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OSSA17 - Live patch, VMI, Security Mgmt (50 mins, no embedded demos)


Published on

The talk covers several technologies and best practices to managing Security Vulnerabilities, which are told as interconnected stories.

We will cover how the largest clouds in production came together through the Xen Project to develop an industry leading open source security process to manage software vulnerabilities effectively, how those vendors collaborated to stop cloud reboots through Live Patching and how security and CPU vendors collaborated to protect against 0-day vulnerabilities and advanced persistent threats using hardware assisted virtual machine introspection. Finally, we will also provide information how you can use tools such as CVE Details to assess how secure an open source technology is relative to another, such that you don't have to rely solely on security stories from the technology press.

The talk will cover how these technologies work, the limitations and challenges which still remain and how they are used in practice using examples of Xen Project based products and installations. We will also cover how these technologies impact software vulnerability management processes and system administrators.

Published in: Technology
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OSSA17 - Live patch, VMI, Security Mgmt (50 mins, no embedded demos)

  1. 1. Presentations on Lars Kurth Community Manager, Xen Project Chairman, Xen Project Advisory Board Director, Open Source, Citrix lars_kurth
  2. 2.
  3. 3. Vulnerability A weakness in the computational logic of software that, when exploited, results in a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, OR availability of that software. Patch / Live Patch A fix for a security vulnerability. A live patch can be applied to a running system Known vulnerabilities with patches
  4. 4. Malware Software designed to disrupt, damage, or gain authorized access to a computer system. Exploit Malware designed to take advantage of a vulnerability This includes file-less/memory based attack techniques (around 14% at end of 2016) 0-Day Exploit An exploit of an undisclosed/previously unknown vulnerability that is/has been exploited Some malware relies on social engineering: e.g. phishing, trojans, adware, …
  5. 5. Exploit Framework (e.g. Metasploit, …) A tool for developing and executing exploit code against a remote target machine Rootkit Software tools that enable unauthorized users to gain control of a computer system without being detected, some for for a long period of time
  6. 6. A new way to protect against malware Developed by Zentific, Citrix, Bitdefender, Intel and others
  7. 7. VM3 Guest OS App VMn Guest OS App VM2 Guest OS App Dom0 Dom0 Kernel Drivers Agent(s) Agent(s) Agent(s) Installed in-guest agents, e.g. anti-virus software, VM disk & memory scanner, network monitor, etc. Can be disabled by rootkits
  8. 8. Several VM3 VMnVM2Dom0 Dom0 Kernel Drivers VM3 Guest OS App VMn Guest OS App VM2 Guest OS App Security Appliance VM1 Introspection Engine Protected area authentication mechanism to protect the IF Uses HW extensions to monitor memory (e.g. Intel EPT)  Low Intrusion Register rules with Xen to trap on and inspect suspicious activities (e.g. execution of memory on the dynamic heap)
  9. 9. All malware need an attack technique to gain a foothold Attack techniques exploit specific software bugs/vulnerability Most exploits use one of a small set of attack techniques Buffer Overflows, Heap Sprays, Code Injection, API Hooking, … Because VMI protects against attack techniques It can protect against entirely new malware Verified to block these advanced attacks in real-time APT28, Energetic Bear, DarkHotel, Epic Turla, Regin, ZeuS, Dyreza, EternalBlue … solely by relying on VMI WannaCry/EternalBlue blocked in real installations1 1
  10. 10. Rootkits Exploit 0-days in Operating Systems/System Software Can disable agent based security solutions (mask their own existence) VMI solutions operate from outside the VM Thus, it cannot be disabled using traditional attack vectors BUT: VMI is not a replacement, for traditional security solutions It is an extra tool that can be used to increase protection
  11. 11. Pratap Sankar @ Flickr Documentation Products Bitdefender HVI XenServer Protection & Remedial Monitoring & Admin Citrix Ready Zentific Zazen Xen & XenServer & … Protection & Remedial Monitoring & Admin Forensics & Data gathering Malware analysis AIS Introvirt XenServer
  12. 12. Pratap Sankar @ Flickr
