educational Foundation contributed greatly to
the process. Started in 1950, it promotes two-way exchange – first by providing
scholarships for Thais to study in US universities then making it possible for
American professors and scholars to teach and study in Thailand. By the end of the
first year, 48 Thai students were attending graduate or professional schools in the US
while nine Americans were teaching and studying in Thailand. (Thai-U.S.
Educational Foundation, 1986:67) The Fulbright grants encouraged Thai-American
educational exchanges and the number of Thais leaving for studies in the US had been
on a steady climb since then. In 1951, there were 234 Thai students in US universities.
The number more than doubled to 586 in 1955. (Muscat 1990:60) Before embarking
for the US, many Thais polished their English skills at American University Alumni
(AUA), the aforementioned language centre set up by the American government in
1952.
Geneva and Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)
By April 1954, a month before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the French looked like
they were about to cave in to the Vietminh. A worried US started planning direct
American military intervention. Dulles tried to cobble together a coalition of Western
19

23. and Asian nations to justify the possibility of bombing Vietnam. But no one was
interested except for an enthusiastic Thailand, which was then rewarded with a
tentative US promise to help expand the size of its army from 60,000 to 90,000 men.
(Fineman 1997:191) The US continued to make a show of preparing for air strikes
against the Vietminh by helping Thailand build air bases at Nakorn Ratchasima and
Takli in the north, while publicising Phibun’s willingness for the bases. The gambit
worked and scored psychological points against China, which feared the US would
station troops in Thailand or Indochina. At the truce talks between the French and
Vietminh in Geneva, Zhou Enlai pressured Ho to settle for less than the Vietminh
position on the ground justified9. Ho agreed and accepted a “temporary” partition of
Vietnam into northern and southern halves.
With the domino theory10 being the dominant thinking at that time, the success of
the Vietminh had prompted fears of communist expansion in Asia. So in September
1954, representatives from the US, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan,
the Philippines and Thailand met in Manila to discuss and sign an anti-communist
pact – Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) – with the main objective of
containing communism in Southeast Asia11. Thailand had hoped for a stronger US
commitment especially after China’s recent sabre-rattling strategies. On July 30,
Pridi had criticised the “US imperialists” and “the Thai reactionary government” in
the People’s Daily and urged the Thai people to “wage a struggle against the rulers
[of Thailand] – American imperialism and its puppets, the government of Thailand”.
9
It should be noted that this conclusion came about not because there had been any physical movement
of US troops to Southeast Asia but because of the manipulation of impressions given to the Chinese.
10
The theory speculated if one key nation in a region came under the control of communists, others
would follow one after the other.
11
In August, Dulles told Eisenhower of his reluctance to form SEATO because it “involved
committing the prestige of the US in an area where we had little control and where the situation was by
no means promising”. (Dulles papers, Aug 17, 1954)
20

24. (Fineman 1997:196) Phibun wanted SEATO to be more NATO-like but it turned out
to be rather toothless. Nevertheless, the Thais remained keen on the pact because an
increase in US aid was expected and that the pact put on paper the US commitment to
fight for Thailand.
FRUIT OF INOCULATION
Obviously the objective of the above inoculation process was to make the Thais
immune to the lure of communism. In this section I look at how effective the
inoculation was as well as examine the side effects that have arisen from it.
Anti-communist propaganda
The USIS conducts regular research to evaluate the effectiveness of its anti-
communist programmes. The first one was completed in June 1956 and looked into
the communication behaviour of the Thai elite. In that survey, only a quarter of the
respondents perceived the movies that were screened as being outright propaganda.
The majority were very open to the films and saw them as sources of information to
life in America. (USIS 1956:15)
In 1959, another similar study was completed. The respondents were asked what
they had heard about American foreign policy and almost 40 per cent mentioned that
the US helps other countries. More than 90 per cent have heard or read that “America
is interested in the welfare of Thailand and is cooperating with Thailand in improving
Thai living standard”. Most of them could identify accurately the prominent
examples of American aid to Thailand, such as construction of roads, military help,
educational help and medical help. While 82 per cent felt that more aid was needed,
they wanted more economic and educational, instead of military aid. And when the
21

25. respondents were asked what they thought was America’s reason for giving aid to
Thailand, most either said it was to help Thailand fight communism or it was to help
develop Thailand. Only seven per cent voiced that such a move was in US economic
favour. The results showed that the Thai people looked upon the US as a big brother
and not as a country that was helping out of an ulterior motive. (USIS 1959:30)
In 1960, an interesting study using pictures to elicit views was completed. For
example, to get their views on Thailand’s enemy, respondents were shown a picture
of a family running away from their rural house in terror. In the background, there
were planes dropping bombs. Responding to this picture, about 80 per cent of those
interviewed saw either China or Russia as Thailand’s enemy and being the major
threat to the country. The kingdom was also seen as endangered by its strategic
position in Southeast Asia. In another picture, the opinions elicited of the communist
regime in China were uncompromisingly hostile and respondents expressed the idea
that life under the communists was intolerable. (USIS 1960:45)
Hence, it can be seen from these studies that the anti-communist propaganda had
been successful in shaping how people thought about and reacted towards the
communist bloc.
Aid
American aid has largely dominated the dynamics of the relationship between
Thailand and the US. Economic aid improved the nation’s infrastructure and sped up
rural development, with the Isan region reaping the most benefit. The Friendship
Highway opened up vast inaccessible jungle land for new and diversified crops,
22

26. including maize, kenaf, tapioca, castor and soya beans. This also opened up trading
opportunities for the Isan farmers.
It had been suggested that the US economic aid was an attempt to open up the
Thai economy (Surachart, 1985; Kullada, 2003) Hence, the US tried to help the Thai
economy by encouraging exports while Phibun put in place the Promotion of
Industrial Act in 1954, eager to promote US business in order to balance the economic
power of the Phao and Sarit cliques. Moreover, the US was also hoping that the Thai
economy would be integrated into the elements of a world economic system based on
US policy. Therefore, in 1950, the Thai government joined in the GATT negotiations,
in IMF meetings and in UN regional meetings of ECAFE and FAO. While I agree
that the economic aid would later pave the way to open up Thai economy, especially
during Sarit’s regime, I posit that the economic aid given in the early 1950s had more
of a political role rather than economic. The economic programmes were designed to
reinforce the alignment of the Thai government with the US. Any attempt at opening
up the Thai economy by the US was thwarted by the military cliques while foreign
investors got frustrated with the bureaucracy.
While economic aid had helped to improve the lives of Thai people, the military
aid had resulted in a much bleaker picture. It had been used as a tool to influence
both domestic and foreign policies. Because an authoritarian regime was in place, the
supplies of arms to a military regime enhanced its ability to suppress political
opposition. It also sustained domination by the military class, which benefited from
the American aid, and in turn, limited the possibility of civilian rule in the country.
American military equipment that was supposed to protect the country from
communist aggression was being used to make the internal clashes among the
23

27. contending military and political forces more destructive than before. In the past,
Thailand had been famous for the non-violence of the political changes. But since the
Manhattan Rebellion where there were 603 civilian casualties and 3,000 military
casualties, the coups had got progressively bloodier. “American guns killed our
people” became a rumour that was voiced around Bangkok for many days after that.
(Darling 1961:240)
By 1955, a few Americans started to question publicly the role of the US in
Thailand’s internal affairs. One senator declared that the American military
programme in Thailand was much larger than the situation warranted while another
testified that Thailand’s government was keeping itself in power with American arms
and making “windfall profits” from American aid. (Darling 1961:274) This was not
surprising given that by the 1950s, military leaders were firmly entrenched in the
boards of state enterprises and amassing private fortunes from director’s fees and
patronage contracts. They also squeezed private profit out of governmental
expenditure flows by taking a cut from contracts, concessions, and supply agreements.
Both Phao and Sarit grew very rich when their construction companies handled the
contracts for three provincial airports, several highways and buildings for state
enterprises. (Baker and Pasuk 1995:279) In fact, the US aid exacerbated the power
struggle between Phao and Sarit. Their manpower became roughly equal: 48,000
police and 45,000 in the army. They both visited the US in 1954 and returned with
aid commitments of US$25 million (Sarit) and US$37 million (Phao). (Baker and
Pasuk 2005:146) In 1955, Phao asked the US to back him in a coup against Phibun
but was turned down. Phibun survived by mediating these conflicts.
24

28. Education
The Thai-American educational exchanges began to bear fruit very shortly after
they were put in place. The exchange acted as a conduit to disseminate Western
values, which the US had hoped would inoculate the Thais against communism. It
even served to put a human face on US foreign policy. Eunice Brake, one of the first
teachers to come to Thailand to teach in 1951 under the Fulbright scheme said: “To
the Thai students, the US will never be that huge impersonal nation across the sea, for
it will be the home of the American teacher who was sympathetic towards their efforts
to speak English.”
The education programme heightened the political consciousness of the Thai
students returning from the US. Many of them became competent experts and
assumed responsible positions in the administration. Having imbibed the Western
values of equality, freedom, and progress, they sought to improve their own personal
status as well as the welfare of the country. None of these Western-educated
returnees, however, took an active role in politics, and many of them became
increasingly frustrated as military officers with little education or experience ran the
government in an inept and autocratic manner. A returned Fulbright scholar
commented:
“I came back from America full of ideas and enthusiasm to help my
country. But every day I see that nothing is done here except by personal
influence and favouritism. Every bit of policy is controlled by people put
into their jobs by political friends, regardless of their ability.” (Darling
1961:307)
Many Western-educated Thai joined the rising criticism of the military-dominated
government. The US seemed to have been aware of this because the PSB D-23
25