  13. 13. Result of several community consultations
  14. 14. R: Vulnerability reported to P: Vulnerability pre-disclosed on R P Fixing Security Bugs: Dedicated security team = security experts from within the Xen Project Community Security Team: Triage Creation of fix/patches Validation of fix/patches Assignment of CVE Issue description and risk analysis
  15. 15. AR P Fix their systems/software: Eligible Xen Project Users are informed under embargo of the vulnerability Eligible Users = Pre-disclosure list members: Product Companies, Open Source & Commercial Distros (e.g. Huawei, Debian) Service/Cloud Providers (e.g. Alibaba) Large Private Downstream (e.g. Google) Allowed to share information via xen-security-issues- R: Vulnerability reported to P: Vulnerability pre-disclosed on A: Vulnerability announced on &
  16. 16. A XR P General Publication: Information about vulnerability is made public Everyone else: Patches their systems either through security updates from distros/products or builds them from source. Users of service/cloud providers will not be impacted R: Vulnerability reported to P: Vulnerability pre-disclosed on A: Vulnerability announced on &
  17. 17. A XR P R: Vulnerability reported to P: Vulnerability pre-disclosed on A: Vulnerability announced on & Product Vendors: Create and test live patches Product customers: Apply live patches here Service Providers: Create, test and deploy live patches Users of service/cloud providers will not be impacted Security Team: Can a Livepatch can be created? No? If possible, re-write fix/patches
  18. 18. A tale of close collaboration within the Xen Project Community
  19. 19. 2015 2016 2017 4.84.7 P Why did we develop Live Patching? Cloud reboot affected AWS, Rackspace, IBM SoftLayer and others Deploying security patches may require reboots; Inconveniences users How did we fix this? 2015: Design with input from AWS, Alibaba, Citrix, Oracle and SUSE 2016: Xen 4.7 came with Live Patching for x86 2016: Xen 4.8 added extra x86 use-cases and ARM support 2017: XenServer 7.1 releases Live Patching in first commercial product D 10% 1%
  20. 20. const char *xen_extra_version(void) { return XEN_EXTRAVERSION; } push %rbp mov %rsp,%rbp lea 0x16698b(%rip),%rax leaveq retq const char *xen_extra_version(void) { return “Hello World”; } push %rbp mov %rsp,%rbp lea 0x29333b(%rip),%rax leaveq Retq Replacing compiled functions with new code, encoded in an ELF file called payload, while the hypervisor is running without impacting running guests. Design:
  21. 21. The exact source tree used to build the running Xen instance. The .config from the original build of Xen. A build-id onto which the livepatch will be applied. A source patch. livepatch- build- tools The exact same compilation toolchain used to build the running Xen. Livepatch payload
  22. 22. Supports stacking of different payloads; payloads depend on build-id Functionality: list: lists loaded and applied live patches upload: load & verify a live patch unload: unload a live patch apply: apply a live patch revert: un-apply a live patch Xen 4.8.1 XSA 213 XSA 214 XSA 215 Depends on build-id of 4.8.1 Depends on build-id of XSA 213 Depends on build-id of XSA 214
  23. 23. Target Dom0 & Guest Linux Kernel Hypervisor Technology Kernel Live Patching kPatch (RedHat) Xen LivePatch kSplice (Oracle) kGraft (SUSE) Function + Data ✔ ✔ ✔ Xen 4.7 ✔ ✔ Inline f() patching ✗ ✗ ✗ Future ✔ ✗ Data Structures ✗ ✔ via hooks ✔ ✔ ✗ Xen 4.8 via hooks XenServer LivePatch Integrates different solutions into a single user experience For Dom0 (CentOS) For Xen
  24. 24. Source patches + other build artifacts Hot Fixes contain Per valid patch level: a Xen or Dom0 Live Patch Matching RPMs for most recent patch level In case of a reboot or for Xen/Dom0 not capable of Live Patching Extensive Verification and Validation: The process of patching a live hypervisor or kernel is not an easy task. What happens is a little bit like open heart surgery. The patient is the hypervisor and/or Dom0 itself, and precision and care are needed to get things right. One wrong move and it is game over. Live Patch Live Patch Live Patch build for each patch level package Hot Fix LPsRPMs RPMRPMRPM build for most recent patch level Hot Fix LPsRPMs Publication SigningValidation Verification Q&A (livepatch-build or kpatch-build) (iso)
  25. 25. XAPI Toolstack Hot Fix LPsRPM downloadHot Fix LPsRPM Dom0 Dom0 Kernel (CentOS) Hypervisor XenCenter or xe Initiates host update SysAdmin Running System instance that supports live patching Disk updates (such that after reboot the patches are applied) works out correct LP & updates (using native live patching tools or APIs)