29. mentioned care in not “associating too closely with the ruling clique” so as not to
alienate this group of pro-democracy Thais. (PSB D-23, 13)
In the long run, many of those who returned from the US in the late 50s actually
ended up as the movers and shakers in the 1980s. The prestige from having a higher
degree from the US almost always assured future elite status. Hence Udom Bausri
(1982) wrote:
“It has become almost proverbial that those Thais found in elevated
government positions, in commerce or in banking, at universities, and
even in the military, have received at least part of their education in the
US. For a Thai to have attended an American university, or to have been
trained at an American institution for a short term, is of immense
practical value.”
At least 70 per cent of the 1,210 persons in an early 1980s Who’s Who in Thailand
had studied or trained overseas. Sixty-one per cent of the overseas study had been in
the US. About a quarter of those who studied in the US had attended six universities
– Indiana, Pennsylvania, Harvard, Radcliffe, Michigan, Illinois and Cornell. (Muscat
1990:64) This would also imply that the Thai elite would have been rubbing
shoulders among themselves and also with future US leaders during their varsity days.
This would certainly have an impact on policies when the Thai returnees become
decision makers in the government.
A 1986 study showed that nearly 40 per cent of the 411 senior government
positions12 were held by those who were educated in the US. The majority were there
for degree training. Several had gone back to the States for short-term training
opportunities. These returnees were concentrated in the core agencies of the Prime
Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance, as well as in the powerful Ministry of
12
Senior position have been defined as all permanent secretaries, directors-general, secretaries-general,
governor, and their deputies, plus the governors of the country’s 73 provinces.
26

30. Interior. (Muscat 1990:55) Other than these top-layer jobs across the ministries, many
US-educated Thais could be found in the medical and academic fields, where the
Fulbright programme had traditionally put its priority on. Those who went into
teaching would then continue to disseminate the Western values to their students. As
a result, it is little wonder why the Thais see the US-sponsored training as the most
pervasive long-run contribution the US had made to Thai development.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally Thailand was famous for its “bend with the wind” diplomacy.
However there was a shift in Thai foreign policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s
when it openly aligned itself with he United States and the “Free World” against
growing communist forces in the region. That alliance, at first informal, but later
formalised in the Manila Pact, had since then constituted the core of Thai-American
relations. And the US became increasingly reliant on Thailand as a base in Southeast
Asia against communism in the 1950s.
By embarking on a massive programme to strengthen Thailand against the
communist threat, the US unwittingly accelerated two antithetical forces in the
evolving Thai political system. On one hand American military aid which was
supposed to have been used to protect Thailand against external aggressors ended up
being used in the suppression of the regime’s political opponents. On the other hand
larger numbers of Thai people were becoming politically conscious through the
American economic and educational programmes. As higher education and economic
standards were achieved, a stronger individualism arose and more articulate pressure
27

31. groups were formed. As these two forces came into increasing conflict the general
tendency of most Americans was to claim that it was purely an internal affair.
While the schism between the two forces would erupt into the bloody military-
student clashes in later years, the beginnings of that tension could be seen in 1955
when Phibun, inspired by his world tour, decided to experiment with democracy. He
lifted censorship laws, allowed the formation of political parties, permitted criticism
of the government, held press conferences and even set up a “Hyde Park” debating
centre. Threatened by his increasingly powerful subordinates – Phao and Sarit – he
had hoped that the political reforms would gain him a wider base of popular support.
But he probably did not foresee that the outpouring of anti-government sentiment
would increasingly target the US. Leftists, opportunists and many long-standing
political opponents of the military regime began to criticise American military aid and
the SEATO alliance. The US was also blamed for competing in the rice trade, the low
prices for rubber and tin, and the failure to increase economic aid. (Darling 1961:270)
The new US ambassador, Max Bishop, tried to justify the high levels of military aid,
claiming that it was needed for the protection of Thailand and her neighbours. He
said: “I look at Thailand as the cork in the ink bottle, and if you were to pull this cork
the red ink would flow to Australia immediately.” (Muscat 1990:93) In October,
when many appeals were made for the release of political prisoners, the Thai
government explained that it would first have to consider “foreign views” since
Thailand was a member of SEATO (Bangkok Post, 1955) This appearance of
American interference in Thai political affairs led to opposition charges that the US
was controlling the government. The US was seen as a strong supporter of the Phibun
government – which people disliked for its widespread corruption and Phao’s cold-
28

32. blooded tactics. As the Thai military leaders sought to suppress the growing
opposition, public hostility toward the Americans increased. The Bangkok press
printed numerous articles critical of America. A bewildered US in turn assumed that
Thailand was rapidly being infiltrated by the Reds.
The honeymoon years of close cooperation between Thailand and the US were
beginning to wear thin. The United States, once seen as the good friend that helped
Thailand after the war, was now perceived as a meddler in local affairs. George
Kennan, known as the “father of containment”, lamented in his memoirs that US
foreign policy had been “bedevilled” by those wedded to the belief “that all another
country had to do, in order to qualify for American aid, was to demonstrate the
existence of a communist threat”. (1972:322) Thailand certainly exploited that and
the US was a willing partner. There was a communist threat to Thailand during that
time. But both Thailand and the US exaggerated the dangers to satisfy their
individual agendas – the military leaders in Thailand needed an excuse to strengthen
their grip on the country while those in the US needed a bulwark against the Vietminh
in Vietnam. In all probability, the stability and progress of the kingdom could have
been maintained with a fraction of the expenditures and effort which went into this
vast anti-communist program.
29

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