  26. 26. Pratap Sankar @ Flickr - Build LivePatch.mp4 - Apply
  27. 27. Pratap Sankar @ Flickr Xen Project LivePatch Specification & Status Xen Project LivePatch Presentations & Videos (Short) people/larsk/XPDS16-LivePatch.pdf (Long) Xen Project LivePatch Videos XenServer
  28. 28. Security Process Number of Vulnerabilities Media Coverage Other Considerations
  29. 29. A XR P Responsible Disclosure: fix critical systems/software before publication R: Vulnerability reported to security@... P: Vulnerability pre-disclosed to eligible users A: Vulnerability announced publicly F: Fix available Full Disclosure, immediate (no-fix): public disclosure without a fix A XR F A XR Full Disclosure, post-fix: public disclosure with a fix F F
  30. 30. 4) New members: 5) or devel list 6) Only handles x86 KVM bugs (no ARM or other bugs) 1) Is the CVE severity used to handle vulnerabilities differently? 2) Days embargoed (information is classified) 3) D = Distros/Products, S = Public Service, P = Private Downstream 4) Responsible only Days 2 Who? 3FOSS Project Bug Severity 1 Process Type 14-19 D 4 Linux Kernel via OSS-security distros 4 ≥ Medium – Critical Responsible Disclosure 14-19 D 4 QEMU (KVM) via QEMU Security Process 6 ≥ Medium – Critical ≤ Low Responsible Disclosure Full Disclosure, no-fix 3-5 D, S, POpenStack OSSA OpenStack OSSN ≥ Medium – Critical ≤ Low Responsible Disclosure Full Disclosure, post-fix Xen Hypervisor Includes Linux & QEMU vulnerabilities in supported Xen configurations Low – Critical Responsible Disclosure 14 D, S, P 14-19 Linux Kernel via OSS-security distros 4 OSS-security 5 ≥ Medium – Critical ≤ Low Responsible Disclosure Full Disclosure, no-fix
  31. 31. Impacts how long a user (aka you) is at risk Is my distro/vendor on a pre-disclosure list? A surprisingly large number of distros are not: including a few on’s Best Linux Distros of 2016 list Impacts cloud / service providers As a user, are security issues fixed before public disclosure? Low Severity vulnerabilities can still be High Risk Temporal and Environmental CVSS scores are not covered by CVE databases (neither or Vulnerabilities can be chained together, making the combo High Severity (e.g. Hot Potato used 3 old unpatched vulnerabilities to gain root access)
  32. 32. ( Easy to use interface for vulnerability data Data from several sources Browsable by vendor, product, version, type, date… Vulnerability statistics, trends, reports BUT: rigid ➜ getting data outside pre-defined vendor/product categories is near-impossible (good guides on – search for vulners) In many ways more accurate and flexible than cvedetails type:cve AND (description:kvm OR description:qemu) AND published: [2012 TO *] ➜307 type:cve AND (description:xen) AND published: [2012 TO *] ➜ 245 … Works best when used through its API (in particular if you want to visualize the data)
  33. 33. Vulnerability data from 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  Linux Kernel  KVM w. QEMU  Xen Project *) Data up to Sept 4th, 2017 169 517 222 197 129 120 51 7 63 143 34 5 Legend: CVSS Score Distribution Low Medium High Critical *
  34. 34. Data covering September 2016 – September 2017: from, and Clips covering vulnerabilities (US only) % of Vulnerability Stories on The Register155 370 314 7283 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 Xen KVM QEMU Linux 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 Xen KVM QEMU Linux Number of Vulnerabilities 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% Xen KVM QEMU Linux 33% of Xen stories cover Vulnerabilities 2.5% 16% 6.5%
  35. 35. Does the Project Look for Vulnerabilities? Approach to Quality and Testing: e.g. Fuzzing, Audits of components Does the project award Bug Bounties (e.g. NetBSD)? Do vendors supporting the project offer Bug Bounties? Infrastructure related to Vulnerabilities Transparency: How well are processes documented Vulnerability Testing: XTF (in Xen) Vulnerability Tooling: XSATool, XSAMatch (in Xen)
  36. 36. Picture by Lars Kurth
  37. 37. Xen Project: Only Hypervisor with VMI Protection from new classes of malware Several security companies working with XenServer Live Patching Disruption free application of vulnerabilities Used by several cloud providers Used best in commercial products, e.g. XenServer Industry Leading Vulnerability Process Includes QEMU and Kernel XSAs General: Tools do assess project’s track records Not an easy task Harder for proprietary products due to lack of information Picture by Lars Kurth
  38. 38. Picture by Lars Kurth